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A 

COMPREHENSIVE 

HISTORY OF INDIA, 

CIVIL, MILITARY AND SOCIAL. 

FROM 

THE FIRST LANEINO OF THE ENOLISFI, 
TO THE SUPPRESSION OP THE SEPOY REVOLT; 

INCIiUDINO 

AN OUTLINE OP THE E.\RLY HISTORY OF HINDOOSTAN. 

By henry BEVERIDGE, Esq, 

ADVOCATK. 

ILLUSTRATED BY ABOVE FIVE HUNDRED ENGRAVINGS. 

VOLUME HI. 



LONDON: 

BLACKIE AND SON, PATERNOSTER ROW, E.G.: 
AND GLASGOW AND EDINBTTRGH. 


MDCCCtXII. 





OLAHOOW : 

w. o, BZ.ACK1E ANO CO., PRlffTEflS 

VlLLAriJiXD. 



CONTENTS 


VOL. III. 

BOOK VII. 

FROM THE OPENING OF THE TRADE TO INDIA TO THE EXTINCTION OF THE COMPANY 

AS A COMMERCIAL BODY. 

CHAPTER I. 

PACK 

Reuewal of the CJoinpany’s charter by Act 53 George III. c. 165—.Yts loading provi¬ 
sions— Eiirl Moira governor-general—Hostilities with Nejiaul—Itepulsea at 
Ivalunga—Its captin-e -Combined attacks ilefeated—The Glioorka lines at Ram- 
gliur turned—Capture of Ramghur - Subseipient operations—Retreat of General 
Marlcy—Invasion of Kuniiion—Malaun captured—Negotiations for peace—Hosti¬ 
lities renewed -Peace concluded—Proceedings in Cutch—Disturbances at Hyderii^ 
bail ami Bareilly —C^ajiture of Hatr(«»,.. . . . 1 

CHAPTER II. 

1 >etertnination to put down the predatory system—Relations between the Guicowur 
.and the Peishwa—Mission of Gungadhur Sastree—His assassination—Trimbukjee 
Dainglia, the Pei.shwa’s favourite, accused and iiiijirisoned at Tanna—Proposed 
alliance with the Nabobs of Bhopaul and Saugur—Subsidiary alliance with Nag- 
poor-The Pindarecs—Their origin—Their leaders—Tlieir system of plunder— 

The governor-general’s policy in I’egard to them—New treaty with Sciudia—New 
alliances—Apa Sahib, Rajah of Berar—Trimbukjee Dainglia escapes from Tanna— 
Proceedings at Poonah —New treaty with the Peishwa, ...... 34 

CHAPTER 111. 

General jireparations—The array of Hindoostan—The army of the Deccan—First move¬ 
ments—Treaties with Sciudia and with Ameer Khan—Rupture with the Peishwa 
—Battle of Kii'kee—.Flight of the Peishwa—Operations against the Pindarees- 
Rupture with the Rajah of Nagpoor—Battle of Seelabaldce—Rupture with Holkar 
—Battle of Mahidjjoor—Treaty with llolkar—Dispersion of the Piudartfes—Opera-^ 
tions against the Peishwa—Rajah of Sattarah installed— Capture of Sliolapoor and 
Raighnr—Storm of Talneer—Annexation of Saugur—Deposition of the Rajah of 
Nagpoor—Capture of Clianda—Surrender of Bajee Row—The last of the Peishwas, (!2 


CHAPTER IV. 

Barbarous races in India—Apa Sahib among the Gouds—His flight with Cheetoo — 
Cheetoo’s death—Capture of Aseerghur— Settlements with native powers—Central 
India—Hindoostan—Rajpootaua—^Termination of the war—Affairs of Cutch— 
Treaty with the Ameers of Scinde—Relations with the Guicowar, Oude, and 
Hyderabad—Connection with Palmer and Company—Close of the administration 
of the Marquis of Hastings—Its results, external and internal, .... 106 



CONTENTS. 




CHAPTER V. 

Mr. Canning, appointed governor-general, resigns—Loi-d Amherst appointed—Mr. John 
Adam’s interim administration—Lord Amherst installed—Misunderstandings with 
the Burmese—Commencement of hostilities—-Expedition against Rangoon—Its 
capture—Subsequent militaiy operations—Reverses—Sickness of the troops— 
Storming of stockades—Exjjcditions by water—^The Burmese grand army dis¬ 
persed—Operations in Assam and in Aracan—^Mutiny at Barrackpoor—Operations 
in Pegu—Capture of Prome—Negotiations for peace—Termination of hostilities, . 

CHAPTER VI. 

Tranquillity not perfectly established—Disturbances in variotis quarters—Proceedings 
at Kittoor and Kolapoor—Transactions in Bhurtpoor—Question of interference— 
Resignation and death of Sir David Ochterlony—Siege and capture of Bhurtpoor 
—State of aifaii’s in Onde—Death of Sir Thomas Monro—Close of Earl Amherst’s 
administration, .............. 


CHAPTER VII. 

Tx>rd William Bentiuck governor-gqneral—Economical and judicial reforms—Opium 
regulations—Abolition of Suttee—Rights of Christian converts fi’om Hindooism— 
C’ollision between supreme court and governmept of Bombay—Settlement of North¬ 
western provinces—Measures against Thuggee—Internal disturbances in Assam, 
Tenasserim, Mysore, and Coorg, .......... 

CHAPTER VIII. 

Approaching expiry of the Company’s charter—Views of ministers and of the Com¬ 
pany—Bill for renewing the charter introduced—The discussions produced by it— 
The act passed—Its leading provisions—Close of Lord William Bentinck’s admin¬ 
istration, ............... 


BOOK VIII. 

FROM TIIK EXTINCTION OF THE TRADE OF THE COMl’ANY TO THE COMMENCEMENT 

OF THE GREAT SEFOY MUTINY. 

CHAPTER I. 

Sir Charles Metcalfe provisional governor-general—He removes the restrictions on 
the Indian press—Ojiposite views of the Court of Directors and the Board of 
Control in rq^ai’d to the appointment of a successor to Lord William Bentinck — 
Lord Heytesbury’s appointment revoked by the ci’own—I^ord Auckland becomes 
governor-general—A now succession in Oude—Intrigues and ileposition of the 
Rajah of SattRrah, ............. 


CHAPTER II. 

Relations with the Punjab, Scinde, Cabool, and Persia—Burnes’ mission to the court of 
Dost Mahomed—Its failure—The Tripartite Trpaty—The siege of Herat—The 
expedition to the Persi.an Gulf;—The Simla manifesto, ...... 


PACE 


128 


170 


190 


230 


2.')1 


269 






CX)NTBNTS. 


CHAPTER III. 

The siege of Herat—Lord Auckland’s policy—Demonstration in the Persian Gulf—The 
Tripartite Treaty—The Simla manifesto—The army of the Indus—Invasion of 
Afghanistan, .............. 


CHAPTER IV. 

Partial withdrawal of British troops from Afghanistait—Capture of ELhelat—Surrender 
of Dost Mahomed—Commencing disturbances—Outbreak at Cabooi—Gross mis¬ 
management—Disasters, ........ . . . . 

CHAPTER V. 

Operations in different parts of Afghanistan—Sale at Jelalabad—Conflicts in the 
Khyber Pass—Nott at Caudahar—Views of the Indian government—Conclusion 
of Lord Auckland’s administration—Lord Ellenborough governor-general—Pro¬ 
posed evacuation of Afghanistan — Double advance upon Cabooi by Generals 
Pollock and Nott—Recapture of Ghuznee—Re-occupatioii of Cabooi—Recovery of 
British iirisoners—Evacuation of Afghanistan—Lord Ellenborough’s proclamations, 

• 

CHAPTER VI. 

Relations with Scinde—Lord Ellenborough’s jwlicy in regard to it—New treaty—Pro¬ 
ceedings of Sir Charles Napier—Capture of Emaumghur—British residency at 
^/yderabad attacked—Battles of Meauee and Dubba—Subsequent jwoceedings— 
Annexation of Scinde—Relations with Scindia—Hostilities commenced—Victories 
of Maharajpoor and Puuiai-—New treaty with Scindia—Abrupt recall of Lord 
Ellenboi’ough, .............. 


CHAPTER VII. 

Sir Henry Hardinge governor-general—His first measures—Threatening aspect of 
affairs in the Punjab—State of the court of Lahore—Disorder and military ascend¬ 
ency—British fi’ontier thi'eatened—Assemblage of trooj®— Invasion of the British 
territories and commencement of hostilities—Battle of Moodkee—Battle of Feroze- 
shah—Battle of Aliwal—Battle of Sobi’aon—Termination of the first Punjab war 
—Treaty of peace—Proceedings in Scinde—Sir Charles Napier’s hill campaign— 
Resignation of the governor-general, ......... 

CHAPTER VIII. 

The Earl of Dalhousic governor-general—Second Punjab war—Siege of Mooltan— 
Defection of Shere Sing, and consequent raising of the siege—Repulse at Ram- 
nuggur—Sie^e of Mooltan resumed—Its capture—Subsequent militwy operations 
—Battle of Chillianwalla—Victory of.Gujerat—Annexation of the^ Punjab—Sir 
Charles Napier’s return to India as commander-in chief, . . . . . 

CHAPTER IX. 

A new Burmese war—Ca 2 Jture of Mai-taban^ Rangoon, aaid Profile—Annexation of 
Pegu—Peace with Burmah—Claims of the British government in India as the 
paramotmt power—Annexation.of Oude—Termination of the Marquis of Dal- 
housie’s government—Changes in the constitution of»the East India Company, 


vii' 

PACE 

317 


363 


430 


460 


486 


605 


630 







viii 


CONTENTS. 


BOOK IX. 

FROM THK SEPOY MUTINY TO THE PRESENT TIME. 

CHAPTEB I. 

PAGE 

Lord Canning governor-general—Mutinous spirit prevalent among the Bengal sepoys— 
Objection to greased cai^dges—Mutiny at Berhampoor—Precautionary measures 
adopted by government—Disbandment of the 19th and 34th native regiments at 
Bnrrackpoor—Indications of a wide-spread conspiracy—Proclamation of the gover¬ 
nor-general—Massacres at Meerut and Delhi, ....... fi53 

CHAPTEE II. 

Tlie progress of the mutiny—Vigorous measures of repression in the Punjab—Outbreaks 
in other quarters—The Doab—Neemuch and Nusseerabad—Jhansi—Bareilly— 

Oude—Measures of government to meet the crisis—Eeinforcements and proclama¬ 
tions—Siege of Delhi commenced, .......... 672 

CHAPTEE III. 

Siege of Delhi continued—Eepeated attempts on the British position by the rebels— 
Eepulses—Death of Sir Henry Barnard, and, appointment of Brigadier-general 
Wilson to the command—Eeinforcements on both sides —Defeat of the rebels at 
Nujufghur—Preparations for the assult—Eecapture of Delhi, . , . .611 

CHAPTEE IV. 

Successes of General Neill at Benares and Allahabad—The British besieged in Lucknow 
—Death of Sir Henry Lawrence—Arrival of troops from Persia—General Have¬ 
lock appointed to the command of a relieving force—His brilliant victories—Third 
Cawnpoor massacre—Campaign in Oude—New victories—Tlie Ganges recrossed— 

Battle of Bithoor.. 626 


CHAPTEE V. 

Mutiny at Dinapoor—Arrah besieged and relieved—Arrival of Sir Colin Campbell as 
commander-in-chief—Eeinforcements from Europe—Havelock superseded in his 
command—Continued siege of the British garrison at Lucknow—Relief and sul)- 
sequent blockade—Second relief—Sir Colin Campbell’s campaign—Havelock’s death. 644 

. CHAPTEE VI. 

< 

Cawnpoor attacked by the rebels—Victory of Cawnpoor—Other successes in the Doab 
—The auxiliary force from Nepaul—General Outram in Oude—Final march upon 
Lucknow'—Its capture—Subsequent operations in Behar, Oude, and Eohilcund- - 
The campaign'dn Central India, .... ...... 664 

CHAPTEE VIT. 

Proposed change in the goverament of India—Change of ministry—Lord Canning’s 
Oude proclamation—Lord Ellenborough’s despatch—^Extinction of the East India 


Company—The Queen’s proclamation-*-Suppres8ion of the mutiny—Conclusion, 685 

Uenerai. Index, .* . 709 







LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS, 


VOUTME Ill. 


FKoNTlSrJEC'E.- auANii Di.'jibah at Cawhpoor, 3j) NoVEJiBEai, 1850. 
ENGBAVEl) TITl.K. -IN'IUAN Uakaak. oh Nativk MAiucirr P 1 .AOK. 
Map op Punjab and I'Annsiuits. 

Map or Ahsam, IJnoTAN, &u. 

Mai’ or EAJIwrrANA, Gujkrat, ,tu. 

I’ljiN or Smnc or l>ici.iii. 

Pi.AN or Hikue or I.uoknow. 


1‘ortrait of Ijjord Civstlereajjli, 

Portrait of Clenoral the Karl of Moira, . 
Khatmaivloo and Kalita-patan, from the West, 
(Ironp of Ghoorkas, ..... 

I’ortr.ait of M ajor-genoral Uobert Rollo Gillespie, 
Wtockaded Position of the Ghoorkas at .Jytak, 
J’ortrait of Major-general Sir David Ochter- 
loiiy, Bart., K.C.B., . . . . * 

View of Almora, ...... 

Defile W which General Gchterlony turned 
the ^liriaghati Ihiss, .... 

Arab Mercenaries in Pay of the Ilow of (.hitch, 
I’own and Teniphss of Dwatuka, . 

Hatras, the Port of Dyarain, 1817, 

Nassik on the Godavery, . ... 

A Pindaree Fort, I’rovince of Benares, 

Portrait of Maharana Bheein Sing, Prince of 
Gdeypoor, ...... 

Plan of Ofierations at Poonah, 

Seetahaldee Hills and Nagpoor Residency, 

I’lan of Operations against Nagpoor, 

Fielii of the Battle of Mahidjnior, 

.fain Temple in Fortress of Kuinulner, 

Portrait of Sir Thomas Monro, 

View of Chanila, ..... 

View of Talneer in 1818, . ... 

The Fort of Malligaum, West and South Sides, 
Portrait of Sir John Malcolm, 

Portrait of Rajah of Cutch, 

HiU-fort of Bhooj, ..... 


l AOK j 

4 ! 


10 

12 

14 


21 

24 

27 

29 

:52 

.38 

46 


00 

07 i 


8.3 I 
87 i 
90 i 

9.3 I 
99 

103 

114 

11.3 


Attack on Fort of Syriaiu, 

Burmese War-lsiat, ..... 

Armour worn by Maha Bandoola, 

The River Hooghly, near Ihirrackjioor, 
Baudoola’s Look-out Tree, with Four Guns, 
at Doualxjw, ..... 

Group of Burmese, ... 

Prome, from the Heights, .... 

Portrait of George Stapleton Cotton, Viscount 
Comliermcre, ...... 

Long-necke<l Bastion, BhuitjKior, 

Silver Howdah of Durjan Sal, the Usurper of 
Mysore, ....... 

View of Simla, ...... 

I’ortrait of Lord AVilliam Cavendish Bentinek, 
l^ort and Harbour of Kurrachia!, . 

Assamese Gossaiiis or Landholders, 

Portrait of Rammohun Roy, 

Town and Pass of BiMindee, 

A Yogis-Fakir, or religious mendicant, 

A Chuprasi, or native servant, 

Ruujeet Sing’s Kneampment near Roopur, on 
the Sutlej, ...... 

Mounted IViojicr of Skinner’s Horse, 

The Court of I’roprietors, Fast India House, 
The Court of Directors, East Inilia House 
View of Ootacamund, ..... 

Portrait of I<ord Macaulay, 

Muttra—the Temple and Bathing Ghauts, a 
P ortrait of Right Hon. Charles T. Baron Met- 


Portrait of the Honourable Mountstuart 
Elphinstone, ...... 

Group of Wagars, 

View of the East India Hou.<e, 

A Ryot, ....... 

Portrait of William Pitt, Tjord Amherst, 

The G<.)vemmBnt House and Treasury, Chil- 
cutta, from the Old Course, 

Principal Approach to the G<ilden Dagon Pa¬ 
goda, Rangoon, . . . . . 

Storming of a Stockade, Rangoon, 

Portrait of Sir Archibald Campbell, Bart., • . 
The Shwe-da-gon Pagoda, Rangoon, 

VoL. III. 


calfe, G.C.B. 

117 Portrait of Right lion. George, Earl of Auek 

118 land, G.C.B., . 

12;i View of Jumfx>, . 

120 View of Amritser, .... 

129 Fort of Govindghur, near Amritser, 

The Koh-i-noor, or “ Momitain of Light." 
133 Seriiiagur, the Capital of Cashmere, 
j. Portrait of Sir Henry I’ottinger, 

1.36 The Bala Hissar, Cabool, 

142 View of Surat, ..... 

144 Portrait of Sir Alexander Bumes, 

140 Portrait of Jlost Mahomed Khan, 

h 


T-A<1 F. 

151 

1.32 

1.34 

159 


166 

169 

171 

183 

18.3 

186 

189 

191 

197 

206 

212 

223 

224 

225 


227 

228 
234 
237 

246 

247 
250 


2.32 

2.38 

271 

273 

27.3 

278 

279 
283 
289 
293 
298 
302 







X 


UST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. 


View of Candahar, . . . . . 

Portrait of Mahomed, Bliab of Pcraia, 

Afghan Soldiers in Winter Costvune, 

View of Island of Kaixak, 

Portrait of Runjeet Sing, 

Portrait of Shah Shujnli-nl-Moolk, 

Golden Tlirone of Eunjeet Sing, . 

Fort of Bukkur, ..... 

The Bolan J*as8, .... 

Mud-fort and Town of Quettah, 

Entrance to the Kojuk Pass from I’arush, 
Touih of Eunjeet Sing, at Goverdhun 
(Citadel of Ghiizneo, .... 
Khelat—-the Candalmr Gate, 

Fort of Khelat-i-Gliiljio, 

I’ortraitK of Khan Shcreen Khan an<l <.!ht>!aiii 
Mahonuid, ..... 

'Hie Pass of NuiToosk, . . . . 

Beloochees on the look-out, 

View of Bamian and Ghoolgoola, . 

Surrender of Dost Mahomed to Sir W. H. 

Miicnaghtcn, . . . . c . 

Tile Bazaar, Cabool, during the Fruit Season, 
Portrait of Sir W. H. Maonaghtcn, Bart., 
lntorif)r of Shah Shujah’s P.alace, Cabool, 

Plan of (!abool, ...... 

I’ortrait of Mohun Lai, .... 

•fczails, or Afghan Muskets, .... 

Bala llissar and C!ity of Cabool, 

Portrait of Mahomed Akbar Khan, 

Mahomed Khan's Fort, .... 

.Tugduluck, where General Klphinstonc made 
his last stand, ..... 

View of Jelalabad, ..... 

Portrait of Major-general Sir Eobert Sale, 

G.C.B. 

Fort of Ali Musjid, in the Khyljcr I’uss, 
Portraits of British Commandant of Shall Shu- 
jah's .Taubaz Cavalry and Moer Ilumzu of 
Ist Janbaz Cavalry, .... 

Portrait of General Pollock, 

Gassyara, or Grass-cutters, .... 

Tower at Tezoen, where General Elphinstone 
died, ....... 

Village of Urgundvh, .... 

Portratit of Lieutenant-general Sir Charle.s 
Napier, ....... 

I’ortraits of Moer Mahomed, Meer Nussoer 
Khan, and Meer Nour Mahoud, throe prin¬ 
cipal Ameers of St^Kjde, .... 

North-west Face of the Fort of Hyderabad, 
Entrance to Town of Sehwan, with Tomb of 
Lai Shaz Baz, 

Fortress of Gwalior, .... 
Portrait of Lieutenant-general Lord Gough, 
The King of Gwalior. .... 
Portrait of Viscount Hardinge, 


313 Group of Sikhs, ...... 

318 Portrait of Major-general Sir Horry G. W. 

320 Smith, G.C.B.,. 

325 Plan to illustrate Battle of Aliwal, 

328 Plan to illustrate Battle of Sobraon, 

329 Outpost at Sobraon,. 

339 The Entry to Lahore, .... 

344 Sikh Guns, Sliields, &o,, .... 

351 Portrait of Gholab Sing, .... 
353 Express Camel Trooper, 6th Irregular Cavalry, 
355 Portrait of Lord Dalhousie, 

357 j Town and Fort of Ferozepoor, 

360 Shore Sing and his Suite, .... 

.365 Storming of the Khoonee Boor j Breach, Mool- 
370 tan, ....... 

Plan of the Battle of Eamnuggur, 

372 Portrait of Maharajah Dhuleeji Sing, 

374 View of Moulmein, ..... 

375 Temporary Stockade, Martal>an, 

378 Ijantcha of the Strait of Malacca, 

1‘ortrait of Lord Clanning, .... 

381 Portrait of Sir John Lawrence, G.IM!., 

388 Tile Residency, Lucknow, .... 

391 Iron .Bridge, Lucknow, .... 

395 Tmambara, or House of the Twelve Patriarchs, 
397 Lucknow, ...... 

407 Officer of the Guide Corjis and Ilavild.ar ai\l 
414 Soldier of the Sirmoor Ghoorkas, . ! 

416 Hindoo Row’s House, before Delhi, 

418 Moree Gate, Delhi, ..... 

422 nie Serai Picket in the iSubzee Mundoe, liefore 
Dellii, ....... 

429 Portrait of Brigadier general Sir Archdale 

432 Wilson, G.C.B., ..... 

Water Gate of Palace, Delhi, 

433 Tlic Tomb of Humayoon, near Delhi, 

435 Plan of the Entrenchments and Residency, 
Lucknow, ...... 

Portrait of Sir Henry Lawrence, 

438 Portrait of Major-general Sir Henry Havelock, 
441 View of Futtehpoor. ..... 

451 The “Slaughter-house,” t!awiipoor, 

'Well at Cawnpoor, ..... 

454 Fortified House at Arrah, .... 

456 I’ortrait of General Sir James Uutrani, G.C.B., 

' I’ortrait of General Sir John Inglis, G.C.B., 
403 Interior of the Alumliagh, near Lucknow, 

I Portrait of General Sir Colin Campbell, 

' Interior of Fort of Agra, .... 

465 Bailey Guard Gateway, Eesidency, Lucknow, 
469 j Havelock’s Grave and Picket-house art. the 
Alumbagh, ...... 

471 View of Cawnpoor, ..... 

478 Portrait of Jung Bahadoor, 

481 ! Chuttur Munzil Palace, Lucknow, 

482 j Fort of Satigor, ...... 

485 Arms of the East India Company, 


489 

493 

494 

496 

497 
499 

499 

500 
502 
506 
514 
516 

518 

520 

520 

531 

533 

5.52 

554 

574 

585 

588 


593 


602 

603 

605 

609 

613 

618 

624 


628 

630 

6.32 

633 

638 

639 
645 
64*7 
650 
652 

658 

659 
662 

664 

666 

670 

673 

680 

709 











A 


COMPREHEIN^SIYE 

HISTORY OF INDIA 


BOOK YU. 

FPvOM THE OPENING OF THE TRADE TO INDIA TO THE EXTINCTION 
OF THE COMPANY AS A COMMERCIAL BODY. 

CHAPTER 1. 


Renewal of the Ciinipaiiy’H ehartiir liyAct 53 George 111. c. 155—Its leading provisions—Earl Moira 
governor-general—Hostilities with Nepaul—Repulses at Kalunga—Its capture—Combined attacks 
defeated—Tlio Ghoorka lines at Kamghur turned—Cajdure of llaiughur—Sulis(sjuent ojierations 
—Retreat of General Marloy—Invasion of Kunuum—Malaun captured — Negotiations for peace 
—Hostilities renewed—Reace concluded—Proceedings in Cutch—Disturbances at Hyderabad 
and Bareilly—Capture of Hatras. 

|T tlie last renewal of the Company’s charter in 1793 the con- a. n. isos. 

• tinuance of their monojioly was .strenuously opposed, particu¬ 
larly by the large commercial towns, which naturally desired rroposwi re. 

•1 /r* in Muwjklofthe 

to sliare in the tramc to the East, and insisted that with company s 
perfect .safety it might, and therefore in justice ought to be, 
thrown completely open. The concession made in 1793 was 
very slight, and consisted only in requiring the Company to 
allot a certain quantity of their tonnage annually for the accom¬ 
modation of the private trade. This paltry concession increased rather 
than diminished the general discontent. Not merely the limited amount 
of the allotted tonnage, but the heavy freight charged for it and the 
^ inconvenient legulations by which the use of it was trammelled, formed 
just subjects of popular complaint; and it was foreseen by all paj;ties that, in 
any new charter that might be granted to the Company, concessions at once more 
extensive in their nature and more liberal in their spirit belioved to be made. 

Prudence required that a discussion, which could not be avoided, and which 
would of necessity be keen and protracted, should not be too long postponed; 
and hence, as early as 1808, while the House of Commons appointed a select 
committee to inquire into the state of the afiairs of the Ea.st India Company, 

Mr. Dundas, on the part of the Board of Control and' the crown, suggested to 

VoL. III. ,97 








2 


HISTOKY OF INDIA. 


[Book Vll. 

• ■ 

A.D. i8ia. the directors the propriety of endeavouring without delay to come to an under- 
~~ standing on the subject of a new chaiiier, in order that it might be submitted 
to the early consideration of parliament. 

OpixwinB The directors thus invited liad no difficulty in approving of an early dis- 

Ttrotnonf*^ cussiou, and, after an interview with Mr. Dundas, gave a written exposition of 
their views in a letter dated 10th December, 1808. They proposed a charter 
for twenty years, which should recognize their right to the territorial possessions, 
provide for increased dividends in proportion to the improved revenues of India, 
a.ssi.st them in the liquidation of the Indian debt, relieve them from the portion 
of military expenditure incurred for objects p\u-cly British, and continue the 
present system of what was called “a regulated monopoly of the trade,'' as 
being “ the most expedient both for the foi'eign and domestic interests of this 
country.” In regard to this last jioint, which was rather suggested than stiiiu- 
lated, Mr. Dundas intimated that ministers would not consent to any chiu-ter 
that dirl not coniine the Company’s monopoly of trade exclusively to China, and 
throw it open within all their other limits to his maje.sty’s sulyects at large in 
their own vessels. He also ]iroposed the adoption of some method for con¬ 
solidating the Company's troops with those of the crown serving in India. 
These views were so diametrically ojiposed to those of the directors that they 
declared their determination not to acquiesce in them, and as there was not as 
yet any absolute necessity for immediate action, the conferences were in the 
meantime dropped. 

Negoiiiitloiiu In the end of 1811 the jiresident of the Board of Control (now Lord 
Melville) again opened the discus.sion, by informing the directors that the 
admission of the ships as well as the goods of private merchants to the trade 
with India, under such restrictions as might be deemed necessary, was regaided 
by ministers as a settled point, and that no charter would be granted which 
did not concede it. The directors, now convinced that by yielding too little 
they might endanger the whole, contented themselves with reiterating their 
objections, and at the same time agreeing to lay the |iroposal of opening the 
trade before the proprietors. They took the precaution, however, to expre.ss 
their belief that ministers, while advocating a free export to India from British 
ports generally, did not mean to interfere with the present warehousing .system, 
by which all imports from India were confined to the single port of London. 
In accordance, with these views the court of proprietors, on tlie recommendation 
of the directors, ])resented a petition to the House of Commons on the 7th of 
April, 1812. This jietition was the signal for many othei's of an o])positc 
character, which poui’ed in from almost all the ports and manufacturing towns 
of the kingdom. These petitions prayed generally for the entire abolition of 
tlie Company’s monopoly, and were unanimous in protesting against the 
absurdity of a free export from all British ports, and an import confined only 
to the port of the metropolis. 



CnAP. I.] 


RENEWAL OF COMPANY’S CHARTER. 


3 


Tt would seem that ministers, when they first invited the directors to a a.d. isis. 
discussion of the subject, were not unwilling to have confined the import to 
London, and thus continued the Company in possession of all their warehousing 
advantagea Had the original terms which they offered been accepted, there between 
is little doubt from the apathy existing in the public mind in regard to every- 
thing but the astounding events of which the continent of Europe was then 
the theatre, that a renewed charter might have been obtixined, nearly on the 
very terms on which they were at length petitioning that it should be granted. 

It was now too late. They had lost their opportunity, and been outwitted by 
their own grasping spirit. A change of ministry had taken place, and several 
members of the new cabinet, influenced as much jierhaps by political con¬ 
nection as by conviction, declared loudly in fiivour of commercial freedom. 

The Karl of Buckinghamshire, whom as Lord Hobart we have already seen 
governor of Madras, was now president of the Boai'd of Control, and lost no 
time in informing the directois that tlie im[)ort as well as the export trade 
must be opened, though the former would necessarily be subjected to some 
i-estrictions, intended chiefly for the prevention of smuggling. All hopes of a 
.succeasful compromise were in conse<pjence abandoned by the proprietors, who, 
on the 5th of May, held a general court, in which they adopted a series of 
resolntidhs, and di ew largely upon their imaginations in depicting the misery 
and ruin which must ensue by allowing any place but London to import 
directly from India. Ministers, so far from being alarmed at this gloomy 
jiicture, clo.sed the discus.sion on the 4th of Januaiy, 1813, with a kind of 
menace to the eftcct that, if the Company thought themselves incapable of 
governing India under a system of free trade, it would remain for ])arliament 
to determine whether their future intervention in the government might not 
be dispensed with. The proprietors, equally resolute, not only repeated their 
former resolutions, but on the 22d of February presented a petition to parlia¬ 
ment, deprecating any extension of the import trade from India to the outports 
of Great Britain, and praying for a renewal of the privileges granted by the 
charter of 1793. 

Nothing now remained but to commence the stirnggle, and accofdingly 
the 22d of March, 1813, Lord Castlereagh submitted to the House of Commons 
a series of thirteen resolutions, containing the leading provisions which it was 
proposed to embody in an act renewing the Company’s charter. Most of the 
questions discussed were then novel, and both the dangers apprehended by the 
one party, and the expectations entertained by the other, made it necessary 
for the legislature to proceed with the utmost caution. Information was sought 
from all quarters, and whole volumes of evidence were taken from those who 
were supposed most competent to give it. In the debates which afterwards 
ensued, there were few speakers of eminence in either house who did not 
deliver their sentiments, and deem them of so much importance as to justify the 



4 


HISTORY OF INDIA, 


[Book YTI.* 


A O. 1813. 


Parliameti' 
tary debate! 
on renewal 
of Com- 
jiany’e 
charter. 


subsequent revisal and publication of their speeches. So great, however, has 
been the progress of political economy as a science, and so strong the light 
which has been thrown upon it by experience since this famous debate, that 
many of the propositions most elaborately argued are now regarded as truisms, 
and much of the alarm sounded is felt to be mere exaggeration. The result is 
therefore the only thing which now jMjssesses much historical interest, and 



Lord Casti.eueaoh. 

Front o iwrtrnit by Bir Tltomas Lawrence. 


nothing more is necessary here than 
to give a very brief analysis of the 
most imjiortant sections of the Act 
53 Geo. III. c. 155, which, while 
essentially modifying and curtailing 
the jrtivileges formerly possessed by 
the Company, renewed their charter 
for another period of twenty years, 
to be computed from the 10th day of 
April, 1814. 

After declaring that the terri¬ 
torial acquisitions now in possession 
of the Company, are to remain with 
them “without pi-ejudice to’’the un¬ 
doubted sovereignty of the crown of 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Ireland, in and over the same, 
or to any claim of the said United 
Company to any rights, franchises, 
or immunities,” the act proceeds, in 
its first section, to declai-e it cx- 


ToiTOBofiiBw pedient that “the right of trading, trafficking in and adventuring in, to and 
from all ports and j)laces within the limits of the said United Company’s present 
charter, save and except the dominions of the Emperor of China, should be 
open to all his majesty’s subjects in common with the said United Company, 
subject to* certain regulations and provisions, but that the existing restraints 
respecting the commercial intercourse with China should be continued, and the 
exclusive trade in tea preserved to the said Company.” 'fhe principal “regula¬ 
tions and provisions” enacted were that the trade thus opened should be carried 
on in vessels of not leas than 350 tons registered measurement, and that the 
imports from India should be admitted only to such ports as should be certified 
for that purpose by orders in council. 

The above provisions for opening and regulating the trade with India con¬ 
stitute the main features in the act, but there were others not of a commercial 
nature which met with strenuous opposition, and were denounced by many as 
dangerous in the extreme, if not absolutely incompatible with the existence of 



Chap. I.] 


RENEWAL OF COMPANY’S CHARTER. 


5 


the British power in India. After reading the earnest and virulent declama- a.d. isis: 
tion directed against the 13tli resolution, proposed by Lord Castlereagli, one is 
surprised, and at the same time relieved, on finding that, both as it was nsaaing 
originally expressed and as it now stands embodied in the 33d section of the ..fnew 
act, it pledged the legislature to nothing more than the following simple pro- 
position: That “it is the duty of this country to promote the interest and 
happiness of the native inhabitants of the British dominions in India, and sudi 
measures ought to be adopted as may tend to the introduction among them of 
useful knowledge, and of religious and moral improvement; and in further¬ 
ance of the above objects, sufficient facilities ought to be afforded by law to 
persons desirous of going to and remaining in India, for the purpose of accom¬ 
plishing those benevolent designs, so as the authority of the local governments 
re.specting the intercourse of Europeans with the interior of the country be pre¬ 
served, and the principles of the British govemment, on which the natives of 
India have hitherto relied for the free exercise of their religion, be inviolably 
maintained.” In order to give effect to this declaration, the section proceeds 
to enact that “peraons desirous of going to and remaining in India for the R'H^pean 

resideittA. 

jibove purposes,” or “for other lawful purposes,” should apply for permission to 
the court of directors, who .should either grant it, or, in the event of refu.sal, 
trausmit.tlie ajjplication, within one month of the receipt of it, to the Board of 
Contiol, who were empowered finally to dispose of it. All persons obtaining 
[)ermiasion, whether from the court or from the board, were to be furni.shed by 
the directors with certificates, entitling tliem, “so long as they shall properly 
conduct themselves, to the countenance and protection of the several govern¬ 
ments of the said Company in the East Indies, and parts aforesaid, in their 
res])ective pursuits, subject to all such provisions and restrictions as are now in 
lorce, or may hereafter be judged necessary with regard to persons residing in 
India.” The only pecuniary provision made in connection with this section, 
was the allotment of a sum of not less than £ 10,000 annually for the “revival and Education, 
improvement of literature, and the encouragement of the learned natives of 
India, and for the introduction and promotion of a knowledge of tlie sciences 
among the inhabitants of the British territories in India.” Such a sym, paltry 
!is it was, was not permitted to do the good which might have been expecteef 
from it, and instead of being employed in instructing the natives generally, 
continued for many years to be partly paid away to learned Mahometans and 
Hindoos, for explaining and inculcating their respective dogmas, and partly 
allowed to accumulate, as if expenditure for native education were impracticable 
or useless. 

The only sBctions of the act in which there was any distinct I’ecognition of Roiigion. 
the claims of Christianity were those in which provision was made “for the 
maintenance and support of a church establishment” in the East Indies. By 
section 49th, it was provided that, if his majesty should be pleased by his royal 



G 


HISTOEY OF INDIA, 


[Book VII. 


A D.1813. letters-patent under the great seal, “to erect, found, and constitute one bishopric 
for the whole of the British territories in the East Indies,'’ and one arch- 
Provinion in deaconiy for each of the presidencies, the Company were to pay £5000 per 
tor ropport annum to the bishop, and £2000 per annum to each of the archdeacons.” While 
wteWisT*' question of an Episcoiial church establishment was under discussion, a 
was put in for the Church of Scotland, on the very sufficient ground that 
a majority of the British residents in India were Scotch, and of the Presbyterian 
communion. The justice of the claim was not denied, but on some plea of 
ex])ediency, more easily understood than vindicated, it was not recognized in the 
act, and the appointment of Scottish chaplains, which Presbyterian residents 
were entitled to demand from the legislature as a right, was only received as a 
boon from the court of director. 


ProviBioii 

reapectiiiK 

putrunago. 


Coinm«noe' 
mout of 
Eari Moira's 
adniinistra* 
tiuii. 


State of 
Ne]}aul. 


The only other sections of the act whicli it is necessary to notice are the 80th, 
which increased the patronage of ministers, or rather removed the ambiguity 
which previously attached to it, by enacting that in future the apiiointments 
of governor-general, governors, and commanders-in-chief, should not be valid 
without the express approbation of the crown, signified by the sign-manual, 
countersigned by the president of the Board of Control—the 88tli, which pro¬ 
hibited the directors and proprietors, without consent of the board, from 
granting a gratuity of more than £600—and the 90th, by which the originally 
gratuitous services ol the board were to be paid by salaries, which, limited by 
the act of 1793 to an aggregate of £22,000, were henceforth not to exceed 
£26,000 per annum. 

Earl Moira formally assumed the office of governor-general at Calcutta on 
the 4th of October, 1813, and found the position of affairs by no means flat¬ 
tering. The expense of the foreign einljjissies and foreign conquests had 
trenched deeply on the revenues, and a considerable amount of financial embar¬ 
rassment had ensued. In order to meet the demands for I'etrenchment the 
army had been injudiciously reduced, and far more than a fair amount of 
service was required from it. The natural result was a degi’ee of discontent, 
and in connection with it a laxity of discipline. These things were the more 
to be deplored, from its being obvious that the relations with neighbouring 
kates were not satisfactory, and that, particularly with one of them, hostilities 
had already become all but inevitable. This was the state of Nepaul, with 
which the British arms had not hitherto come into direct collision. 

The territories of Nepaul, according to the limits claimed for them at this 
period, skirted the northern British frontier, including that of Oude, for about 
700 miles, in a direction from north-west to south-east, and extended back¬ 
wards with an average breadth of 130 miles across the ascending ranges of the 
Himalaya, to its region of eternal'snow. A more forbidding theatre on which 
to carey on an offensive warfare could not be imagined, and this may perhaps 
be one of the reasons which induced successive govemors-general to submit to 



Chap. 1.] 


STATE OF NEPltTL, 


7 


insults and encroachments on the part of the Nepaulese, and continued to a.d. i bis. 
negotiate, after it had become manifest that the points in dispute could not be 
settled without an apjjeal to arms. A brief recapitulation of the circumstances 
will be necessary. 

Nepaul proper was originally con¬ 
fined to a single mountain valley, of no 
great extent, commencing on the edge 
of one of the lower ranges of the chain, 
and continued longitudinally through 
pasae.s, practicable only during a few of 
the summer months, to the table-land of j 
Tibet. The primeval inhabitants belong j 
to the Tibetan family, but their origin 
is so remote that no authentic account 
of it can be given. Hindoo colonists, 
headed by Rajpoot chiefs, arrived and 
established a complete ascendency. I 
Feuds among the chiefs were followed | 
by tlie usual results. The weaker, un- [ 
able to Hold their ground, were gradu- Oenebal the Earl of mojba. 

^ ^ Afivr a picture by M. A. 8ii«e» E. A. 

ally absorbed by the sti’cnger, and after 

a long struggle a few of the more talented or more fortunate reduced all the oriBima 
others to subjection. As late as I/(Jo the valley of Nepaul was shared by the ofNoJitui. 
three Hindoo Rajahs of Khatinandoo, Lalita-patan, and Bhatgaon. Their 






Khatuanooo AKO Lauta-patan, ftom the West.—From Hamiltou’e Kingdom of Nepaul. 


disunion proved their ruin. Prithi Narayan, chief of the mountain tribe of 
Ghoorka, seeing his advantage, overpowered them in detail, and made himself 




8 


HISTORY OP INDIA. 


[Book VIT. 


A.D. 1818. 


Ghoorka 
ftftoeiiclency 
in Kopaul. 


First liritUh 
intoruoiirso 
with Ne- 
INiul. 


sole master. The sovereignty thus won he transmitted to his uescehdants, and 
the name of Ghoorkas, at first applied only to the members of his tribe, became 
the common designation of all his subjects. 

Prithi Narayan was succeeded in 1771 by his son Pratap Sing, who sur¬ 
vived him only four years, and left an infant son Kana Bahadur, under the 
guardianship of his widow Eajendra Lakshmi, and liis brother Bahadur Sab. 
Thougli a regency could hardly have been in itself favourable to advancement, 
the fact however is, that the career of conquest commenced by the founder of 
the new dynasty was so vigorously followed up, that not only several rajahs to 
the east and west, but the living type of Buddha residing at Lassa in Tibet 
was obliged to profess allegiance to the Ghoorka rajah. This, however, was 
too daring an insult to Buddhism to be overlooked Tlie Emperor of China 
himself undertook to avenge it, and sent a large army which had advanced 
triumphantly within a few miles of Khatmandoo, when the Ghoorka state was 
only saved from destruction by agreeing to become tributary to China. As in 
conseciuence of this discomfiture conquest to the north was no longer to be 
dreamed of, the Ghoorkiis confined their aggressions to their more immediate 
neighboui's, and were thus gradually brought to the British frontiers. 

As early as 17G7, when Prithi Narayan was only laying the foundations of 
his power, the Bengal government had rashly interfered with the Hftairs of 
Nepaul. The liajah of Khatmandoo when driven from the t)pen country, and 
obliged to shut himself u{) in his ciipital, sent a i)ressing invitation to Calcutta 
for as.sistivnce against the Ghoorka rajah. When the council agreed to grunt it 
they must have been tivking a leap in the dark. They knew nothing of the 
justice of the cause, nor of the relative strength of the contending parties, and 
had nothing better to allege in justification of their interference, than that,an 
advantageous trade had been carried on between the rajah’s country and that 
of Beiai’, and a considerable quantity of gold impoi-ted into Bengal. A 
military expedition, undertaken sf)lely with such sordid views, experienced the 
fate which it deserved. Captain Kinloch, to whom the command was intrusted, 
finding the task much more difficult tharr he had imagined, applied for rein- 
. forcements. I’lie council, unable to grant them, because all the troops they 
could master were required to maintain the contest with Hyder, recalled the 
expedition; but with the same disregard of justice which they had manifested 
throughout^ .seized some rich and fertile lands of the Ghoorka rajah, bordering 
on “the Bettea country, which was in quiet possession of the vizier” (Nabob of 
Oude), in order "to indemnify the charge already incurred.” In other words, 
they first make war upon the Ghoorka rajah who had never offended them, 
because they hoped it would prove profitable, and when they are repulsed, 
they indemnify themselves for their own' injustice by seizing a valuable portion 
of his territory. It is rather singular that this expedition, though directly at 
variance with the course of policy which the directors were constantly incul- 



Chap. 1.] 


STATE OF NEPAUiL. 


9 


eating, received their marked apjirobation. Referring to it in their letter to 
Bengal, dated 11th November, 17G8, they say:—“As we look with a fisivourable 
eye on every attempt for the extension of commerce, we do not disapprove the 
expedition to Nepaul, and are sorry it failed of succesa You did right not to 
renew the expedition till the state of your forces would better admit of it, 
and to hold in your possession lands taken from the Ghoorka rajah as an 
hidemnification for the expenses we had been put to; and they may be of use, 
should it hereafter be thought proper to renew the attempt, and we hope their 
abiount has answered your expectations.’’ 

Intercourse with Nepaul, when next attempted by the Company, was of a 
pacific character. In 1792, apparently in consequence of the Chinese invsxsion, 
tlie Rajah of Nepaul, who must now have been the same as the Ghoorka rajah, 
though the Bengal government appears not to have been aware of the fact, 
applied for military aid. Captain Kiikpatrick was in consequence sent on a 
mis.sion to Khatmandoo, and obtained much new and interesting information 
respecting the country. The political benefits contemplated were not, however, 
.realized, and matters returned to their foimer footing. In 1795, Rana 
Bahadur having attained majority, assumed tlie government. One of his first 
.acts was to put his uncle to death, as a punisliment for the thraldom in which 
he had k^pt him during his guardianship. Tliis might perhaps have been 
pardoned, but his whole life was so dissolute, and his cruelty so ferocious, that 
his subjects rose in arms against him, and compelled him to abdicate in favour 
of his son. He I’etired to Benares, and as it was hoped that his exile might 
have improved him, he was permitted after two yeara to return. His old 
habits returned with him, and ])rovoked a conspiracy of his principal nobles, 
who murdered him in open council, and placed his half-brother. Shir Bahadur, 
upon the' throne. A civil war ensued, during which the .ascendency was gained 
by a chief of the name of Birn Sah, who phiced an illegitimate son of Rana 
Bahadur upon the throne, and conducted the government in his name with so 
much ability that the Ghoorka territeries were greatly extended, reaching so 
far to the we.st as to threaten a collision with Runjeet Sing, and encroaching 
so much on the territories of the Company as to make longer forbearance im¬ 
possible. 

The encroachments of the Ghooikas, when they first commenced, wei'e justi¬ 
fied by a plea which was probably not unfounded. We have already seen that 
in 1707, rich and fertile tracts belonging to the Ghoorka rajah were seized by 
the Company without the least semblance of justice, and therefore, when the 
Ghoorkas alleged that the tracts which they had occupied originally belonged to 
Nepaul, there cannot be a doubt that, in regard at least tf) some of them, 
the allegation was strictly true. In regard to* others of them, again, there is 
just as little doubt that they were justly characterized as encroachments; and 

hence, as there was right and wrong *on both sides, the joints in dispute were 
VoL. III. 


A.D. 1813. 


British 

expeditiou 

against 

N«paul. 


Tacifle inter- 
ounrso. 


Ghoorka en- 
cniochmeuts. 



A.D. ISU. 


Fallnre of 
iiegoiiatloDM 
with ilio 
QhoorkaH. 


{loBtilitieii 

declaretl. 


10 HISTORY OF INDIA. [Book VII. 

fair subjects for negotiation or compromise. This mode of settlement unfortu¬ 
nately failed, and at the time when Earl Moira entered upon the government, 
almost all hope of an amicable adjustment had disappeared. As a last effort, 

his lordship addressed a letter to the 
rajah, in which he repeated the argu¬ 
ments and remoiistrances that had 
been already employed, and urged 
him to acquiesce in the peaceable oc¬ 
cupation of the disputed lands by the 
British government. This was posi¬ 
tively refused, and they were there¬ 
fore, without further parley, occupied 
by force. The N epaulese, as if their 
final determination had not yet been 
taken, retired without offering any 
resistance, but their proceedings, at 
the same time, showed that they were 
fully alive to the importance of the 
step which must now be taken. In 
an assembly of the princii)al chiefs the question of peace or war was formally 
discussed, and after long debate settled, but liy no means unanimously, in 
fiivour of the latter. The peace party recommended a continuance of the pro¬ 
crastinating course which had hitherto been so successsful, but did not hesitate 
to avow their readine.ss to yield the disputed territory rather than to fight for 
it. There was a danger, they argued, that some of the hill rajahs might prove 
treacherous, and leave the ])asscs open for the advance of an hostile force. 
They also adverted to the character of the enemy whom they would have to 
encounter: “ We have hitherto but hunted deer; if we engage in this war vve 
must pi'epare to fight tigers.” The war party, on the other hand, appealed to 
their past successes. No enemy had hithertf) been able to stand before them, 
whereas the British had been obliged to retire from the small fort of Bhurt- 
poor. That was but the work of man, and yet the British had failed in all 
their attempts against it. What likelihood, then, was there that they would 
l>o able to storm the mountain fastnesses, constructed bv the hand of God? 
The deei.sion of the rajah to try the fortune of war was responded to without 
delay by thq governor-general, who, being at this time on a tour to the 
northern province.s, issued a manifesto, dated Lucknow, 1st November, 1814. 
It was addressed to the friends and allies of the Company, and detailed the 
causes which made war inevitable. 

The army assembled to carry on the war mustered about 34,000 men, of 
whom rather more than 12,000 were irregular troops and native contingents. 
The plan of campaign'was not to advan’ce in one combined force, but in four 



Giioobras. —From Fraeer’M lliinalu MonniaitiH. 



Chap. I.] 


AVAR WITH THE GHOORKAS. 


11 


distinct divisions. Selecting the river Kalee, which, though now the western a.d. 1814. 
boundary of Nepaul, was at the commencement of the Avar near its centre, jis 
the common basis from Avhich operations were to diverge to the Avest and to rian law 
tlie east, Earl Moira made his aiTangements as follows:—the first division, 
con.si8ting of about 6000 men, under General Ochterlony, was to attsick the 
Ghoorka positions at the western extremity of their line; the .second division of 
3500 men, under General Gillespie, was to occupy the valley of Dehra Doon, 
situated above the first range of hills, and lay .siege to the fortress of Jytak, 
in the province of Ghurwal; the third division, about 4500 strong, under 
General Hood, was to start from the Goruckjtoor frontier, and advance through 
Bliotwal and Sheeoraj to Palpa; the fourth division, mustering nearly 8000 
men, under General Mai'le^’, was to march through Makwanpoor directly upon 
Khatmandoo, the capital. At various points at which the enemy might attempt 
to force their Avay into the Briti.sh territories, local corps were .stationed, AAdiile 
toward the eastern extremity of Nepaul, beyond the Ooosy liver, Captain 
Latter, with a local and a regular n.ative battalion, was not only to defend the 
frontier, but, if opportunity offered, to assume the offensive. 'I’lie whole Ghoorka 
force did not exceed 12,000 regular troops, .scattered along the Avhole length of 
their frontier. Such a force, so inferior in every resjiect to that brought against 
it, could not, under ordinary circumstances, have made any eftectual resistance; 
but the nature of the country funiished them with numerous almost imiireg- 
nable fastnesses, and their native courage animated them to a defence which, 
though it could not ultimately avail, protracted the Avar, and inflicted repeated 
disasters on their inA^adcrs. In course of time the struggle became comjdetely 
national, and bands of irregular troops spi'ung uj) in all ]iai‘ts of the country 
to aid in fighting the battle of independence. As the four divisions of the 
British force formed in fact so many distinct armies, it Avill bo nece.ssary to 
give a separate detail of the ojierations of each. 

On the 19th of October, 1814, the advance of General Gillespie’s division, senmisro- 

]>ulfiea at 

Avhich had assembled at Saharunpoor, started under command of Colonel xaiunga. 
Carpenter, and proceeded by the Timlee Pa.ss into the valley of Dehra Doon. 

Three days after the main body followed under Colonel Mawbey, who occupied 
the town of Dehra, and continued to follow the retiring Ghoorkas in the direc¬ 
tion of Kalunga, or Nalapani, situated about five miles to the north-east. This 
fort, which was of small dimensions, occupied one "extremity of the flat summit 
of a detached hill, which was about 600 feet in height, and had its steep sides 
covered with jungle. The position was naturally strong, but little had been 
done for it by art, the whole fort consisting of a quadrangular .stone building, 
to which access had been rendered diificult by means of stockades. It was 
garrisoned by GOO men, under Balbhadra Sing, a leader of tried ability and 
courage. Colonel Mawbey on arriving before the place, and receiving a defiance 
in answer to his summons, began to prepare for the siege, and' having by very 



12 


HISTOEY OF INDIA. 


[Book VH, 


A D. 1814. 


HoriniiB ra- 
of 

thti Brititdi 
liy tho 
GlioorkiiA 
at Kalunga. 


great exertion succeeded in placing some guns in battery on the top of the hill, 
ventured on an attack. It proved abortive, and he suspended proceedings to 
wait for further orders. General Gillespie arrived on the 2(ith of October with 
the remainder of the force, and immediately caused a battery of heavier guns to 

be erected. So much progress was made 
that the assault was fixed for the 31st. The 
storming party consisted of four columns of 
attack and a reserve. Three of the columns, 
in order to reach their allotted stations, had 
to make a considerable circuit, and had not 
reached them when the signal gun for the 
attack was fired It is said that they never 
heard it, or, if they did, did not believe it 
to be the sigmU, as the time originally fixed 
had not then arrived. Be this as it may, 
it would seem that the enemy, who were 
probably a ware of the intended assault, dis¬ 
dained to wait for it, and taking advantage 
of the absence of the others, made a vig¬ 
orous sortie on the remaining column. It 
was repulsed, and General Gillespie, in the hope that his men might be able to 
enter the entrenchments along with the fugitives, ordered them to rush forward 
and carry the place by escalade. It was a rash attempt. The batteries had made 
no impression on the works, and the assailants, when they arrived at the foot of 
the wall, were met by such a murderous fire as swept them off' by whole filc.s, and 
made it impo.ssible to plant the ladders. When thus foiled they attempted to 
carry the gateway and an outwork which defended. In this they were equally 
unsuccessful, and had no alternative but to seek the cover of some huts in the 
vicinity. General Gillespie’s imj)atience had already cost his men dear; it w.os 
now to prove fatal to himself. Irritated at the previous failure, nothing would 
satisfy him but a renewal of the attempt. At the head of three fresh companies 
of his majesty’s o3d regiment, and a company of dismounted dragoons, he 
hastened again towards the gate, and being in advance of the men of the 53d, 
who hung back, was waving his sword, and calling upon them to follow, when 
a musket-ball jnerced his heart. This disaster completed the second failure, 
and the a.ssailants were again driven off with a heavy loss. All hope of taking 
the fort with the inadequate means provided was now abandoned, and Colonel 
Mawbey, on whom the command had devolved, retunied with the division to 
Dehra, to wait the arrival of a battering train from Delhi. 

The battering train having arrived on the 24th of November, the division 
set out on the following day to resume the siege of Kalunga. By means of a 
battery of eighteen-pounders, a practicable breach was effected on the 27th, and 



MaJOU-UENFIEAL ilOHKRT lloUA) GliXKUI’lK. 
Aftur a portrait Chlniieiy. 



Chap. I.] 


WAR WITH THE GHOORKAS. 


13 


the storming party immediately advanced to the asstiult. Somewliat in a spirit a.d ism. 
of bravado, scarcely reconcileable with the iirevious repulses, the men were 
forbidden to load their muskets, and carry the breach by the baj'onet alone. Fresh re 
They reached it, not without considerable loss, but, on attempting to mount, Kutair^ 
were appalled at the sight which presented itself. Within the breach, at the 
bottom of a precipitous descent of about fourteen feet, part of the gamson stood 
ready to encounter them Avith spears and pikes, while the other part stood 
behind armed with matchlocks and other missiles. The assailants scarcely 
made an effort to overcome tliis resistance, and drew off to a short distance, 
where, from some unaccountable mismanagement, they remained for two hours, 
completely exposed to the enemy’s fire. The loss was dreadful—exceeding in 
killed and wounded the whole number of the garrison. After all this loss and 
disgrace, a mode of attack wliich would have SJived it was ad<ipted, and the 
garrison, subjected to a bombardment from the effect of which the bare stone 
walls of their inclosure gave them no shelter, suttered so dreadfully, that in the 
course of three days not more than 70 of the original 600 survived. With itH nithnatc 
such a feeble band, br(;athing an air which had been rendered pestilential by 
the number of unburied dead, a longer defence wsis impracticabhj, and the fort 
was evacuated. The besiegers, whom it had cost so dear, immediately demo¬ 
lished it. 

This sad commencement of the war was more than ominous. Besides the on.hi.md 
actual loss sustained, the relative positions of the combatants were changed, mentcif 
The invaders, who, from their superiority both in numbers and in discipline, 
had promised themselves an early submis,sion, or a comjiaratively easy coiujuest, 
began to doubt whether they had not undertaken a task which was beyond 
their strength, and in which, so far from reaping laurels, they might only be 
doomed to experience disaster after disaster. Such reflections naturally tended 
to produce a degi’ee of timidity as irrational as the jirevious rashness, and 
conjured uj) difficulties which a bolder spirit of enterprise would have disre¬ 
garded, or ould have easily overcome. The Ghoorkas, on the othei' hand, were 
proportionably elated, and obtained a large augmentation of strength from the 
number of new adherents who had formerly kept aloof while the iasue seemed • 
doubtful, but were now eager to share in the honours and profits of a warfare 
of which the success was now regarded by them as almost certain. The effect 
of these opposite feelings undoubtedly was to give the war a new character, 
and protract it long beyond the peiiod at which, if it had commenced more 
prosperously, it would have been brought to a close. 

In the interval between the retreat from Kalunga and the return to it. 

Colonel Mawbey detached Colonel Carpenter with the division to a position on 
the Jumna, where, by commanding the folds, he might cut off the enemy’s 
communications between the east and west, and at the same time encourage 
any of the hill chiefs who were disposed to throw off their allegiance to the 



14 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book VII. 


AD. 1814 . Ghoorka rajali. Tlie revolt of the people of Jounsar thus excited, caused so 
much alarm that tlie Ghoorkas, without waiting to be attacked, hastily evacn- 
Prugrewof ated the stronghold of Barat. After Colonel Carpenter’s return, and the 
capture of Kalunga, Colonel Mawbey was ordered westward into the valley 
of Karda, with a view to co-operate with the division under General Ochter- 
lony. On tlie 20th of December Colonel Mawbey was superseded in the com¬ 
mand by General Martindale, who, after occupying Nahan, moved to the foot 
of tlie mountain range, on the highest summit of which Fort Jytak stands, at 
an elevation of 5000 feet above the level of the sea. At the town of Jytak, 
situated at a lower level to the south of the fort, Ranjor Sing Thapa, tlie son ot 
Amar Sing, the regent or niini.ster. commanding a considerable Ghoorka force. 



Stockaded Pobitiok or tub Guoobkab at .Tytak.—F rom FriiiBep’s NiuTative. 


Geiiemi ]iad then his head-quarters. The fort of Jytak, strongly situated in the 

Murtiiidal# ^ , , , , ° 

roimiBod at angle where two lofty ridges met, was approached by an abnipt and rugged 
ascent, occasionally interrupted by ravines. General Martindale, after recon¬ 
noitring, saw nothing more hojieful than to deprive the gairison of their supply 
' of water, which appeared to be drawn from springs situated at some distance 
below the fm-t, by taking possession of a strongly stockaded post situated about 
a mile to the west. The attack was made by two distinct columns, both of 
which having failed to take the enemy by surpiise, wei’e defeated in succession 
with severe loss. General Martindale, in consequence of this new disaster, was 
obliged to suspend operations and wait for reinforcements. 

The division of General Ochterlony, whose sphere of action Avas still farther 
to the west, encountered difficulties which were at least equally great, and 
would doubtless have proved eq^lly disastrous, had not greater skill been 
displayed in surmounting them. The -Sutlej, after a long course to the 
west, makes an abrupt tm-n to the south, and thus with its left bank foi-ms, in 




Chap. I.l WAR WITH THE GHOORKAS. 15 

two direptions, the boundary of a very rugged and mountainous country. Tlie a o. ism. 
tract lying within the angle formed by the river in changing its course, became 
the scene of the military operations, in which General Ochterlony was opposed 
to Amar Sing Thapa, the ablest and most distinguished of the Ghoorka leaders, ochteriony. 
The division began to move in the end 
of October, 1814, and on the 2d of No¬ 
vember arrived at the first and lowest of 
the mountain ranges. Before any further 
progress could be made, it was necessary 
to gain possession of the fort of Nalagerh, 
and the outwork of Taragerh, occupied by 
a Ghoorka garrison, and commanding the 
pass into the mo\intains. In two days, 
by almost incredible exertion, a battery 
was ei'ected at a sufficient elevation, and 
ojiencd with such effect, tliat on the 6th 
tl)e fort was surrendered and tlie outwork 
abandoned. 

Ihe pass being now open, no dim- A(ier.pi«ur.i.,i..Tta. 

culty was experienced in reaching its 

summit,” but it was only to come in siglit of another obstacle of a more Fort of 
formidable description. I'his was the fort of Ramghur, seated on a mountain 
summit 4600 feet above the sea. Amar Sing, who- had his head-quarters at 
Arkee, thirty miles north-east of Malaun, on learning the British advance, 
liastened to Ramghur with about 3000 regular troops, and encamped upon its 
ridge, with his right resting on the fort, and his left on a strongly stockaded 
hill, while stockades placed at intervals protected his whole front. The position 
was too .strong to be forced, and General Ochterlony therefore determined to 
turn it on the left and assail it from the rear. With this view he proceeded 
till he gained possession of a height seven miles north-east of Ramghur. As 
this position gave him a commanding view of the whole Ghoorka lines, and 
seemed to be the point from which it would be most easy to as.sail them, he 
determined on the erection of a battery. The labour of transporting heavy, 
ordnance had again to be endured, and occupied twenty daj^s. Much of it proved 
to be labour lost, for the battery was so distant that its fire when opened was 
unavailing. To remedy this blunder, Lieutenant Lawtie of the engineers was 
detached with a small party to select a nearer spot. He had fotind it, and was 
returning to camp, when the Ghoorkas, who had been observing his movements, 
descended in great force from their heights and placed them.selves across his 
path. Fortunately a small stone inclosure was near. Here the lieutenant and 
his party gallantly maintained themselves, till a failure of ammunition compelled 
them to abandon the inclosure and run the gauntlet of the Ghoorka fire. A 



16 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book VIT. 


A.D. 18 U. reinforcement sent from the battery was obliged to share their flight, and a large 
' proportion of the whole party had fallen before a strong detachment from the 

ReiwiM camp arrived, and effectually checked their pursuera This affair, magnified by 
the enemy into a victory, tended to counteract the moral effect of the advan¬ 
tages which the division had previously gained. 

General Ochterlony, though aware how much the difficulties with which he 
had to contend could now be increased, was preparing to carry out his plan for 
turning the Ghoorka lines, when he received intelligence of the second serious 
repulse at Kalunga. Afraid that a general rising of the whole country might 
ensue, he deemed it prudent to abandon the offensive till new reinforcements 
should enable him to resume it with more certainty of success. This period of 
inaction was not unprofitably spent. The country as far as practicable was 
explored, roads practicable both for troops and artillery were formed, and some 
degree of discipline was given to the irregular troops of some petty ntjahs, 
whom the presence of a British force had emboldened to throw off the Ghoorka 
\iTiviagfTO- yoke. On the 2Gth of December, after nearly a month had been devoted to 
these useful labours, the expected reinforcements arrived. They consisted of the 
2 d battalion of the 7th native infantry and a levy of Sikhs^ General Ochter¬ 
lony, feeling again strong enough, immediately resumed the offensive by 
sending off a detachment to spread along the enemy’s rear and threaten his 
communications with Arkee and Bilaspoor, by occupying a low range of hills 
on the north-east of Rsimghur. Amar Sing, alarmed at this movement, 
endeavoured to frustrate it by a daring attack on the detachment. The offen¬ 
sive, however, proved as adverse to him as it had done to the British in their 
encounters, and he sustained a repulse which obliged him to return to his posi¬ 
tion at Ramghur. The British general, still following out his plan, left Colonel 
Arnold with a division to watch the enemy's movements, and proceeded with 
the main body towards a mountain ridge, the occupation of which would place 
him between the Sutlej and the Ghoorka fort of Malaun. At the same time he 
sent forward about 2000 troops belonging to the petty Eajah of Hindoor, who had 
early joined him and rendered valuable service. These troops, under the 
command of Captain Ross, took possession of the heights above Bilaspoor, 

„ between whose rajah and that of Hindoor a deadly feud had long existed. 
Capture of The succcss of tlicse combined movements soon appeared. Amar Sing, 
Kajughur. position was no longer tenable, left a garrison in the fort of 

Ramghur, and hastened with his whole remaining force to the ridge on which 
Malaun stands. Colonel Arnold, thus left at liberty, moved round the opposite 
extremity of the ridge to co-operate with General Ochterlony, and during the 
march received the submission of the Rajah of Bilaspoor, as well as gained 
possession of the fort of Ratangerh, situated opposite to Malaun, and only 
separated from it by a wide and deep ravine. A detachment under Colonel 
Cooper shortly after gained possession of Ramghur, and dispossessed the 



Chap. L] 


WAE WITH THE OHOORKAS. 


17 


Ghoorkas of all their other posts in the south. Thus, by a series of skilful a.d. isw. 

movements, General Ochterlony, without a direct encounter with the enemy, 

had obliged them to retire before him till only one place of strength witliiu inveetmant 

. ofMBlauu. 

the district remained in their possession. Even this was held by a very preca¬ 
rious tenure, for on the 1st of April, 1815, Malaun was completely invested. 

An account of the subsequent operations in this quarter must in the meantime 
be postjioned, in order to attend to the proceedings of the other two divisions 
of the British army. 

The division under General Wood was not able to take the field before the 

Wood’s 

middle of December. Leaving Goruckpoor, he began his march northwards in opamtioiM. 
the direction of Palpa, situated about 100 miles W.N.W. of Khatmandoo. In 
order to reach it by the most direct route, it was necessary to traverse a difficult 
mountain-pass, which was reported to be strongly stockaded, and therefore 
General Wood, understanding that it might be turned by following a different 
route, proceeded on the 3d of January, 1815, to attack the stockade of Jetpoor, 
at the foot of the Majkote Hills, about a mile west of Bhotwal, as in conse- 
jjuence of the new route which he meant to follow, it would be necessary to 
carry it. He accordingly advanced with twenty-one. companies to attack the 
stockade in front, while Major Comyn was detached with seven companies to 
turn it om the left. As his information had been imperfect or erroneous, he 
encountered a determined resistance at points where he had not anticipated, 
and became so disheartened, that he despaired of success before there was any 
reasonable ground to doubt of it. He therefore not only ordered a retreat, but, Hia retreat, 
assuming that his forces were inadequate to the task assigned him, abandoned 
all idea of offensive operations, and resolved to confine himself to the humbler . 
task of preventing the Ghoorkas from making incursions across the frontier. 

Even in this.he was not successful. The Ghoorkas found little difficulty in 
l>enetrating at many points and committing great devastation. Under these 
circumstances the best thing which occurred to him was to retaliate, and he 
was repeatedly seen vieing with the Ghoorkas as to the amount of injury 
which they could mutually inflict on the unoffending inhabitants whose misfor¬ 
tune it was to dwell on either side of the boundary between British India and 
Nepaul. After persisting for a time in this petty and ignominious war&re, 
the insalubrity of the climate began to tell seriously on the health of the troops, 
and they were finally withdrawn jinto cantonments at Goruckpoor. , 

The division under General Marley, as it was the strongest of all the four. General 
was also the one from which the most decisive results were expected. It was o|)eratlonsL 
directed immediately against the capital, and it was therefore presumed that 
if it succeeded, the Ghoorka rajah would have no alternative but to sue for 
peace. It assembled at Dinapore, and on the 23d of November commenced its 
march in the direction of Bettia. To clear the way for its advance. Major 
Bradshaw had been previously det^hed against the 'Ghoorka posts in the 

VoL. lu. 1B9 



A.l>. 1815. 


Oetieral 

Mariey’ft 

u]Jdratioi]0. 


llioirinjinli- 


Oeneral 

MarloyV 

rotroat. 


18 HISTORY OF INDIA. [Book VII. 

frontier forests. While thus occupied, he succeeded, on the 24th of November, 
in completely surprising Parsuram Thapa, the governor of the district, who was 
encami)ed on the banks of tlie Bhagmate with 400 men. The governor himself 
was among tlie .slain, and the whole force was so completely dispersed, that the 
other ])ost3 of the district fell without opposition; and the low swampy and 
unhealthy tract lying at tlie southern outskirts of the Himalaya, and known 
by the name of the Tirai, was formally annexed to the British dominions. 

This first .success, had it been properly followed up, would have been the 
])relude to others of still greater importance, but General Marley, though his 
instructions ordered him to leave his guns in the rear, till he had gained a 
po.sition considerably in advance, chose to wait for them, and waste his time 
in other preliminary arrangements, till the advantage which might have been 
taken of the alarm caused by Parsuram Thapa’s discomfiture was completely 
lost. The Ghoorkas were not long in penetrating the character of the com¬ 
mander to whom this division of the British troops had been intrusted, and 
were in consequence craboldejicd to undertake an enterprise which had the 
effect at the very outset of hampering all the futm-e operations of the British. 
To secure the Tirai a.gainsfc any attempt that miglit be made to recover it before 
the ai'rival of the main body. Major Bradshaw stationed three small bodies of 
troo])S about the distance of twenty miles apart from each other; the central 
one at B.iragerhi, another at tSamanpoor on the right, and the third at Parsa 
on the left. Genei’al Marley encamped at Lautan, only two miles west of 
Baragerhi, but no ])rccaution was taken foi- the safety of the outposts of Sajnan- 
poor and Parsa. The result which might have, been anticipated was soon 
realized. Both posts were suddenly attacked on the Ist of January, 1815. 
The attack on Samanpoor was a complete surprise, and all the troops at the 
station were killed or dispersed. At Par.sa an attack had been expected, and 
reinforcements which had been apjJied for were actually on the way, but 
they only arrived in time not to frustrate the attack, but merely to cover the 
I’etreat of the fugitives. 

These lo,s.ses, sufficiently great in themselves, were rendered disastrous by' 
the course which they induced the commjinder to adopt. Alarmed at the 
number of desertions, and even doubtful of the fidelity of those who remained, 
while the terror of a Ghoorka attack, which he would be unable to resist, con¬ 
tinually haunted him, he saw no safety but in a retrogi-ade movement, in order 
to save the depot of Bettia from capture, and give protection to the Sarum 
frontier. His teiTors preceded him, and nothing was talked of at Goruckpoor 
and Tirhoot but the approaching invasion of an overwhelming Ghoorka force. 
Nothing but the weakness of the enemy prevented the catastrophe which 
cowardice thus predicted. The effect however was to enable the Ghoorkas to 
recover nearly'^ the whole of the Tirai, and to carry their incursions once more 
into the British territories. General Marley’s mode of conducting the war had 



Chap. I.] WAR WITH THE GHOOEKAS. 19 

been severely condemned by the governor-general, and he had in consequence a.d. isib. 
been deprived of the command. He was therefore oidy waiting for the arrival 
of his successor, General Wood, when he volunteered a stronger proof of sudden dig- 
imbecility tlian any lie had yet furnished by suddenly disapjiearing from the of oouona 
camp before daylight, without giving the troops any notification of his intention, 
or even making any provision for the ordinary routine of command. The 
absence of such an ofticer could not cause any permanent inconvenience, and tis 
the divi.sion had i-eceived reinfoi’cements which raised it to the number of 13,000, 
it was now better prepiU’cd thiui evei’ for offensive operations. While the 
temporary command was held by Colonel Hick, an affiiir took placo which threw 
the enemy' into gi'eat alarm and inflicted on him con.siderable loss. Lieutenant 
Lfickei'sgill, while engaged with a small escort in survejdiig, fell in with a party 
of 400 Ghoorkas, who in the eageraess of pursuit left the cover of the forest, 
iind followed him in the direction of the British camj). Colonel Dick, on hearing 
the firing, sent forward a ti’(H)p of 100 irregnliir lioise, and followed in i>er.son 
with iill the jackets. The Ghoorkas, totally unccaiseious of the snare into which 
jthey were running, no sooner saw’ how they had entangled theiiiselvcs, than they 
Wire seiztsl with jianic, and niiidc an int'ffectual effort tt) escajie. More thsin 
a hundred, including the commander, were killed, many in attem|)ting to cross 
a str(!am were drowned, and the remainder were either Liken j)risoners dis- 
jx'ised. The afi’air, though in itself comjiaratively insignificant, sjn’ead so much 
.alarm among the Ghoorkas, that they hastily retired from their advanced j)Osts, 
and allowed the Tirai to be again occnjned by the British. 

Considering the pusillanimous course which Genei.al Wood had followed at 
the head of his own ilivision, one is at a loss to account for the infatuation 
which selected him for this new and more important command. When he 
arrived in the en<l of February, 1815, the unhealthy season was still a month 
distant, and there was therefore room for much active service. He thought 
otherwise, and after marching and countermarching as if for the mere purj)o.se 
of assuring himself that the Ghoorkas had really abandoned the lowlands, and 
had no intention of disputing the possession of them, he returned to the frontier, 
and ])laced the army in cantonments. The advance on Khatmandoo, the great The Hiivanca 
object of the campaign, was thus abandoned without having been once seriously niiuKioo 
attein{)ted. In other quarters greater activity was disjdayed, and better results 
wei’t* obtained. Captain (now Major) Latter, who, with his small detachment, was 
stationed on the banks of the Coosy, not only accomplished the defen.sive object 
jirimai-ily contemplated, but drove the Ghoorkas from all their position,s, gained 
jw.ssession of the province of Moorang, and formed an important alliance with the 
Rajah of Sikhim. In the province of Kumaon, forming the very centre of the 
Ghoorka conquests, successes of still greater consequence were accomplished. The 
Rajali Chautra Bam Sak, who had been compelled to yield to the Ghoorka yoke, 
was with his people groaning under it, and ready to embrace any opportunity 



20 


HISTOEY OF INDIA. 


[Book VII. 


A.D. ISIS. 


OpenitJmui 
ill Kiunaon. 


Subjugation 
of Kumaon 
titid Cibur' 

w’al. 


OchtoTlony*8 

BUocesseD. 


which promised the means of deliverance. The inhabitants of the adjoining pro¬ 
vince of Ghurwal were similarly affected. Dislike to the rule of the Rajah of 
Serinagur had induced them to countenance a Ghoorka invasion, but having soon 
found that in changing masters tliey had not improved their condition, they 
were agjiin ready for a new revolution. It was resolved to turn these circum¬ 
stances to account, and Colonel Gardner, after raising an irregular force 
of about 3000 men, began on the 15th of February, 1815, to ascend the hills in 
tlie direction of Almora. He was shortly after followed by another body of 
irregulars under Captsiin Hearstiy. As Colonel Gardner advanced, the Glioorktis 
were driven successively from all their posts, and obliged at last to concen¬ 
trate on the ridge on which Almora stands. Captain Hearsay, after commen¬ 
cing with simil.ar ])romise of success, and capturing Chumpawut, the capital of 
the district, was suddenly attacked while engaged in tlie siege of a liill-fort, 
defeated, and taken prisoner. 

The importance of the operations in Kumaon having now been practically 
tested. Colonel Nicolls was sent thither with a body of about 2000 reguliu* 
troops, and a proportion of field artillery. Having arrived on the 8th of April, 
and assumed the command, he detached Major Paton agsiinst Hastoe Dal 
Chautra, the officer who had defeated Captiiin Hearsay, and who, after lodging 
his prisoner in Almora, had proceeded to the noith-west to occu})y a mountain 
psiss. An encounter took phice, and after a spirited struggle, in which the 
Ghoorkas lost their commander, they were jmt to flight. Before they were 
permitted to recover from the effects of theii’ discomfiture, the stockades in 
front of Almora were attacked, and gallantly carried. Not a moment was 
lost in pi’eparing to attack the fort, and the very next morning the mortars 
opened upon it with destructive effect Bam Sak, who defended it, had not 
hitlierto shown any symptoms of the disaffection which he was supposed to 
entertain. He had even indignantly rejected the advantageous offers made to 
temt)t his fidelity. Tlie bombardment was more effectual. Shortly after it 
commenced, crowds of deserters began to flock into the British camp, and a 
flag of truce announced the readiness of the gjirrison to capitulate. The terms 
were that the Ghoorkas should be permitted to retiie acro,ss the Kalee with 
their arms and peraonal effects, and that not only the fort of Almora, but the 
entire provmces of Kumaon and Ghurwal should be ceded to the British. 
This was unipiestionably the most triumphant result which the Nepaulese war 
had yet yielded. 

Still farther west, though General Martindale in the Debra Doon still 
remained before Jytak, and had abandoned all hope of reducing it except by 
famine. General Ochterlony was continuing his more brilliant career. After 
seizing all the enemy’s posts and confining them to the heights of Malaun, he 
determined to break through the line of their defences. These stretched along 
the summit of the mountain between Malaun on the right, and the fort of 



Chap. I.] 


WAR WITH THE GHOORKAS. 


21 


^urajghur on the left. Still farther to the right, at not much less elevation a.d. wib . 
than Malaun, stood the fort of Ratanghur which had been captured by Colonel 
Arnold. At some distance on the slope below Malaun lay the Ghoorka canton- cenemi 
ments protected by strong stockades. In the line of stockades which stretched 
along the ridge between Malaun and Surajghur, the British commander 
detected two assailable points, Ryla and Deothul, the possession of which would 
enable him to cut off Malaun from most of its dependent outworks. Ryla was 
gallantly attacked and secured on the night of the litli of April, 1815. At 
daybreak of the following morning Deothul was likewise carried, but two other 



View op Almora.— From a drawing by Maason, in Library of East India I^pnse. 

operations which had been carried on simultaneously were less fortunate, 
divert the attention of the enemy during the attack on these posts, 

*letachments were sent from opposite directions against the cantonments, 
one moved off from the column advancing to the attack of Deothul, while the 
other proceeded from the fort of Ratanghur. Though nothing more than a 
diversion was proposed, much more appears to have been attempted. The 
detachment from Ratanghur was in consequence thrown into complete con¬ 
fusion by a furious onset, and pursued by the Ghoorkas with great slaughter. 

The other detachment made good its footing, so far as to be able tojemain on 
the defensive till the evening, when it was withdrawn. On the capture of 
Deothul an attempt yras made to seize a stockade within battering distance of 
Malaun, but was so resolutely met, that the assailants were seized with panic 
and driven back in the utmost confusion. 

The po.ssession of Deothul was so obviously fraught with danger to the Attadion 
enemy that a fierce struggle was foreseen, and as far as possible provided 
against, by strengthening it with reinforcements, protecting it with a species of 
Stockade, and planting two field-pieces upon it. The anticipated attack took 
place on the IGth of April. It was headed by Bhakti Sing Thapa, a distin¬ 
guished Ghoorka leader, and suppoi'led by Amar Sing In person. At daybreak 


To DiKoater B\m 

taiiied by 
two Itritish do* 
r£tj tacbment. 




22 


HISTOEY OF INDIA. 


[Book VIT. 


A.D. ISIS, the enemy was seen advancing in a semicircle along the ridge and its tw<^ 
declivities, so as to envelope the position and turn both its flanka The charge 
TheGhoorka was fierce and resolute, the Ghoorkas advancing to the very muzzle of tlie guns, 
Deothui and returning repeatedly to the charge in the face of showere of grape. Tlie 
reiniisoa. after it had been persisted in for two hours, having slackened. Colonel 

Tliompson, who commanded the post, seized the opportunity to order a charge 
with the bayonet. It was completely successful, and tlie Ghoorkas, unable any 
longer to maintain the struggle, fled in disorder. Bhakti Sing lay dead on the 
field with .500 of his.countrymen, and Amar Sing collecting his scattered troops 
retired into Malaun. He was now so com]>letely crest-fallen that he offered 
scarcely any resistance to the subsequent operations for completely investing it. 
/i battery of heavy guns began b) play on the woi'ks, and 

lowoiii.yii preparations for the assault had become visible, when the great body of the 

convtiiitioii. , 1 t • 1 • i fN 

gjUTison, nnablc either to iimnce Amar Sing to surrender or to endure the 
privations of a ngorous blockade, loft the fort without arms, and gave them¬ 
selves up to the nearest British post. As a .show of resi,stance continued, the 
breaching batteiy again opened on the lOth. Its destructive effects convinced 
Am.ar Sing of the uselessness of further resistance, and he sent his son on the 
followijig morning to intimate his desire to negotiate. By the convention 
with him. it was stipulated that the Ghooikas should cede all their territories 
west of the Jumna, and that he himself, and all the members of the Thapa 
family, together.witli the garrison of Malaun and part of that of Jytak, should 
be allowed to return to Nepaul with their personal property and their arms. 
Many of the private.s, instead of going to Nepaul, jircfeiTed entei’ing the British 
service, and were formed into battalions for duty in the highland districts. 
NoKotiatioiis yjie nrovemmcnt of Nepaul saw the necessity of suing for peace. With this 
view Bam Sak Chautra was employed to communicate with the British com¬ 
missioner in Kumaon, and Gaj Kaj Misr, the Gooroo or spiritual teacher of the 
late Rajah Rana Bahadur, was summoned fi-orn his retirement at Benares, and 
sent as envoy to Colonel Bradshaw, whom the governor-general had empowered 
to conclude a peac;e on the following conditions:—the cession of the hill countrj'^ 
west of the Kaleo or Gogni—the abandonment of all claims on the lands in 
dispute before the war commenced—the cession of the Tirai throughout its 
whole extent—the restoration of a tiact which had been taken from the Rajah 
of Sikhim, now become a Bi itish ally—and the admission of a British resident 
at Khatmandoo. When these terms were made known to the Gooroo, he ob¬ 
jected particularly to the ce.ssion of the Tirai, which, by stripping the nobles and 
ministers of their jaghii-es, would leave them without support, as well as deprive 
the country of the main source from which its supplies of gi’ain were obtained, 
and the admission of a resident, who, it was feared, might repeat the coursb 
taken in Oude, and ultimately appropriate all the real powers of government. 
A long negotiation enfeued, during which the Nepaulese showed themselves 



ClIAP. I.j 


WAB WITH THE GHOORKAS. 


23 


well acquainted with all the wiles of diplomacy. Ultimately, however, every a. d. i816. 
pt)int in dispute seemed to be arranged, and on the 2d of December, 1815, the 
treaty was duly executed at Segoulee by the British agent and the Nepaulese Twaty con- 
commissioners, the latter promising that the ratiiication would, be returned not ratified 
from Khatraandoo in fifteen days. The governor-general, flattering himself Noilmicu 
that a war of which ho had become heartily tired was now advantageously 
ended, ratified the treaty on the Dtli of December. The Rajah of Nepaul took 
the matter more coolly, an<l instead of the ratification, the commissioners 
received a letter from the regent, informing them that through the ififluence of 
Araar Sing Tliapa the war party was again in the ascendant. After such an 
evasion, it might have seemed that the only dignified course left was to declare 
the negotiation at an end and recommence liostilitiea Strange to say, the 
governor-general was now of a spirit so diflerent from that which he had 
di.sj»layed at the outset, that he allowed his agent almost to solicit the ratifica¬ 
tion, by holding out hopes that, if it were given, the terms of the treaty would 
not be rigorously enforced. It appeals, in fact, that be was now willing not 
.only to leave the Nepaulese in jiosse.ssion of the Tirai, but to make tliem a 
present of the very districts which had been the whole cause of the wai'. The 
ground on which the governor-general justified this extraordinary concession 
was, that.tlie districts, though worth fighting for as a point of honour, wiTc 
otherwise of no real value, and tlierefore, after the Nepaulese had yielded the 
point of honour by ceasing to claim them as a right, nothing was lost by 
allowing them to resume possession of them as a favour. Surely if the districts 
were so worthless, the point of honour supposed to be involved might, and 
ought to have been satisfied by some milder method than a bloody and pro¬ 
tracted war. 

The relaxation of demands by the governor-general at the very time when lunowai 
tlio prevaricating conduct of the Nepaulese government made it more than ever 
imperative to insist upon them, produced the result which has almost invariably 
been realized when negotiating with native Btate.s. Modei’ation was mistaken 
for conscious weakness, and the court of Khatmandoo, which had j>reviously 
been willing to purchase peace on any term.s, began to question the propriety 
of even desiring it. The negotiation was indeed nominally continued, but 
every day made it more and more apparent that the real object was to spin out 
the time till the proj^er season for action had passed away. This conviction 
having at length forced itself on the governor-general, he ordered hostilities to 
be vigorously renewed. General (now Sir David) Ocbterlony, having been 
vested with the chief command, political as well as military, took the field in 
the beginning of February, 181G, with an army of nearly 17,000 men, which 
he-arranged in four brigades. One of these he detached by the right to pene¬ 
trate by Harikurpoor, and another to the left to penetrate by Ramnuggur, 
while with the other two he set out* on the 12th of February, and marched 



24 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book VII. 


A.D. 1816. 


Tha Chiria- 
ghsti Pbm 
left luiat- 
tempted. 


Uejiurn) 
Oolitarlony 
makee hie 
way by an 
other piwa. 


through the forest to the foot of the Chiriaghati Pass. This pass, formed by 
the bed of a mountain torrent, was not only difficult in itself from natural 
obstacles, but was defended by successive tiers of stockadea It could hardly 
have been forced at all, and certainly not without a very serious loss. Fortu¬ 
nately another pass was discovered, which, though even more difficult than the 
other, pre.sented the great advantage of being undefended. It was a deep 
ravine, with rugged and precipitous sides, covered with overhanging trees, 
which nearly excluded the light. At night on the 14th of February', Sir David 



IlEnLE BY WHICH GeNEHAL OCIITERLONY TDBNEI) THE CHIRIAOHATI PABa. 

From Printep't Nftrrahvoof the PolUiotl aud MiUUr}-Transactions of India under the Maiquls Ilastings> 


Ochterlony, leaving the fourth brigade at the mouth of the ravine, began hi 
asceml it with the third brigade, he himself leading at the head of his majesty’s 
87th regiment, by a path so narrow as seldom to afford room for more than a 
single file. After proceeding thus for some distance, the gi-ound became more 
open, till a water-course was entered, and found to lead to the base of a steep 
acclivity about 300 feet high. With infinite difficulty, by laying hold of 
boughs and pi'ojecting rocks, the advance clambered up, and by eight in the 
morning had gained the summit. It was ten at night before the rest of the 
troops and two field-pieces were got up. The three following days were spent 
by the pioneers in making the ascent practicable for the conveyance of stores 
and ammunition, but the main difficulty had now been overcome, and the 
troops were able to advan<jje without encountering any very serious obstacle. 
On the day after the ascent the general arrived at Hetaunda on the banks of 
the Raptee, and was delighted by the junction of the 4th brigade. The 
Ghoorkas, on finding that the Chiriaghati Pass was turned, had abandoned 
their stockades, and allowed the brigade to ascend without opposition. 

On the 27th of February Sir David Ochterlony amved in the vicinity of 
Mukwanpoor, and endimped on a level ‘about two miles to the south of its 



Chap. I.] 


PEACE WITH THE GHOOEKAS. 


25 

foiiified heights. A village on the left, which a strong detachment of the a d. isio. 
enemy had abandoned, was immediately occupied, but only to become the scene 
of a despenite struggle, for the enemy, apparently convinced that they had Fm-thw 
done wrong in retiring,.no sooner saw the position occupied than they returned o«u^” 
to attempt the recovery of it. As it was only held by three companies of 
native infantry and forty men of the 87th, the assailants probably anticipated 
an easy conquest, but reinforcements continued to pour in from both sides, till 
tlie engagement became almost general. The Ghoorkas sent down at least 2000 
men fiom the heights. All their efforts, however, though made and main¬ 
tained with their usual dauntless valour, proved unavailing, and they were 
finally I’epulsed with a very heavy loss. On the day after this affair the first 
brigade, under Colonel Nicolls, arrived. It had ascended by a pass to the north 
of Kainnuggur, and then marched without opposition up the valley of the 
llapteo. The second brigade, under Colonel Kelly, was also advancing. It had 
' arrived at the foi’t of Harikurpoor by selecting a mountain pass which was not 
stockaded, and almost immediately gained a commanding position, from which 
J,ho Ghoorkas endeavoured in vain to dislodge it. This failure so disheartened 
the sjarrison of the fort that it was forthwith evacu.ated without further struggle, tuo 

, ^ i*f puaou 

I’hc successes with which the new campaign liAd opened liad changed the nitifici 
views of Ijie Nepaulesc chiefs, and the peace party once more predominated. 

Hence, as Sir David Ochterlony was preparing for the siege of Mukwanpoor, 
the commandant, Avho was a brother of the regent, sent a messenger to intimate 
to him that he liad received the ratified treaty from Khatmandoo, and i-ecpiested 
p(irmission to send it to him in charge of an agent. On the 3d of March the 
agent arrived, and as the document was duly executed, liostilities of course 
ceased, but not till consent had been given to an additional article, which 
8 ti[>ulated that the ceded territory should include-thc valley of the llaptee, and 
whatever had been conquered during the actual campaign. At the time when 
the cession of the Tirai was demanded by the British government, the objection 
that it would leave many of the princij)al chiefs without the means of siqiport 
was met by a pioposal from the governor-general to grant pensions to those 
whom the ce.s.sion would deprive of their jaghires. This proposal was submitted 
to Muth great reluctance, because, as it was justly argued, the pensioned lords 
would be more likely to favour British interests than those of their own sove¬ 
reign. Much gratification was therefore felt by the rajah when the Honourable 
Mr. Gardner, who had been appointed British resident at Khatmiindoo, was 
authorized by the governor-general to propose that the pensions should be 
commuted for a grant of lands. The arrangement was at once enteretl into, 
and the Nepaulese, who had previously been gratuitously reinstated in the 
Tirai, could henceforth boast that, after all the disasters which the war had 
cautsed them, they remained at the conclusion- of it in possession of a portion of 
the very lands which it was the avowed object of the war to wrest from them. 

VoL. IIT, 2 Q 0 



26 


HISTOEY OF INDIA. 


[Book VII. 


3Iisaioiis 
of tho 
Ghoorkas 
1 foroigu 
coiirta. 


A.D. 1816 . It must still be admitted that after all these cessions, considerable territorial 
acquisitions remained with the Company. The magnificent provinces of Kumaon 
naraitofthe and Ghurwal had been formally annexed to the British dominions, and several 
N^uiew rajahs, though left nominally independent, were placed under restrictions 
which made all their military resources available for British purposes. The 
treaty with the Rajah of Sikhim was also an excellent stroke of policy, as .it 
interposed an insurmountable barrier between Nepaul and Bootan, and thus 
made it impossible for these two states to go to war with each other, as they 
ceased to be contiguous, and therefore could not engage in hostilities without 
violating territory which belonged to the Company, or which the Company 
was pledged to protect. There can scarcely be a doubt that, but for this inter¬ 
position of Sikhhn, the Ghoorkas, when deprived of their western conqu^ts, 
would have endeavoured to compensate themselves by the subjugation of Bootan. 
jiiMiojis Though the war never extended beyond the territories belonging to or claimed 
Ghnorkas by Ncpaul, the Ghoorkas, when they commenced hostilities, were not without the 
difrtT'’" being joined by powerful allies. They had made application in every 

quarter which gave any promise of success. A correspondence between Scindia 
and the Ghoorka government was actually intercepted. The Pindarees were 
also applied to, and Ruujeet Sin^ was tempted by the offer of a large sura, 
together with the fort of Malauu, in return for his assistance. During the 
early reverses which the British arms sustained, the Ghoorkas flattered them¬ 
selves with the hope of a general rising among the native powers of Hindoostan. 
They did not even confine to India their applications for aid, but sent a mission 
to the court of Ava and endeavoured to engage the Emperor of China in their 
quarrel. They had, as already explained, acknowledged themselves to be the 
emjieror's tributaries, and partly on this ground, and still more on the false 
allegation that the Engli.sh were making war upon them, merely because they 
had refused them a passage into the Chinese tenitory, they earnestly solicited 
him to a.ssist them, either with money or with an army. The Chinese, though 
doubting the truth of this statement, indulged their naturally suspicious temper 
so far as to send an army to the frontier. It did not arrive, however, till 
hostilities were at an end, and the governor-general had, by explanation, 
convinced the Chinese authoidties that the Ghoorka statement as to the cause 


of the war was unfounded. Their oAvn shrewdness, indeed, had previously 
led them to the same conclusion. “ Such absurd measures as those alluded to,” 
they obsefved, “appear quite inconsistent with the usual wisdom of the 
Englishand the Ghoorka statement was declared to be manifestly false, 
because the English, if they had wished to invade the Chinese dominions, 
could have found a nearer route than through Nepaul. The authorities in 
England, though doubtful at first of the necessity of the war, and of the wisdom 
of the plan adopted in conducting it, were delighted with the final result. The 
crown testified approbation by conferring on the govex-nor-general the title of 



CnAP. 1.] 


STATE OF CUTCH. 


27 


Marquis of Hastings, and on the commander the baronetage already mentioned, a d. isia. 
while the courts of directors and proprietors not only concurred in unanimous 
votes of thanks to tliem and the officers and men engaged, but bestowed on Sir 
David Ochteiiony a well-earned pension of £1000 a year. 

During the war in Nepaul, transactions of some importance took place in state of 
other quarters. The native state of Cutch, consisting of a kind of peninsula, cutcu. 
tnmnected with Scinde on the north and with 
Gujerat on the east by a very extensive salt 
marsh called the Ran or Runn, and bounded 
on the south by the Gulf of Cutch, and on 
the west by the Indian Ocean, was nominally 
under the government of a ruler with the 
title of Row Raidhan, but had become really 
subject to two adventurers, the one Hans-raj, 
a Hindoo merchant, and the other Futteh 
Mahomed, the commander of a body of Arab 
mercenaries. The two, in theii’ struggle for 
.supremacy, courted the interference of the 
British government, which, however, inter- ;. 
posed only so far as seemed necessary to pro¬ 
tect the territoiies of the Guicowar from 
Cutch depredation. The contest seemed ter- Arab mebcehaeikh m pay of the uow of cotcu. 
minated by the death of Hans-ra,j in 1809, and 

tlie consequent undi.sputed ascendency of liis comjfetitor, but in 1813 the confu¬ 
sion became worse than ever. In that year, both Futteh Mahomed and tlie Row 
died, and the succession was disputed. Tlie Row, who had embraced Mahome¬ 
tanism, left a son, Bhai’malji, by a Mahometan wife. The Jhaneja Rajpoot, of 
whom the Row was the head, refused to acknowledge his legitimacy, and gave 
their allegiance to Lakpati, the late Row’s nephew. The civil war which ensued uritmii in- 
was thus pai-tly of irreligious character, and continued to rage with such alterna¬ 
tions o^succe.ss, that regular government almost ceased to exist. The chiefe there¬ 
fore followed their natural bent, and not satisfied with the narrow limits of 
Cutch, crossed the Runn on foot and the gulf in boats, and carried their depreda¬ 
tions over the whole of the adjoining territory, canying off tlie cattle, burning 
the villages, and murdering the inhabitants. As the Guicowar, whose territory 
was thus ravaged, was an ally of the British and under their jTrotection, it 
became necessary, after remonstrance had proved in vain, to send a body of 



troops against Bhooj, the capital of Cutch. Here both, the competitors for the 
throne were resident. They had cemented their quarrel by a compromise 
which left Bharmalji in possession of the sovereignty; but the anarchy which 
previously prevailed was scarcely diminished, since the new sovereign, so far 
from suppressing the marauders, made common caus.e with them, and even 


A. I). 1810. 


BHtialj in- 

in aiTaini 
of CMtoh. 


MjUt'iry 

ojHsratioTiM. 


of Cntoii. 


State of tho 
Nizani'R 
(ioiniiiionB. 


28 HISTORY OF INDIA. [Book VII. 

fomented disturbances in Kattiwar, the province of Gujerat immediately 
opposite to the Gulf of Cutch. His defiance, indeed, was so openly declared, 
that he ordered a native agent whom the British had stationed in Bhooj to 
withdraw, and had a large body of Arabs on the march to assist the rebels in 
Kattiwai-, when they learned that the rebellion was suppressed. 

Colonel East, by whose exertions a rebellion, which thus threatened to 
assume more formidable dimensions, had been nipped in the bud, was directed to 
advance into Cutch for the purpose of punishing this overt act of hostility, and 
taking such measures as might be nece.s8{uy to pi-event a repetition of it. In 
pui'suance of these objects he croased the Runn in December, 1815, and pro¬ 
ceeded towards Anjar. It was held by a son of the late Futteh Mahomed, 
who made fiiendly professions, and at the same time gave the lie to them, by 
ordering the wells on tlie British line of march tt) be jioisoned. To punish his 
treachery, batteries were erected against his fort, and when a practicable breach 
was effected, he only saved himself from worse consequences by surrendering 
Anjai-, and ceding along with it the small port of Juncr, on the Gulf of Cutch. 
The Row, deterred by this first result of the campaign, prevented the capture of 
his capital by a timely submission, and entered into a treaty which bound him 
not only to defray the expenses of the war, and compensate for the devastations 
of his marauders, but to assist in putting them down, and acknowledge himself 
a British tributary by the annual payment of £7000. In return he was taken 
under British protection, and established in full possession of the districts which 
refractory chiefs had wre.sted from him. After the pacification of Cutch, 
Colonel East returned to Kattiwar, and took the most effectual method of sup- 
])ressing the juracyfor which the Gulf of Cutch had long been notorious, bj’’ 
disj)()ssessing the chiefs along its southern .shore, and suljecting their harbours 
and strongholds to Briti.sh authority. Among the places captui’ed on this 
occasion was Dwaraka, situated near the north-west extremity of the Kattiwar 
pcniiLsula, and famous throughout India for its great temple of Krishna. 

The next .scene of di.sturbance reciuiring notice is Hyderabad, the cajjital of 
the Kizam. Under the arrangement which had given the chief management 
of affairs to Chandu Lai, and rendered him at the same time completely subser¬ 
vient to the British resident, the Nizam, and his fiivourite minister Moonir-ul- 
Moolk, had ceased to interfere in public business, and found more congeniid 
employment in grovelling indulgence.s. The Nizam’s sons did not bear their 
exclusion fi’om office so coolly, and compensated themselves by becoming the 
heads of riotous brawlers and contending factions. The two youngest sons in 
particular, surrounded by a band of profligate retainers, kept the city in constant 
alarm by their lawless proceedings. The Nizam would rather not have inter¬ 
fered, but the remonstrances of the resident obliged him to bestir himself, and 
. he issued orders that the necessary steps should be taken to restrain them. The 
body of troops sent for this purpose found Jthe task more difficult than had been 



Chap. I.] 


STATE OF THE NIZAM’S DOMINIONS. 


29 


anticipated. On approaching the palace, the retainers of the princes opened a a.d. isis. 
heavy fire, and killed a British officer of the resident’s escort. In the struggle 
which ensued, the defence of the princes was so well maintjiined, that the iimirreo- 
British detachment, after blowing open the palace gatos, were unable to advance, IJyderaImt] 
and deemed it prudent to retire for reinforcements. During the ensuing night 
the whole city Avas in commotion, and courtiei-s wore not wanting to advise the 
Nizam that he could not do better than free himself at once from the British 
yoke, by overwhelming the troops at the r-esidency before the reinforcements 



Town ani> Temi'l.1^ of DwAitAi'kA.—fruai GriiiUliiy'ri K^uery of Wostoru liidiu.. 


could arrive. He listened to better advice, and instead of tiiking a course by 
which lie must inevitably have been ruined, by withdrawing all countenance 
from the princes, he made them aware of the gulf on which they stood, and 
convinced them that they had no alternative but to submit. They were 
obliged notwithstanding to pay the penalty of their misconduct, and wei’e con¬ 
fined in the old fortress of Golconda. 

Another disturbance, originating in more trivial causes, threatened to pro- opposition 
ducc more serious results. The inhabitants of India dread nothing so much as iio«»t..iiow 
innovation, and have an especial abhorrence of taxation, when it presents itself 
under a new form. This latter feeling receives an easy explanation, when it is , 
remembered how much they have suffered from the extortion of their l ulers, 
and how often occasion has been taken to convert some .small as.se.ssment, 
imposed ostensibly for .some distinct and temporary purjiose, into a permanent, 
indefinite, and ojipressive burden. The land had always been the main soui’ce 
of revenue, and the .share of its produce demanded by government, though often 
oppressive in its amount, was seldom openly resisted. The payment of it was 
looked upon as a kind of law of nature, and, however much it might be grumbled 
at, excited neither disappointment nor indignation. With a new tax the case 
was entirely different, and hence, when the government of Bengal in 1813, | 
daring the administration of Lord Minto, endeavoured to increase the revenue ' 




30 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book VII. 


A.D. 1814. 


Passfve re< 
i»Litaiioe to 
taxation at 
B«xiar(»». 


0)1611 ra* 
MHtnnuo at 
' Bareilly. 


by a bouse tax, the opposition was so general and determined, that nothing but 
a repeal could quiet it. At Benares, in particular, the inhabitants desisted from 
their ordinary employments, shut tlieir shops, and encamping in the open fields 
at a short distance from the city, sent a petition to the magistrate, in which 
they declared that they would never return to their liomes till the tax was 
removed. This pa,s.sivo re.sistance was more eftectual than any violent outbreak 
could have been in convincing the government of the necessity of yielding, and 
khe idea of increasing the public revenue by a house tax was abandoned. 

Government though defeated was veiy unwilling to acknowledge it, and in 
the following year endeavoured to establish the principle of a house assessment 
by confining it to police yiurposes, and giving it the form of a voluntary pay¬ 
ment, by leaving it to the inhabitsints to assess themselves in their different 
wards by means of committees of their own .selection. At first, the only cities 
so assessed were Dacca, Patna, and Moorshedabad, but when the precedent was 
by this means secured, the sphere of its oj>eration was largely extended, and 
embraced, in addition to the lower provinces, the districts of Benares and 
Bareilly. Though strong di,s,satisfaction with the assessment wsis generally 
felt, Benares was conteixted to rest satisfied with its former victory, and con¬ 
sented, not without manifest repugnance, to pay its quota of assessment. The 
opposition of Bareilly was not so easily overcome. This city, situated not far 
from the centre of the Rohilla country, contained among its inhabitants not a 
few families who had fallen from high rank and wealth into comparative insig¬ 
nificance, and could trace their sad revei’se of fortune to the iniquitous bargain 
by •wdiich Waiven Hastings sold them to the Nabob of Oude. The injustice 
which they liad suffered on this and on other occasions .still rankled in their 
hearts, and as it Avas im2)o.ssible that they could feel any real attachment to a 
government which had so used them, they were ready to lay hold of any real or 
imaginary gi-ievance which would enable them to give free vent to their dissatis- 
fivetion. The military and turbulent propensities of the population generally, 
easily induced them to take })art in any commotion however occasioned, and 
there were be.sides several local causes of animo.sity'. The kotwal, or head of 
the polipe, obnoxious to the Mahometans merely because he was a Hindoo, 
had made himself generally detested by his overbearing conduct, and the British 
magistrate, instead of conciliating good-will by frank and courteous manners, 
had acted as if he thought that his dignity could only be preserved by distant 
and haughty aii-s, which so offended the more respectable native families, that 
they kept aloof fi’om all friendly intercourse with him. The materials being 
thus prepared, any spark was sufficient to excite the conflagration. 

An assessment for municipal police was not an absolute novelty in Bareilly. 
In the principal thoTOUghfares the shopkeepers had been accustomed to provide 
for the security of their property by a moderate police rate. On their part, 
then, the only objection felt to the rate'was its increased amount. This was 



Ohap. r.] INSUREECTION AT BAREILLY. 31 

doubtless a grievance, but it -wns light compared with the grievance felt by a.d. isia. 
those who, formerly exempted from the rate, were now for the first time to be 
subjected to it. The chief persons in this position were the reduced families Obnoxiou* 
already mentioned. In the midst of their poverty most of them managed to nousmeixt at 
keep as many retainers as were quite sufficient for their own protection, and the 
effect of the new rate was therefore only to increase their burdens, without 
conferring upon them any benefit. No doubt they might dismiss retainers and 
leave it to the municipal police to protect them. This, however, was the very 
last step which they were disposed to take. To dismiss their retainers was to 
subject them to what they considered degradation; and a tax wliich threatened 
to compel them to do this was not only disliked as a burden, but repudiated 
as an insult. 

The attempt to obtain a voluntary assessment by means of committees offAtterapt <o 

^ . onforoeU. 

the inhabitants having entirely failed in Bai’eilly, the magistrate ordered the 
kotwal to apportion and levy it at his own discretion. In performing this 
task, which must under any circumstances have been attended with much diffi¬ 
culty, he is said to have proceeded with the greatest harshness, threatening the 
lower orders with the stocks, and the higher with chains and im^misonment. 

While the whole city was thus in a ferment, and the popular indignation at its 
height, one of the police ])eons, when resisted in levying the tax, wounded a 
woman. The populace immediately placed her on a bed, and carried her to 
the mufti Mahomed Arwaz, whose sanctity Avas held in the highest reputation 
throughoiit Rohilcund. He hivd early coimtenanced the popular excitement, and 
on being thus api)e.aled to, advised that the woman should be forthwith taken 
to the magistrate’s re,sidence. The answer obtained there was, that the woman 
must lodge Irer complaint before the proper court in due form. The excitement 
and irritation wore too great to be appeased V)y a I’egular process, and the mufti 
gi'catly increased both, by declaring that, if justice was to be so dispensed, no 
man’s life or honour was safe. Mobs now began to assemble in the streets, 
and assumed so threatening an appearance near the mufti’s house that it was 
deemed necessary to disperse them. On the appearance of the magistrate at 
the head of a few horsemen and sepoys, it was sxispected that he meant to . 
apprehend the mufti. This the multitude were determined not to permit, and 
an encounter took place, during which some lives were lost, and the mufti 
made his escape. 

A general insun’ection was now imminent. The green flag of Islam, hoisted inenwection 
on the slrrine in which the mufti had taken refuge, announced to the faithful 
that their religion was in danger, and in addition to those in Bareilly itself, 
crowds of fanatics began to flock in from the neighbouring towns. In the 
course of two days about 6000 men appeared in arms. The officials on their 
part were not idle. The force at their immediate command amounted to 420 
men, with two guns, while reinforcements were hastening forward by forced 



32 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book VI r. 


A.D. ISIS, marches from MoradabacL Meantime a parley with the insurgents took place, 
and the mufti would gladly have escaped from the storm which he had raised. 
iiMurreotion It was beyond his power, and the insurgents, left to their own guidance, dictated 
as their only terms that the tax should be abolished—that the kotwal should 
be delivered up to punishment for the blood which had been shed—that the 
families of the suffei-ers should be provided for—and that a general amnesty 
should be proclaimed. As the.se terms wei’e at once refused, the rioters lost 
not a moment in proceeding to extremes, by shooting dovTi a youth, the .son of 
one of the judges of the circuit court, as he was passing unarmed from one 



military post to another, and then making a sudden onset on the troop.s within 
the town before the expected reinforcements arrived. The result was not long 
doubtful. The insurgents, first resisted and then pursued, fled, leaving behind 
them about 400 dead, and a greater number of wounded and prisoners. The 
defeat was most 0 ]:)portune, as there cannot be a doubt that a first success on 
the part of the popuhice would have been followed by a general rising. No 
attempt was made to renew the conflict. The mufti and other ringleaders 
escaping beyond the Company’s bounds were not sought after, and the few 
trials which took place terminated without conviction, either from want of 
evidence or because leniency seemed preferable to severity. 

Disturb Before resuming the general narrative there is only one other disturbance 

anoea in tho . . ^ ^ ^ 

Doab. which requires to be noticed at present. The locality was the Doab. The talook- 
dars there had managed, during the anarchy which prevailed, to seize large tracts 
of property to which they had no legal claim, and to exercise powera of jurisdic¬ 
tion which converted them into petty sovereigns. Under the license thus per¬ 
mitted them they had multiplied the numbers of their military retainers, and 
erected forts which they held as their own in defiance of all authority. The 
confusion and oppreteion which en.sued* may easily be imagined. The people 








CnAP. tj DISTUEBANCES IN THE DOAB. 33 

appealed in vain to the paramount power, and it was soon seen that all efforts to 
relieve them would be unavailing, unless the strongholds in which their oppres¬ 
sors, had entrenched themselves were dismantled. It was necessary to begin 
with an example, and for this purpose Byaram, as zeininadar or talookdar of 
Hatras and various other districts, was selected as at once one of the largest and 
most refractory. His capital of Hatras, situated in the district of Alighur, about 
thirty miles north of Agra, coirsisted as usual of a town and a fort, the former 
inclosed by a wall Jind a ditch, and the latter perched on an eminence, and so 
fortified with walls, towers, and bastions, as to be I'egarded as a place of con- 
.siderable strength. Dyaram’s whole force Avas about 3500 caA^alry and 4500 
infantry. He made a ready profe.ssiou of allegiance to the British government, 
but on being called to giA’c a proof of it by disbanding his troops and dis¬ 
mantling his fort,-ga\’^e an answer which .showed that nothing short of com- 
pulsitm would sufiice. A strong division under Cloneral Marshall accordingly 
marched .against Hatras, .and completely invested it on the 12th of February, 
1816. By the 23d the walls of the town Avere etfectually breached, but the 
•garrison, on seeing preparations to stoian, retreated into the foi-t. TIjc siegi* of 
it was immediately commenced by the erection of })Owerful batterie.s, Avhich 
opened their fii-e from numeroTis mort.ars .and breaching-guns with such destruc¬ 
tive effect, that Dyar.am'.saw the \iselessncss of further defence. This conviction 
Avas hastened by .a tremendous explo.sidn, caused by the firlling of a shMl upon 
a j)owder magazine; and at midnight of the 2(1 of March he consulted his OAvn 
.sjvfoty by (piitting the fort with .a small body of retainers, who, though discov- 
ci’ed, .and atbicked by a body of dragoon.s, fought their Av.ay, and made good 
their i-etreat, after ijjflicting more lo,ss than they I'cceived. This .success Avas 
attributed not more to their courage than to the completene.ss of their aimour, 
consi.sting ]>artly of b.ack and breast plates, and gauntlets of steel. After 
Byaram’s escape little resistance was offered, and the cai)ture and demolition of 
the fort produced such an effect on the other talookdars, that they hastened to 
give in their submission. 


A.D. 1810. 


Capture nf 
Ilnti'UA 


VoL. III. 


201 



A.I». m:\. 


<»t tho 
)H>lu:y oj* 

loivnci*. 


Necttetiity of 
Aluuidoii 
iiiK il 


34 


UISTOEY OF INDIA. [Book VII. 


CHAPTER IL 


IJukniiiiiatiiin to put down the predatory system—Belations between the Guicowar and the Peishwa— 
Mission of Gungadhur Sastree—His assassination—Trimbukjoc Dainglia, tlie Peishwa's favourite, 
aeeused and imprisotied at Tanna—Proposed alliance with the Naboljs of Bhopaul and Saugur— 
Sulwidiary alliance with Nagjioor—Thu Piudarees—Their origin—Tlioir leaders—Their system of 
plunder—The governor-general’s jxditiy in regard to them—Now treaty with Scimlia—Now alliances 
—Apa Sahib, llajah of Berar —Trimbukjee Dainglia escapes from Tanna—Proceedings at I’oonah— 
New treaty witli tlie Peishw.a. 


T the time wLeii the Nepaulese war commenced it was foreseen 
that in various other quarters hostilities could nt^t be distant. 
The policy of non-interference had aecomjilished the short¬ 
sighted and selfish views which had led to its adoption. It 
had indeed left the native states to carry on their quan’els in 
tlieir own way, and thus involved them in interminable intestine dissensi<mH, but 
it had not thereby secured tlie territories of the Conifiany from aggression, or 
enabled them to ilisjien.se with a large military est<ablishment. While the strong 
were pei’initted with impunity to prey ujion the weak, and nono^'elt secure but 
those who were able to repel force by force, all idea of amiisible and legal settle¬ 
ment was necessarily abandoned, and a species of general anarchy pi’cvailed. 
As a necessary consequence the jn’edatory system, which had always been one of 
the greatest curses of India, received a new development, and bands of armed 
marauders were rapidly spreading over tlie whole countr3^ Wherever tliere was 
a hope of plunder, they were sure to be found adding to the general confusion 
and committing fearful devastation. For a time the awe which the Company’s 
arms hail ins]»ired deterred the marauders from venturing on incursions into 
their territories. It was impossible, however, thatdt could opercatc as a perma¬ 
nent resti’aint, and as soon as the means of plunder became deficient in the parts 
of Centi’al India where the principal predatory hordes had established their 
head-quartei-s, the Company’s frontier wiis no longer held sacred, and both their 
allies and their immediate subjects were pillaged without mercy. The policy 
previously in fashion, when it became necessary to provide against these de- 
.structive inroads, gave the preference to defensive operations, and an attempt 
was made to estsrblish a line of posts to guard the points where it seemed pro¬ 
bable that the marauders would attempt to break through. The futilitj^of this 
plan was soon demonstrated. It was impossible thus to guard the frontier, and 
had it been possible, the permanent expense which it entailed was far greater 
than would suffice to follow the marauders into their own haunts and com- 




OUAP. 11.] 


POLICY OP NON-INTERFERENCE. 


33 


pletely extirpate them. The ollenaive, therefore, was the only plan which a.d. isii. 
promised to be effectual; and the governor-general, convinced of its necessity, 
woiild at once have given effect to it, had he not deemed it prudent and be- Necessity of 
coming to obtain the previous sanction of the home authorities. In order to policy of 
put down the predatory system it would be necessary to deprive it of the 11"“!,',"'“' 
countenance and sujiport which it received from some of the native princes, 
and tliis could only be done by taking measures whicli could not be reconciled 
with the j)olicy of non-interference. The question, thei’cfore, which the home 
authorities were called upon to decide was, whether this policy was to be per¬ 
sisted in, notwithstanding all the evils which it had engendered, or whether a 
return should be made to the more manly and vigorous jiolicy which the Mar- 
(piis of Wellesley had adojitod, and which, if it had been followed out, would 
have made the British authority paramount throughout India. Before the 
an.sM'tu’ of the home authorities tt> this important question was received, several 
imiiortant events oecurj-ed. 

The relations between the I’eishwa and the Guicowar had long been in an iici.iii.Mi.H 

^ , lK5t.\tUCU tllO 

Mmsatisfaiitory state. The former had advanced claims upon the latter to tlie j'owIiwhjhhi 
amount of nearly £3,000,000 sterling. By the treaties of alliance with the two 
courts, the British goveniment had become bound to arbitrate in the setth'- 
inent of Ihese claims, and a most complicated accounting had taken j)lace 
witbont producing any practical re.siilt. Tlie Peishwa would fain have taken 
the matter into his own hands and made good his claims by force. This, how¬ 
ever, he could not do without an op)en violation of the treaty of Bassoiu, and 
for this, though there was good ground to susi>eet that he had it in contempla¬ 
tion, he was not yet pirepiircd. It was therefore necessary for him, while com- 
])laiuing hnidly of the injustice w^hich he suffered from delay, to allow the 
accounting to proceed. But though force was jirecluded, intrigue was still 
o])en to him, and he had secured a ))arty which pdeased him the more, from 
not only favouring his claims, but being decidedly adverse to British interests. 

In 1814 the Peishwa became extremely urgent for the settlement of bis claims, 
and was able to give pdausiWe I'easons for liis urgency. The district of Ahme- 
dabad was sliai’ed between him and the Guicowar, but the whole was in p)o.s- 
sossioii of the latter on a ten years’ lease, which was about to exp)ire. A new 
arrangement was lienee absolutely necessary, and the Peishwa had declared 
his determination not to relet, but to enter into actual possession. 

The court of Baroda at this time gave full scopie for intrigue. Anand Row, stotoof 
the nominal sovereign, was in a state bordering on idiotcy, and a younger 
brother, Futtch Sing, administered the government as regent. For this piosition 
he was mainly indebted to British influence, and consequently felt the necessity 
of being in a gi’eat measure subservient to it. The party oppiosed to liim natu- 
mlly followed a different course, and thus gave rise to two factions who wore 
constantly striving to thwart each other. Gungadhur Sastree, Futteh Sing’s 


partioH at 
tUo court (if 
the bitter. 



30 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book VII. 


A.D. 1S14. 


Ktate of par¬ 
ties at tlio 
court of the 
Ouicowar. 


Trimbukjoc' 

Dainglia, 

PoiKljwa'.H 

favourite. 


prime minister, followed of course in the footsteps of his master, and was a 
strenuous supporter of the British alliance. On the other hand Sitaram, who 
had previously held the office of minister and been discarded for incapacity, 
headed the opposition party, and being strongly supported by female influence 
in the palace, continued to cherish the hope of regaining his lost position. 
With this view lie paid great court to tiie Peishwa, and laboured to convince 
him that if he were restored to j)ower ho would at once satisfy all his claims. 
It was probably in consequence of these representations that the Peishwa 
became anxious for the removal of Gungadhur Sastree from the Guicowar’s 
court. The pretext employed was the slow progress made in the settlement of 
the claims. If, instead of corresponding by letter, the Sastree would come to 
Poonah and confer personally on the subject, there was ground to hope that 
many of the difficulties which now stood in the way would be easily removed. 
The proposal, when made by the Peishwa, seemed so plausible that the British 
g<^ornment at once acquiesced. Gungadlmr Sastree was more doubtful. 
He not only suspected an intrigue, but feared for his life, and thei’efore refused 
to set out until he obtained from the resident a guarantee of his personal safety. 

Gungadhur Sastroe’s fears w'ere by no means unreasonable, for the Peishwa, 
Bajec Row, who had never before given his confidence to any man, IukI at last 
firllcn under the ascendency of an unprincipled adventurer. This was Trim- 
bukjet'. Dixinglia. He had commenced life as a courier and a spy, and after 
attracting tlie Pcishwa’s notice, liad risen raj)idly in his favour by ministering 
to his licentiotxs jdeasures, and showing himself ready on all occasions to exe¬ 
cute his orders without fear or scriqxle. When the Guicowai’’s lease of the 
moiety of Ahmedabad expired, and the Peishwa refused to renew it, the admin¬ 
istration was committed to Ti-imbukjee, who immediately sent some of his 
own creatures to levy it. This first step of promotion was soon followed by 
his appointment to the command of the Peishwa’s contingent, and his introduc¬ 
tion by the Peishwa himself to the Honourable Mountstuart Elphinstone, the 
resident at Poonah, as a person high in his confidence. Trimbukjee’s arro¬ 
gance kept pace with his elevation, and he forthxiilth began to take such an 
active and prominent part in all public business, as showed that whatever 
his nominal position might be, he considered himself as virtually at the head of 
the government. Thus installed, he made no secret of the course of policy 
which he was resolved to pursue. Tlie Peishwa must again resume his place 
as the head of the Mahratta confederacy; his claims, even to the extent of de¬ 
manding chout from Bengal, were to be boldly maintained; and British influ¬ 
ence, as the great obstacle to the realization of these schemes, must either be 
secretly undermined or forcibly overthrown. So little, indeed, was Trimbuk- 
jee at pains to disguise his intentions, that Mr. Elphinstone had no difficulty in 
predicting a rupture with the Peishwa, the inevitable result of the schemes 
into which his fiivourite was hurrying him. 



Chap. II.]. 


37 


INTEIGUES AT POONAH AND BARODA. 

Shortly after the arrival of Gungadhur Sastree at Poonah, two individuals, a.d. isu. 
known to be in the interest of his rival Sitaram, made their appearance there, 
and were openly and favom’ably received at the public audience. They claimed nago- 
authority to act, and produced as their cicdentials a letter which the imbecile r<K>imh. 
Guicowar had been induced to write in their favoirr. The resident lo.st no time 
in remonstrating against their reception, but his objections were overruled, and 
Sitaram’s intrigue continued to ]>ro.sper. Under such cireum.stances the con¬ 
ference to which Gungadhur Sastree had been invited became a mere mockery, 
and he announced his desire to return to Baroda. Had lie done so, the intrigue 
which had been commenced there simultaneously with that at Poonah, would 
in all probability have been frustrated, and it was therefore determined to 
detain him. This could only be effected by convincing him that the object of 
his visit might yet be accomplished. The obstacles he was assured were only 
temporary, and by the exerci.se of a little patience everything might be satis- 
iaetorily arranged. To give effect to this representatiou, the treatment" of 
which he comjilained was reversed, the utmost deference w'^as paid to his 
o])inion.s; his vanity, said to har'e been his greatest failing, was flattered in 
every po,ssiblc way; and the cold and distant manner both of Trimbukjee and 
his master was exchanged for one cixpressive of the fullest confidence ami 
friendship. 

The suddenness of the chan<j:e iustified susnicion, and JVlr. Elnhinstone was Trimhukjoe’B 

” ^ ‘ . .In|,.licity. 

SO little imposed upon that he refused any longer to countena7ice the negotia¬ 
tion. On Gungadhur Sastree himself the impression was very different, and 
he became so confident of a successful result, that after applying for recall, he 
actually petitioned for permission to remain. It was granted—and he con¬ 
tinued the negotiation more on his own responsibility than with any concur¬ 
rence on the part of the Briti.sh government. In a short time he seemed to 
have sworn an eternal fi-iend.ship with Trimbukjee. They were constantly in 
each other’s society, and so completely unbosomed their secrets that Trimbukjee, 
to show how much hLs feelings towards his friend had altered, could not refrain 
from confessing to him that he bad at one time entertained designs upon his 
life. Such a confession, so far from opening the Sastree’s eyes to the danger 
of the new connections he had formed, only seemed to him to furnish additional 
evidence of the sincere friendship which was now felt for him. The Pelshwa 
completed his delusion by courting affinity with him, and agreeing^ to give his 
wife’s sister in marriage to Gungadhur Sastree’s .son. 

It does not seem that all this flattery had shaken Gungadhur Sastree’s omisadhur 
TKiclity to his own master. He had indeed agreed to a settlement by which tangiomenta. 
the Peishwa was to compromise all his claims on the Guicowar for the cession 
of as much territory as would yield seven lacs of revenue; but in this, so far 
from sacrificing the Guicowar’s interest, he had made a far better bargain for 
him than could have been anticipated. From some ca’use, however, not easily 



38 


TTISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book VIT. 


A. I). 1814. 


(Iniigadhur 
8iv»iroe’» on* 
tuiglemontH. 


UiH conr/iTe 

HUB i-tiitie- 
Tiient to the 
I'emliwa. 


explained, Futteh Sing, when the settlement was submitted to him, refused to 
ratify it, and declared his determination to make no cession of territory what¬ 
ever. In this dilemma Gungadhur Sastree took the course which was the 
easiest at the time, but was sure to prove the most difficult in the end. He 
concealed the fact of Futteh Sing’s refusal, and had recourse to a series of 
evasions for the purpose of accounting for the non-ratificatioTi. Nor Avas this 
all. The proj)oscd )narriage was understood to be so comj)lete]y arranged that 
Bajee liow sot out with his family for Nassik, a celebi*ated Hindoo pilgrimage, 
situated 100 miles north of Poonah, with the intention of preparing for its 



Kassik on thk UwOAVf.HY.— IVom DaititiMV OrioMtiil 1840 . 


adebration there. Though there does not .seem to be any necessary connection 
between the marriage and the settlement, Gungadhur Sastree had deteimiined 
that the one should not take jdace without the other, and he was thus by his 
evasions allowing the Peishwa to proceed with preparations for a marriage 
which was not to be celebrated Accordingly, when the truth could no longer 
be concealed, and the necessaiy explanations took place, Bajee Row doubtless 
felt that he had been personally insulted. The resentment which he felt must 
have been greatly increased when Gungadhur Sasti'ee had the manliness to 
tell the Pei,shwa that he could not allow his wife to visit at the palace of 
Poonah, in, consequence of the notorious licentiousness which was permitted 
within it. 

Thus become the object of resetitment to a prince who Avas never knoAvn 
to forgive an injurj^, Gungadhur Sastree ought not to have lost a moment in 
hastening back to Baroda. He must haA^e been aware of the deadly offence he 
had given, and yet he continued to linger on in the belief that the professions 
of friendship which continued to be lavished bn him must be sincere. His 
intimacy with Trimbukjee continued apparently on the same footing as before. 




CUAP. II.] 


GUNGADHUE SASTREE ASSASSINATED. 


89 


and hence, after the pilgrimage to Nassik was completed, he at once accepted a.d. isis. 
an invitation to accompany the Peishwa to Punderpoor, another celebrated 
place of pilgrimage, situated on the Beema, 112 miles south-east of Poonah. 

As if the circumstiinces which ought to have increased his caution had only flungndimr 
increased las confidence, he left the greater part of his escort behind, and took 
only a few necessary attendants along with him. Proceeding thus in company 
with the Peishwa and Triinbukjee, he anived with them at Punderpoor on tlie 
14th of July, 181 5 . After an entei’tainment given on that day by Ti-imbukjee, 
he returned home somewhat indisposed, and left oiders that if an invitation 
to the tem 2 fie arrived, the answer should be given tljat he was unwell, and 
unable to attend. Shortly afterwards a messenger from Triinbukjee arriveil 
with the invitation. When tlio excuse was made, the invitation was reiieated, 
with the addition that, as the crowd had retired, he had better come immedi¬ 
ately with a small retinue. He still refused, but sent two of his attendants 
mure fully to exi)lain the reason. On a third invitation, still more urgent, the 
fear of giving offence overcame his reluctance, and he set out w'ith only seven 
unarmed attendants. This sealed liis fate. After ])erforming his devotions, 
and convei'sing for some time with Trimbukjee, he had just left the tem 2 )Ic to 
return home when three men came running from- behind, and calling out to 
i;leai- the. way. The moment they reached him one of them struck him with 
what seemed to be only a twisted cloth, but had concealed a sword. Otheis 
immediately followed nj) tlm blow, and in a few minutes he was a mangled 
cor]>se. 

I'lie eireuinstances under which this atrocious murder hatl been committed iviTetrat'"-" 
left no doubt as to the per 2 )etrators of it. Tnmbukjeo Dainglia, acting with 
the knowledge, and ju’obably by the express orders of the Peifshwa, had arranged 
the whole ])lot, and carried it out to its horrid consummation. His rejieated 
urgency had almost forced the Stxstree to visit the temple; he had met him 
tlicre as if for the express purpose of sinierintending the final aiTangements; 
the murderers a.]> 2 jear just to have left him when they issued from^ the temjde 
to do the deed; and he was still there when they returned to it, with the bloody 
swords in their hands, to announce that it was done? Could there have been 
any doubt on the subject, it would have been removed by Trimbukjee’s subsc- 
< 2 uent conduct. The actual assassins, though they might easily have been 
seized at the time, were permitted to escape: no .search was made for them, 
and orders were even issued that the subject .should not be jiublicly talked of. 

Mr. Elphinstone, who had accomiianied the Peishwa to Nassik, and seen enough 
to satisfy him that his presence was no longer desired, had turned aside to visit 
the caves at Ellora, and was there when the news of the murder reached liim. 

The necessity of immediate action being apparent, he at once addressed a letter 
to the Peishwa, demanding a rigorous investigation, and the speedy punishment 
of the murderers. Common justice’ required this—the Peishwa^ for his own 



A.D. 1816. 


The Dritiah 
resident 
at Ptkiinih 
neciises 
Trimlmkjeo 
of Gungail' 
hnrHastroo's 
murder. 


Ooiiduct of 
the PeisliU'a. 


40 niSTOEY OF INDIA. [Book VIT. 

vindication, could not do less, and nothing less would satisfy the British 
government, which would proceed to any extremes sooner than stain its honoim 
by overlooking the barbarous murder of an ambassador whose personal safety 
it had guaranteed. 

Mr. Elphiiistone, after preparing for the worst by ordering the division of 
the Hyderabad force stationed at Jaulna to advance to Seroor, only forty miles 
north-east of Poonah, hastened towards this capital, and reached it on the Gth 
of August. Trimbukjce arrived on the following day from Punderpoor, The 
Peishwa followed on the 9th, but apparently so overcome by alarm and conscious 
guilt, that though it was the festival of the Dakshin, when thousands of 
Bi ahraiiis wore assembled to receive a wonted largess from his liands, he entered 
the city by .stealth, under cover of the night in a close palanquin. The 
resident’s inquiries had in the meantime fully confirmed his worst suspicions, 
and there could be no doubt as to the accuracy of the universal belief, that Bajee 
How had .sanctioned and Tnmbukiee directly superintended the assassination 
of the Sastree. It was however deemed j)olitic to refrain from charging the 
Peishwa, and to accuse only Tibnbukjee. On the 11 th of Augu.st, Mr. Elphinstone 
demanded an audience, but being refused on various pretexts, he procured the 
delivery of a memorial, in which, after recai)itulating the evidence he had 
obtained, he continued thus:—“ On all these grounds I declare my conviction 
of Trimbukjee Dainglia’s guilt, and I call upon your highness to apprehend him, 
jis w'dl as Govind Row Burdojee and Bhugwunt Row Gykwar (Sitaram’s 
agents from BiU'oda, who were deeply implicated), and to deposit them in .such 
cuistody as may be considered safe and trustworthy. Even if your highness is 
not fuUy convinced of the guilt of these persons, it must be admitted that there 
is sufficient gi’ouial for confining them; and I only ask of you to do so, until 
his excellency the governor-general and your highness shall have an opportunity 
of consulting on the subject. 1 have only to add my desire that this ai>prehen- 
sion may be immediate. A foreign amba,ssador has been mui’dered in the 
midst of your highness’s court; a Brahmin has been massacred almost in the 
temple during one of the greatest solemnities of your religion; and I must 
not conceal from your highness that the impunity of the perpetrators of this 
enormity luis led to imputations not to be thought of against your highness's 
government. Nobody is more convinced of the falsehood of such insinuations 
than I am; but I think it my duty to state them, that your highness may see 
the necessity of refuting calumnies so injurious to your reputation." 

The Peishwa, though pleased to find that the guilt of which he was conscious 
was only insinuated, and not directly charged against him, was apparently 
xmable to summon up sufficient resolution for the adoption of any decided 
course, and was obliged to content himself with weaving pretexts for delay. 
He could not believe, he said, that Trimbukjee was guilty, but if sufficient 
proof were given, he w&s ready to arrest him. At the very time when he made 



OiiAr. II .3 


DEMAND ON THE TEISHWA. 


41 


this profession, he was busily adding to the number of his troops, and seemed 
so bent on tiying hostilities, that Mr, Elphinstone was obliged to’ remonstrate 
and declare that if military preparations were continued, he would order the 
.subsidiary force to advance upon Paonah. While Bajee Row was thus making 
common cause with Trimbukjee, the resident, who had hitherto been acting on 
his own responsibility, was confirmed in the course he had pursued, by a letter 
of instructions from the governor-general, who, though willing to gratify the 
Peishwa so far as to promise that if Trimbukjee’s guilt were established by a fair 
trial, perpetual confinement would be his woi-st punishment, intimated his deter¬ 
mination to hold him responsible for the consequences of contin^ng to screen him, 
or of allowing him to escape. Fortified by the governor-general’s resolution, 
Mr, Elphinstone presented another memorial, in which, instead of merely calling 
for th§ arrest of Trimbukjee, he insisted on his delivery to the Briti.sh govern¬ 
ment in the course of twenty-four hours, and intimated that the only alterna¬ 
tive of a refusal would be a suspemsion of all friendly communication between 
the twm governments, and the calling in of the subsidiary force to Poonah. 
The Peishwa, whose cowardice was notorious, was intimidated by this menace, 
and yielded a reluctant compliance so far as to send off Trimbukjee to the hill- 
fort of Wusuntgliur, situated considerably to the south. This, however, was 
considered as evasion, rather than performance, and Mr. Elphinstone had 
actually ordered the march of the subsidiary force stationed at Seroor to Poonah, 
when the Peishwa yielded, and Trimbukjee, delivered up to the British govern¬ 
ment, was carried off as a prisoner to the fort of Tanna, situated on the east 
.side of the island of Salsette, twenty-four miles north-east of Bombay. Sitaram’s 
two agents, delivered at the same time, were ultimately ])laced at the disposal 
of the Guicowar. The Peishwa endeavoured to avenge himself for the humilia¬ 
ting surrender of his favourite, by entering more keenly than ever into the 
intrigues by which he hoped to place himself at the head of a new Mahratta 
confederacy. 

The governor-general, before he resolved to put down the pi'edatory system, 
V)y having recourse to offensive operations, endeavoured to make the defensive 
line as complete as possible. The most promi.sing method would have*been the 
e,stablishment of a subsidiary alliance with the Rajah of Nagpoor. This, Earl 
Minto had laboxired to accomplish, but the relqctance of the rajah, who 
saw that it would be equivalent to a renunciation of independence^ could not 
be overcome, and his final refusal, delayed by a fruitless negotiation, arrived 
shortly after the new government commenced. Failing the Rajah of Nagpoor, 
the only other defensive line practicable was to be attained by forming an 
alliance with the Nabobs of Bhopaul and Saugur, whose territories furnished a 
continuous line of communication between Bundelcund and the Deccan, and 
might be so guarded as to make it difficult for devastating hordes to cross the 
Company’s frontier, though it might not altogether suffice to exclude them. 

Vot. HI. 202 


A.D. 181 . 1 . 


Conduct of 
tlio I’cUhwtt. 


ITe at la»t 
ftoiniiellocl 

todolivoru]) 

Trimbukjee. 


rro|)osed 
HlIianctM 
with Nabobs 
<if Bbopani 
and Saugur. 



42 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book VIT. 


A D. isifl. In resolving to attempt such an alliance, the governor-general had also another 
important object in view. The Mahrattas were obviously aiming at the recon- 
i>ropo8o.i stitution of the Mahratta confederacy, for the scarcely disguised purpose of 
witbNaJwijB forming a counterbalance to British influence. It was therefore of importance 
and sXnr. to adopt mcaiis for the purpose of cutting oflT communication between the 
leading states, and thus preventing or impeding their mutual co-operation. 
For this purpose Bhopaul and Saugur were admirably situated. The former in 
particular was interposed between the territories of Scindia and Ragojee 
Bhonsla, and formed, so long as it retained its independence, an insuperable 
barrier between them. So much were they themselves alive to the obstacles 
thus tlirown in tlieir way, that they had recently united their armies for the 
purpose of conquering and partitioning Bhopaul. Nothing but the talents and 
desperate courage of the Nabob Vizier Mahomed had prevented theip from 
eflecting their object, and there was therefore every reason to apprehend that 
in the ensuing season they would again unite their forces and renew the 
campaign. And there was nothing to prevent them, since the non-interference 
policy of the Company left them in no fear of interruption. 

Such was the state of matters in Bhopaul when, in conseciuence of the 

ufTeroil to 

thoiii. failure of tlie negotiation with Ragojee Bhonsla, the attention of the governor- 
general was directed to the importance of framing some new defensive line. 
Iri this no difiiculty was anticipated from the nabob himself, as he had become 
sensible of his inability any longer to withstand the Mahratta combination, and 
had made urgent appliciition to the British government for aid. In addition 
to the mutuid benefits to be derived frojn the alliance, he could also point to 
the services which one of his predecessors had rendered to the Company during 
the celebrated overland route of a body of troops sent by Warren Hastings 
under Colonel Goddard from Calpee to Bombay. These services, which, when 
the non-intervention system prevailed, it was deemed politic to forget, it was 
now conveuient to remember, and Mr. (afterwards Lord) Metcalfe, to whom, as 
resident at Delhi, the nabob’s application had been made, was instructed to 
conclude an alliance with him on the following basis:—“The British govern¬ 
ment to afford its protection against the present designs of Scindia and the 
Bhonsla, and a perpetual guarantee for the future; the nabob to be left in 
complete independence in the management of his internal administration; the 
British troops to have free ingress and egress through the Bhopaul territories, 
together with every facility in the pi-ovision of their supplies and necessaries; 
a fortress to be delivered as a present dep6t, and eventually a spot to be allotted 
for a cantonment or permanent station; the nabob to renounce all connection 
with the Pindarees, and not to negotiate with other powers except in concert 
with the British government, abiding by its arbitration in all differences with 
them.” As additional inducements to the nabob to enter into alliance on the 
above terras, all claim for the expense of defending him was to be waived, and 



Chap. II.] 


SCINDIA’S DESIGNS ON BHOPAUL. 


43 


any of liis territories now in possession of the Pindarees were to be recovered a.d. isis. 
for him and restored. Terms nearly the same were proposed to the Nabob of 
Saugur, and were understood to be so nearly arranged that Mr. Strachey, the Aiiianoaa 
resident at Scindia’s court, thought himself authorized formally to communicate of Bhopani 
the fact to that chief In consequence of this communication, others to the 
.same effect were made to the courts of Poonah and Nagpoor. 

The Peishwa, who had no direct interest in the subject, professed to be 
rather pleased than otherwise that Bhopaul and Saugur were henceforth to be 
under British protection, as he hoped that thereby several of his dependants 
would be le.ss exposed to marauders, who had repeatedly pillaged them. 

Kagojee Bhonsla did not take the intimation quite so coolly, and requested 
time to consider; but on being pressed for an answer, deemed it prudent to 
feign acquiescence, though he found it difficult to conceal his dissatisfaction. 

Scindia was more o})en, and did not hesitate to denounce the alliance witlirn^astof 
Bhopaul as a violation of subsisting treaties. Bhopaul was one of his depen- ngniust 
deucies, and it had been expressly stipulated between him and the Company 
that he should be at perfect liberty to deal with them as he thought fit without 
being interfered with. It was well known that he had been engaged in 
reducing Bhopaul to submission; he had no doubt of being able to effect it in 
a new campaign, and therefore for the Company to step in at such a time, and 
exclude him from his ju,st liglits by calling Bhopaul an ally, was tantamount to 
a declaration of war. He would not submit to this injustice, but would proceed 
with his preparations against bhopaul, regardless of the intimation which had 
been made. 

The governor-general had calculated on some such ebullition on the part 
both of Scindia and Ragojee Bhonsla, and had therefore been careful in com- »depBud- 
inencing the negotiation, to provide against the possible, if not probable effects 
of their displeasure. He had reinforced the troops in Bundelcund, and held 
them ready to move on the shortest notice; he had ordered the Nizam’s sub¬ 
sidiary force to move from Jaulna to Ellichpoor, and the Peishwa’s subsidiary 
force to prepare to sujjport it by moving forward toward the station which it 
had quitted; and he had directed the whole troops of Gujerat to be concen¬ 
trated at some point considerably to the east of its frontier. But for these 
precautions it is not unlikely that Scindia would have canied his threats into 
execution, and risked hostilities sooner than abandon the hope pf making 
himself master of Bhopaul. As it was, he readily availed himself of the 
opportunity to recede from a position which he was not prepared to maintain, 
when the governor-general, after stating the grounds on wfiicli he conceived 
Bhopaul entitled to be dealt with as an independent state, called upon him, if 
he had evidence to the contrary, to produce it. The question was thus once 
more brought within the sphere of diplomacy, and Scindia, hopeless of being 
able as yet to gain anything by open rupture, was not unwilling to spin 



4+ 


niSTOBy OF INDIA. 


[Book VII. 


A.D. ISIO.. 


Allianoo 
with Bh<»- 
l>aiU fitiH* 
trated >>y 
tiie dupli* 
city of tlu 
nabob. 


Doatii of 
Ilagojot* 
JfhoiiHla. 


KiilMsuiiary 
alliance 
with luM 

KltCeOBKO!', 

A]>a Sahib. 


out the time in labouring ineffectually to prove that the British government 
liEwl no right to enter into alliance with Bhopaul. His objections were for the 
most part re-echoed by Eagojee Bhonsla. The most curious part of the whole 
is, that the alliance itself, which l)ecame the subject of so much argument and 
diplomacy, was not completed. The intimation made to the Mahratta chiefs 
having secured Vizier Mahomed against actual invasion, that wily Patan nabob 
had no wi.sli to commit himself any farther, and instead of completing the 
alliance on the basis proposed, entered into a correspondence with Jean Baptiste 
Filozc, Scindias gcneiul, who had hoped to conduct the campaign against 
Bhopaul, with the view of ascertaining whether he might not make better 
terms than those which the Oom])any had offered him. The governor-general, 
on discovering this duplicity, was so indignant that he abniptly closed the 
negotiation, and instructed the resident at Gwalior to leave Scindia at full 
liberty to carry out any projects he might be contemplating against Bhopaul. 

In con.secpience of the abrupt teianination of the negotiation with Bhopaul, 
the joint attack upon it would probably have been renewed, hud not two events 
occurred which gnjatly changed th(i ])osition of ])olitical affairs. These were tlui 
deaths of Vizier Mahomed, Nabob of Bhop.aul, and of Ragojee Bhonsla, Rajah of 
Nagpoor, which happened within a week of each other, the fornier on the 17th, 
and the latter on the 22d of March, 1816. In both cases a sou succeeded, but 
while the new nabob, Nuzur Mahomed, possessed no less talent and more 
honesty than his father, the new rajah, Purswajee Bhonsla, was so weak, both 
in body and mind, as to be altogether iucapabk*of conducting the government. 
The (piestion of a regency was therefore immediately rsiised, and led to disputes, 
of which the governor-general did not scniple to avail himself, in order to effect 
the subsidiary alliance which had so long been desired. By supporting the 
idaim of Modajee Bhonsla, better knoAvn as Apa Sahib, the nephew of the late 
rajah, he secured his elevation to the office of regent, and with it an influence, 
which, it was lioped, would be productive of great advantages. Apa Sahib 
accordingly, as soon as ho was installed, felt that his only security against the 
j)owerful party which originally op])osed, and was still able to thwart him, was 
to fonn a close alliance with the British government. I’he subsuliary alliance 
was no sooner proposed than ho acceded to it, and concluded a treaty on tht 
27th of May, 1810, by which the Company undertook to protect the rajah 
against all eneniie.s, foreign and domestic, and to maintain for that purpose a 
subsidiary force, consisting of a regiment of native cavalry, six regiments oi 
infantry, and a complete company of European artillery, and the rajah engaged, 
be,sides paying seven and a half lacs as the annual expense of this force, tc 
maintain an efficient contingent of not le.ss than 3000 cavalry and 2000 infantry 
to abstain from all encroachment on British allies, and to negotiate with 
foreign states only after consultation with the British government About tin 
same time when this'treaty was concluded, the new Nabob of Bhopaul madt 



Chap. Il.j SUBSIDIAEY ALLIANCE WITH NAGPOOE. 45 

overtures for an alliance, on terms similar to those which had been offered to a.d. isro. 
his father, but the governor-general, either because bis indignation had not yet ^ 
sufficiently cooled down, or because he thought that the Nagpoor alliance had siihsidiary 

^ 1 11 1 1 rtlliftnc© 

rendered one with Bhopaul unnecessary, met the overtures coldly, and gave the with Na^- 
nabob to understand that, in regairl to his territories, it was his intention to 
maintain the strictest neutrality and indifference. 

The subsidiary alliance concluded with Nagpoor seemed so important, that 
no time was lost in acting upon it. A body of troops, designed to form the 
subsidiary force, had previously been assembled at Ellicbpoor, and as soon {is the 
requisite notification was received from the resident, commenced their march 
under the command of Colonel Walker. Starting on the 1st of June, they U" 

, , larity. 

crossed the Wurda on the 6th, and two days after arrived within a march of 
N{igpoor. Here the m{iin body halted, and two battalions moving forward, 
made their entrance into the Bhonsla cajiital on the 10th. Croat was the 
•surprise which had been produced by their arrival in the vitanity. The conclu¬ 
sion of the treaty had been kept a profound secret, and was not even suspected, 
till it was formally proclaimed only the day before the troops made their 
fippearance. It is natural to infer that there was good ground for this secrecy, 
and that the tve.aty was concealed because it was foreseen that its terms would 
not bo lellshed. It Wiis a virtufil surrender of iiiitiomil independence, and 
o])])osition to it, therefore, furnished {i ridlying point to all the di.saffected, wlio 
were now able, in opposing tlie government, to conceal their ftictious aims 
under the disguise of an affected patriotism. M{iuy even who had given in <'riti<;.i 
tlieir lulJiesiou to Apa Salub, coinplamed loudly of his breach of faith in carry- AiKiSaiiiu. 
ing on and concluding so imporbint a negotiation without consulting them. 

The quarrels which ensued were so bitter, find hi,s position became in conscfiuenec 
•so precarious, that he considered the two battalions whicli bad arrived insuffi¬ 
cient for his pi’otection, and begged that the main body, whose destined station 
was TIoshungabad, on the left bank of the Nerbudda, should in the meantime 
remain in the vicinity. The permanent cantonment .selected for the two 
battalions Wfis .situated about three miles we.st of Nagpoor. This seemed to 
Apa vSahib too distant for his peraonal safety, and he therefore took the extra¬ 
ordinary step of withdrawing from the seat of government, and fixing his 
residence at a villa immediately adjoining the cantonment. 

As the time for decisive measures to put down the predatory system had riiuprein- 
now an-ived, it will be proper, before proceeding further, to give soibe ficcount 
of the leading bands against which the military operations in contemplation 
were to be -directed. We begin with the Pindiirees. The derivation of the 
name is unknown, but the parties bearing it make some figure in the early 
wars of the Deccan, previous to the extinction of the Mahometan dynasties 
there by the Moguls. They formed large bodies of. irregular horse, and were 
dhiefly distinguished from other troops of the same description, by serving with- 



46 


IlISTOEY OF INDIA. 


[Book VII. 


A.i>. wifl. out pay, on condition of being permitted to compensate themselves by plunder. 

This permission was of course understood to apply only to enemies, but the 
Hie Pindarees were not scrupulous, and when plunder was attainable, made little 
prodfttory distinction between friend and foe. When the Moguls liad established their 
nation. ascciidency In the Deccan, the Pindarees transferred their services to the 

Mahrattas, and shared largely in the disaster at Paniput. Having thus been 
brought into Northern India, they established themselves chiefly in Malwah, and 
obtained settlements in the vicinity of the Nerbudda, taking the designations 
of Scindia Shahi and Holkar Sbahi Pindarees, according as they adhered to 
the one or the other of these Mahratta chiefs. In following their fortunes, 
however, they never allowed their supposed allegi_ance to interfere with their 



A PiNDAREE Fonx, Province of Boiiaroa. — From original drawing in i) 08 se 8 sion of Miss Tlierosu Jolmsoii. 

interest, and were always ready to join any party whose expeditions promised 
to yield the largest amount of plunder. 

Ti>airi.imi The Sciudia Shahi Pindarees, by far the most numerous, first obtained their 

pedSs. assignments of land from Madhajee Scindia in 1794. They were then headed 
by two brothera, Hoeroo and Burun, who raised their standard at the season of 
the Dussem or Dasahara, an annual festival, celebrated at the end of October or 
beginning of November; and having collected their own followers, and all 
vagalx)nd adventurers who chose to join them, set out at the end of the rains 
on a lukhir or plundering expedition. The whole body were mounted, some 
so well as to form an efiicient cavalry, but the far greater part very indiffer¬ 
ently on small horses or ponies, and with arms of a miscellaneous description, 
including pikes, clubs, and sticks pointed with iron. Carrying no baggage, 
because they trusted to the expedition itself for the supply of their wants, they 
moved with great celerity towards some previously appointed rendezvous, 
from which as a centre they spread over the whole country, and made a 
thorough sweep of everything "v^hich was portable and possessed any value. As 



Chap. II.] 


THE PINDAEEES. 


47 


they were not disposed to risk an encounter with regular troops, they a.i). isio 
endeavoured to fall by surprise on each district marked out for plunder, and 
to complete the work of devastation before there was any danger of being 
overtaken. In caiTying out this plan, no time could be lost, and hence, inflicted by 
as the speediest means of extortion, every species of torture and abomination aarces. 
was resorted to. Persona suspected of concealing property had a bag of hot 
ashes tied round theif head, and were suffocated, by being thus compelled to 
inhale them; or, after being thrown on their back, had a heavy beam placed 
across their breast, while a Pindaree sat at each end pressing it down, and at 
the same time inflicting blows on the helpless victim. Boiling oil and burning 
straw were also common materials of toi-ture, and not unfrequcntly children 
torn from their mothers’ arms were dashed on the ground, or thrown into wells, 

<ir to.sse<l into the air, and received on the point of a spear. It is almost 
unnecessary to add that the mothers themselves, and all other females who 
<'ould tempt bratality, were subjected to treatment worse than death. 

The two chiefs, Heeroo and Burun, died in 1800, and left sons who fol- neiuiera..f 

the Pin- 

lowed in their fathers’ footsteps. It was impossible, however, that anything ouiwa. 
like hei'editary succession could be followed out among the Pindarees. 
Individual talent was the true passport to leadership, and accordingly we find 
that in a few years, though the sons of the above leaders acquired considerable 
notoriety, the chief power had passed into other hands. Among the leaders of 
the Scindia Shahi Pindaree.s, two particularly distinguished themselves. These 
wore Cheetoo and Kureem Khan. Cheetoo, by birth a Jat, was sold when a child 
during a famine to a Pindaree. As ho grew up, he distinguished himself in 
the durra, or Pindaree company, to which his master belonged, and in 1804 
stood so high in the estimation of Dowlut Row Scindia, that he gave him a 
jaghire and conferred upon him tho^ title of Nabob. Two years after he fell 
into disgrace, and was imprisoned by Scindia, who did not restore him to liberty 
till he had been four years in prison, and purchased release by the payment of 
a heavy ransom. He afterwards returned to his jaghire, and again ingratiated 
himself so much with Scindia, that he gave him five additional districts lying 
on the east of Bhopaul. His cantonments were situated at Nimar, opposite to 
Hindia, on the Nerbudda, and his usual residence was Sutevas, in the vicinity. 

Latterly he seldom inade distant excursions, though expeditions annually issued 
by his orders, and were said sometimes to muster 12,000 horse. 

Kureem Khan, the other principal leader of the Pindarees, was by birth a Kureem 
Rohilla, and first attracted notice as the head of a band of Pindarees in the 
service of Dowlut Row Scindia, when that chief made war upon the Nizam, 
and compelled him to submit to the disgraceful convention of Knrdla. 

During that campaign, Kureem Khan enriched himself with plunder, and laid 
the foimdation of his future fortune. His mamage with a lady belonging to a 
bmnch of the family of Bhopaul, while it added to his respectability, procured 



48 


IIISTOEY OF INDIA. 


[Book VII. 


A 1>. 1810. 


Kureom 

Khan, 

leatksroftUo 

l’jndar«tiK. 


IIU 

treaohorouA 
Hoisniru by 
Soiiidia. 


him some assignments in that territory, and the value of his services induced 
Scindia to endeavour to secure them by creating him a nabob, and granting 
him several additional districts. If in these respects he resembled Cheetoo, he 
resembled him still more in the subsequent treatment which he received. In 
jiroportion as his power increased, Scindia, who had thought of him only as an 
useful deiiendant, began to suspect that lie might one day prove a dangerous 
rival. There were certainly some grounds for this swspicion, since Kureem 
Khan had begun to act as if he contemplated the establishment of a regular 
sovereignty. Not contented like other Pindaree leadei'S with heading a body 
of predatory horse, he enlisted a number of infantry, possessed himself of several 
guns, and formed a parjah or establi-shment of household troops. All these 
things indicated an amount of ambition which Scindia was determined not to 
tolerate in any Pindaree, and he therefore contrived a plan for securing Kureem 
Khan’s person, and annihilating his jiower. To effect this by open force would 
have been difficult; cunning furnished at once an easier and a sui’or process. 

To put his scheme in execution, Scindia set out from Gwalior, and sent a 
message to Kureem Khan to meet him on important business. The Pindaree’s 
vanity was flattered by the me.s.sage, and he advance<l to meet his acknowledged 
sovereign with a state scarcely inferior to his own. The interview took ]ilace 
in the vicinity of Bersiah, and Kureem Khan, who had vainly been attempting 
the capture of the fort of Suttunbui’ee, was deluded into the belief that Scindia 
Tneant, after reducing the place by his more powerfnl artillery, to make him a 
jiresent of it. Thus thrown off his guard, he was still more flattered when 
Scindia offered to visit him in his own camp. To show his high sense of the 
honour, he seated his visitor on a temporary throne, formed of a hag of rupees of 
the value of £12,500, which, siccording to a custom usual in India when a superior 
conde.scends to vi.sit an inferior, was raeapt and accepted as a present. Scindia 
])rofessed to be not only delighted with his reception, but filled with admiration 
of Kureem Khan’s abilities. He had found, he said, what he had long sought 
in vain—an individual combining the qualities of a soldier and a statesman, and 
there was scarcely anything he could iisk that he was not inclined to gi'ant. 
This hirkt was not lost on Kureem Khan, who applied for several important 
grants in addition to those that had previously been promised. Sunnuds, or 
deeds of gi-ant, and a rich dress of inve.stiture, were ordered to be prepared, and 
nothing ijemained but to complete the ceremony. Full of hope, he proceeded 
on the appointed day with a few attendants to the Mahratta camp. He was 
received with singular honour, and seemed on the eve of having all his wishes 
fulfilled, when Scindia on some pretext quitted the tent, and a body of armed 
men rushed in and made Kureem Khan their prisoner. The success of this 
first treachery being announced by a signal gun, Scindia’s troops instantly 
attacked the Pindaree camp, and dispersing aU the persons who belonged to it, 
' gained an immense booty. Still more was expected, as it was known that at 



Chap. II.] . DEPEEDATIONS OF KUEEEM KHAN. 49 

Shujahalpoor, where his family resided, Kiireem Khan had deposited the greater 
part of his jewels and treasure. His mother, however, saved them by hurrying 
off with everything of value to the westward, and ohtaining^An asylum with 
Zalim Sing, Nabob of Kotah. Kureera Khan was 'carried off as a prisoner to 
Gwalior. His followers, naturally exasperated, were not slow in retaliating, 
and, divided into several bands, the largest of which was headed by his nephew 
Namdur Khan, pl^d^ed the territories of Scindia without mercy. ' The effect 
was to convince the treacherous Mahratta that he gained little by Kureein 
Khan's imprisonment, and he was therefore induced, at the end of four years, 
by the tempting offer of a payment of six lacs, to give him his liberty. 

^ Before Kureem Khan was relea.sed, some attempt was made to obtain an 
oblivion of the past, and engage him once more in Scindia’s interests. While 
in custody he made no scruple of promising everything that was asked of him, 
but the moment he saw himself again at the head of his Pindarees the work of 
vengeance commenced, and Scindia foimd that if he erred in seizing Kureem 
Khan at first, he had erred still more in selling him his freedom. Ere long his 
loss by depredations far exceeded the six lacs which had been paid him, and 
Kureem Khan could boast of more extensive territories than belonged to him 
before his captivity. In addition to the force which he could himself collect, he 
had the disposal of that of Cheetoo, who having formerly been under great 
obligations to him, and having moreover like himself wrongs to avenge 6u 
Scindia, was ready to take part in any inoureion into his territoriea The 
effect of this union was to increase the Pindaree force to an extent which jnade 
it really formidable. At the dusaeru of 1811, the number of Pindarees who 
assembled is stated by Sir John Malcolm to have been not less than 60,000. 
This is an exjiggeration, and Prinsep is certainly nearer the truth, when he 
states them at “not less than 25,000 cavalry, of all descriptions, besides several 
battalions of infantry newly raised for the purjiose.” 

This great prosperity of Kureem Khan was destined not to be of long dura¬ 
tion. He was anxious for an incursion into the territories of Ragojee Bhonsla, 
from which, owing to the notorious feebleness of the government, a rich booty 
with little risk was anticipated. Cheetoo, on whom Ragojee had recently con¬ 
ferred several jagliires, was unwilling to forfeit them by taking part in such an 
incursion, and the quarrel became so bitter that the union was broken up. 
While thus weakened, Kureem Khan was attacked by Jagoo Bapoo,^ a general 
whom Scindia had sent against him, and so completely defeated that his durra 
was dispersed, and he had great difficulty in saving himself by a precipitate 
flight. Though Cheetoo did not take an active part in this attack, lie is said 
to have suggested it. At all events he managed to turn it to his advantage, 
and by the dispersion of his rival’s durra added so largely to his own that he 
was now by far the most foimidable of all the Pindaree leaders. Kureem Khan 
continued his flight to Kotah, where his family had found an asylum; but the 

VoL. III. 203 


A.n. 1811 . 


ImpriaoM- 
ineut of 
Ktireem 
Kban. 


IXte FelenAO 
and tul>8e- 
(j iieiit clo' 
lYTodations. 


TTib incur 
ttion into 
the Nagj)OOi 
territory. 



50 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book VII. 


A.O. 1812. 


] >urni of 
Kureom 
Kliaii (Uh 

poriied. 


iiiuniKioim 
into tlui 
BritiHli tor- 


wary nabob, unwilling to commit himself further, advised him to seek the pro¬ 
tection of Ameer Khan, who received him with many professions of friendship. 

.They could not have been sincere, for he shortly after, under pretence of recom¬ 
mending him to Toolsah Bai, then regent of Holkar’s dominions, handed him 
over to his agent Guffoor Khan, by whom he was detained as a prisoner for 
tliree years. During this inters^id his nephew Namdur Khan had exerted him¬ 
self to keep up liis durra, but on his return he found it so much diminished, 
that he consented to hold only a secondary place, by uniting it to the duira 
of Do.st Mahomed, and Wasil Mahomed, the two sons of Heeroo. Tliese, as 
.succe.s.sors to their fathei’, had always claimed a place among the Pindarce 
leaders, but wei-e mainly indebted for the prominent position whicli they had 
attained to Kureem Khan's overthiow. They held considerable jaghires in the 
neighbourliood of Bhilsa, and were usually cantoned within the Bhopaul terri¬ 
tory. In 1814 the relative strength of the principal Pindaice durras was 
supposed to be as follows:—Cheetoo’s 15,000, Kureem Khan’s 4000, and Dost 
and Wasil Mahomed’s 7000. Adding to these 8000 under independent leaders 
oi’ inferior note, the whole Pindaree force must have mustered about 34,000. 

Foi’ many years the Pindarees confined their depredations to the neighboiu’- 
ing territories fif the Peishwa, the Nizam, and the Rajah of Berai’. Those of 
the rajah, as the weakest, suffered most severely, and he was more than once 
alanned both for his own ])ersonal safety and for that of his capital. In 
])ro])ortion as their devastations impoverished the districts subjected to them, 
their expeditions began to jirove unproductive, and it became necossar}’^ to 
extend them over a wdder field. The British territories had hitherto escaped, 
but after a pusillanimous policy was adopted, the hope of impunity tempted 
aggi'e.ssion, and in January, 1812, a body of Pindarees belonging to Dost 
Mahomed's dumi penetrated through BTindelcund and Rewa. After spreading 
devastation and terror on every side, burning numerous villages, and commit¬ 
ting fearful atrocities on the inhabitants, they were advancing to the pillage of 
the large commercial town of Mir 2 a]>oor, when the approach of British troo])s 
from Benares and Allahabad compelled them to change their route, and make 
the best of their way home through a province of Nagpoor. The quantity of 
booty obtained imide it cei’tain that this was oidy the first of a series of forays, 
and while the inhabitants of the districts threatened were kept in a state of 
alarm which seriously interfered with their industrial occupations, government 
incun’ed gi'eat expense in stationing and maintaining troops in the various 
localities into which it .seemed most probable that incursions would be made. 
In this way a line of posts was formed, stretching from the frontiem of Bundel- 
cund to the Gulf of Cambay. It was impossible, however, that such a line could 
be effectually guarded, and the Pindarees repeatedly breaking through it, or 
turning it, carried on their ravages simultaneously in all the three presidencies. 
One band about 5O()0 strong, headed by Clieetoo, penetrating westward, laid 



ClIA!-. II.] 


ATROCITIES OF THE PINDAllEES. 


51 


waste the dependencies of Surat; while other bodies, carrying their depredations a.i>. ituti. 
to the south and east, entered the Northern Circars, and carried off a rich booty 
from the district of Masulipatorn. In March, 1816, the devastating hordes novu«tati..ii» 
mustered in the greatest numbers they had j'et displayed. In three divisions, i-in.iiiiw-H 
one of them estimated at 10,000, and the other-s at 5000 each, they burst into 
the territories of the Nizam. Orre of tlie smaller divisions continuing onward, 
penetrated to Guntoor and Masrrlipatarn, and for eight days kept moving about 
at the rate of thirty or forty miles a day, committing fearful devastation, and 
perpeti'ating horrible atrocities. Froirr the rejroi’t of a conrmi&sion specially 
appointed to ascer-tain the amount of injury inflicted, it appeared that*dui-ing 
the above eight days, 182 persons had been .slain, 505 wounded, and 3638 
tortured. 

The comparative impuirity with which the Piirdar'ees had escajted in March, nene'vwi 
1816, terirpkd them to retunr in December. The populatiorr, desjraiilng of i.v them 
being able to offer- any rasistarree, fled to the neiglibour irrg hills and thickets, Jm’itno*”*'' 
Sind left tlieir villages and homes sit the mercy of the rnar-auders, who hsul par-- 
tially plundered the town of Ganjsvrn, and threatened the temple of J uggernaut, 
ivhich no feeling of veneration would hsii e induced them to sitai-e, when the. 
approach of trooits hastened thoir departure. They were not allowed, however, 

T.t> escape so easily as before. One Briti.sh detsichment hanging on their resir, 
rejteatedly came so near as to inflict severe punishment on the main body; other- 
detachments intercepted them in their retreat, and when at last they r eached 
their cantonments it was with gi-eatly reduced numbers, and the lo.ss of much 
of their ill-gotten boirty. These dissistei-s, and othcr-s of si .similsir natur-e which 
befell the Pindarees in var-ious quarter.s, gave some countenance to the efficacy of 
the defen.sive systenr, and jrarties were rrot M-anting, both at home and in India, 
to oppose the suloption of more vigorous rireasm-e.s. These, however, were now 
decidedly in a nrinor ity, surd the most conrjretent judges concuired in recom¬ 
mending offensive o])eratioirs. During the administration of Lord Minto the 
.supreme government declared that “the arrangements and mesisures of defence 
which the^'^ had adopted were merely palliatives,” and that they “ antici])ated 
the necessity, sit some future time, of undertaking a .system of military and 
])olitical operations calculated to strike at the root of this great and increasing 
evil.” Ear-1 Moira had never had any doubt on the subject, and had from this 
very first urged the suppression of the preilatory hordes as essential to the pro¬ 
sperity and per-manent tranquillity of the country. 

Notwithstanding the decided conviction expressed by two successive Indian -fimid 
administrations, the home authorities dung so strongly to the defensive, that a 
letter from the secret committee, dated 29th September, 1815, cxpres.sly jrro- 
hibited the supreme government “from engaging in plans of general confederacy 
and offensive operations against the Pindarees, either with a view to their utter 
extirpation, or in anticipation of an apprehended danger.’* The governor-gene- 



52 


HISTOEY OF INDIA. 


[Book VIT. 


A.D. 1S16. 


Timid couii- 
sola of tlio 
homo im- 
thoritioo in 
reg/ir<l to 
Piiidareodo- 
vaKtationo. 


Tlw lM»klor 
]Kdicy of 
Earl Moiin 

ly adoptoil. 


ral contiaued to urge his views, but so unsuccessfully, that even Mr. Canning, 
who in 1816 had become president of the Board of Control, dictated instructions 
in which the following passages occur: “We are unwilling to incur the risk of 
a general war for the uncertain purpose of extirpating the Pindareea Extended 
political and military combinations we cannot at present sanction or approve.” 
Again, after a reference to the “ suspicious behaviour of certain of the Mahratta 
chieftains and the daring movements of the Pindarees,” it is added: “We enter¬ 
tain a strong hope that the dangers which arise from both these causes, and 
which must, perhaps, always exist in a greater or less degree, may, by a judi¬ 
cious management of our existing relations, be prevented from coming upon us 
in any very formidable force; while, on the other hand, any attempt at this 
moment to establish a new sj^stem of policy tending to a wider difiusion of our 
power, must necessarily interfere with those economical regulations which it is 
more than ever incumbent on us to recommend as indispensable to the main¬ 
tenance of our present ascendency, and by exciting the jealousy and smspicion 
of other states, may too probably produce or mature those vciy projects of 
hostile confedei’acy which constitute the chief object of your apprehension.” 
These crude notions, and tlie pusillanimous policy which they recommended, 
were only carried to their legitimate consequences, when the secret committee, 
acting in obedience to Mr. Canning’s dictation, suggested the practicability of 
taking advantage of the mutual dissensions of the Pindarees, and of neutralizing 
their mischievous activity by setting one leader against another. The indig¬ 
nant reply of the governor-general deserves to be quoted: “When the honoura¬ 
ble committee suggest the expedient of engaging one portion of the Pindarees 
to destroy some other branch of the association, I am roused to the fear that 
we have been cid])ably deficient in pointing out to the authorities at home the 
brutal and atrocious qualities of those wretches. Had we not failed to describe 
sufficiently the horror and execration in which the Pindarees are justly held, T 
am satisfied that nothing could have been more repugnant to the feelings of the 
honourable committee than the notion that this government should be soiled 
by a procedure which w’as to bear the colour of confidential intercourse—of a 
common cause with any of these gangs.” 

The atrocities of the Pindarees had at length been canied to such a height 
that the home authorities became convinced of the necessity of adopting a 
bolder course than they liad hitherto enjoined, and so far modified their previous 
instructions, as to admit that “they were not intended to restrain the governor- 
gener.al in the exercise of his judgment and discretion upon any occasion when 
actual war upon the British territoi-ies might be commenced by any body of 
marauders, and where the lives and properties of British subjects might call for 
efficient protection.” Any measures which he might have adopted for the 
purpose of repelling invasion and pursuing the invadera into their own haunts 
were approved by anticipation. The governor-general lost no time in acting 




Chap. TI.] 


THE RAJPOOTS. 


53 


upon the new policy thus indicated, and prepared to negotiate the new alliances a isio. 
which it would be necessary to form before any reasonable hope could be 
entertained of suppressing the predatory system. The Pindarees, though the other (i«- 
most numerous and most atrocious, were by no means the only depredators. 
Depredation in some foim entered largely into the militaiy system of the Mah- 
rattas, and many of the troops professedly belonging to Soindia and Holkar 
were marauding mercenaries, who trusted much more to plunder than to regular 
})ay, and were ever ready when dissatisfied with the one or the other to change 
masters, or to assume independence and create disturbances merely foi' the pur¬ 
pose of profiting by them. The desertion of the alliances which the Marquis 
of Wellesley had formed was a virtual declaration in favour of predatory wai- 
fare, and bands of Pabin mercenaries, sometimes in the n.ame of Mahratta chiefs, 
but more fre(][uently without thinking it necessary to employ any ])retext, 
begaJi to roam over the territories from which protection luid been withdrawn, 
as if that withdrawal had declared tliom to be a common prey. Ameer Khan, 
whom we have already seen at the head of these marauders, having fixed upon 
Itajpootana as the principal sphere of liis operations, kept the whole country 
in a state bordeiing on anarchy. Tlie feuds existing among the Rajpoot chiefs 
made it easy for him to play the one against the other, and thus enrich and 
aggrandize himself at the expense of all. In order to show how much the 
general tranquillity was thus disturbed some detad will be necessary. 

Rajjisthan or Rajpootana, an extensive region stretching westward fi-om the 
Jumna to Scindc, and southward from the Punjab to Malwah and Gujerat, 
derived its name from the principal tribes inhabiting it, who called themselves 
Rajpoots, or “Sons of Princes,” because they claimed to represent the Cshatriya, 
or the original regal and military Hindoo caste. It is said that at an early 
l)eriod the whole territory was ruled by a single prince. Be this as it may, the 
primitive monarchy, if it ever existed, had been completely dissolved, and the 
country broken up into a number of independent principalities. Of these, by 
far the most important were Mewar, Marwar, and Dhoondar, better kuown by 
the names of their respective capitals, Odeypoor, Joudpoor, and Jeypoor. Th(< 
chief, or, as he is called, the Rana of Odeypoor, claimed, direct descent from 
Rama, and accordingly took precedency of all the other Rajjpoot princes, who, 
when the succession opened to them, did not think themselves fully installed 
till he had recognized them by bestowing an ornament worn upon the forehead. 

This recognized pre-eminence of the Rana gave him much more political weight 
than he could have derived from Ms territory, which, situated in the south of . 
Rajpootana, was throughout rugged, and, with a few exceptional spots, far from 
fertile. The Mogul, though he often tried, failed to make him tributary, and 
he maintained his independence to, the last. Immediately to the west beyond 
the Aravali Mountains lay the territory of Marwar, or of the Rajah of Joudpoor, 
who belonged to the Rahtore tribe of Rajpoots, and derived his descent from a 



54 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book VIL 


AT). 1803. 


The three 
leading He j- 
lK>ot statom. 


KrlKhtia 
KiNmiuree, 
the llaiui of 
OdeyjaMirV 
beiiutifiil 
<latijjhter. 


family which reigned at Ganouje about the time of the Mahometan conquest. 
He possessed some fertile tracts, particularly towards Ids south frontier, but all 
the rest of his territory was little better than a sandy desert. In the reign of 
Akbar the rajahs acknowledged the Mogul as their superior, and held high office 
at his court, till tlic bigotry of Aurungzebe compelled them to throw off the 
yoke. During a war of thirty years they maintained their independence and 
were never again subject to the Mogul. On the north-eiist, extending nearly to 
the banks of the Jumna, was tlie territory of the Rajah of Jeypoor, who claimed 
descent from Kasa, a younger son of Rama, and was the acknowledged head of 
the Kachwaka Rajpoots. Many parts of the territory, though sandy, had been 
brought by irrigation tinder profitable culture, and many other parts were so 
well ada])ted for grazing that a very considerable revenue was raised. Tlie 
proximity to Agra and Dellu brought the lajahs into early antagonism with the 
Mogul emperors, and deprived them of independence. While the empire 
existed they endeavoured to compensate themselves for the lo.ss by repeatedly 
gaining possession of the first offices in the state; when the empire became 
hopelessly dismembered, Jey Sing, the rajah then reigning, ceased to contest 
the Mahratta ascendency, and making the best terms he could with them, con¬ 
tinued till his death in 1713 to devote him,self to internal improvements, and 
to tlie cultivation of his literary tastes, more especially the .science of astro- • 
uomy, his proficiency in which is attested by his {istronomical tables drawn uji 
for the reformation of the calendar, and the observatories which he erected at 
Jeypoor, Oojein, Bcnare,s, and Delhi. 

In 1803, at the close of the second Mahratta war, Bheciu Sing was Raiia 
of Odeyjioor, Meer Sing Rajah of Joudpoor, and Jugat Sing Rajah of Jeypoor. 
Their only safety was in union, but their feuds made this impossible, and left 
them to become the prey of comparatively ignoble enemies. The original 
cause of (piai’rel is so singular and characteristic, as to be not undeserving of a 
short narrative. Bheem Sing had a beautiful daughter, Kiishna Koomaree, 
who was sought in marriage by several Rajpoot princes: the Rajah of Joudpoor 
was the successful suitor, but died before the marriage was celebrated. The 
Rajah of Jeypoor was next preferred; and all the prelimimuy aiTangements 
having been made, an escort of 3000 troops had actually proceeded to Odey¬ 
jioor to bidng the jirincess home, when Man Sing, now Rajah of Joudpoor, 
stepped in and claimed her as his wdfe, insisting that after she had been the 
affianced bride of his pi'edecessor it would bring indelible disgrace upon him to 
allow her to be married into any other family. As no time was to be lost, Man 
Sing took the most effectual means to prevent the marriage with Jugat Sing, 
by attacking and routing the troops which he had sent to escort the prince,ss 
from Odeypoor. A fierce war immediately ensued, and was so far in favour 
of Man Sing, that the Rana broke off the intended nuptials and agreed to accept 
him as his son-in-law. * For this success he was mainly indebted to the Mah- 



Chap. II.] 


THE RAJPOOTS. 


55 


rattas, who, having during their conquests in Hindoostan established their a d. isos, 
claim of chout in Rajpootana, made it a ground for interfering in the internal 
concerns of its chiefs. Both Scindia and Holkar gave their support to the Fends 
Rajah of Joudpoor, but notwithstanding this formidable combination, the Rajah lujpoot 
of Jeypoor was still in hopes of being able to maintain his ground, as he had, 
in December, 1803, concluded a treaty with Lord Lake, by which the integrity 


of his teiritories was guaranteed by the 
(Company. In this case, however, the 
guarantee of the Company proved a 
broken reed. Sir George Barlow, on find¬ 
ing that the treaty interfered with his 
pusillanimous iiolicy, availed himself of 
some flimsy pretexts for cancelling it, 
and as if this injustice had not been 
sufficient, let the Mahrattas loose upon 
him by freeing them from some restric¬ 
tions which prohibited them from inter- 
fi'viiig with his territoiy. The first effect 
of this desertion was to subject him to a 
visit from Holkar, whom he was obliged 
to buy off at the jirice of twenty lacs of 



Maharaka Bhbem Sing, Princo of Odeyjioor. 
Fram Todd'« Annal« of BojMthftn. 


rupees. 

In consideration of this sum, Holkar undertook not to interfere in the war wurpro- 
which the rival maniage had produced, and Man Sing, not only attacked their ais- 
by Jugat Sing, but opposed by a powerful body of his own subjects, who, 
di.sgusted by his tyranny, had ri.sen in support of another claimant to the 
tiironc, was obliged to shut himself up in the citadel of Joudpoor. Scindia, who 
had been bought off by the Rana, had also agreed to remain neutral, but both 
he and Holkar, while keeping their engagements in the letter, laid no restraint 
on their marauding dependants. Ameer Khan in particular, considering it 
contrary to his interest that Man Sing’s power should be annihilated, compelled 
Jugat Sing to raise the siege of Joudpoor, and hasten home to the defence of his 
own dominions. The Rana, though he took no part in the war between the 
two rajahs, suffered so much from the exactions of Scindia and Ameer Khan, 
and felt so indignant at being obliged to treat them as equals, that he made 
an urgent application to the Company, ahd offered tp purchase their protection 
by the cession of half his territory. The two rajahs, also convinced that their 
hostilities were only making them the prey of a common enemy, offered to submit 
their quairel to the arbitration of the British government, which having, as 
they justly argued, succeeded to the place of the Mogul emperor, ought not to 
decline his duties, one of the most obvious and important of which was to in¬ 
terpose authoritatively for the maintenance of the general tranquillitv. The 



56 


HISTOEY OF INDIA. 


[Book VII. 


A.n 1806 


Horribio 
jiiodo of 
reooncUiTig 
(lisMmBioiiH 
nioonglliy' 
l>or>i otii^u 


Tragical fate 
of KrUlma 
Koumoroe. 


policy now in favour was too selfish and cowardly to attach any weight to 
these representations, and the British government looked on with intiifference, 
and kept boasting of its moderation in standing aloof, while whole provinces 
were falling into a state of anarchy. One effect of this policy was to seal the 
fate of the beautiful Krishna Koomaree, Princess of 'Odeypoor. The Rana, her 
father, deprived of all other support, was driven to enlist the services of Ameer 
Khan, and assigned to him a fourth of his revenues as the permanent hire of 
one of tlie Patan adventurer’s brigades. Availing himself of the influence thus 
acquired. Ameer Khan, wlio had discovered in the Rana a character as heartless 
and unjirincipled as his own, ventured to suggest, that as the marriage feud 
still continued to rage, the only effectual mode of terminating it wotild be to 
remove its cause by putting tlie jirincess to death. Strange to say, the inhuman 
jiroposal, instead of being rejected witli liorror, was listened to, and according 
to Ameer Klian’s account, the Rana replied as follows:—“If you will jfledge 
yotirself to get for me Khalee Row (a coveted tract of territory), from Rajah Man 
Sing, I will in that case contrive to get rid of my daughter after you shall have 
gone, using such means as shall create as little odium as possible.” The means 
adopted were to mix j)oisou with his daughter’s food. The quantit 3 ' taken 
])roved insufficient, but the princess, divining what had been intended, sent to 
her father to say that if her living longer was deemed inconsistent with the 
interest of his family, there was no necessity for going secretly to work. She 
accordingly dressed herself in gay attire, and procuring a bowl of poison, drank 
it off, exclaiming, “This is the marriage to which 1 was foredoomed.” Her 
mother, unable to survive the tragical fate of her beloved daughter, died shortly 
after of a broken heart. Tlie father continued to live and reap tlie full fruits 
of his infamy. According to the account given by Sir John Malcolm, the 
untimely death of the princess was no sooner known in Odeypoor, than “loud 
lamentations burst from every quarter, and expressions of pity at her fate 
were mingled with execrations on the weakness and cowardice of those who 
could purchase safety on such terms.” The difficulty of finding any redeeming 
trait in this diabolical atrocity, will justify the insertion of Sir John’s narrative 
of the conduct of “Sugwant Sing, chief of Karradur, who, the moment he 
heard of the proceedings in the palace, hastened from his residence to Odey- 
]ioor, and dismounting from a breathless horse, went unceremoniously into the 
presence of his prince, whom he found seated with several of his ministers in 
apparent affliction. ‘ Is tlje princess dead or alive?’ was his impatient interro¬ 
gation ; to which, after a short pause, Adjeit Sing replied, by entreating him 
‘ not to disturb the grief of a father for a lost child.’ The old chief immediately 
unbuckled his sword, which, with his shield, he laid at the feet of the Maha- 
rana, saying, in a calm but re.solute tone: ‘ My ancestors have served yours for 
more than thirty generations, and to you I cannot utter what I feel, but these 
arms shall never more be used in your service.’ ” Sugwant Sing kept his 



Chap. II.] 


THE BAJPOOTS. 


word. Though he lived eight years longer, and did not actually renounce his 
allegiance, he did not again bear arms for the Rana 

It was impossible that permanent peace could be purchased by such 
inhuman moan.s, and war and rapine, the effect partly of foreign aggression 
and partly of intestine dissension, prevailed in almost every part of Rajpootaria 
which held out any hope of plunder. Besides the three Rajpoot principali¬ 
ties, of which some account has been given, there were many othera, some of 
them like those of Bikanecr and Jessulmoer, though of gi-eat extent, situated 
so far to the north and west, and of so sterile a character, as to be almost beyond 
the reach of military operations; and others, like Kotah, Boondee, and Mackaree, 
of comparatively small extent, but from their immediate proximity to the 
eastern frontier, of considerable military and political impoi-tance. Mackai’ee 
was the only one of these which had a subsisting alliance with the Company; 
but it was perfectly obvious that until they were all brought into the same 
position, the predatory system could not be successfully combated. Such then 
was the first task to which the governor-general considered it necessary to 
address himself. It was not very difficult, for such was the state of insecurity 
jiiid W)'etchedness to which most of the chiefs had been reduced, that nothing 
more than the intimation of a readiness to abandon the non-interference j)olicy 
was required, in order to induce them to a])]dy fqr the benefits of the better 
)>olicy about to be resumed. The Rajah of Jeypoor, who, from the unjustifiable 
manner in which he had been thrown off, was considered as luiving a prior 
claim, made the first applicirtion, and the i-esident at Delhi, to whom it had 
been presented, was authorized in April, 1810, to negotiate an alliance. The 
Rana of Odeyj)oor and the Rajah of Joudpoor ftdlowed his example. So anxious 
was tln' Rajah of Kotah for protection, that he offered beforehand to .submit to 
any tenns which the governor-general might dictate, 'fhe Rajah t)f Boondee, 
hiking a .similar course, jdeaded seivices wliich ought not to have been forgotten; 
while a number of petty chiefs on the frontiers of Bundelcund or Malwah prayed 
to be taken within the pale of pi-otection. Even Ameer Khan, as if carried 
away by the current, or conscious that he would be unable to resist it, offei’ed 
to desist from 2 >illage if guaranteed in his actual possession, and to a,s.si,st in 
dispersing the Pindarees. Nuzur Mahomed also, the Nabob of Bho 2 )aul, 
notwithstanding the little encouragement formerly given, renewed his a 2 ^ 2 )lica- 
tion with more success, and concluded a preliminaiy engagement. 

Some doubt was felt as to the course which Scindia might take. The Pin¬ 
darees had been accustomed to take part in all his expeditions, and deeiped 
themselves so necessary to him, that Namdur Khan, on hearing of the projected 
crusade gainst them, addressed a letter to Scindia, in which he asked, “ Wliat, 
it we are destroyed, will become of you? ' Nor was this question .so extrava¬ 
gant as it may at first sight appear. Scindia himself was doubtful if he could 

dispense with their jissistance, and several of his most distinguished officers 

in. 


A.D. 1816 


Subordinate 

RajtHKit 

tjcH. 


(»f the 
govenior- 
gencnil to 
ro.minie tho 
alliance 
liojicv. 


Dubions 
procedure of 
Scindia and 
iJolkttr. 



58 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book Vll. 


A.O. 1816. 


Tba 

PincUiroes 

abaiuWuod 

bicindia. 


Policy of tin* 
I'oiBliwu. 


Escape of hiH 

favourite 

TrimbuKlee. 


not oniy patronized the Pindarees, but believed that, if duly supported, they 
might prove a match for the British, and be the means of re-establishing the 
mode of warfare which the Mahrattas originally pursued, and to the abandon¬ 
ment of which not a few ascribed their more recent disasters. It was therefore 
not without alarm and deep mortification that Scindia, shrinking from a new 
contest, felt constrained to abandon the Pindarees to their fate, and even to 
profess his desire to assist in any measures that might be adopted for their 
extermination. Wliile Scindia was thus afraid to show any countenance to 
the Pindarce, little was to be apprehended from the troops of Holkar, whose 
mu.snud was now occupied by a child, while an unprincipled woman acted as 
regent, and had difficulty in maintaining her position among contending factions. 

In regard to the Peishwa, there was more room for doubt. He had long 
submitted with the utmost reluctance to the yoke which the subsidiary alliance 
had imposed upon him, and ever since he had been compelled to allow his 
favourite, Trimbukjee, to be carried off to an imprisonment which was appar¬ 
ently to be for life, his bitter animosity to the British had scarcely been dis¬ 
guised. Loud and incessant were his complaints of harslmess and injustice. 
He had given up Trimbukjee, he alleged, only that he might be brought to 
trial, and in the belief that if found guilty he would be returned to him for 
punishment. He was also sustaining severe pecuniary loss, as Trimbukjee, who 
had been intrusted with his treasures, was the only person who could show 
where they were concealed. While daily importuning the resident on this 
subject, and enlarging on many other imaginary grievances, the startling intel¬ 
ligence arrived that Trimbukjee had made his escape on the 2d of September, 
1816, from the Fort of Tannah. For greater security, the garrison of the fort 
consisted entirely of Eurojiean soldiers, and this circumstance was proved to 
have aided-the means used for setting him at liberty. He was allowed eveiy 
afternoon to take exercise for an hour or two on the ramparts, and it was 
remembered when too late that a Mahratta groom who had the charge of an 
officer’s horse, used about the same time to be busily employed immediately 
below in currying and cleaning him. He was often singing snatches of Mahratta 
songs, the meaning of which the sentries did not imderstand, but which Bishop 
Heber, from the account given to him, has exhibited in the following verses;— 

“ Behind the bush the bowmen hide, 

Tlie horse beneath the tree. 

Where shall I find a knight will ride 
The jangle paths with me ? 

There are five-and-fifty coursers there. 

And four-and-fifty men; 

When the fifty-fifth shall mount his steed. 

The Deccan thrives again.” 

A hole cut in the wall of the stable where the Mahratta groom kept his 



Chap. II.] 


THREATENED WAR WITH THE PEISHWA. 


59 


horse was easily reached from an outhouse of the fort, to which Triinbukjee a.d. isig. 
was permitted to retire at a certain hour in the evening in charge of a sentry. 

In a dark and rainy night, while the sentry stood outside, the prisoner dis- E«»peof 

° , n 11. -ii. Trimbukjee. 

appeared, and having changed his dress into that of a comtUon labourer, with a 
basket on his head, passed the gateway of the fort unquestioned. The narrow 
channel of Salsette was aU that separated him from the Mahratta territory. 

He waded over, and found a body of horsemen, who soon placed him beyond 
the reach of pursuit. 

The Peishwa, on being informed by Mr. Eiphinstone of Trimbukjee’s escape. Duplicity 

/»!•• 1 tilW 

not only professed entire ignorance, but promised to adopt energetic measures Peishwa. 
for recajituring him. He soon gave cause to suspect his sincerity. Any infor¬ 
mation lie gave was found only to mislead, and he began to collect troops even 
in the vicinity of Poonah, with so little attempt at concealment, that it seemed 
as if he cared not how soon open hostilities were commenced. Meanwhile, 
though Bajee Row pretended to have no idea of the place to which Trimbukjee 
had retired, and declared solemnly that he believed him to be dead, all his 
.subjects were well aware that he had found an asylum among the Mahadeo 
Hills, to the south of the Neera, and placed himself at the head of considerable 
bodies of horse and foot. It was moreover ascertained, that interviews had 
actually taken place between Trimbukjee and his master, who had conveyed 
money to him, and acted in such a manner as to make his cause his own. The 
troops under Trimbukjee at last amounted to nearly 20,000. This seemed only 
the prelude to a much more formidable muster, since the Peishwa displayed 
augmented activity in raising new levies, in removing his treasures from Poonah 
to Raighur, and in improving the defences of his strongest forts. 

It was now high time to bring the question of peace or war to a formal Mutual pro- 
decision, and Mr. Eiphinstone, while waiting for instructions from the governor- f^^nii- 
general, proceeded to prepare for the worst, by recalling to Poonah the principal 
part of the subsidiary force which had been stationed on the frontier to watch 
the Pindarees, and instructing the Hyderabad subsidiary force to advance into 
Candeish. Here a body of insurgents, about 5000 strong, had assembled under 
Godajoe Dainglia, Trimbukjee's nephew, while his brother-in-law, Jado Row, 
headed another body of about the same strength, in the south-east, in the 
vicinity of Punderpoor. Besides these, a number of smaller parties were pre¬ 
paring to join from various quarters. Had this been all, a short delay might 
still have been possible, but every step taken by the Peishwa shoVed plainly 
that the insurgents had his full sanction, and had good ground for believing 
that he would soon place himself at their head. One of his most overt acts 
was the collecting of gun bullocks for the artillery in liis arsenal at Poonah. 

Thus distinctly warned, Mr. Eiphinstone deemed it folly to leave matters longer 
in suspense, and addressed a note to the Peishwa, in which, after reproaching 
him with duplicity and wanton aggression, he notified to him that the friendly 



60 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[^OOK VII. 


A.D. 1816 . relations between the two governments were at an end, that any attempt to 
leave Poonah would be regarded as a declaration of war, and that the subsidiaiy 
force would proceed forthwith to put down the insurrection. The last threat 
the I’meiiwo. was immediately put in execution, and British troops moved forthwith against 
the principal bodies of insurgents. Colonel Smith, at the head of a detachment 
lightly equipped, hastened to the south, and endeavoured in vain to come 
up with a body of 4000, which seemed only anxious to avoid an encounter. 
Another detachment under Major Smith was more successful, and after a chase 
of 150 miles in four days, overtook the fugitives. They made little resistance, 
and were dispersed witliout suffering severely, as the detachment had no 
cavalry to continue the pursuit. The other main body of insurgents 
assembled in Candeish did not escape so easily; a detachment of the Hyderabad 
subsidiary force under Captain Davies having encountei’ed them, and compelled 
them to a precijiitate flight, leaving more than 400 dead upon the field. 

Ilia jjarni. Bajec Row, wlien he saw the extreme to which matters had been precipitated, 
became seriou.sly alarmed, and seemed willing to make any concession that 
might be required of him for the re-establishment of amicable relationa 
Another short delay in consequence took place, but its oidy effect was to give 
him another op])ortunity of manifesting his insincerity. The moment the more 
immediate pressure was removed, all his promises were forgotten, and he 
resumed his former course.s. Mr. Elphinstonc, though still left without direct 
instructions from the governor-general, did not shrink from the responsibility 
in a mamier forced upon him, and having on the 6th of May, 1817, obtained a 
private audience of the Peishwa, informed him that after what had passed, no 
accommodation with him could now be made excej)t by his engaging to deliver 
Trimbukjee, and giving security for performance. This communication was 
received with great apparent coolness, and Mr. Elphinstone therefore thought 
it necessary on the following day to give a more definite foim to his demands, 
by embodying them in a note which specifically required an obligation to 
deliver Triinbukjcc within one month, and deliver the forts of Sinehur, Poor- 
under, and Raighur, as interim pledges. The written demand was received 
with as much apparent indifterencp as the verbal communication, and the 
twenty-four hours allowed for answer had nearly expired when vakeels arrived 
to intimate that the Peishwa agreed to the termis, and would suri'ender the forts 
without delay. Tliis unexpected result had been produced by the movement 
of the subsidiary force to positions which would have given them a comjilete 
command of Poonah. 

On the 10th of May the instructions of the governor-general arrived. They 
approved by anticipation of all that Mr. Elphinstone had done, and made 
specific provision for three cases which, it was supposable, might have occurred. 
In the first case, assuming that the Peishwa had surrendered Trimbukjee, or 
made sincere efforts to seize him, the relations between the courts were to be 



Chap. II.] ' T.EEATY WITH THE PEISHWA. Cl 

replaced on tlie same footing as when Trimbukjee was surrendered in 1816. 
In the second case, assuming that the Peishwa had not taken active steps of 
any kind, the delivery of Trimbukjee within a definite time, and of greater 
securities than furnished by the treaty of Bassein, were demanded. In the third 
case, which supposed that refusal or evasion continued after the receipt of the 
instructions, the securities were to be enhanced. The securities mentioned 
included cessions of territory to the amount of twenty-nine lacs, to meet the 
expense of an additional subsidiary force of 5000 horse and 3000 foot, to be 
substituted for the Peishwa’s contingent; the surrender of all claims on Gujerat, 
Bundelcund, and Hindoostan; and generally, a renunciation of all claim to be 
the head of a Mahratta confederacy. Should war have actually commenced, 
the Peishwa was to be seized, and a temj)orary arrangement made for the 
government of the country. Tlie fact of instructions having been received from 
the govemor-general was intimated to the Peishwa, but their precise contents 
were not explained to him till the 1st of June, when the resident waited upon 
him, and explained article by article the draft of a new treaty which he had 
j)repared. 

The Peishwa and his ministers laboured hard to obtain some abatement of 
the teims, but did nothing to jTistify it. Gn the contrary, the levy of troops 
continued as before, and the month allowed for the surrender of Trimbukjee 
was allowed to expire. There was now therefore no room for hesitation, and 
Mr. Elphinstone demanded that the treaty, in teims of the draft, which he had 
explained, should forthwith be executed. A short delay was gained by the 
discussion of the terms, but all evasions being at length exhausted, the treaty 
was signed and sealed by the Peishwa on the 13th of June, 1817. The stipu¬ 
lations would have desei’ved a minute detail had they been destined to regulate 
the'relations of the two governments foi‘ any lengthened j)eriod, but as events 
.shortly afterwards took jJace which entirely superseded them, it is necessarj’^ 
only to mention that the Peishwa was taken bound to cede tenitory yielding 
a revenue of thiiiy-four lacs; to renounce the character of supreme head of the 
Mahratta empire, and the right to communicate with other native powers, 
except through the British resident; to commute all past claims on the Quicowar 
for an annual payment of four lacs; to renew the lease of the moiety of 
Ahmcdabad to the Guicowar, for four and a half lacs, and to surrender all 
rights in Bundelcund, Hindoostan, and Malwah. The terms were undoubtedly 
rigorous, and the Peishwa felt them to be so to such a degree, that a^ the very 
time of ratifying the treaty, he protested that it had been wrung from him, 
and that he acquiesced merely because he was unable to resist. It is impossible, 
however, to feel any sympathy for him He had brought all his disasters upon 
himself bj’^ a cowardly, deceitful, and vindictive temper; and, as will soon be 
seen, the power left him, curtailed as it was, was still sufficient to tempt him to 
complete his ruin, by plunging once more into hostilitie.s.- 


A.D. 181". 


Kigonttis 
ternin 
offerotl to 
the Peiebu 


Tie accepts 
them utidrr 
proleat. 



02 


HISTOEY OF INDIA. 


[Book VJr. 


A.D. 1817. 


I’raiMU’atioiw 
to suppram 
the preda¬ 
tory Byetem. 


Army <»f 
llindouatan. 


CHAPTER III. 


General preparations—^The army of Hindoostan—^The army of the Deccan —First movements—Treaties 
with Hcindia and with Ameer Khan—Rupture with the Peishwa—Battle of Kirkee—Flight of tho 
Peishwa — Ojwrations against the Pindarees—Rupture with tho Rajah of Nagpoor—Battle of 
Seetakalduo—Rupture with Holkar—Battle of Mahidpoor—Treaty with Holkar—Dispersion of the 
Pindarees—Operations against the Peishwa—Rajah of Sattarah iustallod—Capture of Sholapoor and 
Raighur—Storm of Talneer—^Annexation of Sangur—Deposition of the Rajah of Nagpoor—Capture 
of Chanda—Sun-ender of Bajee Bow—The last of the Peishwas. 



|AVING obtaiued from the home authorities a distinct though 
somewhat qualified assent to the necessity of suppression of the 
predatory system, the governor-general, who had previously 
formed his plans, lost no time in completing his general prepara¬ 
tions. With this view, two powerful armies were provided to 
advance simultaneously from the north and south, so as not only to envelope 
the usual haunts of the Pindarees, but to overawe any of the native chiefs who 
might be disposed to countenance tliem. The army of Hindoostan was com¬ 
posed of four main divisions, each of them of sufficient strength to act indepen¬ 
dently should circumstances require it. The right division, assembled at Agra, 
and commanded by General Donkin, consisted of two regiments of cavalry, one 
of them his majesty’s 8th dragoons, a regiment of European (his majesty’s 14th) 
and three battalions of native infantry, with eighteen guns. The left division, 
stationed at Callinger in Bundelcund, and commanded by General Marshall, 
consisted of a regiment of native cavalry, two corps of irregular horse, and five 
battalions of native infantry, with twenty-four gums. The centre division, 
stationed ?bt Sepundra, on the left bank of the Jumna, about thirty miles 
W.S.W. of Cawnpore, and commanded by General Brown, consisted of .three 
regiments of cavalry, one of them his ma,iesty’s 24th light dragoons, his 
majesty’s 87th regiment, and eight battalions of native infantry, with fifty-four 
guns. This division, with which the govei-nor-general as commander-in-chief 
established his head-quartei-s, mustered 12,500 fighting men of the regular 
army. The fourth was a reserve division, stationed under Sir David Ochterlony 
at Kewaree, about fifty miles south-west of Delhi, and composed of a regiment 
of native cavalry, two corps of Skinner’s horse, liis majesty’s G7th regiment, 
and five battalions of native infantry, with twenty-two gums. To each division 
considerable bodies of iri’egulars were attached, while separate detachments 
w’ere stationed in various localities to the east and west, so as to give support 










Chap. III.] 


PEEPAEATIONS AGAINST THE PINDAEEES. 


63 


as required, or intercept the marauders vsben attempting to e.scape. The whole A.n. lan. 
of the army of Hindoostan mustered 63,000 men; 

The army of the Deccan, commanded by Sir Thomas Hislop, commander-in- Army of the 

' mi rs T • Ueccim ms- 

chief of the Madras presidency, was formed into five divisions. The first divi- sembied for 
sion, with which Sir Thomas Hislop fixed his headquarters, was intended to pro- 
ceed to Hindia, and consisted of a squadron of his majesty’s 22d light* dragoons, 
two I'egiments of native cavalry, flank companies of his majesty’s royal Scots, 
and six battalions of native infantry, with field artillerj*. The second division, 
commanded by Colonel Dovfeton, and designed to manoeuvre in Berar, consisted 
of a regiment of native cavalry, and of the remainder of his majesty’s royal 
Scots, six battalions qf native infantry, and the Berar and Hyderabad brigades. 

Tlie third division, commanded by Sir John Malcolm, who had also a commis¬ 
sion to act as the governor-general’s politiciil agent, was intended to proceed in 
advance, and consisted of a regiment of native cavalry, and five companies of 
native infantry, with the Ru.ssell brigade, the Ellichpoor brigade, and 4000 
Mysore auxiliary horse. Tlie fourth division, commanded by Colonel Smith 
and intended to oiierate in Candeish, consisted of a regiment of native cavalry. 

Ids majesty’s 6.5th regiment, six battalions of native infantiy, and a body of 
reformed Poonah horse under European officers. The fifth division, forming the 
Nagpoor subsidiary force, commanded by Colonel Adams, consisted of two regi¬ 
ments of native cavalry, a body of Rohilla liorse, the contingent of the Nabob 
of Bhopaul, and six battalions of native infantry. A reserve division was 
formed under Colonel Pritzler, and brigades were left at Poonah, Nagpoor, and 
Hyderabad. A respectable force had also been a.sseml)led in Gujcrat under Sir 
W. G. Kerr. The two armies, nearly equal in number, amounted in the aggre¬ 
gate to 113,000 men, with 300 pieces of ordnance. 

I’he Marquis of Hastings embarked at Calcutta on the voyage up the Tiiogovor- 
Ganges on the 8th of July, 1817, and after a short stay at Patna, to receive a 
comjdimentary deputation from Khatmandoo, arrived at Cawnpore in Septem 
her. On the 16th of October he took the field in person, reached Secundra, 
where the centre division had assembled, on the 20th, reviewed the troops on 
the 2l,st, and crossed the Jumna with them on the 20th. General Donkin 
moved simultaneously from Agra, and both began their march upon Gwalior, 
the centre division by the route of Jaloun and Seonda on the Sindh, and the 
right division by Dholpoor Baree on the Chumbul. The object of th^se move¬ 
ments cannot be better explained than in the governor-general’s own words: 
“Residing at Gwalior, he (Scindia) was in the heart of the richest part of his 
dominions, but independently of tliis objection that those territories were separ¬ 
ated from our territory only by the Jumna, there was a military defect in the 
situation, to which it must be supposed the Mahara,jah had never adverted. 

About twenty miles south of Gwalior a ridge of veiy abrupt hills, covered 
with tangled wood peculiar to India, extends from the Little Sindh to the Chum- 



64 


HISTORY OF INDIA, 


[Book VII. 


A.D. 1817. 

]*ruject of 
;^>voriior 
KOiiernl in 
re^inl to 
Hcindia. 


Now iroat^ 
tllllKWOti 
ii]>oii him. 


tcriOH. 


bul, which rivers form the flank boundaries of the Gwalior district and its 
dependencie.s. There are but two routes by which carriages and perhaps 
cavalry can pass that chain, one along the Little Sindh and another not far 
from the Cliuuibul By my seizing, with the centre, a position which would 
bar any movement along the Little Sindh, and placing Major-general Donkin’s 
division at the back of the other pass, Scindia was reduced to the dilemma of 
subscribing tlie treaty which I offered him, or of crossing the hills through 
bye-paths, attended by a few followers who might be able to accompany him, 
sacrificing his splendid train of artillery (above 100 brass guns), with all its 
appendages, and abandoning at once to us his most valuable possessions.” 

How far it was justifiable to take advantage of the false position in which 
any one had placed himself, and impose upon him terms which, as the governor- 
general himself confesses, “were essentially unqualified submission, though so 
coloured as to avoid making him feel public humiliation,” might well have been 
questioned, had not Scindia by repeated acts of perfidy forfeited all claim to 
more indulgent treatment. While professing.a readiness to assist’in the exter¬ 
mination of the Pindarees, he had not only promised them protection, but was 
suspected of sharing in their plunder. With his Mahratta confederates he had 
been incessantly intriguing for the formation of a league designed to destroy 
British supremacy, and had very recently been detected in a treacherous corre¬ 
spondence with the Nopaulese. This last act, which crowned all his other 
offences, had been discovered by mere accident. While two passengers were 
ci’ossing the Ganges at Bithoor, a full-sized impression of tScindia’s seal chanced 
to <lro]) from the turban of one of them Suspicion being excited, they were 
detained and searched. Besides several letters from Scindia himself, some open 
and some sealed, they were found to be in possession of a letter urging the 
Ghoorkas to make common cause with the other independent power’s of India. 
For better concealment, this letter was neatly pasted between the leaves of a 
Sanscrit book of the Vedas which one of the passengers, who professed to be a 
travelling student, was carrying with him. The governor-general, as the most 
delicate and impressive mode of intimating to Scindia that the intrigue was 
known, sent the sealed letters to be delivered to him, unopened and without 
comment, in full durbar. This discovery undoubtedly had its weight in deter¬ 
ring Scindia from disputing the terms which were dictated to him, a.nd which 
he was ^ell aware might easily be made still more rigorous and unpalatable. 

By the treaty concluded on the .5th of November, 1817, ho engaged to use 
his best efforts for the destruction of the Pindarees; to furnish and maintain in 
comjdete efficiency a specific contingent to act in concert with the British and 
under the direction of a British officer; to admit British garrisons into the forts 
of Hindia and Aseerghur, and allow them to be used as depfits during the war; 
to remit for three years his claims upon the British government, in order that 
they might be applied to the equipment of the contingent; and to allow the 



Chap. III.] 


TEEATY WITH SCINDIA. 


65 


sums hitherto paid in pensions to his family and ministers to be applied to the a.d. isit. 
regular payments of those of his troops co-operating with the British. With 
the exception of the troops so co-operating, all the others belonging to Scindia Terms of 
were to remain stationary at the posts assigned by the British government. ciua«»iwith 
By the eighth article of treaty of Surjee Argengaum, concluded in November, 

1805, the British government had engaged to confine its alliances with other 
native states within certain limits. This article, as interfering with the alli¬ 
ances necessary to be formed for the successful suppression of the predatory 
system, was superseded by a new article, which gave full liberty to conclude 
alliances with the Rajpoot states of Odeypoor, Joudpoor, Jeypoor, and others 
on the left bank of the Chumbul, always, however, subject to the tribute which 
these states were bound to pay to Scindia, and the payment of which was 
muu-autecd to him in consideration of his a^reeiiiff not to interfere in future 

o o o 


with their affairs. This treaty with Scindia was immediately followed by 
another with Ameer Khan, who had sagacity enough to foresee the ruin which 
hostilities with the British would necessfvrily bring ui>on him, and therefore 
engaged, on their guaranteeing to him all the territories which he actually 
po.sse,ssed under grants from Holkar, to disband his Patans, and give up his 
artillery, on receiving five lacs of rupees as their estimated value. As an hostage 
for the fulfilment of this treaty. Ameer Khan’s son and heir was to reside at 
Delhi. 

In the midst of these negotiations a final rupture with Bajee Row took Final toiv 
plfice, and actual hostilities commenced. When he signed the treaty he had, BojeoKow. 
with more boldness and honesty than he usually evinced, protested that it was 
wrung from him by compulsion, and there could not therefore be a doubt that 
he would seize the first opportunity to shake himself free from it. As if 
by signing it he felt so degraded as to be ashamed to show himself to the 
inhabitants of his capital, he withdrew from it, and coptinuing absent under 
various pretences, did not return till the end of September. Wliat he was 
meditating v’^as very apparent, for the whole of October was spent by him in 
collecting troops from all quarters, and urging his jaghirdars to prepare their 
contingents. It was the middle of the month before Mr. Elphinstone could 
obtain an audience, and when he demanded an explanation, he was merely 
told that the Peishwa was desirous to take part in the Pindaree war to the 
extent of his means. This pretence was too shallow to deceive, l^eanwhile, 
other circumstances gave unequivocal proof of intended hostilities. Numerous 
attempts were made to tamper with the fidelity of the sepoys of the brigade, 
and the Mahratta troops, as they crowded into the capital, encamped so as to 
inclose the British cantonments. The site of these, on the north-east of the city, 
had been well chosen for the purpose of defending it against an attack from 
without, but became very insecure when an attack was threatened both from 
■without and from within. The necessity of remoidng to a stronger position 

VoL. in. 205 



66 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book VII. 


A I). 1817. 


Hits <if 
J’oonah aii<l 
tlio Britin)! 
caritoii 
lueiitA. 


I>eni:in<lH 
of the I’oif-Jj- 
wii oij M r. 
KI]ihjiislA)ite 


became every day more and more apparent, and at last Mn Elphinstone, tliougli 
most reluctant to precijiitate the open ruptm'e which was seen to bo impending, 
gave orders on the 31st of October that the stores of the brigade sliould be 
transported to Kirkee, and tliat tlie brigade itself should immediately follow. 

The Moota from tlie south-west meeting the Moola from the north-east, 
forms with it the Moota-Moola, which takes an intermediate direction and 
flows east. On the right bank, in tlie angle made by the Moota and the Moota- 
Moola, lies the city of Poonah, inclosed by the livers towai’ds the west and 
north, Init (piite open towards the south and oast, in which latter direction, as 
already mentioned, the subsidiary force had its cantonments. On the oj)po.site 
or loft bank of the Moota, at the point of junction with the Moola, stood the 
British i-esidency, which had thus the disadvantage of being entirely scfiarated 
from the cantonments, a river and the whole breadth of the city intervening 
between them. It was to get rhl of this di.sadvantage, and escape from the 
danger of being .surrounded by the troops Avhich Avero jiouring into the city, that 
the British brigade removed on the 1st of November to the village of Kirkee, 
situated rather more than two miles to the north, in an angle formed by an 
abrupt bend of the Moola, and affording peculiar advantages for defence. The 
brigade, consisting of a Bombay European regiment, which had just airived, 
and three native liattalions under Colonel Burr, seemed quite able to maintain 
its new position till succours should arrive, but it was decimal prudent to send 
to fSeroor for a light battalion that had been left there to meet contingencies, 
and a corps of 1000 auxiliary horse that had just been raiseil in the same quarter. 

This reinforcement started from Seroor on the 5th of November, and in the 
forenoon of that day, Bajee How, iuformeil of the fact, put his trooiis in motion. 
Gokla, a Mahi’atta chief, who had always been at the head of the war party, 
moved round a battalion, which took u]i a position between Kirkee and the 
residency, obviously with the view of cutting off the communication between 
the two. Mr. Elphinstone having immediately demanded an explanation, an 
officer arrived on the part of the Peishwa to say that he had heard of the 
approach of troops as well from Seroor as from Colonel Smith’s army, and 
having twice before been the dupe of his own iiTCSolution, he was now deter¬ 
mined to be beforehand with his demands. These were that the recently 
anived Europeans should be sent back to Bombay, and that the brigade must 
both be i-educed to its usual amount, and c.antoncd wherever he should apijoint. 
A categorical answer being required, Mr. Elphinstone could only I'eitlj^, that if 
the Peishwa joined his anny, he would join the brigade, and that if the 
Mahratta troops advanced towards the brigade, they would assuredly be 
attacked. Bajee Row seems to have been too impatient to wait for tliis reply, 
for the moment his message left the residency, he mounted his horse, and joined 
his army at the Parbutee Hill, a little south-west of Poonah. So quick were 
the subsequent movements, that Mr. Elphinstone and his suite had barely time 



Chap. 111.] WAE WITH THE PEISHWA. 67 

to foi-d the Moola, and hasten up its left bank, to cross it again by a bridge 
which led to Kirkeo, when the residency was attacked, pillaged, and burned, 
with all Mr, Elphinstone’s valuable books and papers. 

Although the position at Kirkee could not have been successfully assailed, 
it was resolved to advance from it into the plain. Tlie extent to which the 
fidelity of the native troops liad been tampered with was not certainly known, 
and by keeping them cooped up, more might he lost than by assuming the 
oifensive. Accordingly, Colonel Burr, leaving a detachment in charge of 
Kirkee, advanced and formed his lino, placing the Europeans in the centre. 
Major Ford, who was cantone,d at l)ha})oora, a sliort distance to the west, with 
two battalions of the Poonah contingent, marched in to take liis share in the 
danger, but Avas so much impeded by a party of hoi’se sent to intercept him, 



a. Position taken uj) by C'<»lonol Burr on tlie 4th j il, First battjilion of tth 'Boml>ay Native Infantry, 

Nov. 1817. I ^ advaiicud ainl nearly surrounded, 

li. llt*Hiilonco, whence Mr. Flphinstonc r.diz’od l*y , o, Fii>;tlj.Tttaliouof 7fch nonilmy Native Infantry, 
route h b b, on i>tli Nov. j aa fornio<l afterwards tn jH/teuci'.. ’ 

c. Major Ford’s battalion, as they camo in fixun i f. Colonel Miluo on the TiiomiiiK of IJie 10th. 
i>]iajhX)ra. 1 g, His bivouac. 

that ho was obliged to fight his way, and did not anive before the action was 
hotly commenced. The Mahrattas opened a heavy but distant cannonade, and 
attempted to ])u.sh bodies of horse round the British flanks. In this they partly 
.succeeded, but were ultimately repulsed with considerable loss, and did not 
agaiji attempt to come to close quarters. At nightfall the British returned to 
Kirkee, with a loss of only eighteen killed, and fifty-seven wounded; whereas 
the enemy, who had for some time kept at a respectful distance, retired 
leaving about 500 on the field. 

Hostilities being now openly declared, the Mahrattas, as if for the purpose 
of making reconciliation impossible, proceeded to give a ferocious character to 
the war, by putting to death Captain Vaughan and his brother, who, having 
been surrounded while travelling with a small fcscoi*t, had surrendered on pro¬ 
mise of quarter; and inhumanly murdering or mutilating most of the women 


A.D. 1817. 


BatMo of 
Kirkee. 


Barlmroiu 

murder 

of two 

brothorMr 

Brititdi 

ofiluera. 





C8 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book VII, 


A.D. 1817. belonging to the l^rigade who had been found in the vicinity of the old can¬ 
tonments. Meanwhile, a just retribution was in course of preparation. Colonel 
KiWit Smith, inferring the state of matters at Poonah, fi'om the interruption of his 

I’BiBijwa. communications, hastened southward. On the 8th of November he reached 
Ahmednuggur, and though parties of the enemy’s cavalry kept hovering around 
liim, did not experience much annoyance till he had passed Seroor, when they 
appeared in such numbers as to surround him on eveiy side. He forced his 
way, notwithstanding, and after a loss of part of his baggage, arrived ai Poonali 
on the 13th. A combined attack on the enemy’s camp was arranged, but at 
day-light on the I7th, when it was put in execution, it was found deserted, 
with the tents still standing. The Peishwa’s courage had again failed him, and 
he had hastened oif during the night to save himself by flight. - Poonah surren¬ 
dered in the course of the day, and a pursuit of the flying enemy was successful 
in capturing eighteen guns, with their tumbrils and ammunition, and a large.: 
quantity of baggage. 

stnte of During the di8cus.sions with the Peishwa, a complete change had come over 

atTttirH at , , , , 

NagiKwr. the policy of Apa Sahib. We left hizn so conscious of dependence on British 
protection, that he had withdrawn from Nagpoor and fixed his residence close 
to the cantonments of the subsidiary force. His naturally restless and intrigu¬ 
ing disposition did not permit him long to remain quiet, and he soon became 
intimately connected with the very party which had most strenuously opposed 
his appointment to the regency. This change was sj^eedily followed by indica¬ 
tions of a desire to shake himself free of some of the obligations to which he had 
become bound by the treaty, and he began with complaining that the subsi¬ 
diary force and the contingent absorbed far too large a proportibn of the public 
revenue. This comjdaint was doubtless well founded, as the proportion exceeded 
a third of the whole, and measures were about to be taken to lighten the 
burden, when his own impatience and folly rendered an amicable adjustment 
impossible. The possession of the regency did not satisfy his ambition. He 
was anxious not only to wield the power, but to bear the name of rajah, and 
as there was no obstacle to his possession of the musnud except the imbecile 
Pursajee, the necessary means were taken to remove it. On the morning of 
the l.st of February, 1817, Pumijee was found dead in his bed. Though it was 
afterwards ascertained that he had been murdered, the vague rumours of 
violence which were whispered at the time passed unheeded, and Apa Sahib 
gained the object of his crime by being immediately proclaimed, without oppo- 
Ai^saiiib sition. Rajah of Nagpoor. After this elevation he lost no time in effecting the 
eriy, 1 . wliicli lie had been meditating. Nerayun Punt, who had strongly 

advocated the subsidiary alliance, and had continued ever since to be the main 
channel of communication with the British government, was dismissed, and 
Purseram Row, a notorious intriguer in favour of an opposite policy, was 
appointed in his jilace. When remonstrated with by Mr. Jenkins, the resident, 



Chap. III.] 


RELATIONS WITH NAGPOOR. 


69 


on the incongruity of this appointment, he revoked it indeed, ^ut only to make a.d. i8it. 
choice of the commander of his private troops, Ramchundur Waugh, who was 
in some respects still more objectionable. All his other appointments to impor¬ 
tant offices in the state were made in a similar spirit. 

The British alliance, which Apa Sahib had previously professed to regard Apa^iva 
as the main prop of his power,'was how regarded with undi^uised aversion, i.«stuuyt..> 
and he plunged deep into the intrigues which were at this time carried on for '' 

the purpose of establishing a new Mahratta confederacy. When the Peishwa, 
after threatening an open rupture sooner than give up Trimbukjee, was 
frightened into submission, and concluded the humiliating treaty mentioned 
above, Apa Sahib, aware how far he had committed himself, endeavoured to 
obviate the consequences by retracing his steps. He ostensibly restored 
Nerayun Punt to favour, made a new arrangement respecting the contingent, 
with which he professed to be perfectly satistied) and gave so many proofs of a 
friendly disposition, that the resident was partly imposed upon, and as late as 
tlie end of October, gave it as his opinion that no immediate rupture was to be 
a])prehended. Very possibly, had affairs remained at P«Jonah on their former 
footing, this opinion might have proved correct, but no sooner was it known 
that tlie Peishwa had ru-shed into hostilities, than Apa Sahib resolved to make 
common cause with him. He did not, however, immediately declare himself, 
and only indicated his designs by the extent and activity of his mtlitary 
preparations. By the middle of November, appearances were so menacing that 
the resident requested that a brigade of Colonel Adam’s division should halt on 
the south of the Nerbudda, and be I'eady to detach a battalion with three troo 2 )s' 
of cavalry, to reinforce the Nag[)oor brigade, which had been much weakened 
by sickness. The result of the battle of Kirkee, and the arrival of Colonel 
Smith at Poonah, followed by the Peishwa’s flight, however much they might 
have disconcerted Apa Sahib, made no apparent change in his purposes, for 
his levies of ti'oops continued ivs briskly as before. At the same time, it was 
known that the question of peace or war was frequently agitated in the privacy 
of his court, and that he alternated from the one to the other, according .os 
prudent or desperate counsels swayed him. 

The first overt declaration of Apa Sahib’s determination to throw in his lot ms profes- 
with Bajee Row, was given on the night of the 24th of November, when the giaiice totho 
resident received a note from Ramchundur Waugh, intimating that the rajah ^'‘“***'*' 
had received a khelaut, or dress of honour from Poonah, and intended'’next day 
to go in state to his camp, to be invested with it, and also formally to assume 
the title of Senaputee, or commander-in-chief, which had been conferred on 
him. Mr. Jenkins was invited to assist at the ceremony. Nothing could bo 
more preposterous. Bajee Row was at this moment at open war with the 
British, and yet Apa Sahib, professedly their ally, was preparing in the most 
public maimer to declare allegiance to him. Mr. Jenkins pointed out these 



70 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book VII. 


A.D. 1817. 


ProparatioiiB 
for boftUli- 
)jetwecii 
Apa Saiiib 
anU t]i« 
liriimli. 


inconsistencies, and not only refased to take part in the ceremony, but remon¬ 
strated against it in the strongest terras. Apa Sahib was not to lie thus deterred; 
but aware that tlie performance of the ceiemonj^ could only be regarded as an 
unequivocal declaration of hostility, he immediately showed how ready he was 
to proceed to extremes by stationing his troops in threatening positions. The 
means of defence were very limited, consisting only of two battalions of native 
infantry, considerably reduced by sickne.ss, three troops of native cavalry, two 
coin] (allies forming the resident’s escort, and a detachment of artillery with 
four six-pounders. Colonel Scott had the command. 

The residency was situated to the west of Nagpoor, and separated from it 
by a low ridge extending from north to south, and terminated by two heights 
called the Sectabaldee Hills, about 400 yard.s apart from each other, and with 



Hertauai.ihsi: lliu.s and NAcrooTl t(R»iDENCY. —KroiH I’riusoiVs Narrative. 


rmitimi of jxii elevation nowhere exceeding ] 00 feet. 1’he south hill, the larger of the two, 
riwidoiiij. had a flat summit neai’ly 280 yards long from east to west, and was covered 
with tombs. Tiie north hill, much leas than the other, but rathei' more 
elevated, was of a conical shajie, and at the top not more than thirty-three 
yards long by six broad. The slope of both hills was gentle, and the ascent 
easy, exefept at a few points where quarries had been opened. The buildings 
of the residency lay iilong the western base of the ridge overlooking a spacious 
})lain; the base of the other three sides of the ridge was occupied by native 
huts iiregularly gi’ouped. Colonel Scott made his arrangements as follows. 
()n the north hill he posted 300 men of one of the battalions, with two of the 
six-pounders, under command of Captain Sadleir. The remainder of this bat¬ 
talion, and the whole of the other, with part of ilie escort and the rest of the 



Chap. ITI.] 


HOSTILITIES WITH NAGPOOR. 


71 


artillery, were stationed on the south hill. The residence', hastily fitted for a.d. isir. 
defence, was occupied by the other part of tlie escort, while the three troops of 
cavalry and some liglit infantry kept possession of the grounds in front of it. state of 
Tlie whole force under Colonel Scott mustei*ed about 1300; the Mahratta army, 
which lay to the east of the city, and stretched round from esist to south at the 
distance of about three miles from the Seetabaldee Hills, was estimated at 
12,000 horse and 8000 foot; of the latter 3000 were Arabs. 

Oil the 2Gth of November, though the rajah’s cavalry were jiroceeding in 
large masses towards the western plain fronting the residency, and his 
infantry and artillery were taking up positions which menaced the Seetabaldee 



n. First British ixiaitioii on Dtsc. 

I>, SocoTid Brilitth poidiion un lOtii Dec. 

c, I’liird Britisli iio.sitioii on HHh Dee. 

d, Knuiny'H ^luis ahaudonod on J^ritish advance, 
eaud f. Position of (hiloniO M*TjOod after oucniy's 

ilofoat. 

K. British reserve. 


hand i, Kiioiny's criiui) atul guns jda^ing on 
Jh'itisJi advaju'o. 

k, Kmnn.v’BcninpaiMl guns playing on Col. Galuui. 
1, Battery of howitzers, ojiened t!0th J>w. 
in, A«lv;ujco<l jiosil.ion against fort, lilttt Dec. 
n o, Fiitiiny's magazine. 

1 > p, Swtubaldee lliils. 


Hills, he kept up the farce of sending pacific messages. At .sunset two ministens, 
Nerayun Punt and Nerayunjee Nagria, the latter as notoriously hostile as 
the other was friendly to British interests, airived, but before the object of 
their visit could bo ascei-tained hostilities commenced with a smart fire of commun. 
musketry, opened by the Arabs almost simultaneously on both hilL^. It was hosuiitiB! 
replied to with sjxrit, and the conflict continued to rage throughout the night. 

At two in the morning an intermission of some hours took place, and the 
British availed themselves of it to make up fresh cartridges, and strengthen their 
position by placing along the exposed brow of the bills sacks of flour and gi’ain, 
and anything else that might serve for cover. The enemy had made no decided 
impression, and yet affairs had begun to wear a very gloomy appearance. On the 
northern hill, against which the attack had been specially directed, a heavy loss 





A n. isur. 


Hostilitiee 
with Nag- 
poor. 


Hattie of the 
Beetiibaldee 
lliile. 


Defeat of the 
MohrattoH. 


72 HISTORY OF INDIA. [Book VII. 

had been sustained. Captain Sadleir was killed, Captain Charleworth the next 
in command was wounded, and the defenders were so thinned or exhausted 
that it was necessary to relieve them. It was therefore obvious that if the 
enemy chose to avail themselves of their vast superiority of numbers, and keep 
up the attack by bringing forward fresh assailants, the defenders must ulti¬ 
mately be overcome by mere exhaustion. 

Such seemed to be the enemy’s plan, and in the meanwhile their cavalry 
were closing round the residency on the south and west so as to prevent the 
possibility of escape, and take advantage of any opportunity of a sudden onset 
in that quarter. At daybreak the fire opened more furiously than ever, addi¬ 
tional guns having been brought to bear during the night, and about ten o’clock 
the explosion of a tumbril on the summit of the northern hill caused so much 
confusion that the Arabs rushed forward with loud cries and carried it. Thus 
in possession of the key of the position, the Arabs opened a destructive fire from 
the gun which they had captured, and two others which they had brought up. 
The first shot killed Lieutenant Clarke and Dr. Neven the surgeon; the second, 
a round of grape, fatally wounded Mr. Sotheby, the resident’s assistant, and 
disabled four soldiers; and it seemed as if the defenders were about to be oom- 
pletely overpowered, when a gallant exploit saved them. Captain Fitzgerald, 
who commanded the cavalry, under insti-uctions to keep off the enemy’s horse, 
but not to advance into the plain against them, remained at his post while the 
enemy closed round and hemmed him in on every side. At last they brought 
two guns to bear upon him, and caused such loss that he chose rather to forget 
his orders than submit to it. Rushing forth at the head of his troops, he 
drove the masses of horse in flight before him, captured the two guns, turned 
them upon the fugitives, and with so much effect that they allowed him to 
carry them back as trophies to his post. This unexpected and most successful 
charge so animated the defenders on the ridge that they attacked the Arabs, 
who had already planted their standards upon it, and forced them to give way. 
At this moment another tumbril exploded on the northern hill, and the sepoys 
pushing forward amid the confu.sion succeeded in recapturing it at the point of 
the bayonet. The tide of battle was now completely turned, and the Mahrattas 
gave way on every side. The Arabs, who still showed in some force, having 
been dispersed by another cavalry charge, the troops on the hills moved down, 
cleared the sun-ounding houses and villages of the enemy, and captured all the 
guns not previously carried off. The enemy, though aware that the British 
troops were worn out, and that their ammunition was nearly exhausted, had 
suffered too severely, and wepe too much intimidated, to try the issue of a second 
conflict. The victors had good reason to congratulate themselves on this 
cowardly conduct, since they had already lost about a fourth of their whole 
number in killed and wounded. 

As soon as the battle was decided, Apa Sahib, as if he thought that his 



Chap. HI.] 


HOSTILITIES WITH NAGPOOR. 


73 


double game had not yet been played out, sent a message to the resident to a.i). isit. 
express his concern for the untoward event. His troops, he said, had acted 
without his sanction or knowledge, and he was most anxious to renew the Term* dio- 
former friendship. The resident i*eplied that the final decision now rested with ai* saiub. 
the governor-general, but consented, on the withdrawal of the rajah’s army to 
the east of the city, to a suspension of hostilities. This consent he gave the 
more readily because he was in daily.expectation of reinforcements; and in 
fact, on the 29th, only two days after the battle, Colonel Gahan, by accelerating 
his advance, arrived with three additional troops of cavalry and a battalion of 
native infantry. Another detachment, under Major Pitman, aixived on the 5th 
of December; and on the 12th and 13th, Colonel Doveton encamped at Seeta- 
baldee with the wliole of the second division of the army of the Deccan. The 
resident was now in a position to dictate terms, and on the 15th made the fol¬ 
lowing propositions to the rajah:—that he should acknowledge having, by his 
<lefection, placed his territories .at the mercy of the British governmeht—that 
he should give up all his artillery—that he should disbsind the Arabs and other 
mercenary troops, sending them off in certain specified directions, so as to leave 
Nagpoor and its fort in British occupation—and that he should himself come to 
the British residency, and remain there as an hostage for performance. On the 
.acceptance of these terms former relations would be restored, and nothing more 
would be demanded than the cession of as much tenitory as would meet the 
expense of the subsidiary force, and a provision for such a degree of internal 
control'as might suffice to prevent, a rej)etition.of similar aggression. He was 
allowed till four o’clock of the following morning to declare his acceptance, and 
told that in the event of refusing it he would forthwith be attacked. 

A pa Sahib endeavoured to obtain a longer respite, and on representing that Treachery 

1 , - _ 111* n 

he was willing to accept the terms, but was prevented by his troops from mtfruuiiarieti. 
coming to the residency, the time was prolonged till nine AM. This hour 
having arrived without anything being done. Colonel Doveton put his army 
in order of battle and began to advance against the Mahratta camp. This 
movement thoroughly intimidated the rajah, who now, listening only to his 
fears, mounted his horse and hastened off with a few attendants to the resi¬ 
dency. 'Hie whole difficulty was not yet overcome. 'Hie artillery remained to 
he delivered up. The rajah again pleaded for delay, but as the interval might 
have been used for the clandestine removal of the guns it was peremptorily 
refused. The arrangement made, therefore, was that the troops shouliT be with¬ 
drawn and the artillery abandoned by twelve o’clock. A little before this 
time Ramchundur Waugh, who had been sent to expedite matters, returned 
to the residency and reported that all the necessary steps had been taken. 

When a message to tliis effect was sent to Colonel Doveton, he saw reason to 
suspect that some deception was intended, and therefore, instead of only send¬ 
ing a detachment, he resolved to advance his whole line. After taking posses- 



74 


HISTOEY OF INDIA. 


[Book VII. 


A.D. 1817 . sion of thirty-six guns in the arsenal south of the city, and leaving Colonel 
Scott with a brigade to take charge of them, he was proceeding south-east 
Treachery of towEvds tlic Sakoo Durcc Gardens, where he knew that there were several 
Arab^e^" batteries, when a lieavy cannonade suddenly opened on his front and right 
cimaries. fl^nk. Befoi'e this treacherous attack could be overcome, battery after battery 
behoved to be carried, and many lives were lost. Ultimately the whole of the 
artillery, amounting to seventy-five pieces of ordnance, and the Mahratta camp, 
with all its ei^uipage, including forty elephants, were captured. 

The above treacherous cannonade, and the conflict following upon it, 'do not 
appear to have been at all sanctioned by the mjah. Indeed, the subsequent 
jiroceedings made it plain that the blame rested chiefly with the Arabs, who, 
determined to make the liest bargain they could for themselves, expected to 
gain their object by showing how much mischief they were capable of pro¬ 
ducing. Accordingly, uniting with another body of mercenaries from Hindoo- 
stan, so as to muster nearly 5000 men, they retired into the city on the captuie 
of the guns and the camp, gfvined possession of the fort, which was of consider¬ 
able strengtli, and contained the rajah’s palace and other important public build- 
Thcy occupy iugs, and declared their determination to defend themselves to extremity. As 

the fort of , 1 . 1 1 1 , • • • • 

Nagpoor. any attempt forcibly to dislodge them must have laid the city in ruins, it was 
deemed advisable to endeavour to bring them to terms. They were offered a 
safe conduct to the Nag 2 )oor frontier, and must have been understood to have 
accciited of the offer, since, in the course of the negotiation, they received all 
their arrears of pay. This jiremature comjiUance with their demands appears 
to have convinced them that it would be possible to obtain still bettor terms, 
and they again announced their determination to hold out. There was thus 
110 longer any alternative, and the siege of the foii was commenced. The 
moans were very inadequate, for the besiegera had no battering train, and were 
obliged mainly to dejicnd for breaching on such of the cajitured guns as seemed 
to bo of sufBcient calibre. The effect produced was not great, but the western 
gate, which had been selected as the jjoint of attack, was supjiosed to be so 
materially injured as to justify an assault. The assailants had been too san¬ 
guine. On approaching the gate it was found to be completely commanded 
from inner walls, from which the defenders kept up a murderous fire, rendering 
further advance imiiossible. This unfortunate repulse cost the storming party 
Cftpituiati«u a loss of 90 killed and 179 wounded. The gallantry disjdayed was not how- 
tiiom. .» ever wholly lost, for the Arabs, made aware of the fate which must sooner or 
later overtake them, became intimidated, and offered to surrender if allowed to 
march out with their families, baggage, private property, and arma These 
terms being granted, the fort was evacuated on the 30th of December, 1817. 

The revolt in the capital had naturally been followed by manifestations ot 
hostility in other parts of Nagpoor.’ These assumed^o formidable an appear¬ 
ance in the eastern part of the valley of the Nerbudda and in Gundwana, that 



Chap. III.] 


TREATY WITH NAGPOOR. 


76 


several small British detachments deemed it prudent to retire to the west and a.d. isis. 
concentrate at Hoshungabad, where they united on the 20th of December. 
Meanwhile Colonel Hardyman, holding a defensive position in Rewa, had Hostilities 

^ , , in other 

received orders from the governor-general to march immediately to the Ner- parts at 
budda, and there be guided by the advices he might receive from Mr. Jenkins. 

In accordance with these orders he pushed- forward at the head of a regiment 
of native cavahy, and a regiment of European infantry, with four guns, and 
arrived on the 19th of December at J ubulpoor. Here the Mahratta governor 
was waiting to give him battle with a body of 1000 horse and 2000 foot. They 
were strongly posted between a rocky eminence on the right, and a large tank 
with Jubulpoor on the left. Colonel Hardyman after a short cannonade 
charged the enemy’s left, broke it, and then following up liis advantage com¬ 
pletely cleared the field, inflicting a severe loss on the fugitives. His threat¬ 
ened bombardment of the town and fort was spared by the speedy surrender 
of both, and ho was continuing his course southward, when an intimation from 
Mr. Jenkins that his services were no longer required, permitted him to return 
and establish his head-quarters at Jiibulpoor. 

The hostilities throughout Nagpoor being thus happily terminated, it only Treaty witii 
remained to settle the future relations with the rajah. To a certain extent 
tiicse had been already defined by the propositions which the resident had sub¬ 
mitted to him, and on the faith of wliich he claimed to have surrendered. In 
strict trutli he had not done so, for the time allowed liad expired before he rode 
bo the residency, and the’ troops had not been disbanded, nor the whole artillery 
obtained, until a battle had been fought. Still, as the mjah’s surrender had 
1 )een received without remark, and his subsequent conduct had been satisfactory, 
to dej)Ose liim and assume the government would sciircely liave been recon¬ 
cilable with good faith; Mr. Jenkins had therefore, on his own responsibility, 
prepared the draft of a treaty, by which tlie rajah, while permitted to occupy 
the musnud, was to make large cessions of territory, and submit to British 
control in regard to every branch of his administration, internal as well as 
external. On the 2d of January, 1818, before this treaty was definitively 
arranged, the instructions of the governor-general, which had been despatched 
some time before, but detained owing to the troubled state of the country, 
arrived. They differed very decidedly from the views on which the resident 
was proposing to act. Any reconciliation with Apa Sahib was peremptorily 
forbidden, and the rajahship was to be conferred on a grandson oT Ragojee 
Bhonsla by a daughter. As he was a mere child, a regency of British selection 
was to conduct the government. Feeling that he was too far committed to 
give full effect to these instructions, Mr. Jenkins followed out his original 
proposals, and entered into a treaty, subject, however, to the governor-general’s 
approbation, by which Apa Sahib resumed his seat on the musnud, but engaged 
govern by a native ministry of British selection; to throw open all the forts 



A. I). 1818. 


Rigorotw 
nature of 
trejity iiw- 
on 

A|>a Saliib. 


Btato or 
affairR at 
Holktu’’H 
court. 


of 'ruolaueo 

13aeo. 


76 HISTOEY OF INDIA. [Book VII. 

of the couiitry to the discretionary introduction of British garrisons, besides 
giving up the Seetabaldee Hills and a portion of adjacent ground in perpetuity 
for the erection of fortresses and a bazaar; to pay all arrears of subsidy; to reside. 
inNagpoor under British protection; and to cede territories yielding revenue to 
the amount of twenty-four lacs for the payment of the subsidiary force. 
Tliis treaty, which reduced the rajah to a mere pageant, sufficiently met the 
views of the governor-general, and was accordingly confirmed by him. Indeed, 
the j)lan of appointing Ragojee Bhonslas grandson rajah could not have been 
carried out, as the boy, then about ten years of age, together with his father 
Gooja Apa, had, previous to Colonel Doveton’s arrival, been forcibly sent off 
to the strong fort of Chanda. The new arrangement proved short-lived, but 
before proceeding with the details, it will be proper to turn aside, and trace the 
events which were taking place in other quarters. 

The court.of Holkar, during the insanity, and still more after the death of 
Jeswunt Row, was distracted by numerous unprincipled factions, which made 
it impossible that any regular and consistent policy could be pursued. Toolasee 
Bace, who from being a public singer had become Jeswunt Row’s favourite 
mistress, and acquired a complete ascendency over him, was able after his death 
to secure the succession to a boy t)f the name of Mulhar Row. He was the 
son of Jeswunt Row, and as she, having no son of her own, had adopted him, 
slie continued in pos,session of the regency. Posse.ssed of great personal attrac¬ 
tions, engaging manners, and no mean talents, she might have made her 
position secure, had she not excited general disgust and contempt by her pro- 
fligacy, and provoked hatred by her vindictiveness and cruelty. With her 
dewan Gunput Row she carried on a criminal intercourse, which those who 
could easily have overlooked its immonility and shamelessness were not slow 
in turning to account for political purposes, and cabals among tlio chiefs, and 
mutinies among the troops, were of constant occurrence. At first the policy she 
puraued was accordant with that of her principal leaders, and she listened 
readily to the proposal of a new Mahratta confederacy, by which the British 
influence was to be overthrown. Her advisers, however, being doubtful of its 
success, were careful not finally to commit themselves, and sent an envoy to the 
re.sident at Delhi to assure him of the friendly dispositions of the regent. A 
treaty similar to that which had been concluded with Scindia was Jiccordingly 
proposed. By this time it had almost become a necessity with Toolasee Baee 
and her paramour, who had at last become convinced that without British 
protection it would be impos.sible for them longer to make head against 
disaffected chiefs and a mutinous army. Those opposed to her and to British 
interests, no sooner saw the coxirse which the negotiation was taking, than they 
determined at all hazards to prevent it. On the morning of the 20th December, 
1817, the young Mulhar Row, being enticed from an outer tent where he was 
playing, was carried off. At the same instant a guard was placed over Toolasee 




Chap. 111.] 


WAE WITH HOLKAE. 


77 


Baee. She suspected the fate intended for her, and tried to anticipate it by a.d. isi s. 
refusing all sustenance. Her guards were too, impatient to wait for so tardy a 
death, and hastened off with her in her palanquin to the banks of the Seepra, ueath of 

^ ^ Tooliuteo 

where they cut off her head and threw her body into the stream. nuoo. 

The party opposed to the British having now the whole power in their 
hands, lost no time in showing the use which they meant to make of it, by 
preparing to encounter the British divisions under Sir John Malcolm and Sir 
Thomas Hislop, which, with a view to fmther the negotiation with Toolasee 
Baee, had, after forming a junction and halting two days at Oojein, advanced 
on the 14th of December towards the camp of Holkar. On approaching nostuitiM 
Mahidpoor on the 21 st of December, Sir Thomas Hislop, who wjis marching “ 

along the right bank of the Seepra, discovered the enemy drawn up in line on 



of the Battle or Mahidpoor. 

Fiom Talen(tne’« M«inoir of the Opontioni of the UiJtieh Annjr durlotf the Mahratta War. 


the opposite bank, as if for tlie purpose of disputing the passage of the only nattuof 
practicable ford in the vicinity. Their right was protected by a deep ravine, 
and their left by a slight bend of the river and a deserted village. This 
])o.sitioTi might have been turned by making a considerable detour, but the 
British commander determined to take the shortest road, and succeeded without 
much difficulty in forcing the passage. No sooner, however, had they crossed 
and begun to emerge from the cover of the banks and a ravine which led to the 
top of the bank, than they were received with a tremendous cannonade from 
a double range of batteries moimting seventy guns in front. Advancing with 
unflinching steadiness in the face of this cannonade, they were imrniediately 
loraied, and the first and light brigades under Sir John Malcolm attacked the 
enemy’s left, while the cavalry, supported by the second brigade, attacked the 
right. Both flanks gave way, but the centre stood firm till the second brigade 
wheeled round and dispersed it. The flight was now general, and the pursuit 
was continued till light failed. The loss of the enemy in killed and wounded 
was estimated at 3000; that of the British was also serious, amounting to 778. 



78 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book VII. 


A 1). 1«18. 


New treaty 
withllolkar 


RavaffeB of 
oliolura in 
the liritish 
camp. 


Young Holkar, who was present at the battle of Mahidpoor seated on an 
elephant, is said to have shed teara on seeing his troops defeated. After the 
action lie was carried to Allote and placed under the guardianship of Kesariak 
Baee, his mother, as regent, who appointed Tantia Jog as her dewan. Notwith¬ 
standing the defeat some of Holkar’s troops still kept the field, and a division 
under Sir John Malcolm was sent to disperse them. Meanwhile it became 
apparent that the struggle was hopeless, and overtures were made for peace. 
The negotiation was quickened by the concentration of the army of the Deccan, 
and the junction of Sir William Keir from Gujerat, and on the Gth of January, 
1818, a definitive treaty was concluded. It confirmed Ameer Khan in the 
territories guaranteed to him by the British—ceded to Zalirn Sing Raj, Rana of 
Kotah, in property, certain districts which he held from Holkar only on lease— 
renounced all right to lands within and north of the Boonda Hills—and ceded 
all claims to territory or revenue within and south of the Satpoora range, 
together with all claims of tribute on the Rajpoot princes. The territories of 
Holkar were guaranteed in their integrity as now curtailed, free from all claims 
of any kind on the part o:F the Peishwa, and the sirbsidiary force was to be 
kept up at the Company's expense, but a contingent fixed at 3000 horse was 
to be maintained by Holkar in a state of complete eflrciency, so as to be ready 
at all times to co-operate with the British troops. It is scarcely neces.sary to 
observe th.at the.se stipulations deprived Holkar, whose father had recently 
contended with the British government for supremacy, of real sovereignty, and 
reduced him, like all the other native powers with whom .sub.sidiary alliances 
had been formed, to a state of vassalage. 

The sudden insurrections at Poonah and Nagpoor had necessarily interfered 
to some extent with the operations against the predatory horiles, and an enemy 
still more formidable than the Mahrattas had, shortly after the conclusion of 
the treaty with Scindia, made fearful havoc in the centre division of the grand 
army. Cholera, though known in India from time immemorial, had hitherto 
been confined to particular seasons and localities, without attracting much 
notice, but in the middle of 1817 it began to assume the form of a most 
destructive epidemic. Commencing in the eastern districts of Bengal, it pro¬ 
ceeded up the right bank of the Ganges, crossed it near Ghazipoor, and passing 
through Rewa, made its appearance in the centre division in the beginning 
of November. At first it crept about insidiously, attacking chiefly the lower 
classes ofeamp fiillowers. Its virulence, however, gradually increased, and by 
the 14th it was carrying on its ravages in every part of the camp. The 
followers aiud the native soldiers still contihued to furnish its most numerous 
victims, but Europeans of every rank were attacked, and the governor-general 
deemed it necessary to guard against the consequences of his own possible 
death, by providing that, in order to conceal it both from the troops and the 
enemy, he should be buried secretly in his tent. In one week 764 fighting men 



Chap. HI.] 


THE PINDAEEES. 


79 


and 8000 followera perished. Death, and the desertions produced by terror, a.d. isit. 
were depopulating the camp, when it was resolved to try the effect of a change ~ 
of locality. The army accordingly moved south-east from the Sindh towards of 
the Betwa, and crossing it, encamped on its dry and lofty banks at Erich, the uritwh 
Whether owing to the change of site, or because it had already exhausted its 
viri(Jence, the disease disappeared, and the centre division was able again to 
resume active operations. 

The Pindarees, aware of the offensive operations about to be made against 
them, cantoned, for the rains of 1817, in three dun-as or encampments. One, 
under Cheetoo, was situated near Ashta on the Parbutee, about forty miles 
south west of Bhopaul; another, under Kureem Khan, due north of this town 
near Bairsea; and the third, under Wasil Mahomed, who by the death of liis 
brother Dost Mahomed had succeeded to the sole command, near Oarspoor, 
thirty-five miles west of Saugur. The enmity between Cheetoo and Kureem oporationB 

, ngoiimt the 

Khan was so rancorous as to prevent them irom concerting any common course Piudax^es. 
of action; and the native princes most disposed to favour them were so afraid of 
tlie consequences, that they confined themselves to general expressions of good¬ 
will, without even promising protection to their families and baggage. The Piu- 
darees had thus been thrown entirely on their own resources when the rainy 
season closed. Meanwhile, General Mai-shall, commanding the left division of 
the main army, had moved from Callinger and advanced south-west to Huttah, on 
the Sonar, which was reached on the 28th of October. During this movement 
Wasil Mahomed suddenly quitted Garspoor, and penetrating a pass to the west¬ 
ward of General Marshall’s route, made his appearance in Bundelcund, part of 
which he sviccceded in plundering before the approach of an adequate force 
compelled liiiii to retire. General Marshall, continuing his march, arrived at 
Rylee, to the east of Saugirr, on the 8tli of November, and opened a com¬ 
munication with Colonel Adams at Hoshungabad. Tlie effect of these 
movements was to oblige Wasil Mahomed to decamp from Garspoor and 
hasten westward. Sir John Malcolm had previously ari’ived in the valley 
of the Nerbudda; General Donkin was moving with the right division of the 
grand ai-my in a south-west direction to guard the left bank of the Chumbul; 
and the governor-general, with the centre division, had taken up a position 
which prevented an escape to the north or east, so that there was every prospect 
ol soon seeing the Pindarees completely enveloped. 

Tlie execution of this plan was momentarily endangered by a l*etrograde 
movement of Sir Thomas Hislop, who on hearing of the commencement of 
ho.stilities at Poonah, hastened off thither in the belief that there the chief 
danger lay, leaving only the third and fifth divisions of the Deccan army, under 
Sir John Malcolm and Colonel Adams respectively, to prosecute the Pindaree 
war. Sir Thomas Hislop was stopped in his retrograde movement by an order 
from the governor-general, who, believing, as the event afterwards justified. 



80 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book Vll. 


A.D. 1817. that he liad otherwise sufficiently provided against the Poonah hostilities, 
enjoined him to return and adhere to the original plan of campaign. Fortun- 
ni9 ately, the Pindarees had failed to profit by his absence, and by the united 

retreat Operations of General Marshall, Sir John Malcolm, and Colonel Adams, were 

owato. driven entirely from their usual haunts, Kureem Khan and Wasil Mahomed, 
after uniting near Seronge, retiring together in a northerly direction towards 
Gwalior, while Cheetoo moved westward towards Holkar’s army, which had 
now taken the field. 

The governor-general, when he learned the movement of the Pindarees upon 
Gwalior, was at Erich, to which the cholera had driven him for change of site, 
and determined imrnediatelj^ to retrace his steps to the Sindh. On arriving at 
the Sonaree ford, within twenty-eight miles S.S.E. of Gwalior, he sent the 
advanced guard under Colonel Philpot across the river. This movement, by 
cutting off' the communication of the Pindarees with Gwalior, reduced them to 
the necessity of endeavouring to force a passage in some other direction, and at 
tlie same time convinced Scindia that, humiliating though the treaty was 
which he had recently been compelled to sign, his only safety consisted in 
adhering to its terms, and performing his part of them with more alacrity than 
Tiwir iiucceR- lie had liithcrto manifested. For a short time the Pindarees halted in consterna- 
»ive oua . ^ considerable distance to the south-Avest, among the jungles and broken 

ground in the vicinity of Shahabad. To advance upon Gwalior was now 
impo.ssible; to retrace their steps southward was equally impossible, as General 
Marshall and Colonel Adams had seized the points from which it would be easy 
to intercept them. The practicable openings still remaining seemed to be by 
the Chumbul into Jeypoor, or by Hurastee into Kotah. The latter was selected, 
probably because Zalim Sing, the Rajrana, had long been one of their greatest 
supporters. Now, however, his policy had undergone a change, and he deemed 
it necessary to give the British a proof of the sincerity with which he had 
entered into the recent alliance with them, by occupying all passes by which 
the Pindarees might attempt to force their way. Despair, however, appears to 
have armed them with extraordinary courage, and they succeeded in clearing 
a way for themselves in spite of the resistance oft'ered by Zalim Sing’s troops. 
But the respite which they thus obtained was only of short duration. On the 
1 Iith of December, General Marshall, who had been following on their track, 
found that they were encamped only a short distance beyond the pass which 
they had'‘forced, and hastened forward in the hope of taking them completely 
by surprise. In this he failed, but the Pindarees, headed by Kureem Khan 
and Wasil^Mahomed, onl 3 ’- escaped by throwing away their loads of grain and 
other baggage. In their next sui’prise they were still more unfortunate. 
General Donkin advanced so secretly upon them from the west, that they were 
not aware of his approach till he surprised their advanced guard in a night 
bivouac, about tliirty miles north-east of Kotah. Kureem Khan’s wife was 



Chap. Ill,] 


WAR WITH THE PIlsDAEEES. 


81 


captured and all Ms state elephants, standards, and other insignia. The main a.d. isis. 
body of the-, two durras being still six miles distant, had time after hearing of 
the surprise to burn their tents and baggage before dispersing. The greater Rout of the 
part of the fugitives were afterwards cut up by the different detachments 
which had been closing around them, or mui'dered by the villagers in retaliation 
of the cruelties which they had so often suffered at their hands. The two 
leaders, taking with them nearly 4000 men all well mounted, hastened off to 
the south, and managed to pass to the left of Colonel Adams' division, while he 
was manoeuvring on the right bank of the Parbutee. 

The only formidable body of Pindarees now existing was the durra headed of 
by Gheetoo, who had retired into Mewar or Odeypoor. Sir John Malcolm, 
who had arrived at Tullain on the 26th of November, had determined to lose 
no time in following upon his track. With this view he had proceeded by 
Sarungpoor to Agur, when the hostile dispositions manifested by the camp of 
Holkar induced him to fall back upon Oojein, in order to form a junction there 
Avith Sii’ Thomas Hislop. The Pindarees had in the meantime been permitted 
to encamp close to Holkar's army, and in conseqiience a body of his followers, 
as well as of those of Kureem Khan and Wasil Mahomed, actually took part 
with it in the battle of Mahidpoor. Cheetoo himself however did not long 
remain in the vicinity, but moved to the country on the west bank, and near 
the sources of the Chumbul. He did not however remain long here, and 
removed north along with the other Pindaree leaders, and the remnants of 
their durras still kept together, to Jawud, where a chief of the name of Jeswunt 
Row Bhao, nominally dependent on Scindia, but disposed to act as his own 
master, had offered them an asylum. In this direction therefore various British ni«i»niionof 
detachments proceeded, and Jeswunt Row Bhao was so far intimidated that he 
compelled the Pindaree leaders to remove with their followers from his neigh¬ 
bourhood. They proceeded at first northwards to Chittoor and then separated: 

Cheetoo moving towards the frontiers of Gujenit, and Kureem Khan and Wasil 
Mahomed towards Malwah. After various doubling.s, and the endurance of 
great hai-dship, partly from the unproductiveness of the country and partly 
from the hostility of the Bheels and other mountaineers, the main body of 
Cheetoo’s followers, finding the passes towards Gujerat too well guarded to 
leave any hope of penetrating, them, endeavoured, as a last resource, to regain 
their original haunts in the upper valley of the Nerbudda. Q’aking a circui¬ 
tous route, so as to avoid the various British 4®f“'Chments, Cheetoo an-ived at 
Oonchode, about fifty-five miles east of Indore, and on the 24th of January, 

1818, ascended the pass of Kanode, which brought him within twenty-five miles 
of Hindia. Here a British detachment was stationed under Major Heath, who 
immediately set out in pursuit, and coming upon the Pindaree camp just as 
night set in, completely dispersed ii Cheetoo afterwards assembled some of 
his scattered followers, and continued for some time wandering about Malwah. 

VoL. III. 207 



82 


HISTOEY OF INDIA. 


[Book VII. 


A.D. 1818. 


Wat Against 
the Pin< 
darees. 


Dis])erBioii 
<»f dumiH of 
Kureuin 
Kium fuid 
Wasil 
Maliomed. 


At last he took the resolution of endeavouring to make terms with the British 
government, and with this view suddenly made his appearance in, the camp of 
the Nabob of Bhopaul, to retjuest his intercession. The proposal he made was 
to enter the British service with a body of followers, and to receive a jaghire 
for their maintenance. Being offered nothing more than pardon for the past, 
and a provision for the future in some part of Hindoostan, he again set oft) 
made his way into Candeish and the Deccan, and shared the fortunes of some 
of the disorganized bands which had belonged to the Peishwa. At a later 
period ho endeavoured to profit by renewed trouble/i in Berar, where we shall 
again meet with him. 

The durras of Kureem Khan and Wasil Mahomed had entered Malwah in 
three partie.s. The largest of the three, headed by Namdar Khan, Kureem 
Khan’s nepliew, after passing round the camp of Sir Thomas Hislop at Mundi- 
soor, crossed the Chumbul, and moved eastward to Kotree, a village on the 
banks of the Kalee Sindh. Here they bivouacked on the 12th of January, 1818, 
and liad no idea of any immediate danger, when Colonel Adams detached a 
body of native cavalry under Major Clarke to beat up their quarters. Having 
arrived before daylight of the 13th, and found them either so lulled into secu¬ 
rity, or wwn out by fatigue, that they were totally unconscious of his approach, 
he detennined to make more sure of success by waiting till the dawn, and in 
the meantime so disposing his regiment in two bands, that while one made the 
attack, the other was wiiiting to intercept the fugitives at the point by which 
it was foreseen that on the first alarm they would attempt to make their escape. 
The stratagem completely succeeded, and of the whole body, estimated at 1500, 
not more than a third escaped. The other two parties were chased from place 
to place without intermission during nine days, and arrived on the confines of 
Bhopaul ill a state bordering on despair. As the position of the Pindarees had 
become absolutely hopeless, it was presumed that they would now be ready for 
unqualified submission, and accordingly intimation was conveyed to them 
through the Nabob of Bhopaul, that if they threw themselves on the mercy of 
the British government the chiefs would be provided for in some districts remote 
from their old haunts, and the lives of their followers would be spared. Namdar 
Khan at once availed himself of this intimation, and was allowed to settle 
in Bhopaul, the nabob becoming responsible for his good behaviour. Wasil 
Mahomed sought refuge in Gwalior, and remained for a time concealed in 
Scindia’s camp. The resident, on ascertaining the fact, called upon Scindia to 
apprehend him. He refused as a point of honour to do so, and wished the 
resident to undertake the ungrateful task, but was ultimately compelled to 
execute it, the governor-general insisting not only that he should do it himself, 
but do it in broad day, in order that all India might see that an enemy of the 
British government could nowhere find an asylum. 

Kureem Khan, instead of accompanying his durra into Malwah, had remained 



CiiAr. III.J 


WAR WITH THE PINDAREES. 


83 


at Jawud, under the covert protection of Jeswunt Row Bhao. This chief was a.d. isig. 
in charge of one division of Scindia’s troops, which, in terms of the treaty, were 
to co-operate against tiie Pindarees, under the immediate direction of British Knreem 
officers. Captain Caulfield, sent to Jawud for that purpose, was received with Jawud. 
the greatest external deference, but soon discovered that Jeswunt Row Bhao 
was much more disposed to co-operate with the Pindarees than against them, 
and still continued to harbour several of their leaders whom he had ostensibly 
dismissed. The governor-general was so indignant at this double-dealing that, 
on the 2 tth of January, 1818, he despatched instructions to proceed against 
Jeswunt Row Bhao as a public enemy. Before these instructions arrived, 

Ceneral Brown, by whose detachment they were to have been executed, had 
anticipated them. Captain Caulfield, after in vain demanding the surrender of 



Jain Temple in Foktbess of Kumelneb.—F rom Todd's AiiimlB of llnjastluui. 


the harboured Pindarees, withdrew on the 28th of January to General Brown’s storming of 
camp. The very next day a squadron of cavalry, sent by the general to occupy 
a pass by which it was understood that the harboured Pindarees were about to 
escape from Jawud, was fired upon both from this town and Jeswunt Row 
Bhao’s camp. This overt act of hostility left no room for hesitation, and the 
whole British line was immediately ordered out for an as.sa.ult on the enemy’s 
posts. They were all forced with scarcely any loss, and the town itself was 
stormed, after blowing open the gate by a twelve-pounder. Jeswunt Row Bhao 
escaped by the fleetness of his horse with only a few attendants, and the places 
and districts which he had recently seized from Odeypoor returned to the 
Rana, now a British ally. Among the places thus restored was Kumulner, 
situated thirty-five miles N.N.W. of Odeypoor, and regarded as one of the 
strongest hill-forts in India. Kureem Khan, who was concealed in Jawud 
when it Wiis stormed, succeeded with the utmost difficulty in getting off on foot. 

For some time he lived in the neighbouring jungles, and after various adven- 


84 


aiSTOEY OF INDIA. 


[Book VII. 


A.D. 1818. 


Pate of 
Findaree 
leaden. 


Continnod 
piiniiilt of 
the Feishwa. 


tures submitted to his fate by surrendering to Sir John Malcolm on the 14th of 
February. He was finally settled with his family in the Goruckpoor district, 
not far from the frontiers of Nepaul, on a property which yielded about £1600 
a year, and spent the rest of his life as a peaceable and industrious farmer. 
Wasil Mahomed, placed under surveillance at Ghazipoor, on the Ganges, 
thirty-five miles north-east of Benares, could not be reconciled to his lot, and 
after an ineflfectual endeavour to escape, poisoned himself. The Kndaree war, 
though Cheetoo was still at large, might now be considered terminated 
Another war, rather more worthy of the name, since the once formidable 
Peishwa was the enemy to be encountered, was about the same time brought 
to a conclusion. The remaining details must now be given. 

The Peishwa, after his defeat at Poonah, on the 16th of November, 1817, 
fled southward pursued by General Smitli. It was thought that he intended 
to shut himself up in one of his hill-forts to abide a siege. He had a very 
different object in view. Probably from having penetrated tlie governor- 
general’s intention of supplanting his authority by that of the rajah, who had 
long been kept as a mere pageant in the hill-fort of Wusota, fifteen miles north¬ 
west of Sattarah, he had sent forward a party to carry him off with his family. 
This object having been accomplished, Bajee Row, now possessed of the persons 
of those whose legal title being better than his own might have become formi¬ 
dable rival claimants, turned eastward to Punderpoor. General Smith, after 
providing for the occupation of Poonah, commenced his pursuit, and on the 
29th of November forced the Salpa Pass, leading to the table-land in which the 
Kistna has its source. He had not proceeded thus far undisturbed, for Gokla, 
with 5000 of the Peishwa’s best horse, kept hovering on his line of march, ready 
to seize any advantage that might offer. Bajee Row managed in the meantime 
to keep two long marches in advance, and on leaving Punderpoor on the Cth of 
December, succeeded by getting round the pursuing force in advancing rapidly 
to the north-west. Passing about midway between Seroor and Poonah, he con¬ 
tinued his flight northward to Wattoor, on the road to Nassik, and received a 
considerable addition to his force by the junction of his old favourite, Trim- 
bukjee Dainglia. Nassik now seemed to be his object. If it was, he had lost 
the opportunity by loitering at Wattoor, for General Smith, who, in continuing 
the pursuit, took a route considerably to the east, had advanced so far that on 
the 2Gth^pf December, when the Peishwa was still at Wattoor, he was to the 
north-east of him, and moving in a line by which his further progress by the 
Nassik road would be inevitably intercepted. The Peishwa accordingly, after 
making a march to -the north of Wattoor, returned to it, and on the 28th 
December hastened southward on the direct road to Poonah. 

The advance of the Peishwa in the direction of Poonah naturally created 
alarm, and Colonel Burt, the officer in command, having no doubt that an 
attack was meditated, judged it necessary to solicit the reinforcement of a 



Chap. III.] 


BATTLE OF KOEIGAON. 


85 


battalion from Seroor. Captain Staunton of the Bombay establishment was 
accordingly detached at six in the evening of the 31st December, with the 2d 
battalion of the 1st regiment of Bombay native infantry, 600 strong, twenty-six 
European artillerymen under Lieutenant Chisholm of the Madras artillery, and 
about 300 auxiliary horse imder Lieutenant Swanston. At ten in the morning 
of New-year’s Day, 1818, Captain Staunton, on reaching the heights above 
Korigaon, perceived the plain below covered with the Peishwa’s army, estimated 
at 20,000 horse and 8000 foot, a large proportion Arabs, and therefore superior 
to the ordinary native Indian infantry. He immediately endeavoured to gain 
possession of the village, under cover of which, as it was surrounded by 
a wall, and rendered inaccessible to cavalry on the south by the bed of the 
Beema, he might be able to maintain himself, at least till he could be relieved. 
The enemy, aware of his design, endeavoured to frustrate it by pushing forward 
a body of infantry. The two parties arrived nearly at the same time, and each 
obtaining possession of part of the village a desperate struggle ensued. It con¬ 
tinued without intermission from noon till sunset. At first the British were 
the assailants, and endeavoured to dislodge the Arabs. Having failed in this 
they were obliged in turn to defend their own post, the Arabs keeping up a 
galling fire from a small fort which they had seized, and from terraced roofs of 
the houses, and at the same time rushing on with desperate courage on the 
very points of the bayonets, in the fiice of murderous discharges from the two 
admirably served guna During this protracted conflict the British soldiers, 
besides being exhausted by their previous march, and obliged to encounter the 
fresh parties which the enemy, from an overwhelming superiority of numbers, 
were able from time to time to bring forward, remained without either food 
or water. Towards evening their position became critical in the extreme. 
Of the eight officers. Lieutenant Chisholm had been killed, and Lieutenants 
Pattinson, Connellan, and Swanston, and Assistant-surgeon Wingate wounded, 
so that only Captain Staunton, Lieutenant Innes, and Assistant-surgeon Wylie 
remained effective. A large proportion of the artillery, too, had fallen or been 
disabled, and not a few of the other soldiers, besides being thinned by casualties, 
wore sinking under fatigue. At this time the enemy succeeded in capturing 
one of the guns, and seizing a choultry in which many of the wounded had 
been deposited. The first use they made of this success was to commence a 
horrid butchery of the wounded. Assistant-surgeon Wingate was literally 
hewn to pieces, and a similar fate was prepared for Lieutenants Swa*nston and 
Connellan, when the choultry was recovered by a sudden onset, and the mur¬ 
dering Arabs within were bayoneted. The recapture of the gun took place 
under circumstances still more extraordinary. They are thus related by Captain 
Duff: ’—“ Lieutenant Thomas Pattinson, adjutant of the battalion, lying mortally 
wounded, being shot through the body, no sooner heai’d that the gun was 

> Duff’s Mahrattaa, vol. iii. p 436, 436. 


A.D. 1818. 


Engagement 
with the 
Peishwa's 
army at 
Korigaon. 



86 


HISTOEY OF INDIA. 


[Book TIT. 


A.D. 1838. 


Battle of 
Korlg^oji. 


Defeat aixl 
of tho 
M^Uirattiis. 


Conduct tif 
Biijee liuw. 


taken, than getting up, he called to the grenadiers once more to follow him, 
and seizing a musket by the muzzle, rushed into the middle of the Arabs, 
striking them down right and left, until a second ball through his body com¬ 
pletely disabled him. Lieutenant Pattinson had been nobly seconded; the 
sepoys thus led were irresistible, the gun was retaken, and the dead Arabs, 
literally lying above each other, proved how desperately it had been defended.” 

When the gun was recovered, the body of Lieutenant Chisholm was found 
beside it with the head cut off Captain Staunton took advantage, of this 
barbarous mutilation to point it out to his men, and tell that such was the 
treatment awaiting all who should fall dead or alive into the hands of the 
Mahrattas. Some had previously begun to talk of surrender, but all now 
declared their determination to maintain the fight to the last, and if necessary 
die to a man. While thus animated with new courage, thej’’ succeeded in 
obtaining a supply of water, and were also enabled in some measure to recruit 
their strength, as the enemy, now evidently di,scouraged, began to relax their 
efibrts, and by nine at night completely evacuated the village. When the 
morning dawned the Mahrattas were still hovering around, but appeared to 
draw off in the direction of Poonah. They were in fact preparing for flight, in 
consequence of intelligence that General Smith was approaching. Ca])tain 
Staunton, not aware of this fact, believed that they were taking up a position 
in order to intercept his advance to Poonah, and tlierefore determined on 
retracing his steps to Seroor. As soon as it was dark he commenced his 
retreat, and without knowing the cause, was agreeably surprised to find that 
no attempt was made to molest him.. He had lost of the battalion, and of the 
artillery, in killed and wounded, 175 men; about a third of the auxiliary hor.se 
also were killed, wounded, and missing. Among the wounded whom he was 
able to bring along with him, was the gallant Lieutenant Pattinson, respecting 
whom the following additional particulars are furnished by Captain Duff:— 
“Lieutenant Pattinson was a very powerful man, being six feet seven inches in 
height; nothing could exceed his heroic conduct on the memorable occasion 
when he received his wounds; he did not expire until the regiment reached 
Seroor, but unfortunately in his last moments he laboured under an impression 
that his corps had been defeated, wliich cansed him great distress.” 

The loss of the Mahrattas at the battle of Korigaon was nearly 600. Both 
Gokla and Trimbukjee Dainglia were present directing the attacks, and the 
latter was at one time within the village. Bajee Row viewed the conflict fi-om 
a rising ground on the opposite side of the river, about two miles distant, and 
frequently expi-essed his impatience, tauntingly asking his commanders, “where 
were now their boasts of defeating the English, when they could not overcome 
one battalion.” The Rajah of Sattarah, who sat beside him, having put up an 
astabgeer or screen from the sun, the Peishwa begged him to put it down, 
“otherwise the English would send a cannon-ball through it.” This incident. 



Chap. III.] 


CAPTUEE OF SATTAEAH. 


87 . 


not improbable in itself, is very characteristic of Bajee Row, whose cowardice a d. isis. 
was notorious. When the battJe was lost, and General Smith’s approach became 
known, he started ofl'for the south, and never halted till he reached the banks Continued 

' ^ ^ flight of tn« 

of the Gatpurba, To his surprise he found part of a country which he believed PeWiwa. 
to be friendly already in possession of the British. General (afterwards Sii* 

Thomas Monro), who had been sent from Madras to settle the districts of the 
Carnatic, ceded by the treaty of Poonah in 1817, had produced this change by 
collecting a few regulars in addition to his own escort, and taking advantage 
of the disaffection of the native population to the Mahratta rule. Alarmed at 
this state of matters, and also at the 
approach of General Pritzler, who had 
joined in the pursuit, the Peishwa 
turned round and pursued his flight 
northward to the vicinity of Meeruj. 

General Pritzler was now close upon his 
track, and Gokla sustained considerable 
loss by a smart action to which he was 
brought while endeavouring as usual 
to facilitate his escape. Meanwhile 
Ceneral Smith coming from Mie north, 
jnevented the Peishwa’s further pro¬ 
gress in that direction, and he again 
<lecamped for the south. General Smith’s 
and General Pritzler’s divisions being' „ ... 

° SiB Thomas Monro.—A fter a incture by M. A. She©, R.A 

thus brought into communication, united 

their forces near Sattarah on the 8th of February. The fort on being sum- Capture of 
moueil immediately surrendered, and the rajah’s flag being hoisted, a mani- 
fe.sto was published, declaring that the British government had determined to 
establish the Rajah of Sattarah in an independent sovereignty, and completely 
extiugui.sh the I'ule of the Peishwa, by annexing his teriitories to those of tlie 
tlompany. The latter object had already been in a great measure accomplished, 
since Bajee Row, hunted about from post to post, could not be ssiid to possess 
anything but the ground which he actually occupied. 

The comparative ease with which the Peishwa had hitherto eluded his pur- New pia« 
suers seemed to prove something defective in the mode of pursuit, and the omitaming’^ 
two divisions of Generals Smith and Pritzler having been placed at the* disposal 
of Mr. Elphinstone, who had been appointed commissioner with full powers for 
the settlement of the territory formerly belonging to the Peishwa, it was 
resolved to form a new distribution of the troop.s, by employing the artillery 
and most of the infantry in the reduction of the various forts in the southern 
Mahratta districts, and continuing the pursuit of the Peishwa with the cavalry 
and a light division, consisting of the horae artillery, two squadrons of his 




88 


HISTOEY OF INDIA. 


[Book VII. 


A.D. IHIS. 


Oaptui^ of 
Hahratta 
Btrougholds. 


(/ontiiinocl 
pursuit of 
tlitt Peishwa. 


His camp 
surprised. 


majesty’s 22d dragoons, the 2d and 7th regiments of Madras cavalry, 1200 
auxiliary horse, and 2500 infantry. The foimer service was assigned to Gene¬ 
ral Pritzler, who captured in succession the strongholds of Singh ur, Vizierghm*, 
and Poorundur. These important captures were followed by the surrender of 
a number of minor places as soon as the army appeared before them. The 
forts in the Southern Concan yielded with equal facility to Colonel Prother, 
who had been sent into it with an armament from Bombay; while General 
Monro, who had completely occupied the whole country j;o the south of the 
Malpnrba, succeeded without much difficulty in reducing the forts of Badamy 
and Bhagulkote. In consequence of this uninterrupted chain of success many 
of the principal Mahratta jaghirdars made their submission. 

General Smith, to whom the iJursuit of the Peishwa had been assigned, 
finding that he had fled ea.stward beyond the Beema, and its tributary Seena, 
as far as Sholapoor, set out on the 13th of February, and on the 39th arrived 
at Yellapoor. Here lie learned that the Peishwa was again moving west, and 
might in all probability^ be met with about Punderpoor. A night march was 
accordingly made in that direction, but it was only to learn that the Peishwa 
had once more changed his route and proceeded twenty miles north to Ashtee, 
where he was reported to be totally unconscious of the vicinity of a British 
force. Encouraged by this information General Smith, taking only tlie cavalry 
and horse artilleiy, hastened across the Beema at Keroulee, and at half past 
eight on the morning of the 20th, had the satisfaction of hearing the Peishwa’s 
kettle-drums beat in preparation for a march. It had been hastily resolved 
upon, for the general’s approach, previously unsuspected, had just become 
known. Bajee Row, as usual, thought only of his personal safety, and set off 
followed by the main body of his army. Gokla, to whom he had previously 
sent a taunting message for having allowed the ai’my to be thus surprised, only 
replied by promising that his rear would be well guarded. He kept his word. 
Detaining a body of about 4000 horse to support him, he took his station with 
500 across the line by which the British cavalry were advancing. His friends 
advising him to fall back and return with a more adequate force, he simply 
answered, “Whatever is to be done must be done here.” As soon as the British 
were within musket-shot the Mahrattas fired an ineft’ectual volley, and then, to 
the number of about 300, with Gokla at their head, made a charge by galloping 
down diagonally across the front, and suddenly wheeling round on the flank 
of the 7th regiment of cavalry as they were forming after crossing a ravine. 
The momentary confusion thus produced was soon repaired by Ma-jor Dawes, 
who, charging with his dragoons along the rear of the 7th regiment, dashed into 
the midst of the Mahrattas and dispersed them. No further resistance was 
attempted, and the fugitives were followed for about five miles. Though the 
loss of the enemy did not exceed 100 men, the results of the victory were most 
important. Gokla, on whose fidelity, courage, and military talents the Peishwa 



Chap. HI.] 


PEOCEEDINGS AT NAGPOOE. 


89 


mainly depended, was among the slain, and the Rajah of Sattarah, with his a.d. ism. 
mother and brothers, who had been forced to accompany the Mahratta camp, 
were captured and released. The Peishwa continued his flight northwards to Def^toftiie 
Kopergaon, on the north or left bank of the Godavery. While at Sholapoor he 
liad obtained some addition to his force by the arrival of Gunput Row from 
Nagpoor with the remnants of the rajah’s dispersed and disbanded army, and 
in his present flight he was joined by part of Holkar’s broken army, whose for¬ 
tunes were as desperate as his own. These reinforcements were, however, far 
from compensating for the daily thinning of his ranks by desertion, few of the 
Maliratta chiefs being willing to risk the loss of everything by adhering to a 
ruined cause. Before following the Peishwa in his flight some attention must 
be paid to the events which had taken place in Nagpoor, 

The governor-general, more from a sense of honour than a conviction of its Affairaof 
accordance with sound policy, had ratified the treaty which restored Apa Sahib 
to his seat on the musnud of Nagpoor. The narrow escape from dei)osition 
would, it was supposed, incline the rajah, if not from a sense of gratitude, at 
least from a regard to his own interest, to avoid any future collision with the 
British government. It was not long before he gave abundant proof of being 
actuated by a very difierent spirit. Not only had he never recalled the secret 
orders issued before the treaty to the mountain rajahs, to call out their followers 
and tlu’ow every po.ssible impediment in the way of the British authorities; but 
after the treaty was concluded he had instructed the commanders of the various 
forts and districts which had been ceded, to refuse compliance with the calls 
which would be made upon them to surrender. On the 18th of January, 1818, 
only nine days after the rajah had returned to his palace, he instructed the 
commandant of Chanda to commence recruiting, and particularly, though in 
direct defiance of the treaty, to enlist Arabs. At a later period it was ascer- Apa saWb’. 
tained that when Gunput Row went off to join the Peishwa, he was accoinpanied 
1 >y an agent authorized to make overtures for mutual co-operation against the 
British. The resident, when once his suspicions were aroused, had little diffi¬ 
culty in obtaining evidence that not merely the rajah’s favourite ministers, 

Nagoo Punt and Ramchundur Waugh, but the rajah himself, partly through 
them, and partly in his own name, had solicited and were even expecting 
assistance from the Peishwa. Sirch an expectation was certainly a great 
delusion, but some movements of the Peishwa in the dmection of Chanda, 
which was the rajah’s principal stronghold, and to which it was suspected that 
he himself was preparing to escape, so alairaed Mr. Jenkins, that on the 15th 


of March he resolved to act on his own responsibility in arresting both Apa 
Sahib and his two implicated ministers. After the arrest, as happens almost 
invariably in India, the proofe of criminality rapidly increased, and it now first 
clearly appeared that Pursajee, the previous rajah, instead of dying a natural 
death as was pretended, had perished by Apa Sahib’s hired assassina 



90 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book VII. 


A.D. 1818. During these transactions at Nagpoor, the Peishwa was continuing his 
flight. On arriving at Kopergaon, the pursuit, in consequence of General Smith 
th^iiahwa having turned aside to escort the Bajah of Sattarah to his new sovereignty, 
seemed so far abated, that he ventured to pay a visit to Nassik, and then pro¬ 
ceeded northwards to the vicinity of Chandore, apparently in the hope of being 
able to pass through Candeish into Malwah. In this direction, however, his further 
progims was arrested by the first division of the army of the Deccan, which, 
in the beginning of March, had crossed the Taptee, on its return to the south. 
As he was at the same time threatened by General Smith from the west and 
General Doveton from the south-east, there was only one other direction open 
to him. This was due east. He immediately began to follow it, and not 
without the hope of being able in some measure to retrieve his fortunes. 
Gunput Row, and others in the interest of Apa Sahib, had laboured to convince 



View of Cuanda. 

Fr«in rritiaep's Narrative of the Politkatl and Militur) Tratiutciiont of [udia under the Marquis of llaatinga 


liim that his presence in Nagpoor would be followed by a general insmrection 
in favour of the Mahrattas, and his object therefore now was to join Apa Sahib, 

Ills sohemo wlioiu he cxpected to find at Chanda. This scheme had been frustrated by the 

iVufitnitecl. jy -hr T 1 • 1 • • • • *' 

precautions of Mr. Jenkins, who, besides arresting the rajah and his ministers, 
had despatched Colonel Scott with the greater part of the force then at 
Nagpoor towards Chanda, and had also particularly called the attention of 
Colonel Adams to the importance of attempting the immediate reduction of 
this fortress. The consequence was that the Peishwa found himself suddenly 
stopped short in his advance, and learned that Apa Sahib, instead of waiting 
for him at Chanda, was a prisoner within the British residency. For some 
days he seemed unable to decide what his next route should be, shifting his 
ground between the Wurda and the Payn Gunga, but not venturing to cross 
either of those rivers. Meanwhile, the divisions of General Doveton and 
Colonel Adams were hemming him in, and making escape almost impossible. 



Chap. JU.] 


CAPTUEE OF WUSOTA. 


91 


On tbe 17th of April, Colonel Adams set out from Pipalkote, and had scarcely 
marched five miles on the road to Seonee, not far from the junction of the Payn 
Gunga with the Wurda, where the enemy were understood to be encamped, 
when he came in sight of the van of the Peishwa's army, flying from General 
Doveton by the very road by which he (Colonel Adams) was advancing. The 
encounter was in consequence inevitable, but the Mahrattas, anxious only to 
escape, made no resistance, and were easily thrown into confusion. The nature 
of the ground unfortunately favoured their flight, and they disappeared through 
the jungle, leaving above 1000 on the field. The British loss was only two 
wounded. Five guns, all that the Peishwa possessed, were taken, together with 
tbree elephants and 200 camels. The elephants, known to be those on which his 
treasure usually was laden, were expected to yield a rich booty, but the whole 
had disappeared in the confusion except 11,000 rupees. Bajee Row had, as usual, 
on the first appearance of danger, moimtcd his horse and galloped off! General 
Doveton, who was only twelve miles distant when this action was fought, 
immediately took up the pursuit, and dividing his force into two bodies, 
continued close upon the heels of the Mahratta army during five successive 
days, during which famine and fatigue did as much execution on the enemy as 
the sword. A few days later, desertion left the Peishwa with little more than 
a third of the adherents who had encamped with him at Seonee. 

The Peishwa, after his last discomfiture, fled south-west to Boree, on an 
affluent of the Godavery, and then turned northwards, intending to cross the 
'J'aptee and penetrate if possible into Hindoostan. Before following his future 
i'ortunes some incidents which occurred in the south may be mentioned. On 
the Sl.st of March a force 2 )rcpared for the attack of Wu,sota, the strong¬ 
hold in which the Rajah of Sattarah and his family had been kept, com¬ 
pletely invested it. Though rejmted one of the strongest jJaces in India, it 
could only have been so before gunpowder was invented, as all its defences by 
nature and art were rendered unavailing by the proximity of a hill called Old 
Wusota, which commanded it. The breaching batteries, erected on this hill, 
opened with such destructive effect, that one day’s fire- sufficed to compel a 
surrender. Valuables to the amount of nearly three lacs were found within the 
place, and restored to the rajah, to whose family they belonged, the troops 
receiving a compensation. Two British officers. Lieutenants Morrison and 
Hunter, who were taken prisoners at the commencement of the Poonah 
hostilities, were confined in the dungeons of the fort. They “were'found,” 
says Captain Duff, “in a dress of coarse unbleached cotton, made into a form 
neither European nor Indian, but partaking of the nature of both; their beards 
had grown, and their appearance was, as may be imagined, exti-aordinary; but 
their health was perfectly good They had been kept in ignorance of the 
advance of their countrymen, or the state of the war; the firing, in driving in 
the outposts, was lepresented by their guard as the attack of some insurgents 


A.T). 1818. 


The Peii^wa 
enoouutered 
by a British 
force. 


Capture of 
Wusota^ and 
release of 
the Kfvjah 
of Sattarali. 



92 


mSTOEY OF INDIA. 


[Book TII, 


A.O. 1818. 


Re-establiflli* 
ment of tUo 
of 

iSattarali. 


Extent of 
territory 
limtowod 
upon him. 


in the neighbourhood; the bursting of the shells over their heads was the first 
intimation of approaching deliverance, and the most joyful sound that had 
reached their ears for five dreary months.” To the honour of Gokla it should 
be mentioned that a letter was found in his own hand-writing, addressed to the 
killedar, and desiring him to treat the two poor Europeans well. 

On the 11th of April, shortly after the fall of Wusota, the Rajah of Sattarah 
was, with great pomp, seated on his throne by Mr. Elphinstone the commis¬ 
sioner. The policy of thus erecting what was virtually a new Mahratta 
sovereignty is very questionable. Had it been what it professed to be, a real 
sovereignty, it might have excited expectations which it was never meant to 
gratify, and kept alive recollections which it would have been safer to suppresa 
As it was only a nominal sovereignty, the rajjah continued to be as formerly, 
little better than a pageant. Captain Duff, the author of the History of the 
Mahrattas, was the agent selected by Mr. Elphinstone to arrange the form, or 
rather to exercise the powers of the newly established government. He had thus 
the best opportunity of judging of the result, and though he speaks with some 
reserve, his language certainly indicates an unfavourable opinion. The Rajah 
Pertab Siew (or Sing), wlio was in his twenty-seventh year, was “ naturally 
intelligfent and well disposed; but bred amongst intrigue, surrounded by men of 
profligate character, and ignorant of everything except the etiquette and parade 
of a coui-t. His whole family entertained the most extravagant ideas of then- 
own consequence, and their expectations were })roportionate, so that, for a time, 
the bounty which they experienced was not duly appreciated.” Subsequently 
the rights of the rajah were defined by a formal treaty, which bound him to 
hold his territory “in subordinate co-operation with the British government;” 
and subject to this condition, he was invested with complete sovereign powers. 
On this arrangement Captain Duff' simply remarks, that “the boon thus con¬ 
ferred by the Britisli nation was certainly appreciated by the country generally, 
as well as by his relations and himself; but time must prove whether this liberal 
experiment, on the part of the authorities of the East Iiulia Company, will be 
attended with any lasting good effect to the governors or the governed.” The 
territory bestowed upon tlie rajah extended between the Wurna and Neera, 
from the Syadree Mountains, a range of the Western Ghauts, on the west, to 
Punderpoor, near the Nizam's frontier, on the east, and yielded directly to the 
rajah an estimated revenue of thirteen lacs, 7.5,000 rupees (£137,.500), together 
with three lacs granted in jaghire, and three lacs permanently alienated, thus 
making the aggregate revenue of the whole territory about £200,000. Though 
anticipating the narrative, it may here be mentioned that the result, of which 
Captain Duff spoke so doubtfully, did not prove satisfactory, and that ulti¬ 
mately advantage was taken of a failure of direct heirs to extinguish the rajah- 
ship, by declaring the whole to be British territory. 

On the 13th of April, General Pritzler, after detaching part of his division to 



Chap. III.] 


SIEGE OF CHANDA. 


93 


assist in the capture of the forts north of Poonah, proceeded southward with a d. isis. 
the remainder to place himself under the orders of General Monro, who, it will 
be remembered, had with very inadequate means reduced Badamy and secured Affm rof 
other important advantages. Thus reinforced, he was able to accomplish 
a design which he had for some time contemplated. This was to attack the 
infantry and guns which the Peishwa, in order to facilitate his flight, had left 
behind at Sholapoor. Setting out on the 26th of April, he crossed the Beema 
on the 7th of May, and two days after arrived before Sholapoor, the town and 
fort of which was strongly garrisoned with Arabs, while the main body of the 
Peishwa’s infantry, with eleven guns of his field train, was encamped under its 
walls. On the 10th, when the pettah was attacked and earned by escalade. 

General Monro, perceiving tliat the enemy were moving off in small parties 
from the camp, detached General Pritzler in pursuit, with three troops of the 
22(1 dragoons, and about 400 irregular horse. When overtaken, a few miles 
from the town, the enemy were marcliing in pretty close column. The attack 
at once broke and dispersed them, the greater part throwing down their arms 
and saving themselves by flight. The Arabs, who disdained this cowardly 
mode of escape, paid dearly for their courage, and fell in great numbers. On 
tlic 15th of May, after a single day’s bombardment, the fort surrendered, and 
with it the whole of the Peishwa’s remaining artillery, amounting to thirty- 
seven gums. During these operations the British loss in killed and wounded 
was only ninety-seven, while that of the enemy in killed alone exceeded 800. 

Almost simultaneously with these successes, the fort of Chanda, the chief 
stronghold of the Rajah of Nagpoor, was taken by Colonel Adams. On learn¬ 
ing tliat both Generals Doveton and Smith were in hot pursuit of the Peishwa, 
with every ])rospect of success, he turned east and sat down before Chanda on 
the Oth of May. The poisoning of the wells in the line of his approach seemed 
to indicate the determination of the commandant to hold out to extremity, 
while tlie natural and artificial strength of the place, and a garrison of upwards 
of 3000 men, furnished him amply with the means. Influenced partly by these 
conisiderations. Colonel Adams endeavoured to avoid the necessity of a siege bj' 
an offer of favourable terms. These, however, were indignantly rejected, the 
commandant, as if determined to make capitulation impossible, having not only 
detained the messenger, but, it is alleged, barbarously blown him from a gun. 

There was now therefore no alternative, and the siege commenced. 

Chanda, situated eighty-five miles south of Nagfwor, was about* six miles Advance 
in circuit, and inclosed by a stone wall, flanked at intervals with round towers 
of sufficient size and strength to carry the heaviest guns. Near its centre stood 
the citadel crowning a commanding height. Access to the place was rendered 
difficult, on the north by a large tank and dense jungle, and in other direc¬ 
tions by the Eraee and Jurputi, two affluents of the Wurda, which running 
along its eastern and western faces, met at the distance of about 400 yards to 



A.l>. 1818. 


Btcmnlng of 
ChandA. 


Capture of 
Raighur. 


Fort of Tal* 
iieor. 


94 HISTORY OF INDIA. [Book VIT. 

the south. Colonel Adams took up his position in this last direction, and 
selected the south-east angle for the point of attack. A breaching battery, 
erected only 2.50 yards from this point, opened on the morning of the 19th of 
May, and before evening had made a breach which was pronounced practi¬ 
cable. The storm took place on the 20th, and succeeded with little loss to 
the assailants, while at least 500 of the garrison were killed. The commandant 
was among the number, and the defenders of the citadel, disphited in conse¬ 
quence, forthwith abandoned it. Colonel Adams, thus successful beyond expec¬ 
tation, was returning to the cantonment at Hoshungabad, when the cholera 
broke out among his troops, and in a few days carried off more men than he 
had lost during the whole of the military operationa The scourge indeed had 
now spread over the whole country, and no part of India, from the mountains 
of Nepaul to Cape Comorin, escaped. 

Some other captures, either from their own importance or accompanying 
circumstances, arc deserving of notice. In the Concan, and in the adjacent 
country, both below and above the Ghauts, Colonel Prother, who had been 
sent with a detachment from Bombay, succeeded in the reduction of several 
strongholds. One of tlie.se, Raighur, situated among the mountains, thirty-two 
miles south-west from Poonah, was regarded by the Mahrattas as impregnable, 
and had accordingly been selected by the Peishwas as the chief depositoiy of 
tlieir treasures. In April, 1818, when Colonel Prother appeared before it, it 
was the residence of Varanasee Bai, the wife of the Pcishwa, who had selected 
it !is the most secure asylum that could be found for her, and was defended by 
a picked garrison of 1000 men, mostly Arabs On the 24th of April the pettah 
was gained, and shortly afterwards, mortars and» howitzers being with great 
difficulty brought into position, the bombardment commenced. A safe-conduct 
had previously been offered to the Bai, but the officers of the garrison, deter¬ 
mined on resistance, did not communicate it to her, and the shells continued 
to be thrown in for fourteen days with such destructive effect that most of the 
buildings were laid in ruins. At last, a shell having set fire to the residence of 
the Bai, she insisted on a surrender, and the garrison capitulated on being per¬ 
mitted to march out with their private property and arms. 

Though the Peishwa was still at liberty, the great objects of the campaign 
had been accomplished, and the governor-general therefore determined to 
reduce his military establishments. The army of the Deccan was first dissolved, 
and accordingly. Sir Thomas Hislop began, in the middle of January, 1818, to 
march southwards with the first division, after reinforcing the third, which was 
still to remain with Sir John Malcolm in Malwah. Having traversed the 
country between the Nerbudda and the Taptee, he arrived on the 27th of 
February at Talneer, situated on the right or north bank of the latter river. 
As this was one of the places which Holkar had ceded by the late treaty, no 
difficulty was anticipated in obtaining the delivery of it, n,nd the baggage pre- 



Chap. III.] FOET OF TALNEER. 95 

ceding the division advanced into the plain without any suspicion of danger. 
The first intimation of hostility was given by the firing of a round shot from 
the fort. A summons to surrender was immediately sent to the conunandant, 
and he was distinctly warned that, if resistance was ofiered, he and his garrison, 
as acting contrary to the orders of his own sovereign who had ceded the place, 
and in defiance of the British government, to which it now rightfully belonged, 
would be treated as rebels. The commandant refused to receive the letter eon 
taining this warning, but its purport was verbally communicated to liim. It 
is therefore to be presumed that when he determined to resist, and gave open 
proof of it by commencing a fire of musketry which proved fatal to several 
British soldiers, he had counted the cost, and was ready if unsuccessful to pay 



View of Talnkkb in 1818. —From PrinBcp’d Narrative. 


the penalty. The subsequent proceedings having led to much important dis¬ 
cussion, must be given with some detail. 

The message to the killedar or commandant was sent between seven and 
eight in the morning. It intimated to him that the order from Holkar to sur¬ 
render the fort was in Sir Thomas Hislop’s possession, called upon him to send 
out some person to examine and recognize its genuineness, in order that the 
surrender might take place before noon, and concluded with the above warning 
as to the consequences of refusal. The messenger was detained, and noon 
having arrived without any answer, the provisional batteries which had been 
hastily prepared against the place opened their fire. At the same time the 
commander-in-chief instructed the deputy adjutant-general. Colonel Maegregor 
Murray, “that nothing less than unconditional surrender would be received; 
that the lives of the garrison should be guaranteed; that no promise whatever 
could be given to the killedar for his, but that he would be held personally 
answerable for his acts.” About three o’clock a person came out from the fort 
and inquired whether terms would be given. Colonel Murray answered as 


A.D. 1818. 


rrooeediiigM 

before 

Talneer. 


Its resist¬ 
ance, not¬ 
withstand¬ 
ing Uolkar’s 
orders to 
surrender. 



96 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book VII. 


A.D. 1818. above instructed, and another hour having elapsed without any appearance of 
surrender, the detachments selected for the assault moved forward. It had 
Aa«auitof becu intended to blow open the outer gate, and two six-pounders had been 
carried up for that purpose. It was Unnecessary, however, to use them, as the 
wall of the gate had been so much injui-ed as to give a ready passage to the 
storming party. They found the second gate open, and were rushing on to 
the tliird gate, when a number of unarmed persons, apparently intending to 
escape, came out from the wicket, and were placed under a guard. At the 
third and fourth gates the assailants met with no resistance. On andving at 
the fifth they found the wicket open, or saw it opened from within, and the 
garrison, which consisted of 300 Arabs, standing behind it. Some parley took 
place, the Arivbs demanding terms, and the assailants insisting on their uncon¬ 
ditional surrender, with an assurance that their lives would be saved. It is 
very probable that the parties were unintelligible to each other, but Colonel 
Murray and Ma-jor Gordon, understanding that the surrender was acquiesced 
oonanii in, passcd the wicket with a few grenadiers. No sooner had they entered 
maiMacrc. —from causes wliicli have not been satisfactorily explained, some attributing 

it to treachery, others to misunderstanding, and others to a rash attempt to 
deprive several of the Arabs of their arms—Major Gordon and the grenadiers 
were shot or cut down, and Colonel Muiray, after being dangerously stabbed, 
was only saved by being dragged back througli the wicket, which had fortu¬ 
nately been kept open. The assailants now infuriated forced their j)assage, and 
j)ut every man of the garrison to the sword. 

This genei'al massacre, though certainly much to be lamented, was inevitable 
under the circumstances. The storming party, having every reason to believe 
that their comrades had been treacherously murdered, followed the natural 
impulse of the moment, and took summary vengeance. It has been argued 
that thei’e was no treachery, as there was no suiTender, and that the Arabs in 
attacking tho,se who had entered within the wicket, only understood that they 
Tiiekuiwiar were repelling force by force. If so, the}’" brought their fate upon themselves, 
since, according to the rigorous but well known laws of war, troops standing 
an assault are not entitled to quarter. The slaughter of the garrison, therefore, 
being either justifiable or inevitable, need not be further discussed. But a 
very important question still remains. Among the persons who issued from 
the wicket of the third gate and were placed under a guard was the killedar 
himself " This fact was not observed at the time, as there was nothing in his 
dress to distinguish him, and he did not make him,self known. Afterwards 
when the assault was over, it was determined not to give him the benefit of 
any surrender, real or supposed. He was therefore tried on the spot, con¬ 
demned, and in the course of the evening hanged on one of the bastions. Was 
this legal? Was it accordant with justice and humanity? 

When the proceedings at Talneer became known in England they produced 



Chap. III.] 


EXECUTION OF THE KILLEDAE. 


97 


a very strong sensation. The execution of the killedar in particular was & n isis. 
severely animadverted upon, and not only the courts of directors and pro- 
jn-ietors, but both Houses of Parliament, in passing votes of thanks to Sir 
Thomas Hislop and the army of the Deccan, specially excepted his execution of expiAnation 
the killedar, as an act on which further explanation was required. This tioii of the 
explanation was furnished by Sir Thomas Hislop in a very long despatch, 
addressed to the governor-general in council, on the 10th of September, 1819. 

The only part of it necessary to be quoted is his account of the evidence on 
wliich the sentence proceeded:—“At the investigation I attended, and was 
assisted by your lordship’s political agent (Captain Briggs) and the adjutant- 
general (Colonel Conway). Evidence was taken in the killedar’s presence, by 
which it appeared that my communication sent to him in the morning had 
been delivered, and understood by him and several others in the fort; that he 
was perfectly aware of the cession of Holkar, and that it was publicly known; 
that he was entreated by several peraons not to resist in such a cause, but that 
he was resolved to do so till death; his resistance and exposing himself to an 
assault, was therefore regulated by his own free-will; he was sensible of his 
guilt, and had nothing to urge in his favour. The result of the inquiry was the 
unanimous opinion (after the witnesses had been heard, a»d the killedar had 
been asked what he had to say in his defence, to which he replied. Nothing), 
that the whole of his proceedings became subject to capital jmnishmeut, which 
every consideration of humanity and justice urgently demanded should be 
inflicted on the spot.’' 

This verbose account is by no means satisfactory. The killedar was not inipowi- 
iinj)licated in the supposed treachery of the ganison at the fifth gate, for he j’^tifying 
h.ad previously surrendered or been made prisoner; nor could he be said in 
strict truth to have stood an assault, as he had laid aside his arms and become 
a pri.soner before the storming party encountered any real opposition. The only 
grounds, therefore, on which the sentence admits of any plausible vindication, 
are that his original resistance was I’ebellion, and that in order to prevent the 
rebellion from spreading it was necessary to strike ten-or by making a signal 
example. Now it is not to be denied that the killedar in resisting the order of 
his sovei’eign to deliver up the fort was technically a rebel, but in order to fix 
the amount of guilt which he thus incurred, it is necessary to remember that at 
this period Holkar himself was merely a child, and the whole powers.pf gov¬ 
ernment were in the hands of contending factions. The killedar, who was a 
man of rank, the uncle of Balaram Set, the late prime minister of Tulasi Bai, 
belonged to one of these factions, which had long possessed the ascendant, had 
only lately lost it, and was in hopes of being able to regain it. In these cir¬ 
cumstances rebellion in the ordinary sense of the term was impossible. The 
order to surrender the fort, though it bore the name of Holkar, must have been 

viewed by the killedar as only the order of the faction to which he was opposed, 

VoL. HI. 



98 


HISTOEY OF INDIA. 


[Book Vn. 


A.», 1818. 


Unjustifi¬ 
able execu¬ 
tion of the 
killedar. 


Oi)enitions 
in Caudeieh. 


Attempt to 
capture 
Malligaiim. 


and it was therefore preposterous in the extreme for a third party to step in 
and inflict the punishment of rebellion on a leader of one of the factions, for 
refusing to recognize and yield implicit obedience to the orders issued by 
another. The sentence being thus unjust cannot have been politic, and hence 
the other ground of vindication—^the expediency of making an example— 
hardly requires to be discussed. It may be true, as Sir Thomas Hislop alleges, 
that other killedars from whom resistance might have been anticipated imme¬ 
diately yielded up their forts; but any advantage thus obtained must have 
been more than counterbalanced by the opinion which prevailed among the 
native troops and people generally, that the killedar had suffered wrongfully, 
and that the British government, in sanctioning his execution, had stained 
their reputation for moderation and justice. 

While the different divisions of the army of the Deccan had been employed 
in following on 'the track of the fleeing Peishwa, and reducing the provinces 
which had hitherto acknowledged his sway, the district of Caiidoish had in a 
great measure been overlooked. The bands of Arab mercenaries who belonged 
to the different native armies whicli had been broken up, liad hei'e congre¬ 
gated, and as it seemed vain to expect that they would ever forget their 
military habits and form a peaceable and industrious population, it was deter¬ 
mined to offer them no better terms than payment of any arrears that might 
be due to them, and reconveyance to tlieir native country. As there was no 
reason to believe that they would voluntarily accept of these terms, compulsory 
measures were resorted to, and Colonel Macdowall, who had been successful 
with a detachment of the Hyderabad division in the line of hills north of the 
Godavery, was ordered to proceed for the same i)urpoSe into Candeish. Leaving 
Chandore on the 13th of May he mai'ched northward, and on the 15th arrived 
before Malligaum, a strong fortress situated in a circular bend of the Musan, a 
little above its junction with the Girna, an affluent of the Taptee. Here the 
Ai'abs had mainly concentrated their force and jrrepared for a detcimined 
resistance. 

Malligaum consisted as usual of a fort and a pettah. The fort, in the form 
of a S(iuare, was protected by the river on the north and south, and inclosed by 
a triple wall, Avith a wide and deep ditch between the second wall and the 
first, which was lofty and built of solid masomy, with towers at the angles. 
The entrance to it was by intricate passages, leading through nine gates 
furnished with excellent bomb-proofs. The pettah, situated on the eastern side, 
was inclosed by a partly decayed rampart, and contained many buildings of 
sufficient strength and height to be used as points of defence. The means 
which Colonel Macdowall possessed for the siege of such a place were altogether 
inadequate, consisting of not more than 950 firelocks, 270 pioneers, and a 
small detail of European artillery; but Captain Briggs, who acted as agent 
under Mr. Elphinstone, was in hopes of a comparatively easy capture, fi'om 



Chap. III.] ASSAULT ON MALLIGAUM. 99 

having established an understanding with part of the garrison through Rajah A.n. isis. 
Bahadur, who had held the place as jaghirdar, till he was dispossessed by the 
Arabs, and placed under a kind of thraldom. It was soon seen that nothing 
was to be expected from the rajah, and that the utmost courage and science 
would scarcely suffice to insure success. 

The south-west having been selected as the point of attack, the engineers Attempt to 

capture 

broke ground at nightfall of the 18th of May behind a mango grove near the MaUigaum. 
bank of the river. Scarcely, howevei; were operations commenced when a 
vigorous sally from the fort was made, and not repulsed till the besiegers had 
lost twenty-one men in killed and wounded—a loss all the more serious that 
one of the killed was Lieutenant Davies, an officer of great ability, who com¬ 
manded the engineers. Notwithstanding this interruption, two batteries were 



Tiiri Fgrt of Malliuaum, West aiul South Sides.—From Lake's Jouruals of the Sieges of the Miuiras Army, 1817-1819. 


thrown up in the course of the night at the distance of 500 yards, and progress 
continued to be made. By the 28th a breach had been effected which appeared 
to be practicable, and as reinforcements of GOO infantry and 500 irregular horse 
had in the meantime been received, and the ammunition was on the point of 
failing, it was resolved to risk an assault. It was made at daybreak of the lufaiiurf 
29th, and proved premature. The storming party, headed by Ensign Nattes, 
the surviving engineer officer, on arriving at the verge of an outwork beyond 
the ditch, found that the garrison had dug a trench so deep as to make it impos¬ 
sible to descend the glaci.s. Ensign Nattes, standing on the verge, was in the 
act of pronouncing the word “ impracticable," when he was shot dead. After 
remaining for a short time exposed to a destnictive fire, the storming party 
was recalled. Simultaneously with the assault an attack was made on the 
pettah, and an escalade of the outer wall of the fort attempted. The former 
was gallantly carried by Colonel Stewart, sword in band, but the latter was 
abandoned in consequence of the failure at the breach. The inadequacy of the 



100 


HISTOEY OF INDIA. 


[Book VII, 


A.P. 1818. force and the exhaustion of the ammunition having made the continuance of 
active operations impossible, Colonel Macdowall turned the siege into a blockade, 
and waited for reinforcements. These, consisting of a strong body of Euro¬ 
peans ;md a native battalion, with an additional train of artillery, and a supply 
of stores from the dep6t at Ahmednuggur, were sent oif under the command of 
Major Watson, and arrived on the 9th of June. 

Renewed The fadure of the assault and the capture of the pettah had led to a change 
cnl^ldatioii in the plan of attack. The intention now was to carry it on from the north 
* With this view the main body of the troops crossed the river, 

mines were commenced, and a battery of five heavy mortars and four howitzers 
was constructed. At daybreak of the 11th of June the battery opened its fire, 
and in the course of the day threw upwards of 300 shells in the direction wliere 
the principal magazine was known to be situated. This perseverance was 
crowned with success, and a tremendous explosion took place, blowing about 
thirty feet of the curtain outwards into the ditch, and killing and disabling 
many of the garrison. Preparations were again about to be made for the 
assault when the Arabs anticipated them by offering to capitulate. Colonel 
Macdowall insisted on an unconditional surrender. The garrison did not 
decline the terms, but dreading a repetition of what had happened at Talneer, 
urgently requested a written assurance that their lives would be spared. This 
the colonel at once conceded, and still further to allay their fears, engaged that 
they should be well treated. 

cmitTOi On this occasion a striking and rather costly illustration was given of the 

t..tonii»,r importance of a knowledge of the native languages. The Mahratta moonshee, 
draw up the written engagement, used expressions which went far 
beyond what was intended, and instead of a promise of good treatment on uncon¬ 
ditional surrender, made Colonel Macdowall engage that “ whatever was most 
advantageous for the garrison” should be done; “that letters should be written 
concerning the pay; that the British government should be at the expense of 
feeding and recovering the sick, and that the Arabs should not want anything 
till they reached the places where they wished to go.” These words, “ where 
they wished to go,” were a mistake for “ where it was intended to send them.” 
Abdool Kader, the principal Arab chief, with this letter in his pocket, marched 
out on the 1 -tth of May at the head of his garrison, now reduced to 300 Arabs 
and sixty Hindostanees. The mistake was first discovered by Captain Briggs, 
the political agent, who, when Colonel Macdowall went to hand over the 
prisoners to him for the purpose of being transported to their own country, 
declined to receive them, on the ground that the written engagement did not 
warrant such treatment. Ultimately, on the whole matter being referred to 
Mr. Elphinstone, he never hesitated a moment to take the course which honour 
dictated, and the prisonera were treated with the utmost indulgence to which 
a liberal construction of the written engagement could entitle them. They 



CnAP. III.J 


ESCAPE or APA SAHIB. 


101 


were immediately released, their whole arrears were paid to them from the a.o. isis. 
government treasury, and they were furnished both with a safe conduct and 
with money to supply their wants till thej’ should reach the residence of their 
own choice. This treatment doubtless did much to counteract the bad effects 
of the severity displayed at I’alneer. 

Ana Sahib and his two favourite ministers had been an-ested in consequence ApaSaiub 
of the multiplied proofs of their intrigues with the Peishwa, and the alann prisoner to 
excited by the approach of the former in the direction of Nagpoor. As a 
grandson of Eagojee Bhonsla by a daughter had, according to the governor- 
general’s original intention, been placed on the musnud, and government was 
henceforth to be administered in his name during his minority by the resident, 
it was necessary finally to dispose of Apa Sahib and his two associates. For 
the ex-rajah’s residence the old palace of the Mogul within the fort of Allahabad 
was fixed upon, and accordingly on the 3d of May Captain Browne, escorted 
by a wing of the 22d Bengal infantry, and three troops of the 8th native 
cavalry, started from Nag|)oor with the three prisoners. He proceeded north¬ 
east in the direction of Jubulpoor, where his prisoners were to be handed over 
to a fresh escort, and he had arrived at Raichoor, within a march of it, when 
Apa Sahib made his escape. A Brahmin who accompanied the party from 
Nag})oor for a few marches, then left, and returned on the 12th of May, the 
very day before the escaj>e took place, was supposed to have jdanned it. By 
representations of the merit of rescuing a Hindoo of the race of Sevajee, and 
large ])ecuniary bribe.s, several of the sepoys had been tempted from their 
fidelity. In consequence of a regular plot tlnis formed, a sepoy dress was 
introduced into the tent about two in the morning of the 13th; Apa Sahib 
having substituted it for his own joined the guard, and under semblance of a 
relief marched out of the camp without interniption. Six sepoys deserted at niB escape 
the same time, and others, together with a native officer, were deeply impli- *’^‘*‘®**^‘ 
cated. To postpone pursuit, precautions were taken to prevent an early dis¬ 
covery. Everything in the tent remained as usual; and when at four in the 
morning an officer as usual looked into the tent to ascertain the presence of the 
rajah, he found the two attendants who,se duty it was to hand-rub (shampoo) 
their master apparently engaged in performing this office, and not suspecting 
that they wei’e thus operating only on the cushions of the bed, reported that 
all was right. When the escape was discovered puisuit was attempted in vain. 

The very direction he had taken could not at first be ascertained, and after it 
was found that he had fled to Heraee, about forty miles to the south-west, and 
found an asylum with the Gonds among the recesses of the Mahadeo Hills, 
the offered reward of £10,000, subsequently-Mncreased to £20,000, and a jaghire 
of £1000 a year for life, could not tempt his protectors to betray him. 

The long-continued pursuit of Bajee Row was meantime drawing to a close. 

He had tm-ned northwards in the hope of either reaching the camp of Scindia, 



102 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book TIL 


A.n. 1818. 


Th« Peifthwa 
proposeft to 
Murreiider. 


XogotiatiDiiH 

with that. 
view. 


who might perhaps be induced to make common cause with him, or of taking 
refuge in the strong fortress of Aseerghur, held by Scindia’s nominal dependant, 
Jeswunt Row Lar. He had however begun to talk of surrender, and had 
despatched messengers to tender it to the residents at both Nagpoor and 
Poonah. Having on the 5th of May crossed the Taptee just below its conflu¬ 
ence with the Poonia, he proceeded along its right bank to Chupra, but finding 
this route closed against him, turned suddenly north-east, and arrived at 
Dholkote, about thirteen miles west of Aseerghur. Here as he had gained con¬ 
siderably in advance of General Doveton, who had been pursuing him, he 
began to refresh his broken and dispirited troops. General Malcolm, who on 
tlie departure of Sir Thomas Hislop had been left in command of all the troops 
of the Madras army north of the Taptee, received this intelligence at Mhow, 
about twelve miles S.S.W. of Indore, and immediately sent off detachments to 
occupy the leading ])oints on the line of the Nerbudda, and make it impossible 
for Ba,iee Row to penetrate into Malwah withoixt being attacked. On the 
16th of May, Anund Row Jeswunt and two other vakeels arrived in the camp 
at Mhow with a letter from the Peisliwa desiring peace, and requesting that 
General Malcolm, whom he styled one of his best and oldest friends, would 
undertake the re-establishinent of a good understanding between him and the 
British government. After a long conference, in which the vakeels urged the 
Peishwa’s request that General Malcolixi would vi.sit him in his camp, and he 
declined, both because it might have an injurious tendency by indicating undue 
solicitude for peace, and might interfere with his direction of the necessary 
military operations, the vakeels, made aware that “ their master must prepare 
himself to abandon his throne and quit the Deccan,” set out on the 18th of 
May on their return, accompanied by Lieutenants Low and Macdonald, General 
Malcolm’s first and second political assistants. 

On the very night of their departure General Malcolm having received 
intelligence of Aj)a Sahib’s escape, and feeling uncertain of the effect which it 
might have on the Peishwa’s intentions, forwarded instructions to Lieutenant 
Low, directing him to allow the vakeels to proceed alone, and not to go to the 
Mahratta camp unless they returned in a short time with the Peishwa’s special 
invitation to that eft’ect. At the same time General Malcolm moved south¬ 
ward to Mundlesir, on the Nerbudda, where he arrived on the 22d of May, 
and General Doveton proceeding in an opposite direction reached Boorhan- 
poor, within fourteen miles of the Mahratta camp. The Peisliwa, though now 
in great alarm, did not make any advance towards Mundlesir, and therefore 
General Malcolm, who had proposed to wait there for him, fearing some new 
evasion, crossed the Nerbudda on the morning of the 27th, and advanced by a 
forced march to Bekungong. The previous day the vakeels had returned with 
assurances of their master’s sincerity, and an invitation to Lieutenant Low to 
proceed to his camp. That officer accordingly, made fully acquainted with the 



Chat. III.] 


TEEMS OFFEEED TO THE PEISHWA. 


103 


only terms wliich could be gi’anted, had an interview with the Peishwa on the a.d. isis. 
29th of May. The result was the arrangement of a meeting between the 
Peishwa and General Malcolm on the 1st of June at Khairee, immediately to 
the north of the mountain pass of that name. 

At the meeting, which took place as appointed, the Peishwa was appar- Proposed 
ently unable to make up his mind to the terms which were offered, and which 
seemed to fall far short of his expectations. He thought he would have been 
permitted at least to retain the title of Peishwa and reside at Poonah, and on 
finding the contrary, proposed that they should meet again next day. This 
General Malcolm positively refused. He knew that the Peishwa had just sent 
the whole of his property into Aseerghur, 
and suspecting that he was about to follow 
it in person, he determined, as he himself 
says, “ that not a moment was to be lost 
in bringing matters to a close.” He there¬ 
fore no sooner returned to his tent after 
the termination of the interview than he 
sent the following schedule of agreement 
for the Peishwa’s signature:—“1st, That 
Bajee Row shall resign for himself and his 
successors all right, title, and claim over 
the government of Poonah, or to any sove- 
leign power whatever. 2d, That Bajee 
Row shall immediately come with his 
family, and a small number of his ad¬ 
herents and attendants, to the camp of 
Brigadier-general Malcolm, where he shall 

be received with honour and respect, and escorted safe to the city ofTernw 
Benares, or any other sagred jilace in Hindoostan that the governor-general um. 
may at his request fix for his residence. 3d, On account of the peace of the 
Deccan, and the advanced state of the season, Bajee Row must proceed to 
Hindoostan without one day’s delay; but General .Malcolm engages that any 
part of his family that may be left behind shall be sent to him as early as 
possible, and every facility given to render then' journey speedy and con¬ 
venient. 4th, That Bajee Row shall, on his vqjuntarily agreeing to this 
arrangement, receive a liberal pension from the Company’s government for 
the support of himself and family. The amount of this pension will be fixed 
by the governor-general; but Brigadier-general Malcolm takes upon himself to 
engage that it shall not be less than eight lacs of rupees per annum. 6th, If 
Bajee Row, by a ready and complete fulfilment of this agreement, shows 
that he reposes entire confidence in the British government, his requests in 
tavour of principal jaghirdars and old adherents, who have been ruined by 





104 


HISTOEY OF INDIA. 


[Book VIT. 


A.D. 1818 . tlieir attachment to him, will meet with liberal attention. His representa¬ 
tions also in favour of Brahmins of remarkable character, and of religious 
Terms establishments founded or supported by his family, sliall be treated with regard, 
thei’etahwa. Gth, The above propositions must not only be accepted by Bajee- Row, but he 
must personally come into Brigadier-general Malcolm’s camp within twenty- 
four hours of this period, or else hostilities will be recommenced, and no 
further negotiation will be entered into with him. ' 

These propositions were sent to Bajee Row, with a message that they could 
not be altered, and that not more than twenty-four hours would be allowed for 
tlieir acceptance. To quicken his decision. General Malcolm had recourse to 
the rather petty device of allowing one of his writers to give the vakeels of 
the two leading Mahratta chiefs still adhering to Bajee Row a copy both of 
He is intimi- tlic letter seiit and of the propositions submitted to him. The effect, as he 
necepta was told, WBS, that “ tlicy perused them with eagerness, and the knowledge of 

them. consideration meant to be given them, in the event of a settlement, 

appeared to quicken their zeal in no slight degree.” Lest this should not 
jirove sufficient, more active steps were taken, Tlie main.body of the British 
troops began to advance towards Khalree; further communication between the 
two camps was strictly prohibited; and Bajee Row was distinctly informed 
that if he did not immediately accept tlie terms, and encamp near the British 
force, he would throw away his last chance. At length Bajee Row, thoroughly 
intimidated, and seeing that nothing was to be gained by further evasion, 
began to ajiproach the British camp, and arrived in its vicinity at eleven o’clock 
on the morning of the 3d of June. The force which accompanied him con¬ 
sisted of about 5000 horse and 3000 infantry. Of the latter nearly 2000 were 
Araba 

PBri)iex«i British and the Mahratta forces made several marches together towards 

Bitnatioii 

Bajee Uow. tlie Nerbudua, General Malcolm repeatedly remonstrating with Bajee Row on 
the imprudence of keeping together so large a body of armed men, the greater 
proportion of whom must, from their situation, be discontented. Nothing, 
however, occurred till the 9th of June, when the Arabs demanded their arrears. 
They had been hired some months before by Trimbukjee Dainglia, but had 
only been a short time with Bajee Row. On this ground he oifered to pay 
only for the time of their actual service with himself, whereas they insisted, 
with some show of reason, t^iat they were entitled to pay from the time when 
they were hired. After a whole day spent in discussion no arrangement could 
be made, and Bajee Row, in the greatest alarm for his life, sent contradictory 
messages to the British camp, csilliug for relief, and at the same time praying 
that no movement towards him should bo made, as he thought that the first 
appearance of it would be the signal for his murder. There was indeed good 
gi-ound for alarm. The Arabs had completely surrounded his tent, and in all 
probability, had they proceeded to extremes, not only Bajee Row himself, but 



Chap. III.] 


SUBMISSION OF BAJEE ROW. 


105 


all liis family, including women and cliildren, would have been sacrificed. By a.u. isis. 
dexterous management on the part of General Malcolm, and gre.at foibearance 
on the part of the troops under his command, the mutiny was happily quelled, 
and an award was pronounced which 'satisfied all parties. Subsequently to 
this event Bajee Row’s attendants were reduced to about 700 horse and 200 
infantry^ and he readily complied with every wish expressed, as to marclnng, 
encami)ments, and all other points. 

The governor-general, when made acquainted with the terms on which the Binwatinfac- 
surrender of Bajee Row had been obtained, was considerably disappointed. He K<'vcni<ir 
thought that General Malcolm eiTed, first in negotiating at all with Bajee 
Row, next in deputing an officer to his camp, and lastly, in the large amount 
assigned to him as a pension. The governor-geiieral, in giving this opinion, 
was influenced by the belief, that “the troops with which Bajee Row had 
crossed the Taptee were completely suiTounded. He found progress towards 
Gwalior impracticable, retreat as much so, and opposition to the British force 
altogether hopeless; so that any terms granted to him were purely gratuitous.” 

On the other hand. Sir John Malcolm, when reviewing the transaction in his 
Political Hibiory of I'lulia, says:—“But after all, the real fact was, that Bajee 
Row was not in our power. He had the means, by going into A.scerghur, of pro¬ 
tracting the war for five or six months, and keeping all India disturbed ami 
unsettled during that period.” In su])port of this fact he produces a letter, in 
which General Doveton says, “that Bajee Row had the ])erfect pow’er of going 
into Aseerghur at any hour of the day or night, without its being ])Ossible for 
any efforts of ours to have prevented it at that time.” The question is not of 
much importance, but if it was ]>ossible, as here alleged, for Bajee Row to have 
protracted the war for other six months, the pension which induced him to 
terminate it at once was not extravagant. This was the opinion of the court Tinsyam 
of directors, who, in their gimeral letter to Bengal, wrote as follows;—“It was Ity the court 
also ])ossible that he (Bajee Row) might have been compelled to suri’endcr 
unconditionally, had no terms been offered to liim; but it does appear to us 
tliat he still had some chance of escape, and that by throwing himself iiito 
Aseerghur, he might, at all events for a considerable period of time, have 
ileprived us of the important advantages which resulted fr<jm his early sur¬ 
render; and, in this view of the subject, we are di.sposed to think that these 
advantages justified the terms which were granted to him.” The gpvernor- 
goneral, though disapproving of the terms, did not for a moment question the 
validity of the engagement, and the residence of the ex-Peishwa w<as fixed at 
Bithoor, on the right bank of the Ganges—a residence recommended to him 
for its sanctity, as the place where Brahma is said to have offered an aswamedka, 
or sacrifice of a horse, on completing the act of creation, and recommended to 
the government from being only twelve miles north-we.st of Cawnpoor. 

During the arrangements with Bajee Row, several of his leading adherents 
VoL. III. ^ 210 



166 


HISTOEY OF INDIA. 


[Book TII. 


A.D. 1818. 


ProceotUiiiga 
of Bajee 
liow’a fol- 
luweiB. 


liarbaro\i'4 
raowi ill 

India. 


endeavoured to make terms for themselves. Among these were Trimbukjee 
Dainglia and the Pindaree Cheetoo. On finding that an unconditional sur¬ 
render was demanded, and nothing more promised than that their lives should 
be spared, they disappeared. Trimbukjee concealed himself for some time in 
the vicinity of Nassik, but being discovered and captured, was first remanded 
to Tannah, his former prison, and afterwards sent off to Bengal, to end his 
days in the strong fort of Chunar, sixteen miles south-west of Benares. Cheetoo, 
after remaining for a time on the southern frontiers of Bhopaul, joined Apa 
Saliib, and shared his asylum among the Gonds of the Mahadeo Hills. 


CHAPTER IV. 


UarbaroiiH raceR in India—^Apa Sahib among the Gonds—His fliglit with Cheetoo— Clieetoo’s deatli — 
Capture of Aseerghiir—Settlements with native powers—Cientral India —Hindoostaii—Itajpootaiia 
—Termination of the war—Affairs of Cutch—Treaty with the Ameers of Hcinde—lielations with 
tlie Guicowar, Onde, and Hyderabad—Connection with Palmer and Company—Close of the ailmiuis- 
tration of the Manjuis of Hastings—Its results, external and intenial. 


N both sides of the Nerbndda, and nearly parallel to its course, 
are two mountain ranges, the Vindhya on the north, and the 
Satpoora on the south. Near the centre, where they are lowest, 
tliey are traversed by the principal routes from the Deccan to 
Hindoostan ; but rising gradually towards the east and the we.st, 
they form at esich extremity a lofty mountain barrier, rendered almost impene¬ 
trable by the thickets and forests with which they are clothed. They are 
inhabited by semi-barbarous tribes, supposed to be the descendants of the 
aboriginal natives who took refuge among them, when driven from the lower 
grounds by tlieir Brahrninical conquerors. Towards the western extremity, 
Avhere the mountains separate Malwah from Candeish and Gujerat, the inhabi¬ 
tants are designated by the name of Bheels, and are supposed by Sir John 
Malcolm, though probably on insufficient grounds, to be distinct from all other 
Indian tribes. He divides them into three distinct classes, of which he gives the 
following account r'—“The first consists of a few who, from ancient residence 
or chance, have become inhabitants of villages on the plains (though usually 
near the hills), of which they are the watchmen, and are incorporated as a 
portion of the community; the cultivating Bheels are those who have continued 
in their peaceable occupations after them leaders were destroyed or driven by 
invaders to become desperate fi’eebooters; and the wild or mountain Bheel 

' Central India, vol. i pages 620, 621. 





Chap. IV.] 


BAEBAEOUS EACES IN INDIA. ' 


107 


comprises all that part of the tribe who, preferring savage freedom and indol- a.d. isis. 
ence to submission and industry, have continued to subsist by plunder. ’ The 
name of Bheel, however, is no longer confined to those properly so called, but TheBiieeia. 
in consequence of intermixtures of foreign blood, and the adoption of then- 
usages and modes of life by other classes of the community, is applied generally 
to all the plunderers dwelling in the mountains, and on the woody banks of 
rivers in the western parts of India. During the period of non-interference, 
the Bheels of the plains lost the little civilization which had been communi¬ 
cated to them, and uniting with the wild mountaineers almost annihilated 
cultivation and commerce by their depredations; but in completing the sup¬ 
pression of the predatory system successful effbi-te were made, pai-ticularly by 
Captain Briggs, the political agent in CandeLsh, and Sir John Malcohn in Mal- 
wah. Partly bj'^ severity, but far more by judicious measures of conciliation, a 
gi-eat proportion of the Bheels have been reduced to order, and a Bheel militia, 
disciplined and commanded by British officers, have made the most lawless 
districts secure both to the farmer and the traveller. 

Towards the eastern extremity, where the ranges attain their greatest riie KuKb, 
height, and separate Bengal and Orissa from Berar, the inhabitants, in some au.i 
ros])ects still more barbarous than the Bheels, consist of various tribes, of which 
the principal are the Koles, the Khands, and the Gonds. Some of them lead 
an agricultural, and more a pastoral life, but a large proportion depend for 
subsistence on the wild fruits and wild animals of their almost impenetrable 
thickets. Their chief weaj)ons are bows and arrows, and long knives; their only 
luxury is ardent spirits, in which they indulge to the greatest excess; and their 
sanguinary deities, before the British government put down the abomination, 
were often propitiated by human victims. The Gonds, by far the most nume¬ 
rous tribe, spread from the southern and we,stern limits of Behar into Berar, 
and for some distance westward along the valley of the Nerbudda. Some of 
them consequently were tlie nominal subjects of the Rajah of Nagpoor, and 
hence it is easy to understand how the ex-rajah Apa Sahib sought and found 
an asylum among them. His protector was Chain Sah, who had usurped the 
rights of his nephew, the chief of Harai or Herye, and by extending his 
authority over several adjacent districts had the seat of his power among the 
Mahadeo Hills, situated on the east of the road leading between Nagpoor and 
Hoshungabad. 

Apa Sahib’s place of refuge was no sooner known than he was joined by Api sniiibv, 
various other Gond chiefs, as professed vassals of Berar, and by bands of Mah- tiia gouUb. 
rattas, Pindarees, and Arabs, whom late events had thrown out of employment. 

The whole number of adventurers whom he thus gathered around him fell little 
short of 20,000, and acting in parties, amounting occasionally to 2000 or 3000, 
immediately commenced a war of posts on the British detachments. The season 
of the year did not admit of a regular campaign, but in order to confine the 



108 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book VIT. 


A.I). ISIO. 


Military 

againflfc A)*a 
Haliih and 
Ilia Imiid «>f 
udvonturui'H, 


A ciinix>aigii 
aiiiotiK tiiti 
Guilds. 


of 

Apu Sahib. 


depredations of Apa Sahib’s followers within as narrow limits as possible, and 
check any general rising in his favour, detachments fi-om Hoshungabad, Nag- 
poor, and Bangui- were stationed in various parts of the valley contiguous to the 
hills. In the desultory warfare which ensued, the enemy's better knowledge 
of the country gave him considerable advantages. A body of Arabs having 
assembled near the sources of the Taptee, advanced and gained possession of 
the town of Maisdi. With the view of dislodging these, Captain Sparkes was 
detached on the 18th of July, 1818, from Hoshungabad to Baitool, with two 
companies of the lOth Bengal native infantry. Stronger detachments followed 
on the 20th, but Captain Sparkes pushed on without waiting for them, and 
encountered a body of horse. When they retreated he rashly followed, and 
i'ound himself brought suddenly face to face with a main body, consisting of 
2000 horse and 1500 foot. He took post on the edge of a ravine, and notwith¬ 
standing the enormous di.sparity of numbers maintained his ground till he 
fell. Ultimately, the whole of the ammunition having been expended, the 
enemy rushed in and ])ut all to the sword, with the exception of a few indivi¬ 
duals who managed to escape. 

To avert the natural consequences of this disaster, movements on a larger 
.scale became necessary, and troops began to advance simultaneously from 
Hoshungaliad, Nagyioor, Jubulpoor, and Jalna, but the inclemency of the 
weather and state of the roads so retarded their pi ogi-ess, that the enemy were 
able in the meantime to gain new successes. In the beginning of August they 
obtained possession of the town of Mooltaee by the connivance of the civil 
authorities, and still farther to the eastward, after ca])tui-ing several places, 
advanced to within forty miles of Nagj)oor. Here great alarm prevailed, and 
was much increased by the detection of a conspiracy against the young rajah. 
At length, when the difficulties of the march had been surmounted, and the 
troo])s began to act, the \vork of retaliation commenced, and all that the enemy 
had gained was soon wrested from them. Not only were they driven fi-om all 
their y>osts in the plain, but they were followed into the hills, and made to pay 
dearly for all their aggres.sions. With the'beginning of 1819 the campaign 
opened in more regular form, and paities penetrating into every recess of the 
hills took Chain Sah prisoner, and beat up the head-quarters of Apa Sahib. 
He had anticipated their arrival, and fled, accompanied by Cheetoo and a few 
well-moinited horsemen, in the direction of Aseerghur, where they hoped to 
find .an asylum. Attemi^ts were made to intercept them, and well-nigh succeeded, 
for they only escaped by dashing into a deep ravine, into which, owing to the 
darkness of the night, ctivalry could not follow them. The commandant Jes- 
w'unt Row Lar admitted Apa S.ahib, but refused to admit Cheetoo and his 
followers, who remained in the vicinity till they were attacked by a detachment 
sent by Sir John Malcolm. They would in all pi-obability have been captured, 
had not the matchlock-men in the foi’t opened on their pursuers, and given 



CuAr. IV.j 


ATTACK ON ASEERGHUK. 


109 


Ibcm an opportunity of dispersing. Not thinking himself yet secure, or a n isis. 
because Jeswunt Row was afraid to risk the consequeJices of harbouring him, 

Apa Sahib set out in the disguise of a religious mendicant to Boorhanpoor, and 
after a short concealment there, proceeded through Malwah towards Gwalior. 

Scindia though not indisposed was afraid to countenance him, and he found no 
rosting-idace till he entered the Punjab, and obtained a friendly reception 
from Runjeet Sing. At a later period the Rajah of Joudpoor, on becoming 
responsible for his conduct, was allowed to give him an asylum. A worse late 
was reserved for Cheetoo. On the dispersion of his followers at Aseerghur he 
lied north with his son, crossed the Nerbudda, and attemj)ted to penetrate into 
Malwah by traversing the Vindhya Mountains. On finding the Baglee Pass 
carefully guarded he parted from his son, and was not afterwards seen alive. A 
party of Holkar’s cavalry passing from Baglee to Kantapoor perceived a horse 
wandering alone. Having caught it and recognized it to bo Cheetoo’s, they of 

Clhuctuo. 

made a search in a neighbouring thicket notoriously infested by tigers. At 
lirst they found a sword, parts of a dre.ss torn and stained with blood, some 
money, and some recent grants which Cheetoo had obtained from the ex-Rajah 
of Nagjmor, and part of a human body. There could now be little doubt that 
he had met a death not unbefitting the kind of life he had led, and been seized 
by a tiger. That there might remain no doubt of the fact the animal was 
tiaced to its den. It had just fled, leaving behind it a human head in so 
]ierfect a state, that when brought to Sir John Malcolm’s camp, it was at once 
recognized by Cheetoo’s son, who had been made prisoner, and given up to 
him tor interment. 

The design of Apa Sahib to seek an asylum in Aseerghur having been pene- I’l-oimriitiiu.# 
(rated by the British government, Scindia, who had engaged previous to tlie Aaeergiim. 
war to yield it up for temporary occupation, was called upon to fulfil this 
engagement. He com])lied with apparent readiness, and sending orders to 
deliver it up to Sir Jolin Malcolm, repaired to Gwalior. Jeswunt Row professed 
similar readiness, but spun out the time by evasive pleas, till Apa Sahib 
actually arrived and gained admittance as already mentioned. By tliis act, 
and still more by firing on the troops in pursuit of Cheetoo, Jeswunt Row had 
shown that nothing but force could compel him to yield up the fort, and there- 
lore Sir John Malcolm and General Doveton were instructed to employ the 
forces at tlieir disposal in reducing it. They accordingly arrived in its vicinity 
and took up their positions. Sir John Malcolm on the north, and General 
Doveton on the south. 

Aseerghur consisted of an upper and a lower fort, and of a partially walled 
town, situated immediately to the west of the former. The upper fort crowned 
the summit of an isolated rock of the Satpoora range, about 750 feet in height, 
and occupied an area, which, though nearly 1100 yards in extreme length from 
east to west, and*600 yards in extreme width fi’om north to south, was, owing 



110 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book VII. 


A.D. 

Fort of 
AHeergliur. 


i bB vtipiure. 


to the irregularity of its outline, not nearly so large as these figures might seem 
to indicate. Within the area were two depressions or basins, in wliich a 
sufficient supply of water for the garrison throughout the year could be 
collected, but this advantiige, seldom enjoyed by a hill-fort, was partly coun¬ 
terbalanced by the numerous ravines which aftbrded cover to an enemy in 
making his a])proaclies. The wall inclosing the area was only a low curtain, 
but nothing more was required, as the whole ])recipice was carefully scai’j)ed 
on all sides to the depth of 120 feet, so as to make access impossible except at 
two points, tlie OTie on the noi’tli, and tlie other on the south-west face. The 
priMcii)al task, therefore, which art had to accomplish was to fortify these 
avenues. The one on the north, naturally the more difficult of the two, was 
carried up a 2 )recij>itou.s ravine, and was in its upper part defended by an outer 
ram]iart containing four caseinates, with embrasures 18 feet both in height 
and thickness, and 190 feet in length acro.ss the approach. The easier and 
more used avenue, after ascending from the town to the lower fort, which was 
suiTounded by a rampart 30 feet high, and flanked with towers, was continued 
by a steej) flight of stone steps traversing five succes.sive gateways, all con¬ 
structed of solid m.asonry. The guns placed in battery on the summit of the 
rock Avere of enormous calibre. One of them cairied a ball of SSO pounds 
weight, and was believed by the natives capable of lodging it at Boorhani)Oor, 
a distance of fourteen miles. 

Operations Avere commenced on the Istli of March, 1819, by the attack of 
the toAvn, which was cai’ried Avith little resistance, the garrison retiring into 
the loAver fort. Batteries were immediately constructed notwithstanding a 
spirited sally, and by the 21st a practicable breach was effected. The garrison 
not venturing to stand an assault retired to the upjier fort, but immediately 
after took ailvantage of the explosion of a powder magazine belonging to one 
of the batteries, to return and resume their fire. This however was soon 
silenced, and on the 30th, when preparations were again made for storming 
the lower fort, the assailants were allowed to take po.ssession of it without a 
struggle. McanAvhile General Doveton had moved round with the principal 
part of the heavy ordnance to the east ffice, from which side it seemed that the 
upper fort could be most adA'antageously attacked. The progress, impeded by 
many obstacles, was necessarily slow, but by the 7th of April the defences 
were so ruined that Jeswunt Row consented to an unconditional surrender. 
The loss'of the besiegers, amounting to 313 killed and wounded, was greater 
than that of the gai’rison. 

According to agreement, Aseerghur, of which the British were entitled 
only to temporary occupation, was to be restored to Scindia, but an unex¬ 
pected discovery within the place itself rendered this unnecessary. It was 
known that Bajee Row had deposited valuable jewels in the fort. The com¬ 
mandant, on being ordered to produce them, declared that they had been 



CHAr. TV.] 


SCINDIA’S TREACHERY. 


Ill 


returned. This not being believed, he engaged to show Bajee Row’s receipt. isio. 
It was contained in a casket among other papers, one of which was observed 
by an officer who stood by to be in Scindia’s handwriting. On mentioning i>i"«>veiy 

^ 1 ofSoindi.i’s 

the circumstance the commandant betrayed so much confusion that it was treachery, 
deemed proper to seize the casket, and examine its contents The paper which 
liad attracted observation proved to be a letter from Scindia instructing the 
commandant to obey whatever orders the Peishwa might give him, and refuse 
delivery of the fort to the English. When charged with this treachery Scindia 
and his ministers did not venture to deny it. They only attempted a kind of 
apology by alleging that any message sent to Jeswunt Row could only be con¬ 
sidered as words of course, since it was well known that that officer would 
only do what was pleasing to himself To give some colour to this apology, 

Scindia even admitted that he had invited Bajee Row to Gwalior merely 
because he knew that it was impossible for him to come. In justification of 
this double duplicity, he simply remarked how natural it was for a man seeing 
his friend struggling in the water and crying for help, to stretch out the hand 
and speak words of comfort, though aware that he could give him no assistance. 

The penalty inflicted by the governor-general was to retain permanent posses¬ 
sion of Aseerghur and its district: Scindia, who had feared a heavier puiush- 
ment, was glad to escape so easily. 

As military o])erations terminated with the capture of Aseerghur, and the uosuitR of 
armies returned to their usual cantonments in time of peace, we are now in a 
]>osition to form an estimate of the results of the war. At first sight the pre¬ 
parations seemed far greater than the occasion required. The ostensible object 
was to put down a number of predatory hordes, who, though they mustered 
their tens of thousands, wei’e known to be incapable of carrying out a regular 
campaign, and never ventured to fight a pitched battle. But though the 
Pindarees were Ijy no means formidable in themselves, they had poweiTul 
sui)porters who would gladly have come to the rescue if they had seen the least 
chance of success. As it was, three of the leading Mahratta powers did break 
out into open hostilities, and Scindia was only deterred from following their 
example by the judicious measiires which had been taken to bring an over¬ 
whelming force to bear upon him. The danger was that a great Mahratta it* 
confederacy would be formed, and make it necessary to wage a new war fox 
sujxremacy. The salutary fear inspired by the strong force maintained in 
action by the governoi'-geneiul, induced each Mahratta power to keep aloof in 
order to consult its own safety, and thus made it easy, when hostilities did 
actually commence, to encounter them separately, and beat them in detail. 

The powerful armies Avhich the governor-general brought into the field, 
while they overawed the Mahrattas, were necessaxy in order to carry out the 
vigorous policy which it had been wisely resolved to substitute for that of 
non-interference. In the vain and selfish expectation that we might increase 



112 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book VIT. 


A.n. 1819. 


KecuBaity f>r 
the Dritisli 
maintain^ 
inga power¬ 
ful army in 
Jitdia. 


JlritiH)) 

HBcetulcucy 

establislioil. 


our own security by leaving the native states to waste themselves in preying 
upon each other, wc had allowed a kind of general anarchy to prevail, and 
could not be aroused to a sense of the true position we were called to maintain 
till we began to count the cost, and found that in order to prevent the anarchy 
from spreading into our own territories, we were incuiring as much expense 
as would suffice to suppress it altogetlier, and bring back tranquillity. For 
this purpose it was necessary not merely to convince the states to which we 
liad refused protection that we were now disposed to grant it, but to show by 
the actual forces which we mustered that we were able and willing to make it 
good against all who might venture to call it in question. It was this which 
made the E.aj{>oot and other chiefs so eager to obtain our alliance, and induced 
them virtually to sacrifice their independence for the sake of the security which 
they knew we could afford them. From this period the British government 
was recognize<l as umpire in sill disputes between sovereign native states, and 
an appeal to its decision has been haj^pily substituted for the former invariable 
appeal to the sword. 

In contemplating the vastness of the change one cannot help wondering 
at the comparative facility Avith which it was accomplished. Numerous 
encounters took j)lace, and the superiority of British skill and courage was 
ncA'er more fully manifested; but no great battles were fought, and yet how 
vast the revolution which has been effected! Scindia so humbled that he dared 
not take a single step in favour of those to whom it was notorioiis that ho had 
pletlged his support; Holkar, who was at one time so formidable as, single- 
handed, to defy the whole Briti.sh power, left in possession of little more than 
half his original territories, and these so intersected and dismembered as to be 
incap.able of acting together for any common purpose; one Rajah of Nagpoor, 
fifter forfeiting a large ])ortion of his territories, deposed, and unable to fiml an 
asylum without fleeing to one of the extremities of India, and another placed 
on the musnud solely by British influence; and last of all, the very name of 
Peishwa, the acknowledged head of the Mahratta confederacy, abolished, and 
the last individual who bore it exiled to Bengal, to live under British autho¬ 
rity, and subsist as a pensioner on British bounty, while his extensive terri¬ 
tories have been annexed to the British dominions, either absolutely or in 
effect. In various quartei’s, too, while important accessions of territory have 
been gained, an influence in some respects as valuable as territory has been 
acquired. Our alliances have been extended over all Rajpootana, including not 
only the leading states of Odeypoor, Joudpoor, and Jcypoor, but the extensive 
though 1 ‘cmote and barren territories of Jessulmeer and Bikanecr, together 
with the minor states of Kotah, Boondee, Kerowlee, Siroki, Banswara, &c. In 
all these states the Mahratta influence, once paramount and used only for 
purposes of oppression, has been completely destroyed, while British ascendency, 
besides being stipulated by treaty, has been further secured by the cession of 



Chap. IV.] 


EXTENSION OF COMPANY’S TERRITORIES. 


113 


the. central province of Ajmeer, fomieily held in bondage by a nominal depend¬ 
ant of Scindia. In Bundelcund the reduction of refractory zemindars has 
put an end to the lawless exactions by which the cultivators were oppressed, 
and the whole country kept in constant alarm; and while the Nabob of 
Bhopaul has been rewarded for his fidelity to his engagements by considerable 
accessions of territory, and relief from indefinite Mahratta claims which were 
continually threatening his independence, the neighbouring chief of Saugur, 
for refusing to fulfil his engagements, has paid the pcujilty, and seen his terri¬ 
tory finally merged in that of the Company. 

It is of importance to remember that the extensive accjuisitions of territory 
made during, and in consequence of the war, were not originally contemplated. 
The suppression of the predatory system, as it was the ostensible, was also the 
real object for which the Marquis of Hastings brought the armies into the field, 
and hence all the districts from which the Pindarees were expelled, instead of 
being retained as lawful conquests, were at once lestored to the states from 
which they had been dissevered. The same course would have been followed 
to the end, and the war, however much it might have added to British influ¬ 
ence, would have terminated without increasing the extent of British territory. 
The Mahrattas brought their fate upon themselves by their open hostilities or 
secret treachery; and the British, after being forced into such struggles as took 
[)lace at Poonah, the Seetabaldee Hills, and Mahidpooi’, had no alternative but 
to provide against their recurrence by deposing or curtailing the territories of 
blie chiefs who, while jmofessing friendship, had thus treachei'ou.s]y assailed 
them. Though it cannot be supposed that the humiliations thus experienced 
did not leave rankling feelings behind them, it has been siitisfactorily proved 
that both Scindia and Holkar, by exchanging a condition bordei’iug on anarchy 
for one of comparative tranquillity, gained more in revenue than they had lost 
in territory. Sir John Malcolm, contrasting Central India in 1817 and 1821, 
says:—“ Dowlut Row Scindia has already derived a double benefit from the 
change in the reduction of his army, and the increase of his revenue. ” “The 
saving in actual expenditure, from reductions alone, ciinnot be less than twenty 
lacs of I’upees per annum; and it is difficult to calculate the amount of money 
and tranquillity gained by the extinction of men like Bapoo Scindia and 
Jeswunt Row Bhao, and other leaders who commanded those bodies of his 
army which were at once the most useless and expensive. In 1817 tliere was 
not one distiict belonging to Scindia in Central India that was not more or less 
in a disturbed state; in 1821 there existed not one enemy to the public peace. 
The progress of improvement in his territories diffei-s in every part; but it is 
general.” “On the whole of Scindia’s territories in this part of India, we may 
safely compute a rise of about 25 per cent, in the revenue, and a deduction of 
lo in the expenses of its collection.” Of Holkar’s dominions he speaks in still 
more flattering terms:—“The revenues of Holkar from his possessions in 

Voi,. HI. . 311 


A.D. 1819. 


RritUh 

ascendency 

oRtahlishcd. 


FIxteiision 
of territory 
not urigiii- 
ally oon- 
teniplaiod. 


Indirect 
advantages 
secured to 
Huindia. 



114 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book VIT. 


A.D. 181 !). Malwah and Nemaur were in 1817, 441,679 rupees (£44,167); in 1819-20 they 
were 1,696,183 rupees (£169,618). The expenses of collection were four years 
Indirect ago from 35 to 40 per cent.; they do not now exceed 15 per cent.; there being 
eeonred to iu fact hardly any aebundy or revenue corps kept up. The proximity of the 
BriUeh British troops, with the knowledge of the support and protection which that 
in*CTOtr^™ govci-nment affords to the Holkar territories, has hitherto continued to preserve 
India. them in trail(luillity.” In order to give a more complete idea of what he calls 
“the rapid resuscitation of this state,” Sir John Malcolm has inserted in the 
appendix to his Central India, a table, showing that, of 3701 government 
villages belonging to Holkar, “tliere were in 1817 only 2038 inhabited; 1663 
were de.serted, or, as the natives emphatically term it, without lamj>. In 1818, 
269 villages were restored; in 1819, 343 ; and in 1820, 608, leaving only 543 
deserted; and there can be no doubt that within three years, these will be 

re-populated.” The progress of improvement was 
equally satisfactory in other quarters. The Puar 
states of Dhar and Dewass, which were nearly depo¬ 
pulated, had commenced a career of prosperity; 
Bhopaul, which in 1817 struggled for existence, was 
“in a state of rapid improvement;” the petty Raj¬ 
poot states had exjierienced “as great an improve¬ 
ment as any in Central India;” and this description 
applied, “with a little difference, to all the Rajpoot 
principalities cast and west of the Chumbul.” Some 
miscellaneous transactions for which no place in the 
narrative has yet been found may now be mentioned. 

Row Bannaljee, the Rajah of Cutch, with whom, 
it will be lemembeied, the British government had 
concluded a treaty, had sun-ounded himself with dis¬ 
solute companions, and indulged to such an extent 
in intemperate habits as to affect his intellect. His 
State of whole conduct was that of a ci^uel and capricious tyrant. The young prince 
cuteh. Lakhpati or Ladhuba, who had coriqieted with him for the sovereignty, was 
barbarously murdered by his orders; and Ladhuba’s widow, who had been 
left pregnant and afterwards gave birth to a son, would have shared her 
husband’s fate had not the British government thrown its shield around 
her. With such a brutal prince it was impossible that friendly relations 
could be durable, and he began almost openly to make military prepara¬ 
tions, The British thus foi’ewarned reinforced their station at Anjar with 
an additional battalion; and Bannaljee, now afraid to risk the encounter, 
turned his arms against Kallian Sing, the father of Ladhuba’s widow, and one 
of the Jhareja chiefs under British pi'otection. This infringement of the treaty 
was not allowed to pass unnoticed, and the ai)proach of a British detachment. 



HaJAIT of CUTCfl. 
From Mrs). Fo«tan’» Cutch. 



Chap. IV.] 


STATE OF CUTCH. 


115 


combined with the little success which had attended his operations, compelled a.d. 1819. 
him to a hasty retreat. The detachment then advanced upon Bhooj on the 
24th of March, 1819, and after repulsing large masses of horse and foot by 
w hich they were charged, carried the fort by surjnise. As it completely com¬ 
manded the town, Barmaljee saw the fruitlessness of further resistance, and 
surrendered at discretion. By coucei-t with the Jiiareja chiefs he was deposed, 
and the government was administered, in the name of his infant son Row 
l)esal, by a native regency, under the direction of tlie resident and the guar¬ 
antee of the British government. In the treaty concluded at this time clauses 
were inserted against the practice of female infanticide, which prevailed to a 
horrible extent among the Jharejas. It is not unworthy of notice that Cutch, 
sliortly after these political commotions, suffered dreadfully from an earthquake. 



][II.1.-F0RT OF Bhooj. - Fi-om Mm. KIwoncJ's Overtniid .Tmirnoy to ImHii. 


An enormous mound of earth and sand many miles in extent was heaved up, nreadfui 

ourtlHiuake. 

and at the same time an adjacerrt tract of country sunk down and was .sub¬ 
merged. At Bhooj 7000 houses were thrown down, and 1140 persons buried 
among the ruins. At Anjar about 3000 houses were thrown down or rendered 
uninhabitable, and tlic fort became a pile of ruins. Many other towns were 
wholly or partially destroyed. Tlic volcanic agency, though most tremendous 
in Cutch, was not confined to it, and simultaneous shocks were i'elt in many 
other parts of India. 

The political arrangements in Cutch gave great umbrage to the Ameei’S 
Scinde. They had long been bent on the conquest of it, and were mortified to Amooraof 

r. >1 ^ Scinde. 

find their designs anticipated. The feelings of enmity to the British govern¬ 
ment thus engendered were aggravated by other circumstances. The confines 
of Gujerat and Cutch had been pillaged by the Khosas and other marauding 
tribes on the borders of the desert of Scinde. In order to suppress these ravages 
the co-operation of the Ameers had been requested, and they had sent a body of 



A.D. 1819. 


HoHtilt) pro- 

of 

tho Ameers 
of bcinUo. 


Btatc of 
affan*H in 
Giijerut. 


116 UISTOEY OF INDIA. [Book VIL 

troops to act with a British detachment sent against the plunderers under 
Colonel Barclay, from Pulanpoor, near the northern confines of Gujerat. The 
Scindian auxiliaries, so far from aiding in tlie expulsion of the Khosas, allowed 
them to encami> without molestation in their vicinity, and when Colonel Bar¬ 
clay attacked the mai-auder.s and disj)ersed them, complained as if they themselves 
had been tlie direct object of attack. New ground of ottence was given when 
tlie Biitisl) troo})s, in ]>ursuing the fugitives, crossed the Scinde frontier. Tho 
Ametirs, without deigning to ask for explanation, or attempting an amicable 
arrangement, at once took redress into their own hands by invading Cutch 
with a body of troops, which advancing within fifty miles of Bhooj, took the 
town of Loona, and laid waste the adjacent country. On the advance of a 
British detachment they retired, but the Bombay government refused to over¬ 
look the aggression, and threatened to retidiate by sending a division into 
Sciiide. The Ameei-s, not yet i>rcpared for ho,stilities, disowned tho proceedings 
of their troops, and sent apologies both to Bombay and Bhooj. The governor- 
general was not at this time disposed to risk a new war which did not seem to 
hitn to jirornise any piofitable re.sult ; and therefore, accepting the disavowal as a 
sufficient apology, he autJiorized the conclusion of a treaty, which simply stipu¬ 
lated that tile Ameers should juocure the liberation of the jirisoners and I’estrain 
the Khosas .and othei’ marauders from making inroads on the British or their 
allies. The reasons which induced the supi'cmo government to adopt this 
])acific course were put on record, ami are sufficiently curious to justify a quota¬ 
tion: “Few things would be more impolitic than a war with Scinde, as its suc¬ 
cessful jirosecutiori would not only be unprofitable but an evil. The country 
was not Avorth possessing, and its occujiation would involve us in all the 
intrigues and wars, and incalculable embarrassments of the countries beyond the 
Indus. Hostilities might become unavoidable hereafter, but it was wise to 
defer their occurrence as long as possible.” 

The state of aflairs in the neighbouring territories of Gujerat has akeady 
been ]Aartly exjilained. The imbecile Guicowar, Anand Row, retained posses¬ 
sion of the nmsnud, while the government was administered by his brother, 
Futteh Sing, in concert with the British resident. On Futteh Sing’s death, in 
1818, Syajec Row, a youngei' brother, of the age of nineteen, took his place, and 
with this excej)tion, the arrangement continued as before. An important 
change, l.iowever, took place when Anand Row died in 1819. By this event 
Syajee Row became Guicowar. He was not disposed to forego .any of his rights, 
and argued with much plausibility that since he had been considered fit to 
conduct the government as regent to his pr’edece.ssor, he must surely be capable 
of conducting it, now that the sole right of sovereignty was legally vested in 
himself. There was therefore no longer any occasion for the control of the 
British resident. Though the claims of the new Guicowar to independent 
authority were acknowledged, it was foreseen that the uncontrolled exercise of 



(Jhap. IV.J 


STATE OF GUJERAT. 


117 


it would endanger both British interests and the prosperity of the country, and 
Mr. Elphinstone, now become governor of Bombay, judged it necessary to 
repair to Bai'oda for the purjwse of placing the future intercourse of the two 
states on a proper basis. The deposition 
of the Peishwa had confeired many im- 
])ortant advantages on the Guicowar. It 
had relieved him from large pecuniary 
claims, and procured for him important 
territorial acquisitions; and therefore, as 
the British government had undertaken 
tlie entire defence of the country, it was 
considered fair that the quantity of terri¬ 
tory ceded for subsidy should be consider¬ 
ably increased. Still, however, it was 
supposed that the revenues haS been 
brought into such a prosperous state as to 
be well able to bear the additional burden. 

Great was Mr. Elphinstone’s tistonishment 
to learn that the finances were in a state 
of embarrassment. Above £1,000,000 sterling of debt remained undischarged; 
tlie expenditui-e of the two last years had exceeded the recei])tB; the troops 
were hugely in arreara; and the tributaries, paidly from bad seasons, but still 
more from o])pressive exactions, were suffering severe distress. Under these 
circumstances the idea of abandoning all control over the internal administra- 
(ion was necessarily abandoned, and after providing for the discharge of the 
debt by means of loans raised at a reduced i-ate of interest, on the security 
of assignments of revenxie and a British guarantee, a final airangement was 
made to the following effect—^The British government should have the exclusive 
management of foreign affaii’s, and the Guicowar, so long as he fulfille<l the 
engagements which the Bi’itish had guaranteed, should conduct the inteiiial 
affairs, subject, however, to the following provisos—that he should considt with 
the British government in the a])pointment of his minister, and that the resi¬ 
dent should have free access at all times to inspect the public account, be 
apprised of all jmiposed financial measures at the commencement of each year, 
and be consulted before any expense of magnitude was to be incurred. 

Before leaving Gujerat some notice is due to an expedition undertaken in 
1820 against the piratical tribes which continued to infest the north-western 
coast of the peninsula. Tempted by the withdrawal of the British troops for 
the Mahratta war, the Wsigars of Okamandal rose in insurrection, surprised 
Dwaraka and Beyt, and meeting with no adequate force to oppose them, made 
themselves masters of the whole district. They had been in undisputed posses¬ 
sion of it for several months when the Honourable Colonel Stanhope, who had 



A.D. 1820. 


Kew Jtr- 
rangoiDoiit 
with tho 
Guicowar. 


Kxpedition 
agaiuat the 
of 

Qujerat. 



118 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book VII. 


A. D. 1820. 


Suppmisiuii 
of piratical 
insiurectioii 
in Gujarat. 


Relationn 
with Oude. 


been sent by sea at the head of an expedition, consisting of his majesty’s 65th 
regiment, two battalions of Bombay infantry with details of artillery, and the 
Ist regiment of native cavalry, arrived off Dwaraka The troops were landed 
on the 26th of November, and 
after a short bombardment carried 
the town by escalade. The garri¬ 
son, composed chiefly of Arabs and 
natives of Scinde, retired into the 
great temple, who.se solid and 
lofty walls seemed to defy all 
ordinarj" means of attack. An en¬ 
trance was however effected from 
the roof of an adjoining house, 
and of 500 men who had taken 
refuge within the temple and been 
driven out, not more than 100 
escaped. This signal chastisement 
so intimidated the chiefs, who had 
taken up strong j) 0 .sitions within 
the thicket, that they surrendered at discretion. The garrison of Beyt also 
caijitulated, and the insurrection was comjdetely sujrpressed. 

Discussions which had been carried on between the Nabob of Oirde and 
Major Baillie, the British resident at his court during the administration of 
Lord Minto, after being suppressed for a time, recommenced shortly after the 
arrival of his successor. The great subject of debate was the degree to which 
the resident was entitled to interfere with the internal administration of the 
nabob, the latter striving to limit, and the for-mer to extend it as much as 
pos.sible. Earl Minto had decided in favour of the resident, but quitted India 
before any steps had been taken in accordance with his decision. Meantime 
an event took place which promised to lead to an amicable adjustment. The 
nabob, Sadut Ali, whose ruling passion had been avarice, died on the 11th of 
July, 1814, leaving an accumulated treasure of £13,000,000 sterling. He was 
succeeded by his eldest son, by the title of Ghazee-u-din Hyder, who, aware 
how much he was iirdebted to Major Baillie for the ease with which he obtained 
the succession, showed his gratitude by consulting hirrr in the choice of his 
ministers, and consenting to several of the reforms which had been urged in 
vain upon his father. This satisfactory state of matters did not last long. 
Some of the resident’s reforms, not being in accordance with native prejudices, 
were very unpopular, and the nabob began to suspect that he would have 
acted more wisely if, instefid of consulting him, he had taken his own way. 
While under this impression, he paid a visit to Earl Moira, who had arrived at 
Cawnpore to be near the scene of action during the Nepaulese war, and shortly 



Wauars. —From Mr*?. PuBUm’a AVandoritiga in India. 



Chap. IV.] 


KELATIONS WITH OUDE. 


119 


afterwards returned with him to Lucknow. On this occasion the young 
nabob ofiered a crore of rupees (£1,000,000 sterling) as a free gift to the 
Company. It was accepted as a loan, and registered as a public debt, bearing 
interest at the government current rate of 0 per cent. 

At the time when the nabob offered his present, he delivered a paper which, 
while professing personal regard for the resident, indicated a desire to be less 
subject to his control. The governor-general having learned privately that the 
nabob’s feelings on this subject were much stronger than he had ventured to 
express, took a questionable, and certainly a very undignified method of 
an'iving at the truth, by not only holding personal conferences with the nabob, 
but allowing members both of his civil and military staff to hold them also, 
and then listening to the tales which they brought him. Little reliance could 
be'placed on information thus obtained, more especially as the nabob never 
seemed to be of one mind, making complaints one day, and retracting them the 
next; but the governor-general satisfied himself that the nabob was not treated 
with all the deference which, according to his lordship’s notions, was due to 
regal state. lie therefore instructed the resident to treat the nabob on all 
public occasions as an independent prince; to be strict in the observance of all 
established ceremonials; and to confine advice or remonstrance upon any mis¬ 
management in the nabob’s administration to such occasions as might endanger 
British interests. Not long .after receiving these instructions, the resident was 
desired to apply to the nabob for a second crore of rupees. They were obtained, 
and furnished another seasonable supply for the Nepaulese war. It would 
seem however that the nabob parted with the money more by constraint than 
willingly, and felt more than ever dissatisfied with the resident as the instru¬ 
ment employed in exacting it. He displayed his resentment by becoming 
more hostile than ever to all kinds of reform, and removing from his counsels 
.all the persons known to have the resident’s support. Major Baillie, attributing 
these ])roceedings of the nabob not so much to caprice or personal resentment 
.os to factious intrigues encouraged by the course which the governor-general had 
pursued with regard to him, forwarded in September, 1815, a letter dated five 
months before, in which he gave free utterance to his feelings. The governor- 
general in replying did not hesitate to express his opinion that the resident had 
displayed a grasping and domineering spirit, which justified the jealousy and 
resentment of both the late and the present nabob. In consequence of this 
rupture, the governor-general in council removed Major Baillie, and tlms freed 
the nabob fi-om all control in his internal administration. This change was fol¬ 
lowed by great cordiality between the two governments, and to the satisfaction 
of both the loan of the second crore of rupees was discharged in May, 1816, by 
a treaty which commuted it for a tract of territory which belonged to the 
British government, and was situated to the north-west of Oude, on the frontiers 
of Nepaul, The governor-geneitd, satisfied that the affairs of the country had 


A.D. 1829. 


Iioan by the 
Nabob of 
Oude to the 
Company. . 


He com* 
plams of 
being sub¬ 
jected to 
undue con¬ 
trol. 


Governor- 
general’s 
opinion in 
regard to 
pi-oceeding^ 
of British 
rodent. 



120 


HISTOEY OF INDIA. 


[Book Vlt. 


A.p. 1832 . improved since the irritating interference with the internal administration had 
ceased, ventured to recommend another change, with the view of giving Oude 
still more the character of an independent sovereignty. 

The Nabob The Nabohs of Oude had hitherto been satisfied with the title of Nabob 
^umwthe Vizier, intimating that they were the hereditary viziers or prime ministers of the 
title of king. Mogul. They were accordingly regarded not as the equals, but as the ser¬ 
vants of tlie King of Delhi. So much was this distinction regarded in practice, 
that tlie governor-general, during a second visit to Lucknow, was witness to an 
act of humiliation imposed by it. Two brothers of the King of Delhi were living 
there on pensions furnished partly by the Company and partly by the nabob. 
Notwithstanding this subordinate position, etiquette gave them such decided 
precedence, that when, the nabob met them in the streets of his own capital, his 
elephant was miide to kneel in token of homage. The thing seemed to the 
governor-general so incongruous, that he suggested to the nabob the propriety 
of ridding himself of all such forms of servility. He had advised him on his 
accession to dispense Avith application to Delhi for confirmation or investiture, 
and he now advised him to assume a title which Avould declare him to be no 
longer the servant, but the equal of the Mogul. The only restriction was, that 
change of title .should make no change in the nabob’s relations with the British 
government. The governor-general .seems to ha\’c been apprehensive that the 
throne of Delhi might lie occupied by a prince hostile to British union, and ho 
therefore deemed it good policy to convert the two heads of the Mahometans in 
India into rival sovereigns. The nabob, who.se pride and ambition were thus 
flattered, hastened to act on the governor-general’s suggestion, and in 1819, to 
the extreme indignation of the court of Delhi, and the dissatisfaction of 
Mahometans generally, issued a proclamation declaring his future designation 
to be Aim Muziiffar, Moiz-u(l-din, Shah-i-Za'num, Ghazi-ud-din, Hyder Shah, 
Padehah-i'-Awadh, '' the Victorious—the Upholder of the Faith—the King of 
Misgovern- the Ago—Uthazi-ud^din, Hyder Shah—King of Oude.” The .soundness of the 
ondo. governor-general’s judgment in this matter has been questioned; but the subject 
was too insignificant to deserve all the discussion which it provoked, and has 
already Idst any little interest which once belonged to it. In regard to the 
condition of Oude, it is necessary only further to add, that it scarcely justified 
the flattering - picture which the governor-general drew of the happy conse¬ 
quences resulting from the nabob’s uncontrolled internal management. British 
troops were repeatedly called out to assist in reducing refractory zemindars; 
and in the beginning of 1822, in the vicinity of Sultanpoor alone, a Briti,sh 
detachment dismantled above seventy of their forts. Bands of armed robbers, 
liountenanced by the ziiinindars and connived at by the police, haunted the 
jungles, and not unfreqiiently passed the frontier to carry on their depredation.s 
within the British territory. 

The relations Avith the Nizam did not undergo much change during the 



ClIAF. IV.] 


RELATIONS WITH THE NIZAM. 


121 


administration of the Marquis of Hastings, but several events took place which a.d. iskj. 
on various accounts deserve more than a passing notice. The nominal admin- 
istration of the government was vested in the Nizam's favourite Moonir-ul-Reiattow 
Moolk, but the real power was exercised by the Hindoo Chandoo Lai in 
concert with the resident. The Nizam, indignant at not having the absolute 
control, allowed matters to take their course, and when asked for his opinion, 
sullenly answered that it was of no use to give it, as he had no interejjt. 

Chandoo Lai was able and active, but aware of his precarious position in con¬ 
sequence of the hostility felt to him at court, endeavom-ed to make friends there 
by a liberal distribution of money to all the courtiers or their retainers who 
possessed any influence, or could furnish him with information by acting as 
spies. So profuse were his bribes that part of them were said to find their 
way to tlie hoards of the Nizam himself, and Moonir-ul-Moolk, whose testimony, 
liowever, being that of an enemy, must be taken with qualification, said that the 
whole of the Nizam’s family was bribed, every one of his own servants was in 
Chandoo Lai’s pay, and even his own mother-in-law sent him a daily report 
of whatever occurred ijj the inmost recesses of his house. This system 
required an enormous expenditure, which the minister endeavoured to meet, 
partly by rapacious exactions, and partly by loans at exorbitant interest from 
the bankers of Hyderabad. The revenues were let to the highest bidders, and 
tlic contractora, intent only on profit, employed so much violence and extortion, 
that the cultivators abandoned their lands in despair, and both the revenue and 
the population rapidly diminished. 

As British influence had placed and was maintaining Chandoo Lai in power, ea«eofwn 

, .7 T .. . • 1 . 7 7 liamPalmar 

the supreme government felt responsible for his proceedings, and on the repre- >ii»i co. 
sentations 6f the resident ordered a stringent control to be exercised over him. 

Among other sources of financial embarrassment was his connection with a 
mercantile house which had been established at Hyderabad under the firm of 
William Palmer and Co., and which, being recommended by Mr. Russell, then 
resident, had so far succeeded, in 1814, in obtaining not merely the permission, 
but the countenance of the governor-general in council, that he was instructed 
to show it every proper degree of encouragement consistent with the treaty 
with the Nizam. Chandoo Lai’s pecuniary necessities soon brought him into 
intimate communication with the firm, and he obtained considerable advances 
from it. In 1816 William Palmer and Co. professed to doubt whether their 
dealings with the Nizam’s government were not struck at by Act 87 *Geo. III. 
c. 142. The 28th section of this act, proceeding on the preamble that “the 
practice of British subjects lending money, or being concerned in the lending 
of the same, or in transactions for the borrowing money for, or lending money 
to the native princes in India, has been productive of much mischief, and is the 
source of much usury and extortion,”.enacts that from the 1st of December, 

1797, “no British subject shall by himself, or by any other person directly 

VoL. HI. 212 



122 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book VII. 


A.D. 1810. 


Question as 
to the 
legality uf 
William 
Palmer and 
Co.'s loans 
to the 
Nizam. 


The gover¬ 
nor-general 
sanctions 
their deal¬ 
ings. 


or indirectly employed by him, lend any money or other valuable thing to any 
native prince in India, by whatever name or description such native prince shall 
be called; nor shall any British subject be concerned either by himself, or by any 
other person, either directly or indirectly, in raising or procuring any money 
for such native prince, or as being security for such loan or money; nor shall 
any British subject lend any money or other valuable thing to any other person 
for the purpose of being lent to any such native prince; nor shall any British 
subject by himself, or by any other person, either directly or indirectly, for his 
use or benefit, take, receive, hold, enjoy, or be concerned in any bond, note, or 
other security or assignment granted or to be granted after the 1st day of 
December next, for the loan, or for the repayment of money or other valuable 
thing.'’ The violation of the law was to be treated as a misdemeanour, and 
the security taken for the money lent, was “to be null and void to all intents 
and purposes.'’ 

Notwithstanding the minutene.ss and stringency of the above prohibitions, 
it was expre.s8ly declared that the things forbidden were unlawful, only 
provided they were done “without the consent and approbation of the court of 
directors of the East India Company, or the consent and approbation of the 
governor in council of one of the said Company’s governments in India, first had 
and obtained in writing.” If the previous dealings of William Palmer and 
Co. were, as they themselves suspected, illegal, it is very questionable if any 
subsequent consent would have cured them; but they were naturally anxious 
to be in safety for the future, and succeeded on application in obtaining the 
requisite consent of the governor-general in council, subject only to the reser¬ 
vation that the resident should have full permission to satisfy himself at any 
time as to the nature of the transactions in which the firm might engage in 
consequence of the permission then granted. Backed by the countenance of 
the supreme government they extended their pecuniary transactions with 
Chandoo Lai, and in particular undertook with its full cognizance to provide the 
pay of the reformed troops in Berar and Aurungabad. The regular payment 
of the troops being indispensable to their efficiency, the sanction to this trans¬ 
action was the more easily obtained, from its being asserted that the native 
bankers would not advance the necessary funds at the same rate of intere.st, or 
on the security of assignments of revenue. 

William Palmer and Co. had as yet only been experimenting on the credulity 
of the su|>reme government, and on finding how readily all their requests were 
complied with, entered into a negotiation for a loan to Chandoo Lai of sixty 
hies of rupees (£000,000). Their application for the sanction of this loan was 
forwarded to Calcutta by Mr. Russell, the resident, who recommended it on the 
ground that equally advantageous terms could not be obtained through any other 
agency. The loan, according to Chandoo Lai’s statement, was to be employed 
in reducing the arrears, dud to the public establishments, in paying off heavy 



Chap. IV.] 


RELATIONS WITH THE NIZAMI 


123 


inciimbrances held by native bankers and others, and in making advances to a.d. isao. 
the ryots to enable them to cultivate their lands. The proposed mode of appli¬ 
cation was .unexceptionable, but some degi*ee of suspicion had been aroused, 
and the resolution to sanction the loan, opposed by two members of the supreme Pnimer and 
council, was carried only by the casting vote of the governor-general This NizMn^*'**** 
was particularly unfortunate, as one of the leading members of the firm of 
William Pahner and Co. had married a ward whom the governor-general had 
brought up in his family and loved like a daughter, and persons were unchari¬ 
table enough to suggest that the relation thus established had clouded his judg¬ 
ment, and gained his consent to an airangement of which he would otherwise 
liave been the first to perceive the impropriety. 

In 1820, shortly after the sanction to the new loan had been granted, a 



The Eaht India House. —From a water-colour drawing in Libraiy of Ea«t India House, 


ilespatch was received from the directors strongly disapproving of the whole of 
the transactions relating to the firm of Palmer and Co., and enjoining both that tom. 
the consent which had been given with the view of legalizing their proceedings 
slioiild be withdrawn, and that in the event of any discussion as to the claims 
of the firm on the Nizam, the British government should not interfere to enforce 
them. In consequence of these instructions the firm wsis interdicted from future 
pecuniary dealings with the Nizam's minister. Had William Palmer and Co. 
been acting in an honourable and straightforward manner, they might have 
complained with justice of the severity of this sudden interdict and the ruin in 
which it might involve them; but when the real state of the case was investi¬ 
gated, their explanations were considered shuffling and evasive, and the so-called 
loan of sixty lacs proved little better than a fiction and fraud. Like Chandoo 





124 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Boor VII. 


A.T>. 1823. lal they had represented the loan as an entirely new advance made for specific 
purposes, whereas Sir Charles Metcalfe, who had become resident at Hyderabad, 
nesiguatioj. had little difiiculty in discovering, notwithstanding the mysterious maimer in 
Mamuia of wliicli the accounts were stated, that there had been no real advance, and that 
Haatiagn. sixty lacs was nothing more than the transfer of a previous debt of 

tliat amount, claimed by the firm from the Nizam, to a new account. They 
had thus obtained the sanction of the supreme government by false pretences. 
As soon as the real facts were discovered, the governor-general became fully 
alive to the gross imposition which had been practised upon him, and charac¬ 
terized it as it deserved. For a moment imputations affecting the governor- 
general’s personal integrity were whispered in some quarters, but another 
moment dissii>ated them, and the worat that could be said was, that from not 
exercising due caution he had allowed his confidence to be abused. This unfor¬ 
tunate affair is the more to be lamented from having brought the administration 
of the Marquis of Hastings to a close sooner than he intended. Mortified at 
the want of confidence which the instructions fi’om the directors implied, and 
stung to the quick by the suspicion which some of their ex 2 )ression 8 seemed to 
insmuate, he tendered his resignation in 1821, and finally quitted India on the 
1st of January, 1823. 

Ills internal The liolitical clijingos efiTected by the Martinis of Hiustings, though they con- 
tion. stitutc at once the leading feature and the highest merit of his administration, 
ought not to make us forget the im 2 iortant internal reforms which ho introduced 
into the various branches of the 2 >ublic service. Several of these reforms cannot 
be said to have oiiginated with himself Some were 2 )ressed upon his notice by 
the home authorities, and others suggested by such eminent 2 >ublic servants 
as Sir Thomas Monro, Sir John Malcolm, the Honourable Mountstuart El 2 )hin- 
stone. Sir Charles Metcalfe, &c. Still to the Marquis of Hastings belongs the 
merit of singling out those which were most worthy of being adopted, and 
making the necessary arrangements for carrying them into 2 >ractical effect. In 
tlie judicial department the accumulation of undecided cases had become a crying 
evil, and amounted in fact to a denial of justice. The causes were sufficiently 
obvious—the undue multqdication of forms, which, though meant to secure 
regularity of procedure, protracted litigation, while the number of judges was 
LawrofontB.fa,]. Small for the business allotted to them. A considerable diminution of 
the evil M'as obtained by shortening and sim 2 >lifying process in cases where 
quickness'of despatch was scarcely of less importance than accuracy of decision, 
and by increasing both the number and the emoluments of the native judges. At 
the same time the jurisdiction of these judges was greatly extended. Moonsifs, at 
first restricted to cases of the value of 50 rupees, were made competent to cases 
of 150; and sudder ameers, also limited at first to 50, were ultimately allowed to 
adjudge in cases of 500. Encouragement was also given to punchayets, a kind 
of courts where the judges acted as arbiters; and while both their constitution 



Chap. IV.] 


AFFAIRS OF BENGAL. 


125 


and procedure -were regulated, tbeir decisions were declared unchallengable on a.d. isib. 
any ground but that of corruption. In criminal justice the chief alteration 
consisted in an abandonment of the rule laid down by Lord Cornwallis, that lhw reform 
the offices of collector and judge, or magistrate, were never to be combined, by 
The native rule was the very reverse of this, and by returning to it, wliile the 
duties of collector were not seriously interfered with, a great number of ci’im- 
inai cases were summarily disposed of by judges in whose impartiality confi¬ 
dence could be placed. 

In no branch of the public service was improvement more wanted than that 
of revenue. In Bengal no fundamental alteration could be made. The per¬ 
manent settlement had been finally and irrevocably adopted, and the utmost 
that could be done was to enact regulations for the correction of previous errors, 
or to provide for altered circumstances. Among the regulations thus adopted 

,1 . . ^ ° ^ reform in 

under the permanent settlement, notice is due to those which checked fraud Ucngai 
and precipitancy in the sale of land for arrears of revenue, and still more to 
those which gave to the ryot a protection which lie had never before enjoyed, 
at least under the permanent settlement of Bengal. By an extraordinary over¬ 
sight or deliberate jierpetration of injustice, the sale of a zemindary abolished 
all sub-teimres, and the purchaser was entitled if he chose to oust and order off 
every occupant whom he found upon it. Instead of this iniquitous and t}^!!- 
nical law, it was now enacted that tenants and cultivators having a hereditary 
or prescriptive right of occiqiancy could not be dispossessed so long as they 
])iiid their customary rents, and that those rents could not be increased except 
in specified circumstance.s. It was indeed high time to take effectual measures 
for checking all the forms of injustice and oppression which had prevailed in 
the collection of the public revenues. In Cuttack, in particular, though belong- 

. . . 1 , iii CiiUiick. 

mg to the Bengal presidency, and at no great distance from its capital, the 
.ibuses had become so intolerable that the people were goaded into a rebellion, 
which s])read over the greater part of the province, and continued to rage from 
1817 to 1819. The revenue exacted from the province, owing to the errone¬ 
ous principle on which it had been calculated, was excessive. Under the Mah- 
rattiis it had averaged little more than ten lacs, and these subject to nume¬ 
rous deductions. Under the British it amounted, without deduction, to 
nearly twelve lacs, afterwards so much increased by random augmentations as 
to amount, in 1816-17, to nearly fourteen lacs. Under this system of extortion 
aiTears quickly accumulated, and many of the old zemindars, driven from their 
estates by sales not only forced but often fraudulent, were replaced by new 
men, who were hated alike for their rapacity and intrusion. After a kind of 
reign of terror had commenced, the people of Khoorda, who had been most 
mercilessly dealt with, found a leader in Jagbandoo, the principal military 
officer of the rajah. So general was the disaffection that in a few weeks he 
was heading above ,3000 insurgents. The successes which he gained before a 



126 


HISTORY OF lilJKrA. 


[Book VII. 


A.D. 1819. 


Hettlement 
of Onttiick. 


Kimwiciui " 
reform in 
tlio !Mu<lras 
presidency. 


sufficient force "was collected to oppose him, were of course soon checked, but 
his adherents continued to act in desultory bodies, and tranquillity was not 
restored till effectual steps were taken to convince the people that their griev¬ 
ances would be redressed. In accordance with the recommendations of a com¬ 
missioner, specially appointed, large arrears were cancelled, sales of defaulting 
estates in many instances suspended, and the amount of former assessments 
considerably reduced. On inquiry, many instances of oppression and extortion 
were established, not only against native officials, but their European superiors, 
who, if not directly guilty, had incurred responsibility by connivance. The 
former were justly punished, the latter displaced, and though Jagbandoo did 
not sun-ender till several years later, so little of the insurrectionary sjnrit 
remained that in August, 1819, a general amnesty was proclaimed. The lesson 

of Cuttack was not 
lost upon the govern¬ 
ment, and care was 
taken, by searching 
out and correcting 
abuses, to prevent si¬ 
milar risings in other 
quarters. 

Though the estab- 
A kyot.—F rom Asiatic costamofi. lisliuient of the perma¬ 

nent settlement in the 

ancient provinces of Bengal, Behai’, and Orissa precluded the introduction of 
fundamental changes in regard to them, a large field for exjieriment lay open in 
the ceded and conipiered provinces. The permanent settlement, once eulogized 
as the lierfection of wisdom, had fallen into disfavour, particularly with the home 
I authorities, who had peremptorily forbidden its extension. The pro])er substi¬ 
tute for it was not yet finally decided, and the Marquis of Hastings certainly 
took the wise.st course which could be adopted under such circumstances, by 
leaving tlie question open, and in the meantime taking active and extensive 
measures to acquire the knowledge which was nece.s.sary for its right decision. 
Among the temporary arrangements by which the revenue was to be collected, 
in the interval, the preference was given, particularly in the upper provinces, to 
the system known by the name of village settlement, which fixes a certain 
amount’ of assessment on each village or community, and levying the whole 
from one or more individuals acting as the representatives of the villagers, leaves 
it to them, subject to an appeal to the civil courts, to adjust the proportion due 
by each individual cultivator. In the Madras presidency, though the zemindars’ 
settlement had been early introduced into the Northern Circars, the Company’s 
jaghire, and the districts of Madura and Tinnevelly, and the village settlement 
had also been adopted in different quarters, a decided preference was given to 






AKBEE DISCOVERING THE MURDER OF HIS MINISTJBt ItAHOMED 


























Chap. IV.] 


AFFAIRS OF MADRAS PRESIDENCY. 


127 


another system known hy the name of the ryotwar settlement, which found a a.d. isss. 
]»owerful advocate and able administrator in Sir Thomas Monro. The peculiarity 
of this settlement is that it dispenses with middlemen, and brings the ryots'Tiieiyotwnr 
into immediate contact with government. An annual adjustment is made with 
each individual cultivator, by fixing a maximum money rent, according to the 
quantity, fertility, and estimated produce of the land ho actually cultivates. 

Should the sum thus fixed eventually prove excessive, proportionable reductions 
are made. The great objections to this settlement are the amount of labour 
which it entails on the collectors, and the constant fluctuations which it causes 
in the amount of revenue. In answer to these objections the advocates of the 
settlement hold out the prospect of being able in course of years to obtain 
such a correct average of the actual capability of each fleld, as to allow the rent 
to be permanently fixed, and thus render an annual adjustment unnecessary. 

In the presidency of Bombay the zemindary settlement was prevented by the 
iinpossibility of finding individuals who could be considered as zemindais, and 
the revenue was collected on no very uniform principle, partly by the village 
and partly by the lyotwar settlements, either separate or combined. Per'ha])s 
too much importance has been attaclied to the mere mode of settlement. The 
great point of interest to the cultivator is the amount which he is required to 
pay, and provided this is kept sufficiently moderate, the particular system 
according to which it is levied gives him little concern. 

During the administration of the Marquis of Hastings, the public revenue intiyap of 
of India was augmented nearly £6,000,000 sterling, the amount in 1813-14, rovoime. 
being £17,228,000, and in 1822-23, £23,120,000. Much of this increase was of 
a fluctuating chariicter, and the only part which could be considered j^ermanent 
was the land revenue derived from the newly acquired or the increa.sed produc¬ 
tiveness of the old territories. The receipts of 1822-23 exceeded the expendi¬ 
ture by nearly three millions and a half, but sin addition of nearly two millions 
Sind a half was made to the public debt, the debt bearing interest being in 
1813-14, £27,002,000, sind in 1822-23, £29,382,000. 

The merits of the Marquis of Hastings were sxcknowledged immediately QueBtimiof 

, 111 ‘ii i-econiiwuso 

sitter the terrainsition of the Nepaulese wsir, by the advance m the jseerage to MiiiY|niri 
alresidy mentioned, and after the termination of the Pindaree war, by a grant 
from the Company of £60,000. In both these case.s, however, it was his mili¬ 
tary merits only that were honoured and rewarded, but there had been no 
acknowledgment of the soundness and signal success of the policy which had 
inside the British authority paramount in India, and conferred incalculable 
blessings on the whole country, by extirpating systematic plunderers, and putting 
an end to international wars. He did not receive this act of tardy justice till he 
had intimated his intention to resign. Then only the directors and proprietors 
concurred in a resolution expressing regret at his resignation, and thanking him 
for the unremitting zeal and eminent ability with which he had for nearly nine 



128 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book TII. 


A D. 1825. years administered the Indian government. This resolution being deemed by 
the friends and admirers of the Marquis of Hastings a very inadequate recogni- 

Motimi loBt Qf jjjg services, the subject was again brought under the notice of the 

for granting ^ o c? 

iHwuiimry proprietors on the 3d of March, 1824, by a motion recommending the court of 

rBwarii i • iiiii 

Maninia of dircctors to rejiort on the mode of making such a pecuniary grant as should be 

iitMtiugH. jjjy eminent services and of the Company’s gratitude. This motion 

was met by anotlier for the printing of all the correspondence, and other docu¬ 
ments upon the public records, which regarded the administration of the Marquis 
of Ha.stings, and might enable the court to judge of the propriety of a further 
jiecuuiary reward. The second motion was carried, and some time having 
elapsed before the voluminous documents for which it called could be printed, the 
discussion was not revived till the 11th of February, 1825, when at a meeting 
of the general court it was moved that there was nothing in the papere relating 
to the transactions with William Palmer and Co., which in the slightest degree 
affected the personal character or integrity of the late governor-general. This 
motion was met by an amendment which, while admitting that the purity of 
his motives could not be impeached, approved of certain despatches sent to 
Bengal, in which the directors strongly censured the countenance given to the 
above firm. After a discussion, prolonged for seven days, a ballot was taken 
and proved in favour of the amendment. Here the matter rested, and a simple 
error of judgment (for it was now admitted on all hands to be nothing more) 
was held sufficient to justify the withholding of a pecuniary reward, which 
would otherwise have been bestowed without a dissentient voice, and which, if 
ever due to a governor-general, certainly ought not to have been denied to the 
Marquis of Hasting.s. 


CHAPTER V. 

Mr. Canning, appointed governor-general, resigns—Lord Andierst appointed—Mr. John Adam's interim 
administration—Lord Amherst installed—Misunderstandings with the Burmese—Commencement 
of hostilities—Expedition against Rangoon—Its capture—Subsequent military operations—Reverses 
—Sickness of the troops—Storming of stockades—Expeditions by water—The Burmese grand army 
dispersed—Operations in Assanr and in Aracan—Mutiny at Barrackpoor—Operations in Pegu— 
Capture of Prome—Negotiations for peace—Termination of hostilities. 


RITISH politics, at the time when the Marquis of Hastings inti¬ 
mated his intended resignation, were in an unsettled state. 
Queen Caroline had returned to England, and ministers, urged 
on by George IV., had reluctantly committed themselves to that 
great scandal known by the name of the Queen’s Trial. 
Mr. Canning, who was then president of the Board of Control, had publicly 











Chap. V.] 


LORD AMHERST, GOVERNOR-GENERAL. 


129 


intimated his determination not to take part in it, and therefore, on the 24th of a.d. 1820 . 
June, 1820, when, in consequence of the queen’s refusal to submit to a com¬ 
promise recommended by a large majority of the House of Commons, it was Appoint- 
seen that the trial must proceed, he tendered his resignation. The king refused resignation 
to receive it, and made it possible for him to continue in office, by leaving 
him at perfect liberty to follow his own inclinations with regard to the 
trial. Mr. Canning accordingly, though still retaining office, went abroad, and 
did not return until the bill of pains and penalties had been withdrawn. The 
unliappy questions connected with it still continued to be agitated, and 
Mr. Canning, feeling the incongruity of 
remaining in a ministry with which he 
could not act in a matter of the greatest 
moment, again tendered his resignation. 

This time it was accepted, and he once 
more went abroad. Being thus oiit of 
place wlien the Marquis of Hastings in¬ 
timated his resignation, he readily con¬ 
sented, in March, 1822, to succeed him as 
governor-general. His preparations for 
the voyage were immediately commenced, 
and lie had nearly completed them when 
the melancholy death of the Marquis of 
Londonderry threw open the doors of the 
ministry to him, and he re-signed his In¬ 
dian appointment to accept that of secre- 
tixry of state for foreign affairs. 

The office of governor-general having thus become once more vacant, two Api-mio 
candidates were put forward—Lord Amherst, whose conduct during his embassy T.i>rd Am- 
to China, though it had received the entire approbation of the directors, had not 
yet been rewarded; and Lord William Bentinck, who.se summary dismissal from 
the government of Madras on grounds which had since been considered insuf¬ 
ficient, gave him some claim to the still higher honour which the directors 
now had it in their power to bestow. Loi’d Amherst was preferred, but did 
not arrive till several months after the deimrture of his predecessor. In the 
interval the office of governor-general devolved on Mr. John Adam, as the senior 
member of council It was not to be expected that diudng this short and 
uncertain interregnum Mr. Adam would venture on any new measure of import¬ 
ance. All he had to do was to carry on the government as before, to comidete 
any transactions which remained unfinished, and to take the initiative only 
when delay would obviously have been mischievous. Though inclined thus to 
regulate his procedure, Mr. Adam felt constrained, particularly on two occasions, 
to act in a manner which subjected him to some degree of unpopffiarity. 

Vot. III. 213 



William Pitt, Lord Ainlicrst. 
After a jtortrait by Sir Tliotna* Laarviice. 




130 


HISTOEY OF INDIA. 


[Book VIT. 


A.ri. is2«. 


Mr. Adam’s 
interim go- 
venimont. 


Bankruptcy 
of William 
Palmer and 
Co. 


CouKorsiiip 
of tho pivss. 


Mr. Adam had from tlie first strenuously objected to the encouragement 
given to the house of William Palmer and Co., and therefore lost no time in 
following out the orders which the court of directors transmitted on the subject. 
The. debt due to the firm by the Nizam was accordingly discharged by an 
advance of the Company on the security of the tribute which they were bound 
to pay to the Nizam for tho Northern Circars, and to prevent the recurrence 
of similar entanglements, the order to interdict all future pecuniary dealings 
with the court of Hyderabad was strictly enforced. The measure proved fatal 
to the house of William Palmer and Co. Had they alone been the sufferers, no 
regret could have been felt for their downfall. Unfortunately many individuals 
who had no share in their misconduct were involved by it, and complained, 
not without some degree of plausibility, that had less precipitation been used, 
and the firm been allowed to wind up gradually, the eventual loss might have 
been greatly diminished. Tlie answer, however, is that in the affair of William 
Palmer .and Co., Mr. Adam acted ministerially, and had no option but to yield 
implicit obedience to the orders which he received. In the other measure he 
acted moi-e on his own judgment, and, we are inclined to think, with less 
discretion. 

The pres.y, from the difficulty of leaving it free while the government was 
absolute, had engaged the attention of successive administrations, and been 
subjected from time to time to restrictions more or less stringent. A regular 
censorship had at last been established, and no newspaper was allowed to be 
printed without being “previously inspected by the secretary to the govern¬ 
ment, or by a person authorized by him for that purpose.” The penalty for 
offending was “immediate embarkation for Europe.” At first the censorship 
applied only to newspapers. Earl Minto, during the whole of whose govern¬ 
ment “there appears,” according to Sir John Malcolm, “to have been a very 
vigilant superintendence of the press,” placed religious publications under 
similar fetters, and in 1813 directed, “not only that the newspapers, notices, 
handbills, and all ephemeral publications, should be sent to the chief secretary 
for revision, but that the titles of all works intended for publication should be 
transmitted to the same officer, who had the option of requiring the work itself 
to be sent for his examination, if he deemed it necessary.” Sir John Malcolm, 
from whose Political Imiia, vol. ii. p. 299, the above passage is quoted, lauds 
“these additional restrictions on the press” as evincing “the necessity of increased 
vigilance to check a growing evil,” and yet, as if for the very purpose of showing 
that the evil could not be “growing,” immediately bears the following testi¬ 
mony: “It is worthy of observation that from the time the office of censor was 
established, though there were never less than five newspapers published at Cal¬ 
cutta, in which every kind of European intelligence, and all matters of general 
and local interest, were inserted, there did not occur, from 1801 till 1820, a 
|>eriod of twenty yesirs, one occ^ion on which government was compelled even 



Chap. V.] 


CENSORSHIP OF THE PRESS. 


131 


to threaten to send any individual to England.” In 1818 the Marquis of Hast- a.d. isis. 
ings abolished the censorship. In reply to aji address from the inhabitants of 
Madras, he thus stated his reasons: "My removal of restrictions from the press iteguiations 
has been mentioned in laudatory language. I might easily have adopted that ofnastings 
procedure without any length of cautious consideration, from my habit of 
regarding the freedom of publication as a natural right of my fellow-subjects, 
to be narrowed only by special and urgent cause assigned. The seeing no 
necessity for those invidious shackles might have sufficed to make me break 
them. I know myself, however, to liave been guided in the step by a positive 
and well-weighed policy. If our motives of action are worthy, it must be wise 
to render them intelligible throughout an empire, our hold on which is opinion. 

Further, it is salutary for supreme authority, even when its intentions are most 
pure, to look to the control of public scrutiny; while conscious of rectitude that 
authority can lose nothing of its strength by its exposure to general comment. 

On the contrary, it requires incalculable addition of force.” These remarks, 
however true in themselves, were not applicable to the circumstances, since the 
governor-general, though he speaks of breaking ‘‘those invidious shackles,” and 
subjecting the ‘‘supreme authority” to "general comment,” showed that he 
meant nothing of the kind, by issuing the following regulations:—“The editors 
of newspapers are })rohibited from publishing any matter coming under the fol¬ 
lowing heads: 1. Animadversions on the measures and proceedings of the 
honoxirable court of directors, or other public authorities in England, connected 
with the government in India; or disquisitions on political transactions of the 
local administration; or offensive remarks levelled at the public conduct of the 
members of council, of the judges of the supreme court, or of the lord-bishop of 
Calcutta. 2. Discussions having a tendency to create alarm or suspicion among 
the native population, of any intended interference with their religious opinions. 

3. The republication from English or other newspapers of passages coming 
under any of the above heswis, or otherwise calculated to affect the British 
power or reputation in India. 4>. Private scandal and personal remarks on 
individuals tending to excite dissension in society.” Assuming that, in the 
actual condition of India, these regulations, or at least some modification of 
them, was indispensable, it was obviously absurd to speak of the abolition of 
the censorship as equivalent to the establishment of freedom, and Sir John 
Malcolm states the simple truth when he observes, “by this measure the name 
of an invidious office wsis abolished, and the responsibility of printing offensive 
matter was removed from a public functionary to the author or editor; but 
this change, so far from rescinding any of the restrictions upon the press, in 
reality imposed them in as strong, if not in a stronger degree, than any measure 
that had before been adopted.” 

Shortly after the abolition of the censorship, a newspaper entitled the 
Calcutta Journal was established by Mr. James Silk Buckingham, as proprietor 



132 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book VIl. 


A O, 1823. 


RestHctiona 
impofiod on 
the press by 
Mr. AUaiq. 


Misundor- 
standing 
with tho 
BiiniieBo. 


and editor. It was conducted with much talent, hut much less in accoi’dance 
with the governor-general’s regulations than with the views which he was 
understood to have sanctioned in his reply to the Madras address, and hence 
Mr. Buckingham had been more than once warned that, unless he acted with 
more circjumspection, he would forfeit his license to remain in India, and be 
shipped oif for England. The governor-general, however, was unwilling to 
take a step which it would be impossible to reconcile with his rather high-flown 
sentiments on the advantages of free discussion, and therefore quitted India 
without carrying his menaces into execution. Mr. Adam, who was not 
restrained by any such scruples, signalized his short tenure of office by a kind 
of crusade against the press. Without venturing to re-establish the censorship, 
he obliged every printer to obtain a license before he could print a newspaper, 
pamphlet, or any other work whatever, and gave a practical proof of liis deter¬ 
mination that the regulations of the Marquis of Hastings were no longer to 
remain a dead letter by actually putting them in force against Mr. Buckingham 
and shipping him off for England. By this decided step he incurred much 
obloquy, as it was generally felt that tlie offence, which consisted merely in 
the insertion of a paragraph ridiculing the appointment of one of the chaplains 
of the Scotch church to the office of clerk to the committee of stationery, was 
not of so grave a character as to justify the severe punishment with which he 
visited it. The offence, at all events, was not of a kind which required to be 
immediately put down by a strong hand, and Mr. Adam would have acted in a 
more becoming manner had lie refrained from using his short tenure of office 
for the purjiosc of displaying his known hostility to freedom of the Indian press, 
and left it to the new governor-general to deal with the offending proprietor of 
the Calcutta Journal in his own way. Though Mr. Buckingham failed to 
obtain redress either from the court of proprietors, before whom his case was 
repeatedly brought, or from the privy-council, who refused an application to 
rescind the press regulations, he never allowed the subject to be lost sight of, 
and ultimately succeeded in procuring compensation for his loss in the form of 
an annuity. 

Lord Amherst arrived at Calcutta on the 1st of August, 1823, and was no 
sooner installed in his office of governor-general, than he found himself involved 
in hostilities with a new and untried enemy, beyond the proper bounds of 
India. The countries immediately beyond the Company’s eastern fi’ontier, after- 
being long possessed by petty chiefs, from whom no great danger could be 
apprehended, had gradually fallen under the dominion of the King of Ava, the 
sovereign of the Burman empire, and a collision which had often been imminent 
had at last become inevitable. Assam in the north-east, Kachar in the centre, 
and Aracan in the south-east, along the eastern shores of Bengal, either formed 
part of the Burman empire, or were in course of being incorporated with it; 
and it was scarcely possible that a people so arrogant as the Burmese, and 



EELATIONS WITH BUEMAH. 


133 


Chap. V.] 

unconscious of the extent of the British resources, after pushing their conquests aD. 
to our Indian frontier, would be contented to remain there without attempting 
encroachment. Nor were plausible pretexts wanting. Aracan, though Mwmiaer- 
inhabited by a people identical in origin with- the Burmese, formed an inde- ^h^”,e 
pendent kingdom till 1784, when Minderagee Prahoo, King of Ava, taking 
advantage of some intestine dissensions, crossed the Yumadong Mountains, 
subdued it, annexed it to his empire, and placed it under the government of a 
viceroy. The new rule was so oppressive, that great numbers of the Aracanese 
or Mugs, as tliey were usually termed, fled from the tyranny which they 
despaired of being able to resist, and were allowed to settle on certain tracts of 
waste land within or bordering on Chittagong. Here many of them became 



The OoT£Ri«ment lIorsR akd Treasurt, Calcutta, from the Old Course. 
Aft«r a (Irawiiig by Williiuii Pritutep, Eftj. 


industrious cultivators, but more of them preferred to live as marauders, and 
retaliate, by means of phmdering incursions, the injuries they had suffered. 

In 1793, three chiefs, or, as they are sometimes described, leadem of baJnditti, Anumo»o 
fled across the border into Chittagong, and were followed across the Naaf by a tim British 
body of Burmese, who had orders not to quit the pursuit, how far soever it 
might carry them, till they had captured the fugitives. The pursuers wlio 
thus crossed the Naaf were estimated at 5000, and to support them, if opposi¬ 
tion should be offered, an army of 20,000 men began to assemble in Aracan. 

This violation of the British frontier at first only called forth a strong remon¬ 
strance, but the Burmese officer, while disclaiming hostile intentions, plainly 
intimated that he would not retire till the fugitives wore given up, and to show 
that he was in earnest, stockaded his camp. Such a defiance aroused even the 
timid spirit of Sir John Shore, who was then governor-gerieral, and a detach¬ 
ment was sent to compel the Burmese to retire. The beneficial effect of this 
<ieoided step was neutralized by a promise that the British government, if 
satisfied of the guilt of the fugitives, would deliver them up. On this assurance, 
the Burmese officer withdrew, and of course was able to boast that he had 




134 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book VII. 


A.U.17»8. 


Pltdillaiilm* 
ous oundUGt 
of Dritiali 
go> 

veniment. 


Emignmts 
from Aracan 
claimed by 
the Ihir- 

mHMti. 


gained his point. This boast was fully confirmed when the fugitives, after 
undergoing the form of a trial, were pronounced guilty, and handed over to the 
tender mercies of their enemies. What these would be must have been fore¬ 
seen, and therefoi-e, however much we may be shocked at the dastardliness and 
inhumanity which consigned them to such a fate, we cannot be surprised to 
learn tliat two of them were shut up in closed cells and starved to death; the 
third contrived to escape. When the whole circumstances are considered, it 
must be admitted that the Bui’mese oiJy drew a very natural inference, when 
they attributed the delivery of the fugitives to fear. At all events any doubts 
wliich they might have had on tlie subject must have been removed, when the 
governor-general, so far from insisting on any apology for the violation of the 
British territory, showed himself only anxious to conciliate the good-will of the 
King of Ava, and in 1795 despatched Captain Symes on a friendly mission to 
his court. 

During 1797 and 1798, the continuance of oppression in Araean was followed 
by a va.st increase of emigrants into the Chittagong districts. To prevent the 
rej)etition of a Burmese incursion and consequent misunderstfindings, orders 
were given to clieck the emigration. This, however, was found to be no easy 
task. One party, when ordered to i-etire, boldly replied:—“We will never 
return to the Araean country; if you choose to slaughter us here, we are ready 
to die; if, by force, to drive us away, we will go and dwell in the jungles of the 
great mounbiins, which afford shelter for wild beasts.” Fugitives, amounting 
in the aggregate to 40,000, are <lescribed as “ Hying through wilds and deserts, 
without any preconcerted plan, numbers perishing from want, sickness, and 
fatigue. The rojid to the Naaf (the river separating Araean from Chittagong) 
was strewed with tlie bodies of the aged and decrepit, and of mothers with 
infents at the breast.” It was impossible, without violating tlie dictates both 
of policy and humanity, to drive such multitudes to desperation by denying 
tliem an asylum, and the Marquis of Wellesley, now governor-general, appointed 
Captain Hiram Cox to sujierintend their location. Meanwhile the viceroy of 
Araean had despatched a body of troops across the frontier in pursuit of the 
fugitives, and addressed a letter to the magistrate of Chittagong, in which he 
said: “ If you, regarding former amity, will deliver us up all the refugees, 
friendship and concord will continue to subsist. If you keep in your countiy 
the slaves of our king, the broad path of intercourse between tlie states will bo 
blocked*up. Our disagreement is only about these refugees; we wrote to you 
to deliver them, and you have been ofiended thereat. We again write to you, 
who are in the province of Chittagong, on the part of the king of the Company, 
that we will take away the whole of the Aracanese; and further, in order to 
take them away, more troops are coming. If you will keep the Aracanese in 
your country, the cord of friendship will be broken.” Mr. Stonehouse, the 
magistrate, rejilied that there could be no negotiation until the Burmese had 



Chap. V.] 


RELATIONS WITH BUEMAH. 


135 


retired, and declared his determination, if compelled, to use force for that purpose, a.d. isii. 
To this alternative he actually had recourse, but unfortunately without success, 
for the Burmese, who had erected a strong stockade, repulsed the attempt made Temiionu-y 
to dislodge them. Further hostilities had become apparently inevitable, when n"nt witn 
the Burmese retired of their own accord, and the governor-general, who was 
fully occupied elsewhere, availed himself of their withdrawal to attempt an 
amicable settlement. With this view he deputed Lieutenant Hill on a mission 
to the viceroy of Aracan. The King of Ava, then occupied with schemes for 
the conquest of Assam, deemed it expedient to profess moderation, and sent an 
ambassador to Calcutta. The result was, that the ambassador departed 
apparently satisfied with the explanations and promises given to him. These 
were in effect, that all Mugs who could be proved guilty of crimes would be 
surrendered, and that in future no subjects of the Burman empire would be 
received as emigrants within the British territories. 

The amicable settlement proved to be a delusion, for in 1800 the viceroy of Emigrants 
•Aracan demanded the unconditional surrender of the fugitives, and threatened aaiZod. 
invasion if the demand were not immediately complied with. Affaii-s of gi-eatev 
moment made it inex 2 >edient to resent this menace, and therefore the governor- 
general, choosing to regard it as the unauthorized act of the viceroy, sent Colonel 
Syinos on a second mission to Ava in 1802. According to the official des]>atch, 
lie succee<led in impressing the Burmese court witli full confidence in the good 
faith and friendly views of the British government, and received similar assur- 
finces in return, but subsequent information has proved this to be a gross mis¬ 
statement. Colonel Symes was only admitted to a single and disdainful 
audience of the king, while the letter which he delivered from the governor- 
general was not even honoured with an answer, unless that name is given 
to a paper of questionable authenticity in which the subject-matter of the letter 
was passed unnoticed. Considering the circumstances under which the mission 
was sent, a better reception was scarcely deserved, and ought not to have been 
anticipated. 

In 1809 it was ascertained that the Burmese had long been meditating the compTainta 

® ^ ^ ® of the Bur- 

conquest of the British provinces of Chittagong and Dacca, and it is hence easy 
to understand how readily, before they even prepared for an open rupture, they 
availed themselves of the proceedings of the Aracanese emigrants, to keep an 
open ground of quarrel. And it is not to be denied that their complaints wei’e 
often too well founded. In 1811 an emigrant chief of the name of Khyen-bran, 
usually printed in English King-bearing, collecting a large body of his country¬ 
men, burst suddenly into Aracan, overran the whole country, and compelled the 
capital itself to capitulate; Earl Minto immediately despatched Captain Canning, 
who liad previously been employed on two missions to Ava, to disavow all con¬ 
nection with the insurgents, and declare the anxious desire of the British gov¬ 
ernment for the continuance of friendly relations. On arriving at Rangoon, 



136 


HISTOEY OF INDIA, 


[Book VII. 


A.D. 1811. 


Embargo 
ou British 
vessels at 
iiaiigoun. 


Invasion of 
British ter¬ 
ritories by 
the viceroy 
of Arocoii. 


Captain Canning found not only that a strong belief of British connection with 
the revolt prevailed, but that, in anticipation of hostilities, an embargo had 
been laid on the British vessels in the port. He succeeded in inducing the' 
viceroy of Pegu to remove the embargo, but about the same time received a 
letter from CaIcutta»informing him of the invasion of the British territory by the 
viceroy of Aracan, and ordering his immediate return. This had now become 
a task of some difficulty, for orders had arrived from the Burman capital 
to send Captain Canning thither with liis consent or without it, the intention 
obviously being to detain him as a hostage for the delivery of Khyen-bran. 
The envoy, by his own firmness, and the presence of two of the Company’s 



pRiNCirAL Approach to the Golden Dauon Pagoda, Rangoon. — Fnjiu Moore':* Views in Rangoon. 


armed vessels at Bangoon, defeated this project, and he succeeded in re-embark¬ 
ing for Calcutta. 

The invasion of the British tenitorj’^ by the viceroy of Aracan had been the 
natural result of his succe.sses over Khyen-bran, who, having encountered a 
large Burmese force, had sustained a complete defeat, and been driven back 
with his followers to their former haunts. Elated with victory, the viceroy, not 
satisfied with demanding the delivery of the rebels, intimated that if this were 
refused, he would invade the Company’s territories with 60,000 men, and annex 
Chittagong and Dacca to the Burman empire. This menace having been met 
in a proper spirit, the court of Ava desisted from military demonstrations, and 
indicated a desire to negotiate. 

While matters were in this state, a person an-ived with a commission from 
the King of Ava to proceed to Benares, and purchase some of the sacred works 
of the Hindoos. This was the professed, but as had been suspected, it proved 
not to be the real object, for instead of purchasing books, he spent his time in 
intriguing against the British government. Shortly afterwards, another person 


Chap. V.] 


RELATIONS WITH BURMAH. 


137 


arrived with a commission to proceed to Delhi. The purchase of manuscripts a d. isit. 
was as before his professed object, but as it was discovered that he had no less ~ 
an object in view than the formation of a general confederacy, for the purpose inBi<iiou8 
of expelling the British from India, the permission he asked was not granted, 
and an intimation was made to the Bajah of Aracan, "through whom tlie 
application had been made, that on furnishing a list of the works and other 
articles wanted, they would be furnished without subjecting him to the trouble 
of deputing agents. Notwithstanding this somewhat ominous display of hostile 
designs, the form of negotiation was continued, and in 1813 a mission arrived 
at Calcutta from the viceroy of Pegu. The letter accompanying it was certainly 
not flattering in its terms. Among other things it informed the govemor- 
general (Earl Minto) that, by surrendering the Mug fugitives and sending them 
to Ava, he might obtain the ro 3 ^al pardon for the numei’ous falsehoods he had 
written. 

Khyen-brau having in the meantime recovered from the etiects of his dis- rroMcUuss 
comfiture, had again collected a largo number of tidherents, and renewed his 
incursions into the Buimesc territories. Earl Minto had hitherto treated the 
Aracanesc refugees with great indulgence; but in September, 1813, having 
become possessed of a letter in which Khyen-bran avowed Ids intention to 
invade the Burmese territories, he deemed it necessary to put a check \ipon his 
movement.s, and issued a proclamation denouncing the proceedings of the 
insuj'gents, forbidding the subjects of the Company to give them any counten¬ 
ance, and offering rewards for the apprehension of their leaders. These 
measures were not very successful, and Khyen-bran continued his inroads with 
little interruption, till his death in the beginning of 1815. This event put an 
<‘nd to the border trouble.s, and to the consequent danger of an immediate col¬ 
li,sion between the two states, but the Burmese were by no means satisfied, and 
continued fi-om time to time to reiterate their demand for the surrender of the 
insurgents. The deputies from the viceroy of Pegu had not left Calcutta when 
Earl Moira arrived to assume the government, but on finding that he was di.s- 
posed to treat their application with no greater favour than his predecessor had 
done, they immediately returned to Rangoon. 

After the death of Khyen-bran, the depredations of the Mugs were seldom Threat of 
canied into Aracan, and some surprise therefore was excited, when, in the bjthe 
beginning of 1817, Mr. PecheU, magistrate of Chittagong, received a letter from 
the Rajah of Ramree, governor of the four Burman frontier provinces, wTitten 
in a very bombastic style, and plainly intimating that nothing but the 
immediate surrender of all the Mugs would prevent hostilitiea “The Mugs of 
Aracan,” observed the Rajah, “are the slaves of the King of Ava. The English 
government has assisted the Mugs of our four provinces, and given them a resid¬ 
ence. There will be a quarrel between us and you like fire. Formerly the 
government of Aracan demanded the Mugs from the British government, which 

Voi,. III. 214 



A.n. 1818 . 


Threat <»f 
hoMtilitieH 
liy the 
llurmu8ti. 


of 

t}ju home 
autlioriiieri. 


138 HISTORY OF INDIA. [Book VTI. 

promised to restore them, hut at length did not do so. Again the Mugs 
escaped from your hands, came and despoiled the four provinces, and went and 
received protection in your country. If at this time you do not restore them, 
according to my demand, or make delays in doing so, the friendship now sub¬ 
sisting between us will be broken.” This letter was delivered by the rajah’s 
son, who told Mr. Pechell tliat its contents were dictated by the king, and that 
they therefore did not recpiire arguments, but an answer. The governor- 
general, on being made acquainted with tlie r.ajah’s letter, instructed Mr. Pechell 
to reply to it in a conciliatory but firm tone, and at the same time addressed 
a letter to the viceroy of Pegu, in whicli, after observing “that tlie 
British government could not without a violation of the principles of justice, 
on which it inviiriably acts, deliver up a body of people who had sought its pro¬ 
tection, and some of whom had resided within its territories for thirty years,” 
he declared his confidence “that the enlightened mind of his Burmese majesty 
would perceive the inability of agitating a question, the further discussion of 
Avhich could lead to no result advantageous to either state.” 

The relations with the court of Ava had in the meantime engaged the 
attention of the homo authorities, and instructions as to the course to be pur¬ 
sued towards the fugitives had been sent out to the supreme government. In 
a letter dati'd Gth January, ISl.'), they say; “We earnestly hope that you have 
not been driven to the necessity of delivering up Khj'^en-bran, because we 
observe that every Mug who is suspected of being a partizan of Khyen-bran is 
])\it to death, and that a whole village containing about two thousand five 
hundred souls was massacred on this account, when neither men, Avomen, nor 
children were spared. If therefore, for the sake of avoiding hostilities with the 
King of Ava, you should have been compelled to the adoption of this measure, 
Ave trust that Khyen-bran has been the single person delivered, and that none 
of his infirtuated followers have been included in such a surrender.” In another 
letter dated l!)th May of the same year, after approving of a proposal to unite 
<he Burmese with the British troops in suppressing the insurgents, they add: 
“Wc are pleased to observe that the magistrate was cautioned to avoid using 
language which might be interpreted by the Kajah of Aracan into a promise, 
on the part of our government, to deliver the chiefs of the insurgents to the 
Burmese, in the event of their surrendering themselves to the British troops.” 
It is to, be rcgi-etted that the home authorities subsequently abandoned these 
humane sentiments, and in the vain hope of preventing hostilities which had 
obviously become inevitable, gave orders that in future all offending Mugs 
when* apprehended should be delivered to the blood-thirsty Burmese. 

In 1818 the son of the Rajah of Ramree arrived a second time at Chitta¬ 
gong, and desired to proceed to Calcutta, to deliver to the governor-general a 
letter, which he said his father had written by orders of the King of Ava Its 
substance was as follows:—“The countries of Chittagong and Dacca, Moor- 



Chap. V.] 


EELATIONS WITH BUEMAH. 


139 


shedabad and Cossiiabazar do not belong to India. Those countries are ours. 
The British government is faithless. This was not formerly the case. It is not 
your right to receive the revenue of those countries; it is proper that you should 
pay the revenue of those countries to us; if you do not pay it, we will destroy 
your country." Tliis letter appears to Imvc been written under the impression 
that the British government was so engi’ossed or rather ovcrwlielmed by tlie 
Pindaree war, as to be willing to make any sacrifice sooner than ri.sk hostilities 
with so invincible a people as the Burmese imagined themselves to be. Befoi’e 
it was delivered, the Pindarees and Mahrattfis, in whom the Burmese expected 
to find powerful allie.s, had been comjdetely subdued, and they thcurselves had 
sustained a defeat from the Siamese. Under these altered circumstances, the 
Mar(|uis of Hastings, who had apparently resolved to leave, the Burmese war as 
a legacy to his successor, fell upon the device of treating the offensive letter as 
a forgery. “By this procedure,” says his lordship, “I evaded the necessity 
of noticing an insolent step, foreseeing that his Burmese majesty would be 
thoroughly glad of the excuse to remain (piiet, when he learned that his secret 
allies had been subdued.” 

Tlie claim which the Burmese monarch made to the districts mentioned in ' 
his letter was probably founded on the recent conquests which he had madir, 
and which may have been sup[)osed to cjirry the adjacent territtiries enumenited 
its accessories. One of the most important of these conquests was Assam, 
situated to the north-east of Bengal, and consisting chiefly of an immense valley 
inclosed by mountains, and traversed longitudinally from cast to west by the 
Brahnia])Ootra. This territory, governed nominally by a rajah, but in I’eality 
by a council of three ministers termed Goltains, who claimed it as their hereditary 
right to appoint him and overrule all his proceeding.s, had fallen into a stat»^ 
bordering on anarchy. In 1809, the Rajah Chandra Kanta, in endeavouring 
to rid himself of the Boora Cohain, was woi’sted, and after applying without 
success to the British goveimment, called in the aid of the Burmese, who fur¬ 
nished him with a force of 6000 men. The death of the Boora Gohain enabled 
the rajah to dispense with foreign aid, but the Burmese had no sooner rctiu’iied 
home than their presence was again required. A son of the Boora Gohain 
had raised up a new claimant to the throne, and obliged the rajah to save him¬ 
self by flight to the confines of Bhootan. The Burmese again I'cinstatcd him, 
but soon began to covet the territory for themselves. An open rupture hence 
ensued, and Chandra Kanta, unable to make head against the Burmese general, 
Maha Bandoola, lost the sovereignty of Assam, which was hence¬ 
forth regarded as a dependency of Ava. Misunderstandings similar to those 
which had prevailed in regard to Amcan and Chittagong were the consequences 
of this new conquest, the British authorities complaining of depi’edations on 
their district of Rungpoor, and the Burmese, without offering redress, insisting 
on the suiTender of fugitives from As,sam, and declaring their deteimination to 


A.n. is)«. 


Portions of 
Britisii 
torritor,>' 
(‘luiniod I«y 
tho litir- 

UK'MC. 


l*iohul»]u 
Kourres 
tliu cl.'viiii. 



140 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Boor Vll. 


A D. isffl. follow them beyond the frontier. Tlie conquests of Kachar, which encompassed 
the British district of Sylhet on the north and east, and of Munipoor, which had 
been overrun by Alompra, the most celebrated of the Burmese sovereigns, 
about tlie same time when he added Pegu and Aracan to his dominions, fur¬ 
nished additional points of contact at which collision was to be apprehended. 

Tii« liur- For some years the vigilance of the British authorities in Chittagong had 

oiT^a” prevented any serious inroads into Aracan by the emigrants. The Burmese, 
liowcver, were far from reciprocating this forbeai’ance, and had in fact entirely 
changed the jwsition of affairs, by becoming themselves the aggressors. People 
following their avocations within the British boundaries were slain, or car¬ 
ried off and sold as slaves, and these outrages were so openly encouraged as to 
make it plain that the Burmese, so far from desiring to prevent, were bent on 
provoking hostilities. Their recent con(;[uests had satisfied them that they 
were invincible, and they believed that they had only to attempt the conquest 
of Bengal in order to achieve it. Their celebrated general, Maha Bandoola, on 
his return from As.sam, is reported to have said, that if his sovereign wished for 
Bengal he would engage to conquer it for him with no otlier troops than the 
strangers dependent upon Ava; and according to another account, “from the 
king to the beggar, the Burmese were hot for a war with the English.” Dr. 
J udson, the American missionary, who had resided ten years in the country, repre¬ 
sents the prevailing feeling as often expressed in such words as the following; 
“The English are the inhabitants of a small and remote i.sland. What business 
iiave they to come in ships from so great a distance ri) dethrone kings, and 
take possession of countries they have no right to ? They contrive to conquer 
and govern the black foreigners, the peojde of castes, who have puny frames 
and no courage. They have never yet fought with so strong and brave a 
])eople SIS the Burmese,’ skilled in the use of the sword and speai-. If they 
once fight with us, and we have an opportunity of manifesting our braveiy, 
it will be an example to the black nations, which are now slaves to the English, 
and will encourage them to throw off the yoke.” This feeling could not fail to 
manife.st itself sooner or later in overt act.s. Thei-e was no difficulty in finding 
a pretext. 

Commonco- At the mouth of Uie Naaf was the small island of Shai)ooree, which had for 
many years been possessed by the British as belonging to Chittagong. The 
Burmese set up a claim to this island, and on the 24th of September, 182.3, a 
body of about 1000 men landing upon it, overpowered the British guard, and 
after killing or wounding several individuals, obliged the rest to save them¬ 
selves by flight. The aggressors shortly afterwards retired, but as they had 
escaped with impunity, and nothing but an unavailing expostulation from Cal¬ 
cutta followed, the Burmese were confirmed in their belief that they had 
nothing to apprehend from British resentment. It was not, however, in this 
quarter that actual hostilities were to commence. In the north-east, a body of 



Chap. V.] 


WAR WITH BURMAH. 


141 


4000 Burmese and ^-ssamese, penetrating by the Bharteke Pass, encamped at a.d. isai. 
Bikrampoor, about forty-five miles east of Sylliet, while a more considerable 
force advanced from Munipoor. A British detachment, which had been pre- 
viously posted to guard the Sylhet frontier, advanced upon Bikrampoor, and 
finding the Bunnese engaged in comjdeting a stockade, attacked them and put 
them to rout. The detachment was too feeble to follow up this advantage; and 
on its retiring within the British boundary, the two bodies of Burmese, amount¬ 
ing in all to about 0000, effected a junction, advanced to Jatrapoor, con¬ 
structed stockades on both sides of the Surma, and advanced along its north 
bank till within 1000 yards of a British post at Bbadrapoor. Ca[)tain John¬ 
stone, the officer in command, immediately attacked them, and carried tlie 
stockades at the j)oiut of the bayonet. The division from A.ssam w<rs driven 
back in disorder into that territory; the division from Mani]>oor managed 
better, and defended their stockfule on tlu' Surma so successfully that the 
British were obliged to retire. 

While hostilities had thus actually commenced in the north; they were about Governor 
to commence in Aracan. The rajah who governed there had received orders SimtLu 
to expel the British from Shapooree, be the cost what it might, and Maha 
Bandoola, the most celebrated of the Bmunese generals, wfis appointed to the 
chief command. The island was in consequence once more seized, and the 
governor-general, unable any longer to put off' the evil day by additiojial pro¬ 
crastination, had no alternative but to publish a declaration of war. This 
document, published on the 24th of Februmy, 1824, is far too long to admit of 
(jiiotation or even analysis. After a full detail of the ciicumstances, it charges 
the couii of Ava with having “grossly and wantonly violated the relations of 
liiendship so long established between the two states,” and with having “com- 
jielled the British government to take up arms, not less in self-defence than 
for the assertion of its rights and the vindication of its insulted dignity and 
honour,” and concludes as follows: “Anxious, however, to avert the calamities 
of war, and retaining an unfeigned desire to avail itself of any proper opening 
which may arise for an accommodation of differences with the King of Ava, 
befn-e hostilities shall have been pushed to an extreme length, the British gov¬ 
ernment will be prepared even yet to listen to pacific overtures on the part of 
his Burmese majesty, provided that they are accompanied with the tender of an 
adequate apology, and involve the concession of such terms as are indispensable 
to the future security and tranquillity of the eastern frontier of Bengal” 

In forming the plan of milittiry operations it was necessary to take into 
consideration the nature of the country, and the mode of warfare practised by 
the enemy. The country was almost a continuous tract of forest and mft-sh, 
completely inundated at certain seasons, and at all times teeming with vapours 
which made the atmosphere almost pestilential; and so little was known of the 
geogi-aphy that, with the exception of a few narrow belts of land along the 



142 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book VII. 


coast, or the banks of navigable rivers, it was entirely unexplored. To lead an 
army through such a country, even if the population hjid been friendly, would 
rtaii of mill- have been a task of no ordinary difficulty; but to force a passage through it, 

tary openi- 

tiouBfor wliere all tlie available routes were occupied by an enemy possessed both of 
Himo^’ " skill and courage, and prepared to meet their a.ssailants with a murderous fire 
from lieliind trenches and stockades, so strongly constructed as to form, in fact, 
a continuous series of forts, was an enterprise, the difficulties of which afford 
tlie best explanation of the reluctance of successive governors-general to engage 
in it. It was a knowledge of these difficulties, and confidence in their peculiar 
mode of warfare, that made the Burmese .so anxious to provoke an encounter. 
The Prince of Tharawadee, the brother of the King of Ava, when told that the 
Burmese soldiera could not cope with the British, replied, “We arc skilled in 



.Stouminu ok a STih'Kadk, liANtiouN.— From Moora’a Views in Rangoon. 

jiiiniioM) making trenches and stockades, which the English do not understand;” and 
warfaro. there caiiTiot be a <l()ubt that to this skill they were mainly indebted for any 
successes which they obtained in the course of the war. Every individual 
soldier caivied a spade or hoe as an essential part of his military equipment. 
With this, as the line advanced, he dug a hole, from which ho fired away under 
cover till a nearer approiich unearthed him. It was only, however, to retire 
to much, better j^rotection within his stockades. These usually formed com¬ 
plete inclosures of a square or oblong shape, varying in height from ten to 
twenty feet, constructed sometimes of solid beams of timber, previously pre- 
])ared, and sometimes of bamboos and young wood in a green state. The whole 
firinly and closely planted in the ground, and bound together at the top by 
transverse beams, with no more openings than were necessary for embrasures 
and loop-holes, formed a defensive work which did not yield readily to an 
ordinary cannonade, and was most effectually a.ssailed by shells and rockets. 




Chap. V.] 'WAR AVITH BURMAII. U3 

Within the interior, platforms were fixed or embankments thrown up, on which 
gingals, or small guns, carrying a ball of six or twelve ounces, were planted, 
and occasionally, to increase tfie difficulty of access to the main work, it had the 
additional protection of outer and inner ditches, and of minor stockades, abattis, 
and similar outworks. 

In arranging the plan of a camjiaign in a country presenting such physical 
features, and again.st troops pursuing such a .system of military tactics, the 
most advisable course seemed to be to avoid, as much as possible, the difficulties 
and tedioiisness of land routes, and endeavour to reach the interior by water. 
No doubt was entertained as to the practicability of the latter plan. The 
capital and other chief cities of the Burman empire were situated on the 
Jrawadi, which, if the proper season were chosen, miglit lie ascended by a 
llotilla conveying troops for a distance of oOO miles in about six weeks. In 
this direction, therefore, it was determined that the main effort should be made; 
and that, in the meantime, little more .should be attempted in f)thci’ quarters 
than to keep the enemy at bay and check his further progi’ess. This plan, 
though adopted by the supreme government in the alisence of Sir Edward 
Paget, the commander-in-chief, was cordially ajiproved by him before any actual 
steps were taken. The adjutant-general, writing in his name, says:—“The 
connnander-in-chief can hardly persuade himself that if we place our frontier 
in even a tolerable state of defence, any seiious attempt will be made by the 
Burmese to pass it; but .should he be mi.staken in this ojiinion, he is inclined to 
ho 2 >e that our military ojierations on the eastein frontier will be confined to 
their exjmlsion from our territories, and to the re-establishment of those states 
along the line of frontier which have been overrun and captured by the Bimue.se. 
Any military attempt beyond this, ujion the internal dominions of the Kiiig of 
Ava, he is inclined to deprecate, as in place of armies, fortresses, and cities, lie is 
led to believe we should find nothing but jungle, iiestilence, and famine. It a^ipears 
to the commander-in-chief that the only efiectual mode of punishing the 
insolence of this power is by maritime means.” 

Ill supplying troops to the maritime expedition, Bengal very irnpcrfectl}’ 
lieiformod its part. The aversion of the sepoys to a sea voyage could only 
have been overcome by forcing their inclinations, and as this was judged inex- 
jiedient, this presidency furnished only his Majesty’s 13th and 38th regiments, 
two companies of artillery, and the 40th regiment of native infantry. Madra.s, 
where the sepoy objection did not exist to the same extent, and was perhajis in 
some degree overcome by the energy and popularity of Sir Thomas Monro the 
governor, furnished a much larger force, consisting of his Majesty’s 41st and 
89th regiments, the Madras European regiment, and seven native regiments, 
with detachments of pioneers and artillery. The whole force, mustering 
upwards of 11,000 men, about one half Europeans, was placed under the 
command of Major-general Sir Archibald Campbell. Under him Colonel 


A.n. 1824. 


riati of 
lilUTRet-O 


Jlritib}! fnreo 



HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book VII. 


A D. 1824. 


Arrival of 
Britisti tlflot 
oflTRaugoon. 


The Irawudi. 


Ui 

M'Oreagh commanded the Bengal, and Colonel Macbean the Madras division. 
The naval force consisted of the sloops of war Larne and Sophia, with several 
of the Company’s cruisers, having the transports in convoy, a flotilla of twenty 
gun-l)rigs and twenty war-boats, each carrying a piece of heavy ordnance, and 
the Diana, a small steam-vessel,, which, as she was the first of the kind seen on 
the east coast of the Bay of Bengal, was regarded by the natives with wonder 
and aui)erstitious terror, when they saw her without sails or oans, moving 
against wind and tide by some mysterious agency. Captain Canning accom- 
]»anied the expedition as political agent and joint-commissioner with the 
commander-in-chief Port Cornwallis, situated near the north-east extremity 
of the Great Andaman Island, was the appointed jdace of rendezvous. The 

Bengal, and the first part of the Madras 
force, met here in the end of April, 1821, 
and having been joined by Commodore 
Grant, the chief naval officer in the 
Indian seas, in the Liffcy frigate, sailed 
north-east on the 5th of May, and on 
the 9th, to the great astonishment and 
alarm of the Burmese, who apjiear 
never to have dreamed of an attack in 
this quarter, arrived off the mouths of 
the IraM’^adi. 

The Irawadi rises neai- the eastern 
exti emity of the Himalaya, on the fron¬ 
tiers of A.s,sam, and after a southern 
course of about 1000 miles, falls into 
the Bay of Bengal. Like the Ganges, it 
has a large delta, at the upper extremity 
of which it divides into a number of branches. These opening into one another, 
form a kind of net-work across the delta, and carry off so much of the water 
that the main stream may be said to disappear. The two principal branches 
are the Bassein on the west, and the Rangoon on the east, each of them so 
called from an important town of the same name situated on its banks. 
Rangoon, the larger of the two towns, and the chief port of Burmah, stood on 
the left bank, about twenty-five miles from the sea, in a fork formed by two 
branches, the one of which flows eastwai’d under the name of the Syriam, while 
the other, continuing the river of Rangoon, properly so called, flows south to 
the sea. Its width at Rangoon was nearly half a mile, and on its opposite 
bank stood a town of some extent called Dalla. 

On the 11th of May, the expedition sailed up the river, and anchored 
opposite to Rangoon. Its defences, consisting only of a stockade about twelve 
feet high, which inclosed it on every side, and of a principal battery of twelve 



♦Sir Arcithiaij) ('ampbkbl, Hart. 

After a picture by J. Wood. 



Chap. V.] 


WAE WITH BURMAH. 


145 


guns, situated on a wharf at the i-iver side, were far too feeble to offer any a.d. 1824. 
effectual resistance. After a few shots from the battery, which the Liffey 
instantly silenced, the troops landed and took possession of the town without Attack and 
seeing an enemy. When the firing commenced, the governor sent an American 
missionary to ask what the English wanted, and threatening, if the fii-e did not 
cease, to put to death such Europeans as were in his hands. These so-called 
Europeans were eight British traders and pilots, two American missionaries, 
an Armenian, and a Greek. His fears prevented him from canying out his 
murderous threat, and he fled, leaving his prisoners behind him. These, to the 
surprise and disappointment of the victors, proved to be the only inhabitants 
remaining in Rangoon. The whole population had been ordered to retire into 
the adjacent forests, and not a man had ventured to disobey. 

This total desertion of the city was an event which the British had never 
anticipated, and against which consequently they had made no provision. 
Knowing that Pegu, the province in which Rangoon is situated, was a Krrorin 
comparatively recent conquest of the Burmese, and that the inhabitants were 
by no means satisfied with their new masters, they had expected to be hailed 
as deliverers, and to have all the resources of a productive country placed, at 
their disposal, whereas they now found that no assistance whatever would be 
given to them, and that they must depend entirely upon themselves for supplies. 

Under such circumstances, an advance into the interior was at once seen to be 
impracticable. With the view of taking advantage of the augmented volume 
of water in the river, they*had arrived at the very commencement of the rainy 
season, when the greater part of the country would become inundated, and 
instead of carrying on a decisive campaign, it would be neces.sary to remain 
shut up in Rangoon, or at least to confine military operations to its immediate 
vicinity. Considerations which had been previously overlooked now forced 
themselves into view, and it became impossible not to admit, that in the 
arrangemeht of the campaign serious blunders had been committed. The 
attack by sea, if advisable at all, was ill-timed. An attempt to ascend the 
river in incommodious boats during the tropical rains, without native boatmen 
to guide them, and while both banks were in possession of the enemy, would 
only be to invite destruction; and yet, to remain cooj)ed up among the swamps 
of the delta, was to expose the troops to a mortality which, while it gave none 
of the triumphs of actual warfare, could hardly fail to be far more destructive 
No choice, however, remained, and it was resolved to place the troops under 
cover, and use all despatch in obtaining the necessary provisions and supplies 
from India. 

The stockades of Rangoon, though a feeble defence against a British force, were 
a sufficient protection against any sudden onset of the natives, and no new 
works therefore were required for security. The more commodious and 
substantial of the buildings were appropriated for the head-quarters and general 

VOt. III. Qii: 



146 


HISTOEY OF INDIA. 


[Book VII. 


A. I). 1824. 


Tho Shwo- 
dii gon, or 
Golden 
PagodH. 


Snccoffites of 
thu UritiBb. 


staff, and for the stores and ammunition. About two miles to the north of 
Rangoon, on an artificial mound about thirty feet high, stood a famous Buddliist 
temple, called Shwc-da-gon, or the Golden Pagoda, solidly built of brick, on an 
octagonal base, coated with gilding, decorated with ornamental mouldings, and 
rising in tlie form of a cone gradually tapering to a spire to the height of 
above 300 feet. This temple being, like the town, entirely abandoned, was 
taken possession of by his Majesty’s 69th regiment and the Madras artillery; 
the rest of the troops found convenient cantonments in a number of small 
temples and priests’ residences, lining two roads which led from the northern 
gateway of the town to the pagoda. During the completion of these arrange¬ 
ments, detachments explored the neighbourhood, and parties proceeded up the 
river in boats for the purpose of reconnoitring and destroying any defences or 



The Hiiwe-da < 30 n Tacopa, Rangoon.—F rom a photograph. 


fire-rafts which they might discover. One of these parties came ujion an unfini.shed 
stockade at Kemcndine, about sixty miles above Rangoon, and having landed, 
gallantly carried it, though not without some loss, against a very superior force. 
On the same day a considerable detachment, sent some distance into the interioj', 
fell in with the governor of Rangoon, who, instead of risking an encounter, fled 
into the adjoining forest. While these successes gave reason to believe that 
Burmese courage Avas not of a high order, there were numerous indications of 
their activity in preparing for a future struggle, and of their determination not 
to allow their invaders to remain long at ease in their cantonmenta About the 
middle of May the I’ains set in, and the whole of the country ai'ound Rangoon 
became one vast sheet of water. 

While the expedition was preparing to proceed against Rangoon, a force 
collected under Brigadier-general M'Morine at GoUlpara, on the Brahmapootra, 
near the frontiers of Assam, moved eastward on the 13th of March, 1824, to 




Chap. V.] 


WAE WITH BITRMAH. 


147 


Gowhatty, where the Burmese had thrown up stockades. They did not, 
however, venture to defend them, and retired as the British approached. The 
population, who had been cruelly treated by their Burmese masters, were eager 
to throw off the yoke, and manifested a most friendly disposition; but as they 
were too poor to furnish the necessary supplies, and the transport of these was. 
from the nature of the country, a work of the utmost difficulty, it was necessary, 
instead of advancing with the whole force, to send forward a detachment 
under Colonel Richards to Nowgong to meet Mr. Scott, the commissioner, who 
had ari’ived there with an escort. From Nowgong, Colonel Richards proceeded 
to Kaliabar, and thence eastward to Maura Mukli, where the governor of Assam 
was stockiided with a force of about 1000 men. The favoiu-able oj)poi-tunity 
of striking a blow which would ju'obably have liberated tlie wliole of Upper 
Assam, was abandoned from want of supplies, and Colonel Richards, thus 
obliged to renounce the advantage of his j>revious successes, returned to Gowhatty 
to pass the rainy season. 

In June, the Burmese, who had in the beginning of the year retired from 
Kachar, returned with a force estimated at 8000 men, and began to make 
incursions from Munipoor, stockading themselves on the heights of I’alain, 
Dudi)at]ec, and Jatrapoor. Tlie force left in Sylhet was far too feeble to offer 
any effectual opposition to them, and an attempt to dislodge tliem from a stockade 
at I’alain proved a failure. A retreat followed, and the Burnie.se, elated witli 
success, remained in undisputed possession of Kachai- till the season should 
allow the camjiaign to be again opened. 

In Aracan, the original seat of their aggression, the Burmese appear to have 
made their main effort; and in the beginning of May, when the British were 
surprising them at Rangoon, they were effecting an almost eciual surprise by 
appearing on the frontiers of Chittagong with a force of more than 10,000 men, 
commanded by the renowned Maha Bandoola. The force prepared to resist this 
invasion was wholly inadequate, but the Bengal government, though mad<i 
aware of the threatened danger, made no additional effort to avert it. Mdiat- 
ever may have been the cause of this great negligence, it was severely punished. 
Colonel Shapland, holding the command in Chittagong, had pushed forward to 
Rarnoo a detachment under Captain Noton, consisting of five companies of the 
45th native infantry, with two guns, and details from a Mug levy and the 
Chittagong provincial battalion. Against this detachment, the Burmese, after 
crossing the Naaf, rapidly advanced with their whole concentrated force, and on 
the 13th of May arrived at a stream flowing past Ramoo. Cajitain Noton’s 
two guns, well seiwed, prevented their passage for some time, but they at last 
effected it, and hastened to attack him. His whole force consisted of about 1050 
men, but of these 050 were irregulars, on whom no dependence could be placeci 
Having posted his troops behind a bank surrounding the encampment, with 
his right flanked by the river, his front formed by the regular sepoys with the 


A.D. 1824. 


LaiiU force 
in the north. 


Proceetliiigs 
in Kachov 
and Muni- 


Itivaeion of 
Chittag«mg 
by tin; Bur- 
invHe. 



148 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book VII. 


A D. 1824. 


T}ie Britisli 
repulsed at 
Hamoo. 


Ojwatioin 
in tho 
vicinity of 
Uaiigoon. 


two six-pounders, and protected by a tank, at which a strong picket was sta¬ 
tioned, and his rear protected by another tank, which was given in charge to the 
provincials and the Mug levy, he waited tlie encounter. After a short struggle, 
tho provincials and Mugs gave way, and the Burmese, making their way into 
the rear, rendered the position untenable. Of necessity a retreat was ordered. 
At first it was conducted with some degree of regularity, but ultimately, as the 
enemy pressed on with increasing boldness, the men threw down their arms 
and rushed into the water. The loss was less than might have been .expected. 
Only about 250 in all were missing, but not a few of these, carried off as 
prisoners to Ava, contirined that court in the belief that its soldiers were in’esis- 
tible; while an unmanly panic, communicated from Chittagong and Dacca, 
spread even to Calcutta, where, among other absurdities, it was deemed not 
incredible that a body of adventurous Burmese might penetrate through the 
iSunderbunds into the British Indian metropolis. Though the disaster was 
thus monstrously exaggerated, there cannot be a doubt that had the Burmese 
known how to imjirove their advantage, a considerable tract of Britisli territory 
might have been overrun and pillaged. Foi’tunately they .spent the time in 
iiUe exultation, till the rains oiiposed an effectual barrier to their further progre.ss, 
and before the season for campaigning again commenced, a blunder which had 
left Chittagong almost undefended was repaired. The expedition to Rangoon 
had also jiroduced its effect, and the King of Ava, alarmed for his capital, had 
given orders that all available troops should be concentrated for defensive 
warfare. The army of Aracan was consequently recalled, and the only occasion 
on which the Burme.se could have inflicted a serious blow was lost. 

The rains, while they rendered a regular campaign impossible, had not pro¬ 
duced a cessation of hostilities at Rangoon. The Burmese, considerably rein¬ 
forced, constructed stockades in every direction, in order to exclude access to 
the interior, and by sending parties through the jungle, incessantly harassed 
the pickets and cut off all stragglers. They also sent down fire-rafts for the pur¬ 
pose of burning tho vessels and flotilla anchored off Rangoon. During these 
operations the British were not contented to remain on the defensive. On tire 
28th of May, Sir Archibald Campbell, taking 400 Europeans and 250 sepoys, 
with a gun and howitzer, proceeded to make a reconnoissance. The path, after 
leading through a tangled forest, where the natural obstacles were increased by 
artificial imjiedimcnts, opened on rice fields and plains knee-deep in water. 
The difficulty of transporting the guns in consequence became so great, that it 
was judged necessary to send them back under the escort of the sepoys. The 
detachment, thus limited to Europeans alone, continued the route, and at the 
distance of about eight miles from Rangoon came in sight of a body of the 
enemy about 7000 strong. Part of them, entrenched behind strong stockades, 
were immediately attsicked and routed with great slaughter. The main bodj’-, 
intimidated by this success, showed no inclination to avenge their comrades, and 



Chap. V.] 


WAR WITH BUEMAH. 


149 


the detachment returned unmolested to the cantonments. Two daj’s after, a d. 1824. 
another stockade not far from the great pagoda was stormed. 

These successes, however much they may have discouraged the Burmese, Affaimt 
did not deter them from prosecuting tlie plan they had evidently formed of 
liemming in the British troops witliin Rangoon, so as to leave them no alterna¬ 
tive but surrender or destruction. At Kemendine, in particular, a series of 
extensive works had been constructed. These it was determined to attack 
botli by land and water, and with this Anew three columns were detached 
against the northern and eastern faces of the stockades, while General Campbell, 
embarking 300 of his Majesty’s 41st regiment, ascended the Irawadi with 
three cruisers. The works proved stronger than had been supposed, and none 
of the columns having siicceeded in penetrating them, a I’etreat became 
necessary. The Burme.se, however, were not permitted long to exult in this 
succe.ss. On the 10th of June the attack was renewed with a more adequate 
force, consisting of 3000 men, with four eighteen-pounders and four howitzers. 

Before reaching Kemendine it was necessary to capture a strong stockade which 
liad been erected between it and the great pagoda. Three of its .sides were 
inc-'losed by tlie forest, and the fourth .side had in its front a plain covered with 
Avater. This naturally strong position shoAved the importance Avhich was 
attached to it by the number of troops collected to defend it. The attack com¬ 
menced with a cannonade on the open face. After an hour a sufficient aperture 
Avas made, and the storming column rushed forward; and about the same time 
a second column managed to clamber oA’cr the palisiules in the rear. The 
defenders thus attacked in opposite directions, and unable to escape, fought 
with de.speration, while the bayonet made fearful liaA'oc among them. This 
attack was expected to be only the jirelude to one of greater difficulty, and 
batteries had begun to fJay on the Avorks at Kemendine, Avhen the unu.sual 
silence caused inquiry to be made, and they were found to be abandoned. The 
Burmese, after the severe lesson that had thus been taught them, became less 
confident, and withdrawing to a greater distance, began to concentrate their 
forces at Donabew, fifty miles above Rangoon. 

Notwithstanding these successes, the British had not as yet made any comparative 
decided progress, and were obliged to remain in a state of comparative inaction, produced i.y 
One obvious cause of this was the state of the country in consequence of the 
rains, but there was unfortunately another cause of a more di.stre,ssing nature. 

Disease, the effect partly of the climate, and partly of a deficiency of fresli and 
wholesome provisions, began to prevail to such an alarming extent, that scarcely 
3000 men remained fit for active duty towards the end of the monsoon. 
Meanwhile the enemy, apparently aware how much their invaders were reduced 
and enfeebled, were encouraged to make new exertions. Towards the end of 
June, great numbers of troops were observed passing from Dalla on the right 
bank to the left above Kemendine, and on the 1st of July, while the forests in 



150 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book VII. 


A.l). 1821 . 


KxtuiiKive 
prepara¬ 
tions of Um; 
liunuoHu. 


Cajiture t>f 
stockades at 
Kama root. 


front were occupied with troops, three columns, each about 1000 strong, moved to 
the right as if to interpose between part of the cantonments and Rangoon, 
They were speedily checked and dispersed, but the verj^ next day resumed 
operations by marching a strong body upon Dalla. It was only to sustain a 
second repulse; and Dalla itself, as it had been deserted by its inhabitants, and 
might be used as a cover for other attemjits, was destroyed. 

The court of Ava had been hoping to hear of the annihilation of tlie 
invaders, and being of course disappointed with tlie progress of events, had 
superseded Thekia Wungyee in the command, and given it to Thamba Wungyee, 
who, knowing what was expected of him, was naturally anxious not to fall short 
of it. He accordingly made a great display of activity, and gave so much 
annoyance that it became necessary to dislodge him. This was no easy task. 
The Rangoon river, about six miles above the town, is joined by another branch 
of the Ira-wadi, called the Lync. Here Thamba Wungyee had erected four 
stockades—one at the junction, another about half a mile below on the right 
bank of the Rangoon, a third immediately opposite to it on the left bank, and 
a fourth at Kamaroot, about a mile and a half above the junction, and at some 
distance from the left bank of the Lyne. This last, the largest and strongest of 
all, wtis connected with the others by entrenchments. These works were 
defended by at least 10,000 men. On the 8th of July, Sir Archibald Campbell 
ascended the river with a flotilla, consisting of the Larne, two of the Company’s 
cruisers, and some smaller vessels, having on board a considerable bodj^ of troops, 
and having with little difficulty oveipowered the enemy’s fire by that of the 
ships, can'ied the three stockades aece.ssible from the river. The fourth stockade 
could not be thus reached, and a .strong detachment undei' Brigadier-general 
Macbcan marched against it from the Shwe-da-gon. The march proved so 
difficult, that the heiivy artillery was sent back, and only a few small howitzeis 
retained. On reaching Kamaroot it was found that the stockades to be 
captured were no fewer than seven, ami besides being strongly garrisoned, 
were defended by thirty pieces of artillery. Within ten minutes after the 
attack commenced, the first stockade was carried by escalade; the second after 
a longer re.sistance yielded to the same mode of capture; the otliers scarcely 
offered any resistance; and thus, without firing a .shot, by the aid of the 
bayonet alone, works which the Burmese regarded as almo.st im 2 '>regnable were 
wrested, from them by a mere handful of assailants.* Among the incidents at 
Kamaroot, a single conflict between Ma;ior (afterwards Sir) Robert Sale, and a 
Burman of rank who fell by his hand, is not unworthy of notice. About 800 
of the enemy lay dead within the stockades; Thamba Wungyee, the com¬ 
mander, died of his wounds. The defeat at Kamaroot struck terror into the 
Burmese, and made them for the first time doubtful of the issue of a war 
into which they had entered with the utmost confidence. 

While waiting the return of the dry season. Sir Archibald Campbell was 



CnAP. V.] 


WAE WITH BUEMAH. 


151 


necessarily restricted on land to a petty and desultory warfare. In the 
beginning o£ August he took S 3 Tlam, the ancient capital of Pegu, situated 
near the junction of the river of Pegu with that of Rangoon, and of some 
liistoriciil interest from tlie establishment of a factory in it by the Portuguese, 
wlien they were aspiring to extend their dominion over the whole East. In 



Attack os Fort of .Sviiiam. —From M<xna*s V’iowa in Rangoon. 


tliis old factory the Burme.se, wlien attiicked by the British detachment, forti¬ 
fied themselves as if determined to stand a siege; but after ojiening a brisk lire 
their courage failed them, and the}'^ saved themselves from the consequences of 
an escalade, liy a precipitate flight. The inhabitants of Rangoon, who had at 
first so universally obeyed the order to quit it, now began gradually to return, 
and the inhabitants of Pegu generally showed .so much di.saffection to their 
Burmese ma.sters, that they might to all appearance have easily been, induced 
to throw off the yoke which had for sixty years lain heavily upon them. As 
yet, however, it was not thought exjiedient to give any encouragement to 
their wishes for independence, as the effect might have been to place a chief 
u]»on the throne who was unable to maintain himself upon it without British 
assistance. The restraint thus exercised was at all events cautious, but it may 
he questioned if it w'as well judged, as it made the Peguers, if not jealous of 
our success, indifferent to it, and thus tended to protract the wai-. Thi.s seems 
to have been the view ultimately taken by the supreme government, as they 
afterwards gave the encouragement which they now refused, and offered to 
recognize the independence of any chief whom the Peguers might appoint to 
rule over them. 

The obstacles to operations by land did not apply to those by sea. While 
the expedition was on its way the island of Cheduba had been reduced by a 


A.D. 1824 . 


(^aptwro of 
Syriam, and 
otHirationK 
in Pegu. 





152 


HISTORY OF INDIA, 


[Book VII, 


A.D. 1824. 


Subjugation 
of the Teii- 
asserim 
proviiieus. 


Burnuise 
atttnupt on 
the (JolJun 
Bagoda. 


party detached for that purpose, and at the end of August a strong division 
sailed for the Tenasserim provinces, which, under the names of Ye, Tavoy, and 
Mergue, form a narrow hut fertile maritime tract stretching along the east 
coast of the Bay of Bengal, through six degrees of latitude, from the mouths of 
the Irawadi to tlie frontiers of the Molucca peninsula. The towns of Tavoy 
and Morgue, and the provinces of which they are the capitals, were speedily 
reduced. The inhabitants of the former cordially assisted in the invasion, and 
after seizing the Burmese governor, made a voluntary surrender. At Mergue 
the resistance was more seeming than real; and after the troops had landed 
and stormed the first stockade, all opposition ceased, and the people who had 
at first fled soon returned, and were perfectly reconciled to their new masters. 
The resistance in Ye, or Amherst, as it has since been called, v^as confined 
chiefly to the important town of Martaban, situated in the north on a bay of 
the same name, and either on or within the fi’ontiers of Pegu. As it possessed 
defences of some strength, and was gairisoiied by a considemble number of 
Burmese, it was not taken without the combined exertions of the naval and 
the laud forces, and the storming of a series of stockades. The imjiortance of 
these conquests was soon felt in more abundant sujtplies of fresh jirovisions to 
the troops at Rangoon, and the establishment of comjiaratively healthy stations 
for the recovery of invalids. 

Tlie Burmese meanwhile wei'c not inactive, and besides keeping up a seiles 
of potty but harassing manoeuvres, actually ventured on a night assault of the 
British j)Ost at the Golden Pagoda. In this attempt they had no ordinary 
encouragement, for they were headed liy leaders, part of them said to be 
female, who had succeeded by means of charms and amulets in making them¬ 
selves invulnerable. The loss of twenty of their number having satisfied them 

that the charm had 
somehow or other 
lost its efficacy, they 
decamped in con¬ 
fusion. On the op¬ 
posite side of the 
river at Dalla, where 
a British post liad 
been established, the 
Buimese made a 
bold attempt to cut 
off some gun-brigs 
which were anchored in the vicinity. For this purpose they brought down a 
flotilla, which on the first alarm was put to flight, and chased till five of its 
boats were captured. Higher up the river, where the Burmese were understood 
to be busily erecting stockades and preparing fire-rafts, a combined naval and 



Burmrhk War-boat.-— From Syme’s Embassy to Ava. 



Chap. V.] 


WAR WITH BUEMAH. 


153 


land force succeeded in dislodging them on the first onset. These encounters a.d. 1824 . 
proved that the courage of the Burmese had greatly declined, but an event 
now occurred tending greatly to revive it. 

Information having been received in the beginning of October that the ScriouB ro' 
Burmese had taken up a strong position at Kaikloo, about fourteen miles from Kn'kio,!. 
Jlangoon, it was determined to dislodge them, and as the Madras native 
infantry were mortified at the subordinate part they had bonie in previous 
exploits, this important task was now assigned to them alone. Accordingly, 

Colonel Smith was detached on the 4th with a brigade of the 3d and 34th 
native infantr}’-, mustering about 800 men, and two howitzers. In the course 
of the evening he arrived at a Burmese entrenchment, and after an ineffectual 
attempt to carry it by escalade, succeeded by means of the howitzers. 'J’he 
failure of the escalade was rather ominous, and Colonel Smith, on learning from 
the prisoners that the preparations of the Burmese at Kaikloo were more 
formidable than had been imagined, asked to be reinforced by a detachment of 
Europeans. The commander-in-chief, under the influence of feelings which 
are more easily explained than justified, refused Europeans, and .sent only 
300 Madras infantry, with two additional field-pieces. 1’he whole set out for 
Kaikloo on the morning of the 7th of October. 'J’he first obstacles encountered 
were a succe.ssion of breastworks. From the time spent in carrying these by 
storm, it was five in the afternoon before the principal stockade was reached. 

Its right rested on a height crowned with a fortified pagoda. Colonel Smith 
arranged his troops in three columns—the first to attack the stockade in front, 
the second to diverge to the right and attack it in flank, and the third to 
form a reserve, while a party should make a dash at the pagoda. The first 
column was allowed to approach within sixty yards, and was then suddenly 
assailed with a murderous fire of grape and musketry. Major Wahab, who 
commanded, and the leading officers and men, soon fell killed or wounded, and 
the others, losing their presence of mind, lay down to avoid the fire. The 
assailants of the pagoda also failed, and were in their turn jmrsued. The second 
column, unable to penetrate the thicket, was in the meantime retracing its 
steps without having effected anything. Under these circumstances Colonel (’onsequcTit 
Smith saw no alternative but retreat. Fortunately the second column cftiioifur- 
arrived in time to prevent the retreat fiem becoming a complete rout, and the 
whole fell back in tolerable order, after sustaining a loss of twenty-two killed 
and sixty-six wounded. This affair, magnified by the Burmese int()St great 
victory, revived their spirits, and was exialtingly celebrated at the court of Av.t.. 

No time, however, was lost in retrieving the disaster. On the 17th of October, 
a force of 420 Europeans and 350 native infantry, with three field-pieces, 
inarched against Kaikloo, and had their indignation roused to the highest pitch 
on seeing the bodies of their comrades who fell on the 7th hanging from trees 
in horrid states of mutilation. They hastened forwai’d resolved on a signal 
Vot. HI. 216 



A.r). 1824. 


1 of 
Ky«j Wiui- 
gyee. 


PONltTOtlA 
of tho iMU 
annleft. 


154 ifjISTORY OF INDIA. [Book VTT." 

vengeance, but found the works abandoned, and returned to Rangoon without 
seeing an enemy. At the very time when the repulse at Kaikloo was sustained, 
it was partly compensated by the signal defeat of Kye Wungyee, a leading 
member of theAva ministry, who had taken post at Thantabain, on the Lyne. 
Besides fourteen war-boats, each carrying a gun, he was defended by three 
breastworks, beliind which stood the principal stockade, constructed of solid 
timber, fifteen feet high, with an interior platform cai’rying small iron and 
wooden guns, and heavier ordnance placed in battery on the solid ground 
below. Formidable as these works appeared, a small naval and military force 
sent against tliem stormed part with scarcely any loss, and thereby struck such 
terror, that the other part was abandoned after one or two ineffective charges. 

The season for opening the campaign 
was now approaching, and though the 
climate and unwholesome food had pro¬ 
duced so much sickness that not more 
than 1300 Eui’opeans remained fit for 
duty, and the native troop.s were similarly 
reduced, the prospect of active opera¬ 
tions was hailed with enthusiasm, in the 
full conviction of coming triumphs. 
And yet the circumstances were such as 
might have appalled them. According 
to prevalent rumour, the King of Ava 
luid at last mustered all his forces foi’ 
a final effort, which was to drive the 
invsiders into the sea, or send them off 
in chains to the interior, where igno¬ 
miny and torture awaited them. Maha 
Bandoola, the grejitest of the Burmese 
warrioi-s, had anived with his veterans from Aracan, and was atlvancing on 
Rangoon at the head of 60,000 men. Though much of this rumour was justly 
treated as mere ga.sconade, there w.as no room to doubt that it was partly true, 
as Maha Bandoola actually made his appearance in the vicinity of the British 
lines in tho beginning of December. His army, supported on the right by a 
flotilla of war-boats and fire-rafts, extended in a semicii’cle from the river 
opposit J Dalla, past Kemendine and the Golden Pagoda, and rested with its left 
on Puzendoon creek, about half a mile east of Rangoon. His front, for the most 
])art covered by dense jungle, was, where open, protected by breastworks and 
stockades. The Golden Pagoda, forming the key of the British position, was 

' This suit, now in the Tower of London, consists ornamented with a rich gilded arabesque bordering; 
of a mixture of plate and quilted armour—the former tho latter composed of crimson velvet, with small 
having a circular breast defence, and all the pieces studs of metal. The spear shaft is of chased silver. 



AliMOUB WOKK BY MmIA UaNIKJUJ.A,' 
at the hktlic of Donabew. 




CAPTAIN BEST’S ENGAGEMENT WITH THE PORTUGUESE FLEET, OFF SURAT, NOV. 29 th, 1612 . 

SEE VOL I.-PAGE i54. 















Chap. V.] 


WAK WITH BUEMAH. 


155 


occupied by 300 then of his Majesty's 38th, with twenty pieces of artillery, a.o. 1824 . 
while the 28th Madras iufautry were stationed immediately below. His 
Majesty’s 13th were posted with some guns along tlie high ground lea<ling from Po»itiou 
the pagoda to the town. An old Buddhist convent in front of the lines was held aimyat 
by 200 Madras European infantry and some sepoys; and the-stockade ol‘ 
Kemendine, which covered the left rear of the position, by the 2Cth Madivas natix e 
infantry an<l a few Madras Eui-opeans. The remainder of the force was i)lace(l 
in communication with Rangoon, which, as well as Kemendine, derived impor¬ 
tant additional defence from the shipping. 

During the first week of December, Maha Bandoola kei>t his army incessantly 

^ tituw the 

employed, both in advancing his works and making repeated attempts on the iiunnesu-. 
Kemendine stockade. Repulse seemed to have no effect in dislodging them, foi' 
the moment their assailants retired, they returned and resumed their labours. 

By this perseverance they made so much progress, and so annoyed the shipjnng 
by' constant firing and the launching of fire-rafts, that something more than 
desultory efforts seemed necessary, anil a general attack was i-esolved upon. 
Actiordingly, while gun-boats sailed up Puzendoon creek to take the Burmesi^ 
in Hank, two columns, the one of 1100 men under Major Sale, and the other of 
GOO men under Major Walker, moved against their left. The ojieratiou was 
successful, and both columns breaking thiough the entrenchments drove the 
whole of the enemy'’s left from their position, with a heavy' loss in men, guns, 
military' eipiipments, and stores. Mahiv Bandoola seeming still disposed to 
maintain his right and centre, another and still greater effort became necessary. 

It wjis made on the 7th of Decembei', iii four column.s, and resulted in the com¬ 
plete discomfiture of the whole Burmese army, which fled in coinjilcte disorder 
without waiting to be attacked in the entrenchments. No hostile force nt)w 
remained in the vicinity' of Rangoon, but it was not long before the B\irmese 
again gave proof of their presence and their determination to omit no mode of 
warfare which gave any promi.se of success On the 14th of December a con¬ 
flagration, Avhich, fiom breaking out in different places at once, wjis evidently 
intentional, laid a great part of Rangoon in ashes; and at the same time intelli- 
g(‘nce arrive^ that a force estimated at 20,000 had reached Kokein, oidv five 
miles to the noi'th, and were busily' employ'ed in throwing up strong defences. 

I’lieir presence at such a distance was no longer to be tolemted, and thei efore, on nritiBh 
the 15th, the commander-in-chief in persoji started off with two columns, the right K«kuii.. 
mustering GOO, and the left 800 men. Short as the time had been, tlm'works 
at Kokein had been thrown up with such rapidity', that they embraced a circuit 
of thi'ee inile.s, and consisted of two huge and stnmg stockades situated on the 
flanks, and connected by six circular entrenchments. The attack having been 
so JUTanged as to commence simultaneously in front and rear, the Burmese were 
completely hemmed in, and both within the stockades and in attempting to 
escape from them suffered a very heavy loss. During this operation the boats 



15G 


HISTORY OF INDIAN 


[Boor VII. 


A.l). 1824. 


Diirniode 
dofeatoil sit 
Kokdii. 


Olieratioiw 
ill AHHAdi. 


ItA final Kub- 
juguiiuti. 


of the men-of-war and gun-boats, towed by the Diana steamer, were employed 
in destroying the enemy’s war-boats and fire-rafts. The grand army which 
came to Rangoon for the purpose of either slaughtering the invaders or carrying 
tliern off in chains, had vanished. Maha Bandoola, however, was not the man to 
despair prematui-ely. He had alwa^’S strenuously advocated the war, and was 
not yet prepsired to confess that the only effect of his advice had been to bring 
liis country to the brink of ruin. Retiring to Donabew, he immediately began 
to organize a new army, and to entrencli it within works stronger and more ex¬ 
tensive than those from whicli lie had previously been driven. While he is thus 
employed it will be proper to take a survey of the operations in other quarters. 

'J'hc retirement of Colonel Richards from his advanced position in Assam to 
Cowhatty was immediately followed by the return of the Burmese and the 
renewal of their inroails into the adjacent districts. It was necessary therefore, 
as soon as he had obtained supplies and reinforcements, to resume the campaign. 
'J’he state of the weather rendering it impossible to proceed at once with his whole 
force, which mustereil about 3()()() native trooiis, he was only able towards the 
end of October to send off two detachments by water for the purpose of check¬ 
ing the enemy’s depredations. The one detachment umler Major Waters, after 
routing a party of Burmese at Ralia Chowki, jiroceeded to Nowgong, where the 
Boora Rajah and the governor of Assam had entrenched themselves with 1300 
men. Notwithstanding their superior numliers, they declined the encounter, 
and left him to take undisputed possession of their works, 'fhe other detach¬ 
ment, under Major (kioper, ])rocecded to Caliabar, and found it abandoned. 
tVdonel Richards having thus .secured two advanced positions, commenced a 
tedious march with the remaimlor of his force along the banks, while his stores 
and baggage were dragged in boats against the cairrent of the Brahmapootra, ami 
on the 0th of January, ]tS2.5, reached Maura Mukh, about 120 miles beyond 
(jowhatty. On the 29tb he arrived at Rangpoor, the capitid of Upper A.ssam, 
situated on the Dikho, a feeder of the Brahmapootra. The fort, consisting of a 
srpiare building of .solid masonry, mounted 200 pieces of cannon, and was more¬ 
over rendered difficult of acci^ss by two swamps and a ditch. It was defendeil 
by a strong gan ison of Burmese and As.samese, and seemed capable of making 
a vigorous defence. Fortunately violent dissensions prevailed among the 
leaders, and Colonel Richards bad no sooner carrietl a stockade wliiiih had been 
erecte<l across the roa<l, and begun to ])lant a brejiching battery, than he received 
proposSds for .suiTtuider. 'fhe terms as ultimately arranged were that .such of 
the garrison as chosti might retire peaceably within the Burmese territories, 
and such as were willing to submit might remain in Assam. At lirst about 
9000 persons, including women .and chihlren, began their departure for the 
Bunnese frontiei*s, but many soon repented, and the number of emigrants was 
greatly diminished. With the surrender of Rangpoor, Assam ceased to be the 
scene of further hostilities, and became a British province. 



CuAr. V.] 


WAR WITH BURMAH. 


157 


Wlien the obstacles which threatened the success of the expedition to Ran- a.d. 1824. 
(foon became known at Calcutta, it was determined to fit out two considerable ~ 
armaments for an overland invasion of Ava, the one to penetmte througli t»o forces 
Kachar and Munipoor into the valley of the Ningtee, a tributary of the Ira- overiund 
wadi, and the other, starting from Chittagong, to cross the mountains between 
Aracan and Ava, and ultimately form a junction with the army from Rangoon. 

The Kachar division, mustering upwards of 7000 men, commanded by Colonel 
kShuldham, assembled on the Sylhet frontier toward the end of 1824. As the 
Burmese ha<l retired from Kachar, and had full occujjation in Pegu, there was 
no reason to apprehend any direct resistance. There were ]>hysical obstacles, 
however, of a very formidable nature, and these unfortunately, from the same 
ignorance and rashne.ss wliich characterized all the initiatory movements in the 
Burmese war, had been in a great measure overlooked. The very first march rroceeciinga 
coixld not be accomplished till a road had been made by the pioneers, with Kudmi 
infinite labour, from Bhadrapoor to Banskandy. The distance to Munij)Oor 
was still ninety miles of one of the most rugged tracts that was ever travelled, 
presenting a succession of steej) hills clothed with dense forests, water-courses 
with high and precipitous banks, and occxisional flats of deep plashy mire. 

Tlie pioneers succeeded in cutting a foot-way of about forty miles, but it was 
only labour in vain, as neither ax tillery nor loaded cxittle could pass along it. 

After the mouth (jf February and March. 1825, had been spent in a vain endea¬ 
vour to overcome these obstacle.s, they were pronounced insurmountable, and 
the prosecution of the invasion by Kachar was in consequence abandoned. 

The Aracan armament, mustering about 11,000 men, under the command of riie Aracat. 
Brigadier-general Morrison, assembled at Chittagong, 'fhe prej)ar{itions for it 
had been dilatory, and accomjxanied with circumstances of an ominous descrip¬ 
tion. The aversion of the sepoys, j)articular]y those of Bengal, to a st^a voyage 
lias already been mentioned. As this aversion seemed not to be overcome, 
government yielded to it, and I’esolved to substitute a tedious and dillicult march 
by land for the far cheapei' and more expeditious sea route For this jiurjiose 
several sepoy regiments were ordeied eastward from the north-westeiii jiro- 
vinces. During their march a very unusual numbei- of desciiions took place, 
and it became obvioxis that the aversion of the sepoys was not merely to the 
sea voyage, but to employment at all in the Burmese war. They had heard of 
the disaster which had befallen ('aj)tain Ntiton’s detachment at Ramoo, and 
they regarded the Burmese with terror, as a kind of magicians who coub’ yender 
themselves invulnerable. Thus overcome by superstitiixus and unmanly fears 
they were determined not to go to Aracan if they could possibly avoid it. All 
therefore that they wanted was a plausible pretext f<xr refusing, and unfortu¬ 
nately, owing to mismanagement on the part of their superiors, they had no 
<lifliculty in finding it. Three native regiments, the 2()th, 47th, and 62d, cantoned 
at Barrackjioor, were under ordera for Aracan. They had received the intimation 



158 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book VIT. 


A I). 1824. 


of HOjKjyrt 
in Aruoaii 
unnuinciit. 


0|Hin mutiny 
of tlitt 47tli 

iiiiiiNo in* 
funtiy. 


with niurmura, complaining with some show of reason that they did not pos¬ 
sess and were unable to procure the necessary means of transport. The sepoy 
carried his knapsack, containing Ids linen and various small articles, and sixty 
rounds of ammunition, but in addition to these, in order not to risk the loss of 
ciuste, he cumbered himself with various culinary articles, as a plate, water- 
l>ot, a boiler, a frying pan, and a cup. These articles, all of brass, weighed 
about twenty-two lbs., and could oidy be conveyed by hiring or purchasing 
bullocks for the purpose. This expense, probably becjiuse it was con.sidered 
to be one of his own cieating, was thrown upon himself, and was usually borne 
without grumbling. In the present instance, however, the circumstances were 
of an exceptional nature, and he not utu’oasonably expected that allowance 
w<.)uld l)e made for them. The commissariat, in .supplying its own demands, had 
nearly swept Bengal of all its available cattle, and none could be obtained by 
the sepoys except at extravagant rates. When the fact was rejiresented at 
hc-ad-quarters, on the part of the 47th regiment, which was t(j be the first to 
march, the answer returned was that the sepoys must provide themselves as 
usual. The mutinous spirit which previously existed now threw off restraint, 
and at private meetings lield within the lines, the sepoys bound them.selves by 
oath not t(t march unless their pay was increased and carriage supplied. To 
remove or allay the discontent. Colonel Cartwright, in command of the I’egi- 
inent, made some purchases of bullocks at his own expense, and government 
ofiejvd advances of money; but the meti having been furnished with a real 
grievance, under cover of which they might disguise, and at the same time give 
effect to their cowardly fears of the Burme.se, refused to part with it. In fact 
tlic grievance had been practicallj’ lemoved, for two days before the final orders 
to march were given, “the cattle for the bagg<age were reported to be efficient 
and reach",’’ and the only thing that can be said in justification or palliation of 
the continued insubordination i.s, that having been allowed to [iroceed so far it 
could not now' be sujipressed. 

Colonel (’artw'right, liaving in vain exerted himself to restore discipline, 
sought tlie advice of his sujierior officer General JJalzell, who procecsled to 
Calcutta to consult witli Sir Edward Paget, the commander-in-chief On his 
retuiii General Dalxell gavc^ or ders that the 47th regiment should appear on 
parade in mar ching order on the 1st of November-. Aboirt a thir d of the whole 
obeyed, but the rest as.senrblrirg tunrultuou.sly in the adjacent liires, threatened 
to fir-^>Tr])oir them il’ they stirred, while all the attempts nrade by General 
Dalzell and the other offieer-s to bring the mutineers to a sense of duty were 
nret witli clamour and rrreirace. They wer e, therefore, of necessity left to take 
their owur cour-se till effectual rmaurs of coercion could be provided. During the 
day and the following night they continued in the same excited and tumultu¬ 
ous state, and on beiirg nrade acquainted with the arrival of the commander- 
in-chief, sent a petition to him. Captain Macan, who was employed to translate 



Chap. V.] 


WAE WITH BURMAH. 


159 


it, appended to Ids translation the following note;—“The original of this 
petition is written in a most barbarous and unintelligible manner. No regard 
is paid to spelling, grammar, or idiom. J am therefore doubtful if I liave 
oxi»reased the sentiinents of the petitioner in every paragraph, and I am con¬ 
vinced that they have themselves not done so. Those parts, however (such as 
the third paragraph), on which 1 have doubts are the least important.” The 
petition certsiinly justifies Captain Macan’s account of it, and requires a very 
wide interpretation, but it is scarcely possible to siippo.se that it does not con¬ 
tain any statement of what the mutineers really wanted. Now it is remark¬ 
able tliat tlie document, though long enough to have enumerated a large list of 
gi’ievances, makes no mention whatever of those to which their conduct has 
usually been ascribed. It says nothing of irregular promotions, which are said 
to have offended them, nor of the difficulty of procuring bullocks for transport. 



Thr Kiva'h NEAR DARiiACKroon.- Krum nardliige'K of India. 


and confines itself almost entirely to one single, topic, “'riie case,” it says, is 
this:—“The .soubahdar major and havildar major told the sepoys, &c., they were 
going to Rangoon, and would be embarked on board .shij), and he told all the 
stqioys that when the Company went to war they ought not to shiink.” 'J’o 
thi.s, according to the petition, the sepoys replied “that they never could put 
their feet on board ship, and that no person would forfeit his caste. For this 
reason all the sepoys swore by the Ganges water and toolsee (sacred basil), that 
they would never put their feet in a ship; and every gentleman know.s*that 
when a Hindoo takes Ganges water and toolsee in his hand, he will .sacrifice his 
life. In this way the regiment, &c., pledged themselves. This which is written 
is our representation.” After complaining of the soubahdar and havildar for 
having stated to Colonel Cartwright that the regiment was ready to march, 
“whereas the sepoys knew nothing of this circumstance,” the petition concludes 
thus;—“Now you are master of our lives; what you order we will do, but 


A.D. i824. 


Mutiny of 
tliu 47th 
lieiigal 
native in¬ 
fantry. 


Ihtir 

alleged 

griovaiieet;. 



A Y>. 1824. 


Mutiny of 
47th regi¬ 
ment. 


Mutiny 


160 HISTORY OF INDIA. [Book VII. 

we will not go on board ship, nor will we march for that purpose. Formerly 
our name was good, but it has now become bad; our wish is therefore that our 
names be effaced, and that every man may return to his home.” From these 
<luotations it is obvious that what the petitioners really demanded was that 
they should either be exempted from serving in the Burmese war or discharged. 
The answer to the petition was that it had never been intended to send them 
by sea, but that no regard could be had to soldiers in actual rebellion, and the 
first and only thing they liad to do was to lay down their arms without stipu¬ 
lating for conditions. 

As the other two native regiments were known to be infected, the suppres¬ 
sion of the mutiny could not be expected from them, and therefore two of the 
king’s regiments—the royals and the 47th—^with a detachment of horse 
artillery, and a troop of the governor-general’s body-guard, had been brought 
to Barrackpoor for that purpose. Early on the morning of the 2d of 
November, thc.se troops were drawn up per])endicu]ar]y to the sepoy lines, the 
artillery a little to the rear. The mutinous regiment, the native 47th, w.as 
formed in front of the lines, and to the left, in the rear of them, the 2(Jth and 
G2d, the two other native regiments which were under ordei’s to march. 
About twenty men of the 2Gth, and above 100 of the 62d, had joined the 47th, 
and stood along with it to share its fate. Before the final step w;is taken Sir 
Edward Paget deputed the (juarter-m.aster general, the adjutant-genei'al. Colonel 
Calloway, the commander of the rebellious regiment, and Captain Macan of the 
16th lancers, as interpreter, to exjdain his answer to the petition, and make the 
mutineers fully aware of the perilous position in which they stood. The 
native officers had previously withdrawn, and left them to themselves. After 
some expostulation, which they met only with clamour and .symptoms of 
increasing violence, they were told that their fate depended on obeying the 
orders about to be given by the adjutant-general. His first was “order arms 
it was instantly obeyed; the second was “ ground arms; ” it was met with loud 
iniirmurs and vociferation,s, and obeyed, it is said, only by a single individual. 
The artilleiy immediately opened fire, and the mutineers, though possessed 
each of forty remnds of ammunition, instead of employing it in resistance, at 
once broke, threw down their arms, and fled. In rushing across the parade- 
ground, several were shot by the infantry, or cut down by a charge of the 
body-guard, still more fell in the pursuit, or perished in the river which skirts 
the f)lain of Barrackpoor on the north. At first the number of killed was 
stated at nearly 200, but this appears to have been an exaggeration, as only 
eleven bodies were found in the lines and on the parade-ground. Of the many 
who were made prisoners, and afterwards tried by native courts-martial, some 
ringleaders were hanged, and others condemned to hard labour in irona A 
more lenient course was ultimately adopted, and all those detained in custody 
were liberated. The native officers, on the assumption that they must have 



Chap. V.] 


WAR WITH BURMAH. 


161 


known of the mutiny, and perhaps encouraged it, were dismissed the service, a.d. 1824 . 
and the name of the 4:7th Bengal native infantry was erased from the army 
list. The stern course adopted was successful, and the mutinous spirit, which 
had already infected two other regiments and might soon have been much more 
widely spread, disappeared. 

From the account which has been given of this mutiny, it seems impossible 

^ ^ iniBiuaiiage* 

to deny that part of the blame must be borne by the military authorities, ment. 
When the difficulty of procuring the necessary bullocks for transport was repre¬ 
sented to them, and not denied, it was, to say the least, harsh and inconsiderate, 
simply to reply iu effect that they neither could nor would assist in obviating 
it. It is true, that they afterwards came forward and offered to advance the 
necessary funds, but by this very act they pronounced their own condemnation. 

If there was any propriety in the advance, it ought to have been offered at the 
time when assistance was requested, and not delayed till it could only be 
regarded as a concession made under pressure to mutineer’s. At the same time, it is 
perfectly plain that the refustd of assistance, however much it may have inflamed 
the mutinous sj)irit and forced it to a crisis, did not originate it. The sepoys 
were determined from the first not to go to Aracan unless under compulsion. 

I’liey began accordingly with swearing “ by the Ganges water and toolsee that 
they would never put their feet in a ship.” When this oath jrroved unavailing 
from its having been determined to send them by land, their reluctance took a 
(liflerent form, and they began to clamour for additional allowances and pay. 

Pretexts, in short, more or less plausible never would have been wanting, as the Trae«m»eof 

* . , , - mutiny. 

men, without having made uj) their minds to actual resistance, were bent on 
shunning a service which they both feared and detested. The court of intjuiiy, 
which afterwards reported on the mutiny, take a different, ami we cannot helj) 
thinking, a very preposterous view of the subject. According to them, the 
mvxtiny was an “ ebullition of despair at being compelled to march without the 
means of doing so,” and they “ do not hesitate to believe that, in spite of every 
other discouraging circumstance, if the means of carriage had been forthcoming 
at the proper period, and in proportion adequate to the nece.ssities of men 
marching on such an arduous and trying service, none of the other points of 
complaint would have been heard, and the late 47th regiment would nt)w have 
been contending against the enemies of the state.” The court of inquiry, when 
they speak thus, entirely lose sight of the notorious aversion of the sepoys to 
the service on which they were ordered, and very absurdly represent the.want 
of bullock transport as the cause of a mutinous spirit which existed, and had 
been manifested by the prevalence of desertion, before this want was known. 

The opinion of Sir Edward Paget, the commander-in-chief, though it was 
scouted at the time, will now, when it can be read by the light of subsequent 
events, be treated with more respect. Giving evidence before a committee of 
the House of Commons on the state of discipline in the native Indian army, he 

VoL. III. 217 



162 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book VII. 


A D. 182 S. says: “It is impossible for me to conceal from the committee that there is a 
great spirit of i ns ubordination in the army, at least in that I had the opportunity 
iiMubonii- of more particularly seeing, which is the Bengal army. A sort of spirit of 
Heugai independence prevails amongst the officers, which is totally inconsistent with 
our ideas of military discipline. 1 had abundant opportunities of seeing it 
myself, and liad the 2 Jroofs before me of that spirit; and 1 have reason to think, 
from what 1 have subsequently heard, that it is by no means subsiding."’ 
naparture of When the mutiny at Barrackjroor was suppressed, all the obstacles to the 
tome. completion of the expedition against Aracaii were removed. It consisted, as 
already mentioned, of a land army of about 11,000 men, commanded by Geneml 
Morrison, and composed of his Maje.sty’s 44th and 54th regiments, the 26th. 
42d, 49th, and 62d Bengal native infantry, the 10th and 16th Madras native 
infantry, the Mug levy, and some local horse, with details of aiiilleiy and 
pioneers. For the conveyance of trooj)s and supjdies along the shore, and to 
co-o^rerate in the reduction of maritime tracts and islands, it was accompanied 
by a flotilla commanded by Commodore Hayes, and consisting of the Vestal 
Bombay cruiser, the Comjrany’s surveying ships Research and Investigator, 
the armed steamer Pluto, five gun-brigs, with tlie ketch bomb-vessel, foiir gun- 
pinnaces, and eighty gun-boats, each carrying a twelve-pounder carronade, 
besides transjiorts and country boats. In addition to the ordinary crews, the 
flotilla carried 600 marines. Owing to various causes of delay. General Morrison 
was unable to move from Chittagong till the beginning of January, 1825, but 
it was expected that he would soon be able to make uj) for lost time, as it was 
known that in consequence of the withdrawal of Malta Bandoola with his army, 
for the jturpose of arresting the progress of Sir Archibald Campbell, there was 
now no Burmese force in Aracan capable of eircountering him. The existence 
of an enemy far more formidable than the Burmese was again in st great 
measure overlooked. 

i'iiy«ioai Aracan stretches nearly 300 miles from north to south along the eastern 

Ararain. sltorc of tile Bay of Bengal. On the cast, the Yumadong Mountains, which 

have an average height of 3000 to 4000 feet, aejiai-ate it from Burmah and 
Pegu. These mountains, and the streams which flow from them, give it its 
jteculiar physical features. In the north, where their distance from the coast 
is greatest^ they leave a width of about ninety miles, but in proceeding south- 
wai'ds the .space between them and the coast gradually mvrrows, till at last 
they leave no intervid at all, and terminate on the shore in Cajte Negrais. In 
the .southern half of Aracan, the mountains come so close to the shore as to 
leave no room for the development of any streams exceeding mere mountain 
torrents; but in the northern half, above the twentieth degree of north latitude, 
the breadth is not only sufficient to furnish supplies to larger streams, but 
being intereected longitudinally by lower ridges parallel to the principal range, 
is divided by them into several long valleys, each of which forms the basin of a 



Chap. V.] WAR WITH BURMAH. 163 

considerable river. Of these rivers, which, in consequence of the configuration a.d. isas. 
now described, necessarily flow southward, the principal are the Myoo, the 
Kaladyne or Aracan, and the Lemyo. They have each a course of about 150 Piiy»i«ii 

It featumjof 

miles, are on an average not more than twenty miles distant from each otlier, Aracan. 
and approaching still nesjrer in the lower part of their course, have a common 
embouchure in Hunter’s Bay, where they communicate by various channels, 
and form numerous small islands. Most of the coast is in like manner skirted 
with islands, but of these, the only two whose magnitude entitles them to 
notice, are Ransee and Cheduba. From the Naaf, which forms the boundary 
between Chittagong and Aracan, the coast is lined by shoals, which sometimes 
stretch two or three miles from the shore; and indented by numerous bays and 
creeks, mostly formed by the torrents which, rushing down from the neigh¬ 
bouring mountains, take the nearest course to the sea The interior is even 
more forbidding than the coast, presenting a succe.ssion of rugged heights, 
separated by deep ravines, or of laarshy flats. In both cases, lofty forests or 
dense jungle render any routes that can be taken difficult in the extreme, 
and poison the atmosphere, particularly at the commencement and cessation of 
the rains, so as to make it absolutely pestilential. 

General Morrison, in order to avoid the apparently insui-mountable obstacles ProowiiiiBs 

!!• 1 11 of tlie Am- 

to his passage through the interior of the country, resolved to pm*sue a route mu lorce 
as near as possible to the coast, hoping that he would thus be able to avail 
iiiraself of the assistance of the flotilla in the conveyance of stores, and in facili¬ 
tating the pa.ssage of troops across the mouths of rivem Having, on the 1 st of 
February, reached the estuary of the Naaf, he sent a detachment across it to take 
possession of Mangdoo, but was not able to transport the main body of the 
army before the 12th. As a great part of the cattle necessary for transport 
had not yet arrived, he was obliged to leave most of the baggage and stores 
at Mangdoo, under charge of a division, and continued his march southward to 
the estuary of the Myoo, or Tek Myoo. It was more than three miles in 
width, and, owing to vaiious causes of delay, was not finally crossed till a 
whole month had elapsed. The army then encamped at Chankrain, situated 
on a branch of the Koladyne, which is navigable by loaded boats to within a 
few miles of Aracan, the capital. To effect its capture was now the great 
object of the expedition. At first it seems to have been intended to approach 
it by water, and Commodore Hayes having entered the mouth of the Koladyne 
with the flotilla toward the end of February, had ascended to a plate .called 
Kiung-pala. Here his further progress was obstructed by a stockade, which, 
after he had sustained some loss in an inefiectual attempt to force it, compelled 
him to return. The land attack was therefore necessarily adopted, and the 
army, on the 20th of March, began to move upwards, following the direction of 
the river. No enemy appeared, and even at Kiung-pala, the stockade which 
had baffled Commodore Hayes was found abandoned. On the 26th, and the 



A.D. 3825. 


Cttpture of 
Arocaii. 


Disontuvs 

OCCMioilVil 

l)y igiior- 
atico of 
Koogvaph.v. 


FearfaJ 

mortality. 


164 HISTORY OF INDIA. [Book VII. 

day following, some resistance was offered at two places where stockades had 
been erected, but it was easily overcome, and the army, advancing without 
opposition, arrived on the 29th at the foot of a range of hills about 400 feet 
higl>, which encircle and completely command the capital, situated in the plain 
below. Here it seemed that no further advance would be permitted, as the 
summit of the hills was strongly stockaded, and a Burmese force, estimated at 
9000 men, stood ready to defend it. Formidable as the works appeared, it was 
determined at once to assault them. This rash resolution was punished by a 
repidse. Tlie assailants in climbing the steep ascent, were met by a murderous 
fire, and volleys of heavy stones rolled down upon them, and after an ineffectual 
struggle, they were compelled to retire with considerable loss. After this severe 
le&son greater caution was used. On the 30th, the guns brought into position 
o])ened a brisk fire on the stockades, and on the evening of the 31st, a detach¬ 
ment succeeded, by a circuitous movement, in gaining the heights withodt 
being discovered. On the 1st of April, tire Burmese, while assailed as before 
in front, lost all presence of mind on being attacked also in flank, and fled, 
leaving Aracan an easy capture. The subjugation of the rest of the country 
was easily accomjdished. 

According to the original plan. General Morrison’s next object was 
co-operate with the army on the Irawadi. Here again, ow’ing to ignorance 
of the geography of the country, or rather to an infatuated neglect of informa¬ 
tion which had been communicated—and the truth or falsehood of which might 
easily have been verified—the perfectly practicable pa.ss of Aeng, by which a 
very extensive trade between Burmah and Aracan was carried on, was over¬ 
looked, and one beset with in.superable difficulties selected. To reconnoitre, and 
if possible attempt this pass. Major Bucke, at the head of a detachment, proceeded 
to Talak, at the foot of the mountains, about seventy miles S.S.E. of Aracan. 
After four marches up the rugged ascent, the troops arrived in a state of com- 
]»lete exhaustion at Thantabain, on the Burman frontier, but it was only to learn 
that the enemy, posted in force, were waiting to dispute their further progress. 
Hitherto it had been almost impossible to advance unopposed. What, then, 
would it be to attempt it with an enemy in front? Major Bucke, influenced by 
this consideration, and the inefficient state to which fatigue and j)rivation had 
reduced his detachment, immediately began to retrace his .stepa Had he, 
instead of attempting the ascent at Talak, only continued his march about ten 
miles farther to the south-east, he would have found the pass of Aeng lying 
open and wide to receive him. The failure of the expedition was not the worst 
of the evils which could be traced to ignorance of the Aeng Pass, The main 
army, left in Aracan, made no other eflbrt to co-operate with Sir Archibald 
Campbell, and remained only to pine away and perish by disease. Its ravages 
were indeed fearful. When the rainy reason terminated, a fourth of the whole 
army had died, and more than half the survivors were in hospital From such 



Chap. V.] WAR WITH BURMA H. 165 

an army notliing further was to be expected, and nothing remained but to avoid 
its total annihilation by withdrawing it from the pestilential atmosphere of the 
capital, and sending its scanty remnants to recruit at different sfcitions on the 
coast which had proved comparatively healthy. It is now time to return to 
the army at Rangoon, on wliose unaided exertions the success of the war seemed 
now to depend. 

After the capture of the stockades at Kokein the condition of the British 
forces had greatly improved. The return of the healthy season had arrested 
tlie ]>rogre8s of disease, reinforcements had arrived, and the population, whose 
dessertion of their houses had added greatly to the difficulties of the campaign, were 
rapidly returning. It has been already mentioned that some overtures which 
tlie Peguers made with a view to secure their future independence were not 
encouraged, because it was feared that the British government might be Ciilled 
upon for a guarantee, which might produce di.sagreeable entanglements. A 
new policy was now inaugurated, and in order to give ixdditional confidence to 
the returning inhabitants. Sir Archibald Campbell issued a proclamation in 
which, after asking “What folly can actuate yoii to attempt any further opposi¬ 
tion to the British arms?” and reminding them of the oppres.sion and tyranny 
which they had for a long time endured “by the cruel and brutal conduct of 
the Burmese government,” and contrasting their wretched position with the 
“comfort and happiness” of the Tenasserim provinces, “now under the pro¬ 
tection of the English flag,” he concluded thus: “Choose from among yourselves 
a chief and 1 will acknowledge him.” There were okstacles, however, which 
made it difficult fl»r the Peguers to take advantage of the pledge thus given 
them. Their ancient ruling dynasty was extinct, and before there was any 
prosi)ect of a harmonious choice, British policy had assumed a new phase, and 
determined to renounce “the present benefit,” in order to avoid “the eventual 
inconvenience” of encouraging the people to recover tlieir indejicndence. 

Difficulty of conveyance and deficiency of supplies had at one time disposed 
Sir Archibald Campbell to meditate an entirely new line of operations. The 
alternative he proposed was, to proceed to Martiiban and thence march on Ava 
through Old Pegu, or to re-embark the troops, and re-land them in Aracan, with 
the view of penetrating into the heart of the Burman empire through some pass 
of the Yumadong Mountains. Fortunately government discountenanced both 
proposals, and satisfied him that he ought to follow out the original design. 
Accordingly, as soon as his ari-angements were completed, he left a gai-rison in 
Rangoon, and formed his army into three divisions:—the first, of 2400 men, 
under his own immediate command; the second, of 1200, under Brig-adier-general 
Cotton; and the third, of 600, under Major Sale. The last division sailed to 
Cape Negrais, and after destroying some batteries which the Burmese had 
erected tliere, ascended the Bassein to the town of same name. The Burmese 
having set it on fire and abandoned it. Major Sale attempted to follow on 


A.D. 1826. 


Propoaeti in- 
deiHindtiiiot* 
of 


N«w plan of 

ojKM'atioub 

aug^eatefl. 



166 


HISTOEY OF INDIA. 


[Book VII. 


A.D. 1826. 


0])eratlon8 
of Mi^jor 
Sale and 
General 
I’ottoii. 


SluekiMloA 
ut Dunnlu'w 


their track, till the failure of proper conveyance left him no alternative but to 
return to Bassein, re-embark, and sail back to Eangoon, without having effected 
any object of the least moment. The blame, however, rested not with him, 
but with those who had sent him on an expedition from which no adequate 
results could reasonably have been anticipated. The second division, accom¬ 
panied by a flotilla of sixty-two gun-boats, and all the boats of the men-of-war, 
proceeded up the river, with instructions to cai-ry the enemy’s works at Pan- 
lang and Donabew by the way. General Cotton began to ascend the riA’er on 
the 16th of February, and three days after arrived at Panlang. I'he stockades 
erected on both banks, and also in front, at the point where the channel 
divided, hatl a formidable appearance, but were quickly cleared by the shells 
and rockets of the flotilla, and captured without a struggle. Destroying all the 

stockades except one, in which a garrison 
was left to maintain the communication 
with Rangoon, General Cotton continued to 
ascend, and quitting the Rangoon for the 
Irawadi at the point where they branch off, 
c<ame in sight of Donabew on the 28tli. 
Here Maha Bandoola commanded in per¬ 
son, and had entrenched himself, with a 
garrison of 12,000 men, within works as 
strong as Burmese art could make them. 

The principal stockade of Donabew ex¬ 
tended for nearly a mile along the right 
bank of the river, and formed a parallelo¬ 
gram, varying in breadth, according to the 
nature of the ground, from 500 to 800 yards. 
The stockading, from fifteen to seventeen 
feet high, was composed of solid teak beams 
driv'en firmly into the earth, and as close as 
possible; immediately behind rose the old brick walls of Donabew, affording 
by means of cross-beams additional strength to the stockades, and a platform 
on which the defenders, while pouring a murderous fire on their assailants, 
were well sheltered. On this platform, and other parts of the works, 140 guns 
of various calibre, and a still greater number of gingals, were mcHInted. All 
round tihe stockade was an outer ditch of considerable depth and width, made 
difficult to cross by various contrivances, such as spikes, nails, holes, &c., and 
on every side except toward the river was an abattis thirty yards broad, and 
otherwise of a very formidable description. Beside the principal stockade 
there were other two of similar structure, but minor dimensions, situated 
lower down the river, and forming a kind of outworks. 

To attack these formidable defences and their garrison of 12,000 men, headed 



JIandooi.a'b TjO(»k-out Trek, with Poim Ounh, 

Ai- Donahp.w — Kiom SnotigraAn' Uunnett- War. 



CflAP. V.] 


WAR WITH BUBMAH. 


167 


by the ablest and most renowned of the Burmese warriors. General Cotton a.d. isas. 
could barely muster 600 bayonets. It was a gross blunder on the part of the 
commander-in-chief to send him on such an errand with such inadequate means, Faiiur# of 
and it was a still grosser blunder on his part to attempt to execute it when he 
had ascertained by ocular inspection that it was scarcely possible for him to 
succeed. From some idea, however, that his instructions left him no option, he 
lost no time in making the necessary preparations. After sending a flag of 
truce with a summons to surrender, and receiving the defiance which he must 
liave anticipated, he commenced his attack at sunrise on the 7th of March, by 
sending his troops in two columns, under cover of the fire of two field-pieces 
and a rocket battery, against the nearer of the two minor stockadea The 
defence, though maintained with more steadiness tlian the Burmese bail 
recently displayed, was unavailing, and the assailants were (juickly within the 
work, dealing death to all who had not previously escaped from it. As soon as 
the first stockade was captured a battery was erected in front of it, and began 
to play upon the second stockade. When a sufficient impression was supposed 
to have been made, 200 men advanced in two parties to storm. The destructive 
fire with which they were met caused them to diverge from the point of attack 
and betake themselves to a ditch. It gave them no shelter, for besides being 
filled with spikes, it had been senrped so as to expose it to the fire of the 
stockjwle, and Captain Ro.se, who though wounded was gallantly leading the 
storming paity, having fallen by a second shot, it was deemed hopeless to 
persevere, and the flotilla, after re-embarking the troops, guns, and shires, 
dropped down the river to wait for new instructions. 

The first division, under Sir Archibald Campbell, was meantime ])ursuing its snVinoqtient 
march. It had started on the 13th of February, and proceeded up the country, 
keeping at a short distance from the left bank of the Lyne. On the 23d it 
niached the town of this name, and on the 1 st of March, after fording the river, 
a inarch of fourteen miles brought it to 'I’harawa, on the Irawadi. After 
halting here for some days, for the pui'pose of receiving accounts of General 
Cotton, a cannonade heard in tlie dii’ection of Donabew on the 7th, and some 
information obtained, led Sir Archibald Campbell to conclude that that 
stockatle hai^ been actually carried, and that he himself might now safely con¬ 
tinue his maich. A despatch from Geneial Cotton undeceived him when he 
had made only two marches in lulvance, and he immediately began to retrace 
his steps, under a conviction of the necessity of not only restoring the rejiuta- 
tion of the British aims, but of removing a hostile force, whicli now commanding 
the river in his rear, entirely destroyed his communication with Rangoon. On 
the 13th he returned to Tharawa, and began to make prejiarations for crossing 
the IrawatlL As the river is here nearly half a mile wide, and the actual 
means of tmusport consisted only of a few canoes, this was a work of no ordi¬ 
nary difficulty. At length, however, by constructing mfts for the more pon- 



168 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book VII, 


.&.D. 1826. 


fiticceBWs of 
the Dritish. 


Tliey ml- 
vanco into 
tlie Ulterior. 


derous inateriaJs, the army with its equipments were safely landed on the right 
bank. On the 18th the retrograde movement was resumed, and on the 25th, 
after a march, during which it was necessary to cut a pathway through thickets 
of intricate jungle, Donabew was reached. 

Sir Archibald Campbell having taken up his position above the works, 
while the Hotilla which had brought up General Cotton’s division was below, 
it became necessary to open a communication. This was gallantly effected by 
the flotilla, which, taking advantage of a fair wind, sailed up the river and 
ran the gauntlet of all the guns which the enemy could bring to bear upon it, 
without sustaining any serious damage. During this achievement the Burmese, 
as if to show what they too were capable of, ventured on a vigorous sortie. 
It was headed by seventeen elephants, each carrying five or six men, armed 
with gingals and muskets, and supported by a small body of horse, and dense 
masses of infantry. It was a vain bravado on the part of the Burmese, and 
cost them dear. As they approached, a well-directed fire of artillery and 
musketry threw their ranks into confusion. The elephants becoming unmanage¬ 
able, or deprived of their drivers, who had been shot down, fled into the adjoin¬ 
ing thicket, the horse followed, and the foot made the best of their Avay back 
into the stockade. In the subsequent operations, so little courage and skill 
were displayed by the defenders, that the assailants had a comparatively easy 
task to j)ei-fbrm. Maha Bandoola had been killed by a rocket or the bursting 
of a shell, and the Burmese troops, thus deprived of the onlj’’ leader in whom 
tliey had confidence, refused to continue the struggle. On the .3d of April, when 
the guns and heavy mortars which had been placed in battery o])ened their 
fire, no answer was made from the stockade, and its defenders were discovered 
in full retreat through the adjoining jungle. No further explanation was 
necessary, and the whole works were taken possession of without more 
resistance. 

The only obstacle to an advance into the interior being thus remcjved. Sir 
Archibald Campbell, now strengthened by his other divisions, and by additional 
reinforcements from Rangooi», resumed his march. The Prince of Tharawadi, the 
brother of the Burmese sovereign, who had assumed the command, had succeeded 
in collecting a considerable force, but was evidently deteimined to^est satisfied 
with the defensive, regularly retiring as the British advanced. Thus allowed to 
march without encountering any opposition. Sir Archibald Campbell had arrived 
withiji thirty miles of Prome, when a British soldier, who had been made 
prisoner 1;)y the Burmese, arrived in his camp, with a letter addressed to liim 
by two of the atwen-wunsi, or royal councillors. It attributed the war which 
had interrupted the ancient friendship of the two states to the conduct of a 
certain paltry chief, and proposed that a negotiation might be opened for the 
restoration of peace. The answer returned was, that the British army 
was advancing to Prome, and that its commander-in-chief, on arriving there. 



Chap. V.] 


WAE WITH BUBMAH. 


169 


would very willingly listen to any overtures that had peace for their object. a.d. 1826 . 
The atwen-wuns had hoped that the proposal to negotiate would induce the 
British commander to desist from advancing, and on finding the contrary, ceased capture of 
to make any further communication. On the 25th of April, Prome, which, 
in the judgment of Sir Archibald Campbell, was so strong by nature and 
art, that a garrison of 1000 men might have successfully defended it against 
ten times that number, was entered without opposition. 

Though the Burmese, by their lame abandonment of Prome, seemed at firet 
sight to have given up the contest in despaii’, they afterwards resumed new 
courage, and began to make large levies of troops. In this manner they 
collected a force of about 52,000 men. Of these about 20,000 were assembled at 
Meaday, on the Ira wadi, forty miles doe north of Prome, under Mimiabo, a half 
brother of the king, 
and 12,000 at Tongho, 
eighty miles to the 
E.N.E., while the re¬ 
maining 20,000 were 
stationed principally 
at Pagahm, Melloon, 
and Patanagoli. To 
oppose all these troops 
Sir Archibald Camp¬ 
bell had under his 
command <3nly 5000 
men, of whom nearly 
a half were Euro- 
]iean.s. Notwithstand¬ 
ing the vast disparity 

* Jit’Kifi-iSK.'—1, Kee Woiigeo, or l*rime Minister. 2, A Troojier. A Oassaj- Horseman. 

of numbers, past ex¬ 
perience justified him in feeding confident as to the result, and yet, for many Negotiation 
reasons, oi which the enormous expense was one of the strongest, the supreme 
government wei’e urgent for an early tenniuation of hostilities. Not long, 
therefore, after he had established his head-quarters at Prome, Sir Ai’chibald 
Campbell took the initiative in negotiation, by addressing a letter to the Bur¬ 
mese ministers, stating that he was empowered to conclude a peace, and inviting 
them to save their country from the calamities which a continuance of the wai- 
would cei-tainly bring upon it. A favourable answer was immediately returned^ 
and the British commander, waiving the point of etiquette, which he w'ould have 
shown more judgment in maintaining, sent a mission to the camp of Mimiabo, 
when he might have insisted on receiving one. After some delay, an annistice 

‘ From Sriodgraae’s iVorratiVe of the Burmese War, Cox’s Residence in the Burman Empire, and Symes’ 

Embassy to the Kingdom,'of Ava, 

VoL. III. 



218 




170 


HISTOEY OF INDIA. 


[Book VIT. 


A.D. X826. 


Meeting of 

oommU' 

nionero. 


F«iliire 
tbe iiegotia- 
tiouiw 


of one month was concluded, and a day was fixed on which Sir Archibald 
Campbell and the Kye Wungyee, one of the principal of the Burmese ministers, 
were to meet and arrange the definitive conditions of peace. 

On the 2d of October, the day fixed for the meeting, the commissioners. 
Sir Archibald Campbell and Sir James Brisbane, the British admiral in the 
Indian seas, on the one side, and tbe Kye Wungyee and Lamain Wun on 
the other, each party attended by a personal suite, and escorted by 1000 
picked men, encamped on the plain of Naibenzik, about a mile asunder. About 
midway between, a lotoo, or hall of audience, on the model of that at Ava, 
had been erected. In all the preliminaiy arrangements the utmost care Irad 
Ixeen taken to maintain an appearance of perfect equality, and this was now 
carried so far, that both parties, by pi’evious agreement, started from their 
encampments at the very same moment, and met together in front of the lotoo. 
‘•Shaking of hands,” says Major Snodgrass,' “and every demonstration of 
amicable, feeling having passed, the parties entered the bouse, and sat down 
on two rows of chaim fronting each other; the wungyees and their sxiite, in 
all fifteen chiefs, each bearing the chain of nobility, and dressed in their splendid 
court dresses, evidently doing grievous penance in seats they were never accus¬ 
tomed to, that no diffeience might apyxear, even in the most trifling particular 
between the jxarties; and so observing and tenacious were they on this point, 
that .scarcely a movement could be made without a coiTCSjxonding one on their 
side.” On proceeding to business, the terms proposed evidently di.sconcerted 
them. Sir Archibald Campbell demanded that the King of Ava should cede 
Aracan, abstain from interference with Assam, Kachar, and Munijxoor, and pay 
two crores of rupees (£2,000,000 .sterling) as the expenses of the war, one half 
immediately, and the remainder at an early date, Rangoon, Maitaban, and the 
I’enasseriin jxrovinces being in the meantime retained as security. The 
Burmese commissioners declared that these rigorous demands had taken them 
completely by surprise, and after arguing strenuously against them, as neither 
just nor generous, proposed an extension of the armistice till the 2d of Novem- 
beirthat they might have an opportunity of submitting them to the king. It 
was evident from what passed, that the Burmese would not make the conces¬ 
sions demanded without another struggle, but as the season for opening a 
new camyxaign had not yet arrived, the extension of the annistice was readily 
granted. A few days before it expired, a letter arrived from the Burmese 
commissioners, intimating the final determination of the court of Ava, in the 
following terms;—“If you sincerely want peace, and our former friendship 
re-established according to Biuman custom, empty your hands of what you 
have, and then if you ask it, we will be on friendly terms with you, and send 
our petition for the release of your English prisoners, and send them down to 

' XarrtUivt of tlte Burmete War, by Migor Snodgrass, military secretary to tbe commander of tbe expedi¬ 
tion, p. 215. 



Chap. V.] WAR WITH BURMAH. 171 

you. However, after the termination of the armistice between us, if you show 
any inclination to renew your demands for money for your expenses, or any 
territory from us, you are to consider our friendship at an end. This is Burman 
custom.” 

Tile Burmese, as soon as they had indignantly rejected the terms proposed 
by Sir Archibald Campbell, lost no time in preparing for the resumption of hos¬ 
tilities, and began to advance upon Prome. A considemble body took post at 
Watigaon, about twenty miles distant, and by commanding the country on 
tlie right flank of the Britisli army, threatened to give great annoyance. In 
order to dislodge them. Brigadier-general M‘Dowall was detached on the 
evening of the 15th of November, with four regiments of Madras native 
infantry, disposed in three columns—the first under his own immediate com¬ 
mand, to attack the po,sition on the left, and tlie second to assail it in front. 



Prome, from the lleighto. -From a 8keU:h hy Lieutenant Willoiiglibv, Bengal Artillery. 


while the third moved to the eastward. The columns, from marching separ¬ 
ately over ground covered witli marsh and Jungle, could not communicate, and 
lost sight of each other. The brigadier airived first. Though he had no 
breaching-guns, and knew nothing of the other columns, he rushed on to force 
an entrance into the works. This precijiitation cost liim his life. After he had 
fallen, and most of the other officers were disabled by the murderous fire of 
the enemj’^, the assailants were compelled to retreat, pursued to within nine 
miles of Prome. The second column was not more fortunate, and after dttack- 
ing a strong stockade, the fire from which nearly annihilated the advance, 
retired with so much precipitation that they were obliged to abandon their 
wounded. The third column escaped disaster by retreating as soon as there 
was reason to believe that the others had failed. The total loss in killed, 
wounded, and missing, exceeded 200. 

The Burmese, greatly encouraged by this success, were confident that under 


A.I). 182S. 


Resumption 
of hoatilities. 


Affair of 
Watignt’iL 



A.T). 1825. 


A new Bur¬ 
mese leader. 


Ilia defciit 
}Uid (ieath. 


Henewid of 
negotiutiona. 


172 HISTORY OF INDIA. [Book VIT. 

the leadersliip of an old retired veteran, of the name of Maha Nemyo, who had 
achieved it for them, they would yet compel the British to abandon Prome. 
To put tins to the proof, they advanced nearer and nearer, till they were only 
a few miles distant. Sir Archibald Campbell was in hopes of turning their 
new confidence to account, and by throwing up earthworks and entrench¬ 
ments, as if he were afraid of an attack, endeavoured to tempt them to become 
the assailants. The Burmese, however, were not to be allured from their usual 
mode of fighting, and continued to make their approaches with such an union 
of caution and perseverance, that it became necessary for the British once 
more to assume the oftensive. Accordingly, on the 1st of December, Sir 
Archibald Campbell, leaving four native regiments in charge of Prome, marched 
out with the remainder of his force in two divisions, the one under himself, 
and the other under General Cotton. The second division arriving first, imme¬ 
diately stormed and carried the woi’ks which the enemy had constructed on 
the Nawain, a stream which runs past Prome before joining the Irawadi. 
Within the stockades were found 300 dead, including the veteran Maha 
Nemyo. This was by no means the whole of the Biirmese loss, for the first 
division having arrived on the oppo.site bank of the Nawain, as they were 
abandoning the stocksides, intercepted them in their flight, and added greatly 
to the slaughter. The enemy’s left having been thus destroyed, the next move¬ 
ment was directed against their centre at Napadi, where Kye Wungyee com¬ 
manded, and had advantageously stockaded himself on a series of heights. 
These, after the flotilla had sailed up the river, and taken up a. position wliich 
enabled it to throw shells and rockets into the stockades on either bank, were 
gallantly carried by a detachment under Colonel Sale, who, having gained the 
summit without firing a shot, drove the Bm’mese from their entrenchments, 
and pursued them from hill to hill, till the whole position, embracing an extent 
of two miles, was secured. The enemy’s right, which followed the Irawadi to 
Padong, was still entire, but General Cotton having crossed the river, succeeded, 
without much difticulty, in breaking it up, by carrying the works on the banks, 
and also a strong stockade at some distance in the interior. 

During this campaign the Burmese had depended much on the aid of tribu¬ 
tary tribes dwelling to the north of Ava, and known by the common name of 
Shans. These, so long as the cause seemed hopeful, had easily been induced 
to take an active part in the war. The late defeats, however, had completely 
altered their views, and they at once returned to their own country. The 
court of Ava, thus brought again to the brink of ruin, saw no hope of escape 
except in negotiation. On the 2Gth of December, when the British force had 
reached Meaday, and were preparing for a- further advance, a flag of truce 
arrived, with a message from the Burmese commander. It stated that full 
powers had been received from the court to conclude a treaty, and proposed 
that deputies should be sent to arrange the conditions. The British commander 



Chap. V.] 


WAR WITH BURMAH. 


178 


consented as before, but in the meantime continued his march in the direction a.d. i 82 e. 
of the capital On the 28th, the Burmese commander sent another message, 
proposing that the commissioners should meet to conclude the treaty on tlie ^ <iofiiiiuve 

* treaty ©xe- 

26th of January. As the proposal of this distant day was accompanied with a cutod, but 
request for an interim suspension of hostilities, it was evident that nothing 
but delay was contemplated, and therefore the utmost concession that could 
be obtained was, that hostilities should be momentiu:ily suspended, to allow 
the commissioners to meet in a boat, which was for that purpose anchored 
in the middle of the river. The meeting took place on the 30th, and aftei- 
a good deal of discuasion, which resxilted in a considerable modification of the 
terms originally proposed, the definitive treaty was formally executed on the 
3d of January, 1826. The result was as before. To give time for ratifica¬ 
tion, and on a promise that the British prisoners would be immediately sent 
down from Ava, and a finst instalment of the pecuniary compensation paid, a 
short armistice was agreed to. It was to terminate on the 18th of January, 
and on the day immediately preceding, a deputation arrived. They brought 
neither the ratified treaty, nor the money, nor the prisoners, and simply 
requested a prolongation of the time. This was at once declined, and on the 
18th, a British deputation proceeded to the Burmese camp, to offer the option 
of either returning the ratified treaty, or of evacuating the entrenchments at 
Melloon, situated across the river, directly opposite to the Britisli camp at 
Patanagoh, by sunrise on the 20th. As they could not or would not comply 
with either alternative, hostilities recommenced. 

During the armistice the Burmese, while pretending strictly to observe its 
con<litions, had secretly strengthened their works and obtained reinforcements, 
and they now stood ready with an army of nearly 20,000 men to contend once 
more for victoiy. On the 19th the British batteries opened their fire, and the 
troops having cros.sed under cover of it, in two divisions, the one above and the 
other below, the Burmese hardly waited to be attacked, and made off with 
such celerity that it was in vain attempted to intercept their retreat. Within 
the works were found a great number of guns, and large su])plies of ammunition 
and grain. Though thus again defeated with an ease which must have convinced 
the Burmese of their utter inability to continue the contest, the terms demanded, 
and more especially the payment of money, was felt by them to be so humili¬ 
ating, that when a military chief came forward and pledged himself to expel 
the invaders, he was eagerly listened to. The utmost force which could now 
be assembled did not exceed 16,000 men, but these seemed quite sufficient to 
the boasting chief Zay-ya-thuyan, alias Nuring Phuring, “Prince of Sunset,” 
who, attributing all previous disasters to the incompetence of the commanders, 
assured the king that he might confidently calculate on very different results. 

His Burmese majesty must have felt somewhat doubtful on the subject, since, at 
the very time when the Prince of Sunset was invested with the chief command, 



174 


HISTOBY OF INDIA. 


[Book VII. 


A.o. 1826 . an attempt was made to renew the negotiations, by employing as deputies for 
_ purpose Mr. Price, an American missionary resident at Ava, and Mr. Snod¬ 
grass, the surgeon of the Royals, who had been taken prisoner. 

New taotkn The British army, continuing its advance, arrived on the 8th of February 

efSuiiset. witliin five miles of Pagahm, an ancient city, which boasted of having been 
the capital of the Burraan empire during the period of its greatest prosperity. 
Behind its brick wall, though ruinous, the Prince of Sunset might have foimd 
good cover, had he not disdained all tactics that savoured of timidity. Instead 
of entrenching himself within stockades, according to the Burmese mode of 
fighting, he had drawn up his army in the open field, and along the sides of a 
pathway loading through a thicket of prickly jungle Indeed, what had he to 
fear if lie was the consummate warrior he believed himself to be, while his force 
was at least tenfold more numerous than that opposed to him? Owing to the 
absence of two regiments employed in foraging, Sir Archibald Campbell could 
not muster more than 1300 fighting men. With this small body he moved to the 
attack on the morning of the 9th of February, and with very little diflBculty 
cleared the field. Nuring Phuring hastened off’ with such rapidity that he was 
the first to bear to Ava the tidings of his own defeat. The object of all this 
haste Avas to solicit a new army, with which he would at once return and expel 
the invaders, but the court had had enough of him, and not satisfied with 
driving him eontumeliouslj' from the jiresence, put him to death that very 
evening 

Negotiatioii.'! The employment of the Prince of Sunset had been the last effTort of despair, 
and it soon became evident that the resources of the Burmese empire were 
insufficient to prevent a mere handful of British soldiers from penetrating 500 
miles into the interior of the country, and compelling the capital to surrender 
to them at discretion. After halting five days at Pagahm, Sir Archibald 
Camjibell resumed his march, and h.ad arrived at Yandaboo, within sixty miles 
of Ava, when negotiators Jirrived in the persons of two BmTnese ministers and 
the two American missionaries, Messrs. Price and Judson. As a proof of the 
sincerity of the court they were accompanied by a number of liberated prisoners, 
and brought with them twenty-five lacs of rupees (^250,000) as the first pecu¬ 
niary instalment. The terms having been previously arranged, nothing remained 

Conclusion but to give effect to them by a regular treaty. This was concluded, without 
giving rise to the least discussion, on the 24th of February, and ratified without 
any unnecessary delay. The treaty consisted of eleven articles, but after the 
incidental notice already taken of them, a full recapitulation would be super- 
ffuou.s. Aracan and the Tenasserim provinces were ceded in perpetuity to the 
British government, and the King of Ava renounced all right to interfere with 
Assam, Jyntra, and Kachar. The crore of rupees, declared to be not merely in 
indemnification of the expenses of the war, but “in proof of the sincere disposi¬ 
tion of the Burmese government to maintain the relations of peace and amity 



Chap. V.] 


PEACE WITH BURMAH. 


176 


between the two nations,” was to be paid by four equal instalments—the fii-st 
immediately, the second in a hundred days, the third at the end of a year, and 
the fourth at the expiry of two years. On the first payment the British army 
was to retii’e to Rangoon, and on the second to quit the Burmese dominions. 
Each .state was to receive an accredited minister from the other, and a com¬ 
mercial treaty was to be framed on principles of reciprocal advantage. 

The Burmese war was never cordially sanctioned by the home authorities. 
The expense at which it was carried on was enoiTOOus, and the acquisitions of 
territory secured by it, though they have proved far more valuable than was at 
one time aiiticipated, must still be considered a dear purchase. The propriety 
of the war cannot be determined merely by counting the cost, and balancing 
the pi-ofit and loss. The Burmese were certainly bent on war, and every con¬ 
cession that could have been made to them would have been followed by some 
new demand. In point of fact they did ultimately lay claim to districts lying 
within the ancient recognized limits of Bengal, and nothing l)ut the series of 
severe lessons which they received after hostilities commenced, sufficed to con¬ 
vince them that they were not the invincible warriors whom they had vainly 
imagined themselves b) be. A Burmese war, therefore, however little to bo 
desired on its own account, was sooner or later inevitable, and the Indian 
government which undertook it have a sufficient vindication in the fact that 
they only 3 ’ielded to a necessity which was laid upon them. For the mode of 
conducting the war the}'^ and the commander to whom they intrusted it were 
strictly responsible, and it is here that the blame lies, liie}' carried it on 
without anj’^ regular plan, committed gi’oss blunders, from which careful inquiry', 
previou.sly made, would have .saved them, and incurred enormous expense and 
loss of life from scattering their forces instead of concentrating them, and en- 
gaging in wild expeditions without any reasonable prospect of an ade(£uate 
result. 


A.D. 1828. 


T'ejM'e con* 
chtded. 


Keviow of 
the Bur- 
mese war. 



HtSTOEY OF INDIA. 


[Book VII, 


-176 


CHAPTER VI. 

n’raiKiuillity not perfectly eatabliBhod—Disturbances in various quarters—Proceedings at Kittoor and 
Kola])oor—Transactions in Bhurtpoor—Question of interferenoe—Itesignation and death of Sir 
David Oohtorlony—Sioge and capture of Bhurtpoor—State of affairs in Oude—Death of Sir Thomas 
Monro—(.lose of Earl Amherst’s administration. 


A.D. 182-1. 


Various 


ihsturhatKKt 
in liuliM.. 



T was stKirccly to be expected tliat when the predatory system was 
sujiprossed, India would at once subside into a state of complete tran- 
(juillity. The multitudes who had pursued rapine as a trade, though 
unable any longer to practise it in large and regularly organized 
bands, were ready to avail themselves of every .source of disturbance; 
and not a few <.)f the native princes, while they were pleased with the security 
which they enjoyed under British protection, were dissatisfied with the sacri¬ 
fices of independence at which it liad been purchased. To the larger states the 
loss of territory and the humiliation which they had suffered were still more 
galling, and nothing but the fear of subjecting themselves to more fatal 
di.sasters deterreil them from once more hazarding a contest. British supremacy 
was thus lecognizcd and submitted to from necessity, not choice; and any 
events which si'cmed to promise an opportunity of subverting it were hailed 
with delight. 'I'he Burmese war gave full scope for the indulgence of these 
feelings. The natives of India entertained the most extravagant ideas of the 
•strength and jirowess of the Burmese. Not only were they known to be capable 
of bringing jKiwerful armies into the field, but they were also suppo.sed to be 
in j)ossession of magical arts by which they could render themselves invulnera¬ 
ble. The effect of these notions on the sepoys has already been seen. The 
order to prepare for inarching to the seat of war became the signal for wholesale- 
desertion, and in one ease wiis followed by a mutiny, which, if it had not been 
speedily .supjiressed by force, would ju’obably have spread over the whole of the 
native army of Bengal. It is hence easy to understand how a general feeling of 
restlessness and di.se,ontent gradually displayed itself in |)roportion as the 
country began to be bared of troops, in order to meet the demands of a foreign 
war, atid how every rumour of disaster confirmed the belief that the British, in 
encountering the Burmese, were rushing blindly on their own destruction. 
Altogether apart from the Burmese war there were many (jauses of disturbance 
at work, and when to these this war was added, the only wonder is that the overt 
acts to which they led were not more numerous and of a more formidable 
description. Some of these which interrupted the internal tranquillity of India 
during Earl Amhenst’s administration will now be mentioned. 











Chap. VI.] DISTURB4JSrcfiS IN NOETUv^EST Il^blA. 

In the nortli-west, among the protected Sikh stMies, a religioufi'rhendiGant a.d. xsaii 
announced his advent as Kali, the last of the Hindoo avatars, for the p'urpose ~~ 
of putting an end to the reign of foreigners. The supposed .desirableness of the o«tbreftk« 

, , . atSahanin- 

event sumced to produce a general expectation of it; and though the precaution pwr, cni- 
had been taken to arrest the mendicant, and he was paying the penalty of his ***’ 
imposture in prison wheiji the day appointed for the advent arrived, a riotous 
multitude assembled, and were not dispersed till military force was employed. 

In the same quarter a predatory leader having assembled a large band of fol¬ 
lowers marie himself master of the fort of Kunjawa, at no great distance from 
Saharanpoor, assumed the title of rajah, and began to levy contributions on the 
surrounding districts. Numbers flocked to him from all quartera, and the 
insurrection was assuming a regularly organized form, when a body of troops, 
collected with some difficulty, marched against his stronghold, and succeeded 
in dislodging him after 150 of his followers had been slain. At some distance 
to the south-west, on the borders of Eajpootana, and even in the vicinity of 
Delhi, the Mewattees and Bhattees, and other bands of plunderers, taking advan¬ 
tage of the withdrawal of the troops which had overawed them, resumed their 
depredations, and carried them on to such an extent that for a short time the 
communication with Delhi was interrupted, ami order was not restored till an 
increase of military force had been obtained. At Calpee on the Jumna, al)Out 
fifty miles south-west of Cawnpoor, a refractoiy jaghirdar of the Rajah of Jaloun 
suddenly appeared with a considerable body of horse and foot, and after an unsuc¬ 
cessful attempt to seize the fort, containing an amount of jiublic treasure, plun¬ 
dered and set fire to the town. In Malwah various sinister rumours were circu¬ 
lated, and it was even represented that owing to tlie difficulties of the Burmese 
war the British were about to retire altogether from Central India. It was pro¬ 
bably owing in part to these aUsurd ramours that in one locality a rising was 
oiganized, and that in the vicinity of Boorhanpoor, among the jungles which 
extend to the north of the Taptee, between Aseerghur and Ellichpoor, Sheikh 
Dalla, an old Pindaree leader, collected a strong body of horse and foot, and did 
serious mischief before he was effectually checked. The Bheels too began again 
to grow troublesome, and were with difficulty restrained from resuming their 
jiredatory habits. 

Still farther to the south, in the Mahratta country, some serious disturb- Maiiratta 

1 -rr* • nit-b • n /'i dinturbaiio^ 

ances occurred. Kittoor, situated to the east of the Portuguese teiTitory of (joa, atKiuoor. 
and to the north-west of Darwar, was, with the adjoining district, held under the 
Company. On the death of the chief without children, in September, 1824, the 
grant was understood to have lapsed, but the natives, who had previou.sly been 
intrusted with the management of the district, being unwilling to relinquish 
it, endeavoured to secure its continuance, by alleging that the chief, previous 
to his death, authorized his wife and his mother to adopt a son for him. In 
accordance with this pretended injunction a boy veiy distantly related to his 

VoL. III. 219 



17& 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book VII.. 


A.D. 1824. 


Revolt at 
Kittoor. 


I^iT'ceediugs 
oi the Rajah 
of Koliii>oor. 


family was brought forwai’d and recognized as his successor. Tlie whole pro¬ 
ceeding was informal. The adoption to be valid ought to have taken place 
during the chief’s lifetime, and at all events no subsequent steps ought to have 
been taken witliout the sanction of the pai-amount power. On these grounds, 
and also because he believed that the real object of the proceedings was to 
favour the ambition of a faction, and carry off the accumulated treasure of the 
late chief, to the detriment of his widow, Mr. Thackeray, the British collectoi', 
l efused to recognize the new arrangements, and in the meantime, while waiting 
instructions from Bombay, took possession of the treasure, and assumed the 
management of the distiict. No opposition was ofiered, and in order to prevent 
the treasure within the fort from being clandestinely carried off, it was sealed 
up and a guard placed over it. The collector, with his two assistants, was 
encamped without the fort with an escort consisting of a company of native horse- 
artillery and a company of native infantry, and on the 23d of October, on sending 
as usual to relieve the guard over the treasure, was astonished to learn that the 
gates had been shut, and that all admission was refused. On the spur of the 
moment an attempt was made to force an entrance and issued in a lamentable 
disaster. The collector and the two officers commanding the escort were killed, 
jinother British officer was wounded, and the two assistants being taken j)risonei-s, 
were carried into the fort and detained as a kind of hostages. This revolt, 
apparently trivial in itself, acquired importance from the general excitement 
which it produced, and the obvious syrajiatliy of the surrounding population 
with the insurgents. It was necessary, therefore, to lose no time in anesting 
the insurrectionary s}>irit, and a large body of troops under Colonel Deacon was 
immediately despatched against Kittoor. Though the garrison must have seen 
from the first that their ease was desperate, they refused to surrender, and only 
yielded at last after the batteries had opened and effected a practicable breach. 

At Kolapoor, the capital of another Mahratta territory, situated among the 
Western Ghauts, the disturbance wiis of a still more serious character. The 
rajah, boasting a direct descent from Sevajee, the founder of the Mahratta 
empire, had a high idea of his own importance, and where he imagined ho had 
a right, thought himself entitled, without consulting any other power, to take 
liis own mode of enforcing it. Acting on this view he made a claim of supre¬ 
macy over the district of Kagal, in possession of Hindoo Row, a brother-in-law 
of Scindia, and when the claim was disjmted marched a body of troops into 
the district and took forcible possession of it. Scindia, ofiended at tins ti*eat- 
ment of his near relative, applied to the British government on the subject, and 
comjdained with some show of justice, that while his own hands were tied up by 
a treaty which did not allow him to interfere, the Rajah of Kolapoor was allowed 
to deprive others of rights which were as good as his own, and thus virtually 
set the paramount power at defiance. This non-interference on the part of the 
government produced its usual fruits, and the rajah, finding his first encroach- 



Chap. VL] 


AFFAIRS OF BHURTPOOR. 


179 


ments unchallenged, proceeded to make them on a more extensive scale. The 
next object of his attack was a zemindar, holding partly of the Rajah of Sat- 
tarah and partly of the Bombay presidency. Even this did not satisfy him, and 
he was soon seen at the head of a body of 6000 horse and foot, and a brigatle 
of artillery, plundering and levying contributions. The Bombay government, 
who had hitherto shown the greatest reluctance to interfere, became convinced 
at last that it had become indispensable, and sent a detachment, before which 
the rajah retired to his capital. His cowardice appears to have been as great 
as his arrogance, and he at once professed submission. A treaty was accord¬ 
ingly made by which he renounced all claim to the territories which he liad 
seized, agreed to pay compensation for the depredations he had committed, and 
became restricted to the employment of a limited number of troop.s. As soon 
as the withdrawal of the detachment relieved him from his more immediate 
alarm, he forgot all these stipulations, and began again to jnirsue a course 
which made it necessary to bind him by still more stringent obligations. The 
consequence was that British garrisons were stationed in his forfs of Kolapoor 
and Panala, and he lost even the semblance of independencie. 

Some disturbances which took place in Cutch towards the end of 1824 
<lerive importance chiefly from the encouragement given to them by the Ameers 
of Scinde, who were again feeling their way, and watching an opportunity of 
effecting a long meditated conquest. The despatch of strong reinforcements 
from Bombay under Colonel Napier, and the successful tennination of the 
Burmese W'ar, convinced the Ameers that, at least for the present, their safest 
course was to keej) the peace. In another quarter not yet mentioned the 
disturbance w>u5 not so easily suppressed, and led to results of gi-eater historical 
importance than any that have yet been mentioned. The treaty which was 
made with the Rajah of Bhurtpoor, after Lord Lake had failed in four successive 
attempts to storm his capital, had been faithfully observed on both sides, and 
the relations between the two governments had long been of the most friendly 
descrii^tion. In 1824 the reigning rajah, Baldeo Sing, feeling his own life to be 
precarious, was anxious to secure the succession to his son Bui want Sing, who 
was then a minor. Under ordinary circumstances he could not have doubted 
that this son, whose legitimacy was undisputed and indispiitable, woidd succeed, 
but he had a nephew, Durjan Sal, whose ambitious designs filled him with the 
greatest alarm, and it occun-ed to him that the most effectual method of frus¬ 
trating these designs would be to place his son under the immediate protection 
of the British government. With this view he applied to Sir David Ochteilony, 
the British resident at Delhi, and induced him to invest Bulwant Sing with a 
khelat or honorary dress, in recognition of his being the apparent heir. This 
ceremony was performed in the beginning of 1824, and about twelve months 
after the succession opened by the death of Baldeo Sing. 

Bulwant Sing, who was then only about six years of age, was immediately 


A.D. 1824. 


Submissian 
of tJie Rftjft 
of Kolapooi 


State of 
fiiatters in 
Ciitch and 
Blmrf.)Kinr. 



180 


HISTOEY OF INDIA. 


[Book VIL 


A.D. 182S. 


Uaurjiation 
of Dnrjau 
Bill iu 
BhurtjKMjr. 


Dtiath of 
Sir Diiviil 
Uchtorlojiy. 


recognized as rajah, while his maternal uncle Bam Katan Sing, acting as his 
guardian, conducted the government. This arrangement had scarcely subsisted 
for a month, when Durjan Sal Justified all the suspicions which the late rajah 
had entertained of him, by gaining over the soldiers, forcing his way into the 
citadel, slaying Bam Katan Sing, and gaining possession of the person of the 
young rajah. Sir David Ochterlouy, holding these proceedings to be equivalent 
to an usurpation of supreme authority, immediately issued a proclamation to 
the Jats, denouncing Duijan Sal as an usurper, and calling upon them to 
support their legitimate sovereign, in whose cause he would soon appear at 
the head of a British force. This decided step was so far efiectual that Durjan 
Sal, who was suspected of a design of clesu-ing his way to the throne by the 
murder of the rajah, professed to have no other intention than to act as regent 
during his minority. This ofiice, according to his own account, he had accepted 
in accordance with the wishes of the whole tribe, whom Ram Ratan Sing’s 
tyrannical conduct had disgusted. This explanation, though plausible, was not 
deemed satisfactory, and on his declining either to visit the British cantonments 
or intrast the young rajah to British custody. Sir David Ochterlony hastily 
jissembled a considerable force, with the determination of at once marching 
against Bliurtpoor. These warlike preparations were suddenly arrested by a 
letter fi-oin the governor-general in council, condemning them in tenns so 
unmeasured, that Sir David Ochterlony felt he had no sdtei'native but to resign. 
The abnxpt prohibition of an exjxedition which it seemed impossible to delay 
Avithout a sacrifice both of honour and sound policy, cut him to the heart, and 
he died shortly after at Meerut, complaining loudly to the last of the harsh 
manner in which he had been virtually dismissed. He had served the Com])any 
faithfully and with distinguished ability for fifty year’s, and it is therefore 
impossible not to I’egret that his retirement, which, owing to his inci’easing 
infirmities, had doubtless become expedient, wfis efiected by means which gave 
it all the appearance of an intended disgrace. The public immediately testified 
their sense of his merits by the erection of a monument to him in Calcuttft, 
and government gave all the compensation which was now in their power, by 
issuing, on the 28th of July, 1825, a general txrder, highly eulogistic of his 
talents, diplomatic as well as military, and directing, “as an especial testi¬ 
mony ” of high respect for his services, and “ as a public demonstration of 
sorrow for his demise,” that minute guns, to the number of sixty-eight, corre¬ 
sponding with his age, should be fired from the ramparts of Fort-William. 

It is rather singular that the princijde of non-interference, for the main¬ 
tenance of which government had been so resolute when Sir David Ochterlony’s 
military prepai-ations called forth their censure, was afterwards expressly 
abandoned. The inconsistency, however, becomes less glaring on considering 
that the opposite decisions were given under different circumstancea When 
Sir David Ochterlony determined to use force, the means of negotiation were 



Chap. VI.] 


AFFAIRS OF BHUETPOOR. 


181 


not apparently exhausted. Durjan Sal was aspiring professedly to nothing a.d. 1825. 
more than the regency, and seemed willing to come under an engagement to 
retire as soon as the rajah should attain majority. This was probably mere 
pretence, but as he seemed to be countenanced by the leading cliiefs among the Further pro- 
Jats, it was not unreasonably considered impolitic, if not quixotic, to enter into n^Mfs^ 
II new war which threatened to be formidable, for the purpose of forcing a new 
government upon a people who were living in tolerable tranquillity under the 
one actually existing. But a very short time had sufficed to give the cjise an 
entirely new aspect. Durjan Sal, on learning that the British military prepara¬ 
tions had been countermanded, had thrown off the mask, and intimated that 
instead of being satisfied with the regency he now claimed possession as legal 
lieir. He had been adopted, he said, by a previous rajah, and had therefore a 
preferable title. At the same time that he put forth this new claim he showed 
that nothing but force would compel' him to abandon it, and military adven¬ 
turers began to flock from all quarters to Bhurtpoor, as a common rendezvous 
where they might hope to be soon actively enqrloyed. The apparent unanimity 
which at one time prevailed among the Jats themselves had also been destroyed. 

Madhoo Sing, a younger brotlier of Durjan Sal, after supporting him in all his 
])roceedings, had suddenly separated from him and made himself master of 
Deeg, and it was becoming obvious that there would soon be no alternative 
between forcible interference and the toleration of a state of anarchy which 
could hardly fail to extend to other native states. 

Under these circumstances the whole (luestion was submitted to Sir Chailes Tiione<«».8ity 

, of Hritwli 

Metcalfe, who had been summoned from Hyderabad, where lie was resident, mtorforenee. 
to succeed Sir David Ochterlony at Delhi. He was one of a band of able 
diplomatists who had received their first training under the Marquis of 
Wellesley, and had ever since been strenuous supporters of the Indian policy 
wliich that great statesman inaugurated. The view which the favourite pupil 
of such a master would give could hardly be doubtful. It is thus explained in 
a very able paper which he drew up on the occasion:—“We have, by degi’ees, 
beccjrae the paramount state of India. Although we exercised the powers of 
this supremacy in many instances before 1817, we have used and asserted them 
more generally since the existence of our influence by the events of that and 
the following year. It then became an establi.shed principle of our policy to 
maintain tranquillity among all the states of India, and to prevent the anarchy 
and misrule which were likely to disturb the general peace. Sir jlohii 
Malcolm's proceedings in Malwah were governed by this pi-inciple, as well as 
those of Sir David Ochterlony. In the case of succession to a principality, it 
seems clearly incumbent on us, with reference to that princijfle, to refuse to 
acknowledge any but the lawful successor, as otherwise we .should throw the 
Aveight of our power into the scale of usurpation and injustice. Our influence 
is too pervading to admit of neutrality, and suftenince would operate as 



182 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book TIL 


A.D. 18 !iS. 


Sir Oluirlw 
Metcalfu*H 
opinitiii iu 
regard toil)' 
teifereiioeii) 
Rhiirt^ioor. 


A<lo))tio}i t»f 
the MUHC 
views hy the 
governor- 
general. 


support.” The application of these principles to the case in question was 
sufficiently obvious. “We are bound not by any positive engagement to the 
Bhuitpoor state, nor by any claim on her part, but by our duty as supreme 
guardians of general tranquillity, law, and right, to maintain the right of Rajah 
Bulwant Sing to the raj of Bhurtpoor, and we cannot acknowledge any other 
pretender. This duty seems to me so imperative that I do not attach any 
l»eculiar importance to the late investiture of the young rajah in the presence 
of Sir David Ochterlony. We should have been equally bound without that 
ceremony, which, if we had not been under a pre-existing obligation to main- 
tiiin the rightful succession, would not have pledged us to anything beyond 
Jicknowledgment.” With regard to the i-egency and the two brothers Durjan 
Sal and Madhoo Sing, the competing claimants for the office. Sir Charles 
Metcalfe did not think that any final decision was yet requiied, but his present 
conviction was tlnis expressed: “We are not called upon to support either 
brother; and if we must act by force it would seem to be desirable to banish both.” 
Negotiation might yet prove effectual, and was undoubtedly the most desirable 
mode of settlement; but if recourse to arms should become necessary, there 
would “not be wanting sources of consolation,” since “a display and rigorous 
exercise of our power, if rendered necessary, would be likely to bring back men’s 
minds in that quarter to a proper tone, and the capture of Bhurtpoor, if effected 
in a. glorious manner, would do us more honour throughout India, by the 
removal of the hitherto unfaded im]»re.ssions caused bj" our former failure, tlian 
any other event that can be conceived. ” 

The above extracts fi’om the opinion given by Sir Charles Metcalfe, are the 
more important from their having practically decided the (juestion, and made a 
convert of the governor-general. “ I have hitherto,” said Earl Amherst, 
“ entertained the opinion that our interference with other states should be 
limited to cjises of positive injury to the honourable Company, or of immediate 
danger thereof. In that opinion 1 have reason to believe that 1 am not sup- 
I)orted by the servants of the honourable Company most competent to judge, 
of its interests, and best jicquainted with the circumstances of this country: 1 
should therefore have hesitated in acting upon my own judgment in opposi¬ 
tion to others; but I am further free to confess that my own opinion has under¬ 
gone some change, and that I am disposed to think that a system of non-inter¬ 
ference, which a])pear8 to have been tried and to have failed in 1800, would 
be tried with less probability of success, and would be exposed to more signal 
failure, after the events which have occuiTed, and the policy which has been 
pursued duiing the last nineteen or twenty j'ears. A much greater degree of 
interference than was f<»nnerly called for, appears to have resulted from the 
situation in which we were placed by the pacification of 1818. It might be a 
hazardous experiment to relax in the exercise of that paramount authority 
which our extended influence in Malwah and Rajpootana specially has impose<l 



Chap. VI.] 


EXPEDITION AGAINST BHURTPOOR. ‘ 


183 


upon us. Applying tliese general principles to the particular case.s before us, a n. isas. 
and believing that without direct inteiderence on our part, there is a probability 
of veiy extended disturbances in the Upper provinces, I am prepared, in the 
first place, to maintain, by force of arms if necessary, the succession of Bulwant 
Sing to the raj of Bhurtpoor.” 

As the members of the supreme council had previously been in favour of Kesolutinii 
a decided policy, the above conversion of the governor-general removed the Bmiremo 
only obstacle to its immediate adoption, and the views of all the membei's were 
substantially embodied in the following resolution:—“Impressed with a full 
conviction that the exi.stiug disturbances 
at Bhurtpoor, if not speedily quieted, will 
produce general commotion and iuterruj>- 
tion of the public tranquillity in Uj)}>er 
India, and feeling convinced that it is our 
solemn duty, no le.ss tlian our right, as the 
jiararaount power and conservators of the 
))ublic peace, to interfere for the preven¬ 
tion of these evils, and that these evils 
will be best prevented by the mainten¬ 
ance of the succession of tlie rightful heir 
to the raj of Bhurtpoor, whilst such a 
course will be in strict consistency with 
the uniform practice and policy of the 
Biitish government in all analogous cases, 
the governor-genei-al in council resolves 
that authority be conveyed to Sir Charles 
Theophilus Metcalfe to accomplish the 
above object, if pnicticable, by expostula¬ 
tion and remonstrance, and should these 
fail, by a resort to measures of force.” 

In accordance with this resolution, negotiation was first attempted, but as there a Briti»ii 
was little probability of its success, military preparations were earned on with 
great activity, and after Sir Charles Metcalfe, desj)airing of an amicable settle- 
ment, had, on the 25th of November, 1825, issued a proclamation denouncing 
tlie j)retensions of Durjan Sal, and declaring the determination of the British 
government to support the rightful jn-ince. Lord Combermere, now commander- 
in-chief, prepared to move against Bhurtpoor at the head of an army of about 
21,000 men, consisting of two regiments of European, and six of native cavalry, 
together with Skinner’s irregular horse, and of three regiments of European, 
and sixteen of native infantry, with strong .detachments of horse and foot, 
artillery and pioneers, and a battering train of above a hundred pieces of heavy 
ordnance. The force of the garrison of Bhurtpoor was supposed to be numeri- 



Geoaok Stavi.ktok Cotton, ViBoouiit Coml»enuoi*o. 
After a |iiciurb’ by Heaphy. 



184 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book VII- 


A D. 1825. 


Exiiedition 
Hgainst 
lUiurt^KKir. < 


Nature of its 
ilefeucen. 


(yonimoncd- 
iiieiit and 
pn>grcB8 of 
the siege. 


cally equal to that of tlie besiegera The army, marching in two divi¬ 

sions, which had assembled at Agra and Madura—the former under General 
Jasper Nicolls, and the latter under General Thomas Reynell—started on the 
<rth and 8th December, and were soon across the Bhurtpoor frontier. On the 
10th, the Madura division moved toward the north-west, keeping considerably 
to the noith of the fort, and screened from view by an intervening forest, and 
arrived in the vicinity of the Motee Jheel, from which tlie ditch which sur¬ 
rounded the fort derived its supply of water. At the former siege by Lord 
Lake, the failure of one of these attacks was attributed to a sudden and 
unexpected increase of the water, by opening the sluices of the Jheel. 
The possibility of such an occurrence was now happily prevented by sending 
forward a column, which, by gaining and retaining possession of the embank¬ 
ment and sluices of the Jheel, prevented the enemy from drawing any water 
from it. The consequence was, that throughout the siege the ditch continued 
almost dry, and thus relieved the besiegers from what might have proved 
one of their most serious difficulties. 

An account of the situation and defeirces of Bhurtpoor having been given 
on the occasion of the former siege, it is only neces.sary here to repeat, that it 
stood in a iilain somewhat rugged towards the west, covered an area of about 
fiv’^e miles in cii’cuit, and was inclosed by a broad and deep ditch, from the 
inner edge of which rose a thick and lofty wall of sun-burned cla.;^’, flanked by 
thjrty-flve tuiTcted bastions. The citadel occupied a height towering abovt; 
the rest of the town, and was inclosed by a ditch 150 feet wide and 50 deejt. 

As the extent of the fortifications made it impossible completely to invest 
the place, the first division took up a position which, resting on the Jheel on 
the north-west, extended along the northern face; the second division, connected 
with the left of the first, fronted the eastern face. The southern and western 
faces were thus left nearly open, but by means of posts gradually established 
beyond the southern and western faces, and in communication with each other, 
the admission of reinfin'cements as well as the escape of .the garrison was in a 
great measure prevented. The points selected for attack were a ravelin a little 
to the east of a prineijial gateway on the north-eastern face, and a bastion on 
the eastern face, which, jutting out from the ramparts by a narrow neck, receive<l 
the name of the Long-necked Bastion. On the 23d of December gi’ound was 
broken for the purpose of making regular approaches towards these two points, 
and on the 24th the batteries which had been erected began to play upon 
them. At first a brisk fire was kept \ip by the garrison, and bodies of horse 
and foot made desultory attempts to interrupt the progress of the siege, but in 
proportion as the batteries were advanced and established an overpowering fire, 
the enemy’s guns were withdravjn from the outer works, and the besiegers suf¬ 
fered little interruption while they continued for several days a heavy fire of 
shot and shells from forty-eight battering guns and thirty-six mortars. The 



CUAP. VI.l CAPTURE OF BHURTPOOR. IS.> 

effect produced, however, was not satisfactory. The clay ranipai-ts stood the 
fire better than if they had been built of solid masonry, and though considem- 
ble breaches both to the right and left had been made, the engineei-s refused to 
report them practicable. The mode of attack was therefore changed, and after 
the trenches had been brought close to the counterscarp of the ditch, the proce.s,s 
of breaching by mines instead of batteries was adopted. By the 8th of January 
four mines were sprung, one of tliem under the cavalier and curtain of the 
north-eastern angle; and though the effect produced was still aliort of what had 
been anticipated, the dilapidation produced was sufficient to show that perse¬ 
verance in mining could hardly fail to succeed. On the 11 th and 12th mines 
were carried across the ditch and beneath the ramparts, and on the 16tli the 
mine beneath the Long-necked Bastion was spiaing with complete success. The 
garrison made some attempts to countermine and also to repair the breache.s. 
In the former they completely failed, and in the latter were exposed to .such a 
tremendous fire from the battei’ies that their success was very partial. The 
a.s.sault was now at hand. It was fised for the 18th, and was to commence on 



ljOlfO-KKUKEi> Baktu»n, Bh uRTPOOli,— Fmiu CreijchUoiV Kiogp »»f 


a very appropriate signal—the exjJosiou of a mine which had been driven under 
tlie N.E.E. cavalier, and charged with nearly a ton weight of gunpowder. The 
effect was tremendous, and proved fatal even to some of the assailants as they 
stood ready in the trenches. After a momentary paiise, pi’oduced by this, acci¬ 
dent, the storming party mshed forward in two columns, and wei'c speedily on 
the summit of the main breaches on the right and left. Though the enemy made 
a resolute defence it soon proved unavailing, and the assailants, as soon as the 
first struggle was over, completed the capture with a loss of aboirt 000 men. 
The loss of the garrison in killed and worrnded was estimated at 14,000. 

During the storm strong bodies of horse and foot attempted to escape by 
VoL. III. 220 


A.D. 1826. 


BiiurtjVMtr 

taken by 

Btonii. 





186 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book VIT, 


A.D. 1826. 

Rajab of 
lihurtpoor 
restored. 


FortifiBa* 
tiona of 
lihurtjtoor 
disniaiitlttd. 


the western gates. Most of them were cut down or captured by the cavalry. 
Among the prisoners thus taken was Duijan Sal, with his wife and two sons. 
He was fortliwith sent off as a state prisoner to Allahabad. On the 19th of 

January, Lord Combermere and Sir Charles 
Metcalfe entered the citadel, and on the 
following day they performed the ceremony 
of placing the young rajah on the throne. 
The principal widow of the late rajah, ap¬ 
pointed nominal regent, was intrusted with 
the custody of his person, while the govern¬ 
ment was committed to two ministers, who 
were to administer it under the control of 
a British resident specially appointed to 
Bhurtpoor. Madhoo Sing, the blether of 
Durjan Sal, immediately made his subniis- 
.sion, and retired from Deeg to live within 
the British ten'itories on a liberal [lension. 
sn.vKR UOW 1 .A 11 OK UIIBAAN 8ai.,i the u»..r,K.r of By the Capture of Bhurtpoor a stain which 



Mysore.—In the Muieuin of the Kut India Coiiipuiiy- 


had long rested on Clie British arms was re¬ 
moved, and the hopes of a future rising, which its supposed impregnability had 
fo.stered in several of the native states, were extinguished. As it was not 
impossible, however, that it might again have become a rallying point for the 
disaffected, its fortifications were dismantled. The expediency of this proceeding 
cannot be questioned; but since the British government were jirofessedly acting, 
not for themselves, but for an ally, it sounds rather strange to hear that one of 
the first things they did after reinstating him in his capital, was to lender it inca¬ 
pable of defence. In another respect the conduct of the captors was still less 
justifiable: “Our plundering here under the name of ])rize,’’ writes Sir Charles 
Metcalfe, “has been verj' disgraceful, and has tarnished our well-earned honour. 
Until I get rid of the prize agents I cannot re-establish the sovereignty of the 
young rajah, whom we came professedly to protect, and have been plundering 
to his last lotah since he fell into our hands.”' 

There was still one other quarter in which the paramount authority of the 
British government had been called in question. The Rajah of Macherry, or as 
he is usually called, the Rajah of Ulwar, from his capital, situated sixty miles 
W.N.W. of BhuHpoor, having died, leaving an illegitimate son and a nephew, 
both ill nonage, his succession was disputed by their respective partizans. Ulti- 


■ This is itiaJe of tliiii plates of silver, very beauti¬ 
fully wrought, fixed on the exterior of a wooden 
framing. The bottom of the howdah is of open cane- 
work, and the sides are covered with crimson silk, 
of which material also are made the cushions. The 
canopy is of extremely ungainly form, but is very 


curious from being in the shape of a crested bird 
with outstretched wings. The body, head, and out¬ 
side of the wings are covered with silver, the under¬ 
side of the latter being lined with crimson flowered 
silk. 

* Kaye’s Life of Lord Metcalfe, vol. ii. p 165. 



Chap. VI.] THE RAJAH OF ULWAR. 187 

inately, as neither had a decided ascendency, a compromise was effected, by 
which Benee Sing, the nephew, became nominal rajali, and Bulwant Sing, tlie 
son, was to administer the government on attaining majority. Till then Ahmed 
Buksh Khan, the nabob of a neighbouring district nnder British protection, was 
to be liis guardian. The peace produced by this compromise was not lasting. 
As soon as tlie youths grew up their mutual claims were revived, and a civil 
war began again to rage. In 1824, the nephew, Benee Sing, gained a decided 
ascendency, and l)ecame real as well as nominal rajah, the son, Bulwant Sing, 
I'etiring upon a jaghire. Shortly after an attempt was made to assassinate 
Ahmed Buksh Khan, and the a.s,sassin being .seized, confessed that he had been 
(‘mployed by Mulha, the rajah’s minister and favourite, and some other leading 
members of his court. Ahmed Buk.sh Khan, being prohibited by treaty with 
the British from redressing himself, applied to them for protection, and a 
demand was thi'refore made upon the rajah to seize the persons aceused, and 
send them to Dellii for trial. He at first ma<le a show of comjdiance by ])]acing 
the parties in nominal confinement, but soon threw oft' the jna.sk, took Mulha 
into gT’cater favour thaji befin'c, and when I’cmonstinted with bji the re,sident a^ 
Delhi, maintainc<l, not without plausibility, that as an indejiendent prince In* 
alone wa.s entitled to tiy his subjects for any crimes alleg(*d to have been com¬ 
mitted by them, d'o give effect to this view, and show that nothing but force 
would compel him to abandon it, he strengthened the defences of his capital, 
began to collect troops, and cntei’e<l into communicatiorjs witli di.saffected paities, 
ami more especaally with Diujan Sal, at Bhurbi»ooi*. The capture of this cele¬ 
brated .stronghold filled him with dismay', and he no sooner heai‘<l that the 
victorious army which achieved it was aliout t<i mareh against him than he 
hastened to make his .submission, by sending off the paities accused as instiga¬ 
tors of the attempted assassination f>f Ahmed B\iksh Khan to take their trial 
at Dellii, releasing Bulwant Sing from the jirison in which he had confined 
him, and, moreover, ceding to him one-half of the territory which Sir George 
liarlow, when he was fooli.shly s<|ua.mlering away the con(iue.sts of the Marquis 
of Wellesley, had bestowed on the Row Rajah of Macherry. 

All open hostilitii's throughout India, having now ccasiid, ICarl Amherst, 
who had intimated his intention to re.sign, sot out, in the beginning of August, 
I82(), on a tour through the Upper provinces. Gn his anival at Cawnpoor, on 
the 16th of November, he wius visited among other native ])rinces by Ghazec- 
ud-din Hyder, the. King of Oude. To return the visit he proceeded to Luckijow. 
In the confidential intercourse which ensued, the subject of internal interference 
was again discussed, the king comjilaining of the extent to which his legitimate 
authority was ajipropriated by the resident, and insisting that there was 
nothing in the state of the country to justify it. On the boi-ders, the turbulence 
of some refractory chiefs led to occasional di.sturbance.s, but the whole of the 
territory was, with a few exceptions, cultivated like a garden, and the people 


A n. 182«. 


DHtiali in- 
terferaiice 
in Ulwur. 


Viftit of 

|jtuveriH»r- 

geueml to 

i iiufknuw. 



188 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book VIT. 


A.D. 18^7. 


Alleg<xl 
griovaiiooR 
nf tlie King 
t*f (>u«le. 


liulatiotiH 
of British 
g4)veriiiiion1 
with llulkar 


Intemew 
iif Jjoitl 

with King 
vt Delhi. 


wei-e apparently contented. These representations, if well founded, derived much 
additional weight from the conduct of the king, who, though far too much 
under the influence of favourites, male and female, had not only faithfully ful¬ 
filled lus engagements, but repeatedly relieved the embarrassments of the Cal¬ 
cutta treasury by libei’al loans from the hoards of Sadut Ali. In addition to 
tlie large jidvances formerly mentioned he had, in the end of 1825, lent the 
Company in per 2 >etuity the sum of £1,000,000 sterling at five j)er cent, interest, 
aud a few months afterwards had increased it by another £500,000. Neither 
liis remonstrances nor liis loans had the effect of jiroducing any essential change 
in the British i>olicy, and his grievances, real or imaginary, remained unre¬ 
dressed when he died in October, 1827, and was succeeded by his eldest son, 
Soliman Jah, under the title of Nasir-ud-din Hyder. 

From Lucknow the governor-general lu’oceeded to Agra, where he arrived 
in January, 1827. Hci’e he was visited by the various chiefs of Malwah, and 
leceivtul missions from Holkar aud Scindia. The former being still a minor 
was [ji-obably thought too young, and the latter was pining away under a 
mortal disease which made it impossible for him to be personally j)resent. The 
territories of Holkar, under the able-management of his minister Tantra Jog, 
and the almost absolute control of Mr. Wellesley, tlie British resident, had 
rapidly imijroved; those of Scindia now enjoyed a degree of tranquillity which 
had long been denied, but in their jiresent extent and resoiu-ces j^resented a 
humiliating coiitinst to what they were thirty years before, during the first 
l^eriod of Dowlut Row tScindia’s rcigii. He had sometimes dreamed that during 
a. 2 )eriod of dis.'ister to the British arms he miglit yet regain all lie liad lost, but 
latterly he had becoum moi’e reconciled to his lot, and sought (^omjiensation for 
disa 2 )])ointed ambition in indolence aud luxurious indulgence. He died in 
March, 1827, without any heir of his own body, and without having ajqjointed 
any successor; biit in accordance with what was supposed to be his wish, a boy 
of eleven years of age, distantly related to his family, wa.s, with the sanction 
of the British government, raised to the throne, and placed under the guardiau- 
sliij) of his favouiite wife, Baiza Bai, as regent. 

After a visit to the young Rajah of Bliurtpoor Ltjrd Amherst j)roceeded to 
Delhi, where he was met by envoys from the different Rajpoot states, and was 
conq)elled to diseu.ss some questions of 2 >recedence with the Mogul, who would 
fain, in the midst of his humiliation, have received the governor-general as a 
vassfil, and exacted the homage which he claimed as his su 2 )erior. The time for 
such mummeiy had i)assed away, and before the visit terminated the King of 
Delhi was made perfectly aware that his existence sis a territorial sovereign 
had ceased, and that he must henceforth be contented to regai-d himself as only 
a stii>endiary of the Company. From Delhi, Lord Amherst continued his jour¬ 
ney northward to Simla, which thus, for the first time, became a temporary 
re.sidence for the Governors-general of India. Wliile here, he interchanged 



ruAr. VI.] 


DEATH OF STE THOMAS MONEO. • 


189 


friendly missions with Runjeet Sing, and received intelligence of the hostilities ^.n. isar. 
which Ijad again broken out between Pei-sia and Russia, and, in conseiiuence of 
the continued encroachments of the latter power, excited in certain quarters no 
small alarm for the future safety of our Indian empire. Tlie governor-general 



Simla. — Fnmi a (Irawing >»y Major l-nani. 


ipiitted Simla in the end of June on his return to Calcutta. About a week oeaOiof 
afterwards, on the Gth of July 1827 the government of India was deprived by jionr.'."*'" 
death of one of its most distinguished servants, Sir Thomas Monro, governor of 
Miulrfis. The length of his service and the state of liis Iiealth had made him 
desirous to I'etuni home, aud by a letter addressed to the <lii-ectors on the 25th 
of September, 1823, he had requested permission to resign in January, 1825. 

The Burmese war comjjelled him to forego his intention, and he exerted his 
utmost enez'gies in foi warding troops and furnishing supplies. When the war 
terminated, he renewed his reejuest to be relieved at the earliest period possi¬ 
ble. His letter was received in September, 182G, but unfortunately no imme¬ 
diate steps were taken, and it was <jnly in Janutiry, 1827, after neaily four 
months had elapsed, that new governors were in one day api)ointed to the presi¬ 
dencies of Madras aud Bombay—the Right Hon. S. R. Lushington to the New K<>»er- 
former, as successor to Sir Thomas Monro, and Sir John Malcolm to the latter, wartnuiaiHi 
as successor to the Hon. Mountstuart Elphiustone. More than four months 
elaj>setl before tlie new governors took theii’ de[)artui'e. So far as regardetl 
Sii- Thomas Moiu’o it was too late. During a visit which he paid to the dis¬ 
tricts north of Mysore, in which he had long and successfully laboured, he was 
•seized with cholera, and died at Puteecindah, not far from Gooty. 

The internal administration of Lord Amherst does not require any lengthene<l 
notice. In Bengal, which was under his more immediate superintendence, the 
different j*ublic <lepartments were left nearly as he fouinl them ; but both in 


190 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book VII. 


A.D. is-ij. Madras and Bombay most important improvements, of which the chief merit 
belongs to Sir Thomas Monro and Mr. Elphinstone, were introduced. The 
ra<»cofLoi-(j leading object of both these distinguished men was to adapt tlieir reforms to 
ndmiiiistm- the fecliiigs and habits of tlie population, and in particular, to employ native 
*'^gency wherever it could be made available, rather as an auxiliary to European 
agency tlian .as a substitute for it. The enormous expenditure of the Burmese 
war had greatly cml)arra.ssed tlie Indi.an finances. Above ten millions sterling 
had been permanently added to the debt. At the same time, while the charges 
had increased, the levenues had diminished, so as to leave in 1827-28 a local 
ileficit of above a million. Tlie account, comparing the close of Lord Amherst’s 
fulmiui.stration with its commencement, .stood as follows: In 1822-28, revenue, 
.£28,118,000; charge, £18,400,000. In 1827-28, revenue, £22,808,000; charge, 
.£21,974,000. Ill 1822-28, debt, £29,888,000; in 1827-28, debt, £89,000,000. 
The liuaneial jirospeet was thus rather alarming, but as the increased exjiendi- 
tiire had been occasioned by wars which were happily terminated, there was 
ground to hojie that by careful economy the temporary embarmssment which 
.h.ad been jiroduced, would .soon di.sajipear. In Februa.ry, 1828, Earl Amherst, 
owing to the illness of a member of his family, sailed for Engl.and without 
waiting for the arrival of a successor. In the interval, the government was 
administered by Mr. Butterworth Bayley, who succeeded to it as senior member 
of council. 


CHAPTER Vir. 


William Penlineli (siov.-rnor-genural—Kconomical aiul judicial reforms—Opium regul.atioiis—Al)oU- 
ti<m of Suttee—Riglits of Clirintian onverts from Ilindooism—Collision between supreme court 
and {'oveinment of Bombay— Settlement of North-weetem pnivincea—Mojisures against Thugg<‘e— 
Iiitenuil disturK-inci's in Ass.aiii, Ttuutsserim, IVIysore, and Oo.>rg. 


T last Lortl William Bentiuck had succeeded in obtaining 
the appointment of governor-general. He had been abruptly 
deprived in 1807 of the government of Madras by a resolution 
of the directors, which declared, “ that although the zeal and 
integrity of the present governor, Lord William Bentinck, are 
rxjrdWiuinm deserving of the court’s .appi’obation; yet, when they consider the unhappy 
events which h.avc taken place at Vellore, and also other parts of his lord¬ 
ship’s administration which have come before them, the court are of ojiinion 
that it is expedient, for the restoration of confidence in the Compan 3 '’s 





Chap. VII.] 


LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK. 


101 


government, that Lord William Bentinck should be removed, and he is 
hereby removed accordingly.” He complained loudly of the treatment, and 
in an appeal to the directors thus expressed himself: ‘ The mutiny at Vellore 
cannot be imputed to me, directly or indirectly. I have been removed from 
iny situation, and condemned as an ac¬ 
complice in measures with wliich I had 
no further concern than to obviate their 
ill consequences; my dismissal was 
effected in a manner harsh and mortify¬ 
ing; and tlie forms which custom has 
prescribed to soften the severity of a mis¬ 
fortune, at all events sufficiently severe, 
were on this single occasion violated, as 
if for the express purpose of deepening 
my disgrace.” He concluded thus: “1 
liave been severely injured in my cha- 
lacter and feelings. For these injuries 
I a,sk rej)aratiou, if, indeed, any repara- 
tit)n can atone for feelings so deeply 
aggrieved, and a character so uniu-stK' i-ord william cavkniush bkntinih. 

Alter a pic'uie by Sir Thuiuaa Lauivnce. 

compromised in the eyes of the world. 

In complying with my demands, you will discharge, if I may ventui'e to say .so, 
what is due no less to your own honour than to mine.” The court answered 
this appeal by long and verbose resolutions, in which, while admitting “the 
charges originall}' advanced against the conduct of the governor and commander- 
in-chief respecting the violations of caste, to have been, bi the sense then attached 
to tlicm, misapplied and defective,” yet, “as tlie misfortunes which happened in 
their administration placed their fate undei’ the government of public events and 
oi)inious which the court could not control, so it is not now in their pow'er to 
alter the effects of them.” In regard to Lord William Bentinck in pai-ticular, 
the apology was somewhat amplified by such expressions as the following:—“But 
in the abruptness of the order of removal the court meant no perstmal disrespect 
to Lord William Bentinck, and extremely regret that his feelings have been 
wounded by considering it in that light. They lament that it should have been 
his fate to have his j)ublic situation decided by a crisis of such difficulty and 
danger as it has been the lot of very few public men to encounter; a ensis which 
they have since been happy to find wtis not produced by intended or actual 
violations of caste, as they are now satisfied that Lord William Bentinck had no 
share in originating the orders which for a time bore that character, and by the 
machinations of enemies working upon the ignorance and prejudices of the 
sepoy.s, were by them believed to be such violations.” Again: “But in all the 
measures of moderation, clemency, and consideration, recommended by Lord 



A.D. 1827. 


liuiitiiick 
ti ciuididnto 
for tl»e oftioi 
of govenior 




HISTOJRY OF INDIA. 


[Book Vli. 


1!)2 

A.a 1827 . William Beutiiick after tlie mutiny, the court, tliougli not exactly agreeing 
with him in the data from wliich he reasoned, give him unqualified praise; and 
loniwiiiiam thouflli the Unfortunate events which separated Lord William Bentinck from 
the .service of the Company cannot be recalled, yet the court are happy to bear 
testimony to the ujirightness, disinterestedness, zeal, respect to the system of 
the Company, and in many instances, succes.s, with which ho acted in the gov¬ 
ernment of Fort St. George, and to express their best wishes that his valuable 
(pialities and honourable charactei’ may be employed, as they de.serve, for the 
benefit of his country.” 

This apology was no means satisfactoiy, and Lord William Bentinck 
was detenuined not to rest satisfied till he had wiped oflT the disgrace to which 
he conceived the directors had unjustly subjected him by their alirupt dismi.ssal. 
For many years aftei’wards lie was employed in the service of his country, both 
as a soldier and a dijilomatist, but his thoughts were still'turned to India, and 
bis ambition was to return to it in possession of a higher appointment than 
that of which he had been deprived. Such an ajqiointment would be the best 
of all modes of reparation, since it would at once I’everse the sentence of inca- 
jiacity which had been pronounced against him, and funiisli him with an 
ojiportunity of jiractically demonstrating his abilities as an Indian adminis¬ 
trator. Aecoi’dingly, as has been mentioned, he became, on the retirement of 
the JMarquis of Hastings, a candidate for tlie office of governor-general. On 
that occasion Lord Amherst was jireferred, but Lord William Bentinck did not 
allow his claims to lie forgotten, and when the office again became vacant, sue¬ 
ts appoint «i ceeded in obtaining it. The appointment was in itself a great triumph to Lord 

govennir- 

geuerai. William Bentinck, as it was imjiossible to re,sist the inference that if he was fit. 
to be governor-general, he ought not to have been dismissed as unfit to lie gov¬ 
ernor of Madras. For a time, however, it seemed doubtful if the ajipointment 
was to ]trove anything more than a barien honour. He received it in July, 
1827, but the niini.stry which had sanctioned his nomination, sustained by the 
death of Mr, Canning in August a shock from which it never recovered, and 
though the .same political party continued for a short time to retain office undci 
Lord Goderich, the ministry of the Duke of Wellington disjtlaced it before Lord 
William Bentinck had taken his departure. It thus became a question whether 
the longing for patronage might not prevail, and induce the new ministers to 
annul the a]ipointment by putting in force the crovm’s undoubted pow'cr of 
recall. To their honour they adopted a more becoming couisc, and Lord 
Arrive* at William Bciitinck was pennitted to depart. He set sail in Feliruarv, 1828, ami 

Calcutta. ^ , J’ > 

immediately on his arrival at Calcutta on the 4tli of July, assumed the gov¬ 
ernment. 

As all hostilities had previously ceased and the country was generally 
tranquil, the first duty of the new administration was sufficiently obvious. A 
large addition had been made to the debt, and the revenue was more than a 





DE CASTRO’S TRIUMPHAL ENTRY INTO GOA 








Chap. VIL] 


LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK’S MEASURES. 


193' 


million sterling short of the expenditure. It was impossible that such a state A.n. i 828 . 
of matters could be allowed to continue, and accordingly before the actual 
arrival of the new governor-general, .Sir Charles Metcalfe, who had been called rordwiiiuiai 
from Delhi to a seat in the council boai-d, only expressed the common resolution i>ouoy of re- 
of himself and his colleagues when he said, “The government which allows 
this to go on in time of peace deserves any punishment. The government of 
which I am a part shall not allow it.” Lord William Bentinck was animated 
l)y the same spirit, perhaps in a still more eminent degree, and during his 
interviews with the directors had the subject so strongl}' forced u 2 ion his notice, 
that he arrived with a determination to institute a ingid examination into 
every branch of the jiublic expenditure, and carr^’’ economy to its utmo.st 
limits. The home authorities had assumed the scale of ex 2 )eiKliture in 1823-24 
as a fair standard, and Lord William Bentinck was prej)ared to give jn-actical 
effect to their views. It must be admitted, however, that his first measure 
of economy was not wisely chosen, as the justice of it was questioned by high 
authority, and the clamour and discontent wliich it occasioned more than coun¬ 
terbalanced the paltry saving which it effected. 

The subject of haita or hatha, a word which merely signifies “extra pay oi- Hw order on 
allowance,” has been ah’eady mentioned. It consisted of a lixe<l addition which on«itt«. 
was made to the 2 )ay of the officers of the anny when they were in the field 
within the temtories of the Company. At an early period the allcovance was 
doubled when the serv'ice was beyond these territories, oi- rendered to natiA’e 
jirinces, who took this wa}’^ of testifying their gratitude to such valuable 
auxiliaries. It was thus ^mid hy Meer Jaffier when he was made Nabob of 
Bengal, and the re<luction of it by the Company, after the grant of the dewannee 
had thrown the burden of the j^ayment upon themselve,s, led to mutinous 
ju-oceedings, which it required all the energj' of Clive to suppi‘e.s.s. At that 
time double batta wsis abolished, Vmt single batta still contimied to be jiaid. 

Strictly speaking it was due only when the troops were in the field, and hence 
the original understanding was, that when they were in cantonraeixts and 
provided with quarters at the jjublic exjiense, oidj' half batta was payable. By 
a subsequent arrangement in 1801, the exj)ense of pi-oviding quarters in canton¬ 
ments was thrown upon the officers themselves, and to compensate for this 
additional burden they were allowed full batta at all times, whether in the 
field or in (juarters. I’his arrangement had never been ajq)roved by the home 
authorities, and in 1814 instructions were given to the goveranient of Bengal 
to return to the original plan of allowing half battti only at those sbitions of 
tlie British army which had been established prior to the extension of the 
(.Jonq)any’8 territories in that presidency. The Marquis of Hastings was so 
strenuously opposed to these instructions, that instead of acting upon them he 
simply retumed them to the court for re-consideration, and Lord Amhei-st had 
in this respect only followed his example. The time for enforcing them seemed 

Vot. III. 221 



194 


niSTOEY OF INDIA. 


[Book VII. 


A O. 1828. 


QuuBtioii >iH 

to OXJIb- 

(Uoiic}’ <if 
g(»vonior 
gciierftis 
onlor lo- 
pinliiiK 


('I.niiour 
raised i>.vtla> 
ulKdilioii <if 
l>utta. 


now to liuve arrived, and the orders of the court were so pei’emptoiy, that Lord 
William Bentinck had no alternative but to obey them or resign. He chose tlie 
former, and had, it is understood, pledged himself, before leaving England, that 
the issue ol' what was afterwards known as the “Half-batta Order,” would be 
one of his first measures of retrenchment. 

TIio half-batta order was issued on tlie 9th of November, 1828, under 
(iircumstauces which must have made the governor-general doubtful of its 
expediency. Lord Combermere, tlie commander-in-chief, jirotested strongly 
against it, and resigned his office sooner than take any part in its execution. 
The two civil members of council, Mr. Bayley and Sir Charles Metcalfe, only 
consented becau.se, as the latter expressed it, “ The order was one which could 
not have been disobeyed, unless we could tell the court that we are supi’enie 
and they subordinate.” So far was he, however, from approving the measure, 

that he recorded his sentiments on the subject “with a view, if possible, to get 

« 

the order rescinded.” In his miniite, after giving it as his confirmed opinion, 
fovinde.d on twenty-eight years’ observation, “that the allowances of officers on 
full batta are barely sufficient for theii’ proper support in their several ranks, 
ami do not admit of any reduction without great suffering,” lie concluded thus: 
“Had I conceived that this government possessed any discretionary authority 
on the subject, the executitin of that measure would never have received my 
assent; for it ajipears to me, witli every defei'ence to the high authorities from 
which it has proceeded, to be extremely unwise and inexpedient, fraught witli 
mi.schief, and unproductive of any essential good.” 

If this was the opinion of the most competent Judges, we can easily under¬ 
stand how loud was the clamour and how violent the opposition of those whose 
incomes were curtailed by this retrenchment. The whole amount of the annual 
saving fell .short of £20,000, and this was only to be obtained by ti*enching 
jiarticularly on the incomes of junior officers, whose aggregate allowances weie 
already insufficient for their support, and breaking what was called the compact 
of 1801, which gave Avhole batta as a compen.sation for the quarters which the 
officers had been obliged to procure at their own expense, and on the faith of 
which they had actually purchased what were previously public (juarters at an 
open sale, and jitiid foi- them with their own money. Those and similar 
repi'esentations were submitted to the government, in memorials pre.sented 
through the commandei'-in-chief, and transmitted to the directors. The govemoi- 
general could only answer that he was acting in obedience to instructions, and 
that it would afford him sincere gratification to recall the half-batta order, should 
the court see fit to give him the necessary authority. The court took higher 
ground, ami after denouncing the tone of the memorials as inconsistent with 
military subordination, closed all further discussion by declaring their detenni- 
nation to enforce tlie retrenchment. No one was so great a sufferer by it as 
the governor-geneml himself, since it subjected him at the very commencement 



Chap. VII.] 


LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK’S MEASURES. 


195 


of his administration to a degree of unpopularity, of which he was never able a.d. i 828 . 
afterwards completely to disencumber himself. The prejudice with which he 
had thus to struggle was not more unfortunate than it was unjust, since he had Tho aimii- 
only acted ministerially in the matter, and rather in opposition to his own a iKiitryand 
opinion than in accordance with it. This may fairly be inferred from a minute 
of a later date, in which, adverting to the subject, he says; “ Trifling, however, 
as this deduction is upon the aggregate amount of the pay of the Bengal army, 
it has been severely felt by the few upon whom it has fallen, and has created 
in all an alarm of uncertainty as to their futirre condition, which has perhaps 
produced more discontent than the measure itself.” The opposition made to the 
half-batta order appears to have made more impression on tho directors than 
they themselves were willing to admit. The only stations to which it was at 
first made applicable were Dinapoor, Berhampoor, Ban-ackpoor, Dum-Dum, and 
Ghazipoor. A much wider application was doubtless intended, and the fact 
that it was not carried further is best explained by a change of opinion in the 
home authorities, who seem, though late, to have been at last convinced that 
any retrenchment which spread discontent tliroughout an army must be dearly 
jturchased. 

In order to carry out the retrenchments on which the home authorities were ooiei 
intent, for the purpose of reducing the expenditure to the standard of 1823-21, 
the governor-general shortly after Ins arrival appointed two committees, a‘ civil 
and a military, each composed of three members, one from each pi-esidency, to 
sit at Calcutta, and institute a full inquiry into all the branches of the jmlJic 
.service, with a view to suggest such alterations as might secure the utmost 
degi-ee of unity, efficiency, and economy in the management of affairs. The 
military committee found the work allotted them already in a great measure 
perforaaed by the sweeping reductions which had been made both in the 
number of troops and in the amount of allowances, and by means of which the 
aggregate military expenditure was diminished to the extent of more than a 
million sterling. The civil committee entered upon a comparatively new field 
of labour, and succeeded after several years of assiduous labour in effecting 
reductions to the amount of nearly half a million. The total aggregate of 
reductions in both branches was £1,553,991. Part of these, however, were only 
prospective, as they depended on vacancies which had not yet taken place; and 
the whole sum, even if it could have been immediately realized, would have 
fallen short of the necessities of the case, as an Indian surjdus of at least two 
millions was required to defray annual expenses incurred on territorial account 
in England. It was therefore still necessary, after every po.s.sible retrenchment 
had been made for the pmpose of diminishing expenditure, to endeavour to 
obtain a positive increase of revenue. Some of the means employed with this 
view deserve notice. 

Under native rule, individuals in public establishments often obtained 



196 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book VII. 


A.D. 1828. 


Laiiils OX' 

amptodft'om 

^veninioiit 


Invalid 
grounds <n» 
whicli Tiiaiiy 
of tllOKli 
i'xetnpticiiis 
were 
claiiui'd. 


Now 

rag Illation. 


grants, exempting their lauds or certain portions of them, from government 
assessment. In most of these grants the exemption was declared to be per¬ 
petual, but practically it was not so, as the grants of one sovereign were fre¬ 
quently recalled or arbitrarily disregarded by his successor. This was the case 
when the Mogul government was in full vigour, and there was no question as 
to the sufficiency of the authority by which each grant was made. At a 
later period, when misrule began to prevail and the Mogul empire was dismem¬ 
bered, not only did the chiefs who had previously been contented to hold a 
delegated authority from Delhi aspire to independence, but advantage was 
taken of the general confusion to obtain exemptions from government assess¬ 
ment, by the intervention of parties who had no right to grant them, and not 
unfreipiently by the still more exceptionable process of forged documents. In 
this way the revenue was seriously impaired, and numerous proprietors who 
claimed and enjoyed the protection of government bore no part of its burdens. 
The British government, when it first began to levy territorial revenue in India 
being very much in the dark, and at the same time di.sposed to act with a 
liberality bordering on prodigality, laid it down as a general rule, to recognize 
the validity of all exemptions of an earlier date th.an the grant of the dewannee, 
provided the grantees were in actual possession. There cannot be a doubt that, 
in this way, many grants not supported by any sufficient title Avere sustained. 
Noj'Avas this the worst. As soon as the principle of recognition Avas announced, 
native dexterity was set to Avork, and the manufactui'e of forged documents was 
carried oil by wholesale. Some easy means of testing their genuineness might 
ha.A'e been devised, but, as if the gov'ernraent of the day had been afraid to 
detect the impositions Avhich were practised upon them, they made it as difficult 
as po.ssible, by rcciuiring that every title of exemption not inA'alid on the very 
face of it should give the holder of it the full privilege of exemption till 
formally set aside by a court of law. The encouragement thus given to the 
concoction of fictitious titles soon beciime so apparent, that the collectors were 
at length empoAvered to investigate rent-free cities and pronounce upon their 
validity. If the decision was adverse and confii’med by the board of revenue, 
the land was forthwith assessed at the usual rate, reserving to the proprietor 
a right of appeal to the ordinary court. This enactment proved an imperfect 
remedy, and even caused some injustice. The accumulation of undecided cases 
in the courts of law led to almost interminable delay, while a percentage 
allowpd to the collectors on every case of resumption converted them into 
interested parties, and so far deprived them of the character of impartial 
judges. To remedy these defects a new regulation was made shortly before the 
arrival of Lord William Bentinck, and afterwards carried into full effect with 
his concurrence. It empowered the governor-general to appoint special com¬ 
missioners to decide on all cases of appeal from the decision of the collectors in 
regard to exemptions, and removed from the collectors themselves the tempta- 



Chap. VII ] 


LOKD WILLIAM BENTINCK’S MEASURES. 


197 


tion to partiality, by depriving them of the percentage on resumption. Under a.d. i 828 . 
tins last enactment a considerable addition was made to the public revenue by 
the assessment of lands which had previously escaped. 

Another branch of revenue which at this time attracted much attention, both Revoimo 
on political and financial grounds, wiis that derived from opium. In Bengal 
the production of this drug was a complete monopoly, no cultivator being per¬ 
mitted to raise it except on account of government, which made advances in 
anticipation of the crop, and received the whole produce at a certain fixed rate 
per lb. From the great difference between the pi-ice thus paid and that after¬ 
wards obtained at the government sales, a large amount of revenue was obtained. 

During the anarchy which prevailed in Central India before the predatory 
,sy.stem was put down by the Marquis of Hastings, the Bengal monopoly was 
not subjected to any formidable competition from native states; but when, in 



Fort and TIabbovb of Ki'DRACUeii;. —From KeiineUy*» Narrative of Caniiviign on t)»e liidiis. 


consequence of the restoration of tranquillity, it became practicable not only 
to cultivate the poppy siiccessfully throughout Malwah for home consumption, 
but to realize a large profit by sending the surplus across Rsijpootana to the 
port of Kiinuchee in Scinde, and thence to the Portuguese settlements of Din 
and Damaun for final shipment to China, the opium profits of the Company 
were seriously diminished, and various schemes were devised for the purpo.se of 
recovering them. The prohibition of the culture in all districts except those 
where the Company’s monopoly was established, was at once seen to be the 
most effectual remedy; but the enforcement of such a prohibition was impossible, 
or, if not impossible, would have been a flagrant violation of the independent rights 
of native- states. It was therefore mentioned only to be rejected; and the plan 
first adopted was to endeavour to secure a virtual monopoly of export by enter¬ 
ing the opium market as purchasers, and buying so largely as to leave no more 
in the liands of native cultivators and dealers than was necessary for home con- 











198 


HISTOBY OF INDIA. 


[Book VII. 


A.D. 1828 . sumption. The absurdity of this arrangement, which might easily have been fore- 
seen, was soon made apparent. Its only effect was to raise the price and thereby 

Objections at oncc incrcasc the demand and enlarge the area of cultivation. The cure 
thus proved worse than the evil which it was meant to remedy, and the native 

amropitim exporters, still obtaining a full supply, were able to carry on the traffic as exten¬ 
sively and as jirolitably as before. The next device was to give the rulers of 
native states an interest in the repression of the opium traffic. With this view 
the Company succeeded in binding most of them by treaty to restrict the cul¬ 
ture of the pojipy, and prohibit the transit of opium through their territories, 
in consideration of an annual sum to be paid to them as an equivalent for the 
e.stimated loss of revenue. These treaties, by their gross interference with the 
rights of industry, wore unpopular in the extreme, and not only exhibited the 
British government in the odious light of adding to its revenue by means of 
tyrannical restrictions imyjosed on cultivators who were not its subjects, but 
•fostered heart-burnings, and led to riots, by which the public tranquillity was 
<li.sturbed, the oj)ium smugglers often moving about in armed bands, and effec¬ 
tually resisting the attempts made to capture them. These opium treaties, 
while they thus ])roved a fruitful source of disturbance, and made British supre¬ 
macy detested, failed to accompli,sh the object contemplated by them. Though 
Holkar, and most of the petty chiefs of Malwah, tempted by the annual e<puva- 
lent, 01 - afraid to give offence to the Company, concluded trcatie.s, Scindia and 
the Rajahs of Jeypoor and ,Ioudy)oor ])ositively refused, and thus lai’ge tracts of 
country remained, in which the poppy was freel^’^ cultivated, and across Avhich 
the oj)ium dealers could cany on their traflic without interru] )tion. The nttei- 
inefficacy of the restrictions was j)alpable from the fact, that the exi)ort of o{)ium 
from Damaun, which in 1820-21 did not exceed GOO chests, amounted in 1827-28 
to 4000. 

Final ar- It was impossible that treaties thus at once tyrannical and inoperative could 

nuigeineiit. ••iriiii -i • 

be mauitaiiied. Lord Amherst had seen the necessity of rescinding them, and 
Mr. Bayley, during his short tenure of the government, had instituted inquiries 
with a view to their abandonment. To this there was no obstacle, as the 
treaties contained a clause which made it optional for the British authorities to 
abandon the restrictions at any future period, and hence all that remained for 
Lord William Bentinck after his arrival was to give effect to this option. The 
great difficulty wa.s to provide against the anticipated defalcation of revenue, 
and the degree of perplexity which it occasioned may be inferred from a sei’ious 
proposal to return to the old abortive plan of buying up the surplus produce. 
A far wiser plan, suggested apparently by Sir John Malcolm when governor of 
Bombay, was, after some hesitation, finally adopted by the governor-general in 
council, in July, 1830. The transit of Malwah opium to Kurrachee through a 
country, great part of which is absolutely a desert, was at once circuitous and 
expensive, whereas the transit to Bombay was short and easy. Founding on 



CUAP. VII.] 


LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK’S MEASURES. 


199 


this difference, the new plan simply was to leave the culture of the poppy in a.d. isas. 
Malwah free from all restrictions except those which the native princes might 
be pleased to impose for their own benefit, and allow the opium to be ti'ans- Kovoimo 

11 fromoiiium 

nutted lor sale or expoix to Bombay, subject only to a payment per chest calcu- 
lated not to exceed the additional ex 2 )ense which must have been incurred 
before it could have been conveyed to Kurrachee, and finally shipped at Damauii. 

This plan, which, if such a traffic is to be caiTied on at all, is the least objec¬ 
tionable that could be devised, is still in force. The revenue obtained from 
opium passes in 1830-31 was only £10,642. Tlie following year it rose to 
£125,230, and it has since continued to increase till it borders on £500,000 
sterling. This of course, being only the revenue derived from opium j)asses to 
Bombay, is but a fraction of that which the whole opium traffic, including that 
of Calcutta, yields to the British government in India. 

The judicial reforms which took place during Lord William Bentinck’s Judicial to- 
administration were chiefly characterized by an extended employment of native j 
agenc 3 ^ The almo,st total exclusion of this agency by Marquis Cornwallis i 
during his first administration had long been regarded as one of its greatest | 
blemishes, and succeeding administrations had so far remedied the evil that in > 

1827, nineteen-twentieths of the original suits in the civil courts wei'e decided 
by native judges. The object now was, not so much to increase the number of 
these judges, as to enlarge their jurisdiction, and improve their jiosition by 
augmenting their salaries, so as to add to their respectability and afford some 
guarantee for their integrity. It was the good fortune of Lord William Ben- 
tinek to carry out these important improvements; but they did not originate 
with him, and the merit of them must at least be shared by him, both with 
distinguished servants of the Company in India, who had recognized their 
necessity, and with the home authorities, who had not only sanctioned them, 
but sent out instructions in conformity to which the most important regulation 
on the subject afterwards was drawn U}) and promulgated. In another arrange¬ 
ment he incurred more responsibility, and is entitled to a gi-eater degree of 
])ersoual credit. 

The court of directors had long been anxious for the abolition of Suttee, and in Ai>.iitioii of 

Suttee 

1824 had declared their conviction “ of the practicability of abolishing the practice, 
or at least, of the safety with which it might be prohibited." Opinion, however, 
continued to be greatly divided on the subject, and the utmost lengtli to w'hich 
the highe.st Indian authorities were disposed to go wjis to make .some exjferi- 
ments in the conquered and ceded provinces, wliere the practice was conljfara- 
tively rare, and in the meantime leave it untouched in Bengal, where it annually 
counted its victims by hundreds. Lord Amherst, while declaring that “nothing 
but apprehension of evils infinitely greater than tho.se arising from the existence 
of the practice should induce us to tolerate it for a single day,” could only “recom¬ 
mend our trusting to the progress now making in the diffusion of knowledge ‘ 



200 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book VII., 


A D. 1829. among the natives, ft)r the gi'adual suppression of this detestable superstition.” 

From adhering to these views Lord Amherst lost the honour which now belongs 
Atmiitioii of to lus succcssor, of having put down a crying abomination, regardless of all the 
alarm and clamour which were employed to deter him from listening to the 
voice of humanity. From what has already been said on the subject of Suttee 
in a previous part of the woik, it is necessary only to add that, by the regula¬ 
tion }>assed by the governoi’-general in council, on the 4th of December, 182f), 
it was expressly declared that, “after the promulgation of this regulation, all 
peraons convicted of aiding and abetting in the saciitice of a Hindoo widow, by 
burning oi’ burying her alive, whether the sacrifice be voluntary on her part or 
not, .shall be deemed guilty of culpable homicide, and shall be liable to i)unish- 
ment by fine or imprisonment, or bj-^ both fine and imprisonment, at the discre¬ 
tion of the court of circuit, according to the natuie and circumstances of the 
case, and the degree of guilt established against the offender; nor shall it be 
held to be any plea in justification that he or she was desired by the party 
sacrificed to assist in putting her to death.” Though none of the threatened 
evils followed the promulgation of this enactment, it ought not to be forgotten 
that, all things considered, it was and ought to be levered as aii act of great 
Fai«o aianiK moral courage. Sir Charles Metcalfe, then a member of the Calcutta council. 
iinhjBLt while cordially approving of the jiroposed regulation, deemed it necessary to 
add, “I do so, not without ay)])rehension that the measure may jiossibly be used 
by the <UsafFecte<l, influential, and designing of our subjects, to inflame the 
pas.sion.s of the multitude, and jiroduce a religious excitement, the consequences 
of which, if once set in action, cannot be foreseen.” While the supportei’s of 
the regulation were thus ajiprehensive, it is easy to understand how gloomy the 
forebodings of its opponents must have been. It is only when all these things 
are duly considered that full justice will be done to Lord William Bentiuck for 
the combined courage and wisdom displayed in the abolition of Suttee. The 
prediction of opposition on the part of the Hindoos did not [)rovc altogether 
groundless, though it fortunately assinned a constitutional form. Petitions 
to the governor-general were preisented against the regulation, and when these 
proved unavailing, the ])etitioners carried their complaint ly appeal before the 
privy council. Here the singular spectacle was presented of Hindoo natives 
apj)earing as appellants, in support of an abominable superstition, while the 
court of directors ap])eared as respondents. After a full discussion, the privy 
council set the que.stion as to the legality of the abolition of Suttee at rest by 
dismis.sing the api)eal. Some degree of excitement was inevitable, but it nevei’ 
amounted to po])ular agitation, and ere long died away. Humanity thus gained 
a decided victory over blind superstition, and a lesson was furnished which, if 
succeeding Indian administrations had duly profited by it, would have been 
followed by many similar triumphs. 

'J’he credit of another measure, which, in some respects, was more important 



Chap. VII.] 


LOED WILLIAM BENTTNCK’S MEASITRES. 


201 


even than the abolition of Suttee, and which, though it trenched more directly 
on native superstitions, attracted comparatively little notice, belongs still more 
unequivocally to Lord William Bentinck’s administration By regulations pro¬ 
mulgated in 1793 and 1803, it was provided that all questions of succession to 
}»roperty should be decided in conformity to the religion of the parties. The 
obvious intention was to give Mahometans and Hindoos the benefit of their 
respective codes, and nothing could be more equitable. Unfortunately the 
regulations were loosely and obscurely worded, and a case which Avas daily 
ac(iuiring new importance was entirely overlooked. I'he efforts of Christian 
missionaries were beginning to bear fruit, but no provision had been made for 
the social position of their converts. As the regulations stootl, tiiere wjis ground 
ibr maintaining that by the mere fact of their converaion, they forfeited the 
rights of succession which would undoubtedly have belonged to them if they 
had continued Hindoos. This result, which had never been contemplated, and 
was, moreover, in itself absolutely intolerable, was remedied by a new legula- 
tion, which provided that the rules relating to succession, as affected by religion, 
should bind those only who were bond Jide professors of Mahometanism or 
Hindooism at the time when the succession opened. The effect was to free 
Hindoo converts to Christianity from all the trammels of their former supersti¬ 
tion, and secure them in the full possession of Christian fi eedoni. In the account 
formerly given of the measures for the suppression of Thuggee and Dacoitee, it 
was mentioned that in the course of six yesirs about 2000 Tliugs were arrested. 
These were years in which the government was administered by Lord William 
Bentinck, and to him, therefore, much of the credit due for the extirpation of 
these murderous hordes belongs. His efforts on the subject of education are 
also deserving of honourable notice, though, from a mistfiken idea that the 
natives might be educated through the medium of English alone, he unfortu¬ 
nately reserved his patronage mainly for it, and thus did unintentional injustice 
not merely to the native literary classes, but to the great bulk of the ]>oj)ulation. 
As one of the great events, not so much of his administration as of the period 
to which it belongs, may be mentioned the successful application of steam to 
the voyage between Europe and India, and the subsequent establishment of the 
regular route by Egypt. The first trial was made by a vessel called the Entcr- 
j>rise, which endeavoured to combine the advantages of steam and sjiiLs, and 
made the voyage by the Cape of Good Hope. The experiment Avas not stvtis- 
IfMJtorj’^, as she sailed from Falmouth on the 16th of August, 182.^, and did not 
> each Diamond harbour, in the Hooghly, till the 7th of December, an interval 
of nearly four months. A route by the Euphrates to the Persian Culf was then 
attempted, but it was soon ascertained that the ancient line across the Isthmus 
of Suez from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea was entitled to the preference. 
The first steam voyage by this route was made by the Hxujh Lindsay, which 
left Bombay on the 2()th of March, 1830, and arrived at Suez on the 22d of 
VoL. III. 222 


A.D. 1829. 


Unfavour¬ 
able po8jti<ni 
of ('hrmtian 
wmvertH 
fitmi Hiu- 
(looiaxn. 


New ro/nilu- 
tiori gocur- 
ing Uieir 
righte. 


StfOstni C4>in- 
nniiiioatiou 
with India 
the Medi¬ 
terranean 
mid Rotl Sea- 



202 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book VIT. 


A.D. 1829. April, an interval of thirty-two clays. In her next voyage she reduced the 
period to twenty-two days. In 1836 the government of Bombay congratulated 
the court of directors on the arrival of despatches from London in sixty-four 
days. Since then the distance has been performed in less than half that time. 
The Bombay The improvements introduced into the different branches of the public ser- 
vice in Bengal had been adopted or imitated at the other presidencies. In 
some respects, indeed, Bombay, placed under the excellent code of 1827, of which 
the chief merit is due to the Honourable Mountstuart Elphinstone, had taken 
the lead in improvement It was therefore learned with no less sorrow than 
surprise that, under the enlightened government of Sir John Malcolm, a deter¬ 
mined attempt had been made, not to advance, but to retrograde. The blame, 
however, hvy neither with him nor liis council, but with the judges of the 
su})reme court, who, entertaining extravagant views of their jurisdiction, 
endeavoured to stretch it in a manner similar to that of which the supreme 
court of Calcutta furnished an example in the days of Sir Elijah Impey. At 
Bombay the English law had long been administered to British .subjects by a 
single judge de.sign.ated recorder. He does not seem to have been overworked 
or to have performed the duties of Ids office inefficiently; but as the .supreme 
courts at Calcutta and Madras had each three judges, it was thought, for the 
sake of uniformity, if not for any better reason, that Bombay was entitled to 
an equal number, and accordingly, in 1823, the court of recorder Wiis aboli,shed, 
in order to make way for a supreme court, composed of a chief-justice and two 
irai«>rtant puisue justiccs. The jurisdiction conferred on this supreme court was exactly 
j'llrirfirtion. the sjime as that of the other two supreme courts, and was expressly restricted 
to Briti,sh .subjects resident at Bombay or in its provinces, or to natives who 
either were, at the time when the cause of action originated, in the service of 
the Company, or had agreed in writing, that in the event of dispute the supreme 
court should be competent to decide. Since the famoiis dispute in the time of 
Wanen Hastings, when Sir Elijah Impey and his compeers at Calcutta endea¬ 
voured to extend their jiu'isdiction over all zemindars, by holding that their 
collection of public revenue made them servanis of the Company, questions of 
jui’isdiction had seldom been mooted, or at least persisted in so as to cause 
serious inconvenience. It was otherwise at Bombay. Sir Edward West, for¬ 
merly recorder, having been imule chief-justice, early manifested a determina¬ 
tion to make the most of Ids new dignity, and with the concurrence of his col¬ 
leagues, who appear unfortunately to have been animated by the same spirit, 
advanced claims to jurLsdiction which the governor and council deemed it 
necessary to resist. While admitting the limitation of jurisdiction over natives 
prescribed by the charter, they managed to discover what one of them called 
an “other i)rinciple of a wider and more extensive influence.” Tins was a 
clause in the charter which declared that the judges were “to have such juris¬ 
diction and authority as our justices of our Cotirt of King's Bench have, and may 



■Chap. VIL] 


GOVERNMENT OF BOMBAY. 


203 


lawfully exercise, within that part of Great Britain called England, as far as a.u. issa. 
cii'cumstances will admit;” and which they interpreted to mean that they were 
hound to watch over and protect the personal liberty of all the king’s subjects, TUe Bombay 
without distinction of native or British, and without reference to territorial 
limitation. Cases by which to test the validity of this interpretation soon 
occurred, and the result was a mo.st unseemly collision between the court and 
the government. 

Moro Ragonath, a young Mahratta of distinction, had been left by his coiusion 
parents under the guardianship of Pandurang Ramchunder, his grand-uncle, govoi-umeiit 
who resided at Poonah, and was related to Bajee Row, the ex-Peishwa. Young 
as he was, he was married, and the relations of his wife being desirous for pur- 
])Ose3 of their own to obtain possession of his ])erson, presented a i)etition to the 
supreme court at Bombay, setting forth that he was kept in confinement to the 
danger of his life, and praying for a writ of habeas corpus. The judges on tlie 
Bombay bench at this time were Sir Edward West, formerly recorder, but now 
chief-justice. Sir Charles Harcourt Chambers, and Sir John Peter Grant. They 
at once found themselves competent to grant the prayer of the petition, and 
issued their writ accordingly for bringing up Moro Ragonath from Poonah to 
Bombay. In the course of the proceedings an extraordinary mortality occun-ed 
among the judges. Sir Edward We.st died on the 18th of August, 1828, and 
Sir Charles Harcourt on the 13th of October following. Sir John Peter Grant 
thiis occupied the bench alone, and as he was the last judge who had taken his 
seat upon it, he might easily have pleaded the novelty and .solitarine.ss of his 
• po.sitiou as an excuse for not running headlong into collision with the gov^ern- 
inent. All pmdeivtial considerations appear however to have been lost upon 
him, and so far from complying with a re<juest of the governor in council to 
delay in the meantime from taking any further steps in the business, he 
denounced this request as a gross interference with the course of justice, and 
even made it the main ground of a petition to the king, praying him “to give 
.such commands concerning the same, as to your majesty’s royal wisdom shall 
seem meet, for the due vindication and protection of the dignity and lawful 
authority of your majesty’s supreme court of judicature at Bombay^’’ 

The government had previously resisted the execution of the writ of habeas Q»«stjou oi 
corpus at Poonah, on the ground that neither the gi’and-uncle nor the nephew 
was amenable to the supreme court at Bombay, and they had subsecpiently, on 
the 3(1 of October, 1828, addressed a letter to the two then surviving judges, 
in which, after justifying this extraordinary step by the necessity of the case, 
and^intimating their determination not to allow any returns to be made “to any 
writs of habeas corpus of a similar nature to those recently i.ssued, and directed 
to any officers of the provincial courts,” they concluded thus: “The grounds 
upon which we act have exclusive reference to considerations of civil govern¬ 
ment and of state policy; but as our resolution cannot be altered until we 



204 


IIISTOEY OF INDIA. 


[Book VIT. 


A D. 1820. receive tlie conmiauds of those higli authorities to which we are subject, we 
inform you of them, and we do most anxiously hope that the considerations 
yiiostioii iw we have before stated may lead you to limit yourselves to those protests and 

to writ of , 

Jiat/fcts cor- appeals against our conduct m the cases specified that you may consider it your 
gOTomm^t duty to make, as any other conduct must, for reasons already stated, prove 
wurtTf*'"" deeply injurious to the public interests, and can. under the resolution taken and 
iioiiiimv. avowed by government, produce no result favourable either to the immediate 
or future establishment of the extended jurisdiction you have claimed. A very 
short period will elapse before an answer is received to the full and urgent 
reference we liave made upon this subject; and we must again express our 
hope, that even the obligations under which we are sensible you act, are not so 
imperative as to impel you to proceedings which the government has thus 
explicitly stated its resolution to oppo.se.' 

This letter, so far from effecting its object, appears only to have exasperated 
Sir John Peter Grant, who having now, by the demise of his colleagues, been 
left to the guidance of no better judgment than his own, took the very extra¬ 
ordinary step of closing the coui’t, on the gi'ound that it Wiis useless to keep it 
oj)en while he was ju’cventcd from enforcing his decisions. The governor in 
council immediately issued a [)roclaniation declai'ing his determination ^ pro¬ 
tect the persons and property of the inhabitants of Bombay, and calling upon 
all classes to assist in alleviating the evils which the closing of the court could 
not fail to produce. The judge seems now to have shrunk from the con.sequences 
of his t)wn lashness, and siibmitted to the humiliation of again opening the 
court, aftei’ he had kept it closed from the 21st of April to the 17th of June, 
Ai.coiii t.. 1820. Some attempt was made to obtain the interference of the supreme gov- 

uonmii.'' eminent, but as the jioint in dispute- ha<l been brought under the notice of the 
jiriyy council by Sir John Peter Grant’s petition, it was deemed advisable in 
the meantime to let this appeal take its coui-se. On the 14th of May, 1829, the 
points wore argued before the privy council, and on the lOth of June, the lords 
repoi'tcd their opinion to his majesty in the following terms: “That the writs 
of habeas eojjms were improperly is.sue(l in the two cases refeiTed to in the said 
petition. That the .supreme court has no power or authority to issue a writ of 
habeas vorjivs, except when directed either to a person resident within tho.se 
local limits wherein such a court has a general jurisdiction, or to a person out 
of .such local limits, who is pereonally subject to the civil and criminal jurisdic¬ 
tion of the supreme court. That the sujireme comt has no power or authority 
to issue a writ of habeas corpus to the jailer or officer of a native court as such 
officer, the supreme court having no power to di.scharge persons imprisoned 
under the authority of a native court. I’hat the supreme court is bound 
to notice the jurisdiction of the native court, without having the same specially 
set forth in the return to a writ of habeas corjms.” It was thus authoritatively 
and finally detennined that the supreme court of Bombay had entii-ely mistaken 



CHAr. VII.] 


LOCAL DISTURBANCES. 


205 


the limits of their jurisdictiou, and with equal rashness and ignorance endea- a.d. 
voured to substitute mere tyranny for law. 

Though the general peace of India remained unbroken during Lord William Dintaru- 
Bentinck’s administration, disturbances more or less threatening took place in varimw" 
various localities. Calcutta itself was alarmed by a tumult in its immediate 
vicinity. It originated with some professed followers of a fanatical Mahometan 
of the name of Syed Ahmed, who from being a trooper in the service of Ameer 
Khan, assumed the character of a religious i-eformer, and declared his determina¬ 
tion to purify Islamism from all the corruptions which had been engrafted upon 
it by the Shiites or followers of Ali. Though himself illiterate, he managed to 
gain learned adherents, and soon mustered so strong in the Punjab as to become 
formidable to the Sikh.s. Having added to his reputed sanctity by a pilgilinage 
to Mecca, and returned by way of Calcutta to the Upper provinces, he reappeared 
in the Punjab in 182G, and proclaimed a holy war. Numbers flocked to him 
frcmi Delhi, Lucknow, and the other principal seats of Mahometanism in 
India, and he was able to take the field at the head of neaily -10,000 men. For 
a time enthusiasm supplied the want of discipline, but Runjeet Sing with hi.s 
Sikhs ultimately prevailed, and the conte.st in the Punjab was terminated by 
tlie defeat and death of Syed Ahmed in 1831. His sect however had taken 
<leep root, and having lost none of its fanaticism, had rendered itself extremely 
obnoxious both to Mahometans and Hindoos by violent opposition to various 
l>ractices which it stigmatized as impure. Recrimination necessarily was ])ro- vioimtim.. 

^ O 1 J I of 

Yoked, and fierce quarrels, sometimes attended with bloodshed, en.sued. One of .i fimatioiii 
these not undeserving of notice took place at Baraset, about fifteen miles north- rau 'rtt" 
east of Calcutta. A considerable body of the sect had here established them¬ 
selves, and fallen into deadly feud with the rest of the inhabitants. As both 
]iartios were ready for an open rupture, an occasion soon occurred. In some 
jwtty quarrel the zemindai’s had taken part against the followers of Syed Ahmed, 
and were in consequence charged before the magistrate with partiality. Either 
thinking that justice was denied them, or being too impatient to wait for it, 
they took the remedy into their own hand, and in 1831, placing themselves 
under the leadership of a fakir of the name of Titoo Miya, they issued forth, 
and commenced a religious war against Hindooism. Having polluted a temple 
by be.spriukling it with the blood of a cow which they had killed, and then 
destroyed the temple, they forthwith proceeded to what were considered still 
greater enormities, by maltreating Brahmins and forcing them to swallow beef. 

Thus once committed they set no limits to their audacity, ])illaging and 
burning down villages, and putting to death without mercy all persons who 
resisted, or wore in any way obnoxious to them. The civil j)Ower having in 
vain endeavoured to restore tranquillity, two native regiments and a party of 
horse marched against them, and came up with them in an open plain near 
Hooghly. Here they had constructed a stockade, behind which, after being 



206 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


CBook VII. 


A.D. 1829. 


Excessoti 

of:Sywl 

Ahmed’s 

followers 

suppressed. 


Disturb 
aiices ill 
Ash:itii. 


Disturb 
Hiices ill the 
Kusya Hills. 


driven from the field, they retired, and defended themselves with desperate 
courage, till about 100 of them were killed, and 250 taken prisoners. The rest 
dispersed, and though they made several attempts to rally, were too much 
intimidated to hazard a new conflict. They still however count numerous fol¬ 
lowers among the more educated Mahometans of India, and having lost none 
of their original fanaticism, are as ready as ever, should a favourable opportunity 
occur, to propagate their tenets by the sword. 

Along the eastern frontier in Assam, and tlie provinces recently wrested 
from the Burmese, serious disturbances occurred. A body of mountaineei-s 
of the name of Singphos, having crossed the mountains on the north-east, 
entered Assam in the beginning of 1830 to the number of nearly 3000, and 
before they could be checked ct)mmitted great depredations. Their main objects 
seemed to be to cairy off the Assamese as slaves and enrich themselves witli 

plunder. When once encountered they 
were incajtable of offering much resist¬ 
ance, as they were mere hordes of savages, 
rudely armed, and totally undisciplined. 
Their presence, however, gave encourage- 
mei»t to other disaffected tribes, and an 
attempt w'as made to surprise the British 
I P station at Rimgiiooi-. It did not succeed; 

'■ but the fmpient rej)etition of incumions 

at last induced government to attem])t a 
more effecrtual I'cmedy, by reinstating an 
ex-rajah in j)art of his sovereignty, on 
condition of keepjing down disturbance, 
and paying a certain amount of tiibute. 
Still further to the south, among the 
Kasya Hills, an insui'rection accom- 
])anied with circumstances of gieat atrocity broke out. Nungklow, situated 
about half-W'ay between Sylhet and Assam, had been obtained by the 
Company by amicable arrangement from Tirat Sing, who was sup>posed to 
be the chief of the Kasyas, for the purpose of conveiting it into a sanatory 
station, for which it seemed well adaj)ted by its climate and its elevati<in 
of 5000 feet above the level of the sea. With this view, and also to open up a 
communication between Sylhet and A.ssam, a series of roads across the hills 
had been commenced. These jiroceedings gave great offence to the moun¬ 
taineers. They feared for their independence, and they complained that Tirat 
Sing, who was only one of a number of chiefs, had disi)Osed of part of the 
common territoiy^ without consulting the others. It was therefore determined 
to recover by force the district which had thus been improperly alienated, and 
in April, 1829, a large body of Kasyas, headed by Tirat Sing and other chiefs, 



Asbamkkf. Gobhainb or Lanuhot.dfrs. 

From A ilrawing b) \V. Pnnse], Ee><{. 



Chap. VII.] 


LOCAL DISTURBANCES. 


207 


suddenly made their appearance before Nungklow. Lieutenant Bedingtield, a.d. issa. 
who, with Lieutenant Burlton, Mr. Bowman, and four sepoys, were the only 
persons resident in the Company’s service, having been invited to a conference, nuturh- 
set out without suspicion, but the moment he arrived was barbarously mur- 
dered. The rest of his party, after gallantly defending themselves in the house TenJ^rin. 
which they occupied, shared his fate, with the exception of one sepoy who 
escaped. A desultory warfare ensued, and lasted with little interruption to the 
end of 1833, when the chiefs made their submission, and Tirat Sing was sent 
off as a state prisoner to Dacca. In Jyntea and Kachar several attempts by 
the native chiefs to throw off'the British yoke only liad the effect of riveting it 
more firmly. In the Tenasserim provinces some of the ousted Burmese gover¬ 
nor, tempted by the smallness of the British force left for their protection, 
entered into a conspiracy to seize the towns of Tavoy ^nd Mergui. At first it 
was successful. At Tavoy, Mung-da the former Burmese govcimor appeared at 
the head of 500 men, and compelling the small party of Madras infantry to 
whom it liad been intrusted to reti’eat to tlie wharf, gained possession of the 
town. At Mergui, possession was gained still more easily, the British officer in 
charge of about 50 sepoys retu’ing without risking an encounter. These suc¬ 
cesses of the insurgents were short-lived, and they only waited the arrival of 
British i-einforcements to resign the contest and make their submission. Tran- 
(piillity, however, was still doubtful, as it was well known that the ex-govemor 
of Martaban was at the bottom of the conspiracy, .and watching an oj)portunity 
to i-enew it. Fortunately his proceedings had rendered him obnoxious to the 
Burmese government, and he was murdered in the midst of his plots by order 
of the viceroy of Rjingoon. 

These insurrections were doubtless encourjiged Ijy the extent to which gov- iiif-urrectum 

. . • 11* /» of t-J*® KoIoh. 

ernment, in its anxietj’ to meet the wishes of the directors on the subject 01 
retrenchment, had carried the reduction of its military establishments. The 
same cau.se, of course, operated in various quarters, and jiroduced its bitter fruits 
in other di.stricts than those which had been recently conquered. Towards the 
end of 1829 the agi'icultural Koles inhabiting the district of Sumbulpoor, 
through which the Mahanuddy flows, being dissatisfied with the conduct of 
their ranee or queen, who had rendered herself obnoxious by di.smissing all the 
relatives of her late husband from their offices and conferring them on her own 
immediate kindred, rose in rebellion, and were with difficulty jirevented from 
marching on the capital. Peace was only I'estored by the interference of the 
British agent, and the deposition of the ranee, who had shown herself devoid 
of tlje prudence and vigour necessary for the government of her biubarous 
•subjects. No sooner was this rebellion quelled than disturbances of a more 
formidable character broke out among a number of petty tributaries of the 
Company, occupying the wild tract situated between the sources of the Ner- 
budda on the west, and the Bengal districts of Burdwan and Midnapoor on the 



AT). 1829. 


Bieturb- 
aiioeff in 
Chota Nag< 
p(K»r. 


Binturh- 
aTtcee iu 
Mysore. 


208- HISTOEY OF INDIA. [Booj^VII. 

east, and usually included under the general des^nation of Chota Nagjwjor. 
Its aboriginal inhabitants consisted chiefly of wild tribes of Koles and Dangas, 
who lived like savages, and subsisted in great measure on the chase; but in the 
lower plains, and the districts directly under British authority, agriculture was 
generally pnxctised both by the native inhabitants and a large number of new 
settlers, who had been induced by the zemindars to come from Bengal and 
Behar. These new settlers were not unnaturally regarded with jealousy by the 
aborigines, many of whom had been dispossessed of their lands to» make w'ay 
for them. The more regular’ form of government established by the Company 
was also very obnoxious to the chiefs, who found their wild freedom of action 
restrained by it, and thus, both chiefs and people having causes of discontent, 
an almost universal rising suddenly took place. Its fury was at first directed 
against the emigrants. Their fields were laid waste, their villages burned, and 
nearly a thousand of them were barbarously murdered. The interference of 
the British was tardier than it ought to have been, and tlie insimgents had 
mustered in thousands before any decided attempt was made to check them. 
This wjis the more to be lamented, as the feeble resistance which they after¬ 
wards made proved how easily they might have been put down at first by 
more rapid and energetic movements. Owing to the want of these, similar 
risings took place in various adjacent districts, and were not suppressed without 
serious bloodshed. 

The presidency of Madras had also its full share of disturbance. The estab¬ 
lishment of the ancient kingdom of Mysore by the Marquis of Wellesley had 
been regarded as a measure of very questionable policy, but the evils appre¬ 
hended were not realized so long as the administration was conducted by 
Pm’nea, under whom the country attained a high degree of prosperity. On 
his retirement in 1811 a sudden change took place. The rajah, determined to 
be his own mastei', conferred the office of dewan on Linga Raj, one of his own 
creatures, who possessed neither talents nor influence; alienated large portions 
of his revenue to Brahmins, who took advantage of his superstitious veneration 
for tliem; and squandered the hoards which Purnea had accumulated, by 
lavishing them on unworthy favourites. Financial embarrassments necessaiily 
followed, and the people, who had formerly been contented and happy, began to 
groan under the burden of immoderate exactions. To prevent the foreseen 
consequences of such a system, the Madras government repeatedly remonstrated 
with the rajah, and in 1825 Sir Thomas Monro made a visit to Mysore, for tlie 
purpose of enforcing the necessai-y mejisures of reform. He received abundance 
of promises, but as soon as he dejmrted, all idea of perfoimance was abandoned, 
and misgovernment in many of its worst forms began to produce its usual 
results. The collectors persisting in their exactions were resisted, and not 
unfrequently murdered by the ryots, and an insurrectionary spirit was excited, 
which, while the rajah looked on helplessly, threatened to carry disturbance 



CHAprvii.j 


REVOLUTION IN COORG. 


209 


into the territories of the Company. The insurrection first assumed a distinct 
and organized fonii in the district of Bednore, where Ram Row, one of the 
rajah’s favourites, had been guilty of intolerable oppression. In 1830 a general 
rising took place, and after various attempts at accommodation, an appeal to 
arms became necessary. A considerable body of Mysore troops were marched 
into the insurgent district, and followed by three regiments of Madras infanti y, 
with two companies of his Majesty’s 62d, and a squadron of native cavalry. 
On a proclamation promising a redress of grievances, the lyots seemed disposed 
to return to their homes, but a new element of rebellion had been added by the 
appearance of a rival rajah, who, though a mere impostor, pretended to be a 
lineal descendant of the former Rajahs of Bednore, and had at an earlier period 
been for a short time in actual possession of it. Thus encouraged, the insur¬ 
rection had become so formidable that Colonel Evans, who commanded the 
troops sent to suppress it and was advancing to Bednore, sustained a check 
which obliged him to fall back on Sheemoga. A second advance was more 
successful, and by the remission of large arrears of revenue and other necessary 
concessions, tranquillity was at length restored. The extent of the danger, 
however, rendered it necessary to take precautions for the future; and under a 
clause in the treaty of 1799, which empowered the Company on certain emer¬ 
gencies to assume the government, the rajah, deprived of all political power, 
was converted into a mere pensioner, and the administration, little changed in 
external form, was placed under the control of a British commissioner and four 
assistants. 

Another revolution of a still more decided character was effected about the 
same time in Coorg. The actual rajah, Vira Rajendra, was a very degenerate 
descendant of the former mjah, whose heroic defence of his independence when 
it was assailed by Hyder and Tippoo has already been recorded. XJidike him 
in every respect, Vira Rajendra was a mere barbarian, ever and anon giving 
way to impulses of fury, during which he set no limits to his cruelty. Often 
without an apparent offence, the officers of his army and the inmates of his 
palace were ordered off to execution. His own kindred were not spared, and 
out (jf one pit in the jungle at a later period, when his atrocities were inquired 
into, the bodies of seventeen of his victims were disinterred, including among 
them those of his own aunt, the child of his sister, and the brother of her 
husband. This monstrous cruelty was of course accompanied by other abomin¬ 
able passions, and his sister Dewah Amajee with difficulty escaped from his 
brutality by taking refuge with her husband within the British territory- 
Previous to this the rajah had manifested a decided hostility to the Company, 
and was augmenting the number of his troops, apparently with the intention 
nf resisting any interference with his proceedings. On the escape of his sister 
and her husband he thi'ew ofi" all appearance of restraint, and positively refused 
to listen to any proposals for an amicable adjustment of the misunderstandings 


A.I). 1880. 


The HajAh 
of Myaoro 
coHvortod 
into A mere 
petiaioiiet. 


Dieturi>- 
aiiuen iu 
CtK-H-g. 



2l0 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book VII. 


A.l>. 1884. 


Tho Rajiili 
of Oooi^ de- 
IHjsed and 
hii territory 
annexed. 


Jlelations 
with allied 
etatee. 


produced by his misconduct, unless the fugitives were sent back in order that 
he ](night wreak his vengeance on them. As this barbarous demand could not 
be complied with, it at once brought matters to a crisis, and a proclamation was 
issued in April, 1834, declaring that “the conduct of the rajah had rendered him 
unworthy of the friendship and protection of the British government; that he 
had been guilty of oppression and cruelty towards his subjects; and had assumed 
an attitude of defiance and hostility towards the British government; received 
and encouraged its proclaimed enemies; addressed letters to the government of 
Fort St. George and to the governor-general, replete with the most insulting 
expressions; and had phiced under restraint an old and faithful servant of the 
Company, who had been deputed by the commis.sioiier of Mysoi-e to open a 
friendly negotiation: for which offences Vira Rajendra was no longer to be 
considered Rajah of Coorg. An army was about to march against him which 
would respect the persons and property of all who were peaceably disposed; 
and such a system of government would be established as might seem best 
calculated to secure the happiness of the people.” Had the rajah, instead of 
being the mo.st detested, been the most popular of princes, it would have been 
impossible for him to offer any effectual resistance. The British troops under 
Colonel Lindsay entered Coorg in separate divisions from the east, north, and 
west. The obstacles presented by the nature of the country were more formid¬ 
able than the weapons of the enemy, and in more tlian one instance, where due 
advantage was taken of them, the invaders not only were unable to advance, 
but obliged to retreat. This was the case paiticularly with the divisions 
approaching from the north and west. Those from the east made better 
progress, and on the Gth of April Colonel Lindsay took possession of Mercaia, 
tlie capital. Four days later the rajah surrendered unconditionally, and after a 
short detention in his palace, received far better terms than he deserved, by his 
removal to Benares in the possession of an ample pen.sion. In e.stabli8hing the 
future government, the heads of villages were assembled at Mercara and desired 
to give free utterance to their wishes. There could not have been any sincerity 
in this proceeding, since the annexation of Coorg to the British temtories had 
been previously determined. The formal assent of the village chiefs to this 
determination was easily obtained, and Coorg has ever since formed an integral 
])ortion of the presidency of Madras. 

In dealing with the allied states, the administration of Lord William 
Bentinck does not appear to advantage. The home authorities, even after they 
had seen the necessity of interference, and experienced its efiicacy in maintain¬ 
ing tran<iuillity, were constantly haunted by imaginary fears of the entangle¬ 
ments in which it might involve them, and issued a series of instructions 
directing that the residents and political agents in the different states should 
leave the native sovereigns uncontrolled in their internal management, and not 
interfere unless when it might become necessary to secure the tribute which 



Chap. VII.] 


NATIVE INDIAN STATES. 


211 


they had engaged to pay, or to prevent them from disturbing the general tran¬ 
quillity by making open war upon each other. Lord William Bentinck’s own 
views appear to have accorded with the instructions thus transmitted for his 
guidance, and he early intimated a determination to make non-interference the 
rule of his policy. Henceforth the British government, when it interposed, was 
to be understood to be pursuing its own interests only. These satisfied, it 
disclaimed all right and all wish to exercise any paramount authority within 
individual states. No sooner was this rule of policy promulgated, than the 
usual results followed. The elements of confusion began to be largely developed, 
and the system of non-interference, while professed as a theory, was repeatedly 
abandoned in practice, in order that the evils which it had engendered might 
be effectually suppressed. The course thus pursued by the British government 
was neither uniform nor consistent, and native rulers often complained with 
good reason that they wei'e neither permitted to manage in their own way, nor 
furnished with the assistance necessary to cany out the different reforms 
expected of them. Various instances of the justice of this complaint will appear 
while we take a brief survey of the condition of the leading native states during 
Lord William Bentinck’s administration. In this survey the states may, for 
convenience of arrangement, be classed under the heads of Mahometan, 
Mahratta, and Rajpoot states. 

Beginning with the Mahometan, we naturally turn first to Delhi, where 
the pageant representative of the Great Mogul still endeavoured to maintain a 
kind of regal state, an<l to complain bitterly of the successive encroachments 
that had been made upon it. At the same time, while taking high giound on 
the subject of precedence, he was obliged to appear in the humble character of 
a j)ctitioner for an increased maintenance. He claimed it, indeed, not as a 
favour, but as a right. The revenue of certain lands had been at one time 
reserved to him, and as in consequence of improvement the rent obtained from 
them had been increased, he insisted that a proportionate addition ought to be 
made to his income. The British government would have readily consented to 
the addition, but wished the king to receive it, and the whole of his mainten¬ 
ance, not as the produce of any reserved lands, but simply as a pensioner. 
Deeming this a new humiliation, he resisted, and on being refused redress 
by the governor-general in council, took the bold step of appealing from him. to 
the home authorities. The agent be sent to England to advocate his cause was 
tlie celebrated Rammohun Roy, a Brahmin of the highest caste, who after 
throwing oflT the yoke of Hindoo superstition, had retired from public life in 
1S14', and exerted himself with some success in Calcutta in diffusing among 
Ins countrymen the knowledge of One God. Unfortunately he stopped short 
in his inquiries, and not advancing further than that bastard form of Chris¬ 
tianity known by the name of Unitarianism, was never able to be a successful 
Clifistian teacher. Such was the agent employed by the King of Delhi. It is 


A.D. 1834. 


Lord 
WUlinni 
BvDtinck's 
tnoiianres in 
regard to 
tli« native 
8tates. 


Diswiti^fsic* 
tion of tile 
K ing of 
Delhi. 



A.D. 18S8. 


RamtnoHun 
Roy's mis¬ 
sion to 
England. 


Murder of 
the Rritisli 
commis- 
Hiduer at 
Delhi. 


212 HISTORY OF INDIA. [Book VII. 

rather difficult to account for Rammohun Roy’s acceptance of the office. He 
was in no want of the salary attached to it, and was too shrewd not to have 
perceived that, independent of every other obstacle, the very manner in which 
the mi.ssion had been conferred upon him must render it abortive. It was a 

secret appointment, of which the govern¬ 
ment in India had been kept in studied 
ignorance; and hence on his arrival in Eng¬ 
land in 1831, he no sooner presented his 
credentials, than they were declared insuf¬ 
ficient to justify any recognition of him as 
the King of Delhi’s agent. Personally his 
reception was of the most flattering descrip¬ 
tion, and full homage was paid to his talents 
and character. Much was expected from 
the enlarged views which he had acquired 
in this country, but he was not destined to 
return to India, an attack of fever having 
carried him off at Bristol in September, 
1833. Tlie King of Delhi, besides the 
expenditure which lie incurred by sending an agent to England on a fruitless 
errand, was made to feel that so far from advancing his interest by the step he 
had taken, lie had been guilty of iiregularity, and given umbrage in high 
quarters, for Lord William Bentinck, in making a tour through Delhi to the 
Upper provinces, made the king aware of his displeasure bj'^ declining the usual 
interchange of complimentary visits. Delhi itself was shortly .afterwards the 
scene of an atrocious crime. The Nabob of Ferozepoor, Ahmed Baksh Khan, at 
his death left the succession to his eldest son Shams-ud-din Khan, but set apart 
the district of Loharoo for two younger sons, and gave them the independent 
administration of it. Shams-ud-din objected to this curtailment of his heredi¬ 
tary territory, and as the district seemed to be mismanaged, the governor-general 
in council so far forgot his policy of non-interference as to decide that Loharoo 
should remain with the new nabob, on condition of his providing his brothers 
in a pension equal to its estimated revenue. Mr. Fraser, the British commis¬ 
sioner at Delhi, disapproved of this arrangement, and succeeded in obtaining a 
postponement of it. Shams-ud-din was indignant, and considering Mr. Fraser 
as the only obstacle in his way, hired an assassin, who shot him as he was 
returning from Delhi to his residence. The assassin and the nabob having been 
seized, were brought to trial, and as the guilt of both was fully established, no 
distinction was made in the punishment, and Shams-ud-din was hanged as a 
common malefactor. That they suffered deservedly there cannot be a doubt, and 
yet so strong was the disaffection to British mle already existing in Delhi, that 
they were venerated by the Mahometan population as if they had been martyrs. 




Chap. VII.] 


NATIVE INDIAN STATES. 


213 


In Oude the complaints of misgovemment were as loud as ever. In the 
time of the last nabob, Ghazee-nd-din Hyder, the favourite minister was Aga 
Mir, but in proportion to the influence which he possessed over the nabob, was 
the hatred home him by the heir apparent. A deadly feud had thus arisen, and 
the nabob, foreseeing the ruin which could hardly fail to overtake Aga My- in 
the event of his own death, endeavoured to provide against it, not only by 
eflecting an apparent reconciliation between his son and his minister, but also 
by inducing the British government to guarantee the latter in his person ahd 
property. The matter was accomplished more easily than might have been 
supposed. By the opportune offer of a loan of a million sterling to the Company 
in perpetuity, at five per cent, interest, at a time of great financial embarrass¬ 
ment, the nabob obtained the desired guarantee, and at the same time arranged 
that tlie interest should be paid to his dependants, among whom Aga Mir, as 
liolding tlie foremost place, was regularly to draw one half of the whole, or 
£25,000 per annum. 

On the death of Ghazee-ud-din, his successor, Nasir-ud-din, seemed entirely 
to have forgotten his former enmity to Aga Mir, and besides continuing him 
in his office, treated him with kindness and liberality. It soon appeared, 
however, that his hatred had lost none of its virulence. He had merely been 
feeling his way, and preparing to shape his course according to what he should 
learn of the intentions of the British government. He was well aware of the 
guarantee, and not unnaturally inferred, that in consequence of it, he would 
not be allowed to take a single step to the prejudice of Aga Mir. On learning 
that the policy of non-interference had once more been inaugurated, and that 
he might calculate on being permitted to follow his own inclinations, he at once 
threw off the mask, and not contented with dismissing Aga Mir and demanding 
his accounts, threatened to make his property responsible for alleged frauds com¬ 
mitted on the treasury. The ex-minister immediately fell back on his guarantee, 
and appealed to the British government for protection. It could not in decency 
be refused, and it was therefore intimated to the king that Aga Mir, having 
enjoyed the full confidence of his late master, was entitled to immunity for 
whatever .he had done with his sanction, and was accountable only for his pro¬ 
ceedings since the commencement of the new reign. This decision fell far short 
of the wishes of Nazir-ud-din, whose vindictive purposes it in a great raeasurs 
fruiitrated; but after long discussion and loud complaints of the impolicy and 
injustice of allowing a great criminal to escape, he had the mortification to see 
Aga Mir placed beyond his reach, by being conducted in October, 18.30, under 
charge of a British military escort, to Cawnpoor. 

On the dismissal of Aga Mir, the king declared his determination to be his 
own minister. For this he was totally unfit by his ignorance of business 
and his dissolute habits, and the whole power of the state was monopolized by 
Jnen who.se elevation was mainly owing to their worthlessness. So notorious 


A.D, isae. 


Helatiouft 
with Owtle. 


Succec^ioD 
of Naair- 
ud-din to 
tlir4>nc uf 
J)ude. 



214 


HISTORY OF INDIA, 


[Book VII. 


A.D. 1831. indeed was their incompctency, that the resident was instructed not to recog¬ 
nize them, and to decline all intercourse of a friendly nature till a respectable 
Hakim minister was appointed. This step, though rather a curious exemplification of 
ueeds Aga nou-interferencc, was undoubtedlj’^ justified by the circumstances, and the king, 
isJrTii”"" aw 9 ,re of the danger of continuing a struggle in which he was sure to be worsted, 
O'wie- recalled Hakim Mehdi Ali Khan, the minister whom Aga Mir had originally 
supplanted. He was then living in retirement at Furrackabad, and readily 
obeyed the summons which placed him once more at the helm of affairs. 
Mr. Maddock, the resident, believing him hostile to British interests, objected 
on this ground to his nomination, but the governor-general, in the hope that 
lie might be able notwithstanding this objection to employ his acknowledged 
talents in introducing important reforms, consented to acknowledge him. His 
early measures justified this expectation. The sums squandered on favourites, 
male and female, were greatly reduced. Many corrupt practices were reformed, 
and the revenue, levied directly by collectors instead of being fivrmed out by 
extortioners, showed signs of improvement. These changes were not effected 
without encountering vehement opposition; and as the king himself had less 
sympathy with his subjects than with those who oppressed them, Hakim Mehdi 
was often succc.ssfully thwarted in his best measures. Under such circum¬ 
stances amelioration was necessarily a slow process, and the resident, who 
appears to have been somewhat inclined to take the worst view of matters, 
continued from time to time to report on them so unfavourably, that the 
neccs.sity of assuming the administration, at least for a season, began to be openly 
talked of. So thoroughly was Lord William Bentinck at last imbued with the 
belief that the ruin of the country was not otherwise to be averted, that in 
April, 1831, when making a tour through the Upper provinces, he visited the 
king at Lucknow, and plainly intimated to him, both orally and in writing, 
that if he did not immediately begin to govern on better principles, the course 
which had been followed in the cases of the Carnatic and of Tanjore would be 
followed in regard to Oude, and it would be necessary for him to exchange his 
position of king for that of pen.sioner. 


rnconwstent The menace thus held out was too serious both in the substance and the 
manner of it not to produce considerable alarm, and not only the minister, who 
deserved some credit for the good he had already effected, promised to exert 
oiuie. himself more energetically, but the king, who had too often declined to give 
him the necessary support, declared that in future nothing that could contribute 
to the cause of good government would be wanting on his part. There is no 
reason to suspect either the king or his minister of insincerity when they made 
these declaration.s. The extinction of Oude as an independent kingdom was 
threatened, and nothing could prevent the threat from being carried into 
execution except immediate compliance with the reforms demanded. Tliere 
were numerous obstacles however to be surmounted, and it is easy to under- 



Chap. VII ] 


AFFAIRS OF OUDE. 


216 


stand how the same influence which had previously thwarted the minister was a n. issi. 
again vigorously exerted in opposing him. Under these circumstances what 
was the duty of the British government? Unquestionably to strengthen the Relation* of 
Iiands of the minister, and more especially, when both he and his sovereign government 
declared their inability to carry out the required reforms without extraneous 
aid, to furnish that aid liberally to any extent that might be necessary. Strange 
to say, the governor-general, after interfering so far with the internal manage¬ 
ment of Oude as to threaten its existence as an independent kingdom unless 
certain changes were introduced, refused when applied to to give the least 
assistance in carrying them into effect, and with singular inconsistency 
attempted to justify the refusal on the ground that the jiolicy which he had 
adopted would not allow him to interfere. In vain did Hakim Mehdi argue 
that by the treaty made with the Marquis of Wellesley, the right of interference, 
at least so far as to give advice, was distinctly recognized; that the interference 
now asked was certainly not greater than that which the governor-general had 
just been exercising, and that the British government by standing aloof was 
making itself responsible for the future mal-administration of Oude, since “he 
who sees a blind man on the edge of a precipice, and will not put forth a hand 
to hold him back, is not innocent of his destruction.” Lord William Bentinck 
remained immoveable, and while complaining loudly of the domestic policy of 
Oude, obstinately refused to assist in improving it. It would be unjust to sus¬ 
pect him of anything so Machiavellian as a design to hasten the crisis wliich he 
professed to deprecate; but the courtiers of Oude did not reason very illogically 
when they inferred, from the inconsistency and caprice which maiked liis con¬ 
duct, that the object at which he was aiming was not so much to improve the 
government, as to And in prevailing abuses a plausible pretext for usurping it. 

From his refusal to strengthen the hands of Hakim Mehdi, that minister found 

® , Mchdi»r«- 

it impossible to maintain his position, and retired into private life, leaving tircmeut. 
Nazir-ud-din entirely in the hands of worthless favourites, under whom mis- 
government advanced with accelerated 2 )ace. It deserves to be noticed as a 
reixiarkable jxroof of the jxrogicss which European ideas had made even in Oude, 
that Hakim Mehdi on his retirement published a defence of his conduct in a 
local newspajxer, called the Mofusil Alchhar. “In appealing to the opinion of the 
public,” he says, “I profess that I am solely actuated by a desire to do myself 
justice, and I disclaim every intention of wishing to draw conclusions inimical 
to the character of any one; facts Jis they are here related will speak for them¬ 
selves.” In another part of the statement, speaking of the two years over which 
his administration extended, he says: “I challenge any one to jxrove tlie exist¬ 
ence of a defalcation of a single rujjee during the whole period. I can, indeed, 
lay my hand upon my heart and solemnly declare before Heaven, that the whole 
of my conduct was actuated with the most disinterested views of serving his 
majesty and the state.” His chief difficulties appear to have proceeded from 



^.lK 1831. 


Ralatiou 

the 

Niscani. 


TranAactiintH 
of William 
Palmer 
& i:i>. 


216 HISTOBY OF INDIA. {Book VII. 

the haiem, and the cause is sufficiently explained when he mentions that five 
of the inmates drew from the jaghires assigned to them an aggregate annual 
income of £192,000. 

In the Nizam’s dominions a considerable change was produced by the death 
of Seconder Jah, and the succession of his eldest son under the title of Nazim- 
ud-DowIah. The new monarch immediately announced his intention to 
manage Jiis own aftairs, and the British government, in accordance with the 
professed system of non-interference, lost no time in assuring him that he was 
at perfect libeity to select his ministers and frame his internal policy. The 
immediate dismissal of Chandoo was in consequence considered certain, but he 
liad managed during his long tenure of office to give so many influential 
j)ersons an interest in liis continued possession of it, that he kept his place, 
and prodigal expenditure and tyraimical extortion continued to go hand in 
hand as befoi’e. While declining to interfere directly for the suppression of 
these evils, the governor-general was not indisposed to follow the course which 
he had adopted in Oude, and menaced the government with extinction. Matters 
however did not seem as yet fully ripe for extreme measures, and before any 
decided steps were taken, the aliairs of the Nizam under a different form had 
begun to attract much attention both at home and in India. 

When the true character of the transactions of William Palmer and Cb. 
with the Nizam’s government was detected and exposed by Sir Charles Metcalfe, 
the directors, not satisfied with ordering that the countenance wliich had been 
given to them sliould be immediately withdrawn, imprudently went further, 
and publicly declared that the loans made by the house both to the state and 
to individuals being usurious, the payment of them could not be legally 
enforced. The directors, in causing this declaration to be made, had proceeded 
on the belief that the loans were struck at by Act 13 Geo. III. c. 63, which 
enacts in its 33d section that “no subject of his majesty” in the East Indies 
“ shall, upon any contract which shall be made from and after the 1 st day of 
August, 1774, take directly or indirectly, for loan of any monies, wares, mer¬ 
chandise, or other commodities whatsoever, above the value of twelve pounds 
for the forbearance of one hundred pounds for a year; and so after that rate 
for a greater or lesser sum, or for a longer or shorter time; and that all bonds, 
contracts, and assurances whatsoever, made after the time aforesaid, for pay¬ 
ment of any principal or money to be lent or covenanted to be performed upon, 
or for any usury whereupon or whereby there shall be reserved or taken above 
the rate of twelve pounds in the hundred, as aforesaid, shall be utterly void.” 
The directors were in error in supposing that the loans of William Palmer 
and Co. were in violation of this enactment, for the twelve judges of England 
when consulted on the subject gave it as their opinion that the above limitation 
of interest did not apply to loans made to the subjects of native independent 
}>rinces by British subjects domiciliated and residing within their dominions. 



Chap. VII.] 


CLAIMS AGAINST THE NIZAM. 


217 


It could not be doubted that the directors, by declaring the loans illegal, had a.d. isao. 
unintentionally but seriously compromised the interests of the creditors of 
William Palmer and Co. In proof of this we need only quote from a letter Transaotioaa 
which Moonir-ul-Moolk, one of the principal debtors of the house, wrote to ^ataer**** 
Chandoo Lai, in which he says: “ If the order prohibiting any money transac- * 
tions with them, and the proclamation describing the claims as void, had not 
arrived, my debt to them would have been completely and fully paid; but how 
could I, in defiance of the prohibition and of such a proclamation, j)ay them?” 

The claims of the house against the Nizam had already been satisfied by 
the money which the Company advanced for that purpose on the security of 
the tribute payable for the Northern Circars, but large sums lent to private 
individuals remained unpaid, and though formerly supposed to be forfeited as 
usurious, might now, in conseciuence of the opinion of the twelve judges, be 
enforced before the native courts. The trustees for the creditors availed them- Legal pro 
selves of this right, and obtained various decisions in their favour. So imper- 
feet however was the administration of justice, that payment was easily evaded, 
and could not at all be enforced where the debtors were in any way connected 
with the Nizam or his minister. Hence Moonir-ul-Moolk could not be reached 
unless the British government would consent to bring their influence to bear 
upon him. The trustees, considering the prejudice which their claims had sus¬ 
tained from having been denounced and stigmatized as usurious, thought them¬ 
selves entitled to expect this amount of interference, and were seconded in this 
view by the Board of Control; while the directors considered that neither 
justice nor sound policy would permit them to go further than to allow the 
claims to be prosecuted as ordinary debts, without any interference on their 
jiart in order to secure payment. After considerable discussion the board and 
the court came to an open rupture on the subject. 

In July, 1830, the court prepared the draft of a letter to Bengal, disapprov- oppoemg 

. n A t • 1 1 ^ t • vioWH of tllO 

iiig of the degree of countenance 'which the supreme government had given to direetow 
Sir William Rumbold, who, as one of the leading partners in the firm of 
William Palmer and Co., had arrived in India for the purpose of assisting in 
winding up its affairs. The board, when the draft was submitted to them, 
altered it so as to change its character entirely, and authorized the resident 
at Hyderabad to support the claims of the finn. It wtis now the turn of the 
court to object, and they were so far successful that the subject was in the mean¬ 
time left in abeyance. A final decision however was absolutely necessary, as 
the governor-general in council continued to call for it, and complained of the 
dilemma in which he was left from not having obtained it. Under these cir¬ 
cumstances the board, allowing the former draft and the emendations which 
they had made upon it to drop, directed a new draft to be prepared. The 
new draft, drawn up by the court on the 20th of March, 1832, in compliance 
with this injunction, was as unfortunate as tlie other. It corresponded to some 

VoL. HI. 224 



218 


HISTOBY OF INDIA. 


[Book VII. 


A.D. im 


ProceotlingK 
of the Board 
of Coutrol 
ill regard 
to olainiB 
of Williiini 
Palmer & 
Co. against 
the Nizaiu. 


extent with the views which had been expressed by the board, for it authorized 
the resident to intimate to the court of Hyderabad the wish of his government 
that the claims of William Palmer and Co. against Moonir-ul-Moolk should be 
settled by arbitration, the Nizam previously engaging to enforce the award. 
This did not seem to the board to go far enough, and therefore, suppressing the 
draft entirely, they substituted for it a despatch which, after declaring that the 
matter in dispute reijuired the interposition of both governments, offered the 
Nizam the option of two modes of settlement—the one arbitration, and the 
other a commission. In the former case the umpire, and in the latter the mem¬ 
bers, were to be nominated by the governor-general; and to make sure that 
tlie proceedings would not prove abortive, the Nizam, in making his selection 
between the two modes, was to engage to give effect to the decision. When 
this communication should be made to the Nizam, the justice and expediency 
of a final settlement was to be urgently pressed upon him. The despatch sub¬ 
sequently underwent some verbal alterations, and it was added by way of 
cxjdanation that nothing beyond earne.st recommendation was contemplated, 
and that even this degree of.interfei'ence would not have been adopted had the 
home authorities not felt that they had unintentionally prejudiced the claims 
by entertaining and promulgating an erroneous opinion of their illegality. 
While admitting jus a general rule that nothing can be more improper and 
impolitic than for the British government to use its influence with the native 
princes of India in order to enforce the payment of private debts contracted by 
themselves or their subjects, we are inclined to think that there were circum- 
stsinces which made the claims of the creditors of William Palmer and Co. an 
exception to the rule, and that the amount of interference proposed in the 
despatch of the Board of Control did not go beyond the justice of the case. 
It seemed otherwise to the directors, who not only objected to it on princij)le, 
but determined to avail themselves of every means in their power to prevent 
the authoritative transmission of the despatch to India. With this view they 
rescinded the resolution under which they had prepared their original draft, 
and then declining to take any initiative step in the matter, denied the right 
of the board to originate any despatch in regard to it. The boai'd, they argued, 
might, by 33 Geo. III. c. 52, modify to any extent any intended despatch which 
the directors submitted for approval, provided it related “to the civil or military 
government or revenues of the said territorial acquisitions in India,” and might, 
moreover, when “ the levying of war, or making peace, or treating or negoti¬ 
ating with any of the native states or princes in India” was “the subject 
matter of any of their deliberations,” originate a despatch without consulting 
the directors, and insure secrecy by transmitting it at once through the secret 
committee specially appointed for that purpose. But the proposed despatch 
respecting the claims of William Palmer and Co. did not fall under any of these 
heads, and therefore, now the directors had resolved to take no further steps in 



Chat. VII.] 


THE MAHRATTA STATES. 


219 


regard to the matter, it was incompetent for the Board of Control to inter- a.d. isss. 
meddle. The subject was not one of those on which they might originate a 
despatch, and transmit it through the secret committee, without consulting the wnt of 
directors, and inasmuch as it did not relate “to the civil or military govern- 
ment or revenues," it was no longer imder the cognizance of the board, even 
for modification, since the directors had formally withdrawn it. Brought to 
this point, the real question now raised was whether the court of directors, 
after submitting a proposed despatch to the Board of Control, could subse- 
(juently prevent them from adjudicating upon it, by simply withdrawing it and 
jdeading that it did not relate to civil or military government or revenues. 

The solution of this question obviously depended on the interpretation of the 
statute, and since the court and the board were equally determined not to yield, 
it only remained to appeal to a legal tribunal. The board accordingly applied 
to the Court of King’s Bench for a writ of mandamus, compelling the directors 
to transmit the contested despatch. After a full argument the board prevailed, 
and the issue of the writ on the 29th of January, 1833, left the directors no 
alternative but to obey, ten of their number however recording a strong protest 
against the despatch as a violation of treaties, of substantial justice, and of 
sound policy. The effect of this process was to establish the complete supremacy 
of the Board of Control, but the point raised must have been of some nicety, as 
it was deemed necessary in a subsequent statute to correct the vagueness of 
language used in 33 Geo. III. c. 52, by extending the control of the board to 
fill public matters whatever. 

In regard to the relations of the British government with the Maliratta Relations 
states a few remarks will suffice. Nagpoor, placed under the almost absolute Mniirattii 
control of tlie resident Mr. (afterwards Sir Richard) Jenkins, had made rapid 
progress, and the best wish that could be formed for the country was that its 
fictual administration should be continued. This, however, was not practicable. 

The rajah had attained his nineteenth year, and naturally longing to be his own 
master, no sooner gave utterance to the wish, than Lord William Bentinck, in 
accordance with his declared policy, at once complied with it. The native 
iidrainistration was ceiiainly no improvement on that which preceded, but as 
important checks were still retained, and the native ministers whom the rajah 
appointed were contented to submit to the guidance of the resident, Nagpoor 
tfiken as a whole continued to be prosperous. On the opposite side of India, 
in the territories of the Guicowar, matters wore a less pleasing aspect. When 
Syajee Row succeeded to the imbecile prince in whose name he had previously 
governed, great hopes were entertained. He had always co-operated cordially 
with the resident, and now that all the restraints which his position as regent 
imposed upon him were removed, it was naturally expected that his increase of 
power would be followed by an increase of the general prosperity. It proved 
otherwise. Paying little regard to his own obligations, he soon began to disre- 



A.D. 1830. 


RelatioDR 
with t)ie 
Gnicowar. 


Tlelatioiis 

withHolkar. 


I)i9puto<l 

sticcession. 


220 HISTORY OF INDIA. [Book VII.' 

gard those of which, with his own consent, the British government had heeome 
guarantees. A collision thus became inevitable, the Giiicowar uSing* every* 
means to escape from his obligations, and the resident insisting on hia fulfilment 
of them. One thing whicli made the Guicowar’s conduct more provoking, 'was, 
that in refusing to pay his debts he could not plead poverty. On Che contraiy, 
he refused to pay, merely that he might be able to gratify a propensity for 
hoarding, and had managed in the course of five years to deposit in his coffers 
about £600,000 of surplus revenue, which, by express stipulation, belonged not 
to him, but to his creditors. The opposition of the resident to this dishonest 
course only exposed him to insult, and the Guicowar carried his hostility so far 
that Sir John Malcolm, the governor of Bombay, was obliged to interfere. As 
there could be no doubt that the guarantees of the British government had 
been bestowed too lavishly, it was deemed advisable, after Lord William 
Bentinck became govemor-geneml, to try the effect of tranquillizing measures; 
and one great source of misunderstanding was removed by means of an arrange¬ 
ment which diminished the number of the guarantees, or restricted them to 
personal immunity, and restored to the Guicowar several districts, the revenues 
of which laid been sequestrated in security. For a time the desired effect 
appeared to be ju’oduced, but the Guicowar ere long returned to his former 
practices, and at last the forbearance which had been exercised towards him 
was found only to have rendered interference and restraint absolutely necessary. 

In Holkar’s dominions the event of gi’eatest importance during Lord 
WiUiani Bentinck’s administration was a new succession, rendered necessary by 
the death of Mulhar Row Holkar at the age of twenty-seven, in October, 1833. 
As he left no children, his widow, with the consent of his motlier Kesaree Bai, 
adopted a child of three j'^ears old, said to be descended from Tookajee Holkar, and 
placed him on the musnud under the title of Martand Row, Kesaree Bai acting 
as hia guardian, and Madho Row Fumave.se, the minister of the late rajah, con¬ 
tinuing to conduct the administration as before. The validity of this succes¬ 
sion was soon disputed by Haree Holkar, a nephew of Jeswunt Row Holkar, 
who, having escaped from Mahaswara, where he had been confined as a prisoner, 
appeared at the head of a powerful body of supporters and claimed to succeed 
as legal heir. Hitherto the British government, though the resident had 
attended Martand Row’s installation, had otherwise kept aloof, and on being 
applied to for aid by Kesaree Bai refused to interfere. A civil war thus became 
imminent, but Haree Holkar’s partizans increased so rapidly that the Bai, 
believing the contest to be hopeless, abandoned it and invited him to Indore. 
There being no longer any competition, the governor-general was now able, 
without violating his system of neutrality, to take part in the proceedings, and 
Haree Holkar entered Indore accompanied by a British escort. He possessed 
few qualifications for the elevation thus conferred upon him; and by placing 
himself entirely in the hands of a worthless and incompetent ■ minister of the 



THE MAHEATTA STATES. 


221 


Cba®. VII.] 


ilktrigiios. 


uame.ofOKevajee Phansia, soon produced so much disturbance and distress, as to a.d. im' 
make it a serious question whether the British government ought not to under¬ 
take the administration and reduce Haree Holkar to the condition of a pensioner. 

After .the death of Dowlut Row Scindia in March, 1827, effect was given to Eoiatio™ 
what- appeared to have been his intentions, by allowing his favourite wife, 

Baiza Bai, to adopt as his successor a boy of eleven years of age of the name of 
Janakajee, and continue in the meantime to govern as regent. In carrying 
out this arrangement Janakajee was affianced to her grand-daughter. Baiza 
Bai had consented to these arrangements with great reluctance. Her ambition 
was to retain the government for life, while she foresaw that Janakajee would 
in all probability insist in the course of a few years on taking it into his own 
hands. This actually proved the case, and Baiza Bai enraged began to form a 
scheme for setting Janakajee entirely aside. Her grand-daughter to whom he 
was affianced had died, and she had a married daughter, Chimna Bai, who 
was pregnant, and might produce an heir to the late Scindia in the direct line. 

'fhese views received no countenance from the British government. The 
adoption of Janakajee had been sanctioned by all the leading persons in the 
court and camp at Gwalior, and any attempt to rescind it would be strenuously 
opposed. Baiza Bai, however, was not to be dissuaded, and commenced the 
execution of her scheme by placing Janakajee under strict supendsion, and 
making him virtually a prisoner in her palace. He made his escape and took 
refuge with the resident, declaring that his life was in danger. After a time an 
apparent reconciliation was effected, but the views of the parties were openly 
declared, and Lord William Bentinck during a visit which he paid to Gwalior 
was importuned by both. A decided declaration on his part would undoubtedly 
have settled the dispute, but from being ham])ered as usual by his neutral 
system he refused to utter it, and left the factions to carry on the struggle in 
their own way, till actual disturbance and threatened anarchy should at last 
compel him to interfere. At present he only ventured to give an equivocal 
julvice, which being interpreted by Baiza Bai to mean that she was, if possible, 
to keep her power, and by Janakajee that he was, if possible, to wrest it from 
her, rather hastened than proti’acted the crisia On the 10th of July, 1833, civiiwur 
some of the disciplined battalions of Gwalior, who had espoused the cause of difficulty 
Janaka-jee, having beset the palace, carried him off to the camp, and compelled 
Baiza Bai to save herself by flight. After taking refuge with her brother Hindoo 
Row, she was proceeding to the house of the resident, who had declined an 
invitation to visit her, when she was encountered by a strong body of Janakajee’s 
troops. It was now too late to stand aloof any longer on the neutral system, 
and the resident succeeded, not without difficulty, in preventing the effusion of 
blood. Ultimately the Bai saw tlie necessity of resigning the contest, and 
retired with a liberal pension to a jaghire in the south of India The govern¬ 
ment did not improve under Janakajee. He had owed his success in a great 



222 


HISTOEY OF INDIA. 


[Book VII. 


A.D. 1880, 


Rolatioiw 
with the 
BaJpt>ot 
utatee. 


Kutuh. 


Booiidee. 


measure to the military, who, thus conscious of their importance, lost no oppor¬ 
tunity of turning it to account, frequently breaking out into mutiny, and pro¬ 
ducing disturbances, not only destructive of the prosperity of Scindia’s territo¬ 
ries, but dangerous to other states. The necessary result might have been 
foreseen, though it was not actually realized till-a later period. 

In the relations maintained with the Rajpoot states during Lord William 
Bentinck’s administration, we see little more than a series of inconsistencies 
produced by the profession of non-interference, and the frequently recurring 
necessity of acting in direct violation of it. In Kotah a singular form of gov¬ 
ernment existed. The offices both of rajah and of prime-minister, or as he was 
called, raj-raTUi, were hereditary. The effect was to establish two co-equal 
sovereigns, who if they chose to work together for the public good, might 
secure a high degree of iirosperity, but were equally capable, and much more 
likely, by pursuing opposite counsels, of throwing the country into confusion. 
During the wise and vigorous administration of Zalim Sing as raj-rana, Kotah 
flourished, and even after his death, and the succession of his son Madhoo Sing 
to his hereditary office, owing to the mutual moderation practised by him and 
his nominal master, and also to the occasional mediation of Colonel Caulfield, 
the resident, misunderstandings seldom arose, or were removed before the public 
peace was disturbed. This favourable position of affairs could not long con¬ 
tinue. New successions placed the powers of government in new hands, and 
collisions between the rajali and the raj-rana became the rule rather than the 
exception. A feverish excitement was thus constantly kept up, and the pro¬ 
sperity of the country began visibly to decline. The British government after 
standing aloof was obliged to interfere. The government however was so 
viciously constituted, that it seemed impossible to effect a remedy without 
changing it in its essential features, and an arrangement as equitable as the 
circumstances admitted was made, by conferring a third of the territories of 
Kotah on the raj-rana, as an independent sovereignty, and leaving the rajah 
in uncontrolled possession of the remaining two-thirds. This arrangement, 
though seen to be advisable, was not carried into effect till some years later. 

The Rajpoot state of Boondee was about the same time seriously disturbed. 
The Rajah Ram Sing was a minor, and the ranee, his mother, desirous to retain 
the rule which she exercised as guardian, kept him in ignorance, and even 
encouraged him in vice in the hope that while thus unfit, he might cease to 
have any wish to govern. Young as he was, the rajah was man-ied to a daughter 
of the Rajah of Joudpoor. The mother made it part of her policy to estrange 
him from his wife, and perhaps succeeded all the more easily that she was ten 
years his senior. The princess however, knowing her rights, resented the treat¬ 
ment to which she was subjected, and complained to her father. His fimt step 
in consequence was to represent the case to the British agent, and request him 
to interfere in his daughter's behalf. The agent acting according to his instruc- 



Chap. VII.] 


THE RAJPOOT STATES. 


m 


tions declined the task, and the Eajah of Joudpoor, thus left to seek his own a.d. isto. 
remedy, first remonstrated by an envoy, and then, when this proved unavailing, 
sent a deputation accompanied by a body of 300 troops to demand the princess, Dwturb- 
and escort her back to her father’s house. The troops encamped outside the 
town, and the deputation entered. They were met by a number of their 
countiymen foi'ming the princess’s original suite, and sent a messenger to the 



Town and Pass of Boondef. —From Grindlay> Scenery of Western India. 


durbar. The ostensible object was to ask when it would be convenient to 
receive them, but a murderous design lurked beneath. The messenger was in 
fact an assassin, who instead of waiting for an answer, drew his sword and 
plunged it into the heai’t of Deva Krishan Row, the Boondee minister. The 
assassin was immediately slain, and the whole dejmtation would undoubtedly 
have been massacred, had not Mr. Trevelyan, the political agent, hastened from 
Kotah, and succeeded in obtaining permission for the departure of all, except 
three, who being considered leaders, were detained and put to death. Man British 
Sing, the Rajah of Joudpoor, appears to have been privy to the assassination, but 
it suited him to deny this in the most solemn manner’, aird to declare that he 
would be utterly disgraced if he did not signally revenge what he called the 
murder of his innocent servants at Boondee. In former times the feud which 
had been thus raised could not have been suppressed without an exterminatftig 
war, which would in all probability have spread over the whole of Rajpootana. 

The governor-general fortunately met the danger with more than his usual 
promptitude, and after a long and acrimonious discussion a mutual oblivion of 
injuries was agreed to. 

Bhira Sing, the Rana of Odeypoor, whose abominable conduct in consenting 
tf> the murder of his daughter for the purpose of relieving himself from political 
embarrassment has already been recorded, died in 1828, after a reign of more 




224 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book VII. 


,A.D. 1831. 


JlelHtioiiB 
with Odey- 
poor. 


With 

Joudpoor. 


than half a century. During his last years the peace of his territories had been 
greatly disturbed by wild tribes, particularly the Minas inhabiting the district 
of Chappan in the south-west, and the Grasias and Bheels of the south and 
east. They had ultimately been kept permanently in check by a strong body 
of the Company’s troops, but under the non-interference policy these had been 
withdrawn, and the rana and liis minister were told that they must depend 
entirely upon themselves for the maintenance of internal tranquillity. This 
was a task to which they were altogether incompetent, and it was not long 
before marauders were carrying depredations to the very gates of Odeypoor. 
Jivan Sing, who succeeded his father as rana, had for some time taken an active 
share in the government, and displayed talents which were deemed capable of 
restoring tranquillity to his country. Such a prince was surely entitled to the 
utmost encouragement, and yet one of the first steps taken by the governor- 
general was to intimate to him, that henceforth he must not calculate on any 
assistance in mtiintaining internsil tranquillity. The state of his hill districts, 
he was told, did not immediately concern British India. On this selfish and 
short-sighted policy, at the very time when the chiefs were openly declaring 
themselves unable to check the marauding propensities of their dependants, the 
regular troops of the Company were withdrawn, and the levy of irregultuvs was 
disbanded. At the same time the residency was abolished, and the communi¬ 
cation between the two governments was transferred to the political agent 
stationed at Ajmere, as a subordinate of the resident at Delhi. It is right to 

add that the rajah, though thus suddenly involved 
in difficulties, managed in a great measure to sur¬ 
mount them. Partly, it may be, from a feeling of 
despondency he gave way at first to habits of dis¬ 
sipation, but he had the good sense and firmness 
afterwards to change his course, and discharge his 
proj)er duties with assiduity and success. 

The relatiorrs of the British government about 
this period with Marr Sing, the Rajah of Joud¬ 
poor, were so little of a friendly nature that open 
hostilities were at one time threatened. From a 
superstitious verreration for a sect of religious 
mendicants or yogis, he not only submitted to 
therir as his spiritual guides, and allotted them 
about a fifth of his whole revenues, but irrtrusted 
^ with the whole power of the state. Under 

the idea that he thus enjoyed super-natural pro¬ 
tection, he did not deem it necessary to guard against giving offence, and 
when remonstrated with, returned sullen or insulting answers. When 
the governor-general made a visit to Ajmere in 1831, he excused himself on 




Chap. VII.] 


THE EAJPOOT STATES. 


225 


frivolous grounds for declining the invitation which he received to meet him. 
It was also known, that so far from exerting himself to suppress the robber 
tribes of the desert of Parkar, he was in league with them, and had on one 
occasion, when they were suddenly dispersed, given a secret a.sylum to one of 
their chiefs. Complaints of depredations, either 
directly committed or instigated by him, were made 
from various other quarters, and, as remonstrance 
had no effect upon him, it was resolved at once to 
have recourse to decisive measures. Accordingly, 
at the end of the rains in 1834, a large force as¬ 
sembled at Ajmere under Brigadier-general Steven¬ 
son, and prepared to move against Joudpoor. This 
demonstration was of itself sufficient, and Man Sing 
hastened to avert the ruin which impended over 
him, by sending a deputation to Ajmere with full 
power to make every concession. “What occasion 
could there be,” said his vakeels, “for the march 
of an army against the rajah? A single clmpixtsi 
(a servant wearing a badge) sent to Joudpoor to 

^ ' •‘A Chvprasi.— Fi*oin Asiatic Costumes. 

communicate the governor-general’s pleasure would 

suffice.” These professions were taken at no more than they were woi-th, and 
a regular treaty was concluded, obliging the rajah to pay indemnity for past 
offences, and curtailing his power of future mischief 

In the Rajpoot state of Jeypoor, the reluctance of the governor-general to 
interfere with its internal administration let loose the elements of discord, and 
gave rise to a series of intrigues which issued at last in the perj)etration of an 
atrocious crime. The ranee or mother of the young rajah, acting under the 
influence of a person of the name of Jota Ram, endeavoured to perpetuate her 
power, and was violently opposed by the leading thakoors or chiefs. A series 
of party struggles in consequence took place, and the contending factious 
appealed to the governor-general, each in the hope of obtaining a favourable 
decision. Earlj' in 1834, while matters were thus in suspense, the .ranee died, 
and an attempt was made to get quit of all competing claims for the regencj", 
by dispensing with it altogether, and giving the personal administration to tlie 
rajah himself, who was now approaching maturity. Jota Ram meanwhile 
managed to maintain his authority, and the strife became still more bitter than 
before. A momentary cessation took place when the British army began to 
assemble at Ajmere. It was destined ostensibly against Joudpoor, but as it 
might easily embrace Jeypoor in its operations, the contending factions there 
deemed it prudent to suspend their intestine strugglea The submission of the 
Joudpoor rajah having rendered the expedition against him unnecessary, it was 
determined to employ part of the troops in an expedition against the robber 

Voi,. III. ^ 225 



A.D. 1834. 

Tiireatened 
liostilities 
with Joud¬ 
poor. 


RelationB 
with Jey- 
jjoor. 



226 


HISTOEY OF INDIA. 


[Book Vn. 


A.D. 188 . 5 . chiefs of Shekhawatee, a country situated between Jeypoor and Bikaneer, and 
nominally tributary to the former, but in fact independent, or rather utterly 
Death ofihe Jawless. For a number of years the chiefs had carried on their depredations 
wholesale, without sparing the British territories, and it was strongly suspected 
picioL™*'. that Jota Kam had not disdained to share in their plunder. His conduct 
cuiiistanooe. confirmed this suspicion. On first hearing of the expedition he 

repaired to Ajmere, and expostulated against it as unnecessary, and after it had 
taken place, and the country had in consequence been placed under British 
management, he had protested against this measure as a violation of the rights 
of Jeypoor. Shortly afterwards, the rajah died suddenly. Foul play was sus¬ 
pected, and the general belief was that Jota Kam, and Rupa, a female who was 
acting in concert with him, had murdered their prince in order that they might 
prolong their power by acting as the guardians of his infant son. In this they 
were disappointed. Major Alves, as political agent of the British government, 
undertook the guardianship, and in concert with the leading chiefs formed a 
new administration, from all connection with which Jota Ram and Rupa were 
excluded, the former being removed to Dessar, about thirty miles east of tlie 
capital, and the latter to a residence within it, where a guard of British sejioys 
was necessary to protect her against the public fury. Not to break the naiTa- 
tive, the events which followed tliis arrangement, though reaching a few months 
beyond the close of Lord William Bentiinck’s administration, must here be 
briefly detailed. 

Ti.onritirfi On the 4th of June, 1835, Major Alves, while quitting the palace along 
woundea with Ml'. Blake his assistant, Lieutenant Ludlow, and Cornet Macnaghten, 
after an interview with the ranee mother and the thakoors, was attacked 
murdemi wouiided by one of the bystanders, who rushed ujjon him with a 

drawn sword. Fortunately, his woimd though severe was not mortal, and 
he was conveyed without obstruction to the residency. The assassin had 
in the meanwhile been seized and placed under a guard at the palace. Mr. 
Blake, who had remained with the guard, prejiared to return to the resi¬ 
dency, and came out holding in his hand the bloody sword which had been 
taken from the assassin. An excited crowd had gathered round the palace, 
and he had no sooner stai-ted ofi’ on his elephant than a fierce attack was made 
upon him. Seeing escape impossible, he stopped at a temple. The doors were 
shut, but along witli the elephant driver, and an attendant chuprasi, he gained 
access by a window, and was secreted by two persons, who were within, in a 
small chamber. Here he had only a short respite, for the mob forcing their 
way, seized him as he was attempting to escajie, murdered him, and threw his 
body into the street. The atrocity was attributed at first to some sudden and 
unaccountable outburst of popular fury, but subsequent investigation traced it 
to the partizans of Jota Ram. All who were proved to have been accessory 
to the conspiracy, or to have agisted in carrying it out, suffered death. The 



Chap. VII.] 


.ALLIANCES WITH NATIVE PRINCES. 


227 


same sentence, though recorded against Jota Earn and his brother, was not a.d. mi. 
executed, and was ultimately commuted into imprisonment for life within the 
British territory. 

Another part of Lord William Bentinck’s administration, which must not TreaHeswith 
be allowed to pass unnoticed, is that which relates to his intercourse with states, native 
so remotely situated that they might be considered as lying beyond the ordinary 
sphere of Indian policy. The alarm felt for the safety of the Indian empire by 
the British ministry, was formerly caused by the proceeflings of the French; 
but more recently it had taken a different direction, and the rapid encroach¬ 
ments made by the Eussians in Persia were regarded as the prelude of an inva¬ 
sion of India from that quarter. It was therefore deemed good policy not to 
remain mere spectators of this approaching danger, but to anticipate it by 
forming alliances with the states through which an invading army must 
ndvance, and thus throw a formidable barrier in its way. At first the real 
design was not mentioned, and nothing more was ostensibly proposed, than the 
establishment of commercial intercourse, by opening the navigation of the 
Indus, and thus obtaining access to the heart of Central Asia. Comuwnications xiie Ameers 
with this view were accordingly opened with the Ameers of Scinde, who after 
manifesting great reluctance were induced to conclude a treaty, by which the 
merchants and traders of India were permitted to convey their goods along the 
Indus, free from vexatious delay.s, and subject only to moderate rates of duty. 



Riinjeet SiNo’e Ekcampwent near BooruR, on the Sutlej.—From White's Views in tiio Himalaya. 

In this treaty the Ameers, unable to conceal their suspicions, procured the 
in.sertion of a declaration that the contracting parties should never “look with 
a covetous eye on the possessions of each other.” Similar treaties were con- Rnnjeetsing. 
eluded with the Nabob of Bhawulpoor and with Eunjeet Sing. With the latter 
a closer connection than a mere commercial treaty could form seemed desirable. 







228 


HISTOEY OF INDIA. 


[Book VII. 


A.D. 1831. 


Sluih Sliitjali 
utt-omirts t<> 
m5<)ver the 
tlin>iio of 
(.'abrxil. 


and in order to conciliate bis friendship, Lord ’Ellenborougli, then president of 
the Board of Control, addressed a letter to him in the name and by command 

of his majesty William IV., with a pre¬ 
sent of some English horses of uncom¬ 
mon size, for which he was known to 
have a fancy. The letter and present 
were delivered by Lieutenant Alexander 
Burnes at Lahore, in July, 1831, and in 
the following October a meeting took 
place at Roopur on the Sutlej, between 
Runjeet Sing and the governor-general. 
The only avowed object of the meeting 
was to strengthen the bonds of a friend- 
shiji already existing, and a week passed 
•away in the interchange of visits, gaudy 
ceremonials, and military evolutions, the 
governor-general having with him, in 
addition to his usual body guards, two 
s<piadrons of his Majesty’s 1 Gth lancers, 
a troop of horse artillery, two risalas of 
Skinner’s horse, his Majesty’s 31st foot, 
and two regiments of native infantry, while Runjeet Sing had come escorted 
by 10,000 of his best horse, and GOOO of his best infantry. It was suspected 
that more serious matters mingled with these amusements, and there is now no 
room to doubt that the foundation was then laid of that alliance, the bitter 
fruits of which were afterwards reaped in the wai’ with Afghanistan. 

At this very time Shah Shujah, the ex-King of Cabool, who had been driven 
from his throne more than twenty years before, was living at Loodiaua, a 
pensioner on the bounty of the British government. Previous to the above 
meeting at Roopur, the ex-king, with a view to his restoration, had been nego¬ 
tiating with Runjeet Sing, and the conditions had been all but definitively 
arranged. These conditions were known to the governor-general, and it is 
impossible to believe that Runjeet Sing allowed the week to pass away without 
sounding him on the .subject, and ascei-taining that in aiding tire restoration of 
Shah Shujah he would at least have the acquiescence of the British govern¬ 
ment. It is true that Lord William Bentinck, when directly applied to by 
Shah Shujah, fell back on his neutral policy and declined to interfere; but it is 
known that the proceedings of Dost Mahomed, the actual ruler of Cabool, had 
already awakened suspicion, and that the governor-general, under instructions 
from England, was jealously watching his intercourse directly with Persia, and 
as it was therefore concluded indirectly with Ruasia. Hence the first attempt 
()f Shah Shujah to recover his throne, as it was commenced in 1833, wljeruLord 



Mupnted Trooper of Skinner’s Horse. 

From Major Luant'b Tiewa in Indin. 



Chap. VII.] 


SHAH SHUJAH. 


229 


William Bentinck was governor-general and had undoubtedly his best wishes, 
though it did not receive his actual co-operation, may not improperly be 
regarded as one of the important events connected with his administration. 

When Shah Shujah started from Loodiana in January, 1833, he could only 
muster a few hundred followers; on his arrival at Shikarpoor they amounted 
to 30,000. The Ameers of Scinde gave him a most friendly reception, and 
continued for a time to furnish him with abundant supplies; but when he 
delayed his departure, and instead of being satisfied, continued daily to increase 
his demands, they became completely alienated, and determined to rid them¬ 
selves of the burden at all hazards. They accordingly collected their forces. 
Shah Shujah on his part was not disinclined to an appeal to arms, and in 
January, 1831, a pitched battle was fought near Roree. Shah Slmjah proved 
victorious, and the Ameers having purchased his departure by consenting to 
pay him an additional subsidy, and assist him with an auxiliary force, he com¬ 
menced his advance on Kandahar. He encountered little resistance, and was 
in hopes of an ea-sy capture, when the approach of Dost Mahomed from Cabool, 
at the head of a powerful force, completely changed the aspect of aftiurs. 
Shah Shujah retired to Abbasabad, where he was brought to bay, and ventured 
to j’isk a battle. Owing partly to the treachery, and partly to the cowardice 
of his followers, be was signally discomfited, and fled westward with a slender 
escort to the fort of Laush, the chief of which gave him an asylum. After a 
short delay he marched north to Furrah, expecting reinforcements from Herat, 
but being disappointed, and threatened by a party of horse under Rehim Khan, 
lie fled across the desert of Seistan, and after great privations, re.ached Kclat. 
His pursuer had followed close upon his track, but the chief of Kelat having 
taken the ex-king under his protection, refused to surrender him. On this a 
charactei'istic bargain was struck, the chief of Kelat agreeing to withdraw his 
protection, and Rehim Khan agreeing to desist from pursuit. Shah Shujah, 
thus obliged once more to, shift for himself, repaired to Hyderabad, where the 
Ameers treated him with more kindness than might have been anticipated 
alter their late cpiarrel. Ifrom Hyderabad he proceeded north-cast across the 
desert of Jessulmeer, and again fixed his residence at Loodiana. His second 
expedition furnishes a tale of disgrace and disaster which must be re,served for 
future narration. 


A.D. 18SS. 


Proceedings 
of Shah 
Slmjah. 


Jlis ultimate 
discoinfitarc. 



230 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book VII. 


A n. 1820. 


Approiich- 
ing expiry 
of tiie 
Company’s 
charter. 


Parliamen¬ 
tary com- 
mittocK 


Arg^imetitB 
against the 
Company’s 
monopoly. 


CHAPTER VIIL 


Approaching expiry of the Company’s charter—Views of ministers and of the Company—Bill for 
renewing the charter introduced—The discussions produced by it—The act passed—Its leading 
provisions—Close of Iiord William Bentinck's administration. 


URING the greater part of Lord William Bentinck’s administra¬ 
tion, India and its affairs engrossed a far larger share of the 
attention of the British piihlic and legislature than had usually 
been allotted to them. The Company’s existing charter was to 
expire in 1834. Ought it to be renewed at all, and if renewed, 
under what conditions? These were questions which it had become abso¬ 
lutely necessary to answer, and in which, it was well understood, the manu¬ 
facturing and cbmmercial interests of the country were deeply involved. The 
monopoly of trade to India had been advantageously abolished—why should 
that of the trade to China be retained? As early as 1829 the leading towns of 
the United Kingdom bad begun to agitate the subject, and to load the tables 
of both Houses of Parliament with petitions against the renewal of the charter, 
and in February, 1830, select committees were appointed on the recommenda¬ 
tion of ministers themselves, Lord Ellenborough making the motion in the 
lords, and Sir Robert Peel in the commons. Both movers carefully abstained 
from giving any indication of the views entertained by the cabinet, and the 
committees were simply appointed “to inquire into the present state of the 
affairs of the East India Company, and into the trade between Great Britain 
and China, and to I’cport their observations thereupon to the bouse.” The 
death of George IV., the dissolution of parliament, and the foj’mation of a new 
ministry pledged to parliamentary reform, withdrew attention for a time 
from the concerns of India. The committees, however, re-appointed from 
session to session, had not been idle, and a vast body of evidence oral and 
written had been accumulated. 

The expediency of throwing open the trade to China could scarcely admit 
of serious discussion. It was open to all the other trading nations of the world, 
and were the British alone to be excluded from it, in order that all the profit 
which it yielded might be monopolized by a company? As usual, however, 
both parties pushed their views to an extreme, the free traders maintaining 
that the Company had no interest to oppose the opening of the trade because it 
yielded them no profit, and the Company, on the other hand, maintaining that 
the profit which it yielded was so large and so necessary to meet the payment 
of their dividends, that they would he ruined if deprived of it. After a great 











Chap. VIII.] 


THE COMPANY’S MONOPOLY. 


231 


mass of conflicting evidence had been given on the subject, the result acquiesced a d. i82b. 
in by the most competent judges was, that during the last fifteen years of the 
Company's’monopoly of the China trade, they had realized from it an aggregate Arguments 
profit of £15,414,000, or rather more than a million sterling annually. But Company's 
when this fact was admitted, it carried little weight with it, because it was 
alleged that the profit was obtained by enhancing the price, and was, in fact, 
a tax levied upon the whole consumers of tea for the benefit of a particular cor¬ 
poration. Even admitting that the profit was legitimately gained by fair trade 
without taxing the consumers, the question still returned, Why should this profit 
go entirely into the pockets of one class of individuals, to the exclusion of all the 
other merchants of the kingdom ? Behind this question there was still another. 

The Company made a million annually by the China ti’ade. Was this the 
maximum profit that could be realized? The extinction of monopoly naturally 
extended commerce, and there was therefore every reason to expect, that if the 
trade were thrown open, it would rapidly extend, so as at once to add greatly 
to the amount of aggregate j)rofit realized by individuals, and of revenue drawn 
by the public. To these views no solid objection could be stated. 

After the question of monopoly was virtually decided, and the Company, 
if continuing to trade at all, could not expect to occupy any vantage ground, future 
the next point was to settle the future government of India. Was the old 
machinery to be thrown aside as worn out and useless, or might it not be possible 
by means of alterations and repairs to render it more efficient than ever? The 
moment the monopoly of the Company was extinguished, its trade, exposed to 
general competition, ceased to be of any value. Nothing, therefore, could be 
lost by agreeing to abandon it. Acting on this view ministers proposed that 
the Company should entirely sink their commercial, and in future act only in 
a political character, their governing powers and relations to the Board of 
Control remaining, with slight modifications, the same as before. The directors, 
when this proposal was submitted to them, expressed great doubts of being able 
to cJirry (jn the government, when divested of their commercial character, but 
they were willing, if certain difficulties which they pointed out could be 
obviated, to recommend to the proprietors to close with the proposal. One 
important point, however, still remained to be explained. Whatever might be 
the view taken as to the territorial rights of the Company, they were certainly 
possessed of a large amount of capital, of which it never could be proposed to 
deprive them, and it was therefore necessary to ascertain how this capital was 
in future to be secured, and from what source the dividends payable on it were 
to be derived. 

On this subject a serious difference of opinion arose. The proposal of 
ministers was, that the whole of the Company's commercial assets should, .so 
far as possible, be converted into money, and that with the sum tlius obtained 
a portion of the Indian debt, bearing interest equal in amount to £630,000, 



232 


HISTOEY OF INDIA. ^;BopK VII. 

A.D. 1829. now annually payable in dividends, should be discharged. In future the 
_ dividends would be regarded as an annuity payable to the proprietors of India 

NegotiiitionB stock, and charged upon the territorial revenue of India. After a certain fixed 
gorra^iuoiit term it would be in the option of parliament to redeem this annuity, by paying 
conipaiij eveiy £5, 5s. of annuity, £100 of capital. The directors objected that these 
assets, if converted into ca.sh, would sufllce to purchase an investment in consols 
equal to the amount of their dividends, and that thej'^ were, therefore, entitled 
in fairness to demand that the assets should either be employed in making 
such an investment for the behoof of the pixiprietors, or at least so employed 
as to provide an effectual guarantee, both for the regular half-yearly payment 
of the dividends, and in the event of redemption, for the payment of such air 
amount of principal as would produce the dividends by investing it in the 
funds. According to the Company the value of their stock, including assets of 
every kind, amounted on the 1st of May, 1829, to £21,103,000, and they had 
also a random claim of £5,000,000 as the value of fixed projierty in India. This 
last claim, however, was very problematical, and even in making up the stock 
to twenty-one millions, one item of £4,032,000, as due from territory, was 
added, and another of £3,796,000, as chargeable to territory, omitted. The pro¬ 
priety both of the addition and the omission was strongly questioned, and if, as 
was not improbable, the one should fall to be deducted from the assets, and tlie 
other added to the debit of the Company, the effect would be to cut off nearly 
eight millions and a half from the aggregate capital, reducing its value at one 
stroke from £21,103,000 to £12,675,000. Nor was this all. Several of the 
items composing this lower value were subject to dispute, and it was therefore 
not impossible that in making a final adjustment, whether by arbitration or 
legal, proceedings, other important deductions might be made. These considera¬ 
tions rendered a compromise desirable, and the original proposal of ministers 
was ultimately accepted, with this important addition, that two millions sterling 
of the commercial assets should be invested in the funds, and there accumulated 
to form a collateral security for the capital of the Company and its future 
redemption. 

DWcretif. The next point to be considered was the term before which the power of 
ogitatoii. redemption should not be exercised, and to which the government of India 
should be continued to the Company. Ministers were willing that the com¬ 
pulsory redemption should not be competent within forty years, but they 
refused to accede to the proposal of the directors, that the government should 
be continued to the Company till the annuity should be actually redeemed; 
ultima^ly, however, they conceded so far as to consent that the government 
should be continued to the Company for twenty years, and tliat at the end of 
this or any subsequent period they should not be deprived of it without a three 
years’ notice, and the option of demanding pa 3 Tnent of the capital, and employ¬ 
ing the whole or any pai-t of it in resuming their trade, should they see fit to 



Chap. 'VIII-.} EXTINCTION QF THE COM^AOT« J^toNOPOLY. 233 

do so. Among the various other points diScussed, the only one requiring parti- .\.d. i 833. 
cular notice at present, was the degree of power to be possessed respectively by ” 

the Board of Control and the Company. Ministers proposed that the absolute Negotiation* 
power which the Company now possessed of recalling. the governors of the govomment 
presidencies and the commander-in-chief should be restricted, by giving the 
lioard a veto on the recall. This proposal was strenuously objected to by the , 
directors, who maintained that the natural tendency of the new arrangements 
was to diminish their influence, and that therefore they were entitled to expect, 
that if any vhangc were to be made in the relative positions of the board and 
the Company, it would be by curtailing the ovei-grown authority of the former, 
and strengthening the impaired powers of the latter. Following out this view, 
they referred to the manner in which the directors liad been coerced by the 
issue of the writ of mandamus, in regard to the claims of creditors in the 
Nizam’s dominions, and threatened with the issue of the same writ in regard to 
similar claims in Glide. Such }>i-oceedings might be repeated, and as their 
obvious effect was to weaken tlie hands of government, and even bring it into 
contempt, it seemed absolutely necessary either to give a right of appeal in the 
event of differences between the coui-t and the board, or at all events to provide 
for their publicity by bringing them directly under the notice of parliament. 

Ministers gave way so far as to desist from pressing for a veto on the powers of 
recall already enjoyed by the court, but they peremptorily refused to give a 
right of repeal, and held that publicity was already sufficiently secured, by tlie 
l ight Avhich the directors possessed, in common witli all the other subjects of 
t he realm, of approaching parliament by petition. 

On the 25th of March, 1833, the correspondence between the directors and aesointtcn* 
the Board of Control as representing the ministry was submitted to the eourt paiimiueut. 
of proprietors, and on the 15th day of April, to which day the meeting had 
l>een adjourned. Sir John Malcolm moved a series of resolutions, embodying in 
substance the leading proposals above made by the directors, and signifying 
the assent of the Company “to conduct the government of India, at the sacri¬ 
fices demanded, provided they were furnished with powers sufficient for the 
effective discharge of so imjxirtant a duty, and their pecuniary rights and claims, 
were adjusted upon the principle of fair and liberal compromise.” The resolu¬ 
tions gave rise to a debate which was spun out to seven days, and were finally 
carried by ballot by a majority of 477 to 52. As yet, however, all that had 
been done was only preliminary to the real battle which was to be fought in . 
parliament. On the 13th of June, 1833, the subject was introduced to the 
House of Commons by Mr. Charles Grant (afterwards Lord Glcnelg), the 
jiresident of the Board of Control, who concluded a long explanatory speech 
hy moving the three following resolutions:—“1. That it is expedient that all 
his majesty’s subjects shall be at liberty to repair to the ports of the empire of, 

Cliina, and to trade in tea and in all other productions of the said empire, subject 
Voi. HI. 226 



A.D. 1833. 

A■-. fc_ 


llesoliitiuuft 
adopted by 
turliament 
rcganHiij? 

India 

Company. 


234 HISTORY OF INDIA. [Book VII. 

tQ such regulations ;as parliament shall enact for the protection of the com¬ 
mercial and political interests of this country. 2 That it is expedient that, in 
case the East India Company shall transfer to the crown, on behalf of the 
Indian telritory, all assets and claims of every description belonging to the said 
Company, the crown on behalf of the Indian territory shall take on itself all 
the obligations of the said Company, of whatever description, and that the 
said Company shall receive from the revenues of the said territory such a sum, 
and paid in such a manner, and under such regulations, as parliament shall 
enact. 3. That it is expedient that the government of the British'possessions 
in India be intrusted to the said Company, under such conditions and regula¬ 
tions as parliament shall enact, for the purpose of extending the commerce of 
tliis country, and of securing the good government, and promoting the religious 



Till; Court of rKori;iETt)iis, East India IIou.se.*- Troin an oiigiiml Urawiiii?: liy J. L. V.’illi 


and moral impi'ovcment of tlie people of India.” It is so remarkable as to be 
not undeserving of record, that' these resolutions, though involving the future 
government of India, and the consequent condition of its myiiads of inhabitants, 
were passed almost without discussion, and awakened so little interest that a 
veiy large majority of the members of the House of Commons did not even deign 
to be present. Adverting to the fact a few weeks afterwards, the late Lord 
Macaulay thus expressed himself:—“The hohse has neither the time, nor the 
knowledge, nor the inclination to attend to an Indian budget, or to the state¬ 
ment of Indian extravagance, or to the discus.sion of Indian local grievances. A 
broken head in Coldbath Fields excites greater interest in this house than 

‘ Tliii apartment was formerly the tea sale-room. the Marquis Cornwallis and the Marquis of Wellesley, 
In niches were statues of ].iOrd Clive, Warren Hast- Sir George PocooVe, and, subsequently to his death, 
ings, 'feir Eyre Coote, General Stringer Lawrence, the Duke of Wellington. 




Chav. VIII.] EXTINCTION OF THE COMPANY S k^NOPOLt. 233 

three pitched battles in India ever would excite. This is not a figure of speech 
but a literal description of fact, and were I called upon for proof of if, I would 
refer to a circumstance which must be still in the recollection of tlie house. 
When my right honourable friend Mr. Charles Grant brought ^forward liis 
impoi-tant propositions for the future government of«*India, theije were not as 
many members present as generally attend upon an ordinary turnpike bill’' 
The resolutions adopted by the House of Commons were, on the 5th of July, 
introduced to the House of Lords by the Marquis of Lansdowne. He could 
enter more-fully than Mr. Grant had done into the particulars of the measure, 
SIS the bill, embodying all its provisions, had been laid on the table of the House 
of Commons, and read a first time on the 28th of June. The discu.ssiou which 
followed was remarkable chiefly for the opposition which the resolutions, and 
the goverament plan generally, received from the Duke of Wellington, and the 
contrary view taken by his brother, the Mar<iuis of Wellesley, who, though 
unable from indisposition to attend in his place, had authorized the Marquis 
of Lansdowne to express his entire concurrence in them. The first reading of 
the bill in the House of Commons had been merely formal, but on the 10th of 
July, when the second reading was moved, an attempt was made to delay 
further pi-ocedure by the following amendment:—“That the confiding the 
political administration of oui- East India possessions, with the interests of 
100,000,000 of people, to the direction of a joint-stock company, and taxing the 
natives of those countries for the payment t)f the tlividends of a mercantile 
concern to the constantly varying holdei-s of East India stock, is a question 
involving t(K) many important considerations to be hastily decided on, more 
especially for so long a term as twenty years; and that, as the other business 
of the sessi(}n is already more than sufficient to occupy the whole time and 
attention of the legislature to bring it to a satisfactory completion, it is expe¬ 
dient that a short bill be passed for the opening of the trade with China in 
April, 1834, and that all the airangements which may be thought desirable for 
the administration of India should be deferred till next session.” This amend¬ 
ment was feebly supported. While the bill was in committee motions were 
made to limit the term of the Company’s goveniment to ten years, to prevent 
proposed changes in the constitution of the presidencies, to restrict the legis¬ 
lative power given to the governor-general in council, and to prohibit any 
extension of the ecclesiastical establishment; but these, with various others of 
minor moment, found little favour, and the bill came out of committee with 
its features almost unaltered. ' The third reading was fixed for the 2(»th of July, 
but three days previously the directors applied for si postponement. Several 
of their suggestion!?, particularly that of giving a right of ap 2 )eal, or at least of 
l)ublicity, in the event of a difference of opinion between the court and tjie 
hoard, had been unceremoniously rejected, and they had therefore summoned 
a court of pTOprietors for the purpose of considering whether they ought not to 


.\.D. 1883. 


Ill'll oiu- 
bodying 
mudutioiiti 
adopted by 
House of 
C'umiuons. 



230 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book YII. 


A.f). 1833. 


Bill uin- 
TKHl>ing 
reiolntiouR 
of Hoiu»o of 
Commons 
regarding 
KnHt 

(Jom)vin>. 


I’rogmss of 
tlic l»iU 


Ui*m)lnt.i()nH 
of c 

tlircotM)r«. 


present a petition ti) parliament stating, their objections to the bill as it now 
stood. Ministei-s declined to postpone the third reading, but the projjrietors 
agreed to a petition, objecting particularly to the absence of any provision for 
i-eporting differences between tlie board and the court to parliament, to the 
changes in tlie constitution of the subordinate goveraments, to the erection of 
a fourth ]>residency at Agi-a, to the extension of the ecclesiastical establishment, 
and to tlie ex])ense needlessly incurred in the maintenance of the college at 
Haileybury. They prayed to be heard b\' counsel in support of these objections. 
This was refused, mainly on the ground that the apidication was too late, and 
the third reiuling passed. 

The bill transmitted to the House of Lords was read a first time on the 
ijyth of July, and a second time on the 2d of August. When about to be 
committed on the 5th, the ]>ro))rietor.s again presented their petition, and 
])i-ayed to be heard by counsel. The application was refused as before, but Lord 
Ellenborougli, wlio led the oppositit)n, and was seconded by the Duke of 
Wellington, moved, “that it be an instruction to the committee to omit all 
such clauses in the bill as relate to alterations in the constitution and powers 
of the govermnents of the several presidencies of India.” This motion having 
been rejected, the bill made rapid progress in committee, and was reported on 
the !)th of August. Before the third reading was proceeded with, a short delay 
took place to allow the court of directors and ])roprietors to decide on the 
course which they wci e to imrsue. They had made appearance in both houses 
as ])etitio7ier.s against the bill, and as their objections had not been obviated, it 
was ]iossible that the}" might declme to part with their assets and accept of the 
g<}vernment of India on the terms offered. On the 12th of August the court 
of directors ado 2 )ted, in opposition to a stiong dissent by both the chainnan 
and deputy, the following resolution:—“ That the East India bill having amved 
at its last stage in the Iloase of Lord.s, it becomes the duty of the court of 
<lirectors to submit to theii' constituents a final opinion regarding the bill as it 
irow stands; and while the court are still impre.ssed with the belief that the 
ce.ssation of the Company’s trade will greatlj’ weaken its position in this 
counti}', and consequently impaii' its efficiency in the administration of the 
government of India—whilst, also, they regard with much anxiety the increase 
of powers given by the said bill to the board of commissioners for the affairs 
of India, and greatly regret that ]>arliament has not provided some lule of 
publicity to act as a salutary check both upon the board and tlie court; and 
whilst, fui’thei’, the court entertain the mo.st .serious ajiprehensions of the inju¬ 
rious effect upon the finances of India, which must result from the loss of the 
trade as a source of direct ])rofit, and as a safe and beneficial channel of remit¬ 
tance, and fi'oni the new charges which the bill imposes—^yet, reviewing all 
the correspondence which has ]ia.ssed with his majesty’s ministers on this 
subject, trusting that the extensive powers of the board will be exercised with 



Chai'. VIII.J 


EXTINCTION OF TUE COMEANY’S MONOPOLY. 


237 


moderation, and so as not to interfere with the independence of the Coinpanj 
as a body acting intermediately between the king’s government and the goveni- 
ment of India, which independence all parties have admitted it to be of vital 
importance to maintain; and relying with confidence that parliament will 
interpose for the relief of any financial difficulties into which the Gompanj- may 
unavoidably be cast through the operation of extensive changes which the bill 
]jroposes to etfect—the courf of directors cannot do otherwise than recommeml 
to the proprietors to defer to the pleiisure expressed by both Houses of Parlia¬ 
ment, and to consent to ])lace their right to trade for their own profit in abey¬ 
ance. in order that they may continue to exercise the government of India for 



the further term t)f twenty years, upon the conditions and under the arrange¬ 
ments embodied in the .said bill. ’ The opinion of the ])rt>prietor.s, ascertained 
by a ballot taken on the Kith of August, was in accordance with that of the 
du ectors. 'This seems to have been regarded so much as a matter of course, 
that a mere fraction of the proprietors I’ecorded their votes, the numbers being 
173 against 04. On the sione day when this ballot was taken, the bill was 
read a third time, and on the 28th of August it received the royal a.ssent. It 
ranks in the .statute-book as 3 and 4 Win. IV. c. 8.5, and is entitled, “An Act 
for effecting an arrangement with the East India Oompany, and for the bettei- 
government of his Maje.sty’s Indian territories, till the 30th day of April, 1854.” 


' 'I’liia apartment is an exact cube of thirty feet, 
aiiil the waiiiscotting being rich dark brown, and 
much enriched with gilding, and tlwe being eeveral 
large looking-glasses, the general appearance of tlie 
>■00111 is very cosy. The marble mantlepiece, sup¬ 


ported by caryatides, boldly sculptured, represents 
Britannia receiving offerings from India, along 
with typical figures of Asia, Africa, and the river 
Thames, and allegorical emblems of peace and com¬ 
merce. 


A.l). isiw. 


UofMilntioiiti 
of wurt of 
diiidCtoii!! 
regur<]iii^ 
India bill. 


TIic bill 












238 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book VII. 


A.D. 1838. 


Leading 
B«ctlon» of 
new India 
bill. 


Rate arid ' 
payment of 
dlTidend. 


Though the general purport of this important act has already been ex¬ 
plained, a brief analysis of its leading provisions seems still to be required. It 
consists of 117 sections; but as many of these merely recapitulate former 
arrangements, or rela,te to points of which it is unnecessary ,to take particular 
notice, the analysis may be made without entering much into detail. The first 
section, aftei- a recital of the Act 53 Geo. III. c. 155, which renewed the charter 
now about to expire, enacts, that from and after the 2d of April, 1834, all 
“territories now in possession and under the government of the said Company, 
except the island of St. Helena, shall remain and continue under such govern¬ 
ment,” and that all “real and personal estate whatsoever” belonging to the 
Company at the above date, shall be held “by the said Company, in trust for 
his majesty, his heirs and successors, for the service of the government of India, 
discharged of all claims of the said Company to any profit or advantage there¬ 
from to their own use, except the dividend on their capital stock secured to 
them as hereinafter is mentioned.” By section 2 all rights, powers, and jjrivi- 
leges, “whether military or civil," heretofore granted and not repealed, nor 
repugnant to the prese»it act, are to remain intact with the Company. Section 3 
enacts that “ the exclusive right of trading with the dominions of the Emperor 
of China,” continued to the Comjiany by 53 Geo. III. a 155, “shall cease;” and 
section 4, that the Company “shall, with all convenient speed, after the said 
22d April, 1834, close their commercial business, and make sale” of all their 
“property whatsoever, which may not be retained for the purposes of the govern¬ 
ment of the said territories.” Sections 5-10 inclusive, regulate the mode of 
winding uj) the commercial busine.ss, provide for the granting of reasonable 
compensations and allowances to persons whose interests may be affected by 
the discontinuance of the Company’s trade, and charge all the actual debts of 
the Company, as well as those which shall henceforth be lawfully contracted 
on account of the government of India, on its revenues, declaring “that neither 
any stock or effects which the said Company may hereafter have to their own 
use, nor the dividend by this act secured to them, nor the directors or proprie- 
tora of the said Company, shall be liable to or chargeable with any of the said 
debts, payments, or liabilities.” 

' J^ction 11 fixed the rate and payment of dividend, by enacting that out of 
the territorial revenues there shall be paid to, or retained by the Company, to 
their own use, a yearly dividend, payable in Great Britain by equal half-yearly 
'.payments, “after the rate of £10, 10s. per cent, on the present amount of their 
capital stock.” This “present amount,” as originally subscribed and successively 
augmented by a series of statutes, was exactly £6,000,000 sterling, iJUt as it 
bore interest at, 10^ per cent., and was declared by section 12 not to be re¬ 
deemable by parliament till the 30th of April, 1874, on payment of £200 for 
every flOO of stock, the real value as thus determined by the sum payable in 
..the evept of redemption was £12,000,000. Tins sum might by section 13 be 



CaAP. VIII.] 


EXTINCTION OF THE COMPANY’S MONOPOLY. 


239 


<1 

demanded on a year’s notice any time after 1854, should the Company then a.d.isss. 
“cease to retain,” or “by the authority,of parliament be deprived of the posses- 
sion and government” of India. Sections 14 to 17 are occupied with providing Leading 
additional security for the regular payment of the dividend, and the final new India 
redemption of the capital. For this purpose the sum of £2,000,000 sterling is 
to be invested in the funds and bear compound interest at the rat* of 3^ per 
cent. It was to be placed in a separate account with the commissioners of the 
national debt, to be entitled '■ The Account of the Security Fund of the India 
CJ^mpany;” and the dividends upon it were to be employed in the purchase of 
additional stock in the funds till the whole sliould amount to £12,000,000 
sterling. In the event of any failure, or delay in remittances from India to 
meet the dividend, the security fund might be drawn upon to any amount 
necessary to make up the deficiency; and at all times the dividend was to 
form a preferable charge on any part of the territorial revenues of India which 
might be remitted to Great Britain. Section 18 may be passed over, as it only 
contains a saving clause, to the effect that nothing contained in the act shall 
prejudice the claims of the creditors of the Nabob of Arcot. 

Sections 19 to 37 are almost entirely occupied in defining the powers of the 
Board of Control. The greater part of these differ little, if at all, from those of control, 
previously existing, and it is therefore necessary to notice only a few of the more 
marked changes. As the law previously stood, the directors were prohibited 
from sending any ‘ orders or instructions whatever, relating to the civil or mili- 
Liry^ government or revenues” of the teiTitorial acquisitions in India, “until 
the same shall have been submitted to the consideration of, and approved by” 
the board; and they were moreover required to pay obedience to “such orders 
and instructions as they shall from time to time receive from the said board 
of commissioners touching or concerning the civil and military government of 
the said territories and acquisitions, and the revenues of the same.” When the 
court and the board quarrelled in regard to the interference which ought to be 
used in favour of the claims of William Palmer and Co., and the writ of manda- 
mu8 was applied for, the directors argued that the despatch which they were 
required to send did not relate “to the civil or military government or revenues” 
of the territorial acquisitions in India, and that they were therefore entitled t5 
decline to send it. Though the argument proved unavailing, and the widt was 
is,sued, it was deemed prudent to leave no room in future for such a captious 
interpretation, and therefore, in the present act, words at once more definite 
and more comprehensive are emplo 3 ’ed, and it is enacted “that no orders,- 
instructidns, despatches, official letters, or compiunications whatever, relating 
to the said territories or government thereof, or to the property or rights vested 
in the said Company in trust as aforesaid, or to any public matters whatever, 
shall be at any time sent or given by ther said court of directors, or any com¬ 
mittee of the said directors, until the same shall have been submitted for the con- 



A D. 1838. 


1.ea>(.ling 
Heotionfi of 
})ew India 
bill. 


Limited 
powers of 
tbedireotoi'H 
regard to 
adiiiiniKtra- 
tion. 


240 HISTORY OF INDIA. [Book VII. 

sideration of, and approved by the said board;” and, however much they may 
have been altered, the directors are “required forthwith to send ibhe said orders, 
instructions, de,spatches, official letter's, or communications, in the form approved 
by the said board, to their destinations.” By section 32, indeed, the directors 
may within fourteen days make a written representation, containing “such 
remarks, observations, or explanations, as they shall think fit,” and the board 
are “required to take every such representation, and the several matters therein 
contained or alleged, into their consideration,” but their decision, whatever it 
may be, is to be “ final and conclusive upon the directors,” except in one singje 
case', which is so special that it must be of very rare occurrence. Tlie S3d sec¬ 
tion thus describes it: “If it .shall appear to the said court of directors that any 
order^ insti'uctions, despatches, official letters, or communications, except such 
as shall pass through the secret committee, upon which directions may be so 
given by the 8i\id board as aforesaid, are contrary to law, it shall be in the 
power of the said board, and the said court of directors, to send a special case, 
to be agreed upon by and between them, and to be signed by the president of 
the said board, and the chairman of the .said Company, to three or more of the 
judges of his ma-jesty’s Court of King’s Bench, for the opinion of the said judges; 
and the said judges are hereby required to certify their opinion upon any case 
so submitted to them, and to send a certificate thereof to the said president and 
chairman, which opinion shall be final and conclusive.” 

It was thus only when the board happened to blunder so egiegiously as to 
ivssue ordere which could not be legally obeyed, that the directoi's could resist 
them by calling in the aid of the judges of the King’s Bench. Even the sorry 
privilege of making unavailing representations was in the most important 
matters denied them, since the power of transmitting despatches through the 
secret committee, Avhich was always competent to the board, was enlarged by the 
present act, the 36th section of which, relating to this subject, is as follows:— 
“ Provided also and be it enacted, that if the said board shall be of opinion that 
the subject matter of any of their deliberations concerning the levying war, 
or making peace, or treating or negotiating with any of the native princes or 
states in India, or with any other princes or states, or touching the policy to be 
observ'ed with regard to such princes or states, intended to be communicated in 
orders, despatches, official letters, or communications to any of the governments 
or presidencies in India, or to any officers or servants of the said Company, 
shall be of a nature to require secrecy, it shall and may be lawful for the said 
board to send their orders, despatches, official letters, or communications to 
the secret committee of the said court of directors, to be appointed as is by 
this act directed, who shall thereupon, without disclosing the same, transmit 
tlie same according to the tenor thereof, or pursuant to the directions of the 
said bqard," to the respective governments and presidencieii, officers and servants; 
and that the,.said governments and presidencies, officers and servants, shall be 



Chap. VIII.] 


EXTINCTION OF THE COMPANY’S MONOPOLY. 


241 


bound to pay a faithful obedience thereto, in like manner as if such orders and a.d. isas. 
despatches, official letters, or communications, had been sent to them by the 
said court of directors.” One might have supposed that these sections which Powers of 
empower the board, whenever secrecy was deemed expedient, to send despatches of control, 
to India without even acquainting the directors as a body with their contents, 
and to modify to any extent the despatches originating with the directors 
themselves, might have sufficed, but in order that there might be no possible 
doubt as to the absolute supremacy conferred on the board, it was enacted by 
a subsequent section (109), “ that every power, authority, and function, by this 
or any other act or acts given to and vested in the said court of directors, sliall 
be deemed and taken to be subject to such control of the said board of commis¬ 
sioners as in this act is mentioned, unless tliere shall be something in the enact¬ 
ments confen'ihg such powers, authorities, or functions inconsistent with such 
construction, and except as to any patronage or right of appointing to office, 
vested in, or reserved to, the said court.” 

This exception in regard to patronage was now indeed the main inducement 

^ 1 °,-I .1 p ofimtroii- 

to the directors and proprietors to undertake the nominal government of India. ng«. 
Hitherto they had a direct interest. Tlieir capital and dividends were at stake, 
and might have been endangered by any gims mismanagement; but by the 
jirovisions of the new act these were effectually secured, and henceforth neither 
the directors nor the proprietors ran any risk of pecuniary loss frejra negligence 
or error in the discharge of the duties intrusted to them. In their case, there¬ 
fore, tlie government established was of a very anomalous description. Indivi¬ 
duals, merely by investing money to a certain amount in India stock, purchased 
the privilege of voting for directors; and the directors sharing among them 
nearly the whole patronage of India, secured the continued possession of their 
seats, by di.spensing it with a liberal hand among those who had voted, or were 
.expected on some future occasion to vote for them. Whatever therefore may 
lave been the theory of government now established, it was virtually the result 
of a compact by which the directors and their constituents agi’eed to submit to 
the dictation of the Board of Control, or in other words, of the ministry of the 
day, in consideration of the amount of patronage reserved to them. In all 
vacancies their power of appointment was absolute, except in regard to a few 
of the highest offices, wliich could not be filled up without the approbation of 
the crown; while even the persons thus approved, including the goveiiior-general 
himself, held their offices only during the pleasure of the directors, who pos¬ 
sessed to the same extent as the crown itself an absolute right of recall. 

Having determined the nature and defined the powers of the home govern- 
inent, the act proceeds to settle the future government of India itself, and 
makes several important changes. The first of these, contained in section 88, 
divides Bengal into twq pi'esidencies, the one styled as before the presidency of 
Fort William in Bengal, and the other the presidency of Agra. ^ Section. 39 

VoL. ni. . 287 



242 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book VIT. 


AD. 1833. 


Sections of 
the ndw bill 
relative to 
gpvemTnent 
of India. 


enacts that “ the sriperiii4endence, direction, and control of the whole civil and 
military government of all the said territories and revenues in India shall be, 
and is hereby vested in a governor-general and councillors, to be styled ‘ the 
Governor-general of India in Council’ ” By section 40 the ordinary councillors 
are to be four—three of them appointed absolutely by the directors from actual 
or former servants who at the time of appointment shall have served at least 
ten years, and the fourth appointed also by the directors, but subject to the 
approbation of his majesty, and selected from persons not in the service of the 
Company. This fourth member was not “to sit or vote” in the council, except 
“at meetings thereof for making laws and regulations.” The commander-in¬ 
chief in India, or if there be no such commander, or the office be conjoined 
with that of the governor-general, the commander-in-chief on the Bengal eshib- 
lishment, may be appointetl by the director an extraordinary member 4)f 
council, and take rank next to the goveraoi’-general. Sections 43-62 are 
chiefly occupied in defining the powers of the council. Thus, it is enacted that 
the governor-general in council “ .shall have power to make laws and regula¬ 
tions for repealing, amending, or altering any laws or regulations whatever 
now in force, or hereafter to be in force, for the said teiritories, or any part 
thereof, and to make laws and regulations for all persons, whether British or 
native, foreigners or othei’s, and for all courts of justice, whether established by 
his majesty’s" charters or otherwise, and the jurisdiction thereof, and for all 
places and things whatsoever within and throughout the whole and every part 
of the said territories, and for all servants of the said Company within the 
dominions of princes and states in alliance with the said Company.” This 
apparently unlimited power is however re.stricted by a salvo against its being 
employed to make “any laws or regulations which shall in any way repeal 
vary, suispend, or affect any of the provisions of this act, or any of the provi - 
sions of the acts for punishing mutiny and desertion of officers and soldiers,^ 
whether in the service of his majesty or of the said Company, or any provisions 
of any act hereafter to be passed in any wise affecting the said Company, oi- 
the said territories or the inhabitants thereof, or any laws or regulations which 
shall in any way affect any prerogative of the crown, or the authority of par¬ 
liament, or the constitution or rights of the said Company, or any part of the 
unwritten laws or constitution of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Ireland, whereon may depend in any degree the allegiance of any person to the 
crown of the United Kingdom, or the sovereignty or dominion of the said 
crown over any of the said territories.” 

To make the above salvo still more explicit, it was provided by a subsequent 
section that nothing contained in the act “ shall extend to affeert, in any way the 
right of parliament to make laws for the said tenitories, and for all the inhabi¬ 
tants, thereof,” and “ expressly declared that a full, complete, and constantly exist¬ 
ing right and power is intended to be resented to parliament to control, supersede, 



• 243 


Chap. VIII.] EXTINCTION OF THE COMPANYS MONOPOLY. 

or prevent all proceedings and acts whatsoever of the said governor-general in a.d. isss. 
council, and to repeal and alter at any time any law or regulation whatsoever 
made by the said governor-general in council, and in all respects to legislate RoBorveu 
for the said territories and all the inhabitants thereof in as full and amjde a paiiiament. 
manner as if this act had not been passed; and the better to enable parliament 
to exercise at all times such right and power, all laws and regulations made by 
the said governor-general in council shall be transmitted to England,'’ and laid 
annually before both Houses of Parliament. Still, though an absolute power of 
repeal was expressly reserved to the legislature, it was provided that “ all laws 
and regulations made as aforesaid, so long as they shall remain unrepealed, 
shall be of the same force and effect within and throughout the said territories 
as any act of paidiament would or ought to be within the same territories, in 
the same manner as any public .act of parliament would and ought to be tixkcn 
notice of.” 

By section 48 the court of directors are enjoined forthwith to submit for the rowersoftiie 
approbation of the Board of Control “ such rules as they shall deem expedient gcuerij. 
for the procedure of the governor-genersil in council in the discharge and 
exercise of all powers, functions, and duties imposed on or vested in him by 
virtue of this act; ” and such rules, when approved, “ .shall be of the .same force 
as if they had been inserted in this act.” In all ordinaiy cases the governoi-- 
general and one ordinary member of council were to constitute a (piorum, but 
in making laws and regulations the governor-general and at least three ordinary 
members behoved to be present. In cases of equality the governor-general was 
to have a casting vote; and, should the majority happen to differ with him 
with regard to any measure whereby, in his judgment, “the safety, tranquillity, 
or interests of the British po.ssessions in India x)i‘ any part thereof” might be 
“essentially affected,” he and the members of council weie forthwith “ mutually 
to exchange with and communicate to each other in writing, under their i e.spec- 
tive hands, to be recorded on their secret consultations, the grounds and reasons 
of their re.spective opinions.” Should the governor-general, after considering 
the same, continue to differ, he might then, “ of his own authority, and on his 
own responsibility,” adopt the course which might seem to himself “ fit and 
expedient. ' The council might ns.semble at any place within the British terri¬ 
tories in India; but, should that place happen to be within any of the other 
jiresidencies, the governor of such ])re.sidency was to take his seiit, and “act as 
an extraordinary member.” 

The 53d section, as one of the most important of the act, deserves to be 
<luoted verbatim. “Whereas it is expedient that, subject to such special 
arrangements as local circumstances may require, a general system of judicial 
establishments and police, to which all persons whatsoever, as well Europeans 
as natives, may be subject, should be established in the said territories at an 
early period, and tliat such laws as may be applicable in common to all classes 



244 


HISTOEY OF INDIA. 


[Book VII. 


AD. 1833. of inhabitants of the said territories, due regard being had to the rights, feelings, 
and peculiar usages of the people, should be enacted, and that all laws and 
Hoard of custouis having the force of law within the same territories should be ascertained 
Bionets. and consolidated, and, as occasion may require, amended: be it therefore enacted 
that the said Governor-general of India in council sliall, as soon as conveniently 
may be after the passing of this act, issue a commission, and from time to time 
commissions, to such persons as the said court of directors, with the approba¬ 
tion of the said board of commissioners, shall recommend for that purpose, and 
to such peraons, if necessary, as the said governor-general in council shall think 
fit, such persons not exceeding in the whole at any one time five in number, 
and to be styled, ‘ The Indian Law Commissioners,’ with all such poweis as 
shall be necessary for the puqioses hereinafter mentioned; and the said com¬ 
missioners shall fully inquire into the jurisdiction, powers, and rules of the 
existing courts of justice and police establishments in the said territories, and 
all existing forms of judicial procedm-e, and into the nature and operation of all 
laws, whether civil or criminal, written or customary, prevailing and in force 
in any part of the said territories, and whereto any inhabitants of the said terri¬ 
tories, whether Europeans or others, are now subject; and the said commis¬ 
sioners shall from time to time make reports, in which they shall fully set forth 
the result of these said inquiries, and shall from time to time suggest such 
jdterations as may in their opinion be beneficially made in the said courts of 
justice and police establishments, forms of judicial procedure and laws, due 
regard being had to the distinction of castes, difference of religion, and the 
manneis and opinions prevailing among diflerent races, and in different parts 
of the said territories.” The above commissioners were to follow such instruc¬ 
tions as should be given them from time to time by the governor-general in 
council, to make special repoi’ts, and receive salaries “ according to the highest 
scale of remuneration given to any of the officers or servants of the India Com¬ 
pany below the rank of members of council.” 

KxdcntivB By section 5G the executive government of each of the presidencies was to 
be administered by a governor and three councillors, the Governor-general of 
HHieucuM. fyj. the time being acting as governor of the presidency of Fort William 

in Bengal; but the \iltimate abolition of councils in the separate presidencies 
was contemplated, and it was therefore provided by section 57 “that it shall 
and may be lawful for the said court of directoi-s, under such control as is by 
this act provided, to revoke and suspend, so often and for such periods as the 
said court shall in that behalf direct, the appointment of councils in all or any 
of the said presidencies, or to reduce the number of councillors in all or any of 
the said councils; and during such time as a council shall not be appointed in 
aqy such presidency, the executive government thereof shall be administered 
by a governor ^one.” 

The only other sections of the act which seem to require special notice are 



Chap. VIII] EXTINCTION OE THE COMPANY’S MONOPOLY. 245 

the Slat and 82d, which specify those parts of India where “ any natural born a.d. isss. 
subjects of his majestymay, and where they may not, reside without a license; 
the 85th, which, assuming that “the removal of restrictions on the intercourse awiaenoeof 
of Europeans with the said territories will render it necessary to provide 
against any mischiefe or dangers that may arise therefrom, requires” the 
governor-general in council, “by laws,or regulations, to provide with all con¬ 
venient speed for the protection of the natives of the said territories from insult 
and outrage in their persons, religions, or opinions; ” the 86th, which makes it 
“ lawful for any natural born subject of his majesty authorized to reside in the 
said territories to acquire and hold lands, or any right, interest, or profit, in or 
out of lands, for any term of years, in such part or parts of the said territories 
as he shall be so authorized to reside in; ” the 87th, which enacts “ that no 
native of the said territories, nor any natural born subject of his majesty resi¬ 
dent therein, shall, by reason only of his religion, place of birth, descent, colour, 
or any of them, be disabled from holding any place, office, or employment 
under the said Company; ” the 88th, which requires the governor-general in 
council “ forthwith to take into consideration the means of mitigating the state 
of slavery, and of ameliorating the condition of slaves, and of extinguishing 
slavery throughout the said territories, so soon as such extinction shall be prac¬ 
ticable and safe; ” and a series of sections which, after providing for the exten- Religious 
sion of the episcopal establishment by the erection of bishoprics at Madras and menta. 
Bombay, and enacting that at each of the presidencies “ two chaplains shall 
illways be ministers of the Church of Scotland,” conclude with declaring “that 
nothing herein contained shall be so construed as to prevent the governor- 
general in council from granting from time to time, with the sanction of the 
court of directors and of the commissioners for the affairs of India, to any sect, 
])crsuasion, or commimity of Christians, not being of the united Church of 
England and Ireland, or of the Church of Scotland, such sums of money as may 
he expedient for the purpose of instruction or for the maintenance of places of 
worship.” 

Tlie last section provides that “this act shall commence and take effect from a curious 

dilemma. 

and after the passing thereof' (that is, from and after the 28th of August, 3833, 
wlien it received the royal assent), “so far as to authorize the ajipointraent, or 
prospective or provisional appointment, of the Governor-general ©f India, gov- 
ernora, members of council, or other officers, under the provisions herein con¬ 
tained, and so far as hereinbefore in that behalf mentioned,” but, “as to all 
other matters and things,” it was only to commence and bike effect from and 
after the 22d of April, 1834. In consequence of the different dates thus assigned 
for the commencement of the act, and some other unexpected coincidences, a 
curious dilemma was produced. By the 4l8t section it is enacted “that the 
person who shall be governor-general of the presidency of Fort William in 
Bengal, on the 22d day of April, 1834, shall be the first Governor-general of 



246 


HISTORY OF 'tBSbe VH. 

A.D. 18 SS. India under this act, and such persons as shall j»e’ meHCfbera bf cotknfiirof the 
vSame presidencj’^ on that day shall -be respecti-C^ely uinm’btirs 'of* council' nonsti- 

oommissi^pw tutcd Tjv this act.” In virtue of this section Lord Wilfianfi Be^itinck was gov- 

issued by ^ ^ ^ 

t^mirtof ernop-geaex'al, and Sir Charles Metcalfe/and Messrs. William Blunt and Alex- 
under Ross were members of the first council of India. But the court of direc¬ 
tors, taking advantage of the earlier date assigned for the commencement of 
the act, had, on the 27th of Deceinber, 1833, issued two commissions—the one 
appointing Lord William Bentinck to take upon himself the office of governor- 
general upon and from the 22d of April, 18*34, and William Blunt, Alexander 
Roas, William Byam Martin, and Thoiniis Babington Macaulay, Esquires, “tb be 
respectively the first, second, third, and fourth ordinary members of the said 
council;” and the other appointing Sir Cliarles Metcalfe to be governor of the 
presidency of Agra u 2 )on and from the said 22d of April. When the campsugn 
against Coorg was opened the governor-general, who had gone to Madras to 
superintend different financial arrangements then in progress, repaifed to Ban¬ 
galore, and after the campaign was .finished he took u{» his residence in the 
Neilgheny Hills for the recoveiy of his health, which had become so seriously 
affected that he had intimated his resignation to the directors. He was thus 



coiinoUHt living at Ootacamund, and Sir Charles Metcalfe, as senior member of council, 

OotAcilmuiul. 

Wiis acting as vice-president and deputy-governor oi Bengal, at the time when 
the new act came into ojjeration. This was unfortunate, because certain impor¬ 
tant stejjs had in consequence of the change of government become absolutely 
necessary, and yet it was difficult to perceive how these stejjs could be taken 
while the governor-general remained isolated among the Neilgheny Hills,.^nd 
in a state of health which would not allow him to return to Calcxitta. The 
course adopted was to summon the first council under the act to meet at Oota- 
camund. This was perfectly legal, since, as has been shown in the above analysis 
of the act, the goyemor-general was empowered to assemble the council at any 




2i7 


Chap. yfltLJ ' OOTAbAMUND. 

place wijjhin 'the' Britteli &idie,n territories, and, except in the case of making a.d. iss 4 . 
laws and regulations;-rfetiuired -itlie assistance of only one ordinary member to- 
constitute a quorumfriStich a member was opportunely found in Mr. Macaulay, ■ 
who, having been" madq aware that Bis 
presence was required, arrived at Oota- 
camund. ' Sir Frederi^ Adam, govemqi- 
of Madras, arrived a&o about the same 
time, and in terms of liin express provi¬ 
sion in the act, took his seat in the 
council as an extraordinary member. 

The first act of the council was. to is.sue 
a proclamation on the IGth «)f June, 1834, 
announcing the passing of the act, and 
tlie installation of the new form of 
government prescribed by it. Ratlier 
strangely, however, the governor-general 
in coimcil, instead of carrying out the 
provisions of the act, ventured to place 
some of the most important of them in 
abeyance. Hence part of the proclama¬ 
tion ijroceeded in the following extraordinary tenns: “ Whereas it is impracti- Proceetungs 

, , . . . ,1 , ofoonncil 

cable to cjwry into immediate execution all the preliminary measures that heiaat o.- 
shall be necessary before the duties of the government of Agra can be entered 
upon, or to adopt, without previous inquiry and mature deliberation, the 
different official and legislative proceedings wdiich the separation of the two 
governments require; and whereas, for the afore.said reasons, it is not expedient 
that the Honourable Sir Charles Metcalfe should assume the government of 
Agra before the retm-n of the govenaor-general and council to Calcutta, the 
governor-general in council,' therefore, has been pleased to resolve, and it is 
hereby notified accordingly, that the administration of the presidency of Bengal, 
as heretofore constituted; shall in the meantime continue to be carried on by 
the honourable the vice-president in council. " 

Sir Charles Metcalfe had, in consequence of his appointment as govenior 
Agm, ceased to be a member of the council, and that council itself, as formerly parUMnent 
constituted, had been entirely abrogated, and yet the proclamation, with a i»sti>onea. 
singular mixture of simplicity and boldness, ignores both facts, and merely 
because the governor-general has been so “pleased to resolve,” notifies accor¬ 
dingly, “that the administration of the pre.sidency of Bengal as heretofore 
constituted” shall, in the meantime, continue to be carried on. Tlie illegality 
of these proceedings is so palpable that it could not possibly have escaped 
the notice either of Lord William Bentinck, or his distinguished coadjutor, 
the late Lord Macaulay. Sir Charles Metcalfe, only ten days after the date 




A.I>. 1834. 


Bemarkd 
of Sir C. 
Metcalfe on 
’ preoeedinga 
of goyemor- 
ganeral. 


Mode of 
remedying 
illegality of 
goven>or- 
general’s 
prooeediugs. 


248 HISTORY OF IJfTpiA. [Book VII. 

of the proclamation, writing his friend Mr. Tucker, then chaimian of the 
court of directors, says, “You know, I conclude, our present position. The 
governor-general would endanger his life were he to quit the Neilgherry Hills 
before September, as he proposes, or .as I should say, before October. He 
has, therefore, from necessity, summoned the council on the hills. He has also 
suspended the formation of the Agra government, andlihe application of the 
new act to Bengal. I am. to remain vice-president here until his return. I fear 
tliat several things in this arrangement are illegal.” At the same time he makes 
the best excuse which could be oifered for it when he adds, “His lordship's 
detention in the hills is quite unavoidable. He, nearly lost his life in his lost 
attack, and every medical man predicted the most fatal consequences if he 
should attempt to encounter tlie heat of the plains at this season. He is now 
quite well where he is, but dare riot move.” Under these circumstances some 
such aiTarigement as that actually made seems to have been absolutely neces¬ 
sary to prevent the mischiefs which must have ensued from leaving the seat of 
government without a regular administration. But no necessity, however 
great, could cure the illegality of superseding or post])oning the operation df an 
act of parliament. 

When the governor-general returned to Calcutta, on the 14tli of November, 
1834, one of tjie first sulyects whic^ engaged his intention was the Ootecamund 
proclamation, and he endeavoured to legalize all that had been done under it 
by an exercise of his legislative power. Accordingly, on the 20th of November, 
the following act was passed, “ Be it enacted that all acts done by the Governor- 
general of India in council, or by the vice-president of Fort William in Bengal 
in councilj or in pursuance of any authority given by the said governor-general 
in council, or by the said vice-president in council, between the 22d of April, 
1834, and the 14th of November, 1834, shall be valid and effectual to all intents 
and purposes, as if the said acts had been done before the said 22d day of April, 
1834.” It is almost needless to observe that the passing of this act, so far from 
curing the illegality, was only a repetition of it. Tbe governor-general in 
council unintentionally, or from some real or supposed necessity, had violated 
the law, and nothing short of the authority of the legislature itself could save 
him, and those who had acted with and under him, from the penal consequences, 
or give validity to their proceedings. The only effectual I’emedy, therefore, was 
at length provided when, on the 13th of April, 1835, the Act 5 and 6 Wm. IV. 
c. 6 was passed, which, after reciting the recent Act 3 and 4 Wm. IV. c. 85, and 
explaining the circumstances imder which the government of India “ was admin¬ 
istered for a time, otherwise than in accordance with the said recited act,” indem¬ 
nifies all the persons directly or indirectly implicated for aU “acts, matters, and 
things” that had been “done, ordered, directed or authorized, honafide, in the 
^Sercise of the administration of the British territories in the East Indies,” 
between the 22d of April, 1834, and the 1st of January, 1835, and declares 



Chap. VIII.] RESIGNATION X)F LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK. 24'9 

that “all Such acts, matters, and things shall be as valid and effectual, and 
shall be. and be deemed to be, of as much force, validity, and effect as if they 
had been expressly authorized by the said recited act.” 

In regard to the new presidency of Agra, which had been provided for by 
the act, it may here be mentioned that, though on the very day of the return 
of the governor-general to Calcutta from the Neilgherry Hills, it was formallj' 
notified that Sir Charles Metcalfe “had taken the prescribed oaths and assumed 
charge of the government of Agra,” the plan of this fourth government, which 
the directors had always objected to as involving a large iinneces.sary expendi¬ 
ture, was never fully carried out. After its duties had been so restricted and 
frittered away that it had become a mere misnomer to call it a “government,” an 
act was passed, on the Slst of August, 1835, making it lawful for the court of 
directors, under the control of the boai’d of commissioners, “to suspend the 
execution of the provisions” of the Act 3 and 4 Wm. IV. c. 85 so far as relates 
to the division of the presidency of Fort William in Bengal, into two distinct 
presidencies, one of which was to be styled the presidency of Agra, and enact¬ 
ing that so long as the execution of these provisions shall remain su.spended, 
the governor-general in council may “appoint, from time to time, any servant of 
the East India Company, who shall have been ten years in their serwico in 
India, to the office of lieutenant-governor of the North-nvestern provinces, now 
under the presidency of Fort William in Bengal, and from time to time to 
declare and limit the extent of the teiTitorics so placed under such licuteiuint- 
govornm*, and the extent of the authority to be exercised by s\jch lieutenant- 
governor, as to the said governor-general in (iouncil maj' seerii fit.” This per¬ 
mission to suspend was so completely in accordance with the views of the direc¬ 
tors, that they immediately- availed themselves of it, and all idea of erecting a 
se])arate ju’esidency of Agra was abandoned. 

After the return of Lord William Bentinck to Calcutta, no event of an}' 
imj*ortance occui'red till his administration closed. He had intimated his 
J esignation, and only waited the return of the sailing season to take his depar¬ 
ture. ()n the 2()th of Mai'ch, 1835, he ceased to be governor-general, and set 
sail for Europe. His governnient had been eminently peaceful, and its merits 
consequently ai'e founded not on new acquisitions of territory, or brilliant mili¬ 
tary achievements, but on the more solid ground of internal improvement—on 
reductions of exj)enditure, the correction of abuse.s, the extension of the means 
<'f education, the more adequate administratitm of justice by the liberal employ¬ 
ment of native agency; and above all, the bold and successful inroad made on 
sxiperstition by the suppression of one of its most abominable pnictices. In all 
these respects Lord William Bentinck proved himself an able, liberal, and con¬ 
scientious administrator. The great defect of his policy was, as we have seen* 
the absurd extent to which he attempted to carry the system of non-interference. 
By standing aloof when disorder commenced, he too often allowed it to increase 
VOL. III. j)2g 


A P. 1830. 


New pmi- 
dency of 
Agi'a loft in 
abeyance 


Merits ot 

Wniiain 

liontiiiok'H 

tultninieitra* 

tioii. 



A.B. 18S4. 


Bemarka 
of Sir C. 
Matoalfe on 
proceedingi 
of goyemor^ 
gonex’al. 


Mcnle of 
remedying 
ill^Uty of 
govemor- 
geneml’a 
prooeediuga. 


248 HIST6eY of IJfpiA. ' [Book VII. 

of the proclamation, writing his friend Mr. Tucker, then chairMan of the 
court of directors, says, “You know, I conclude, our present position. The 
governor-general would endanger his life were he to quit the Neilgherry Hills 
before September, as he proposes, or ^ I should say, before October. He 
has, therefore, from necessity, summoned the council on the hills. He has also 
suspended the formation of the Agra government, and the application of the 
new act to Bengal. I ank to remain vice-president here until his return. I feai- 
that several things in this arrangement are illegal.” At the same time he makes 
tlie best excuse which could be offered for ‘it when he adds, “ His lordship's 
detention in the hiUs is quite unavoidable. He, nearly lost his life in his last 
attack, and every medical man predicted the most fatal consequences if he 
should attempt to encounter the heat of the plains at this season. He is now 
quite well where he is, but dare riot move.” Under these circumstances some 
such airangement as that actually made seems to have been absolutely nece.s- 
sary -to prevent the mischiefs which must have ensued fix)m leaving the seat of 
government without tt regular administration. But no necessity, however 
great, could cure the illegality of superaeding or postponing the operation df an 
act of parliament. 

When the governor-general returned to Calcutta, on the 14th of November, 
1834, one of the first subjects whioli engaged his intention was the Ootacamund 
proclamation, and he endeavoured to legalize all that had been done under it 
by an exercise of his legislative power. Accordingly, on the 20th of November, 
the following act was passed, “ Be it enacted that all acts done by the Governor- 
general of India in council, or by the vice-president of Fort William in Bengal 
in council or in pursuance of any authority given by the said governor-general 
in council, or by the said vice-pre.sident in council, between the 22d of April, 
1834, and the 14ih of November, 1834, shall be valid and effectual to all intents 
and purpose.s, as if the said acts had been done before the said 22d day of April, 
1834.” It is almost needless to observe that the passing of this act, so far from 
curing the illegality, was only a repetition of it. The governor-general in 
council unintentionally, or from some real or supposed necessity, had violated 
the law, and nothing short of the authority of the legislature itself could save 
him, and those who had acted with and under him, from the penal consequences, 
or give validity to their proceedings. The only efiectual remedy, therefore, was 
at length provided when, on the 13tli of April, 1835, the Act 5 and 6 Wm. IV. 
c. 6 was passed, which, after reciting the recent Act 3 and 4 Wm. IV. c. 85, and 
explaining the circumstances under which the government of India “was admin¬ 
istered for a time, otherwise than in accordance with the said recited act,” indem¬ 
nifies all the persons directly or indirectly implicated for all “acts, matters, and 
things” that had been “done, ordered, directed or authorized, bona fide, in the 
^ercise of the administration of the British territories in the East Indies,” 
between the 22d of April, 1834, and the 1st of January, 1835, and declares 



Chap. VIII.] RESIGNATION -OF LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK. 249 

tliat “all such acts, matters, and things shall be as valid and effectual, and 
shall be. and be deemed to be, of as much force, validity, and effect as if they 
had been expressly authorized by the said recited act.” 

In regard to the new presidency of Agra, which had been provided for by 
the act, it may here be mentioned that, though on the very day of the return 
of the governor-general to Calcutta from the Neilgherry Hills, it was formally 
notified that Sir Charles Metcalfe “had taken the prescribed oaths and assumed 
charge of the government of Agra,” the plan of this fourth government, which 
the directors had always objected to as involving a large unnecessary expendi¬ 
ture, was never fully earned out. After its duties had been so restricted and 
frittered away that it had become a mere misnomer to call it a “government,” an 
act was passed, on the Slat of August, 1835, making it lawful for the coiu't of 
directors, under the control of the board of commissioners, “to suspend the 
execution of the provi.sions” of the Act 3 and 4 Wm. IV. c. 85 so far as relates 
to the division of the pi’esidency of Fort William in Bengal, into two distinct 
j(residencies, one of which was to be styled the presidency of Agra, and enact¬ 
ing tljat so long as the execution of these provisions shall remain sus]>ended, 
tlie governor-general in council may “ appoint, from time to time, any servant of 
the East India Company, who shall have been ten years in their service in 
India, to the office of lieutenant-governor of the North-western provinces, now 
under the presidency of Fort William in Bengal, and from time to time to 
declare and limit the extent of the territories so placed under such lieutenant- 
governor, and the extent of tlie authority to be exercise<l by such lieutenant- 
governor, as to the said governor-general in council may seem fit.” This per¬ 
mission to .suspend was so completely in accordance with the views of the direc¬ 
tors, that they immediately availed themselves of it, and all idea of erecting a 
,se])ai-ate presidency of Agra Avas abandoned. 

After the return of Lord William Bentinck to Calcutta, no event of any 
iin))ortance occurred till his ■ administration closed. He had intimated his 
j e.signation, and onl 3 ' waited the return of the siiiling season to take his depar¬ 
ture. On the 2()th of March, 1835, he ceased to be governor-general, and set 
.sail for Europe. His government had been eminenth' peaceful, and its merits 
consequentlj’^ are founded not on new iicquisitious of territory, or brilliant mili- 
taiy achievements, but on the more solid ground of internal improvement—on 
reductions of expendittire, the correction of abuses, the extension of the means 
of education, the more adequate atiministration of jnstice by the liberal employ¬ 
ment of native agency; and above all, the bold and successful inroad made on 
superstition by the suppression of one of its most abominable pnictices. In all 
these resj>ects Lord William Bentinck proved himself an able, liberal, and con¬ 
scientious administrator. The great defect of his policy was, as we have seen*, 
the absurd extent to which he attempted to cany the sj'^stem of non-interference. 
Bj' standing aloof when disorder commenced, he too often allowed it to increase 
VoL. III. 22S 


A 1). 1836. 


New presl; 
doDcy of 
Agra left in 
a1»eyaiKe. 


Merits oi 

Williau) 

llentiiiok’u 

mlininiHtrO' 

tion. 



A D. 1635. 


Merita 
of Lord 
William 
Beniitick’a 
adminiatra- 
tiun. 


250 HISTORY OF INDIA. [Book VII. 

till it became too alarming to be any longer tolerated, and thus laid himself 
open to the charge of dealing harshly with native states^ by making the rulers 
responsible for disturbances which an earlier interference on his part might 
easily have prevented. Still, it must be admitted that non-interference, when 
steadily carried out as part of a general system, possessed several advantages, 
and in more than one instance, by throwing native rulers upon their own 
resources, compelled them to conciliate the good-will of their subjects, and to 
govern with a wisdom and moderation which they had never displayed before. 
Lord William Bentinck had longed for the appointment of governor-general, in 
order that he might remove the stigma of incapacity which he conceived to 
have been fixed upon him by his summary removal from the government of 
Madras. This object he certainly accomplished, since even those disposed to 
censure particular parts of his administration, freely admit that, taken as a 
whole, it entitles him to no mean place among Indian statesmen. 



Temple and Bathing Ohauto.—From u drawing by T. Lotigeruft, 
















BOOK VIII 


FROM THE EXTINCTION OF THE TRADE OF THE COMPANY TO 
THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE GREAT SEPOY MUTINY. 


CHAPTER 1. 


Sir Charles Metcalfe provisional governor-general—He removes the restrictions on the Indian press— 
Opposite views of the Court of Directors and the Board of Control in regard to the appointment of 
^ a successor to Lord William Bentinck—Lord Reytesbury’s appointment revoked by the crown— 
Lord Auckland becomes governor-general — A new succession in Oude — Intrigues and 
deposition of the Rajah of Sattarah. 


FTER the departure of Lord William Bentinck, Sir Charles a.o mn. 
Metcalfe became governor-general, in virtue of a provisional 
appointment. By this appointment, the full powers of the sir charie* 
oince were undoubtedly conferred upon him; but as las provisional 
tenure was precarious and temporary, it seems to have 
been expected, not unreasonablj', that he would continue to 
carry on the government according to its ordinary routine, and 
not innovate, without absolute necessity, on the policy which had 
been previously pursued. He himself judged differently, and in April, 
within a month after his installation, had prepared the draft of an act 
by which all the restrictions to which the Indian press was previously 
subject, were to be repealed. The act itself, however, was not passed 
and promulgated till the following September. It does not appejir whether 
there was any difference of opinion in the council on the subject, but if 
tliere was, there can be no doubt that Mr. Macaulay was one of the majority. 

In substance, the act simply repealed the press regulations of 1823 in the 
Bengal, and of 1825 and 1827 in the Bombay presidency, and ordained that 
every person having a printing press on his premises was to make declaration 
thereof; that every book or paper was thenceforth to bear the name of the 
printer and publisher; and that, within the Company's territories, the printer 
and publisher of all periodical works containing public news, or comments on 
public news, should appear, and declare when it was to be printed or published. 

Tlie soundness of the repeal, in so far as regarded the European press, could 
hardly be questioned; but as it seemed impossible to give freedom to the Euro¬ 
pean, without extending it to the native press, some of the ablest servants of 
the Company entertained grave doubts as to the right course of procedure. 









252 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book VIII. 


A.D. 1835. 


Freedom of 
the Indian 
prewB eet'ib- 
Ushed. 


Merita of thie 
measure 
diauuased. 


The Honourable Mountstuarfc Elphinstone, when consulted on the subject in 
1832, had written as follows:—“If all be free, we shall be in a predicament 
such as no state has yet experienced In other countries the use of the press 
has gradually extended along with the improvement of the government and the 
intelligence of the people; but we shall have to contend at once with the most 
refined theories of Europe, and with the prejudices and fanaticism of Asia, both 
rendered doubly formidable by the imperfect education of those to whom every 
appeal will be addressed.” Sir Charles Metcalfe attached little weight to this 
peculiarity, and in an elaborate replj" to an address presented to him, declared 
the repeal justifiable on general principles. At the same time he thought that 
it had become “almost unavoidable” from cii’cumstancea “The (Indian) 
press,” he said, “ had been practically free for many yeai-s, including the whole 
period of the administration of the late governor-general. Lord Wilham Bentinck ; 

and although laws of restriction existed 


in Bengal which gave awful power to 
the government, they had ceased to 
operate for any pnictictd purpose. They 
were e.xtremely othous. They gave to 
the government arbitrary power, which 
British subjects in any part of the world 
dete.st. No government could now have 
carried them into effect, without setting 
universal opinion at defiance. After 
the liberty given by Lord William Ben- 
tinck’s forbearance, no government could 
have ventured to enforce'those laws, un¬ 
less it had been gifted with a most hardy 
insensibility to ridicule and obloquy. 
Even supposing them to be good, they 
were utterly useless, and as they brought uniiece.ssary odium on the government, 
it would have been absurd longer to retain them.” 

So long as he argued on general principles. Sir Charles Metcalfe was certainly 
right, but his logic fails him when he seeks a justification in circumstances. 
The press regulations, he says, were practically obsolete. They were not and 
they could not be enforced. If so, where was the necessity for hastening to 
repop,! them? They were virtually dead, and there could be no use to slay the 
If, as he argues, “even supposing them to be good, they were utterly 
useless, because they could not be enforced,” is it not obvious that for the very 
same reason they must have ceased to be mischievous, and that therefore a gov¬ 
ernor-general only provisionally appointed, and of courae daily expected to be 
superseded, had no particular call to interfere. If the repeal would have been 
approved by his successor, why step in before him and thus snatch from him the 



Hioht Hon. Chahles T. Baron Metcalfe, G.C.B. 

After ft pictuie bj> F. R. Sej-. 



Chap. I.J 


EMANCIPATION OF THE PRESS. 


253 


popularity which was to be acquired by adopting it? and if, on the contrary, the 
repeal would have been condemned by his successor, why place him in a' false 
position, and embarrass him with an innovation that might be at variance with 
the general tenor of his policy? On these and similar grounds, the propriety 
of the conduct of Sir Charles Metcalfe in hastening to repeal the existing 
restrictions on the press may be questioned, and it is thus easy to understand 
how the measure was received in different quarters with very different feelings. 
Those whom it freed from all fear of restraint naturally hailed it with acclama¬ 
tion, while the public generally regarded it with favour, and testified their 
approbation, not merely by laudatory addresses, but by the erection of a hand¬ 
some public building devoted to literary purposes, and designated the Metcalfe 
Hall, in order at once to celebrate the liberation of the press and perpetuate 
the name of the liberator. When the measure was first announced to the home 
authorities, it was as strongly condemned as it had been elsewhere applauded, 
and called forth a censure, which though not accompanied by an immediate 
withdrawal of confidence, laid the foundation of a serious misunderstanding. 
The directors, become as lukewarm as they had formerly been zealous in 
supporting Sir Charles Metcalfe, overlooked the prim- claim which he had 
undoubtedly established to the first vacant governorship in their gift, and when 
he applied for explanation, returned through their secretary an answer so dry and 
laconic, that on the very day wlien he received it, he despatched a letter intima¬ 
ting his determination to retire from the service of the Company. He accord¬ 
ingly sailed for England on the 15th of February, 1838. The extent of the 
lo.ss which India sustained by his departure was not fully known till after. As 
lie had always been opposed to the policy which led to the disastrous war in 
Afglnuiistan, there is reason to presume that had he remained, as his influence 
would doubtless have been employed, so also it might have sufficed to prevent 
it. His services however were not lost to his country. As governor successively 
of Jamaica and of Canada in the most critical periods of their history, he gave 
new proofs of consummate statesmanship. Public gratitude was not wanting, 
hut the peerage confeired upon him came too late to be anything more than a 
barren title. An excruciating disease was preying upon him, and he returned 
home only to die. 

In nari'ating the emancipation of the Indian press, and tracing some of its 
consequences in the subsequent career of Lord Metcalfe, we were obliged to pass 
onward without referring to a series of ti'ansactions which took place about the 
same time in England, and which, while not properly belonging to the history 
of India, are too important to be omitted. When the court of directors received 
intimation of Lord William Bentinck’s intended resignation, it was proposed to 
put either the Honourable Mountstuart Elphinstone or Sir Charles Metcalfedn 
nomination for tlie office of governor-general. Mr. Elphinstone, on the plea of 
indifferent health, declined, and the court., on the 28th of September, 1834, by a 


A.D. 18S5. 


Eniiuicji>A< 
tion * 
press. 


Lord 

Metcalfe's 
abilities a3a 
stiitceniaii. 


Question as 
to I.ord 
William 
llentinck's 
successor. 



254 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book YIII. 


A.D. 1886. 


QuMtion as 
to Lord 
WUliam 
Bentinck’s 
Bucceseor. 


Governmont 
objection to 
the appoint¬ 
ment of any 
Company’s 
servant. 


Oronnds of 
objection. 


majority of fifteen to two, adopted the two following resolutions;—“1. That 
this court deeply lament that the state of Lord William Bentinck’s health should 
be such as to deprive the Company of his most valuable services, and this court 
deem it proper to record, on the occasion of his lordship’s resignation of the 
office of governor-general, their high sense of the distinguished ability, energy, 
zeal, and integrity with which his lordship has discharged the arduous duties of 
his exalted station. 2. That referring to the appointment which has been con¬ 
ferred by the court, with the approbation of liis majesty, on Sir Charles Theophilus 
Metcalfe, provisionally, to act as Governor-general of India, upon the death, 
resignation, or coming away of Lord William Bentinck; and adverting also to 
the public character and services of Sir Charles Metcalfe, whose knowledge, 
experience, and talents eminently qualify him to prosecute successfully the 
various important measures consequent on the new charter act, this court are of 
opinion that it would be inexpedient at present to make any other arrangement 
for supplying the office of governor-general. And it is resolved accordingly that 
the chairs be authorized and instructed to communicate this opinion to his 
majesty’s ministere, through the president of the board of commissioners for the 
aft’airs of India.” 

When the communication thus ordered was made, Mr. Charles Grant, who 
held the office of president of the Board of Control in the Melbourne ministry, 
not only refused to concur in the second I'esolution of the directors, but pi’o- 
ceeded to give his reasons in the following terms: “ With respect to the appoint¬ 
ment to that office of any servant of the Company, however eminent his know¬ 
ledge, talents, and experience may confessedly be, his majesty’s ministers agree 
in the sentiments of Mr. Canning, expressed in a letter from him to the court, 
on the 25th of December, 1820, that the case can hardly be conceived in which 
it would be expedient that the highest office of the government in India should 
be filled otherwise than from England, and that that one main link at least 
between the systems of the Indian and the British governments ought, for the 
advantage of both, to be invariably maintained. On this principle it has usually 
been thought proper to act; and in the various important mea,sures consequent 
on the new charter act, his majesty’s ministers see much to enjoin the continu¬ 
ance of the general practice, but nothing to recommend a deviation from it.” 

The objection to the appointment of any servant of the Company to the 
office of governor-general, though here ascribed to Mr. Canning, was of an earlier 
date, and was first made by Lord Cornwallis. He did not, however, talk 
rhetorically like Mr. Canning of the necessity of maintaining a “main link,” 
but distinctly placed his objection on the ground, that during the period of his 
first government it would scarcely have been possible to find any old and 
eminent servant of the Company, who had not in some period of his career 
practised or connived at the abuses and corruptions, which it would be one of 
his first duties as governor-general to suppress. If Lord Cornwallis was justi- 



Chap. I.] 


APPOINTMENT OF GOVERNOR-GENERAL. 


255 


fled in making this sweeping accusation, there can be no doubt that he was a.d. issj. 
right in objecting to the appointment of a servant of the Company to the office 
of governor-general, but owing in no small degree to the example of integrity Government 
set by Lord Cornwallis himself, the Indian service had been thoroughly 
reformed, and as indiscriminate charges of corruption could no longer be in- “f 

sinuated, the exclusion of the Company’s servants from the highest offices **>ecom. 
behoved to be placed on some other ground. Mr. Canning’s maxim was accord- goveraov- 

. I 1 1 . • 1 • 1 • • general. 

ingly brought into practical operation, and ministers pronounced a sweeping 
sentence of disqualification which sounded very like a gratuitous insult to those 
against whom it was directed. It may be admitted that a practical acquaint¬ 
ance with European statesmanship was of the greatest consequence to the 
Governor-general of India, and that those, therefore, who could not have had 
any opportunity of acquiring it were not the most eligible candidates for this 
highest office; but Mr. Grant, though he may have meant no more than this, 
u.sed language in which more was implied, and by seeming to cast a stigma on 
their service,, furnished the directors with an opportunity of jiresenting an 
indignant remonstrance. In the correspondence which ensued there appears 
to have been little sincerity on either .side. Under the mask of advocating 
general principles, both parties were pursuing objects of a personal nature. 

Ministers were desirous to procure the appointment for Mr Grant, and the 
directors, offended that he had not attended more to their suggestions in framing 
thtf new charter act, were unwilling to put him in nomination. 

Mr. Grant in his letter had adverted to the disadvantages of a temporary liemou- 
appointment, and urged the necessity of forthwith appointing in regular form, the dii-eo 
Tlie directors in their answer admitted the superiority of a permanent appoint- 
ment, and declared their conviction that Sir Charles Metcalfe was a fit person 
to receive it. It was therefore “with deep regret” they had leamed that he 
was ciinsidered by his majesty’s government “to be ineligible to the station of 
governor-general, and upon- gi'ounds which would exclude the whole service of 
India fr»>m that high office.” After referring in refutation of Mr. Canning’s 
maxim to “the whole course of our transactions in British India,” as “furnishing 
the most conclusive evidence that the servants of the Company, both civil and 
military, are eminently (qualified for the highest public trust, and that the 
important office of governor-general has been held by several of them with the 
utmost advantage to the national interests, ” they concluded with intimating 
that the arrangements for filling up the office of governor-general would be 
taken into consideration at “the proper time.” In strict law Lord William 
Bentinck had not resigned, but only intimated his intention to resign, and 
the directors were not irawilling to procure delay by taking advantage of a 
legal quibble. The design was transparent. The ministry was tottering, and 
the effect of the delay would probably be to allow the appointment to be made 
under the auspices of another political party. But the very circumstance which 



[Book VIII. 


256 miSTOEY Ot- INDIA. 

i83i. recomjnended delay to the directors urged the Whigs to use all possible 
^ despatch, and Mr. Gr*nt, holding that a vacancy in the office of governor- 
QttM(4pn«fi'general-had actually taken place, intimated to the directors that if they allowed 
imtototat - the st^utory lt?:6 months from the date of the notification to elapse, the crown 
would forthwith exercise its reserved power of appointing, The legality of this 
course being more tlian questionably lie subsequently modified his threat, and 
intimated that the crown would not appoint without giving the court a month’s 
notice. Tlie result was, that the Whig ministry having broken down lost 
'• the envied appointment, and left it as a legacy to the Peel ministry who suc- 
cee.ded them. 

The directors having thus gained their point were no longer disposed to 
quibble for delay,.and soon qfime to an understanding with Lord Ellenborough, 
who bad become president of the Board of Control. With his lordship’s con- 
ciCrrence they offered the office of governor-general to the Honourable Mount- 
TJw oflico stuart Elphinstone. By this offer the stigma supposed to have been fixed on 
aud dc}clint)d the servants of the Company by Mr. Canning’s dictum was removed. This, 
howevcr, was all that was gained by the court or sacrificed by the board. It 
Eiphiiwtonc. known to both that Mr. Elphinstone, having already declined the 

appointment, would in all probability decline it again, and it is therefore diffi¬ 
cult to allow Lord Ellenboi'ough all the credit which he claims for having 
outdone the Whigs in liberality by offering the appointment of governor-general 
to one of the most distinguished servants of the Company. A better jiroof of 
liberality, and of an enlightened use of patronage, might have been given by 
offering the appointment, not to Mr. Elphinstone, who, it might have been 
presumed, would decline, but to Sir Charles Metcalfe, who would certainly 
have been proud to accept of it, and to whose distinguished services it would, 
in the judgment pi the directors themselves, have been an appropriate reward. 
He had, as we have seen, been propo.sed for the office, and rejected for a reason 
not more applicable to him than to Mr. Eljdiinstone. Surely, if Lord Ellen¬ 
borough really meant to do the liberal thing for which be has since claimed 
ci-edit, his choice mast have fallen on Sir Charles Metcalfe. So far from thi.s, 
he only waited for' Mr. Elphinstone’s declinature when he hastened to jirocure 
the appointment of governor-general for Lord Heytesbuiy, who certainly 
jjossessed Mr. Canning’s (jualiflfcation in ^jerfection, as he had never served the 
Company and knew nothing of Indian affairs. So little, indeed, was Lord 
Ellenborough disposed to recognize the claims of eminent service in India, that, 
had he been left to follow his own course, he would have conferred the provi¬ 
sional appointment of governor-general on Sir Henry Fane, the newly appointed 
(Sotpmander-in-chief, who had no qualification but that of being a good soldier, 
■ and refused it to Sir Charles Metcalfe, whose qualifications were universally 
recognized. This piece of folly Lord Ellenborough was not allowed to commit, 
and Sir Charles once more obtained the provisional appointment. 



Chap. I.] 


OFffCE QF G0VE]B^6E-GE1IEEAL. 257 

Everytliing seemed now.to be settled. Lord Heytesbury hjid been s'worii ^.d. is^ 
into office, had provided his outfit, taken but his passage, and completed «11- ^ 

preliminary arrangements, but had not actually sailed, when th^e.Peel'ministiy-j tonilieyieii- 
who had endeavoured withoutTsuccess to-strengthen themselVes by. a, di^elution 
of parliament, were conufelled to resign. The Whigs having resumed office 
under Lord Melbourne as premier, b%w the appointment of govemor-geneVal, of 
which they had formerly been "balked, once more in their power, and were not 
to be restrained by any feeling of delicacy from seizing it. Lord Heytesbury 
immediately received a communication from the new government desiring hiifa'^ 
to postpone his departure. Three days later Jie was distinctly informed that 
minis^rs had resolv-ed to advise the crown to revoke his appointnfenl. The 
propriety of this proceeding was keenly canvassed. The. dh-ectors, conceiving 
that its tendency was to hold up the office of governor-general as a prize to be 
contended for -by political parties, presented a strong remonstrance, while the 
opposition brought the subject under the notice of both Houses of ParKament, 
and denounced the revocation as gmsping and unconstitutional. Ministers 
attempted to justify themselves by drawing a distinction between an appoint¬ 
ment which was only about to be, and one which had actually been carried 
into effect. In tlie latter case they would not have interfered, but in the 
former, though there might be inconveniences in the cancelling of the apfjoint- 
ment, they were not nearly so sei'ious as those which would inevitably be pro¬ 
duced by the want of coiifidence and cordiality between the Indian and the 
home government. Another refison foi- revoking the appointment, though it 
])robably weighed more than all the others, was not mentioned. The vacancy 
had occurred while the Whigs were in office, and would have been supplied by 
them had not the directors prevented it by inter])Osing a quibbling delay." The 
Tories had thus by a kind of trick obtained a valuable patronage which did 
not i)roperly belong to them, and could hardly coin])lain either of injustice or 
indelicacy, when it was o,nee more taken out of their hands, and restored to the 
rightful owners. 

The office of governor-general having thus again become vacant, some diffi- Lord aucr- 
culty appears to have been felt in making the new appointment. Mr. Grant, iwiuted. 
now Lord Glenelg, having become colonial secretary, and been succeeded as 
president of the Board of Control- by Sir John Hobhouse, afterwards Lord 
Broughton, might be considered as removed from the field, and as there was no 
other individual whose claims gave him a decided preffirence, some difficulty 
was felt. The consequence was that the same political party who had formerly 
insisted on an immediate appointment were now in favour of delay. The 
luesident of the board accordingly proposed to wait the airival of Lord Willipm 
Bentuwk before appointing his successor, and engaged not to take any advqn- • 
tage of the failure of the directors to fill up the vacancy within the two months 
allowed them by statute. In the meantime the names of various individuals 

VoL. III. 220 



A.D. 1836.! 


. ^rd ATick% 
• land ftp* 
pointed 
governor- 
general. 


Judicial 

reforms. 


258 HISTORY OP T^DIa!' [Book VIII. 

'^ere put forward, and at list the publife annQune6mefit* was made that the office 
of govemor-genei^ had Jjeen • conferred on Lord Auckland. Why he should 
have been selected- in preference to s6me others'Vho had been mentioned was 
jn fti-. very apparent, as there was nothing'in his antecedents to make it probable 
4hat' the affairfe-of India had' engaged much of his-atfention, or that his adminis¬ 
trative talents were likely to prove of a high order. All that could be said to 
be knbwn was that he w^as a nobleman of amiable manners and excellent char¬ 
acter, free from any overweening confidence in his own judgment, and disposed 
to listen to advice from those whom he believed competent to give it. From 

this last feature in his character it was 
anticipated that he would do «othing 
rashly, and be able at least to avoid any 
serious blunder. 

Lord Auckland arrived at Calcutta 
on the 3d of March, 1836, and immedi¬ 
ately entered on the duties of his office. 
The whole country was tranquil, and 
there seemed reason to hope that he 
would be allowed, like Lord William 
Bentinck, to devote himself to the work 
of internal improvement. The recent 
charter act indeed had not left him in 
any doubt as to the measures which 
ought first to engage his attention, and 
had in particular declared it expedient 
that “ a general system of judicial • 
establishments and police, to which all 
persons whatsoever, as well Europeans as natives, may be subject, should be 
established in the said territories at an early period, and that such laws as may 
be applicable in common to all classes of the inhabitants of the said territories, 
due regard being had to the rights, feelings, and peculiar usages of the people, 
should be enacted, and that all laws and customs having the force of law within 
the same territories should be ascertained and consolidated, and as occasion 
may reqqire, amended.” While the great work of legal reform was brought 
prominently under ■^e notice of the Indian government, provision had been 
made for its accomplishment by the appointment of a fourth member of council, 
usually designated the legislative member, to indicate the particular department 
in which he was expected to labour, and the establishment of a law commission, 
whose reports made from time to time were to furnish the grounds or materials 
for improved legislation. Thus instructed and provided with tho necessary 
means, the governor-general was no sooner installed than the work of legislation 
was commenced. On the _28th of March, 1836, additional extent and import- 



Right Hon. George, Eari. of Auckland, O.C.B. 

After a portrait by L Dfekintoa. 



Chap. I.] JUDIQIAL EEFQRMS. 59 

ance was given to the eraployment of uncovenanted judges by a^. enactu]^ent 
that “no person whatever shall ►by reason of-place of birth^ or by reason of 
descent, be incapable of being a principal sudder ^meen, iudder ■a/tneen, or 
moonsif, within the territoriea siibject to the presidency of Fort .William in^ 
Bengal.” Originally the sudder ameen and the moonsif were the only .classes 
of native judges, and had a very limij^ed jurisdiction. Gradually thte*JtoVers of 
both were extended, and in 1827 the sudder ameen, the superior of tha two, 
was empowered fo try suits to thfe amount of 1000 rupees. The necessities t)f 
the case were still imperfectly met, and an important improvement was made 
by Lord William Bentinck in .1831, by the institution of a third and higher 
cliiss of judges called principal sudder ameens, whose jurisdiction, at first 
re.stricted, was afterwards extended to cases involving property to any amount. 
Under the above enactment, all barriers to the attainment of a judgeship in any 

the three clas.ses were broken down, and it was declared that no kind of 
descent, native, European, or mixed, should henceforth operate as an exclusion. 
This first step, as to the propriety of which there could be no doubt, was soon 
followed by another, which, from the opposition which it encountered, ac(iuired 
some degree of historical importance. 

On the 9th of May, 1836, the governor-general in council enacted that from 
the 1st of June following, the 107th clause of Act 53 Geo. III. c. 155, “shall 
cease to have effect within the territories of the East India Company,” and that 
“from the said day, and within the said territories, no person whatever shall 
by reason of place of birth, or by reason of descent, be in any civil proceeding 
whatever excepted from the jurisdiction” of the courts of sudder dewanny 
adawlut, of the ziUah and city judges, of the principijd sudder ameens, in the 
presidency of Fort William, or of the similar courts of the other presidencies. 
For explanation it is necessary to mention that by the above 107th section 
Bi-itish subjects, at the distance of more than ten miles from the presidencies, 
were generally subject to the jmrisdiction of the ordinary civil courts, but 
instead of appealing to the sudder dewanny adawlut, or other courts exercising 
the highest appellate jurisdiction, it was competent for them, as defenders, to 
appeal to the supreme court of the presidency in which they were sued. The 
effect of the above enactment of tlie governor-general in council, therefore, was 
to deprive British born subjects of a privilege, real or supposed, which they 
previously possessed, and place them as defender in the mofussil courts on the 
very same footing as the natives of India. 

There cannot be a doubt that the appeal to the supreme court, given to 
British subjects only and denieil to natives, was one of those invidious dis¬ 
tinctions which was struck at by the late charter act, and to the removal of 
which the legislative council were sjiecially required to direct their attentioi\ 
It had accordingly, in 1835, while Sir Charles Metcalfe was provisional gover¬ 
nor-general, been carefully considered, and Mr. Macaulay as president, as well 


A.D. 1836. 


Employ- * 

• Inant of 
tive judges. • 


Jurisdiction 
of courts 
over British 
residents. 



262 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book VIII. 


A.D. 1836. European* and native, atid which has been adopted by others with sincere and 
perhaps natural, though mistaken feelings.” Entertaining these views of the 
object of the opposition to the enacliment, the government had 
against new no alternative but to resist it and reject the memorials. 

regarding The memorialistsf however, had not yet exhausted their opposition. With 
appeal". resolution and perseverance which would have been praiseworthy in a better 
cause, they carried their complaint to England, and raised a fund which enabled 
them to send it by the hands of one of their own number, who, after heading 
the agitation, had consented to become its hired advocate. Petitions were accord- 
ingly presented, not only to the Board of Control and court of directors, but 
also to parliament. From the former the answer received was—“ That they 
have not seen any reasons for withholding their sanction from the enactment 
complained of, and that a despatch communicating such sanction has, with their 
approbation, been addressed to the supreme government by the court of 
directors.” In the House of Commons the subject, though not more than seventy 
members met to discuss it, was formally considered on the 22d of March, 1838, 
and gave rise to a spirited debate. Mr. Ward, the member for ShelReld, who 
had undertaken to plead the cause of the petitioners, concluded a long speech 
by moving for a select committee to inquire into their allegations, and “to 
report to the house in what manner and to what extent the act of the legisla¬ 
tive council of India of 1836, No. xi., affected the constitutional rights of British 
bom subjects in India, the prerogatives of the crown, and the general interests 
of the United Kingdom.” The hired advocate from India had evidently done 
his best to cram Mr. Ward with all the allegations and misrepresentations which 
had furnished the staple of his own agitation in Calcutta, but it was in vain. 
The case completely broke down, and the clamour which it had raised became 
The result, absolutely ludicrous, when Sir John Hobhouse made the undeniable statement 
that this right of appeal, which the petitioners had represented as the palladium 
of their liberties, had been only twice resorted to during the whole period of 
twenty years, from 1813 to 1833, and that in both cases the judges of the supreme 
court, unable to come to a decision, “ were obliged to go to the judges of the 
Budder dewanny adawlut to interpret tluj law and give an answer to the 
appeal” Mr. Ward, seeing it hopeless to persevere in the face of such a state¬ 
ment, withdrew his motion for a select committee, and allowed Sir John Hob- 
house to set the question at rest by simply moving “ that the minutes of council 
on which was foimded the legislative act (No. xi.) of 1836 be printed.” 

At the very time when the Calcutta agitators made their last effort, and 
sustained a signal pa,rliamentary defeat, Mr. Macaulay, against whom their 
vituperation had been specially directed, resigned his seat in the council of 
India, and took his departure for England. By a singular provision of the 
new charter act, the legislative member was not permitted to vote, except in 
the making of laws and regulations, and thns, while he was excluded from the 



Chap, I.] 


DISPUTED SUCCESSION IN OUDE. 


263 


ordinary administration of the government, he was expected to devote all his a d. isse. 
energies to the formation of a code which might be enforced^ with slight modi- 
fications, throughout the whole length and breadth of British India. Mr. Mac- Lord 

® MacaiUay's 

aulay must soon have perceived that the task which had been assigned to him labours iu 
and the Taw commission was far beyond their powers, and he must consequently 
have toiled on for years tmder the disheartening conviction, that whatever 
fame he had ali'eady acquired, or might be destined still to acquire in other 
fields of labour, he must forego the idea of descending to posterity as a great 
Indian legislator. His penal code, indeed, made some approach to completeness, 
but it was impossible to adopt it as a whole, and the utmost that can be said 
Jh its praise is, that it contains many valuable suggestions, which those who 
succeeded him were able to turn to good account. 

In the midst of the discussions occasioned by the enactment of the govern- Disputed 

* , 1 1 • •11* Bucowsiou 

merit on the subject oi appeals to the supreme court, important intelligence in Oude. 
arrived from Oude. The king, Nasir-ud-din Hyder, after an illness which was 
not thought serious, had died suddenly on the night of the 7th of July, 1837, 
and an attempt to place a spurious successor on the throne had not been defeated 
without bloodshed. Nasir-ud-din left no chihlren. At one time he had acknow¬ 
ledged or adopted two boys, but he had afterwards formally disavowed them. 

Being himself an only son, he had no brothers, and it therefore became necessary 
to seek his successor among ascendants. Here, however, a difficulty arose. His 
father was the eldest of the ten sons of Sadut Ali. The second of these sons had 
died, leaving children, but the third, Nasir-ud-Dowlah, was still alive. According 
to British law, the second son would have transmitted his right of succession 
to his descendant, but the Mahometan law follows a different rule, and prefers a 
younger surviving brother to the children of an elder brother, who had prede¬ 
ceased before the succession opened to him. According to this view, Nasir-ud- 
DovTlah was the legal heir, and Colonel Low, the British resident, immediately 
on hearing of the death, prepared to recognize him. 

There was not a moment to be lost. The Padshah Begum, or queen-mother, Proceeding 
who had been obliged to quit the palace in consequence of a quarrel with her British 
son, was known to be intriguing for the succession of one of the boys .whom he ”“‘**“*^ 
•had formally disavowed, and the cliildren of Sadut Ali’s second son were dis¬ 
puting the soundness of the interpretation of the Mahometan law by which 
they were excluded. Under these circumstances. Colonel Low proceeded as 
follows. Immediately on receiving intelligence that Nasir-ud-din was just 
dying, he wrote to the brigadier commanding in Oude to have 1000 men in 
readiness to march at a moment’s notice. He then hastened to the palace, and 
finding the king already dead, placed sentries at the inner doors, and sealed up 
the repositories. By a second order, the brigadier was desired to send off five 
companies in advance to the palace, and hasten with the remainder. Captain 
Paton, the resident’s first assistant, remained at the palace, and Lieutenant 



264 


HISTOEY OF INDIA. 


[Book Vlll.- 

A.D. 1830 Shakespear, bis second assistant, was sent to the residence of Nasir-ud-.Ddwlah 
tp obtain liis si^ature.to an obligation hastily prepared for,that pui^ose, 
and thereafter escort him to tb6 palace for the purpose of being enthroned. 

Obligation The obligation which Nasir-ud-Dowlah was required to execute was in the 

the new following terms:—“ Lieutenant-colonel John Low, the resident,^ has apprised me, 

ofosur* through Lieutenant Shake.speAr, his second assistant, of the death of Nasir-ud- 
din Hyder, King of Oude. The resident has also communicated to me the 
substance of the orders of the government of India, respecting the necessity 
of new engagements on the part of the Company's government with the Oude 
state; and I hereby declare, that in the event of my being placed on the throne, 
I will agree to sign any new treaty that the governor-general may dictate." 
The old man, suddenly roused in the dead of the night, and told that the pos¬ 
session of a kingdom depended on his consent, readily did as he was asked, and 
after writing a few words binding him to everything that the document con¬ 
tained, comiileted the execution of it by appending his seal. According to 
Lieutenant Shakespear’s account, he appeared to be much debilitated from bad 
health. The necessity of his removal, however, seemed so urgent, that no 
delay could be allowed, and he was carried to the palace, where, after holding 
an interview with the resident at three o’clock in the morning, he was accommo¬ 
dated with a couch in an adjohiing room, “ to take an hour or two’s sleep pre¬ 
vious to his installation on the throne.” 

Violent While tlius cndeavoui’ing to secure the throne for Nasir-ud-Dowlah, Colonel 

proceedings ^ ^ ^ 

of the Pad- Low was uot unmiiidful of the machinations of the Padshah Begum, and having 
some suspicion that she “ might probably make a movement with her ai’med 
followers towards the city,” sent a messenger “ to enjoin her strictly, on no 
account to think of leaving her own place of residence, which is situated about 
four miles from the palace.” The messenger had barely returned with her 
answer, requesting “that she might, for God’s sake, be allowed to see the corjise 
of the late Nasir-ud-din, as she had not been allowed to see him whilst living,” 
when a laige body of her armed followers were seen rapidly approaching. 
Captain Paton hastened to the outer gate to secure it, and found the insurgents 
standing before it in a dense mass and impatiently demanding admittance. 
When this was refused, they forced the gate by means of an elephant, wj«ch 
threw down one leaf of it, nearly crushing Captain Paton in its fall, and-were 
soon absolute masters of the palace. Shortly afterwards, the Padshah Begum 
made her entrance, with her protdgd, Moona Jaun, and lost pot a moment in 
placing him on -the musnud. The resident, who bad managed to push his way 
through the crowd, only arrived to see the installation completed, and after 
vainly endeavouring to dissuade the Begum from the desperate course she Was 
pursuing, was gM to effect his escape. Old Nasir-ud-Dowlah, thus rudely 
awakened from the sleep which he had retired to take, “ previous to his installa¬ 
tion on the throne,” found himself a prisoner in the hands of his most inveterate 



Chap. I.]* 


DISTURBANCES IN Ilt!:CKN<>^- 2^5 

eneiaiea. ‘ It is-a wonder that they did not nxjirdSr 'hiifi on the spot, but fear of a.d. isss. 
the consequeiiQes appears to have restrained thein,-€in4 they .confuted themselves 
with heaping upon him all kinds of insults, and compelling- himi tp ■a'itness' the 
installation of his rival, at the very time when he had been expecting to receive 
his own. 

The British troops having arrived, the resident sent>'message to the-Begum, insn^jeotion 

, iutlieiialac© 

allowmg^ her only a quarter of an hour to make her submission. She returned BU}>pre9aed. 
an evasive answer, and as soon as the respite allowed her elapsed, he ordered 
hostilities to commence. A few discliarges of grape having cleared the way, 
the soldiers rushed forward, and were soon in possession of the persons both of 
the B^um and Moona Jaun. Only three sepoys were wounded in the assault; 
the loss of the insurgents in killed and wounded was about forty. As soon as 
these were removed, Nasir-ud-Dowlah, whom it was found necessaiy “to soothe 
and encourage” after the agitating scenes of which he had been a most reluctant 
spectator, was brought forward and installed by the resident, who, placing the 
crown upon his head, declared him King of Oude. The Padshah Begum and 
her prot%d were sent off as prisoners to Cawnpoor. On the 20th of July, tw'elve 
days after, the installation, the governor-general addressed a letter to the new 
sovereign, in which he says: “I have derived consolation for the death of his 
late majesty, your royal nephew, from the reflection that he has been succeeded in 
the government by a prince of whose experience, abilities, and virtue I have 
been led to form the most favourable opinion.” In a subsequent paragraph he 
■says: “My representative. Colonel Low, who possesses my fullest confidence, h^ 
been authorized by me to propose, for the consideration of yoqr majesty, certain 
modifications of the treaty subsisting between the Esist India Company and the 
Oude state, and I feel assured that your majesty will recognize in those pro¬ 
positions the same moderate views and the same zeal for the welfare of the 
prince and people of Cude, as have invariably characterized the British govern¬ 
ment in its negotiations* with its allie.s.” After reading the above obligations 
imposed on his majesty, this reads like burlesque, and the, governor-general 
must himself have felt it to be so, as he was by no means so thoroughly satisfied 
with the proceedings of Colonel Low as his words imply. In a minute recorded by 
him, when the intelligence first reached Calcutta, he had thus expressed himself: 

“For any criticism in detail on the measures adopted by Colonel Low, we must viewaoftue 

*•/» t ^ govornor- 

wait for further accounts, but I may,.now say that I should undoubtedly have pnoraiaato 
been better pleased if he had not in this moment of exigency accepted the uncon- with native 
ditional engagement of submissiveness which the new king has signed. This 
document may be liable to misconstruction, and it was not warranted by any¬ 
thing contained in the instructions issued to Colonel Low.” To Colonel Low 
himself he wrote as follows:—“His lordship in council’would not qualify, even 
by an expression of doubt, the high approbation which he is ready to express of 
your conduct on this trying occasion. The expediency of obtaining fi-om - his 

"Vot. III. 230 



HiSffOEY" OF INDIA. 


[Book'VIII. 


m 

A.D. 1838. majesty the signature of a'pr^ous agreement, binding himself to absolute sub- 
iqiisaiveness, is the bply point olt which he feels that difference of opinion may 

viewsofthe be entertained;* and if on the one hand, it may appear to secure the objecte of 

gm^°Lto government, and te be justified by precedent on the other, it seems open to 
inisrepreseatation, and, from the'reli^nce which might be placed on tMI character 
and position of his majesty, superfluous." These quotations deserve attention, 
not - merely on account of their own intrinsic soundne’ss, but because they give 
for the first time some insight into the course of policy which Lord Auckland 
was disposed to pursue. For the same reason another quotation from his 
loi'dship’s minute may be here inserted. “It will be matter for our considera¬ 
tion, in what manner some modifications of the existing treaty shall be framed, 
under which the British government might have more power to prevent or 
remedy mal-administration, and by withdrawing from the obligation, still 
existing in teims, although it has long ceased to be recognized as binding in 
practice, of exercising a complete and minute interference, by means of its own 
troops, in defence of the Oude gbvernment, be less liable to responsibility, for 
all its acts, and the ordinary course of its internal policy, and this with increase 
of advantage rather than injury, in rendering disposable our own military 
means, and without admitting on the other hand the formidable groAvth of an 
armed and unchecked independence.” 

other claim- Though the Padshah Begum and Moona Jaun'had been removed, the 

tbronoof question of the Oude succession was not yet set at rest. Yemeen-ud-Dowlah, 
c&,Uing himself the eldest son of Shum-ud-Dowlah, Sadut All’s second son, con¬ 
tinued, though by peaceful means, to persist in his claim. He was residing at 
Benares when the succession opened, and immediately submitted his case to Sir 
Charles Metcalfe, who in reply simply informed him that “the oldest surviving 
uncle of the late King of Oude has succeeded to the throne by inheritance, 
according to the Mahometan law.” Immediately another brother, calling him¬ 
self also the eldest son of Shum-ud-Dowlah, made his appearance, and on being 
at once rejected by the Indian government, showed how much he was in earnest 
by undertaking the voyage to England for the purpose of urging his title there. 
Besides producing a pedigree in which he seemed to prove that he and not his 
brother was the eldest son, he argued that the Mahometan law was misinter¬ 
preted. In cases of ordinary succession, the law doubtless was as the British 
government had understood it; but in the case of successicm to a throne, the 
rule, he said, was different, and representation in the European sense of the term 
was recognized. This is not impossible, but it was now too late to argue the 
question, the vacant throne was again occupied, and endless confusion-would 
have been produced by any attempted change. The court of directors therefore 
cui the matter short by the following letter from their secretary, dated 29th June, 
1838: “I am commanded by the court of directors of the East India Company 
to acknowledge the receipt of your highness’s letter dated the Ist instant, and 



Chap. L] 


967 


AFFAIRS dF'-SATtAEAH:,'^ 

to acquaint you in reply that a claim pifecisely simUaa* t^^lhat- which you have a.d. isso. 
advanced having been preferred to the local autliontiesdn Jndia;by Yemeen-ud- 
Dowlah Bahudur, eldest son of Nawant Shum-ud^Dowlfth, that' prince was 
informed that the eldest surviving uncle of the late King of Oude^has succeeded 
to the throne by inheritance according to the Mahometan la\v.’' 

The decided interference of the British government had about the salne state of 

• matters in 

time become necessary in another quarter. Pertaub Sing, the Eajah of Sattarah^ sattarah. 
had never shown much gratitude for the obligation conferred upon him when, 
under tlie administration of the Marquis of Hastings, he was rescued \^ith his 
family from poverty and thraldom, and established in the possession of a con¬ 
siderable principality. At fi!«t indeed, as the actual administration w;^ npt to 
be conferred upon him till he should give proof of his ability to conduct it, his 
ambition urged him to unwonted exertion, and “he laboured," says Duff, “as 
jissiduously as any carcoon under his government,” but as soon as his object 
was gained, and the formal delivery to him of the entire powers of the state 
in April, 1822, made him his own master, his true character became fully 
developed. Shaking off the cares of government by committing them to 
worthless favourites, he gave himself up to indolence, or to pursuits so childish 
and eccentric, as to make his sanity more than questionable. Colonel Lodwick, 
the resident at his court, in a letter dated September, 1836, thus describes his 
conduct: “That the rajah’s mind has become weak to an extraordinary degree 
is but too evident in his actions. He has lately formed a company of women, 
arming them with muskets, and even drilling them to the management of guns, 
cast and mounted expressly for the purpose. Women are also taught to manage 
elephants, to act as chobdars, massals, &a Every designing gossain or fakir 
offering his services to propitiate the gods in favour of his wishes is attended 
to; and at this time three sects of Brahmins are performing anaostan cere¬ 
monies, at a heavy expense, to procure the departure of a ghost supposed to 
liaunt the palace, and for other objects equally absurd and contemptible.” 

With all this childishness and superstition the Rajah of Sattarah had a ciiaraoterof 
mightyidea oT his own consequence, and looked upon all that had been done 
for him as a mere instalment of what he was entitled to claim as the lineal 
descendant of Sevajee, the founder of the Mahratta empire. Adventurers, both 
native and European, knew how to turn this family pride to account, and as 
the most effectual means of gaining his good graces and stimulating his liber¬ 
ality, flattered him into the belief that he was destined to become the head of 
all the Hindooa In a mind like his these extravagant ideas were not allowed 
to remain inoperative, and the eager desire to convert them into realities, had 
laid him open to the charge of having engaged in intrigues totally at variance 
with the relation in which he stood to the British government. This conduct 
naturally called forth remonstrance, and he was repeatedly warned of the perilous 
course which he was pursuing. He whs not, however, to be either dissuaded or 



A.D. 1839. 


The Bajah 
of Sattarak 
dojTosed. 


Russian 
lutrigues iu 
tlie'Eaat. 


S68 • HISTOSY.OP'niDia; FBook: yiii. 

deterred, and the threatened penalty at last overtook him. Considering the 
weaknesra of his character, and the snspicious nature of much of the evidence 
adduced'to prove his guilt, some measure less severe thftn deposition might have 
fully ahswered the ends both of justice and policy. Sir James Camac, the gov¬ 
ernor of Bombay, was at firet disposed to pursue a lenient course, and held per¬ 
sonal interviews with the rajah in the hope of inducing him to make the necessary 
concessions. He failed, and the result was announced in a proclamation issued 
by the resident at Sattarah, under the authority of the Bombay government, and 
dated September 5, 1839. This document, after detailing the generous manner 
in which the rajah had been treated, and enumerating the leading, articles of 
the treaty made with him, continues thus ; "Notwithstanding this solemn com¬ 
pact, it has been conclusively established to the conviction of the British 
government that the rajah, unmindful of his obligations, and of the generosity 
which restored him to liberty and conferred on him a throne, has, for a series 
of years, held clandestine communications contrary to the stipulations contained 
in the fifth article of the treaty; that he has cherished ambitious designs hostile 
to the British government; that he has advanced claims and pretensions incom¬ 
patible with the letter and spirit t)f the treaty; and that he has conducted him¬ 
self in a manner subversive of the alliance formed between the two states.” 
The governor-general, when first made aware of these charges, and convinced 
of their truth, bilked of annexation as the proper remedy. Ultimately more 
moderate counsels prevailed, and were thus intimated in the last paragraph of 
the proclamation: "The British government, however, having no view of advan¬ 
tage and aggrandizement, has resolved to invest tlj® brother, and next in suc¬ 
cession to the rajah, with the sovereignty of the Sattarah state, according to the 
limits fixed by the treaty of the 2r)th of September, 1819. He is therefore 
hereby declared Rajah of Sattarah, under the title of Shreemunt Maharaj Shahee 
Rajey Chut Turputtee of Sattarah; and all persons residing witliin his territory 
are hereby requbed to render to him allegiance.” The com-se thus adopted 
excited much discussion both in India and in this country, but it was ulti¬ 
mately sustained, and the ex-rajah was carried off to end his days at Benares 
as a pensioner. 

Hitherto the policy pursued by Lord Auckland had been pacific, and seemed 
to indicate that his administration would, like that of his predecessor, run its 
course without any rapture of friendly relations with other states. It was 
otherwise destined. Connections, formed at first for the furtherance of com¬ 
mercial objects, produced political entanglements. The discovery of Russian 
intrigues, and the consequent apprehension of an invasion, suggested the neces¬ 
sity of providing against all possible danger by interposing new barriei-s on the 
western frontier, and Lord Auckland, listening only to- his fears, and the 
counsels of rash advisers, wgss suddenly transformed into the most reckless and 
aggressive of all governors-general. Nedessity, or something which he mistook 



Chap. II.] 


THE SIKHS. 


; 26 &'. 

for it, became his only plea, and in utter disregard both of;justice and prudence a.d. i8s». 
he rushed headlong into a series of measures which wbre ter issue in.‘disgrace 
and fearful disaster. Before giving the details it will be proper to take a l?rief 
survey of.Jihe leading states through whose territories, as bounding with those ' 
of Brittsh India on the west, the invasion, supposed to be threatened, would of 
course be made. 


CHAPTER IT. 


Belations with the Punjab, Scinde, Cabool, and Persia — Bumes’ mission to the court of Dost 
Mahomed—Its failure—The Tripartite Treaty—The siep;© of Herat—^The expedition to tl»e Persian 
Gulf—The Simla manifesto. 


N the north-west, British India was bounded at this pei’iod by <wgii> nod 
the territories of the Sikhs, who, though at first only a religious oftbeSiki>». 
sect, had,, under skilful leadership, acquired political importance 
and become a powerful state. Their original seat was the uj)per 
part of the Punjab, the possession of which had often been 
keenly contested between the Moguls and the Afghans. By both of them the 
Sikhs were equally detested, and hence the alternate change of masters brought 
them no relief. The determination to extirpate them was openly avowed, and 
their only hope of escape was in their own prowess. Thus spurred by necessity 
they fought with the courage of despair. On various occasions they not only 
maintained their ground, but inflicted severe loss on their persecutors; and 
availing themselves of the confusion which prevailed during the last years of 
the Mogul empire, began to figure as conquerors. At first they existed as a 
confederacy composed of separate chieftainsliips, the heads of which claimed to 
be independent of each other, and were accustomed, when the common interest 
required it, to meet as equals in public diet at Amritser, where their principal 
shrine was situated. Towards the end of the last century the confederacy con¬ 
sisted of twelve associations or misals, which extended from the Indus eastward 
across the Sutlej as far as the Jumna. For a time, while it was felt that union Tiieir twelve 

. - 1 . , mlealB. 

was indispensable to their mutual security, they acted together with some 
degree of cordiality; but in proportion as external danger diminished, internal 
dissension increased, and the different misals, disregarding the public interest, 
began to aim at individual aggrandizement. The endless feuds thus engendered 
produced so much confusion that' the necessity of a change of political system 
became apparent. If the Sikhs were to maintaift their independence it could 
only be by submitting voluntarily or conipulsorily to the ascendency of some 





•570 : 


HISTOEY OF INDIA. 


[Book VIII. 


A.D. 1762. one misaJ, which might then incorporate the others with itself, and form the 
nudens of an undivided Sikh sovereignty. The manner in which this was 
accomplished must now be briefly traced. 

Rise of Among the twelve original misals the one which appears to have been last 

ChUrutSing. e> o jrr 

formed, and to have been regarded, in respect of territory, income, and influence, 
as the least important, was the Sookur-Chukea, which had its capital at 
Goojeranwala, about fifty miles north of Lahore. Its founder, Churut Sing, the 
son of a Jat, who had thrown off his own faith and avowed himself a Sikh 
convert, had commenced life as a freebooter, and become possessed of a small 

, garhi or mud-fort, which served as a retreat for his family and followers, and 

a receptacle for his plunder. , The extent of his depredations, and the dangerous 
proximity of his fort to Lahore, induced the Afghan governor of this capital to 
march against him in 1762, at the head of a large body of troopa The expe¬ 
dition proved a failure. The leading Sikh confederates made common cause 
with Churut Sing; and the governor, alarmed at the extent to which disaf¬ 
fection and treachery prevailed in his camp, was glad to secure his personal 
safety by a precipitate flight, leaving all his baggage and camp equipage behind 
him. The celebrated Afghan monarch, Alimed Shah, in the course of the same 
year, amply avenged this defeat by hastening from Cabool and gaining a 
pitched battle, in which the Sikhs lost more than 12,000 men in killed and 
wounded. The state of his afiairs however di<l not allow him to follow up his 
advantage, and on his sudden recall to Cabool to meet a still more pressing 
danger, the Sikhs were able to take the field at the head of a more powerful 
army than they had ever mustered before. No effectual resi.stance could be 
offered to them, and they extended their comjuests on every side. Churut 
Sing, now recognized as one of the ablest of their leaders, was not neglectful 
of his own interest, and became the head of a misal, whiclj took its name from 
the lands of which his progenitors had been merely cultiviitors. 

Higprogrees. When no longer engaged in assisting to repel Afghan invasion, Churut Sing 
was ready for any enterprise from which additional ten-itory or revenue might 
be acquired, and was therefore easily tempted to take part in a violent domestic 
quarrel between the hill-rajah of Jumoo and Brij-RaJ his eldest son. The 
rajali wished a younger son to succeed, and Brij-Raj, as the most efifectual means 
of frustrating this intention, had resolved to anticipate the succession by seizing 
it in his fathers lifetime. With this view he applied to Churut Sing, and 
offered to reward his assistance, in the event of its proving successful, by the 
payment of a large annual tribute. Churut Sing at once consented, and, in 
league with Jye Sing, the head of the Ghunea misal, which could muster 8000 
horse, while he had not more than 2500, proceeded northward to open the cam¬ 
paign. The rajah on his part had not been idle. In addition to several hill- 
chiefs, he had secured the ajd of Jhunda Sing, the head of the Bhangee misal, 
which of itself could bring 10,0©0 horse into the field. While the hostile armies 



Chap. IL] 


THE SIKHS. 


271 


lay encamped on the opposite, sides of the Busuntur, a partial skirmish took a.d. im. 
place, and proved fatal to Churut Sing, who was killed by the bursting of his 
matchlock. This event, which happened in 1774, put an end to the campaign. Death of 
The allies of Brij-Raj withdrew, after the dastardly act of murdering Jhunda 



JuMoo.->-Froiu Hon. C. S. Hartlinge's RocoUections of India. 


Sing by the hands of a hired assassin ; and the Bhangee misal, thus atrociously 
deprived of their chief, had no longer any desire to continue the contest. 

Churut Sing was succeeded by his son Maha Sing, who was only ten years ne la s«o- 

• ^ ceeded by 

of age. For some years the government was conducted by his mother and the MaUaSing. 
Ghunea chief, Jyo Sing; biit the young chief was too talented and ambitious 
to submit long to tutelage, and was only approaching the years of manhood 
when he took the reins of government into his own hands, and immediately 
(rommenced a series of aggi-essions on his neighboura The object of his first 
atbick was the strong fort of Ramnuggur, situated on the east bank of the 
t-henab, and held by a Jat Mussulman of the name of Peer Mahomed. The 
cause of quarrel was a celebrated gun which Churut Sing had captured fi-om 
the Afghans and deposited with the Chutta tribe, of which Peer Mahomed was 
the chief, until he should be able to convey it across the Clienab and transport 
it to his own capital. The tribe, it was alleged, had violated' the trust by 
giving up the gun to the Bhangee misal. On this pretext Maha Sing, in conquests of 

, , ® Maha Smg. 

concert with Jye Sing, made his appearance before Ramnuggur, and after a 
siege of four months compelled it to suirender. The capture was in itself of 
less valUe than the reputation acquired by it; for many chiefs who had previ¬ 
ously been attached to the Bhangefe misal, believing that its fortunes were on 
the wane, abandoned it, and placed themselves under Maha Sing’s protecticto. 

The success of this first enterprise naturally stimulated to a second, and Maha 
Sing turned his victorious arms in the directing of Jumoo. The rajah above 





272 


HISTOEY OF INDIA. 


[Book VIII. 


Ao.iTO. referred to iiad died, and been succeeded by.Brij-Raj, From the friendly 
relations -which had subsisted between the latter and Churut Sing«it might 

co^i^ofhave been suj)posed that Jumoo was the last place which Maha Sing would 
have felt justified in attacking. With him however friendship was invariably 
sacrificed without scruple to what was considered policy; and he therefore no 
sooner learned that Brij-Raj’s misgovemment was producing general discontent, 
tlian he first made claims upon him which he knew would be refused, and then 
made the refusal a pretext for ravaging his territory. Unprindipled though 
the proceeding was it proved successful, and Maha Sing returned from the 
pillage of Jumoo laden with spoil which, certainly not without great exaggera¬ 
tion, was estimated at £2,000,000 sterling. 

Alarm of tiio , Thess successes were not unaccompanied with disadvantages. The other 

other Sikh 

chiefs misals began to take alarm at the sudden aggrandizement of the one which 
had hitherto been regarded as the most insignificant of their number, and even 
Jye Sing was so much offended with the expedition to Jumoo, that when Maha 
Sing waited upon him at Amritser, he not only received him with the greatest 
coolness, but treated him with insult. As usual Maha Sing tlroilght only of 
the manner in which he might turn this contumelious treatment to his own 
advantage, and suddenly made his appearance at the head of a large force 
before Butala, the capital of Jye Sing’s possessions.. Here fortune again 
favoured him, and Jye Sing was compelled to accept of peace on humiliating 
terms, after his son Goor Buksh, a pi’omising youth in whom all his hopes 
were set, had fallen in battle. Maha Sing’s ascendency among the Sikh chiefs 
was now established, but his ambition was not yet satisfied, and he proceeded 
once more to gratify it, without any scruple as, to the means. In 1791 Sahib 
Sing, who had married Maha Sing’s sister, became by the death of liis fattier 
chief of Gujei’at, situated in the Doab, between the Chenab and Jhelum The 
disturbance occasioned by a new succession was too tempting an opportunity 
to be overlooked, and Maha Sing, totally regardless of the claims of affinity, 
determined to bike an ungenerous advantage of his brother-in-law, by urging 
a claim of tribute which he knew to be gi-oundless, and then making the 
refusal of it a pretext for. hostilities. He accordingly collected his forces, and 
commenced operations by laying siege to one of his brother-in-law’s forts. The 
attempt proved more difficult and dilatory than he had anticipated, as some of 
the other misals, now thoroughly alarmed at the unbounded ambition which 
he displayed, had come to the rescue. It is probable, however," that he 
would once more have triumphed, for he had driven the troops opposed to him 
from the field, and was prosecuting the siege with every .prospect of*success,'‘ 
when he was seized with an illness which obliged him to return to his own 
capital, and carried him off in the beginning of 1792, in the twenty-seventh 
year of his age. 

The state of affairs at the time of Maha Sing’s death was very alarming. 



Chap. II.] 


EUNJEET SING. 


273 


He had wantonly provoked the hostility of several of the leading misals, and a.p. mz. 
swddenly disappeared from the scene, leaving the succession to be taken up by 
Ilia only son Runjeet Sing, who was then only in his tweKth year. An honest 
and talented regency seemed alone capable of saving the covmtry, but this was md oucoes- 
, scarcely to be expected. The mother of the young prince, to whom the office jeetsing, 
naturally belonged, was notorious for her profligacy, and shared her power with 



Amiutser.—F rom Sir A. Burued' Cabool. 


a minister with whom she had formed a di.sgraceful connection. What but 
ruin was to be expected from a government administered by such unworthy 
liands! Nor was there much prospect that Runjeet Sing himself on arriving 
at manhood would be able to remedy the evils of previous misgovernment. 

When a mere infant an attack of the small-pox, which threatened his life, cost 
him the sight of one of his eyes, and had left its ravages strongly marked on 
his countenance. His education was almost entirely neglected, and instead of hu early 
being trained to the duties which were expected to devolve upon him, means 
were actually and designedly taken to give him a disrelish, and unfit him for 
the discharge of them. His mother, anxious to retain the government in her 
own hands, sought to gain her object by indulging him in early familiarity 
with every form of vice. From such a youth, judging from appearance, nothing 
was to be expected, and* therefore it is the more wonderful that he ultimately 
proved one of the ablest monarchs that ever reigned, tmited a number of 
disjointed federations into one compact and powerfiil kingdom, extended its 
limits by new conquests, raised it to a height of glory which it possessed only 
while he ruled it, and which it lost as soon as by liis death the government 
passed into other hands. 

According to the preposterous custom prevalent in the East, Runjeet Sing 
was already married at the time of his father's death. His wife was Mehtab 
Koonwur, the only child of (3oor Buksh, whose death in battle has been 
mentioned above, and consequently the grand-daughter of Jye Sing, chief of 
VOI,. III. . . ggi 




A-T>. 1793. 


AdminUtra’ 
tlon during 
Bnnjeet - 
Sing’s 
minority. 


He asBumes 
the govern¬ 
ment. 


His relations 
with Ze- 
maun Shah. 


274 HISTOEY OF INDIA. [Book VIII. 

the Ghunea misal. After the death of his favourite son, Jye Sing had concen¬ 
trated his aifections on this only child, and fallen, in consequence, under thS 
influence of her mother Suda Koonwur, Gk)or Buksh’s widow, a woman of 
great talents and boundless ambition. Availing herself of her ascendency over 
the old chief, she had not only planned the marriage of her daughter with 
Runjeet Sing, but had also secured the succession to the Ghunea misal to herself. 
She accordingly succeeded on the death of Jye Sing in 1793, and was thus able 
while administering her own government to exert a very decided influence over 
that of her son-in-law. Through this interference and the ability with which it 
was exerted, Runjeet Sing’s possessions were tolerably well managed during his 
minority, and many of the mischiefs which must have occurred had his profli¬ 
gate mother and her paramour been allowed to take their own course were 
happily prevented. 

It was not long, however, before Runjeet Sing, in imitation of his father’s 
example, threw off the restraints of tutelage. On attaining the age of seventeen 
he assumed the government, and effectually rid himself of all undue interference 
by procuring the deaths both of his mother and her minister. With Suda 
Koonwur, his mother-in-law, he still remained on friendly terms, deriving 
essential aid both from her counsels and the military assistance which her 
possession of the Ghunea misal enabled her to afford him. Shortly after 
Runjeet Sing began to rule for himself, the Afghan monarch Zemaun Shah 
invaded the Punjab, and caused that alarm in India of which some account has 
been given in a previous pai't of this work. The Sikhs did not venture to meet 
him in the open field, and on his advance retired beyond the Sutlej. RunjeA 
Sing was among the number of the chiefs who thus consulted for their safety, 
but while making common cause with them he was steadily pursuing his own 
interest by means of a treacherous intrigue. Zemaun Shah had taken pos¬ 
session of Lahore without opposition, and was about to complete his conquest 
of the Punjab when dissensions among his own troops, and a threatened 
invasion from Persia, compelled hyn hastily to retrace his steps. In his preci¬ 
pitate flight the Jhelum was found to be so much swollen that he could not 
tran^ort his artillery across it. He therefore entered into a negotiation with 
Runjeet Sing, and engaged to give him a grant of Lahore if he would forward 
the guns to him. Runjeet Sing performed his part of the agreement, and 
having in return obtained the grant,, proceeded to enforce it, though at the 
expense of those with whom he had lately been allied With the aid of his 
mother-m-law he fitted out an expedition, to which the chiefs in possession of 
Lahore were unable to offer any effectual resistance. Thus possessed of the 
capital of the Punjab he prepared to make it the nucleus of new conquests, and 
become, instead of the chief of a misal, the sovereign of a great monarchy. 

For several years after the commencement of the present century, Runjeet 
Sing continued to pursue an uninterrupted career of conquest, dexterously avail- 



Chap. II.] 


EUNJEET SING. 


Z75 


ing himself of every opportunity afforded fcy internal dissensions, ^d aocom- I.d. me. 
plishing as much by bribery and treachery as by force of arma In 1802 the ^ 

Bhangee misal, which had long offered the most determined resistance to his Acq«i«ition* 
encroachments, was broken up and made Mbutary, and many of the districts to 
the south and east of Lahore were compelled to acknowledge his supremacy. 

In 1804 the dissensions which prevailed in Cabool, while the four sons of Timour 
Shah, Huraayun, Mahmoud, Zemaun Shah, and Shah Shujah, were contending 
for the throne, determined him to make an expedition into those countries east 
of the Indus which were still nominally subject to Afghan rule. He accord¬ 
ingly proceeded across the Eavee and the Chenab, and found m(^t of the chiefs 
more disposed to buy him off by presents and promises of tribute than to run the 
risk of hostilities.- He was too politic not to accept of this mode of adjustment, 
which, while it gave him a nominal, that might afterwards be converted into a 
leal supr^acy, enriched his treasury, and thereby furnished him with the 
means of future conquests. In 180.5, shortly after Ids return from this western 



Fort op Qovindghur, wear Amriteor.—From Sketches in PuiOftb by a Lady. 


expedition, Jeswunt Row Holkar made his appearance, closely followed by Histeution* 
Lord Lake. Rimjeet Sing was thus brought for the first time into immediate Mahrattaa 
communication with the Mahrattas and the British, and fully alive to the Bruilh! 
importance of the crisis which had arrived, endeavoured at least to divide the 
responsibility with the other Sikh chiefs, hy holding a gurumata or national 
council at Amritser. The ties which formerly bound the confederacy were 
now so loose that no united decision could be given, and the only tldng left 
was to temporize and give friendly words to the two hostile armies without 
affording any real assistance to either. This mode of proceeding had the 
desired result, for Jeswunt Row Holkar, finding that he had nothing' to hope 
from the Sikhs, was only too glad to accept of the extravagantly favourable 
terms which the timorous policy of Sir George Barlow the governor-general 
had offered him. On the peace which followed the two armies took their . 
departure, and the Punjab escaped for the time from becoming a sanguinary 
battle-field. 



276 


' HISTOEY OF INDIA. 


[Book VIII 


A. 0 . 180 S. While Lord Lake was in the Punjab friendly communications took place 
between him and Runjeet Sing, but the ambitious dfesigns evidently euter- 
Thniatoied tained by the latter were not viewed without some degree of uneasiness, and it 
batweeu was cveu forcbodcd that a collision between him and the British government 
might not be distant. Hitherto Runjeet Sing had confined his conquests to the 
of the Sutlej, but encouraged by the pusillanimous spirit which prevailed 
in the Calcutta council, he had been gradually feeling his way, and pi-eparing 
to extend his sway over the misals which were situated beyond the left bank 
of that river. The dissensions prevailing among the Sikh chiefs soon furnished 
him with plausible pretexts, and he crossed the river, ostensibly for the purpose 
of acting as umpire and reconciling the contending parties. His mode of 
settlement making it obvious that his own aggrandizement was the only object 
he had in view, the Sikh chiefs became alarmed, and despatched a deputation 
to Delhi to claim the protection of the British government. The answer given 
was somewhat ambiguous, as what was called the non-interference policy was 
still in the ascendant, but some assurance of protection was ventured, and the 
deputation returned to announce that further encroachments from the west 
would not be permitted. It was now Runjeet Sing’s turn to feel alarmed, and 
he not only endeavoured to induce the Sikh chiefs voluntarily to renounce the 
British protection for which they had applied, but took immediate steps practi¬ 
cally to test the degree and kind of protection which was to be afforded. 

' Lord Minto, who was now governor-general, was less disposed than his prede- 
»truaty. ccssor to submit to the encroachments of the native powers, and in 1808, when 
the successes of Napoleon I. had led to a belief that even India was in danger 
of a French invasion, endeavoured to provide against possible contingencies by 
despatching three embassies, one to Persia, another to Cabool, and the third to 
the Punjab. The last was intrusted to Mr. (afterwards Lord) Metcalfe, who 
on this mission gave proof of the abilities which ultimately made him a 
distinguished statesman. Runjeet Sing, who was at this time bent on making 
himself master of all the territory between the Sutlej and the Jumna, was 
irritated and mortified when he learned from the letter of the governor-general 
that the Sikh states beyond the Sutlej wei e under British protection, and must 
not be interfered with. This intimation he loudly complained of as equivalent 
t6 a violent usurpation of his rights, and at first, as if he had determined to 
assert thesd at aU hazards, hastened across the- Sutlej, leaving Mr. Metcalfe 
behind because he had refused to follow him, and began to coerce the protected 
statea The firmness of the young British diplomatist, and thq approach of a 
British force under the celebrated David Ochterlony, made Runjeet Sing 
aware of .the dangerous game which he had begun to play, and he felt 
, ultimately constrained to conclude a treaty, wliich, wliile it left him uncon- 
* trolled to the wpst of the Sutlej, and even recognized certain rights of supre¬ 
macy over some districts situated on the east of it, obliged him to restore all 



Chap. II.] 


EUNJEET SING. 


277 


the conquests he had made from the protected states, after the fact of protection 
had been distinctly intimated to him. 

Runjeet Sing’s career of conquest toward the east having been thus abi-uptly 
terminated, he naturally turned to the directions which were stiU open to him, 
smd gradually succeeded by force or fraud in bringing nearly the whole of the 
Punjab under his sway. The faithlessness and treachery which marked his 
proceedings must have produced strong feelings of indignation and abhoirence 
among those who had suffered, or saw themselves threatened by them, but 
internal feuds made it impossible to form any general confederacy against him, 
while the regular discipline which he had introduced among his troops gave 
them such a decided superiority as seemed to render resistance hopeless. He 
was hence able to make the most of hLs successes, and by means of exaction and 
pillage used war as a means of replenishing, instead of exhausting his treasmy. 
Meanwhile events were taking place in Afghanistan which tempted him to 
carry his views beyond the Punjab. In the contest for the crown between the 
sons of Timour Shah, Shah Mahmoud had proved victorious, and his two 
brothers, Zemaun Shah, whom he had barbaroiisly deprived of sight, and Shah 
Shujah, had been compelled to seek a foreign asylum. In prosecuting his suc¬ 
cesses, Futteh Khan, tlie vizier of Shah Mahmoud, had resolved to punish the 
governors of Attock and Cashmere for the assistance which they had given to 
tlie fugitive pidnces. In this manner, from the proximity of tlie territories, 
Futteh Khan and Runjeet Sing were brought into close communication, and 
entered into an agreement, by which it was stipulated that the latter, in 
consideration of a shai^ of the plunder, a present of nine lacs, and some prospec¬ 
tive advantages, would not only allow the foiiner a free passage thi-ough liis 
territories, but frurrish him with an auxiliary force of 12,000 Sikhs. As both 
parties were adepts in fraud, each endeavoured to turn the agreement to his 
own sole advantage. Futteh Sing having recovered Cashmere, refused to share 
the plunder, alleging that the Siklis had not assisted liim according to promise, 
and Runjeet Sing, by means of an intrigue, made himself master of Attock, 
and refused to |>art with it. 

The Sikh auxiliaiiea on their return to Lahore were accompanie<l by Shah 
Shujah, who, having received a pressing invitation from Runjeet Sing, was in 
hopes of being aided by him in an attempt to recover the throne of Cabool. 
The invitation had been given with very different intentions. SJiah Shujali 
was in possession of the celebrated diamond Koh-i-noor, now belonging to the 
British crown,-and Runjeet Sing, who had set his heart upon it, wtis deter¬ 
mined to effect his object, though it should be at the expense of a gi-oss viola¬ 
tion of all the rights of hospitality. The very second day after Shah Shujah’s 
arrival he sent an emissiwy to demand it, and on receiving an evasive answer, 
began to employ every species of duress. Sentinels were placed over the Shah’s 
dwelling, and by actually withholding from him and his family the necessaries 


A.b. 1808. 


Runjeet 
Sin^s 
designs <m 
Afghanistan 


His treat¬ 
ment of 
Shah Shujah. 



278 


HISTORY OF INDIA, 


[Book VITI, 


▲.D. 1819. 


The Koh-i- 
noor ex¬ 
torted ftx>m 
BbahSli^jah 
, by Bunjeet 
Bing. 


Failure of on 
exj^itioQ 
against 
Cashmere. 



The Koh-i-koob, ok Mountain op Liodt.' 
From OQ «iigi«vlz)g in lllSUmted London News. 


of life, he was at last starved into compliance. His own account of the matter 
is as follows:—^When he had endured a month of privation, “Runjeet Sing 
came in person, and after friendly protestations he stained a paper with 

safflower, and swearing by the Granth 
of Baba Namuk and his own sword, 
he wrote the following security and 
compact: That he delivered over the 
provinces of Kota Cumalech, Jung 
Shawl, and KhuUh Noor to us and 
our heirs for ever, also offering assist¬ 
ance in troops and treasure for the 
purpose of again recovering ■ ouir throne. We also agreed, if we should ever 
ascend the throne, to consider Runjeet Sing always in the light of an ally. He 
then proposed himself that we should exchange turbans, which is among the 
Sikhs a pledge of eternal friendship, and we then gave him the Koh-i-noor.” 
The Shah soon found that Runjeet Sing's promises and oaths were equally 
worthless, and after being subjected for months to continued shameless extor¬ 
tion, he at last succeeded with difficulty in 1816 in making,his escape in 
disguise, and obtaining a hospitable settlement at Loodiana, within the British 
territory immediately south of the Sutlej. 

Meanwhile Runjeet Sing, who had succeeded in subduing most of the hill- 
chiefs on his northern frontiers, was meditating the conquest of Cashmere. At 
first, however, he underi’ated the difficulties, and after sustaining severe reverses, 
returned crest-fallen to Lahore. He was too cautious to* attempt prematurely 
to retrieve the disgrace, and therefore, having so far satisfied his vengeance by 
punishing some of the hill-chiefs who had abandoned him, he turned his arms 
in an opposite direction. In the beginning of 1816, having again mustered his 
forces, he proceeded south-west in the direction of Mooltan, which he had long 
been endeavouring to annex to his dominions. His first expedition was unsuc¬ 
cessful, but a second, undertaken in 1818, .was more fortunate, and the citadel, 
with an- immense booty, fell into his hands.' He was now in a condition to 
resume his designs on Cashmere, which he again invade# in 1819. He was 
greatly favoured by circumstances. Almost all the veteran Afghan troops 
were absent beyond tlie Indus, and he w.as opposed only by raw levies, which a 
single encounter sufficed to defeat and disperse. Cashmere with its celebrated 
valley thus became an integral portion of the Sikh monarchy. With his con¬ 
quests his ambition increased, and he began to look southward into Scinde, and 
westward beyond the Indus. In the latter direction Attock, which secured the 
passage of the river, was already in his power, and gave him ready access to 
the territory of Peshawer. As the Afghans, with whom he was about to engage 


■ Runjeet Slug was accustomed to wear tills diamond on his right arm, set, as we have engraved it, in 
gold, surrounded with small rabies. 



Chap. II.] 


EUNJEET SING. 


279 


in hostilities, were naturally brave, and had a high military reputation, Runjeet a.d. issi. 
Sing saw the necessity of still further improving the discipline of his own ^ 
troops, and therefere considered liimself fortunate when two French officers, European 
Ventura and Allard, unexpectedly made their appearance in his capital in quest 
of employment. They had both fought under Napoleon I. at Waterloo, the one 
as colonel of infantry, and the other as colonel of cavalry, and were thus well 
qualified to undertake the task which Runjeet Sing, after satisfying himself 
tliat they had no sinister objects in view, committed to them. Under their 
superintendence bodies of infantry and cavalry were fully initiated in the 
European discipline, and added greatly to the effective fqrce of the Sikh army. 

It was not however till the end of 1823 that Runjeet Sing marched across the 
Indus with the avowed design of making himself master of Peshawer. The 



SEniNAo™, the Cajutal of Caslimore.—From the Hon. C. 8. HnrUiiigo'a Hocollectious of Iiiilia. 


detestation in which the Mahometans and Sikhs hold each other’s tenets gave to Uunjeet 
the contest all the -fury of a- religious war, and though Runjeet Sing had chosen quiBition of 
his time well, and taken his enemies at a disadvantage, his conquest was not 
effected without severe loss. Even after he had made a triumphant entry into 
Peshawer, his difficulties seemed to increase. Wherever he moved his troops 
marauding parties kept hovering around him, cutting off his supplies and 
endangering his communications, and he was glad at last to enter into a com¬ 
promise, by which he left the country in po.ssession of its former chiefs, on their 
engaging to acknowledge, his supremacy and pay him tribute. On the whole 
he liad little cause to plume himself on the results of the expedition. A Maho¬ 
metan fanatic continued ever and anon to raise the religious war-cry, and 
during a series of struggles, only terminated by his death in 1831, made the 
possession of Peshawer by the Sikhs both expensive and precarious. Runjeet 
Sing had now extended his territories to the utmost limits which they were 
destined to attain. His ambition, it is true, was by no means satisfied. Often 




A.l). 1831. 


The baeSn of 
the Indue. 


niiawiiJiHior. 


Bclude. 


280 HISTOEY OF INDIA. [Book VIII. 

Lad lie turned with longing eyes to the south-west, and thought of penetrating 
to the delta of the Indus. He had even undertaken expeditions which had 
that object in view, but his presence there had been anticipated by the British, 
and when made aware that his further progress in that quarter might endanger 
his alliance with them, he was too prudent not to desist. AU the country 
between tlie Punjab and the sea, though not allowed to escape entirely from 
his encroachments, was thus considered independent, and must now be noticed 
as forming part of what was then the western boundary of British India. 

The Indus, after receiving the Punjnud, laden with the accumulated waters 
of the Jhelum, the Chenab, the Ravee, and the Garra or Sutlej, continues its 
course southward to the ocean in a comparatively narrow valley, which in 
respect both of its fertility, where natural or artificial irrigation is afibrded, 
and of the barren deserts which hem it in on either side, has been not inaptly 
compared to that of the Nile. This tract, though not of very great extent, 
furnishes more tlTau one separate sovereignty. The upper part, commencing 
on the left liank of the Indus, and continued, on quitting it, along the left 
banks of the Punjnud and Garra, belongs in sovoi’eignty toilie Khan of Bhawul- 
poor, who, alarmed like the Sikh chiefs on the left bank of the Sutlej at the 
progress of Runjeet Sing, gladly entered into an alliance with the British, 
which placed him beyond the reach of danger. All the tract to the south, 
forming wliat is properly called Scinde, after it had passed through the hands 
of various masters, w^as at last portioned out among a number of chiefs, known 
by the designation of the Ameers or rulers of Scinde. As early as the eighth 
centuiy it had been overnm by the Mahometans, and continued thereafter to 
be regarded as a dependency of Persia. The celebrated Mahmoud of Ghuznee 
included it among his conquests, and made it an integral portion of his kingdom 
of Cabool. On the fall of his dynasty it passed successively to the Sooraras, 
a race of Arab extraction who claimed absolute independence, and to the 
Soomas, a race of Hindoos who, less martial than their predecessors, bartered 
independence for security, and acknowledged the supremacy of the sovereigns 
of Delhi. Dxiring the reign of Akbar, Scinde, while nominally ruled by native 
princes, was to all intents a province of the Mogul empire. At a later period 
the Kaloras, a race of religious teachers who claimed descent from the Abasside 
caliphs, availed themselves of the influence which their supposed sanctity gave 
them, and usurped the government. Mahomed Shah of Delhi, as the only 
means of preserving their nominal dependence, recognized a Kalora of the name 
of Noor Mahomed as his vicegerent. The expedient, however, proved a failure, 
and the Kaloras had shaken off their allegiance when Nadir Shah made his 
celebrated expedition into India. For a short time they professed submission’ 
to the Persian conqueror. On his death they endeavoured to reassert their inde¬ 
pendence, but were only able to exchange the supremac}’’ of Persia for that of 
Afghanistan. 



<;hap. II.] 


EELATIONS WITH SC£NDE. 


281 


The connection thus formed with Afghanistan, though it was seldom more a.d. isos. 
than nominal, was never completely dissolved, and the rulers of Scinde did. not 
consider their title complete till it was formally recognized by the sovereigns of chansw of 
Cabool. Meanwhile great internal dissension prevailed. Not only was the regu- soiude. 
lar line of succession inteijupted by competing claims among the Kaloras them¬ 
selves, but various tribes from Beloochistan having obtained a permanent footing 
in the country, had begun to aspire to the government of it. After a long 
struggle, during which both parties were guilty of barbarous atrocities, the 
Belooches prevailed, and the Kaloras were supplanted by the Talpooras in 178C. 

Futteh Ali, the Talpoora chief by whom the revolution had been mainly effected, 
assumed the sovereignty, but was not long allowed to hold it imdisputed. The 
chiefs who had assisted him thought themselves entitled to a larger share of 
power and territory than he was willing to allot them, and the dispute was on 
the point of being decided by the sword, when the counsels of the elders, and 
the tears and entreaties of the women, prevailed in procuring ‘a peaceful airange- 
inent, by which, though Futteh Ali was still recognized, as the chief ruler, the 
whole country was divided into three independent districts. To Meer Sohral 
was assigned Khyrpoor in the north, and to his kinsman Meer Thara, Meerpoor 
in the south-east, while Futteh Ali seated himself at Hyderabad as the capital, 
and shared the sovereignty with his three brothers, Gholam Ali, Kureem Ali, 
and Moorad Ali. 

The British government, attacfiing an importance to the navigation of the 
Indus which was deemed extravagant by some of the ablest Indian statesmen, aiubbih of 
but which subsequent events have fully justified, had repeatedly attempted to 
form friendly relations with the court of Hyderabad. At an early period a com¬ 
mercial agent of the Company was allowed to reside and trade at Tatta, but 
was so much obstructed by the ruling authorities, and even subjected to popular 
violence, ft>r which no redress could be obtained, that the agency was with¬ 
drawn. This insulting and injurious treatment was owing to the jealous}' 
which the Ameers entertained of the British power, and a suspicion that, under 
the pretext of .commerce, ulterior designs of conquest might be concealed. No 
attempt, therefore, was made to renew friendly intercourse between the two 
governments till a greater fear than that of British encroachment induced the 
Ameers themselyes to apply for it. When threatened with an invasion from 
Cabool they had sought succour from Persia. It was readily granted, and a 
Persian army had been ordered to march to their assistance. Meanwhile the 
Cabool invasion had proved abortive, and the Ameers, now less afraid of it than 
of their Persian auxiliaries, thought it a good stroke of policy to seek the friend¬ 
ship of the British government as a means of frustrating the ambitious designs 
of Persia. An agent was accordingly despatched by them to Bombay with 
a proposal to renew the qommercitd intercourse which had formerly existed. 

Nothing seemed more desirable, and Captain Seton proceeded as envoy to 

Vot. III. JJ32 



A.D. 1809. 


Treaty wit)i 
the Ameem 
of Bcinde. 


Expedition 
up the 
Indue by 
Alexander 
Burnee. 


282 HISSOEY OF INDIA. [Book Till. 

HySerabad to complete the necessary arrangements. The negotiation soon 
assumed a more important form; and Captain Seton, instead of a commercial 
treaty, concluded a treaty of offensive and defensive alliance. In this he ex¬ 
ceeded his powers, and his government, not prepared to risk the entanglements 
in which such a treaty might involve them, refused .to ratify it. Ultimately, 
after many delays, Futteh Ali being now dead, a treaty was concluded with 
his three brothers above mentioned, on the 22d of August, 1809. It consisted 
only of four articles, which being very brief, may here be given entire:—“L 
There shall be eternal friendship between the British government and that of 
Scinde. 2. Enmity shall never appear between the two states. 3. The 
mutual despatch of the vakeels of both governments shall always continue. 
4. The government of Scinde will not allow the establishment of the tribe of 
the French in Scinde.” 

The last article of this treaty reminds us that it was made at the time when 
a French invasion of India, by an army brought overland through Turkey and 
Persia, was believed to be not only practicable but probable.. ■. As thi34ilaim 
soon passed away, the friendly relations which had been established with Scinde 
lost much of their supposed importance, and no further negotiations appear to 
have taken place till 1820, when the governor of Bombay, with the sanction of 
the supreme government, procured a renewal of the first treaty, with the 
addition of an article which bound the contracting parties to take vigorous 
measures to suppress the predatory hordes who were continually making in¬ 
roads and disturbing the tranquillity of the frontiers. A few years later, public 
attention having again been drawn to the navigation of the Indus, Lord Ellen- 
borough, then president of the Board of Control, resolved to take advantage of 
the transmission of a present of horses from the King of Great Britain to Ruiijeet 
Sing, to ascertain the navigable capabilities of the river. With this view the 
horses which had arrived at Bombay were to be conveyed to Lahore by water. 
This double task of conveying the present and making it at the same time 
subservient to a more important, though hidden purpose, was inti’usted to one 
well qualified to {terform it. This was Alexander Burnes, a Scotchman, who was 
bom at Montrose in 1805, and entered the Bombay army as a cadet at the age 
of sixteen. Instead of resting satisfied with the ordinary routine of military 
duty, he was a diligent student of the native language.s, and, made so much 
proficiency that government employed him as a Persian translator and inter¬ 
preter. To diligence as a student he added a great love of enterprise, and thus 
recommended himself to Sir John Malcolm, then governor of Bombay, as the 
best person who could be employed in conveying the present to Runjeet Sing. 
In fact he was already on the spot, having become political a-ssistant to Colonel 
(afterwards Sir Henry) Pottinger, the resident in Cutch, where the miasion 
was to have its rendezvous before starting for Lahoi^. 

Though there was nothing in the treaty with the Ameers binding them to 



Chap. II.] 


DELATIONS WITH "SCINDE. 


283 



permit such a mission to pass along the Indus, it was deemed politic to assume a.d. 1832 . 
that they would not object, or at all events to put it out of their power to ” 

start objections till the voyage had actually commenced. .Accordingly no ob»taci«ii 
communication was made on tlie subject to the government of Scinde, and uenten- 
Lieutenant Bumes, after entering the Indus with his fleet of boats, had reached 
the first inhabited town on its banks, before he forwarded his despatch^ to 
Hyderabad. It wsis no wonder that the 
Ameers took alarm when thus super¬ 
ciliously treated, and immediately sent 
an oflicer, with a small party of soldiers, 
to request Lieutenant Burnes to wait at 
the mouth of the river for further orders. 

He deemed it prudent to comply, and 
spent nearly six weeks in negotiation 
before he obtained permission to proceed. 

Even then so many obstacles were thrown 
in his way, that though he sailed again 
on the 10th of March, 1831, it was the 
18th of April before he reached Hydera¬ 
bad. All objections however had now 
disappeared, and the Ameens, as if con¬ 
scious that their previous opposition 
might be interpreted to their disadvan¬ 
tage, endeavoured to make amends by affording every requi.site facility; the 
navigation of the river itself presented few difficulties, and the flotilla con¬ 
tinuing to ascend to the junction of the Punjtiud successively entered that 
river, the Jhelum, and the Ravee, and on the 17th of July an-ived in safety 
amid great rejoicings at Lahore. 

The problem of the navigati<m of the Indus and its leading tributaries Newtreaty 

° ° witli tlu) 

having been in a manner solved, no time was lost in turning the knowledge Amee™. 
which had been acquired to account, and the Ameers appear to have thought 
that their worst fears were about to be realized, when in the beginning of 1832, 
tlie East India Company submitted to them a new treaty, containing clauses 
very different from those to which they had previously consented. The article 
to which the Company appeared to attach most importance, was that the river 
and roads of Scinde should be open to “the merchants and traders of Hindoostan," 
on payment of “certain proper and moderate duties,” to be afterwards fixed. 

The Ameers showed the greatest reluctance to conclude this treaty, and only 
consented at last, after stipulating that “no military stores” and “no armed 
vessels or boats shall come by the river,” and that “no Englishmen shall .be 
allowed to settle in Scinde.” They expressed their fears still more strongly and 
characteristically in the second article, which is verbatim as follows: “The two 


Sir Uknry PorriNciER. 
After % portrait by lawrenev. 



A.D. 18W. 


Relations 
with Persia. 


Pnrj^ort of 
treaties 
with Persia. 


28* IIISTOEY OF INDIA. -[Eoqk’VIII. 

contracting partiea bind themselves never to look with the eye of covetousness 
on the possessions of each other.” The commercial part of this treaty was 
renewed and made more explicit by another treaty, concluded in 183*, but the 
prohibition of armed vessels and of the transport of military* stores remained 
entire, and could not be violated without a gross breach of faith. 

^Tfiough commercial interests only were ostensibly consulted in the treaties 
relating to the navigation of the Indus,, there cannot be a doubt that political 
objects were also contemplated. The alarm of a French invasion of India had 
entirely passed away, hot another alarm had arisen. Russia was now the 
great bugbear.- In pui-suing her conquests beyond the Caucasus she had 
provoked a collision with Persia, and, as might have been anticipated, gained 
a series of victories, which had at once added greatly to her dominions and 
given her diplomacy a decided ascendency at the Persian court. Persia previous 
to this change in her political relations had been regarded by the British 
government as the strongest bai-ricr against the invasion of India by any Euro¬ 
pean power; .and under this conviction two treaties had been concluded, the 
one in 1809 and the other in 181*, both having it for their main object to 
secure India from European invasion. In the former treaty “ his majesty the 
King of Persia judges it nece.ssary to declare that from the date of these pre¬ 
liminary articles every treaty or agreement he may have made with any one 
of the powers of Europe becomes null and void, and that he -will not permit 
any European force whatever to pass through Persia, either towards India or 
towards the ports of that country.” In the latter treaty the same object was 
steadily kept in view, though, to meet the change of circumstances, the terms 
were so far altered that the Persian government, while binding themselves as 
before “not to allow any European army to enter the Persian territoiy, nor 
to proceed towards Indi<a,” limit tlie former declaration of nullity to “ all alli¬ 
ances contracted with European nations in a state of hostility with Great 
Britain.” 

At the dates of these treaties Afghani.stan, which, from its being interposed 
between Persia and India, was certainly the more natural barrier, appears to 
have been regarded as necessarily and irreconcileably oppo.sed to British interests; 
and hence, as if any idea of an alliance with it were too absurd to be entertained, 
the event of hostilities only was provided for. In the second treaty articles 
eighth and ninth stand as follows;—“Should the Afghans be at war with the 
British nation, his Persian majesty engages to send an army against them in such 
manner and of such force as may be concerted with the English government. 
The expenses of such an army shall be defrayed by the British government in 
such manner as may be agreed upon at the period of its being required.” “ If 
war should be declared between the Afghans and Persians, the English govern¬ 
ment shall not interfere with either party, unless their mediation to effect a peace 
shall be solicited by both parties.” At this time there was an apprehension 



Chap. Il.j 


RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN. 


285 


tliat the Afghans might themselves become aggressors and aspire to the conquest a.d. ism. 
of India; and the British government was so little aware of their utter inability 
to attempt or at least to succeed in such an enterprise, that it was not thought 
degrading to stipulate for foreign aid to assist them in repelling such an invasion. 

The Persian government, better informed as to the real state of the case, were 
contented with stipulating only for non-interference. 

Not long after the second treaty with Persia was signed, British statesmen Argimnistan 

, ^ ® .T« a >>amcr 

saw reason to change their views with regard to the relative iniport«ance of to India. 
Persia and Afghanistan as barriers of defence to India. Persia, brought as lias 
been told, into collision with Russia, proved totally incapable of maintaining 
her own ground, and was in consequence daily becoming more and more subject 
to Russian influence. So far was she therefore from having either the ability 
or the inclination to fulfil the conditions of the treaty and resist any European 
force which might threaten to march upon India, that she had been reduced to 
a kind of vassalage to the only power from which an attack on India could now 
be apprehended. Under these circumstances the idea of a Persian barrier of 
defence was necessarily abandoned, and no alternative remained but to fall 
liack on Afghanistan. For such a purpo.se no country could be better adapted. 

It consists for the most part of a bleak and rugged table-land, inclosed and 
traversed by mountain ranges, and intersected by deep and precipitous ravines, 
through one or other of which an invading army from the west must force its 
way in order to reach the plains of the Indus. To such a march, even unop- 
j'.osed, the physical obstacles were all but insurmountable; but when to these 
was added the hostility of a population proud of freedom, full of courage, and 
accustomed to war and pilhige as their daily occupation, the invasion of India 
by a forced passage through Afghanistan was an obvious impossibility. It is 
no doubt true that on more than one occasion conquering armies had marched 
from that quarter, but there is reason to believe that they never would have 
succeeded had they not previously purchased the aid or at least the forbearance 
of the mountain tribes commanding the passes. 

Assuming then that it was necessary to provide a western barrier to India, Treaty w-th 

^ tlieAfgluiiis. 

there can hardly be a doubt that it was to be sought for in Afghanistan, and 
that the only thing necessary to render it effectual was to secure the friendship 
of its rulers. In this however the great difficulty lay. The country, once 
governed as a united monarchy, had been broken up into a number of rival 
independencies, the heads of which, jealous of each other and pursuing separate 
interests, were little inclined to concur in any common course of action. As 
early as 1809, w'hen the Honourable Mountstuart Elphinstone proceeded on his 
celebrated embassy to Cabool, he found a civil war raging, and Shah Shujah, 
who was then nominal sovereign, engaged in a struggle which was to drive 
him into oxile. Singular as were the circumstances, a treaty was concluded, 
one of its articles declaring that “ friendship and union shall continue for ever 



A.D, 1816. 


Intcrnai 
condition of 
A%haniiitaii. 


Treacherous 
Attack on 
Herat. 


286 HISTOEY OF INDIA. [Book VIII. 

between the two states; the veil of separation shall be lifted up from between 
them, and they shall in no manner interfere in each other’s countries; and the 
King of Cabool shall permit no individual of the French to enter his territories." 
This treaty jiroved a dead letter ii^so far as British interests were concerned; 
but was fortunate for Shah Shujah, as it was doubtless one main cause of the 
asyhun which was afterwards given to him and his family within the British 
temtory at Loodiana. 

The throne of Cabool, when Shah Shujah was driven from it, was occupied 
by his brother Shah Mahmoud. The Dooranee tribe to which they belonged 
thus continued to be the ruling dynasty. In this respect, however, a change 
was about to take place. Shah Mahmoud had been mainly indebted for his 
success to the abilities of Futteh Khan* who stood at the head of the Barukzye 
tribe, only inferior in rank to the Dooranee, and was one of a family of twenty 
brotliei’s. Futteh Khan, well aware of the value of his services, did not 
allow them to be forgotten, find used his office of prime minister in such 
a manner as showed tliat lie was not to be satisfied until all the power of the 
govermnent was concentrated in his hands. Shah Mahmoud had no idea of 
ailowing himself to be thus reduced to a cipher, and watched for an opportunity 
of escaping from the yoke which the Barukzye chief had imposed upon him. 
The violent proceedings of Futteh Khan during an expedition to the frontiers 
of Peraia were made the pretext. The boundaries between the two countries 
were pot well defined, and encroachments from either side, followed by mutual 
recriminations and retaliations, repeatedly took place. Towards the end of 1816, 
shortly after Shah Shujah had resigned the contest for the crown and joined 
his family at Loodiana, Futteh Khan marched an army into Khorasan to repel 
and punish an invasion directed, or at least encouraged, by the Persian govern¬ 
ment. Brought by the expedition to the vicinity of Herat, which was then 
held nominally for Afghanistan by Ferooz-ood-Deen, Shah Mahmoud’s brother, 
he determined to seize it by treachery, and bring it completely under Barukzye 
influence. With this view he despatched his youngest brother Dost Mahomed, 
of whom more will be heard liereafter, to pay an apparently friendly visit to 
Herat, at the head of a small body of tried adherents. Meanwhile Futteh 
Khan arrived in the vicinity with his army, and was engaged in .conference 
with the leading chiefs, who had left the city as a deputation to wait upon him, 
when Dost Mahomed seized the opportunity to effect his purpose. Over¬ 
powering thoise of the garrison whom he had not been able previously to gain 
by bribery, he made the governor his prisoner, pillaged the treasury, and not 
satisfied with massacring all who offered resistance, was guilty of wanton and 
unmq,nly atrocities. 

It is not improbable that the attack on Herat was made with 'the sanction 
of Shall Mahmoud, who was anxious to displace his brother; but the general 
horror and disgust excited by the manner in which it had been effected made 



Chap. II.] 


COMMOTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN. 


287 


him disavow all connection with it, and gave him the means of escaping from a.d. isia. 
the thraldom of his minister. Dost Mahomed, the actual perpetrator, unable 
to maintain his ground in Herat, escaped to Cashmere. Futteh Khan, either Barbarities 
too confident of his power, "or conscious that he could clear hims§lf from all share Futteii 
in the atrocities perpetrated by his brother, was thrown off’ his guard, and was 
only returning from the expedition when he found himself a prisoner in the 
hands of his most inveterate enemy. Tliis was Prince Kamran, the heir- 
apparent to the throne, yrho lost no time in becoming himself the executioner 
of vengeance, by putting out Futteh Khan's eyes with the point of liis dagger. 

This was only the first in the series of barbarities about to be inflicted on 
him. His brothers had all fled, and it was thought possible that as the loss 
of his eye-sight had terminated his own career, he might be induced to use his 
influence with them, and recommend their unqualified submission. His spirit; 
however, was unbroken, and he steadily refused everything that was asked of 
him. It now only remained for his enemies to do their worst, and he was 
brought into a tent, where, in presence of Shah Mahmoud and his son, he was 
literally cut to pieces, not by a sudden onset, but by successive mutilations, 
slowly and deliberately perpetrated by the most vindictive of his enemies, one 
cutting off his right ear, and at the same time taunting him with some real or 
imaginary liffencc, of which it was declared to be the punishment, another his 
left ear, another his nose. With the same horrid barbarity his arms and 
feet were severed from his body, till sfl; last the finishing stroke was given by 
drawing a sabre across his throat. 

It is almost needless to say that this frightful crime was not ponnitted to a»cce«s«w 
escape the vengeance which it provoked. The Barukzye brothers at once mus- uamkzyw. 
tered their forces, and after a series of encounters, obliged Shah Mahmoud and 
Prince Kamran to abandon all their other territories and take refuge in Herat. 

This was now the only stronghold that remained to them, while the Barukzyes 
no longer making any profession of allegiance to the Sudozye dynasty, broke 
up the monarchy into fragments, and began to rule as independent sovereigns. 

Had they remained united they might have defied any force that could have 
been brought against them, but their mutual ambition soon gave rise to com¬ 
peting claims which could not be settled without an appeal to aims. In the 
division of the monarchy Azim Khan retained possessioji of Cashmere, of which 
he had for some time been governor; Shere Dil Khan seated himself at Canda- 
har; and Dost Mahomed Khan, having as much by treachery as by skill and 
prowess captured Cabool, claimed it as his own by right of conquest. The 
division which circumstances rather than choice had thus made between the 
Barukzye brothers could scarcely be regarded as equitable. Azim Khan, who, 
as the eldest* surviving brother, was the proper representative of the family, 
refused to rest satisfied with a disturbed province, while €)ost Mahomed, who 
Was not only the youngest of the family, but in consequence of the low birth 



288 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book VIII. 


AD. 1818. 


DiaaeziBions 
among tlio 
Barukzy(». 


Sbuii 

Mahmoud’s 

abortive 

expedition 

agaiiiHt 

Oabool. 


Ilostilities 
between the 
Barukzyes 
and 8Lkhs. 


of his motlier had with difficulty been recognized as a member-of it, occupied 
the capital. In these circumstances there could be little unanimity betweeil 
the brothers, though it was f@reseen that their dissensions would-make it 
almost impossible for them to maintain the ascendency which they had 
usurped. Indeed, they appear to have abandoned the idea of independence; for 
Dost Mahomed, when threatened with expulsion from the capital, endeavoured 
to secure himself by a nominal restoration of the Sudozye dynasty, in the 
person of Sultan Ali; and Azim Khan, when preparing.to march from Cashmere, 
made an offer of the crown to Shah .Shujah, who could not resist the tempta¬ 
tion, and set out in 1818 to try his fortune once more in Afghanistan. In con¬ 
sequence of all these competing claims the country was thrown into a state of 
anarchy, and it was some time before anything like regular government could 
be re-established. 

The usual bad fortune of Shah Shujah attended him. He had scarcely 
joined Azim Khan with such troops as he could raise, than a quarrel ensued, 
and he was again compelled to save himself by flight. Azim Khan imme¬ 
diately set up another puppet Sudozye sovereign in the person of Prince Ayoot, 
and continued his march on Cabool. Meanwhile, Dost Mahomed was threatened 
with a still more formidable danger from another quarter. The dissensions of 
the Barukzyes had not been lost upon Shah Malimoud, who had left Herat at 
the head of an army, and was advancing in the hope of regaining the scapital. 
To ail appearance he was destined to succeed. Dost Mahomed, threatened by 
two aimies, either of which was more than a match for all the troops he could 
muster, had abandoned all hope of resistance, and only waited the nearer 
approach of the enemy to commence his flight, when he was surprised and 
delighted to learn that it had become unnecessary. Shah Mahmoud when six 
miles off Cabool discovered or suspected an extensive conspiracy to betray him, 
and listening only to his' fears hastened back to Herat. The Barukzye brothers, 
now convinced that their continued hostilities could only issue in their destruc¬ 
tion, came to terms, and a new division was made, by which, under the nominal 
sovereignty of Ayoot, Azim Khan as his prime minister took possession of 
Cabool, Dost Mahomed retired to Ghuznee, Shere Dil Khan remained at Can- 
dahar, and Sultan Mahomed, another of the brothers, was put in possession of 
Peshawer. 

During the apparent tranquillity obtained by this arrangement Azim Khan 
engaged in hostilities with the Sikhs. Kunjeet Sing had made himself master 
of Cashmere, and entered into an arrangement by which, while he left it nomi¬ 
nally independent, he became virtual sovereign of Peshawer. To repel and 
punish these aggressions Azim Khan mustered a large force and commenced 
his march. Had the issue depended on military prowess it is probable that he 
would have succeeded; but Runjeet Sing instead of %hting had recourse to a 
weapon which had seldom failed him, and so dexterously availed himself of the 



Cbaf. II.] 


EELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN.* 


289 


jealousies and heart-burnings which he knew to be still at work in the breasts a.d. iszs. 
of the Barukzye confederates, that Azim Khan, when he was pluming himself 
with the hope of victory, saw his force suddenly melt away. Tlie disa 2 )point- 
ment was greater than he was able to bear, and shortly aftei’wards, in 1823, he 
died of a broken heart. 

Prince Ayoot was still the nominal sovereign of Cabool, but in the confu- Troubled 
sion occasioned by Azim Khan’s death, he was easily set aside, and the*contest ghouietau. 
for supremacy was once more renewed among the Barukzye chiefs. Habib- 
oolah Khan, Azim Khan’s eldest son, was at first acknowledged as his successor, 
but he had none of his father’s talents, and soon made himself contemptible by 
a life of dissipation; and by tyranny and caprice alienated those who were best 
able and were most disposed to befriend him. Dost Mahomed, who had jilayed 
a leading part in the treachery which proved fatal to Azim Khan, Avas the first to 



The Bala IIissar, Cabool.-- From Sale’s Defence of Jolalabjul. 


take advantage of the worthlessness of his son, and after succeeding in inducing 
his troops to abandon him in the open field, compelled him to shut himself uji 
within the Bala Hissar or citadel of Cabool. Here his resistance must have 
been of short duration had Dost Mahomed been left to deal with him in his 
own way. This, however, the other Barukzye chiefs would not pei-mit, and 
Dost Mahomed, at the very moment when he thought himself sure of the prize, 
not only saw it elude his giasp, but was obliged to save himself by flight. The 
Candahar and Peshawer chiefs, who had on this occasion made common cause, 
were now masters of Cabool, while Dost Mahomed was a fugitive in Kohistan. 

After another season of anarchy a truce was agreed to, Shere Dil Khan and HoUowtruce 
Dost Mahomed returning respectively to Candahar and Ghuznee, while Sultan nosT^d 
Mahomed, resigning Peshawer to some other brothers who held it in common 
with him, became sovereign of Cabool. The truce had been hollow at first, and 


290 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book Vnl. 


A.D. 18!)3. 


Rnpturo uf 
the tmoo. 


Treaty bo- 
twodit Blmh 
Bhiijah and 

Siug. 


was ere long succeeded by another rupture. Shere Dil Khan died at Candahar, 
and the temporary arrangement which he had been mainly instrumental in 
effecting was immediately broken up. Dost Mahomed renewed his claims on 
Cabool, and Sultan Mahomed, afraid to encounter him, consented to resume his 
former j)osition at Peshawer. This event, which took place in 1826, though it did 
not formally settle the question of supremacy between the Barukzye brothers, 
virtually gave it to Dost Mahomed. By leaving him in possession of the 
capital it j)rocured for him a general recognition, as sovereign of Afghanistan. 
For several years his title remained undisputed, and it rather appears that he 
proved himself by Ida conduct not unworthy of it. While endeavouring to 
establish order in the government he was not forgetful of his own personal 
deficieneies, and by diligence and perseverance both remedied his neglected 
education, and rid himself of not a few of the vicious habits which he had con¬ 
tracted in earlier life. As far as was practicable among a rude and turbulent 
population, justice was fairly administered, the weak were protected against 
the strong, and real grievances were carefully redressed. In following out this 
procedure it was often necessary to use the strong arm, and no small discontent 
was produced among those who, having been accustomed to practise oppression, 
thought themselves defrauded of their privileges when they were compelled to 
desist from it. The old Dooranee chiefs in particular, who, under the Sudozye 
dynasty, had in a great measure monopolized all the powers of government, 
were indignant at being curbed by an upstart imler, and gave such decided 
evidence of their readiness to conspire against him, that they were not only 
regarded with disfavour, but not unfrequently treated with a severity which 
was neither necessary nor politic. The design obviously was to crush their 
spirit and cm'tail their power, so as to render them less capable of mischief In 
this Dost Mahomed was not very successful, and hence he had always in the 
very heaii of his dominions a powerful party ready to break out in rebellion 
the moment a hopeful leader should appear. 

This state of feeling in Afghanistan was well known to Shah Shujah, and 
led him to cherish a hope that, notwithstanding his repeated failures, he would 
yet be able to recover the throne of Cabool. The treatment which he had 
received from Runjeet Sing must have left little inclination again to court an 
alliance with him, but his chcumstances did not allow him to be fastidious, and 
he therefore opened a negotiation with the ruler of Lahore. His proposals 
were readily entertained, but when the terms came to be more fully discussed, 
the sacrifices demanded in retmii for promised assistance were so exorbitant 
that Shah Shujah, helpless as he was, positively rejected some of them, and 
hesitsited long before consenting to the remainder. At last, in March, 1833, a 
treaty was concluded by which the Maharajah (Runjeet Sing), in return for a 
vague promise to “furnish the Shah, when required, with an auxiliary foi’ce 
com[x>sed of Mahometans, and commanded by one of his principal officers as 



Chap.II.] relations WITH AFGHANISTAN. 291 

far as Cabool,” was confirmed in the possession of Cashmere, Peshawer, and 
all the other territories lying on either bank of the Indus, which he had suc¬ 
ceeded in wresting from the Afghans. After entering into this treaty Runjeet 
Sing showed no inclination to perform his obligation under it. Shah Shujah 
waited in vain for the auxiliary force, and being at last thrown entirely on his 
own resources, endeavoured to raise two or tliree lacs of rupees by pledging his 
jewels. Even this was attended with much difficulty, and he endeavoured to 
secure the co-operation of the British government. Here, however, from what 
he had previously learned, he had little to hope, and therefore, however much 
he may have been mortified, he could not have been greatly sui-prised when, in 
answer to his application. Lord William Bentinck, then governor-general, replied 
as follows; “My friend, I deem it my duty to apprise you distinctly that the 
British government religiously abstains from intermeddling with the affairs of 
its neighbours when this can be avoided. Your majesty is of course master of 
your own actions; but to afford you assistance for the purpose which you have 
in contemplation, would not consist with that neutrality which on such occa¬ 
sions is the rule of guidance adopted by the British government.” 

In the face of all these discouragements Shah Shujah determined to persevere. 
With a small body of troops, and a treasure chest, which would have been 
almost empty had it not been partially replenished with a sum which Lord 
William Bentinck, rather inconsistently with the above profession of nexitrality, 
allowed him to draw as a four months’ advance of his Loodiana pension, ho 
proceeded southward in the direction of Shikarpoor, in order to profit by the 
as.sistance which the Ameers of Scinde had promised him. His subsequent 
adventures, how he quarrelled with the Ameers and defeated them, and how, 
after making his way to Candahar, he was himself defeated in 1834, an<l 
obliged to return as a fugitive to his asylum at Loodiana, having already been 
referred to among the memorable events which took place in India during Lord 
William Bentinck’s administration, need not be again detailed. While Shah 
Shujah was making his attempt in Afghanistan, Runjeet Sing had despatched a 
body of 9000 men in the direction of Peshawer. As his treaty with Shall 
Shujah had been kept secret it was easy for him to disguise his real object, and 
Siiltan Mahomed, the Barukzye chief, who had consented to hold Peshawer as 
a tributary of the Sikhs, on being assured that nothing more was intended 
than to levy the promised tribute, was thrown so completely off his guard, 
that the true character of his pretended friends was not made manifest to him 
till the city was in their hands, and he had no alternative but to save himself 
by an ignominious flight. 

Dost Mahomed, equally exasperated by the mismanagement of his brother 
and the treachery of Runjeet Sing, had no sooner returned from the defeat of 
Shah Shujah than he prepared to attempt the reconquest of Peshawer. His 
hopes of success rested mainly on the fiyiatical spirit of his countrymen, who. 


A.n. 1834. 


Treaty be¬ 
tween Sliah 
8huj^ and 
Knnjeet 
Sing. 


Tl»« 

titakcH him* 
«cl r Tnnst.er 
tifPcHhawer. 



A.D. 1837. 


IkHt 

Mahomed's 
attempt to 
recover 
Peshawer. 


Ca\i8es of it» 
failure. 


The Af^hati 
camp com* 
pletoly 
desertoil. 


292 HISTOEY OF INDIA, ’ [Book VUI.' 

as Mahometatis, held the Sikhs and the religion which they professed in utter 
detestation. To give effect to this feeling, a religious war was proclaimed, an'd 
thcuisauds and tens of thousands, many of them from distant mountain tribes, 
flocked to the .standard which Dost Mahomed had raised, under the assumed 
title of Commander of tlie Faithful Tliis host, estimated merel}’^ by its numbers, 
was overpowering, but besides its want of discipline, which would have made 
it incapable of resisting such regular troops as the Sikhs had now become under 
the training of French officers, it was headed by leaders who had no common 
interest, and were openly or secretly at enmity with each other. It was indeed 
the very kind of army which no man knew better than Eunjeet Sing how to 
defeat without the necessity of fighting with it. Pretending a desire to nego¬ 
tiate, he despatched an envoy to the Afghan camp. The nature of the instruc¬ 
tions he had received may be gathered from the account which he afterwards 
gave of his ijroccedings; “1 was despatched by the prince as ambassador to 
the Ameer. I divided his brothers against him, exciting their jealousy of his 
growing power, and exasperating the family feuds with which, from my previous 
ac<iuaintance, I was familiar, and stirred up the feudal lords of his durbar with 
the i)rosjjects of pecuniary advantages. I induced his brother Sultan Mahomed 
Khan, the lately deposed chief of Peshawer, with 10,000 retainers, to withdraw 
suddenly from his camp about nightfall. The chief accompanied me towards 
the Sikh cami), w-hilst his followers fled to their mountain fastnesses. So large 
a body retiring from the Ameer’s control, in opposition to his will, and without 
previous intimation, threw the general camp into inextricable confusion, which 
terminated in the clandestine rout of his forces without beat of drum, or sound 
of bugle, or the trumpet’s blast, in the quiet stillness of midnight.” 

The above account given by the envoy, an English adventurer of dubious 
antecedents, and evidently also of blunted moral perceptions, is probably too 
laboured and rhetorical to be strictly accurate, but there can be no doubt as to 
the result. On the previous evening the Afghan camp contsiined .50,000 men 
and 10,000 horse ; at daybreak not a vestige of it was seen. Dost Mahomed 
miido good his retreat to Cabool, and felt so disgusted and ashamed, both at the 
disaster which had befallen him and the mode of effecting it, that he seemed 
willing for a time to abandon war and devote himself to peaceful pursuits. But 
the choice was not given him. Sultan Mahomed, now openly leagued with the 
Siklrs, was meditating an attack on Cabool. As the most effectual means of 
frustrating this design. Dost Mahomed in 18.37 despatched a force under the 
command of his two sons, Afzul Khan and Akbar Khan, to penetrate through 
the Khyber Pass, and take up a position so as to command the entrance to it 
from the east. In the execution of these orders they advanced as far as Jum- 
rood, which is only about twelve miles west of Peshawer, and immediately laid 
siege to it. A Sikh force under Huree Sing, Eunjeet Sing’s favourite general, 
advanced to its relief, and an encounter took place. The result was that the 



Chap. IT.] RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN.' 293 

Sikhs, after losing their general, who was killed on the spot, and* sustaining a.d. issr. 
severe loss, were obliged to retire and encamp under the walls of Jumrood. 

The young Afghan chiefs, proud of their acliievement, were for pushing on,, to 
Peshawer, but their impetuosity, which might have cost them dear, was checked rfest Ma- 
by the caution of a veteran officer who had accompanied them, and they mm. 
returned to Cabool to celebrate their succes.9, which fame had magnified into a 
victory. Dost Mahomed, though gratified above measure by the success of his 
sons, was not blinded as to the increasing difficulties of his position. The Sikhs 
were evidently bent on new encroachments; the Sudozye dynasty, still in 
possession of Surat, was only watching an opportunity to march again upon 



Surat. - From Mi*b Young’s '* Mo<dem Noblo.” 


Cabool; Shah Shujah, too, after all his discomfitures, was still sanguine enough 
to hope for success; and treachery from within was continually threatening 
new revolutions. How were all these dangers to be met? The only plau.sible 
answer which Dost Mahomed could give was that he ought tt) endeavour to 
secure himself by a foreign alliance. Here there was not much room for choice. 

The only governments which seemed capable of giving him effectual support 
were the Persian on the west, and the British on the east. It was doubtful 
however if either the one or the other would be willing to afford it. The Shah n<>«t mh- 
«t lersia wjis actually threatening Hemt, and so far might be regarded as bious iioiicy, 
making common cause with Do.st Mahomed, by attacking one of his most 
formidable rivals; but it was well known that the Shah’s ambition canied him 
far beyond Herat, and that he meditated the conquest of it merely as prelimi¬ 
nary to that of the whole of Afghanistan. There was therefore more cause to 
fear than to court him. On the other hand, an application to the British gov¬ 
ernment was far from hopeful. Shah Shujah was living as a pensioner withjn 
the British territory, and had lately received prepayment of his pension, and 
been permitted to depart at the head of a body of troops for the avowed purpose 




294 


HISTOEY OF INDIA. 


[Book VIII, 


A.D. 1834. 


Aacendenoy 
of ItlUffijil 

^ at PeraiuM 
court. 


The Sliah'H 
attempt on 
Herat. 


of fighting' his way to the crown of Cabool. What reason was there, then, to 
expect that any offer of alliance which Dost Mahomed could make would tempt 
the British government to pursue a different line of policy? Thus doubtful as 
to the success of any application for aid, he adopted the course which seemed to 
give him the best chance of success, and made friendly overtures to both gov- 
emmenta 

By the subsisting treaties with Persia, the British government was bound, 
in the event of war arising between the Persians and Afghans, to maintain a 
strict neutrality, and not interfere in any way unless to mediate on the mutual 
request of both combatants. Subsequently when Russia had extended her 
conquests into Persia, and was threatening in fact to convert it into a Russian 
province, the policy which dictated the above neutrality ceased to be applicable 
to the actual circumstances. An extension of Persian was now considered-to be 
only another name for an extension of Russian territory, and therefore, so far 
from being disposed to fulfil the obligation of neutrality, it had become a vital 
object with the British government to provide for the security of their Indian 
frontier by maintaining the integrity of Afghanistan. In consequence of this 
altered policy, a collision with Persia became imminent. Abbas Meerza, the 
heir-apparent to the Persian throne, after his disastrous campaigns against the 
Russians had convinced him of his utter inability to cope with them, was 
anxious to tuim his arms in some other direction where he might be able with 
leas risk to make new conquests that might in some measure compensate for 
recent losses. This ambition was naturally encouraged by Russian diplomatists, 
who saw how it might be made subservient to the views of their own govern¬ 
ment. For a time his choice of a field of enterprise alternated between Khiva 
and Herat. The latter was at last preferred, and in 1833 Mahomed Meerza, 
Abbas Meerza’s eldest son, set out at the head of an army intended to capture 
Herat, which was regarded as the key of India, and thereafter extend its con¬ 
quests still farther to the eastward. 

This attempt ui)on Herat gave great uneasiness to the British government, 
and was made the subject of strong remonstrance by its ambassador at the 
Persian court, but as Russian influence was now completely in the ascendant 
the expedition was persisted in, and the siege of Herat actually commenced. 
Before much ])rogress was made, an event took place which brought it abruptly 
to a close. Abbas Meerza died at Meshed, and Mahomed Meerza, fearing that 
his prospects of succeeding to the throne might in consequence be endangered, 
hastened back with his army, and succeeded in obtaining his nomination as 
heir. He had not long to wait for- the succession, for his grandfather Futteh 
Ali, the reigning sovereign, died in the atitumn of 1834, and left him in undis¬ 
puted possession of the throne, which he ascended under the title of Mahomed 
Shah. Though circumstances had obliged him to raise the siege of Herat, 
the hope) of conquering it had never been abandoned, and therefore a new 



Chap. II.] 


EEliATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN. 


2D5 


expedition was soon meditated. The capture of Herat was only to pave the a d. isse. 
way for other conquests, and Candahar, Ghuznee, and Cabool were to be 
successively attacked. Of these ambitious designs the Shah made no secret. Designs of 

. ^ Pertiaon 

They were openly talked of in Ins council, and it was even hinted tliat Persian Hemt, 
sway might again be extended as far eastward as Nadir Shah had earned it. 

It was well known that in the schemes of conquest which the Shah was thus 
meditating, he was encouraged by Russian diplomatists, and therefore the 
British government deemed it high time to intei-pose, both by remonstrance 
and menace. In 1835 Mr. Ellis, the British ambassador, was instructed by 
Lord Palmerston, “especially to warn the Persian government against allowing 
themselves to be pushed on to make war against the Afghans.” He obeyed 
his instructions, but was scarcely listened to. The Shall was determined to 
take his own way, and pointing to the terms of the subsisting treaty, had little 
difficulty in showing that the British were bound not to interfere with him. 

The intention to resume the expedition against Herat was distinctly avowed, 
and even the necessary preparations began to be made. 

Such was the state of matters when Lord Auckland became governor-general. Dora Anck 
He had entered on his administration under a pledge, voluntarily given, that 
he would pursue a pacific policy, and there was as yet no reason to apprehend, 
notwithstanding some tlireatening appearances, that he would be tempted to 
abandon it. In 1836 Dost Mahomed, in addressing a letter of congratulation to 
the new governor-genei’al, took occasion to express his earne.st desire to enter 
into intimate relations with the British government. After refen’ing to late 
transactions, and to the injuries which the Afghans had sustained from the 
treachery of the “reckless and misguided Sikh.s,” he continued thus: “Communi¬ 
cate to me whatever may suggest itself to your wisdom for the settlement of the 
affairs of this country, that it may serve as a rule for my guidance;” adding, “I 
hoj)o that your lordship will consider me and my country as your own.” This 
language, though certainly not intended to be interpreted literally, strongly 
evinced the anxiety of Dost Mahomed for a Briti,sli alliance, and his willingne.s3 
to make great sacrifices in order to obtain it; but Lord Auckland, instead of 
listening to his overtures, replied nearly in the very terms used by Lord William 
Bentinck to Shah Shujah. “ My friend, you are aware that it is not the 
jnactice of the British government to interfere with the affairs of other 
independent states.” Turning aside therefore from politics, after simply 
expressing a wish that the Afghans “should be a flourishing and united nation,” 
he spoke of the navigation of the Indus, and intimated his intention to depute 
some gentlemen to Cabool to confer on commercial topics. 

Though Lord Auckland was not at this time prepared to make any political 
use of Dost Mahomed’s overtures, he had begun to be apprehensive that his 
administration would not prove so peaceful as he had hoped. Writing Sir Charles 
Metcalfe in September, 1836, he says, “I share with you the apprehension of 



296 


HISTOEY OF INDIA. 


[Book .Vllt. 


A.D. 1836. 


Difficulty 
experienced 
by I^rd ’ 
Auckland 
in coriying 
out a pacific 
policy. 


Travels of 
Alexander 
Burncs hi 
Ceiitml 
Ania. 


our being at no distant date involved in political and possibly military opera¬ 
tions upon our western frontier: and even since I have been here, more than 
one event has occurred, which has led me to think that the period of disturbance 
is nearer than I had either wished or expected. The constitutional restlessness 
of the old man of Lahore seems to increase with his age. His growing appetite 
for the treasures and jungles of Scinde; the obvious impolicy of allowing him 
to extend his dominions in that direction; the importance which is attached 
to the free navigation of the Indus, most justly, 1 think, and yet perhafis 
with some exaggeration, from its value not having been tried; the advance 
of the Persians towards Herat, and the link which may in consequence be 
formed between Indian and European politics—^atl lead me to fear, that the 
wish which I have had to confine my administration to objects of commerce 
and finance, and improved institutions and domestic policy, will be far indeed 
from being accomplished. But, as you say, we must fulfil our destiny.’' These 
apprehensions, however, were still too vague to have produced any decided 
change in his measures, and in a despatch dated as late as 20th Se])tember, 1837, 
the directors, who had never dreamed of his abandoning a pacific policy, thus 
complimented him: “With respect to the states west of the Indus, you have 
uniformly observed the proper course, which is to have no political connection 
with any state or party in those regions, to take no part in their quarrels, but 
to maintain as far Jis possible a friendly connection with all of them.” When 
this despatch was written, the policy which it lauded had been virtually, and 
was soon to be practically abandoned. 

The commercial deputation, hinted at by Lord Auckland in his letter to 
Dost Mahomed, had not been forgotten* At its head was placed Alexander 
Bumos, who, subsequently to his arrival at Lahore with the present to Runjeet 
Sing, had earned new claims to the appointment. After repairing to Simla, 
and there reporting the result of his mission to Lord William Bentinck, he had 
made a long and perilous journey into Central Asia. Proceeding acro^ the 
Punjab, and thence through Pe.shawer and Jelalabad to Cabool, Avhere he 
spent a short time enjoying the hospitality of Dost Mahomed, he ascended the 
lofty mountain range of Hindoo-Koosh, entered the valley of the Oxus, and 
arrived at Bokhara. After remaining here two months he turned westward, 
passed the Persian frontiex’, visited the capital and several of the leading cities 
of that kingdom, and at last sailed from Bushire to Bombay. The govei'nor- 
general having now returned to Calcutta, Burnes hastened thither to give the 
results of his observations. These seemed so important, that he was desired to 
embai;k for England, and communicate personally with the home authorities. 
The attention which he thus attracted was greatly increased by the book of 
travels which he published, and when the commercial mission began to be 
talked of, there was scarcely any doubt as to whom it ought to be intrusted. 

Bumes returned to India in 1835, and while on a mission to the Ameers 



Chap. II.] 


MISSION OF ME. BUENES. 


297 


of Scinde, he was informed of the' intention of Lord Auckland to send liim a.d issr. 
to Afghanistan, and directed to proceed to Bombay to make the necessary 
] (reparations. These being completed he again took the route by Scinde, Mr. BnmeB' 

pushed on to Peshawer, and proceeding through the Khyber Pass, reached caboo" 
Cabool towai'ds the end of September, 1837. The instructions given him were 
entirely of a commercial character. He had been selected, as a letter from Mr. 
Macnaghten, then secretary to the government, informed him, “to conduct a 
commercial mission to the countries bordering on the Indus, with a view to 
complete the re-opening of the navigation of that liver, on the basis of the 
treaties lately concluded with the powers pos.sessing territory on its banks." 

With tliis view he was first to proceed to the court of the Ameers of Scinde, 
and having made the desired airangements with them at Hyderabad, sail up 
the river, first to Khyrpoor, and then to Mittun-Kote. Here he was to be 
met by Captain Wade, Lieutenant Makison, and an agent from Runjeet Sing, and 
select with them the best place “for the establishment of a mart or entrepot, 

* * ltd OHtOIlSi- 

with reference to .all the branches of trade proceeding down or across the Indus, weobjoct. 
and the means best suited for the establishment of an annual fair." At 
Peshawer and Cabool he was to “make inquiry into the present state of the 
commerce of those countries,” “inform the merchants of the measures concerted," 
encourage them by all means “to conduct their trade by the new route,” and 
invite them “to resort to the contemplated entrepbt and fair.” After quitting 
(-abool he was to visit Candahar, keeping the above objects still in view, and 
finally return to Hj'^derabad by the route of the Bolan Pass and Shikarpoor. 

In conclusion he was requested to “have a strict regard to economy” in all his 
arrangements, which he would easily be able to do, “ as parade would be 
unsuitable to the ch.aracter of a commercial mission.” The commercial char¬ 
acter thus "studiously enforced in Mr. Macnaghten's instructions was also the 
only subject of the letter which Burnes was commissioned to deliver from the 
governor-general to Dost Mahomed, whom it thus imloctrinates in politic<al 
economy:—“To your enlightened mind it cannot fail to be obvious that com¬ 
merce is the basis of all national prosperity, and that it is commerce alone 
which enables the people of one country to exch.ange its supei-fluous commodities 
for those of another, to accumulate wealth, and to enjoy all the comforts and 
blessings of civilized life. The general diffusion of these blessings and comforts 
•\mong neighbouring nations is the grand objec“t of the British goverrunent. 

It seeks for itself no exclusive benefits; but it ardently desires to secure the 
establishment of peace and prosperity in all the countries of Asia.” 

'Though nothing could be more palpable than the strictly commercial 
character given to the mission, it is very doubtful if either Dost Mahomed or 
Mr. Bumes understood that it was to be so interpreted. In a private letter 
explaining the object of his mission to a friend, the latter says:—“ I came to 
look after commerce, to superintend surveys, and examine passes of mountains, 

Vot. rri. 284 



298 


HISTORY OF INDIA, 


[Book VIII. 



A.D. 1887. and likewise, certainly, J;o see into affairs, and judge of what was to be done 
hereafter.” As there is nothing of this in the formal instructions given him, it 

Mr. Bumes’ [g reasonable to presume that some latitude had been allowed him, and that 

miMion a •• a i • -a* 

political ono. the name of commerce was meant to cover much more than it truly signifies. 

But for some such understanding nothing 
could have been more preposterous than 
some expressions which occur in the very 
first letter which ho addressed to the 
government secretary at Calcutta It 
was written on the fourth day after his 
arrival, and concludes thus:—^‘TJp to 
this time my communications with the 
Ameer have been confined to matters of 
compliment and ceremony, but I shall 
take an early opportunity of reporting 
on what transpires at this court, merely 
observing at present, from what I have 
seen and heard, that I have good reason 
to believe Dost Mahomed Khan will 
set forth no extravagant pretensions, and 
act in such a manner as will enable the 
British government to show its interest 
in its behalf, and at the same time preserve for us the valued friendship of the 
Sikh chief.” The political diplomatist is here clearly revealed, while the. 
reception given him by Dost Mahomed shows that he regarded him in the very 
same light. Had it been supposed that he had come merely to treat of com- 

ni9 reoop- merce, would the Ameer's favourite son, Akbar Khan, been sent out to conduct 

tion by Bust .... 

MttJiojiieo. him into the city “with great demonstrations of respect and joy;” and would 
the Ameer himself, when Bumes on the following day delivered his letter of cre¬ 
dentials, have received the deputation “in a very flattering manner, with many 
expressions of his high sense of the great honour which had been conferred on 
him, and his at last having had the means of communication with an officer 
of the British government, for which he felt deeply grateful to the governor- 
general?” Such is the account given in the letter already mentioned, and it is 
impossible to read it without feeling convinced that both the Ameer and the 
British envoy were under the impression that they were about to discuss ques¬ 
tions of a more interesting and vital nature than those of commerce. 

The first interview, at which the Ameer allowed only Akbar Khan to be 
presefit, took place in the “interior of the harem," and “lasted till midnight.” 
Bumes in accordance with the letter of his instructions opened with commerce, 
and dwelt on the advantages to be derived from throwing open the navigation 
of the Indus and the trade of Afghanistan. The Ameer listened with apparent 


SlB Adexandbr Bdhnes. 
From A portraUt by D. AIauli«>, II A. 



Chap. II.] 


MISSION OF MB. BUBNES. 


29£f 


interest, but another subject was occupying his thoughta Unshackled com- a.». isarl 
merce might doubtless in the long run prove a great source of wealth, but how 
was he to act in the meantime? The Sikhs had'involved him in an expensive Mr. Bnme«- 
war, and treacherously dismembered the Afghan monarchy by seizing upon vtew 
Peshawer. While thus involved in war, and crippled in his resources, he had 
no alternative but to raise a revenue by any means, however injudicious in 
themselves, which promised to be most effectual; and therefore it was impos¬ 
sible for him, tiU placed in better circumstances, to lighten the burdens under 
which commerce was said to be suffering. The object of the Ameer evidently 
was to ascertain whether there was any hope that the British would assist him 
in obtaining the restoration of Peshawer, or mediate between him and Runjeet 
Sing, for the purpose of preventing future encroachments and securing a 
lasting peace. In regard to the former alternative Burnes could not hold out 
any hopes, Runjeet Sing was an ancient and valued ally of the British gov¬ 
ernment, and therefore, if anything was to be done in regard to Peshawer, it 
could only be in the way of friendly advice. Such being the case, the true 
policy of Dost Mahomed would be to abandon all idea of a conflict, to which 
his resources were inadequate, and think only of a peaceful arrangement. The 
Ameer at once assented, and went so far as to add, that “instead of renewing 
the conflict it would be a source of real gratification, if the British government 
would counsel me how to act; none of our other neighbours can avail me; and 
in return I would pledge myself to forward its commercial and political views.” 

The political turn thus given to the mis.sion it continued ever after to iiisconfor- 

ence with 

retain, and apparently with the concurrence of all parties. At a subsequent him ou the 
interview on the 4th of October, 1837, Dost Mahomed, returning to the sore p'^i^er. 
subject, the loss of Peshawer, assumed an appearance of humility which could 
hardly have been sincere, and expressed his readiness, if so advised by the 
British government, to apologize to Runjeet Sing for the past, and to receive 
back Peshawer, not as his fight, but as a free grant, to be held by him as tribu¬ 
tary to Lahore. Burnes had no instructions which would authorize him to give 
this advice, and was, moreover, aware that it would have been useless, as 
Runjeet Sing, who had begun to grudge the heavy expenditure to which the 
possession of Peshawer subjected him, was disposed to restore it, if he restored 
it at all, not to Dost Mahomed, but to his brother Sultan Mahomed, who was 
in possession of it when it was seized by the Sikhs. Owing to the hostile 
feelings with which the brothers regarded each other. Dost Mahomed considered 
that he would gain nothing at all by such an arrangement, and the subject 
was dropped. 

Burnes seems now to have almost entirely lost sight of commerce, and filled 
his letters to the government secretary with political details. One written On 
the same day when the above interview took place begins thus: “ I have now 
the honour to report the result of my inquiries on the subject of Persian influ- 



500 


HISTOEY OF INDIA. 


[Book VIII, 


A.D.1837. ence in Cabool, and the exact power which the Kuzzilbash, or Persian party 
resident in this city, exercise over the politics of Afghanistan,” and after a 
Arrival of a lengthened disquisition thus concludes: “ The Shah of Persia has not been slow 
ambaamdor in responding to Dost Mahomed Khan’s desire for an alliance; an elckee has 
atcandahai.j^^^ Sent with robes and presents in return, and is now at Candahar, but he 
has appeared at a time most unfavourable to his master, when the attention of 
the Britisli government is directed to Afghanistan, which goes far to discredit 
him with all parties, and even to damp the hopes of the Kuzzilbashes. It is 
even doubtful if he will advance to Cabool, and it is certain if he does so that 
any otfei’s which he may make will never be placed in the balance against those 
of the British government. The King of Persia desires to add Herat" to his 
dominions, and the chiefs of Candahar and Cabool might certainly aid him in 
his designs, but the probabilities of a return for such good offices are more than 
doubtful. ’ 

iboposod q’jig Persian alliance referred to in the above extract was now attracting 
aiioe with mucli attention. As it would have been equivalent to an alliance with Russia, 
it naturally excited considerable alann in the British government, and Burnes, 
aware of the anxiety felt in regard to it, was careful to ascertain exactly how it 
stood. Dost Mahomed Khan, when the subject was broached, “stated with 
considerable candour the whole circumstances regarding it; declared that he 
had sought with ardour the friendship of the British government, from its 
being his neighbour, but he had sought in vain, and hearing of the pow’er of 
Persia and the designs towards Khorasan, he had addressed Mahomed Shah, 
and an elchee was now at Candahar bringing robes for him and his brother, 
with a valuable dagger, and a promise of assistsince in a crore of rupees.” The 
Ameer, notwithstanding the “considerable candour” for which Bunies gives 
him credit, was evidently playing a double game, and endeavouring, by means 
of a proposed Persian alliance, to provoke the jealousy and awaken the fears of 
the British government. He accordingly recurred repeatedly to the subject, 
and showed how' well he was acquainted with its bearings by putting questions 
concerning “the relations between the British government and Russia, the 
influence of Russia over the dominions of Turkey,” and “ the control which 
Russia exercised over the trade in Turkestan.” At the same time he declared 
his decided preference for a British alliance, and urged his brothers at Candahar 
to unite with him m endeavouring to secure it. In a letter which he appears 
to have communicated to the British envoj'^, he thus explains his policy, and 
remonstrates against their desire to connect thepaselves more closely with 
Persia. “ We have some hopes regarding Peshawer. It is well known to the 
world that the power of the Sikhs is nothing in comparison with that of the 
English, and if all our objects be obtained through that power so much the 
better." Again, “ For these few days past no letter has come direct from you, 
but from the contents of letters from Mr. Bumes and others I learn that on 



Chap. II.] 


MISSION OF ME. BUENES. 


301' 


the information of a Persian army coming to Herat, you are going to send your a.d. issr. 
son Mahomed Omar Khan along with the Persian elchee to the Shah. This 
has astonished me very much, because you never did anything before without 
my advice: and what fruits do you hope to reap by sending your son to Persia? 

If the British would not be friendly, then you might make friendship with 
others: the former are near to us, and famous for preserving their word; the 
latter are nothing in power compared to them.” 

The letter from which the above extracts are ffiven was in all probability Britiaiioii- 

® r jectioiis to 

not only communicated to Bumes, but suggested, if not dictated by him. It unianceof 

was written on the 25th October, 18.37, and he had IJie very day before, in A^muut»u. 

replying to a letter addressed to him by Kohan Dil Khan, the Candahar chief, 

used the following language: “ It is known to you that I came to this quarter 

with good intentions towards all parties, and particularly to converse with all 

the membei’s of your family; and I have received a very friendly recej)tion at 

Cabool. At this time I hear from various quarters that you are sending your 

son to Iran (Persia). When I look to the contents of your letter, and to this 

step, I do not understand matters, and believe that some person has been 

deceiving me. It is not possible to hold two water-melons in one hand; 

unanimity in families is a great source of power, family differences are the 

certain cau.se of evil; and foreseeing as much as the feeble intellect of man can 

do into futurit 3 ', I see no good in the step you now contemplate; even I see 

tliat the fruit of the nmtter will be nothing but repentance and loss; and 

vvishiivg you well, I have thought it proper to wam you.” Not satisfied with 

tlius denouncing an alliance with Peraia, Burnes had at the same time ventured 

to assure Dost Mahomed that “ if he succeeded in preventing Kohan Dil Khan 

from acting as he intended, it could nf)t fail to be received .as a strong mark of 

his de.siro for our friendship.” 

Burnes, though apparently still unprovided with any other than his original i"- 
coramercial instructions, had thus thrown himself into the very heart of a AfgUanutan. 
])olitic.al intrigue. The fact was known to his government, and so far from 
being objected to, appears rather to have been regarded with approbation. The 
mission had accordingly assumed a character entirely different from that origin¬ 
ally impressed upon it. This change was mainly owing to the discovery of 
Russian intrigues. Their influence at the Persian court was well known, but 
the extent which it had acquired in Afghanistan was scarcely suspected. 

The expedition against Herat by Mahomed Shah had again been actually 
undertaken, and while this step gave umbrage to the British government, 
from knowing that it was*^*truly more a Russian than a Persian scheme of 
aggrandizement, the startling discovery was made that a Russian agent was 
journeying directly toward Cabool. Oh the 14th of October, 1837, a letter 
was received from Colonel Sftoddart, then with the Persian camp near Nisha- 
poor, stating that “ Captain Vikovich of the Ru^jian service, an aide-de-camp 



302 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book VIII. 


A.D. 183r. 


Riueian in¬ 
trigues in 
Afjghanistan 


Arrival of 
spwial Hub- 
sian agent. 


of the general of Orenburg, arrived here from Teheran and Besht on the 10th 
instant. He is gone on a mission to Cabool. Horsemen have been given to 
pass him to Toorbut, thence a change to Khain, thence again to Lash, from 
. thence to Oiasndaliar. He left yesterday.” The first movements of tliis myste¬ 
rious agent were ascertained rather curiously. Major Rawlinson had set out 
with a small party to join the Persian army, now in full march upon Herat, 
and after accomplishing a distance of 700 miles, had set out on his last day’s 
journey, when, to his astonishment, he came upon a party of horsemen in 
Cossack dresses, and among them one who was recognized to be a servant of 

the Russian mission. On reaching the 
next stage Major Rawlinson, whose 
curiosity was naturally excited, en¬ 
deavoured to gratify it, but the Russian 
party, on arriving shortly after, and 
learning that a British officer was there, 
declined to enter the khan, and rode oft! 
This desire of concealment added of 
course to the curiosity already felt, and 
the major, following as clo.se as possible 
upon the track, came at length upon 
the party seated at breakfast beside a 
rivulet in a gorge of the hills. It was 
now impossible to avoid an interchange 
of civilities, but the officer at the head 
of the party dexterously avoided con¬ 
versation by pretending ignorance of 
the different languages in which Major 
Rawlinson addressed him. He knew no French, no Persian, and answered only 
in Russian. At length a kind of conversation was kept up in Turcoman, but 
so broken that the major could learn nothing more than that he had fallen in 
with “a Inma fide Russian officer caiTying presents from the emperor to 
Mahomed Shah.” Major Rawlinson continued his journey, and had been only 
two days in the camp when the Russian made his appearance, and was intro¬ 
duced to him by the Russian ambassador as Captain Vikovich or Viktavitch. 
He now spoke Frendi fluently, and when rallied by the major on this sudden 
acquirement, only observed with a smile that “ it would not do to be too familiar 
with strangers in the desert.” 

This Russian agent made his appearance in Cabool on the 19th of December, 
1837. Burnes had previously received a notification of his approach from a 
correspondent at Candahar, and on the very day of his arrival was visited by 
Dost Mahomed, who “ came over from the Bala Hissar with a letter from his 
son the governor of Ghuznee, reporting that the Russian agent had arrived at 



Dost Mahomed Kiiah.—F rom Qraiit's Oriental Hoada. 


w’ 





Chap. II.] 


MISSION OF MR. BURNES. 


803 


that city on his way to CabooL” The Ameer, professing that he had come to 
Bumes for counsel, ^declared “ tliat he wished to have nothing to do with any 
other power than the British; that he did not wish to receive any agent of any 
power whatever so long as he had a hope of sympathy from us; and that he 
would order the Russian agent to be turned out, detained on the road, or act 
in any way I desired him.” Bumes gave judicious advice. After observing 
that he could not “ advise him to refuse any one who declared himself duly 
accredited," he told the Ameer that he “ had it in his power to show his feeling 
on the occasion by making a full disclosure to the British government of the 
errand on which the individual had come” He immediately agreed to this, 
and put Bumes in possession of the different documents that came into his 
hands. Two of these from native agents are so far interesting as showing the 
impression produced by the arrival of Vikovich, and the oi>inion formed of his 
character. The first communication, dated from Candahar, says, “ An elchee 
arrived here from Russia. Leaving the rarities of that country in Teheran, he 
came to the camp of Mahomed Shah Kajar, and after seeing his majesty he 
passed through Birjird Jawer, Lash, and Seistan, on way to Ahmed Shahu 
(Candahar). He is a man of Moscow, and stands high in the favour of the 
emperor. The Russian ambassador at Teheran has sent a list of the presents, 
with his letter to the Sirdars, which this elchee left in his charge on account 
of the disorders of the road between Teheran and Candahar. As he looks a 
confidential person, I think he will do everything for the Sirdars.” The second 
communication was sent direct to Dost Mahomed by Moolla Reshid, the coun¬ 
sellor of Kohan Dil Khan, chief of Candahar, and after intimating the arrival 
of Vikovich, and that he is “ the bearer of letters from the Russian ambassador 
at Teheran,” continues thus: “The Russian ambassador recommends this man 
to be a most trusty individual, and to possess full authority to make any nego¬ 
tiation. Captain Burnes will undoubtedly comprehend the real motives of this 
elchee. The conduct and appearance of this man seem to infer that he pos¬ 
sesses no less dignity and honour than Captain Burnes, and whatever arrange¬ 
ments he may make will be agreeable to the Russian ambassador. You Irnve 
now both the English and the Russian ambassadors at your court. Please to 
settle matters with any of them whom you think may do some good oflice here¬ 
after.” 

The other documents furnished to Burnes by the Ameer were a letter wliidi 
he had himself sent by his agent Hajee Hoosain Ali, to the Emperor of Russia, 
about the beginning of 1836, letter or ruckum addressed to the Ameer by 
Mahomed Shah, and the letter which Vikovich delivered from tlie Russian 
ambassador at Teheran on arriving at Cabool. The Ameer’s letter to the czar 
is not unworthy of quotation. It was as foUows:-^“ There have been great 
differences and quarrels between myself and the royal house of the Sudozyes. 
The Englisli government is disposed to support Shujah-ul-Moolk. The 


A.D, 1SS7. 


Interview 
between 
Boat Ma¬ 
homed and 
Mr. Bumes. 


RuEBian 

intrigues. 



AT). 18.17. 


Letter of 
Doot Ma* 
homed to 
the Czar of 
RiiHsia. 


Letter from 
the Buseiaii 
ambuRBodor 
at Telieran 
to Dost Mn 
honied. 


304 HISTORY OF INDIA. (Book VIIL 

whole of India is governed by them, and they are on friendly terms with 
Runjeet Sing, the lord of the Punjab, which lies in their neighbourhood. The 
British government exhibit no favourable opinions towards me. I with all my 
power have always been fighting with the Sikha Your imperial government 
has made friendship with the Persians; and if your majesty will be graciously 
pleased to arrange matters in the Afghan country, and assist this nation (which 
amounts to twenty lacs of families), you will place me under obligations. I 
liope your imperial majesty will do me the favour by allowing me to be 
received, like the Persians, under the protection of the government of Russia, 
under your royal protection. I can j)erform along with my Afghans various 
praiseworthy services.” The Shah’s letter proceeded thus:—“Agreeably to my 
affection and kindly feeling towards you, I-wish to bestow great favours on 
you, and anxiously wait to hear from you. In these days the respectable 
Captain Vikovich having been appointed by my esteemed brother the Emperor 
of Russia to attend your court, paid his respects on his way, stating he had been 
honoured by his imperial majesty to deliver some messages to you; on this I 
tliought it incumbent on me to remember yoxi by the despatch of this ruckiim, 
to convince you that your well-wishers are deeply engraven in my mind. 
Considering the favours of my majesty attached to you, let me liear occasionally 
from you, and by rendering good services you will obtain the protection of this 
royal house.” The letter of Count Simonich, the Russian ambassador at 
Teheran, contained the following pjissages:—“The respectable P. Vikovich will 
wait upon you with this letter. Your agent, Hajee Hoosain Ali, has been 
attacked by a severe illness, and therefore he 8topi)ed at Moscow. When the 
intelligence of his bad health was conveyed to the emperor, a good physician 
was ordered to attend, and cure him as soon as possible. On his recovery I 
will not fail to facilitote him on his long journey back to Cabool. Knowing 
your anxiety to hear from this quarter T have hastened to despatch the bearer 
to you. He was ordered to accoraj)any your agent to Cabool. T hope on his 
arrival at your coui-t that you will treat him with consideration, and trust him 
with your secrets. I beg. you will look upon him like myself, and take his 
words as if they were from me. In case of his detention at Cabool you will 
allow him often to be in your presence; and let my master know, through me, 
about 'J'our wishes, that anxiety may be removed.” The letter concludes with 
an-esnumeration of “some Russian rarities,” which the ambassador would take 
the'first opportunity of forwarding, as the bearer, P. Vikovich, from being 
lightly equipped, was unable to take them with him. 

Besides the above letter from the Russian ambassador, Vikovich is said to 
have been the bearer of a letter from the emjreror himself, in which he 
expressed his great deliglTt at receiving, and his high gratification on perusing 
the letter of the Ameer. Its contents “prove that you are my well-'wisher, and 
have friendly opinions towards me; it flattered jne very much, and I was 



Chap, n.] RUSSIAN INTRIGUES IN AFGHANISTAN. ' 304' 

satisfied of your friendship to my everlasting government. In consequence of 
this, and preserving the terms of friendship (which are now commenced between 
you and myself), in my heart, I will feel always happy to assist the people of Alarm taken 
Cabool who may come to trade into my kingdom.” The genuineness of this BriHi* go- 
letter is denied, and we are disposed to think on sufficient grounds; but 
whether genuine or not, there was certainly enough in the other documents to 
cause alarm and give umbrage to the British government. In January, 1837, 

Lord Palmerston, having received a number of despatches from the British 
minister at the courj; of Persia, in which it was again and again stated that the 
Russian minister there had urged the Shah to undertake a winter campaign 
against Herat, deemed it necessary to instruct the Earl of Durham, then 
ambassador at St. Petersburg^ “-to ask Count Nesselrode whether Count 
Simonich is acting according 4o his instructions, in thus urging the Shah to 
pursue a line of conduct so diametrically opposed to his Persian majesty’s real 
interests.” Should Count Nesselrode sanction Count Simonich’s proceedings, Expinnation 
the Earl of Durham was then to represent “that these military expeditions of byBritiah 
the Shah are in the highest degree unwise and injurious,” but as Count Simo- 
nich’s proceedings were “so ccmtrary to all the professed principles and declared 
system of the Russian government,” it must be assumed that he was acting 
without instructions; and in that case it would simply be necessary to declare 
the full confidence of his majesty’s government, “that the Russian cabinet will 
})ut a stop to a course of conduct so miich at variance with its own declared 
policy, and so adverse to the best interests of an ally for whom the Russian 
government professes friendship and good-will.” Count Nesselrode disclaimed 
the proceedings of Count Simonich, though doubting if they had been fairly 
represented, and further stated, ^lat he entirely agreed with the English gov¬ 
ernment as to the folly and impolicy of the course pursued by the Persian 
monarch. 

The above disclaimer w'as given by Count Nesselrode in February, 1837, ni«!i.iiincr 
and it became impossible to reconcile it witli the course which Count Simonich * 

continued to pursue, and more especially with the new course of intrigue in ;. 

which he seemed about to engage, by sending Vikovich to Cabool. Burnes, . 
who had the art of jumping somewhat hastily to a conclusion, addressed a lofig 
letter to the governor-general, in which, after dwelling on the “strong demon¬ 
strations on the part of Russia to interest herself” in the affairs of Afghanirtaiv 
he stated it to be his “most delibei'ate conviction, that much more rigorous, 
proceedings than the government might wish or contemplate, are necessary to ^ 
counteract Russian or Persian intrigue in this -quarter, than have yet been 
exhibited.” Lord Auckland took fclie matter more coolly, and replied through 
Mr. Macnaghten, that he attached “little immediate importance to this.mi^pik 
of the Russian agent.” ' Bumes was therefore directed to suggest^-to, the 
Ameer, that if Vikovich had not already left Cabool, he should “bfe disanifised 



[Book VIII. 


*306 HISTORY OF INDIA, 

* *, , 

a!d, 1887. wiCh courtesy, with a letter of compliments and thanks to the Emperor of 
Russia for his professed kindness to Cabool traders. His mission should be 
Rnwianiti- assumcd to have been, as represented, entirely for commercial objects; and no 
notice need be taken of the m'essages with which he may profess to have been 
charged.” The British ministry when the subject was reported*to them viewed 
it in a more serious light, and Lord Palmeraton transmitted to the Marquis of 
Clanricarde, who had succeeded the Earl of Durham as ambassador at St. 
Petersburg, the draft of a note to be presented to Count Nesselrode. 

This note, after stating “that events which have lately occurred in Persia 
and Afghanistan render it necessary for the British government to request 
from that of Russia, explanations with respect to certain circumstances which 
are connected with those events, and which have an important bearing upon the 
i.c>r.i i'.a- relations between Russia and Great Britain,” dwells at some length on the 
iu»te. common coui’se.of action wliicii the two governments had agreed to pursue in 
regard to Persia, and the violation of this agreement by Count Simonich, who, 
while the British envoy at Teheran “was preaching moderation and peace,” was 
on the contrary “inciting to war and conquest.” Count Nesselrode, when 
applied to, had at once declared, that if Count Simonich’s conduct was as 
represented, he was not acting in accordance with but directly in the face of 
his instructions, and in proof of this, an offer was made by M. Rodofinikin, 
the head of the eastern department in Count Nesselrode’s office, to show the 
Earl of Durham the book in wliich all the instructions given were entered. 
At this time Count Nesselrode doubted the accuracy of the reports respecting 
Count Simonich’s conduct, but these, the note proceeds to say, “have been 
fully confirmed by subsequent infonnation. For not only did the prime min¬ 
ister of the Shah state that Count Simonich had urged his Persian majesty to 
imdertiike an expedition to Herat, but Count Simonich himself admitted to 
Mr. M‘Neill that he had done so; though he added that in so doing he had 
disobeyed his instructions.” Nor had he stopped here. He had during the last 
twelve months advanced to the Shah the sum of 50,000 tomans, to “enable 
him to prosecute wjth vigour the war against Herat,” and had also announced 
to him, that “if his Persian majesty should succeed in taking Herat, the Russian 
government would release Persia from the payment of the balance of its debt 
to Russia.” Subsequently when the siege of Herat wiis in progress, and both 
Mr. M‘Neill the British minister and Count Simonich had arrived in the Persian 
camp, while the former,, who had arrived first, was in hopes of terminating 
the war “in a manner satisfactory and honourable to both parties,” the latter, 
“assuming a part the very reverse of that which the British minister bad acted, 
appeared publicly as the military adviser of tlie Shah, employed a staff officer 
atitached to the Russian mission to direct the construction of batteries, and to 
prosecute the offensive operations furnished a further sum of money for distri¬ 
bution to the Persian soldiers; and by his countenance, support, and advice, con- 



Chap. II.] 


EUSSIAN INTKIGUES IN AFGHANISTAN. 


307" 


firmed the Shah in, his resolution to persevere in his hostilities.” Passing from a.d. isbt. 
this subject the note proceeds to state, that the British government "possess a ^ 
copy of a treaty which has been concluded between Persia and the Afghan 

^ ^ inentoii'n 

ruler of Candahar, the execution of which has been guaranteed by Count note. 
Simonich, and the stipulations of which are injurious and offensive to Great 
Britain.” The guarantee "contains a promise to compel Persia to defend the 
rulers of Candahar against attack from any quarter whatever,” and though "in 
this stipulation no specific allusion is made to England,” yet the intention 
might be inferred from the original draft of the treaty "which was less cautiously 
worded, and in which specific allusion was made to England, as one of the 
powers again.st whom assistance was to be given by Russia to the rulers of 
Candahar.” Still more recently, a Russian agent of the name of Vikovich, 

"said to be attached to the staff of the general commanding at Orenburg, was 
the bearer of letters from the emperor and Count Simonich to the ruler of 
Cabool,” and Count Simonich "announced to the Shah of Peraia that this 
Russian agent would counsel the ruler of Cabool to seek assistance of the 
Persian government to STipport him in his hostilities with the ruler of the Pun¬ 
jab ; and the further reports which the British goveniment have received of the 
language held by this Russian agent at Candahar and at Cabool, cfin lead to no 
other conclusion than that he strenuously exerted himself to detach the rulers 
of tho.se Afghan states fi’om all connection with England, and to induce them 
to place their reliance upon Persia in the first instance, and ultimately U)M)n 
Russia. ” 

Notwithstanding the long extracts which have been already made from this itsspuiie.! 
note, the conclusion is too spirited and important to be omitted. "The British 
government readily admits that Russia is free to pursue, with re.spect to the 
matters in question, whatever coui’se may appear to the cabinet of St. Petei's- 
lairg most conducive to the interests of Ru.ssia; and Great Britain is too con- 
.scious of her own strengtlg and too sensible of the extent and sufficiency of the 
means which .she po.sse.sses to defend her own intere.sts in every quarter of the 
globe, to regard with any serious uneasiness the transactions to which this note 
relates. But the British government considers itself entitled to a.sk of the 
cabinet of St. Petersburg, whether the intentions and the j)olicy of Russia 
towards Persia and towards Great Britain are to be deduced from the declara¬ 
tions of Count N esselrode and M. Rodofinikiu to the Earl of Durham, or from 
the acts of Count Simonich and M. Vikovich; and the British government 
thinks itself also justified in observing, that if.from any cause whatever, the 
Ru.ssian government has, subsequently to the months of February and May, 

1837, altered the opinions whicli were then expressed to the Earl of Durham, 
then and in such case, the system of unreserVed reciprocal communication upon . 
Persian affairs which of late years has been established between the two gov¬ 
ernments, gave to the British cabinet a good right to expect that so entire a 



308 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book VIII. 


A.D. 18S7. ishange of policy on the part of Russia, together with the reasons on which it 
was founded, would have been made known to her majesty’s government by 
Lord Pal- the cabinet of St. Petersburg, instead of being left to be inferred from the acts 
uotoreiati™ of Russian agents in Persia and Afghanistan. The underaigned (Marquis of 
Clanricarde) in conclusion is instructed to say, that her majesty’s government 
Afghaui»tati.jg j^ersuaded that the cabinet of St. Petersburg will see in this communication, 
a fresh proof of the anxious desire of the British government to maintain 
unimpaired the friendly relations which so happily subsist between the two 
countries, and to which the British government justly attaches so great a 
value; because explanations sought for with frankness, and in a friendl^^spirit, 
tend to remove misunderstandings and to preserve harmony between nations.” 

Count Nesselrode lost no time in transmitting a despatch to Count Pozzo di 
Borgo, the Russian ambassador at London, in which, after declaring that he 
New die did “ not hesitatc a single instant to meet the English cabinet with a frank 
the iioBBian and spontaneous explanation, in order completely to remove its apprehensions 
govemnieiii.^ to the intcntious and views of our government with regard to the afiairs of 
Asia,” he made a very lengthened statement. “ The idea,” he said, “ of assailing 
the security and the tranquillity of the state of possession of Great Britain in 
India has never presented itself and never will present itself to the mind of our 
august master. He desires only what is just and what is possible. For this 
twofold reason he cannot entertain any combination whatever directed against 
the British power in India. It would not be just, because nothing would have 
given cause for it. It would not be possible, by reason of the immense distance 
which separates us, the sacrifices which must be made, the difficulties which 
must be overcome, and all this to realize an adventurous scheme, which could 
never be in accordance with sound and reasonable policy. A single glance at 
the map ought to be sufficient to dissipate in this respect all prejudice, and 
convince every impartial and enlightened man that no hostile design against 
England can direct the policy of our cabinet in Asia.” While maintaining that 
Mahomed Shah, “ in determining to make war against Herat, was completely 
within the limits of his rights as an independent sovereign,” he repeated the 
assurance formerly given that instead of urging him to such an enterprise, which 
in one view offered no chance of success, Russia had done all in her power to 
divert him from it, and to induce him “ to prefer an amicable arrangement with 
the chief of Herat to a state of hostility indefinitely prolonged.” Count 
Simonich had accordingly received a positive order “ to employ all his credit 
with the Shah to dispose him to a formal accommodation.” It was no doubt 
true that “ on his arrival in camp Count Simonich, witnessing the distress in 
which the Persian army was, did not think he ought to refuse his assistance to 
the Shah when that sovereign earnestly entreated him to examine the works of 
the siege,” but “ even if the city of Herat had been forced to open its gates,” 
our minister had suggested a pacific arrangement, by which “ Herat would have 



Chap, II.] 


EUSSIAN INTRIGUES IN AFGHANISTAN. 


309 


been given over to Koban Dil Khan, chief of Candahar"—an arra,ngenieat a.p. issr. 
which, “ if it had actually taken place, would have had for its basis the inde¬ 
pendence of Afghanistan, by imposing upon the Shah the formal obligation in 
no way to assail the integrity of the country of which the Sirdars are actually at Herat 
in possession, nor the tranquillity of the tribes of which they are the chiefs.” 

With regard to M. Witkewitsch (Vikovich), his mission to Cabool “ was simply 
occasioned by the mission of an agent whom Dost Mahomed Khan sent to us 
in 1837 to St. Petersburg, with the intention of forming commercial relations 
with Russia.” It had for its object “ neither a treaty of commerce nor any 
political combination whatever which a third power could have reason to 
complain of or to take umbrage at. It has produced and was intended to 
produce but one result—that of making us acquainted with a country separated 
from our frontier by great distances, which oblige our government to increase 
our precautions, in order that the activity of our commerce should not run the 
risk of engaging there in ruinous enterprises without having been enlightened 
beforehand as to the chances to which it might be exposed.” 

The strict accuracy and sincerity of this explanation were questionable, but Tiieexpiana- 
an important step towards conciliation was made by the recall of Count natwfiwtory. 
Simonich, who was succeeded by Colonel Duhamel. Vikovich's proceedings 
met with a severer condemnation, and led to a more lamentable result. On 
reporting himself after his return to St. Petersburg, Count Nesselrode refused 
to see him, and sent a message to the effect that he knew no Captain Vikovich, 
except an adventurer of that name, who, it was reported, liad been lately 
engaged in some unauthorized intrigue at Cabool and Candahar. The poor 
man, who had been anticipating praise and promotion, hastened home in a fit 
of despaii' and shot himself. Lord Palmerston had good reason to be satisfied 
with the result of his note. Besides procuring the dismissal of the offending 
ambassador, it had drawn forth from the Russian cabinet the strongest assur¬ 
ances that it did not harbour any designs hostile teethe interests of Great 
Britain in India, and had not changed tile policy which in 1834 the two powers 
had agreed to adopt; and it tlierefore only remained to say that “if such shall 
continue to be the policy of Russia, and if her agents in the East shall faith¬ 
fully obey their instructions, there seems every reason to hope that nothing 
can hereafter occur in those quarters that can be calculated to disturb tlic good 
understanding between the two countries.” 

In following out this correspondence between the two governments to its 
close, the order of time has been somewhat anticipated, and it will therefore 
be necessary to go back a little in order to resume the narrative of events in 
Afghanistan. Dost Mahomed had, as we have seen, given strong and unequi¬ 
vocal proofs of his preference for a British alliance. His liope at first was that 
he would be completely secured from foreign aggression, and that Peshavrer, 
on which his heart was set, but which he had now no prospect of being able to 



HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book VIII. 


A.D. 1838. reconquer, would be restored to the Afghan monarchy by an amicable arrange- 
'ment In this hope he was about to be grievously disappointed. Lord Auck- 
Neg^tiation* land, though sufficiently alive to the dangers with which India seemed to be 
Afghan threatened from the west, was not yet prepared for more than friendly inter- 
ference for the purpose of repelling them, and was therefore determined to avoid 
all entanglements which might oblige him to resort to warlike measures. The 
utmost which he was prepared to offer was advice to tlie Afghan chiefs, and in 
returri for this be seems to have thought it not unreasonable to expect that 
they would devote themselves exclusively to British interests, and refrain from 
forming any alliances that might be adverse to them. The unreasonaHeness 
of such an expectation was so obvious that Bumes thought he might take it 
upon himself to disregard it; and accordingly, on finding that the chiefs of 
Candahar, who had previously been on the point of forming an alliance with 
nritiBh Mahomed Shah, might be tempted to break with him, he did not hesitate to 

protection , i 1*1 

imaniBod proiuise the protection of the Briti.sli government against any attack to winch 
by BunioB. might thus cxpose themselves. His own account of the matter in a letter 
to a private friend is as follows:—“The chiefs of Candahar had gone over to 
Persia. I have detached them, and offered them British protection and cas/t 
if they would recede, and Persia attacked them. I have no authority to do so; 
but am I to stand by and see us ruined at Candahar?” He adds—“If the 
Persians move on Candahar, I am off there with the Ameer and his forces, and 


mean to pay*the ])iper myself.’ 

This was certainly a very extraordinary step to take without authority, and 
it cannot therefore excite much suq)rise to find that it was immediately repu¬ 
diated Burnes’ letter intimating that it had been taken, was written on the 
25th of December, 1837, and on the 20th of January, 1838, Lord ^Auckland, 
who was then at Bareilly, on his way to Simla, intimated his displeasure by a 
LordAuck- letter from Mr. Macnaghten. “It is with great pain that his lordship mu.st 

land refixsos , , ® , . , . , , , , , 

to ratify next proceed to advert^P the subject of the promises which you have held out 
oifora^ fo chiefs of Candahar. These proifiises were entirely unauthorized by any 
part of your instructions. They are most unnecessarily made in unqualified terms, 
and they would, if supported, commit the government on the gravest questions 
of policy. His lordship is compelled, therefore, most decidedly to disapprove 
them. He is only withheld from a direct disavowal of these engagements to 
the chiefs of Candahar, because .such disavowal would carry with it the decla- 
i-ation of a difference between you and j’our govennnent, and might weaken 
your personal influence, and because events might in this interval have 
occuiTed which would render such a course unneces.sary. But the rulers of 
Candahar must not be allowed to rest in confidence upon promises so given, 
and should affairs continue in the same uncertainty as that which prevailed at 
your last despatches, you will endeavour to set yourself I’ight with the chiefe, 
and will feel yourself bound in good faith to admit that you have exceeded 



Chap. II.] 


NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE AFGHANS. 


311 


your instructions, and held out hopes which you find upon communication 
with your government cannot be realized.” Burnes thus admonished anJ 
censured had no alternative but to retract his promises, and the Candahar 
chiefs, throwing themselves once more into the anns of Persia, concluded a 
treaty, which Count Simonich guaranteed, and the stipulations of which are 
described by Lord Palmerston, in a passage above quoted from his note, as 
“injurious and offensive to Great Britain.” 

While the friendly ties by winch Burnes hoped to have bound the Candahai- 
chiefs were thus rudely snapped asunder. Lord Auckland pursued a course 
which almost looks as if it had been intended to produce a similar alienation in 
Dost Mahomed. In the very letter in which Burnes was rebuked, he instructs 
him to deal summarily with the Ameer, as if he were not an independent chief, 
but an humble dependant placed entirely at his mercy. “ Should he,” says his 
lordship, “seek to retain the agent (Vikovich), and to enter into any descrip¬ 
tion of political intercourse with him, you will give him distinctly to under¬ 
stand that your mission will retire; that your good offices with the Sikhs will 
wholly cease; and that, indeed, the act will be considered a direct breach of 
friendship with the British government. It has been before at different times 
stated to you, that the continuance of our good offices must be entirely depend¬ 
ent on the relinquishment by the Ameer of alliances with any power to the 
westward.” Nothing could be more dictatorial, and if it Avas really wished to 
conciliate the Ameer, nothing could be more jireposterous than these instruc¬ 
tions. For what were the good offices which tois lord-shij) was wUling to 
undertake, and in return for which the Ameer was to bind himself indissolubly 
to British interests, to forego all alliances with neighbouring powers, and as a 
necessary consequence incur their displeasure, and risk their vengeance? 
Nothing more than to endeavour to j)ersuade Runjeet Sing to refrain from 
making war on Cabool—a thing for which at the time he had neither the 
inclination nor the meansi The Afghans themselves ridiculed the very idea, and 
when such good offices were talked of, could scarcely refrain from showing that 
they considered themselves insulted. Wfiat then must have been the feelings 
of Dost Mahomed, when the same messenger who brought Burnes his letter of 
rebuke, pUt ihto his "hands a letter from the governor-general to himself, 
couched in such terms as the following?—“In regard to Peshawer, truth compels 
me to urge strongly on you to relinquish the idea of obtaining the government 
of that territory. Fi’om the generosity of his nature, and his regard fur his old 
alliance with the British government. Maharajah Runjeet Sing has acceded to 
my wish, for the cessation of strife and the promotion of tranquillity, if you 
should behave in a less mistaken manner toward liim.. It becomes you to 
think earnestly on the mo.de in which you may effect a reconciliation with that 
powerful prince, to whom my nation is united by the direct bonds of friendship, 
and to abandon hopes which cannot be realized. The interference on your 


A.D. 1888. 


Loixl Atick* 
land's 
liaiighty 
.treatment 
of Dost 
Mahomed. 


UntoaRona- 
ble tiocriflcefi 
demanded 
fioni him. 



A.B. 1838. 


L<mp4» 
land’s sn- 
percilious 
l^ter to 
Dost Ma- 
homedl 


Jubbar 
Khan's 
views there¬ 
upon. 


312 HISTOEY OF INDIA. [Book Vm. 

J3ehalf, which my regal’d to yourself and for the Afghan people h^ led me to 
exercise, has hitherto^rotected you from the continuance of a war which would 
have been ruinous to you; and if you can establish equitable tenrfs of peace 
with the Maharajah, you will enjoy, in a security which has long been unknown 
to you, ample means of dignity and honour, and the tenitory which is actually 
under your government. To lead you to hope for more than this would be to 
deceive you; and even for this object, though my good offices would be readily 
employed for you, I would always be careful so to act, as to con|ult the interests 
and honour, and obtain the concurrence of the Sikh sovereign, who is the firm 
and ancient ally of my country. I need not state to you that the English 
nation is faithful to its engagements, and true to its word. It is on this account 
that I have written plainly to you, that you may understand correctly the 
as.sistance which you may expect from me. This assistance also cannot be granted 
if you form any connection with other powers unsanctioned by the govern¬ 
ment. If you wish for its countenance and friendship, you must repose confid¬ 
ence in its good offices alone. Should you be dissatisfied with the aid I have 
mentioned from this government, which is all I think can in justice be granted; 
or sliould you seek connection with other powers without my approbation; Cap¬ 
tain Burnes, and gentlemen accompanying him, will retire from Cabool, where 
his further stay cannot be advantageous; and I shall regret my inability to con- *■ 
tinue my influence in j’our favour with tlio Maliarajali. I am persuaded that you 
will recognize the friendly feeling which has led me to state the truth to you, 
as you can guide your actions as you may consider most proper for yourself.” 

Every lin^ of the above letter must have been gall and wormwood to Dost 
Mahomed, and it would not have been surprising had he, on the spur of the 
moment, taken Lord Auckland’s supercilious advice, and done what he must 
now have considered most proper for himself, by breaking ofi" t^>o negotiation 
with the British government. He acted with more moderation, and was 
cordially seconded by his brother Jubbar Khan, who continued to argue after 
Lord Auckland’s letter had made argument all but hopeless, and proved most 
convincingly that there was no proportion between what the British govern¬ 
ment offered and what was demanded in return for it. The whole letter, he 
said, betrayed great ignorance of the actual state of Afghanistan. The offer to 
restrain Runjeet Sing was worthless, since, so far from his seeking to attack 
Cabool, hostilities had been commenced by the Afghans, who, conceiving thej' 
had just ground of conqdaint, assumed the offensive. The British altogether 
overrated the value of their offers, when tliey expected that in return for them 
the Afghans w6uld form no friendly relations with Persia, Russia, Turkestan, 
&c. Were they in furtherance of British interests to make all these powers 
hbstile, and yet receive no |)romise of protection against the hostility thus 
provoked? Well might he" conclude, that “the value of the Afghans had 
indeed been depressed, and He did not wonder at the Ameer's disappointment.” 



CM.P. II.] NEGOTIATIONS WITH^DOST MAHOMED. 313" 

Up to ^liis time, iJiougb the Ameer had declined to disiQiss Vikovich, he a d. isas. 
had refrained from giving him any public countenancq. He had, however, , 
distinctly*^intimated to the British envoy, that the delay on the part of the Ontowani 

_ , , result* W 

governor-general to declare luinself fully was exhausting hiar patience, and that LordAuck- 
as the interest which Russia had taken in him deserved acknowledgment, he 
was unable to wait longer than the vernal equinox. When Lord Auckland’s “ 
letter was delivered, the disappointment which it produced could not be 
mistaken. The Ameer observed that “it was full of meaning; ” that he would 
“ reflect seriously on what best suited his interests, before he made any answer,” 
and “would send off an express to Candahar, to take tlie counsel of his bi’others 
on what so vitally concerned tlieir common interest.” Tlie delivery of Lord 
Auckland’s letter took place on the 23d of Februa.r 3 ^ 1S3S, and from that date 



(Kandahar. - From Fane's Five Yoai’a in India. 


Mr. Bumes must have seen that the fate of his mission was sealed. His impres¬ 
sions on the subject ai-e given in a letter to Mr. Macnaghten, dated 5th March; 
“ From various quarters I have meanwhile heard that the ruler of Cabool is but 
ill disposed to meet government in its wishes; and the advice given to him by 
one of the first individuals whose counsel he sought was, that he should take 
the British government at their word, and dismiss their agent, since there was 
nothing now to be expected from his presence in Cabool. From the receipt of the 
goveraor-general’s letter to the present time nightly meetings have been held 
at the Bala Hissar; >ind the Ameer has on more tlian one occasion given vent 
to very strong expre.ssions, both as to his future proceedings,' and the disap¬ 
pointment at the slight degree of appreciation entertained by government 
regarding him. It seems very clear, though the final answer of Dost Mahomed 
Khan has not been received, that we have little hope of esbvblishing a friendly 
connection with him on the terms washed by government.” * 

The., above letter had only been despatched when Mr. Bumes was 
visited by Jubbar Khan, who came from the durbar with a string of proposi- 


View* of Mr 
Burned. 


314 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book VIIT) 


A.D. 1838. 


New pro- 
poaale 6t 
Dost Ma< 
homed to 
the British 


Negotiation 

thiitiossly 

continued. 


tioDs, embodying the terms on which, if then agreed to, the Ameer would 
decide in favour of a British connection. They consisted chiefly “m a promise 
to protect Cabool and Candahar from Persia; of the surrender of Peshawer 
by Kunjeet Sing; of the interference of our government to protect at that city 
tluise who might return to it from Cabool, supposing it to be restored.to Sultan 
Mahomed Khan." The British envoy, as if be had now thoroughly imbibed 
the supercilious spirit of which Lord Auckland's letter had set him the example, 
took high ground. “I at once informed the Nawab that I would agree to none 
of the terms proposed; that I was astonislied to hear a race as illustrious as 
the Dooranees, who had carried their sword to Ispahan and Delhi, imploring 
protection against Persia; that as for Peshawer, it belonged to our ancient ally 
the ruler of Laliore, and he alone could surrender it; and that as for protecting 
those who returned from Cabool, supposing the Maharajah to make a settle¬ 
ment, it was an after concern which it was now useless to discuss, as well as 
the other matters stated, since the Ameer seemed so little disposed to attend to 
the views of tlie British government, and, what was of more importance, 
his own interests.” Shortly after Jubbar Khan’s departure, the envoy 
addressed a formal note to the Ameer, in which, after afiirming that the only 
object originally proi) 08 ed in the correspondence opened with the British gov¬ 
ernment, was an arrangement with the Sikhs, whereas demands, “quite uncon¬ 
nected with the Sikhs” were now made, he stated that he “has no power or 
authority to speak on other matters, as is well known from his lordship’s letter, 
and he would thexefore be deceiving the Ameer by listening to them. Undei' 
these circumstances, as there is a Russian agent here, and he is detained by the 
Ameer’s request, it is clearly evident that the Ameer does not approve of the 
offers of the British, but seeks the aid of others; Mr. Burnes feels it due to him¬ 
self and his government, to ask leave in consequence to return to Hindoostan.” 

. The Ameer, not yet prepared to relinquish the hope he had so long enter¬ 
tained of an advantageous British connection, sent two counsellors on the 
following day with proposals “somewhat modified,” and “with many expres¬ 
sions of regret ” at the resolute rejection of all that had been urged.” Ulti¬ 
mately after a long discussion. Captain Burnes accepted the Ameer’s invitation 
’to visit him at the Bala Hissar in the evening. In his account of the interview 
he says, “ I lost no time in entering upon businessj and said I was sorry to hear 
he had not taken, the governor-general’s letter in the spirit it was written, and 
that he had deemed it harsh, when the very fact of his lordship sending such a 
letter proved the interest taken in him, and that I had perused the document 
in English and Persian without finding a single expression to oft’end him. It 
was true it was a very explicit paper, but the Afghans were a nation famed 
for their, straightforward proceedings, and.jt was most important to act toward 
him with a clear good faith, and let him know at once what might be expected 
of the Biitisli government.” The Ameer’s reply consisted chiefly of a reiteration 



Chap. II.] NEGOTIATIONS WITH‘AFGHANISTAN. 315 

of his high jidmiration for the British government, and his willingness to make 
any sacrifice in order to secure its friendship. At last he even went so far as 
to say, “ I throw myself upon the generosity of the Governor-general of India, 
and I rely on the sympathy which his lordship has expressed." “ On this,” 
says Burnes, “ I congratulated the Ameer on his having seen his own interest 
better than to permit of friendship being interrupted between him and a nation 
so well disposed towards him; but that it was now my duty to tell him clearly 
what we expected of him, and what we could do in return. You mirst never 
receive agents jfrom other powers, or have aught to do with them without our 
sanction; you must dismiss Captain Vikovich with courtesy; you must sur¬ 
render all claim to Peshawer on your own account, as that chiefship belongs to 
Maharajah Runjeet Sing; you must live on friendly tenns with that potentate; 
you must also respect the independence of Candahar and Peshawer; and 
co-operate in arrangements to unite your family. In return "for this I promise 
to recommend to the government that it use its good offices with its ancient 
ally, Maharajah Runjeet Sing, to remove present and future causes of difference 
between the Sikhs and Afghans at Peshawer, but as that chiefship belongs to 
the Maharajah, he may confer it on Sultan Mahomed Khan or any other 
Afghan whom he chooses, on his own terras and tribute, it being understood 
that such arrangement is to preserve the credit and honour'of all parties.” 

Empty as these professions of friendship on the part of the British govern¬ 
ment must have appeared to the Ameer, he had the policy to speak of them as 
important concessions, and to request that they might be immediately reduced 
to writing, in order that he might “ fairly see W’hat is expected, and what is to 
be done in return.” No written document being given at the time, he sent two 
of his counsellors a few days after to renew his request for it. It is difficult to 
see what use he could have made of it, but his anxiety made the British envoy 
suspicious, and he refused to commit himself. It is scarcely necessary to follow 
the negotiations further. ■ Qn the 21st of March the Ameer made apparently a 
last effort to gain over the governor-general to his views, by addressing him in 
a letter which, consisting chiefly of unmeaning phrases and compliments, may 
be regarded as an Afghan mode of intimating that the negotiation was at an 
end. He says indeed, “ To make known objects in the hope of profit to those 
personages who can do some -good to the man in want, is consistent with pro¬ 
priety. Your lordship is the source of generosity and favour; therefore I take 
the liberty to repeat my grievances, expecting that your lordship will release 
the Afghans from distress, and enlarge their possessions;” and he concludes with 
saying, “As I rely on your lordship's favour, I have freely laid open my feelings 
in the hope of better fortune,-since delays rai s e up fear of danger.” How littlq 
these expressions conveyed 'his real sentiments' was made apparent only two 
days afterwards, when he paid Captain Bumes a visit, and talked in a tone 
which he had never used to him before. “ He stated that he had been received 


A.I). 1888. , 


IS^egOtiatiou 
fniitleahly 
continued 
with Dost* 
Maboined. 


Letter fnvm 
Poet Ma- 
liomed to 
the gover¬ 
nor-general. 



A.l>. 1888 . 


Dost Ma¬ 
homed's 
statement 
^ Ca^itaiu 
Hunies. 


Final depar¬ 
ture of the 
British 
iniMiou. 


31G HISTOEY OF INDIA. '[Book VIH. 

by our government as no one; tliat his friendship was worth little; that he 
was told to consider himself fortunate at our preventing the Sikhs coming to 
Cabool, of which he himself had no fear; that he had applied to us for a cure 
of affairs in Peshawer, but our remedy was beyond his comprehension; and 
that though he felt honoured and grateful for the governor-general’s sending a 
mission to him, he had now lost every description of hope from us; that he 
saw little or no probable benefit to the Afghans as a people, and less to himself.” 
To all this Bumes could only reply “ that our government had no desire to 
guide him, and if he did not approve of its offers, he need not accept of theiri.” 

Though the crisis was now evidently approaching, the British mission 
lingered for another month, and on the 21 st of April had the mortification of 
seeing the Russian agent in the ascendant. On that day “he was conducted 
through the streets of Cabool, and received a greater degree of respect than 
had hitherto been shown him.” On the following day, Burnes, still unwilling 
to believe that his mission "was to terminate in failure, renewed his correspond¬ 
ence with the Ameer, not, he says, “from any hope that advantage could be 
derived from it in my negotiations, but to place as distinctly as possible before 
him how much he might have himself to blame for what followed.” The 
Ameer in his reply, which was returned on the following day, made no secret 
of his intention to secure himself by new alliances. “Mankind,” he observed, 
“have no patience without obtaining their objects, and as my hopes on your 
government are gone, I will be forced to have recourse to other governments. 
It will be for the protection of Afghanistan to save our honour, and, God for¬ 
bid, not from any ill design towards the British.” He concluded thus: “In 
making friendship with any government my object Will be to save and enlarge 
Afghanistan; and during, these last seven months I have told you everything 
of note, and you know the good and bad. Now I have consigned myself to 
God, and in this no government can blame me. All the Afghans will be grate¬ 
ful to the government which obliges them. There is no more to say which is 
not said. If you like to speak in person, or examine all the correspondence 
that has passed between us, there will be no‘ objection. I am very much 
obliged to you for the trouble you took to come so far. I expected very 
much from your government, and hoped for the protection and enlargement of 
Afghanistan; now I am disappointed, which I attribute not to the ill favour of 
the English, but my own bad fortune. Creatures must rely on the Creator.” 
Burnes understood this letter, as it was obviously <neant to be, “a clear dismissal 
of the mission.” On the 25th of April, he had by the Ameer's appointment 
his audience of leave; the following day he quitted Cabool, and by the 30th he 
had reached Jelalabad, from which he addressed a letter to Mr. Macnaghten, 
stating that , he had received good information, that the Ameer had been con- 
""stantly with Vikovich since he himself left, and repeating as his “-most 
‘deliberate conviction, founded on much reflection regarding the passing events 



Chap. III.] 


SIPGI; OF l^EAT. 


317 


in Centa'al Asia, that consequences of the-most serious nature must in the end a.u. isst. 
flow from them, unless the British government applies a prompt, active, and 
decided counteraction.” What this should be he does not venture to hint, but noiH»ra- 
the subject was already engaging the earnest attention both of the Indian and Brituu 
the home governments. Their deliberations, almost unconsciously to themselves, g"* 
gradually developed a gigantic scheme, which, neither founded in sound policy 
nor prosecuted with anj’^ due regard to the rights of other states, was justly 
punished by a disaster, to which the previous history of British India presents 
no parallel. Before entering on the details, some notice must be taken of the 
siege of Herat, and of the means by which that so-called key of India was pre¬ 
vented from falling into the hands of Persia 


CHAPTER III. 


'lie siege of Herat — Tjord Auckland's policy—Demonstration in the Persian Oulf—Tlie Tripartite 
Treaty—The Simla manifesto—The array of the Indus—Invasion of Afghanistan. 



NCOtJRAGED by the Russian, and regardless of the remon- New Persian 
strances of the British ambassador, Persia had again resolved against 
on the siege of Herat. Having made the necessary preparations, **“"‘*' 
Mahomed Shah set out at the head of an army on the 23d of 
July, 1837. The distance to be accomplished exceeded GOO 
miles, across a counti-y of a difficult and forbidding character. His progress 
Avas therefore necessarily slow, and nearly three months elapsed before he 
leached Nishapoor, still more than 200 miles to the nortli-west of Herat. 

As the difficulties of tlie country were however his only obstruction, he con¬ 
tinued to advance, and in the be^nning of November, having crossed the Afghan 
frontier, arrived at the fort of Ghorian, belonging to the Heratee tenitory. 

This was considered a place of great strength, and liaving recently been 
garri.soned with a large body of picked troops, was expected to make a pro¬ 
tracted resistance. Through cowardice or treachery it proved otherwise, and 
Grhorian fell almost without a struggle. Elated with this success the Shah 
hastened foi'ward, and pn the 22d of Npvember took up a position before 
Herat on a plain at a short distance to the north-west. 

The city now about ^ be subjected to a siege, stands in an elevated but ^tionof 
beautiful and ..fertile valley, 370 miles nearly due west of Cabool. Its popula¬ 
tion was estimated at only 45,000, but its position near the point where thq 
great routes from Persia, Turkestan, and India intersect each-other, added 
greatly to its importance, both commercial and military. Its means of resist- 







818 


A.D. 18a7. 


Pofences of 
llorat. 


Tjilwinncal 
c}i>iracter 
of ItM go- 
veniiiieiit. 


HISTOmp {Bbi9« TIH. 

ance were not very formidable. Tlie defert^j® bOnsistM cliifeify t^.a,'brp«d and 
deep ditch, well supplied with water from springs, which bemg' situated 
within the town itself, could not be cut-off; a, nxound,^ fbrhi^ 6U| of the 
materials obtained in excavating the ditch; a lofty wall of unbhrned brick 
crowning the mound, and a citadel, sufficiently strong to be capable of-defence 
even if the city were taken. The wall was pierced by five gates, foux’of *them 
giving access to as many leading thoroughfares. These int^ected .each other 
at a common centre, and thus left a large space which had a domed ^of, and 
formed the terminus of the principal bazaars. Tlie streets were narrow and 
filthy in the extreme. • 

Prince’Kanxran, who had succeeded on the death of his father, was now 
sovereign of Herat. In early life he had repeatedly given prbof of a cruel • 
blood-thirsty temper, and as he advanced in years had added othef vices, which 
made him still less capable of conducting the government. Indulgence in every 
species of debauchery had made liim feeble and indolent, and thrown all 

real power into the hands of his prime 
minister. . This was Yar Mahomed, a 
man of no mean talents, hut utterly 
devoid of principle. His own interest 
Avas his only end, and his usual methods 
of promoting it were violence, oppres- 
.sion, and extortion. The inhabitants, 
while thus alienated from their.rulers'by 
mi.sgovemment, were unhappily divided 
among themselves. Composed of dif¬ 
ferent race.s, Afghans, Persians, Beloo- 
chees, «fec., they had no common bond of 
union, and were even at deadly enmity 
on religious gi-ounds, the two leading 
psirties, though professed followers of 
Islamism, belonging to the hostile sects 
of Soonees and Sheeahs. In the quar¬ 
rels and jealousies thus produced, the 
Afghans being the dominant race had greatly the advantage, and tyrannized 
without mercy. 

Where so much misgovernment and division prevailed, there was little 
reason to expect that Herat would make a successful defence, and the general 
impression therefore was that it would prove a comparatively easy conquest. 
It could only be on this gi-ound that the British envoy, acting on instructions 
from horqe, had exerted himself to the utmost to prevent the Persian expedi¬ 
tion from being undertaken. Not only had he remonstrated wjth the Shah 
and his ministers in terms approaching" to menace, but he had also entered into 



Mahomiid, Shah of Piiiiwia. 
After A purtmit hy J. H. Twlgg- 



GoAtyiifl ; :.feEAT. 319 

commiMUcaii^^- Kamrant'abd ilrged Min to save himself by timely conces- a.d. issr, 
sions. Tlve He^teis rulef, as if conspious of-his inability to resist, had voluntarily 
adopted -this flottrse!, and,■seemed re^y td saeiifice eveiy thing except the barren TyTOimioia 
name of inde^ndence. ‘ This however was the Very thing which the Shah, ^nrorat;'** 
with a. view apppi^tly to ihe furtherance of other ambitious schemes he was 
meditating, was determined to wrest, from him, and the negotiation, after pro¬ 
mising a pi^efid issue, was abruptly terminated. 

As soon as it became eertain that the siege of Herat would be attempted,. 

Yar Idahomed began to bestir himself, and even assumed atone .of defiance. 

In a letter addressed by him to Mr. M'Neill, now British envoy at Teheran, 
he says, “Should the Persian government evince any great desire to come to 
Herat, do not* prevent the advance, of the army, or take any trouble in the 
mattei'. It is an affair of no consecjuenee. Let them come, in order that they ni^ffiCTiuieH 
may prove what they are able tb.do. May it please God the. merciful, by the grace exiMiiitiou 
and assistance of the Alihighty, the steed^f their wishes shall not accomplish 
the joinney of their design.” Norj>rffu he confine himself to more boasting. 

Foraging jiarties, sent out iutcj the surrounding districts, brought home abund¬ 
ant supplies of grain, and at the same time carried oft' or destroyed everything 
that miglit have been of advantage to an invading army. Alliances were 
formed with mountain tribes, and plans airanged for cutting off the Persian 
comnuinications. The defences, wlierever they were dilapidated, were rapidfy 
repaired, and everything wore the appearance of. a vigorous defence. Among 
tlie-circumstances which favoured it, one of the most important was the season 
at which the siege was about to be undertaken. The climate of Herat, like 
that of Afghanistan generally, was too severe to render a winter campaign 
advisable, and yet the Shah had been so long detained on his march, tliat unless 
lie could succeed by a sudden onset, of which there was no probability, all his 
siege operations were to be commenced and carried on amidst the frosts and 
snows of a bleak and rugged mountain district. The obstacles with which the 
besiegers would on this account have to contend, were made apparent to them¬ 
selves several days before they actually reached Herat. Their condition, while 
iiine marches remained to he accomplished, is thus described by Mr. M‘Neill, 
in a letter to Lord Palmerston: “The whole of the provisions exj^ected from tlui 
rear, and from the districts on the right of the line of march, did not exceed four 
days’ consumption ;,and every mile the army advanced was canying it so much 
farther from the means of subsistence. The cold was already so great, that the 
men had begun to sufFef from it, and a Persian gentleman, in writing to his 
father, states, that at night the cold was so intense, that in the morning people 
could neither use their hands nor articvlate distinctly.” 

NotwithstsCH(ding actual and still greater foreseen- difticMties, the Shall 
commenced (pieratitms wifih spirit. Having taken possession of all the gardens 
and iuQlosures to flie west of the citjvajid obtained good cover among a clustet 



320- 


[Book VHI. 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 

A n. 1888 . of ruins, from which the Afghans endeavoured in vain to dislodge them, tlie 
Persians broke ground,-and by the lOth of December had advanced their 
Siege of trenches nearly to the edge-of the ditch. Their artillery, however, the arm in 
jueaoed. which they were supposed to be most powerful, was productive rather of fear 
than of danger, and failed to make any impression which could be turned to 
account. After the first few days of terror, caused by the loud and constant 
firing and the frequent bursting of shells in the heart of the city, tlie iidiabi- 

tants gradually laid aside their 
fears, and recovered the presence 
of mind which they appeared at 
first to have lost. The ganisou 
made bold and oftep successful 
sorties, itnd felt so confident of 
their ability to repel an assault, 
that three of the ,five gates re¬ 
mained open, for communication 
with the surrounding country, and 
even the cattle were sent out to 
pasture. The con%ience thus in- 
.spired was owing in no small de- 
gri;e to the presence and activity 
of a young Englisli officer, Eldred 
Pottiuger, who having been sent 
by his uncle, Colonel (afterwards 
•Sorvicon Sir Henry) Pottinger, then r-esideut in Scindc, on an explta-atory tour in 

Pottingoi. Afghanistan, was fortunately in Herat when the Persians made their appear¬ 
ance before it. Having no official appointment, he had at fii’st professed to bo 
only a horse dealer, and had afterwards assumed the disguise of a Syed or 
Mussulman devotee. In Herat, le.ss necessity was felt for concealing his real 
character, and he was permitted at Ins own request to pay a visit to Yar 
Mahomed, who, after giving him a cordial welcome, introduced him to his 
master. From that time he obtained a recognized footing in Herat, and deter¬ 
mined to take an active part in the struggle in which it was about to bo 
engaged. His courage and skill were immediately put in requisition, and it 
was not long before he had become, at least in regard to military matters, one 
of Yar Mahomed’s most infiuentinl advisers. As a lieutenant in, the Bombay 
artilleryj he had made himself well acquainted with siege operations, and was 
thus dble to furnish the kind of information which the exigencies of the time 
required. 

• The siege proved very desultory, and furnished few incidents worthy of 
detail In the begining of .January, 1838, some alarm was ckused in the eity by 
the mining operations of the besiegers, >bid; after means had been taken Ipjcoun- 



Af^'oriAM Rot.diku« in Winter CrwruME. 

Flout IhiUrtj’a <Jtf4(uine and ycutteiy of .4rgiiaiiiiftan. 




Chap. III.] 


SIEGE OF HEEAT. 


S21 


teract them the garrison took nei^ courage, and even prepared to take the A.t). iss*. 
initiative. The first proposal was to venture on a night attack. Owing to 
some mismanagement, after every preparation had been made, the intention siow 
was abandoned. The next proposal was to venture out by day, and risk a of Herat, 
regular battle. This time it did not prove a feint. On the 26th of January, 
both cavalry and infantry, to the number of at least 7000, marched out into tlie 
plain. The Persians at once accepted the challenge, and an encounter took 
place, which was continued with varying success throughout the day. No 
decisive result was gained, but as the Heratees obliged tlie enemy to abandon 
their outposts and remained in possession of the ground thus abandoned, tliey 
claimed, and had certainly the best title to claim the victory. 

The above encounter, or rather series of skirmishes, hnd gone far to prove 
that besiegers and besieged were pretty equally matched, and that time, rather 
than prowess, would ultimately determine the result. The siege accordingly 
was continued in a very sluggish manner. The Shah indeed, wlio had previ- 
ou.sly spumed everything like fair accommodation, now betrayed an anxiety to 
treat, and made various overtures, which were rejected as inadmis.sible. 
ActiV<!^operations again seemed to be the only alternative; and a considerable 
advarftage had been gained by the besiegers by the capture of a fortified post 
not more than 300 yards from the north-east angle of the fort, when Mr. M'Neill, 
the British envoy, arrived in the Persian camp. His object was to make a 
last effort at negotiation by offering to mediate between the combatants. He 
had an audience of the Shah on the 13th of AprU. It lasted two hours, and 
waJi^sb satisfactory that Mr. M'Neill took his leave under the impression that 
the Shah was really disjiosed to accept of the proffered mediation. At a subse¬ 
quent audience he actually accepted it, and it was pixblicly announced on the 
ICth of April that deputies were about to proceed from the Persian camp iuto 
Herat to arrange the terms. It is difficult to believe that the Shah was sincere, 
for only two days after, the Persians opened their batteries with more fury 
than ever. 

This hostile proceeding, at the very time when friendly mediation was pro- 
fessedly accepted, must have made Mr. M'Neill very doubtful of ultimate 
succeas. He determined notwithstanding to persevere, and in the evening sent 
his deputy. Major Todd, to seek admission into Hcmt, for the jmrpose of 
explaining the proposed mediation. When the Persians from the trenches 
announced his approach, the Afghans I’eplied with derision. Considering the 
circumstances, the hour was ill-timed, and almost justified the answer returned 
by Yar Mahomed, that at that hour he would not allow the Shah himself to 
enter, but that the English deputy, on presenting himself on the morrow at the 
south-east an^e of the city, would be admitted. Very possibly there was a 
suspicion that the Persians wished to use the admission of Major Todd as a 
means of forcing an entrance for themselves, but Yar Mahomed himself gave 
VoL. ni, JJ 87 



3‘22 


HISTOEY OF INDIA. 


[Book VIII. 


A a i8sg. the real explanation to Pottinger, when referring to tlie offered mediation, he 
said to him, “ Don’t be angry with me; I have thrown ashes on it and blackened 
Attempt of ita face myself.” His meaning he explained, by adding that he wished the 
to mediate Persians to understand that the Afghans trusted to their good swords, and did 
not want either Turks, Russians, or English to interfere. He was by no means 
sincere in this declaration, though he regarded it as a piece of good policy, since 
it might tend to make the Shah lower his terms. 

Major Todd on the following morning made his appearance at the place indi¬ 
cated, and being at once admitted, was ushered into the presence of Kamran, 
who received him with the greatest cordiality, and sent him back fully author¬ 
ized to declare that he accepted of the mediation of the British minister. No 
sooner was Mr. M'Neill in {)ossession of this authority than he deemed it neces¬ 
sary to have a personal interview with Kamran and his minister. It took 
place on the 21st of April, and was evOiy way satisfactory, as the greatest readi¬ 
ness was expressed to ratify any agi-eement which he might judge expedient. 
Everything seemed now in proper train, when an unexpected visitor appeared 
on the scene and completely changed the aspect of affairs. Just as Mr. M‘Neill 
left the Persian can>p for Herat, Count Simonich arrived in it. The effect of his 
1“ fi'Uttro. presence was at once seen. The Shah, retracting his previous consent to^nedi- 
ation, stated his ultimatum in such terms as the following ;—“ Either the whole 
people of Herat shall make their submi.ssit>n, or 1 will ttike possession of the 
forti •e.ss by force of arms, and make them (obedient and submissive.” Under 
those circumstances. Mr. M'Neill contented himself with laying before the Shah 
a full statement of all the complaints which the British govemmeut liad against 
him Not only, though informed that it would be regarded as an act of hostility, 
had he persisted in commencing and cairying on the siege of Heiut, but he had 
refused redress for gross insults which had been offered by his officers to 
members of the Bi’itish mission. One of these, a courier, bearing letters from 
Herat to Teheran, addressed to Mr. M'Neill, had been seized, under pretext of 
his being a native Persian, .searched, pillaged, and threatened with summary 
execution. These things, which the Shah had allowed to pass with impunity, 
though the guilty perpetmtors were well known to him and might easily 
have been brought to justice, made it impossible that friendly relations could 
any longer subsist between the two governments. The firmness of this hvnguage 
intimidated the Shah, and he again professed a willingness to do all that was 
asked of him; but after a course of vacillation, the Russians gained a complete 
ascendency, and Mr. M‘Neill considered that he had no alternative but to put 
his threat in execution. Accordingly, on the 7th of June, he declared the 
British embassy to the Persian court at an end, and took his departure for the 
frontier. 

Meanwhile, under the auspices, and it is said also through the largesses of 
Count Simonich, the siege was prosecuted with new vigour. The count himself 



Chap. III.] 


SIEGE OF HERAT. 


323 


personally superintended the operations, and Russian engineers conducted them, a.d, im. 
The additional skill and energy thus brought to bear upon the beleaguered city 
greatly increased the miseries of its inhabitants, and the necessity of escaping si<«e of 
from them by an acknowledgment of Russian supremacy as a preferable Bumedmider 
alternative to Persian domination, was openly discussed. Pottinger, whom 
Mr. M‘Neill had authorized to act as British agent in Herat, having now an 
official position, had acquired an additional degree of influence, and showed as 
much political wisdom as courage in his manner of exercising it. The struggle 
however seemed daily becoming more hopeless. In fair fight the Afghans were 
seldom worsted, and they had gallantly repulsed the only two assaults which 
liad yet been attempted, but the most dangerous enemies were within—disease, 
famine, and general despondency. Encouraged by new pj-ospects of success, 
the besiegers had resolved on one great effort. It was made on the 2-tth of 
June, under the form of a general assault, embracing five points at once. 

Though sufficient warning had been given of its approach, no adequate effort 
liad been made to meet it, and it had at first all the effect of a surprise. Ulti¬ 
mately, however, the garrison, roused to redoubled efforts, repulsed the assaults 
at all points but one. In the mound on which the wall was reared were two 
fatisse braiea, an upper and a lower, which, though not considcied important 
enough to be enumerated among the defences of the place, formed its best secu¬ 
rity during an actual assault. At one of the points attacked, the assailants forced 
their way into the lower fauase braiCj and then pushing up the slope, cairied 
the upper fausse braie, immediately beyond which was a practicable breach. 

Some of the storming party reached it, and the capture was on the ])oint of being a 
effected when the Afghan reserve amved, renewed the conflict which other j.uiaod. 
defenders had abandoned in despair, and drove back the aasailants in confusion. 

The chief merit of this repulse undoubtedly belongs to Eldred Pottinger. The 
first noise of the assault had brought him and Yar Mahomed to the scene of 
action. Pottinger saw th^ extent of the danger, and, retaining all his coolness 
and presence of mind, pointed out what was necessary in order to avert it. 

Yar Mahomed, on the other hand, though his personal courage was undoubted, 
became completely unmanned, and sat down as if in despair. Pottinger, seeing 
that all was otherwise lost, succeeded in rousing him, and when he again lost 
heart, actually laid hold of him, and moved forward with him to the breach. 

There his presence and recovered energy once more changed the fortune of the 
day, and the Persians, repulsed at every point, retreated to their camp, with a 
loss which was estimated by Mr. M'Neill, from the best information he could 
obtain, at not less than 1700 or 1800 men. 

The Pex-sians, though they had well nigh succeeded in the assault, had 
suffered too severely to have any inclination to repeat it; and the Afghans, ^ 
if more frightened at the danger they had run than elated at their success in 
repelling it, showed no inclination to assume the offensive. On both sides 



324 


HISTOEY OF INDIA. 


[Book VIII. 


A.D. 1838. therefore active operations ceased. When at last this tacit armistice terminated, 
there was a greater inclination than before to listen to terms of accommodation. 

A tioit Could the Shah have maintained his ground and persisted in the blockade into 

^^Tthe which the siege had been virtually converted, the whole contest would have 
reduced to a question of time—Which of the two parties would first have 
tailed to obtain the necessary supplies of food and ammunition? It may seem 
that the besieged, cooped up within their walls, and threatened both with 
famine and pestilence, must have been compelled to succumb. On the other 
hand, the Shah had sufiered severely in carrying on the siege. One winter, 
necessarily entailing the severest privations, had been endured, and midsummer 
had arrived without bringing any prospect of a successful issue. Numerous 
losses had been sustained in actual conflict, a still greater number by desertion 
and disease, and the communications with Persia were daily becoming more 
and more difficult by the pillaging hordes interposed between it and the caiiqi. 
The treasury too was exhausted, and the promises of Count Simonich to 
replenish it were too vague and uncertain to be trusted to. Under such 
ciicumstances, to continue the siege, even assuming it to be practicable, was 
little short of madness. Sooner or later, discomfiture, if not absolute ruin, would 
ensue. I’hough unable to conceal the truth from himself, the Shah was too 
obstinate to yield of his own accord, and incur the disgrace of raising the siege, 
but his anxiety for renewed negotiation proved how willing he would be of any 
decent pretext for withdrawing. With such a pretext he was now fumished. 

Britisii ex- Previous to the departure of Mr. M'Neill from the Persian camp, the atten- 

peditiou to ^ 

tiio Peniiaii tion of the Indian government had been earnestly directed to the siege of Herat, 
and to the supposed dangers to which its fall would expose our Indian empire. 
As early as the 1st of May, 1838, the governor-general in a letter addressed to 
Mr. M'Neill, after stating his belief “that the state of our relations with Persia 
is at the present moment exceedingly critical,” suggested that it might prove of 
“very essential aid” to his negotiations, “were as many cruisers as can be saved 
for the service, together with a regiment of native infantry, despatched to the 
Persian Gulf to hold themselves in readiness for any service” on which it might 
be deemed expedient to employ them, “with a view to the maintenance of our 
interests in Persia.” Withoiit waiting for an answer. Lord Auckland had at 
once acted on this suggestion, by instructing the Bombay government to fit out 
and despatch the proposed expedition, “at the earliest practicable period” 
Little time was lost, and on the 19th of June the expedition arrived in the 
neighbourhood of Bushire, and landed the troops, amounting in all to 387, on 
the island of Karrak. No opposition was ofiered, the governor on being informed 
“that the British govemiSient had sent up a body of troops upon a special 
service, and that the island of Karrak, on account of the salubrity of its climate, 
had been chosen for their place of residence,” simply replying, “that the island, 
its inhabitants, and everything it contained, were entirely at our disposal.” 



Chap. III.] 


SIEGE OF HERAT. 


S25 


Some additional troops and stores were afterwards landed, but the so-called a.d. isss. 
demonstration continued to be to the last a very paltry affair. Such however 
was not the opinion formed of it by those who only heard of it at a distance, Britinh ex- 
and it was generally spoken of as a serious and formidable invasion, which had the Femi&Uu 
probably for its object the overthrow of the existing Persian dynasty. 

The Shah, in one of the last interviews which Mr. M'Neill had with him 
before quitting the camp, had offered to raise the siege of Herat and conclude 
a treaty with its ruler, provided he was furnished “ w'ith such a reason for con¬ 
cluding that arrangement, as might enable him to relinquish with honour the 
enterprise in which he was engaged,” and he himself proposed “that the British 



Ibland of Karrak.—A fter a sketch by A. IlaiTwoii, Xuvy. 


government should threaten him if he did not return,” and “that this threat 
should be conveyed in wi*iting, that he might have it in his power to show the 
document as an evidence that he had not lightly abandoned the expedition 
he had undertaken.” The document furnished by Mr. M'Neill, in compliance Tomwde- 

^ niaiided by 

with this request, was entitled, “ Memorandum of the demands of the British tiie Britiah 
government, presented to the Shah,” and was in the following terms:—“Ist, That 
the Persian government shall conclude an equitable arrangement with the gov- 
cniment of Herat, and shall cease to weaken and disturb these countries. 2d, 

That the Persian government, according to the stipulations of the general treaty, 
shall conclude a commercial treaty with Great Britain, and that it shall place 
the commercial agents of Great Biitain on the same footing with respect to 
privileges, &c., as the consuls of other powera 3d, That the persons who seized 
and ill-treated Ali Mahomed Beg, a messenger of the British mission, shall be 
punished, and that a firman shall be issued, such as may prevent the recurrence 
of so flagrant a violation of the laws and customs of nations. 4th, That the 
Persian government shall publicly abandon the pretension it has advanced, to 
a right to seize and punish the Pei-sian servants of the British mission, with¬ 
out reference to the British minister. 5th, Tliat the governor of Bushire, wh*o 
threatened the safety of the British resident there, shall be removed; that the 
other persons concerned in that transaction shall be punished, and that 




326 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


A.D. 1888. 


Biege of 
Herat raised 


Lord Auck¬ 
land’s war¬ 
like i>olicy. 


Mr. Mao 

niiaeioii to 
Ijabore. 


[Book VIIT. 


measures shall be taken to prevent the recurrence of such proceedings.” On 
receiving this document, the Shah at once, and with some reason, declared that 
it “was not what he wanted”—a variety of other matters had been introduced 
into it, whereas, “ what he required was, a single statement on the subject of 
Herat, on a small bit of paper which he could carry about with him, ‘and show 
to every one—not a great paper like that.” The demonstration in the 
Persian Gulf being certainly much stronger than any written threat, might well 
supply its place, and the Shah’s answer therefore was, “We consent to the 
whole of the demands of the Biitish government. We will not go to war. 
Were it not for the sake of their friendshij), wo should not return from before 
Herat. Had we known that our coming here might risk the loss of their 
friendship, we certainly would not have come at all.” This answer was given 
on the 14th of August, 18.38, but hostilities were to some extent persisted in till 
the 9th of September, when the siege was finally raised, and the Persian army, 
baffled and dispirited, commenced its march homewards. 

The demonstration in the Persian Gulf was only a first, and a comparatively 
insignificant step in the warlike policy which Lord Auckland was now pi-epared 
to pursue. In a minute dated 12th May, 1838, after refeiring to a letter to 
the secret committee, in which he had intimated his intention not to oppose the 
advance of Persia upon Candahar and Cabool, whether by arms or money, he 
viitually retracted the intimation. “ Circumstances,” he says, “ have occurred 
which may materially modify my views, for Russian agents have now put 
themselves prominently forward in aid of the designs of Persia, and we could 
scarcely with prudence allow this new and more formidable element of disorder 
and intrigue to be established, without opposition, on our frontiers.” In a letter 
to the secret committee only ten days later in date than the sibove minute, he 
tells them “that the emergency of affairs may compel me to act without 
awaiting any intimation of your views upon the events which have recently 
occuired in Persia and Afghanistan,” and, moreover, that “in anticipation of 
the possibility of such a contingency, I have deemed it expedient to put matters 
in train by previous negotiation, in order to render whatever measures of direct 
interference I may be obliged to adopt as effective as possible.” 

The negotiation above referred to as intended “ to put mattei-s in train, ” 
was a mission by Mr. Macnaghten, the political secretary of government to 
Lahore. The instructions given to Mr. Macnaghten, composed apparently by 
Mr. Henry Torrens, who, as deputy-secretary, had remained with the governor- 
general, are in a style of unusual grandiloquence. In the extract printed by 
government by order of the House of Commons, they commence thus:—“In 
any discussion upon the present policy of the Indian government, you may 
rfemark that the governor-general has no appetite for wars and conquest; that 
the boundaries of the East Indian empire have seemed to him to be amply 
extensive; that he would rather conquer the jungle with the plough, plant 



Chap. lit] 


MISSION OF MB. MACNAGHTEN. 


327 


villages where tigers have possession, and spread commerce and navigation A.n. isas. 
upon waters which have hitherto been barren, than take one inch of territory 
from his neighbours, or sanction the march of armie.s for the acquisition of instmctioim 
kiifgdomsyet that he feels strong in military means, and that with an army to Mv. Muc^ 
of 100,000 men under European officers in Bengal, and with 100,000 more 
whom he might call to his aid from Madras and Bombay, he can with ease 
repel every aggression and punish every enemy.” Such being the case, it 
might have been supposed that the governor-general deemed it unnecessary to 
give himself any conceim with what might be passing beyond his own frontier, 
and had therefore instructed Mr. Macnaghten to intimate to Bunjeet Sing that 
he was determined not to interfere in any way with Afghanistan. The chiefs 
must settle their feuds in their own way, and the monarch of Lahore was 
welcome to conquer them if he could. In the extrtict of the instructions printed 
by government, there is nothing to show that this was not their purport, but 
ill the additional extract given by Mr. Kaye from the MS. records, in his excel¬ 
lent History of the War in Afghanistan, more explicit infonmation is afforded, 
and we gain an insight into the kind of policy which was about to be adopted. 

After listening to all the Maharajah “has to say,” or “in the event of his show¬ 
ing no disposition to commence the conference,” you can, continues Mr. Toitchs, 

“state to him the views of your own government” These views embraced 
two alternative courses of proceeding. The one “ that the treaty formerly 
executed between his highness and Shah Shujah should be recognized by the 
British government,” and that “ whilst the Sikhs advanced cautiously on Cabool, 
accompanied by British agents, a demonstration should be made by a division 
of the British army occupying Shikarpoor, with Shah Shujah in their company, 
to whom the British govemment would advance money to enable him to levy 
troops and purchase arms.” The other course was “to allow the Mahaiajah to 
take his own course against Dost Mahomed Khan, without any rSference to us.” 

Runjeet Sing, when the two courses were submitted to him, had no difficulty RmijMt 

® Siug’fitgi'itgp. 

in arriving at a decision. Independent action he would have nothing to do ing 
with, and the plan by which he was to act in concert with tlie British govern¬ 
ment was the only one which he could think of adopting. Notwithstsuiding 
this verbal acceptance, which was given oh the 3d of June, 1838, the terms of 
the treaty, called tripartite, because Runjeet Sing, Shah Shujah, and the British 
government, represente4 by the governor-general, were parties to it, were not 
arranged without considerable difficulty. The Sikhs were constantly gnisping 
at new advantages, and did not desist till a significant hint had been given 
that the British government might think it necessary to act independently. 

Even Shah Shujah, when the proposed anangements were submitted to him, 
though he was naturally delighted at the prospect of regaining a throne, from 
which he had to all appearance been finally excluded, could not help remon¬ 
strating against the lion’s share set apart for Runjeet Sing. Not only was he 



A.D. 1838. 


Tripartite 
treaty lie- 
tweeiL Run- 
Jeet 

Slialt Bhu- 
Jali, anil 
the British 
goveniiiioiit. 


Shah 
ShujahV 
atteinirt to 
‘ raise an 
army. 


328 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Boqk VIII. 



to be guaranteed in Peshawer, and all the other districts which he had wrested 
from Afghanistan, but in the event of his assisting the Shah with an auxiliary 
force, he was to have an equal half of whatever booty might be acquired from 

the Barukzyes, and was moreover to 
receive an annual payment from Cabool 
of two lacs of rupees. The claim to 
booty was scarcely reasonable, as, on 
the assumption of Shah <6hujah’s right 
to the throne, the Barukzyes were liis 
subjects, and possessed no property 
which was not already at his sovereign 
disposal; the annual payment was still 
more objectionable, not so much on 
account of its amount as because it 
implied degradation. The King of 
Cabool had hitherto been an indepen¬ 
dent sovereign, but now this annual 
payment, though it purported to be 
made in consideration of a body of at 
least 5000 men being employed to re¬ 
instate the Shah, and afterwards kept 
ready for his service, would be re¬ 
garded, and would be in fact to all intents and purposes, a payment 
of tribute. While thus cui’tailed by the encroachments of the Sikhs, the 
kingdom of Cabool was to be still farther diminished, as one of the new articles 
in.sertcd in the tripartite treaty expressly stipulated that when Shah Shujah 
“ shall have succeeded in establishing his authority in Afghanistan, he shall not 
attack or molest his nephew, the ruler of Herat, in possession of the territories 
now subject to his government.” On all these accounts the joy’^ of Shah Shujah 
at the prospect which had unexpectedly opened upon him, was not without 
mixture, and he therefore submitted a written statement of the points on which 
he deemed it necessary to obtain satisfaction from the British government. A few 
concessions were in consequence made, and the treaty was formally concluded. 

JSfegotiation being now terminated, it became necessary to prepare for 
action. Shah Shujah was natui-ally anxious that not a day should be lost. 
While a mere pensioner at Loodiana, and a mission was in Cabool conferring 
with Dost Mahomed, he had been interdicted from corresponding with those of his 
former subjects who might still be disposed to adhere to him. This interdict was 
now removed, and he began to circulate letters for the purpose of ascertaining the 
amount of support on which he might calculate. The answer was so favourable 
that he had little difficulty in flattering himself, and even inspiring others, with 
the hope that thousands were ready to flock to his standard. One fear only 


UUNJEET SlNO. 

From an oriental painting on glaM, in the Aluaeum at the Kaet India House. 


CHAr. III.] 


PREPAEATIONS FOR HOSTILITIES. 


329 


haunted him, and it was that others would attempt to do the work for him, 
instead of allowing him to achieve it for himself His countrymen were too 
proud and jealous of their independence to tolerate a foreign invader, and tliere- 
foi% it was essential, if not to his success, at least to the future stability of his 
government, that he should make his appearance in Afghanistan at the head 
of an army which he could call his own, because raised by him, paid by him, 
and commanded in his name. The first thing necessary therefore was to com¬ 
mence the formation of such an array. Tliis was no easy task. Money being 
supplied in abundance, there was no lack of recruits, but the' great difficulty 
v/as to make it appear that they were in any sense the troops of Shah Shujah. 
The work of raising and disciplining them was necessarily committed to 
British officers, who were Alone capable of performing it, while the small pro¬ 
portion which the natives of Afghanistan bore to the whole mass collected, made 
it ludicrous to speak of it as an Afghan force. Shah Shujah, who was well 
aware, and had distinctly declared that “the fact of his being upheld by 
foreign force alone could not fail to detract, in a great degree, from his dignity 
and consequence,” did his best to save appearances by taking an open and 
active part in whatever related to the organization of his army, by appealing 
often on parade, where the honours due to sovereignty were regularly paid to 
him, and by causing all proceedings of a military nature to be formally and 
ostentatiously reported to him. These • 
semblances, however, imposed upon no 
one; the real fact was too apparent; and 
the ne-w levies, having nothing of a 
national character belonging to them, 
continued to be regarded as his only by 
a misnomer. They would still there¬ 
fore hq,ve been detested by the Afghans 
fis foreign intruders, even if they had 
been able by themselves alone to caivy 
him in triumph to Cabool. Of this, 
however, they were totally incapable, 
and it soon became manifest that success 
was hopeless, unless the British, instead 
of acting merely as auxiliaries, were pre¬ 
pared to bear the brunt of the contest. 

The governor-general, when he gave the instructions to Mr. Macnaghten, did 
not seem to contemplate the employment of British troops further than to make a 
demonstration by occupying Shikarpoor. Sir Henry Fane, the commander-in-, 
chief, who had a better knowledge of the nature of the hostilities about to be 
waged, insisted that the expedition should be on an adequate scale, and that 
for this purpose a complete and formidable army was absolutely required. His 
Voi. III. 236 


A.D. 1838. 


Mature of 
oiTiiy raised' 
by Shall 
Shujah. 


Small iiro- 
portion of 
Afghans in< 
eluded hf It. 



f 


SlIAH SHOJAH - HL - MoOLK. 
After « eketoh by O T. Tigiie. 




A.D. 1838. 


*St|itifth lire- 
« paratioiis 
ioT an Af¬ 
ghan war. 


oLord Auck- 
'laiid ex. 
plains his 

pniioy. 


330 HISTORY OF INDIA. [Book VIII. 

opinion prevailed, and accordingly “ the army of the Indus” began to be talked 
of. Shah Shujah and his levies were still to take the lead, but a British army, 
following close upon their steps, was to cross the Indus and direct its march 
upon Candahar. The preparations were accordingly commenced on this mag¬ 
nified scale, and in August, 1838, the different regiments intended to be 
employed were warned for field service. Both the Bengal and the Bombay 
presidencies were to furnish quotas. The army of the former, under the personal 
command of Sir Henry Fane, was to rendezvous at Kurnal, situated near the 
right bank of the Jumna, about seventy-eight miles north of Delhi. The 
Bombay army, under the command of Sir John Keane, was to be conveyed by 
sea to the coast of Scinde, and then proceed upwards along the Indus to effect 
a junction with the Bengal army. 

Though these preparations had been begun. Lord Auckland had not yet com¬ 
municated his intentions explicitly to the home authorities. This was now done 
in a letter to the secret committee, dated 13th Augu.st, 1838. Knowing generally 
the views entertained by the British ministry, he had good ground for antici¬ 
pating their approval, but deemed it necessary notwithstanding to enter at 
some length into a justification of his new policy. “ Of the course about to be 
pursued,” he .says, “there cannot exist a reasonable doubt. We owe it to our 
own safety to assist the lawful sovereign of Afghanistan in the recovery of his 
throne. The welfare of our possessions in the East I’equires that we should, in 
the present crisis of affairs, have a decidedly friendly power on our frontiers; 
and that we should have an ally who is interested in resisting aggression and 
establishing tranquillity, in place of a chief seeking to identify himself with 
those whose schemes of aggrandizement and conquest are not to be disguised. 
The Barukzye chiefs, from their disunion, weakness, and unpopularity, were 
ill-fitted, under any circumstances, to be useful allies, or to aid us in our just 
and necessary views of resisting encroachment from the westward.’' Referring 
afterwards to the great expense that will necessarily be incurred, he thinks this 
consideration must “ be held comparatively light when contrasted with the 
magnitude of the object to be gained,” and then speaks of his own responsibility. 
“ I have acted in a crisis which has suddenly arisen, and at a period when 
appearances in every quarter were the most threatening to the tranquillity of 
the British Indian empire, in the manner which has seemed to me essential to 
insure the safety, and to assert the power and dignity of our government. I 
have, in adopting this step, been deeply sensible of the responsibility which it 
places on me; but I have felt, after the most anxious deliberation, that I could 
not otherwise acquit myself of my trust.” On this subject of responsibility it 
may suffice here to mention that the mind of the governor-general must soon 
h4ve been set at rest. Sir John Hobhouse, now Lord Broughton, stated in the 
House of Commons, when the expediency and justice of the Afghan war were 
’■strongly (]|uesti©ned, that Lord. Auckland must not bear the blame of the 



Chap. III.] 


THE SIMLA MANIFESTO. 


331 


measure; it was the policy of the government; and he might mention that the a.d. 
despatch which he wrote (he was then president of the Bbard of Control), 
stating his opinion of the course that ought to be taken in order to meet 
expected emergencies, and that written by Lord Auckland, informing him that 
the expedition had already been imdertaken, crossed each other on the way.” 

After the above communication to the British government, another of great 

• 11 . « 1 T ^ ' manifesto. 

importance still remained to be made. It was necessary that there should be 
no misapprehension in any quarter as to the grounds and objects of this new 
war. This could only be provided against by a full exposition made patent to 
all the world, and accordingly, on the 1st of October, 1838, a document, since 
designated the “ Simla manifesto,” was published under the more modest title 
of “ Declaration on the part of the right honourable the Governor-general of 
India.” Its length will not allow us to give it in fuE, but its importance in 
itself, the discussion which it originated, and the historical interest which still 
attaches to it, will not aUow it to be passed over slightly. Its object, as 
announced in its first paragraph, was publicly to expound the “ reasons” which 
have led to the "important measure” of directing "the assemblage of a British 
force for service across the Indus.” After referring to the treaties made in 1832 
with the rulers along the line of that river, and which had for their object, by 
opening its navigation, “ to facilitate the extension of commerce, and to gain for «*utent8. 
the British nation in Asia that legitimate influence which an interchange of 
benefits would naturally produce,” it proceeds to notice the mission of Captain 
Bumes to Cabool. • I'he original objects of this mission were purely commercial, 
and contemplated nothing further than inviting " the aid of the de facto rulers 
of Afghanistan to the measures necessary for giving full cflect to those treaties.” 

Before the mission had reached its destination, intelligence arrived'that "the 
troops of Dost Mahomed Khan had made a sudden and unprovoked attack on 
those of our ancient aEy, Maharajah Runjeet Sing,” and there was therefore 
reason to apprehend that " the flames of war being once kindled in the very 
regions in which Ave were endeavouring to extend our commerce, the peaceful 
and beneficial purposes of the British government would be altogether frus¬ 
trated.” The governor-general, “ to avert a result so calamitous,” authorized 
an intimation to Dost Mahomed, that “ if he Avould evince a disposition to come 
to just and reasonable terms,” he would exert his good offices " for the restora¬ 
tion of an amicable understanding between the two powers.” The result was 
that the Maharajah, “ with the characteristic confidence which he has uniformly 
placed in the faith and friendship of the British nation,” consented that, "in 
the meantime, hostilities on his part should be suspended.” Subsequently it 
became known to the governor-general that the Persians were besieging Herat, 
and that " intrigues were actively prosecuted throughout Afghanistan for the 
purpose of extending Persian influence and authority to the banks of, and even 
beyond the Indus.” Meanwhile,.the mission to Cabool was spending much time 



332 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book Till. 


A D. 18 S 8 . “ in fniitless negotiation.” Dost Mahomed, relying “ upon Persian encourage¬ 
ment and assistance,” urged "the most unreasonable pretensions” in regard to the 
m “avowed schemes of aggrandizement and ambition injurious to the security 

•braced In and pcacc of the frontiers of India, and "openly threatened, in furtherance of 
manifeit^ those schcmes, to call in every foreign aid which he could command,” making 
it evident that “ so long as Cabool remained under his government, we could 
never hope that the tranquillity of our neighbourhood would be secured, or 
that the interests of our Indian empire would be preserved inviolate.” Return¬ 
ing to the siege of Herat, the governor-general’s declaration proceeds as follows;— 
“The siege of that city has now been carried on by the Persian army for-many 
months. The attack upon it was a most unjustifiable and cruel aggression, 
perpetrated and continued, notwithstanding the solemn and repeated remon¬ 
strances of the British envoy at the court of Persia, and after every just and 
becoming offer of accommodation had been made and rejected. The besieged 
have behaved with a gallantry and fortitude worthy of the justice of their 
cause; and the governor-general would yet indulge the hope that their heroism 
may enable them to maintain a successful defence until succours shall reach 
them from British India.” Wliile Persia has thus been evincing her hostility 
so as to compel the cessation of all friendly intercourse with her government, 
the chiefs of Candahar, brothers of Dost Mahomed, “ have avowed their adher¬ 
ence to the Persian policy.” In this crisis of affaii-s, while the governor-general 
“ felt the importance of taking immediate measures for arresting the rapid pro¬ 
gress of foreign intrigue and aggression towards our own territories,” his atten¬ 
tion was naturally drawn “to the position and claims of Shah Shujah-ul-Moolk, 
a monarch who, when in power, had cordially acceded to the measures of united 
resistance iio external enmity, which were at that time judged necessary by 
the British government, and who, on his empire being usurped by its present 
rulcm, had found au honourable asylum in the British dominions.” Though 
aware “ that the Barukzye chiefs, from their disunion and unpopularity, were 
ill fitted, under any circumstances, to be useful allies,” yet, so long as they 
refrained from proceedings injurious to our interests and security, the Britisli 
government acknowledged and respected their authority. Now, however, a 
diflerent policy is indispensable, and we must have on our western frontier 
“ an ally who is interested in resisting aggression and establishing tranquillity, 
in the place of chiefs ranging themselves in subservience to a hostile power, 
and seeking to promote schemes of conquest and aggrandizement.” The 
governor-general therefore “ was satisfied that a pressing necessity as well as 
every consideration of policy and justice warranted us in espousing the cause 
of Shah Shujah-ul-Moolk, “ whose popularity throughout Afghanistan” has 
been proved “ by the strong and unanimous testimony of the best authoritiea” 
After this determination it seemed “just and proper, no less from the position 
of Maharajah Runjeet Sing than from his undeviating ^friendship towards the 



Chap. III.] 


THE SIMLA MANIFESTO. 


333 


British government, that his highness should have the offer of becoming a party a. a isss. 
to the contemplated operations,” and the result has been “ the conclusion of a 
triplicate treaty by the British government, the Maharajah, and Shah Shujah- content* of 
ul-Moolk, whereby his highness is guaranteed in his present possessions, and manifesto, 
has bound himself to co-operate for the restoration of the Shah to the throne 
of his ancestors,” The declaration next refers to various points which had 
been adjusted, and promises that “a guaranteed independence will, upon favour¬ 
able conditions, be tendered to the Ameers of Scinde,” and 4hat “ the integrity 
of Herat, in the possession of its pi’esent ruler, will be fully respected.” From 
fill these measures, “completed or in progress, it may reasonably be hoped 
that the general freedom and security of commerce will be promoted; that the 
name and just influence of the British government will gain their proper footing 
among the nations of Central Asia; that tranquillity will be established upon 
the most important frontier of India; and that a lasting barrier will be raised 
against hostile intrigue and encroachment.” The concluding paragraph of the 
declaration is not unworthy of being quoted verlmtim :— 

“ His majesty Shah Shujah-ul-Moolk will enter Afghanistan, surrounded by itoconcin- 
his own troops, and will be supported against foreign interference and factious 
opposition by a British army.- The governor-general confidently hopes, that 
the Shah will be speedily replaced on his tin-one by his own subjects and 
adherents; and when once he shall be secured in power, and the independence 
and integrity of Afghanistan established, the British army will be withdrawn. 

The governor-general has been led to these measures by the duty which is 
imposed upon him, of providing for the security of the possessions of the British 
crown; but he rejoices that in the discharge of his duty he will be enabled tt) 
assist in restoring the union and prosperity of the Afghan people. Throughout 
tlie approaching operations, British influence will be sedulously employed to 
further every measure of general benefit, to reconcile differences, to secure 
oblivion of injuries, and to, jiut an end to the distractions by which for so many 
years the welfare and happiness of the Afghans have been impaired. Even to 
the chiefs, whose hostile proceedings have given just cause of offence to the 
British government, it will seek to secure liberal and honourable treatment on 
their tendering early submission, and ceasing from opposition to the couree of 
measures which may be judged the most suitable for the general advantage of 
their country.” 

To the declaration was appended a list of appointments, of which it is Appomt-^ ' 
necessary only to notice that of Mr. Macnaghten, secretary to government, who wa<iimghten 
was to “assume the functions of envoy and minister on the part of the govern- “™“’' 
ment of India at the court^of Shah Shujah-ul-Moolk,” and that of Captain 
Bumes, who wtis to “be employed, under Mr. Macnaghten’s directions, as envoy 
to the chief of Kelat or other statea” The former appointment must have 
been conferred in accordance with Mr. MacUaghten's wishes, and may be con- 



33* HISfOEY OF INDIA. [Book VIII. 

a.d. 1838. sidered as an instance of that vaulting ambition, which too often tempts 
men to quit the station for which they are best qualified, and grasp at another, 

Appoint- for which they are totally unfitted by nature or experience. The second 

MMn^hten appointment was not accepted without some degree of reluctance, and was 

andBnme.. ygg^rjjed as Icss an honour than a disappointment. Captain Burnes, in writing 
to a friend on the subject of the “grand campaign,” which, on his return from 
Cabool, he had been invited to assist in planning, says, “What exact part I am 
to play I know not, but if full confidence and hourly consultation be any pledge 
I am to be chief. I can "plainly tell them, it is aut Caesar aut nullus, and if 
I get not what I have a right to, you will soon see me en route to England.” 
Of course the appointment he meant was that of political chief. Instead of 
this, to be gazetted as only a subordinate envoy to a comparatively insignificant 
khanat of Beloochistan, or “other states,” so little known or thought of that a 
name could not be given to them, was such a descent, that he did not hesitate 
to express his dissatisfaction. Lord Auckland .succeeded in soothing him by 
promises, which though vague were understood to mean, that after seating Shah 
Shujah at Cabool, Mr. Macnaghten would return to his former office, and be 
succeeded by him in the chiefship. To such an arrangement Burnes was the 
more easily reconciled, because, as he himself expressed it, “I am not sorry to 
see Dost Mahomed ousted by another hand than mine.” Why so? Obviously 
because he felt that Dost Mahomed did not deserve the treatment to which he 
was about to be subjected. 

The Simla TWs opiniou was shared by many .besides Captain Burnes, and was one cause 
of the severe criticism which the Simla manifesto provoked, and which, it must 
be confessed, it was ill fitted to bear. According to the governor-general, the 
Sikhs, who had seized Peshawer as they had previously seized Cashmere, by 
gross treachery, were entirely in the right; the Afghans, in endeavouring to 
regain it, were wholly in the wrong; and the only thing wanting to insure 
peace was, that Dost Mahomed “should evince a disposition to come to just 
and reasonable terms with the Maharajah.” So far from evincing such a 
disposition, his troops “had made a sudden and unprovoked attack on those of 
our ancient ally,” and he persisted “in urging the most unreasonable preten¬ 
sions”—pretensions so unreasonable, that the governor-general could not, 
“consistently with justice and his regard for the friendship of Maharajah 
Runjeet Sing, be the channel of submitting them to the consideration of his 
highness.” These statements of the manifesto are absolutely preposterous. 
They are not only not in accordance with fact, but fly in the very face of it, 
and therefore in so far as the determination to oust Dost MaHomed was founded 
on them, they can only be viewed as false pretexts, framed for the purpose 
of perpetrating gross injustice. The next charge which the manifesto brings 
against Dost Mahomed is, if po^ble, still more unfounded. “He avowed 
schemes of aggrandizement and ambition;” he “openly threatened, in furtherance 



Chap. III.] 


THE SIMLA MANIFESTO, 


335 


of those schemes, to call in every foreign aid which he could command,” and a.d. isss. 
“ultimately, he gave his undisguised support to the Persian designs in Afgha- 
nistan.” Where does all this appear ? Certainly not in any part of the cor- Beflactiom 
respondence giving an account of the proceedings of the mission. He certainly 
desired the restoration of Peshawer, but he was willing to accept it however 
hampered it might be by conditions. He had no wish to go to war for it. On 
the contrary, he confessed that he had no forces to cope with those of Runjeet 
Sing, and therefore implored the fnendly offices of the governor-general to pro¬ 
cure it for him by amicable arrangement. What was tlie answer? Runjeet 
Sing, having gained possession of Peshawer, means to keep it, and you must 
cease to hope tliat it ever can become yours. There the matter rested. But he 
threatened to call in every foreign aid he could command. Where again does 
this appear? He courted an alliance with the British government, and was so 
eager to obtain it, that so long as there was the least hope of success, he turned 
a deaf ear to aU the flattering promises of Persian and Russian agenta Only 
give me a little encouragement, is his language to the govemor-generuL I wish 
no friendship but yours; only assure me that if the Persians or any other 
western power attack me, I may rely on your protection. Look again at the 
answer. You should be ashamed to ask protection against the Persians, as you 
should be able enough to protect yourself. At all events, the British govern¬ 
ment will not promise to protect you. It will only promise to intercede with incon«irtent 
Runjeet Sing not to resume hostilities, and in return for this act of friendship, 
it expects that you will form no alliance without its sanction, and in particular 
tliat you will forthwith dismiss the Russian agent, and reject all Persian over- 
turea Were not all this contained in the published correspondence, it would 
scarcely be possible to believe that these were the only tenns which the 
governor-general offered. Dost Mahomed, on being guaranteed from an attack 
by Runjeet Sing, a favour which, -as no such attack was apprehended, was 
absolutely worthle.ss, was to bind himself hand and foot to the British govern¬ 
ment, and fight its battles single-handed, by interposing his territories as a 
barrier between Persia and India. The hostility of Persia and of Russia he 
would thus almost to a certainty provoke, but, be this as it may, he must 
not expect the least assistance. Nothing can be more monstrous than the terms 
thus offered to Dost Mahomed, unless it be the complaint of the manifesto, 
that “ultimately,” on finding himself dealt with in this grossly unfair and 
niggardly spirit, “he gave his undisguised support to the Persian designs.” 

The case which the manifesto sought to establish against Dost Mahomed 
having completely broken down, the measures founded upon it admit of no 
justification, and ik is therefore the less necessary to enter into any*detailed 
examination of the other grounds on which the governor-general attempts .to 
justify his projected invasion of Afghanistan, and subyersion of its existing 
government. . The only points deserving o^ notice are the assertions of the 



336 


HISTOEY OF INDIA. 


[Book VIII. 


A.D. 1838. 


The Biege of 
Kent by 
PenlA not 
unJuatiA- 
abl«. 


Opinion of 
Mr. M‘Neill. 


maaiifesto respecting the siege of Herat, and the expediency of setting up .Shah 
Shujak The attack upon Herat is described as “ a most unjustifiable and cruel 
aggression.” The meaning must be that the ruler of Herat had done nothing 
to provoke it, and that on the part of the Persians it was “ perpetrated and 
continued ” in mere wantonness, without the shadow of an excuse. This view 
is by no means correct, and is totally at variance with numerous statements 
contained in the correspondence relating to Persia and Afghanistan presented 
to parliament, and ordered to be printed in 1839. In a memorandum submitted 
by Mr. .Ellis to Lord Palmerston in t^ie beginning of 1836, he acknowledges 
that the conduct of Kamran in violating his engagements with the Persian 
government “has given the Shah a full justification for commencing hostilities.” 
So indisputable does he hold the fact to be, that in a letter to Kamran liimself 
he tells him he “has learned with extreme sorrow that in consequence of 
failure in the performance of engagements,” the Shah “intends to seek redress 
by force of arms, and to invade the territory of Herat,” and he therefore, both 
as a friend and “ as the representative of the British government,” sta’ongly 
advises him to avert the calamities of war, by sending a proper person to the 
Shah, “ both to compliment his'*majesty on his succession, and to assure him 
that all the engagement which he has contracted shall without, further delay be 
completely fulfilled.” Mr. M'Neill, who succeeded Mr. Ellis, took the same 
view, and expre.ssed it still more strongly. In a despatch to Lord Palmerston, 
dated 24th February, 1837, after mentioning that on the death of the Abbas 
Meerjsa “ negotiations were enteied into, whioli terminated in the conclusion of 
an agreement for the cessation of hostilities between the parties, and the demar¬ 
cation of a line of boundary,” he continues thus, “From that time up to the 
present moment Persia has committed no act of hostility against the A%hans; 
but on the death of the late Shah, the government of Herat made predatory 
incursions into the Persian territories, in concert with the Turcomans and 
Hazareks, and captured the subjects of Persia, for the purpose of selling them 
as slaves. This system of warfare has from that time been carried on without 
intermission by the Afghans of Herat, and Persia has not retaliated these acts 
of aggression by any hostile measure, unless the public annunciation of its 
intention to attack Herat should be regarded as such. Under these circum¬ 
stances there cannot, .1 think, be a^ doubt that the Shah is fully justified in 
making war on Prince Kamran; and though the capture of Herat by Persia 
would certainly be an evil of great magnitude, we could not wonder if the Shah 
were to disregard our remonstrances, and to assert his right to make war on an 
enemy who has given him the greatest provocation, and whom he may regard 
himself Ss bound in duty to his subjects to punish, or even to put down.” In 
the face of such documents, is it not strange that Lord Auckland and his 
advisers could commit themselves to the statement th|*t the attack on Herat 
was “an unjustifiable and ciuel aggression?” That it was impolitic, the event 



Cbap. Iir.] THE SIMLA MANIFESTO, *SS7/ 

proved, and that its success, more especially after Russia had begun jto tidcer the a d. ishb. 
lead in it, would have seriously compromised Britkh interests, may be readily 
conceded; but surely in order to justify the determinfition to march to the relief 
of Herat, it could not be necessarj’’ to make assertions which were false, and 
could so easily be disproved. 

The only other point in the manifesto to which it may be proper to advert, shahshn- 
is the alleged popularity of Shah Shujah in Afghanistan. His popularity, it is popuiarity. 
affirmed, “'had been proved to his lordship by the strong and unanimous testi¬ 
mony of the best authorities.” Who ^ere these ? First and superior to all 
testimony was the fact that Shah Shujah had repeatedly attempted to regain 
his throne, but was so feebly supported, and so formidably opposed, that he only 
saved himself by flight, to return an almost solitary fugitive to the asylum 
granted him by British generosity at Loodiana. Against this fact, unless some 
extraordinary change of public feeling had since taken place (and this was not 
alleged), the testimony of the be.st authorities ought not to have prevailed. 

Be.sid@3, unless the governor-general was in possession of testimony which he 
did not deem it necessary or proper to co:^|^Hnicate, the correspondence, in 
which the best authorities might have been expected fully to disclose their senti¬ 
ments, does anything but bear “strong and unanimous testimony” to Shah 
Shujah*8 popularity. It is unneceasary, however, to discuss the j)omt further, 
i»s future events only too clearly proved that the idea of this popularity, on the 
faith of which the manifesto expresses a confident hoj)e “that the Shah will be 
speedily replaced on his throne by his own subjects and adherents," was mere 
delusion. 

It thus appears that the Simla manifesto is little better than a tissue of t™* 

. *** • <.•«.. I'll terofijord 

unjust accusations, gross mis-statements, and vain imaginations, and that the Auckland'^ 
hostilities about"lo be commenced, however triumphant they might prove, could 
not be justified on grounds either of justice or expediency.,. War engaged in 
under such circumstances was at once a blunder and a crime, and a successful 
result being at variance with the moral laws by which Providence governs the 
world, could hardly be anticipated. At the same time there were other consider¬ 
ations connected with the war itself which gave it a very ominous appearance. 

The nature of the country in which it was to be carried on; the turbulepce, fero¬ 
city, and boldness of the semi-barbarous tribes which occupied it^ its immense 
distance, which made it impossible to reach it till after a long and toilsome 
march over desert tracts, and through deep, narrow, and precipitous gorges, 
which a band of resolute men might close against an army; the almost insur¬ 
mountable difficulty of transporting supplies and keeping open the communica¬ 
tion with the districts from which they must necessarily be drawn—all these 
things made it very questionable if the invading army would ever reach Cabool. 

But assuming that it did, what then ? “ If you send 27,000 men up the Dutto-i- 
Bolan to Candahar,** wrote Mr. Blphinstone; “ and can feed them, I have no 
Vox.. III. 5iafl 



.1 


■Interview 
l>et)vo6u th^ 
governor- 
gAtierul iiixl 
T?iuijQj:t 
King. 


Mit HISTORY. OF INPIA, [Book VIII. 

!ta]&e^ Qiiidahar and Gabool, and set up Shujali; but for main- 
-tainl^'^'hiiiet in a poor, cold, strong, and remote country, among a turbulent 
‘p^ple-.Tike the Afghans, I own it seems to me to be hopeless.” And what said 
the*Duke of .WeUingtcm.?—“The consequence of crossing the Indus once to 
settle a government in Afghanistan will be a perennial march into tliat country.” 
The di.e hoi^ever had been cast; and so little were the difficulties appreciated 
even in.high qitarters-that, according to the celebrated and lamented Sir Henry 
Havelock, ,’^rho took part in the campaign and published an excellent account 
of ft's earlier stage, “a civil fuiictionary distinguished for talent addressing an 
officei’nf rank assui’ed him that our advance into Afghanistan Avould be no 
more tlian a prome'iuide m 'ditcure. " 

' The Bengal portion of the armj’ of the Indus, than wbicb, sa^ s Havelock, 
“ a force lias never been brought together in an}' country in a manner more 
creditable and soldier-like,” after assembling at Kurnal, marclieil westward tit 
Fcrozepoor, situated on the Garra, about thirty miles S.S.E. of Lahore, in the 
end of November. The governor general and Runjeet Sing arrived here by 
previous appointment at the same time, and relieved their more grave ])olitical 
discussions by what Havelock calls “ .sbow\' ]iageants, gay doings, luid feats of 
mimic war.” Loid Auckland’s camjt was about four miles from the Garra. and 
consisted of a wide street of large tents, in the centre of wbicb was the suite 
of lofty and spacious ajiartmcnts of canvas used for the durbar. On the 28th 
of November be was ^’isited l>y tin* Mabarajab. The etiquette pursued on the 
occasion and the whole scene are thus described by Havelock;—“ I’liere is an 
established ceremonial on these occasions. An escort of all arms usually lines 
the space between the pavilions for some hundred yards, and the elephants of 
the British siiwarree are drawn up in front of the duibar tent.’’ On the 
approach of the Maharajah, announced by a salute of ordnaSce, “ the British 
suwarree moved forward a few yaids to pay the compliment of the itilKjhd, as 
it is called, or initiative advance in meeting, both siiwarrees having halted for a 
raomeut befoi’e this courteous concession was made. Lord Auckland, babiteil 
in a blue coat eml)roidered with gold, and wearing the ribbon of the Bath, bis 
secretaries in tlic showy diplomatic co.stumc of similar colour and richness. 
Sir Henry Fane in the uniform of a general officer covered witli orders, the 
tallest Hand most stately ])erson in the whole proce.s.sion of both nations, the 
numeroTXS staffs of the civil ruler and military chief in handsome uniforms, 
made altogether a gallant show, as their animals with a simultaneous rush, 
urged by the blows and voices of the rnohauts, moved to the front. Forward 
te meet them, thei'e came on a noisy and disorderly though gorgeous rabble of 
Sikh horse and footmen, sliouting out the titles of their great Sirdar, somi- 
liabited in glittering brocade, some in the husuntee, or bright spring yellow 
dresses which command so much respect in the Punjab, some wearing chain 
armour. But behind these' clamorous foot and cavaliers; were the elephants 



Chap. Jlf.] 


%UNJEBT 


'S3S- 


Jtotweou*tha 

governor- 

Riinjeo' 

Sing. 




of the Lonl of Lahore; and seated on the; foremost. vr'M se^n an'old” naan in ah a.r. 
advanced stage of decrepitude, clothed in faded erimson, his head,wrapped up 
ill folds of cloth of the same colour. His single eye still lighted up .with "the 
fire of enterprise, his gray hair and beard, and countenance Qf ‘calm design, 
assured the spectators that this could be no other than the Old‘Jjion of the 
Punjab.’ The shock of elephants at the moment of meeting is i^ally- terrific. 
More than a hundi’ed of these active and sagacious but enormous ahiihhls, 
goaded on by their drivers in contnuy directions, arfe suddenly brouglit to-a 
stand-still by the collision of oiiposing fronts and foreheads. This is. the'mo,8t 
interesting moment; for now the governor-general, rising up in his howdah) 
approaches that of Runjcct, returns his salam, einliraces him, and takin^'-Him 
l)y the arm; and supporting his tottering 
frame, places him by his side on his own 
clci»hant. All this is managed amidst the 
roaring, trumpeting, pushing and cru.shiiig 
of impetuous and gigantic animals, and then 
tlieone-c^^ed monarch having ccirdially shaken 
hands with Sir Henry Fane, and every one of 
the two suites whom lie recognized (as the 
jiarties to receive his lordly greeting leant 
over the railing of their loft\' \ ehicle.s), the. 
boast which bore the burden of the two ruloi-s 
Avas Avith difficulty wheeled about in the 
crowd, and the whole of both suwarrees rushed 
tumultuously i\nd_pele riu’le after it towards 
the entrance of the durbar tent.’ . 

A .strange incident closed the scene. “In a retired part of the suite of tents, 
w'ere placed two very handsome, well-cast howitzers, intended as complimentary 
gifts to the Sikh ruler. These he came forth from the council tent, supported 
by Sir Henry Fane, to see. The light in the i-eces.ses of these sjiacious pavilions 
was glimmering and crepnsculous, and the aged Maharajah, heedless of the shells 
which were piled in jiyramids below, Avas stejiping up toAvards the muzzles of the 
guns, Avhen his feet tripped amid the spherical niis.siles, and in a moment he 
lay jnostrate on his face and at full length up(.>n the floor in fremt of the cannon. 

The kind and [ironijit exertions of Sir Heniy replaced him instantaneously on 
his legs; but the siH'ctacle t)f the Loi’d of the Punjab extended in involuntary 
obei.sance before the mouths of the British artillei’y, was regai’ded by the Sikhs 
as a picture of fearful omen.” In the death of llunjeet Sing .shortly afterwands, 
and subsequent events which resulted in the extinction of Sikh independence, 
the omen must have seemed to them .signally fulfilled. 

' Tills very intermtiiig lelio was bronglit from teueil on to a framework of wood. The oosbions 
I.ahore. It is made of thin platos of gold, bean- and lining fo the throne are of crimson and yellow 
tifully ornamented with arabesques of flowers, fas- velvet;' 



e.l)I.DKN Th^NE ok RlJK.TEliT SiNO.' 
Fiolu thv originsf 1u' MttMutn, India Houw’> 


OniiiKdUP 

accident 

U) 

SiiiK. 



A.D. 1888. 


Festivities 
at Feroze- 
poor. 


Afglmi) «x- 

persiKted iu 
after ruining 
of tlie sioge 
of Herat. 


340 SISTOEY OF INDIA. [Book VIII. 

The counter-visit of the governor-general to the Maharajah, and the enter¬ 
tainment and amusements following upon it, need not be described. It would 
give little pleasure to tell how groups-of hunohunees, whom Havelock does not 
hesitate to call “choral and dancing prostitutes,” performed “iu presence 
of the ladies of the family of a British governor-general,” and how Runjeet 
Sing, who was “brutally pre-eminent among Punjabees in his vices,” sat on his 
musnud jesting familiarly with all Who approached him, and pressing, almost 
forcing upon his illustrious guests “ potations from his own cup of the fiery' 
distilled spirit, which he liimself had' quailed with delight for some forty years,” 
but which “the hardest drinker in the Briti.sh camj) could not with impunity 
indulge in” for six successive nights. Nor is it necessary to dwell on the grand 
reviews, iu which “the tactics and warlike forces of both nations were displa 3 'ed 
to the best advantage, on two several days of martial exercise.” Suffice it 
to quote the observation witli which Havelock concludes his account of the 
Ferozepoor festivities. “It was the policy of the hour to humour and caress 
the old rulei’ of the Punjab, who with all his faults was now to be regarded as 
a valuable ally; and since he had come from his capital down to the Garra to 
meet us, might iu some sort be reckoned, either on tlie one bank or the other, 
as a visitor. But it was impossible not to feel that this complaisance was 
carried a little too far, when he was exhibited in the character of a Bacchus or 
Silenus urging others to take part in his orgies, in the presence of an assem¬ 
blage of English gentlewomen, and when these notions of decency were further 
outraged by the introduction, to whatever extent sanctioned by culpable usage 
in other parts of India, of bands of singing and dancing courtezans.” 

The whole of the force wliich had been assembled for the invasion of Afghan¬ 
istan was not destined to be actually employed After all the preparations hail 
been made, on the understanding that it would be necessary to march to the 
relief of Herat, and there encounter a Persian army, aided perhaps by Russian 
auxiliaries, intelligence arrived that the siege of Herat was raised. One main 
inducement to the commencement of hostilities had ceased to exist, and the 
question immediately arose, whether the whole expedition might not now be 
abandoned. The governor-general, who a])pears to have become as resolute as 
he was at first he.sitiitiug, lost no time in setting this question at rest, bj”^ 
publishing orders which commenced with an extract from the letter of Colonel 
Stoddart, announcing that the siege was raised, and then proceeded fis follows:— 
“In giving publicity to this important intelligence, the governor-general deems 
it proper at the same time to notify, that while he regards the relinquishment 
by the Shah of Persia of his hostile designs upon Herat as a just cause of con¬ 
gratulation to the government of British India and its allies, he will continue 
to prosecute with vigour the measures which have been announced, with a 
view 4o the substitution of a friendly for a hostile power in the eastern pro- 
' vinces of Afghanistan, and to thq establishment of a permanent barrier upon our 



Chap. Ill.j 


THE AFGHAN CAMPAIGN. 


841 


north-west frontier/' The orders conclude. witli. |ihe appointment of Eldred a.d. isss. 
Pottinger as political agent, and a weU-desei-ved compliment to him for the “forti¬ 
tude, ability, and judgment" with which, “under circumstances of peculiar danger orJ®™ 
and difficulty,'’ he had "honourably sustoiiied the rcjjutation and'interestsof his Lord Auok> 
country.” In a letter to the secret committee, Lord Auckland justifies his deter- 
mination to persevere, on the ground that it “v^as required from us,'alike in 
observance of the treaties into which 1 had entered with the Maharajah 
Kutijcet Sing, and his majesty Shah Shujah-ul-Moolk, and by paramount con¬ 
siderations of dcfen^ve policy.” 

The campaign, however, having been deprived of one of the most important For™ ’>« 
objects originally contemplated by it, did not require to be conducted on the in Afgluin 
same extensive scale. The British army assembled at Ferozepoor amounted aimhl'ahcd 
to about 13,000 men. It was now determined that of these only 7500 should 
b<! actually employed. Sir Henry Fane, whose health had begun to fail, 
resolved, in consequence of the altered state of affairs, to I’esign his command 
and return to England. Previous to his departui’e, it became part of his duty 
to select the troops which were to ])roceed on the ex})edition. As all the 
regiments were eager for active service, the task of selection appeared to him 
so delicate and invidious, that he shrunk from it, and abandoning the exercise 
of his own judgment had recourse to the extraordinary device of deciding by 
lot. The pro(;ess was completed in his Excellency’s tent, and the result was 
announced to be that the 1st, 2d, and 4th brigades weie to move forward, and 
tlie 3(1 and 5th remain near the Garra. On this subject Havelock justly 
remarks, “Sir Henry Fane need not thus have distrusted, nor }>aid so poor a 
compliment to his own sagacity and impartiality; the one had seldom been at 
fault iz) Iizdia or in Europe, and the other was above suspicion.” As might hzive 
lieen anticipated, the hap-hazzird plan proved as mischievous as it was irrational, 
for “it sent forward to the labours of the campaign the 13th light infzmtiy 
iTlavelock's own regiment), then, zis evci', zealmzs indeed and full of zdacrity, 
hut even at Ferozepoor shzittered by disezise—the spirit of the soldiers williizg, 
hat their physical powers unequzd to the task; whilst it doomed to inactivity 
the Buffs, one of the most effective European corps in India.” The whole 

, ^ . . ReJoAJted. 

azniy about to be employed in the Afghanistan ex])edition was now composed as 
follows; the Bengal force,under Major-generzil Sir Willoughby Cotton, 9500 men; 

Shah Shxyah’s, GOOO, and the Bombziy force contingent under Sir John Keane, 
who was appointed to succeed Sir Henry Fane as commandei'-in-chief, 5G00— 
fu’nounting in all to 21,100. Besides these, a force of about 3000 men was 
to be statizmed in Scinde; and in the north, the Shahzada, Shah Shujah’s eldest 
son, wfis to head a fox’ce of 4800 men, commanded by British officem, under the 
immediate superintendence of Colonel Wade, and penetrate with it and a Sikli 
contingent of 6000 through th|! Khyber Pziss to Cabool. This route would 
also have been the most accessible for the army* assembled at Ferozepoor, brzjt 



1838. 


Wt bft ^ 
Alighanv '• 


lU AiTiva] 
at BAhawiil- 
Hoor. 


342 lilSTOEY OF INDIA. [Book VIII. 

it .would have been difficult to obtain the consent of Run^eet Sing, who with 
all his professed confidence in the British had not entirely divested himself of 
suspicion, and it was moreover necessary to select the route by which the 
meditated junction with the Bombay division might be most easily effected. 
Shah Shujah’s army, in order to give it the precedence which he was so 
anxious to claim for it, took the lead and commenced the march southward in 
the direction of Bahawulpoor, in the first week of December, 1836. On the 
loth, a few days later, it was followed by the Bengal army, consisting of the 
cavalry brigade commanded by Colonel Arnold, tlie artillery brigade com¬ 
manded by Major Pew, and the 1st, 2d, .and 4th brigades of infantry, com¬ 
manded respectively by Colonel Sale, Major-general Nott, and Lieutenant- 
colonel Roberts. Tlie order of march was as follows. The sappers and miners 
and engineer department were to precede the leading column by never 
fewer than two marches, improving the line of road as they moved on. Then 
came the cavalry brigade, followed by the infantry brigades, one after the 
other on sticcessive days, and the siege train and jjark. Besides a certain 
<piantity of supplies which each column carried with it, the commissariat sup- 
[dies of all kinds were sufficient for thirty days; additional quantities of grain 
were sent down the Indus to Iloree, and dep6ts were formed at Bahawulpoor, 
Shikarpoor, &c. A large reserve depot was moreover established .at Ferozepoor. 
The canq) followers were about 38,000, and the number of camels employed 
for su]q)lies only was 14,235. Including the other camels, public and ])riv.ate, 
the whole number accompanying the army could not be less than 30,000. On 
the 27th of December the aiiny arrived at Bahawulpoor. Little difficulty had 
been exi)erienced. Though the weather was cold, the air was clear and health¬ 
ful, the roiids good, the country open, and at every stage the supplies were 
abundant. “These,” says Havelock “were the halcyon days of the movements 
of this force.” The greatest inconvenience experienced was the desertion of 
followers, who carried off the hired camels, and left their masters without the 
means of transport. For a large .share of this inconvenience the mastci'.s had 
themselves to blame. Though an order of precaution had been issued, most of 
the officers had too many, camels, too large teiits, tTnd too much baggage. 
The consecpience was tliat even in the most favourable pait of the march, 
forage became so difficidt that the camels fell off greatly in condition, and the 
deaths were numerous. Those who had hired out their camels, having thus 
obtained a slight foretaste of the gi-eater evils awaiting them, took the alarm, 
and as the most effectual means of escaping danger, resolved not to face it. 
The propinquity of the desert made it easy for them to effect their purpo.se, and 
the utmost vigilance of patrolling parties appointed for the purpose had little 
effect in preventing desertion. Before six marches had been completed, much 
private baggage, bedding, and camp equijrage, was unavoidtJbly abandoned. 

The Khan of Bahawulpoor had always been a faitliful British ally, and on 



Chap. III.] 


THE AFGHAN CAMPAIGN. 


34S 


this occasion appears to have exerted hijmself in providing for the comfort of a.D; 
the army, though his m’feans were scaieely adequate to Ijis wish^, and eorne 
complaints were unreasonably made against him for not obviating" or mitigat- 
ing evils, which under the circumstances were absolutely inevitable. . On the : 

Ist of January, 1839, the army again started, and prepared to enter the tend-■ 
tory of the Ameers of Scinde. Treaties already existed, in which the Ameers 
were recognized as independent princes and the mutual rights of the two 
governments clearly defined, but Lord Auckland had acted from the first as if 
lie imagined that he had no occasion to solicit'wherever he was able to compel, 
and that a treaty with a weaker gave a right to the stronger party to disre¬ 
gard its stipulations as often as the observance of these was felt to be incon¬ 
venient. In defiance of one of the articles on which the Ameers had specially 
insisted, and ui wluch they felt that their strongest security against any attack 
on their independence lay. Lord Auckland had addressed a despatch to the 
resident in Scinde, in which he coolly told him in effect, that he had resolved 
to commit a bi’each of faith, and therefore, “while the present exigency lasts, 
you may apprise the Ameers that the article of the treaty with them, prohibit¬ 
ing the using of the Indus for the conveyance of military stores, must 
necessarily be suspended during the eoui'se of the operations undertaken foi' 
the permanent establishment of security to all those who are a party to the 
treaty.” Not satisfied with this arrogant violation of an obligation to which aucu. 
the British government stoml solemnly and publicly pledged, he goes on to ofloitiuig*^ 
givy.! a kind of insight into the arrogant and iniituitous couise of policy which ‘'‘™‘ 
he was pr-epared to pursue. It is hai’dly necessary, he says, “to remiml you 
that in the important crisis at which we are arrived, we cannot permit our 
enemies to occujiy the seat of power; the interests at stake are too great to 
admit of hesitation in our proceedings; and not only they who have shown a 
disjiosition to favour our adversaries, but they who display an unwillingness to 
aid us in the just and necessary undertaking in which we are engaged, must 
be displaced, and give way to others on whose friendship and co-operation we • 
may be able implicitly to rely.” These menaces are evidently made under an 
impression that the Ameers were unfriendly, but up to this period at least no 
juoof of hostility had been obtained, and the unfriendliness of their feelings 
must have been inferred from a consciousness of the unjustifiable treatment to 
which they had been or were about to be subjected. The above language had been 
the guide of Colonel Pottinger with the Ameers of Hydei-abad, and Captain 
(now Sir Alexander) Bumes, was dealing in similar style with the Ameers of 
Khyrpoor. The invading army had fixed upon Bukkur, as the point at which 
the passage might be most conyeniently effected. When this resolution was 
taken, the sanction of the Ameers had neither been asked nor obtained. Sir 
Alexander Burnes, however, by the kind of blustering which he well knew 
how to use when it seemed useful, and of which the governor-g^eral had set a 



344 


[Book VIII. 


nisTOEY .OF INDIA." 

a.d, 1889 . full example, had little difficulty in obtaining a consent to the route which had 
been selected. “ Xhe Scindian who, hoped to stop the" approach of the British 
Tiireatentag aiiny, might-as Weil seek to dam up the Indus at Bukkur.” But though the 
^ Ameers thus intimidated gave wg-y, they stipulated that the forts on either 
the Ameers jjank of the rivcr were to remain' untouched This was agreed to, and the 

of Sciude. e-*, , ^ • t»ii 

British diplomatist immediately began to meditate a piece of Jesuitry. Bukkur 
stood on an island iii the bed of the river. Was it therefore covered by the 
stipulation, which only reserved entire possession of the forts on its banks? 
Tliis was the question which Sir Alexander Burnes put to himself, but he was 
ashamed or disdained to avail hinfeelf of such a palpable quibble, while aware 
that a compulsory course was open. His object was to obtain the cession of 



Fort c»p Uukkur.- Fmm Ktinnedy'B Ciuniiaigii on tlie Iitdua. 


Fonwi Bukkur as the exclu.sive posses.sion of the Briti.sh during the war. Meer 

iinkjtnr. Roostum, the leading Ameer, finding it hopele.ss to resist, allowed the cession to 

be entered in the treaty as a separate article, the knowledge of which he might 
in the meantime be able to conceal from the other Ameers. When the treaty 
was sent to him for final ratification, the separate article, to which he had 
shown the utmost repugnance, filled him anew with alarm. “Bukkur,” he said, 
“was the heart of his country, his honour was centred in keeping it; his family 
and children would have no confidence if it were -given up.” He offered 
another fort in its stead, or to give security that the British treasure and 
munitions would be protected. ' Resistance was unavailing, and the old man 
had no alternative but to attach his signature, 4he other chiefs looking on, and 
with difficulty restraining their indignation. Having made this sacrifice, by 
which he declared that he was irretrievably disgraced, Meer Roostum, surely 
more in irony than in earnest, asked what he could now do to prove the 



Chat. III.] 


345 


THE. AFGHAN CAMPAIGN. 


sincerity of his friendship to the Bri^sh government Tlie answer, said the a.d. issa. 
British diplomatist, was plain. It was “to give us orders, for supplies, and to ~ 
place all the country, as far as Ite could; at our command.” After such a trans¬ 
action, both parties must have been aware that though the name of friendship 
miglit be used, nothing but hostility could be meant and that the rulers of 
Scinde would to a certainty avail themselves of the first favourable opportunity 
of revenge. 

Notwithstanding this rankling enmity in the breast of the rulers of Upper 
Scinde, it was something to have gained the peaceable possession of a strong Bombay 
fort commanding the passage of the Indus and most conveniently situated for 


a dep6t; and therefore when the army resumed its march it was with prospects 
somewhat improved, because it could now calculate on obtaining a peaceful 
passage .across, the river, and thus escaping from what threatened at one time 
to be one of the serious difiieulties of the campaign. Continuing its route to 
the south-west at no great distance from the left bank of the river, the army 
amved on the 14th of January at Subzulcote, the first jilace lying immediately 
beyond the Scinde frontier. Here intelligence w.as received, which seemed 
to necessitate an altei’ation in the movements which had been previously con¬ 
certed. Sir John Keane, who had arrived with his troops ofl' the coast of 
Scinde in the end of November, 1838, had not been permitted to land without 
some opposition. With difficulty he made his way to Tattah. lie had brought 
no means of transport with him, and the Ameers', on whose friendly aid he had 
ventured to calculate, were from feelings wiiich may be easily understood intent 
only on throwing obstnictions in his w.ay. A seasonable though very limited 
supply of can’iage from Cutch enabled him to mjike some progi'ess, and he 
.advanced up the left bank of the river to Jurruk, only twenty miles S.S.W. 
of Hyderabad. Here he was obliged to halt. The Ameers of Hyderabad 
h<ad not yet consented to his passage through their territory, and the negotia¬ 
tions which had been commenced with that view were anything but promising. 
This w.as a dilemma for which, though it certainly might have been anticipated, 
no provision had been made, and the important point was to determine how 
the oversight was to be remedied. The Bengal army had arrived at Roree, 
opposite to Bukkur, and Shah Shujah with his contingent had actually cro-ssed 
the river and made his waj' to Shikarpoor, where he had been joined by Mr. Mac- 
naghten and his suite. Both the Shah and the envoy were bent on pushing 
onward, but Sir Henry Fane, who, with the intention of afterwards descending 
the Indus and embarking for England, was still accompanying the army as 
commander-in-chief, was decidedly of opinion that, in order to stimulate the 
decision of the Ameers and give relief to Sir John Keane, the greater part of 
the army, instead of crossing the river, should march down towards Hyderabad, 
onder Sir Willoughby Cotton. This change was immediately executed, and the 
propriety of it seemed shortly afterwards confirmed by a message from Sir 
"Vot. ni. S40 



A.D. 1888. 


Threatened 
attiiok on 
Hyderabad. 


Tlie Ameers 
intimidated. 


Injustice 
done them. 


346 HISTORY* OF INDIA- [Book VIII. 

John Keane requesting a troop' of horse iu^tillery, a detachment of cavalry, and 
a brigade of* infantry. 

The !downward movement was hailed with acclamation by the troops. The 
siege of Hyderabad, of the capture of which no doubt was entertained, would be 
a glorious episode in tlie campaign, while the enormous treasures which the 
Ameers were reputed to possess would- give' the captors something more 
substantial than glory, Mr, Macnaghten’s feelings were very different. The 
movement on Hyderabad was characterized by him as “a wild goose chase.” If 
Sir John Keane required aid it was reasonable to expect he would obtain it 
before Sir Willoughby Cotton could join him, as the reserve destined to be 
stationary in Scinde was on its way from Bombay. Meanwhile, the main 
business of the campaign was at a stand, and a whole season might be lost. 
The consetiuences were not to be foreseen. Entertaining these views, and fortified 
in them by a despatch from the governor-general, who declared it to be his first 
wish that the Bengal army should push forward with all possible expedition 
for Candahar, Mr. Macnaghten made a formal and emphatic requisition for such 
a force as would render it possible forthwith to prosecute the campaign in 
Afghanistan. “ I have already urged in the strongest terms your crossing over 
to this side of the river with your whole force. Of Sir John Keane’s army there 
can be no apprehension.” He concluded thus:—“ Daiigerous as the experiment 
might be, it would, in my opinion, be infinitely better that he should let loose 
fifteen or twenty thousand of Runjeet Sing’s troops (who would march down 
upon Hyderabad in a very short time), than that the grand enterprise of restor¬ 
ing Shah Shujali to the throne^ of Cabool and Candahar should be postponed 
for an entire season. By such a' postponement it might be frustrated alto¬ 
gether.” Tlie collision which had thus become imminent between the civil and 
military authorities was happily saved without the necessity of either continu¬ 
ing the march upon Hyderabad, or adopting Mr. Macnaghten’s extraordinary 
substitute of letting loose 20,000 Sikhs, The Ameers of Hyderabad, thoroughly 
intimidated like those of Khyrpoor, followed their exanqile by yielding to the 
pressure brought to bear upon them. 

This pressure must have been extreme. Acwrding to the resident in Scinde, 
“a strong and universal impression” existed throughout the country “as to our 
grasping policy,” and this impression was now fully confirmed. Doth by the 
arbitrary manner in which the obligations of existing treaties had been set 
aside, and by the proposal that the Ameers should agree to receive a permanent 
subsidiary force. Nor was this all. The fourth article of the tripartite treaty 
was couched as follows:—“Regarding Shikarpoor and the territory of Scinde 
lying on the right bank of the Indus, the Shah will agree to abide by whatever 
may be settled as right and proper, in conformity Avith the happy relations of 
friendship subsisting between the British government and the Maharajah, 
through Captain Wade.” This treaty was concluded on the.26th of June, 1838, 



Chap. III.] THE AFQHAIf .CAMPAIGN.' 347 

and the nature of the mediation proposed was iiof allowed to remaih. long in 
doubt, for on the 26th of Ju^ the political secretly to goyeipment, in a long 
letter to the resident, inclosing a copy of the tripaitite treaty and other docu¬ 
ments, to enable him to make the Ameem “fully and fairly acquainted with 
the motives and intentions of the British government,” fells'him that “the 
governor-general has not yet determined the amount which thaAjneers may be 
fairly called upon to pay,” but that “ the minimum may fairly be taken at 
twenty lacs of rupees” (£200,000). His lordship, he adds, will endeavour to 
prevail on Shah Shujah to reduce bis claim on the Ameers to “a reasonable 
amount,” and trusts that the resident “will have no difficulty in convincing 
them of the magnitude of the benefits, from securing the undisturbed possession 
of the territories they now hold, and obtaining immunity for all future claims 
on this account by a moderate pecuniary saciifica” In replying to this 
despatch, the resident expressed “considerable doubts as to their (the Ameers) 
acceding to the pecuniary proposals, or rendering other assistance.” “ I do 
not tliink,” he says, “that the remote advantage (for such they will consider 
it), of being relieved from the future claims of the King of Cabopl, will have 
any (or at least it will be very little) weight with these short-sighted and 
suspicious chiefs.” “ Many besides the Scindees will believe at the outset that 
we are making a mere use of Shah Shujah's name,” and therefore, as we are 
about to make a proposal which will strengthen the existing impression of “our 
grasping policy,” and to “revive a claim to tribute which has long been esteemed 
obsolete,” he intimates his intention “to request the governor of Bombay to 
take early steps to prepare a force for eventual service in Scinde.” 

The nature of the favour which Shah Shujah proposed to confer upon the 
Ameers, and the use which he intended to make of the money he expected 
them to pay in return, \^ere expounded in the IGth article of the tripartite 
treaty, by which Shah Shujah agreed “to relinquish for himself, his heirs and 
successors, all claims of supremacy and arrears of tribute over the country now 
held by the Ameers of Scinde (which will continue to belong to the Ameers and 
their successors in perpetuity), on condition of payment to him by the Ameers 
of such a sum as may be determined under the mediation of tlie British 
government, fifteen lacs of rupees of such payment being made over b}' him to 
Maharajah Runjeet Sing.” The wily Lahore prince had thus made sure of the 
lion’s share of the money about to be extorted by British mediation and the 
revival of an obsolete claim. The determination of the Ameers not to be thus 
fleeced for tlie enriching of a sovereign from whom they had received nothing 
but injuries, threatened to disarrange the whole of the governor-general’s plans, 
and therefore, after some declamation on. “ the deep duplicity displayed by the 
principal Ameer” in secretly communicating with the King of Persia on “the 
distracted state of the government of Scinde,” and on “the feelings of unwar¬ 
rantable enmity >nd jealousy with which, notwithstanding the recent measures 


A.I>. 1833. 


Uii(|u»t 
treatment 
of the 
Ameera of 
Scinde. 


Money ex* 
torted fi'om 
tliem. 



348 


HISTOEY OF INDIA, 


[Book VIII. 


A.D. 1838. by which their authority was preserved from impending destruction, we appear 
to be regarded some of the chiefs of that country,” he intimates to the resi- 
oujiwt dent that he is prepared to go much further than he had proposed, and instead 

ofthe of trusting to the moral efitect of a demonstration, he considera it “essential to 

suindr*’ the cause in which we have embarked, and no more than what is due to a just 

regard for our own interests, that a British force of not less than 5000 men 
should advance with the least practicshle delay for the occupation of Shikar- 
poor, or such parts ot Scinde as may be deemed most eligible for facilitating 
our operations beyond the Indus, and for giving full effect to the provisions of 
the tripartite treaty.” 

sta^meiits The resident, subsequent to the date of this despatch, had made a discovery 
uritish wliich ouglit to havc set the pecuniary question at rest. In a letter, dated 

* October 9, 1838, he says: “The question of a money payment by the Ameers of 

Scinde to Shah Shujah-ul-Moolk, is in my humble opinion rendered veiy 
puzzling, by two releases Avritten in korans, and signed and sealed by his 
majesty, which they have produced. Their argument now is that they are sure 
the Governor-general of India does not intend to make them pay again for 
Avhat they have already bought and obtained in the most binding form a 
receipt in full. I have pi'ocured copies of the releases, and will give them my 
early attention.” After this statement, he proceeds, now very unnecessarily, 
one would think, if double pa 3 'ment was not to be insisted on, to discuss “the 
ability of the Ameers of Hyderabad to pay,” and gives his decided opinion that 
thej' “cannot be so rich as they have been reported.” In a subsequent letter, 
after he had subjected the releases to a critical examination, ho writes: “The 
onegiA’^en to the late Moorad Ali Khan is drawn up with great skill and caution, 
and left the question of tribute, at least, exactly on the previous footing. That 
granted to the present Ameers is stronger; as will be observed, it contains a 
foi'mal renunciation in behalf of the king, of any sort of claim or pretensions in 
' Scinde and Shikarpoor, and their dependencies; and promises that none shall 
be made. How this is to be got over, I do not myself see, but I submit the 
documents with every deference for the consideration and decision of the Gov- 
Koi>i 7 of the emof-general of India.” The reply of the governor-general is curious. He 

goveriior- , , ^ ^ 

geuerai. was actiHg as a mediator between i-he Ameei’s and Shah Shujah, and had pledged 
himself to reduce the demands of the latter to a reasonable amount, and yet 
when releases are produced, showing that the alleged debt has been wholl}' 
paid and discharged, he refrains “from recording any opinion” relative to them, 
and writes as follows: “Admitting the documents produced to be genuine, and 
that they imply a relinquishment of all claim to tribute, they would hardly 
appear to be applicable to present circumstances, and it is not conceh’able that 
his majesty should have foregone so valuable a claim without some equivalent, 
or that some counterpart agreement should not have been taken, the nonfulfil¬ 
ment of the terms of which may have rendered null and void his majesty’s 



Chap. HI-] 


THE AFGHAN CAMPAIGN. ‘ 


349 


engagements. Whatever may be the real facts of the case, the question is one a.d. ms. 
which concerns the contracting parties.” He afterwards gives it as his opinion 
“that it is not incumbent on the British government to enter into any formal 

. _ towards th^ 

investigation of the plea adduced by the Ameera” In other words, while pro- Ameeraof 
fessing to act as umpire between two parties, he does all he can to enforce the ‘ 
claim of the one, and refuses to look at the documents produced by the other 
to show that the claim was groundless. The whole proceeding is in fact dis¬ 
graceful. Runjeet Sing has been bribed into a treaty by the promise of a large 
sum of money; Shah Shujah, besides having engaged to furnish the sum, 
needs in addition to it a large sum for his ovn purposes; and the governor- 
(jeneral allows himself to become the instrument of extorting both sums from 
a third party, who is under no obligations to pay it, and whom the British 
govemnlent was specially pledged to protect against all injustice. Such being 
the manner in which advantage was taken of the supposed weakness of the 
Ameers to extort money from them, it is easy to understand how suspicious 
they were of every proposal made to them, and how they had recourse to all 
possible forms of finesse and tergivei’sation, in order to evade the conclusion of 
!i treaty which they regarded as equivalent to a renunciation of their inde- 
})endence. Ultimately, however, after their capital was threatened by the 
advance of Sir John Keane from the south, and Sir Willoughby Cotton from the 
north, thej’^ saw the necessity of yielding with as good a grace as possible, and 
signed a treaty conceding everything that had been asked of them. 

The terms and the advantages secured by the treaty are thus summed up Treat? with 
by the governor-general in a letter to the secret committee:—“I maybe per¬ 
mitted to offer my congratulations to you upon this timely settlement of our 
relations with Scinde, by which our political and military ascendency in that 
province is now finally declared and confirmed. The main provisions of the 
proposed engagements are that the confederacy of the Ameers is virtually dis¬ 
solved, each chief being upheld in his own possessions, and bound to refer his 
differences with the other chiefs to our arbitration; that Scinde is placed formally 
under British protection, and brought within the circle of our Indian relations; 
that a British force is to be fixed in Lower Scinde at Tattah, or such other point 
westward of the Indus as the British government may determine—a sum of 
three lacs of rupees per annum, in aid of the cost of this force, being paid in 
equal proportions by the three Ameers, Meer Noor Mahomed Khan, Meer 
Nu&seer Mahomed Khan, and Mea Meer Mahomed Khan; and that the naviga¬ 
tion of the Indus, fronai the sea to the most northern part of the Scinde territory, is 
rendered free of all toll. These are objects of high undoubted value, and especially 
so when acquired without bloodshed, as the first advance towards that consoli¬ 
dation of our influence, and extension of the general benefits of commerce 
throughout Afghanistan, which form the great end of our designs. It cannot 
he doubted that the complete submission of the Ameers will go far towards . 



A.D. 1839. 


Treaty with 
Ameers of 
Soinde. 


Advance of 
the Biitiali 
army to* 
wards Af- 
ghnniBtaii. 


Pifficnliiee 

ex])erieiicod. 


350 HISTORY OF INDIiA. VHI. 

diffusing in aU quartera an impression of the futility of resistance to our anus. 
The command of the navigation of the .Indus, up to the neighbourhood of the 
junction of the five riverti, will, by means qf steam vessels, add incalculably to 
the value of our frontier; and the free transit of it8*watersi'*at.,a time when a 
considerable demand for merchandise of many kinds wiE be created by the mere 
onward movement of our forces, will give a spur to enterprise by this route, 
from which it may be hoped that permanent advantages wiU be derived.” 
Tliese are undoubtedly great advantages, but it is deeply to, be regretted that 
when the governor-general congratulated the secret committee that they had 
been acqmred “without bloodshed,” he was not able to add that they had been 
acquired honourably, without fraud, extortion, and intimidation. 

The treaty having been signed by the Ameers on the 5th of February, 1839, 
there was no longer any occasion for the downward movement on Hyderabad, 
nor any obstruction to the advance of the Bombay force. The Bengal army 
accordingly having crossed the Indus at Bukkur, reached Shikarpoor on the 
20th of February, and on the same day, the Bombay force continuing its mai'ch 
along the right bank of the Indus, arrived at Sehwan, situated on the Arrul, 
about four miles above its junction with the Indus. On the following day Sir 
Henry Fane, who had now quitted the army and was hastening down the river 
to embark for England, arrived, with his fleet of boats, at the point of junction, 
and after an interview with Sir John Keane, continued his voyage. At 
Shikarpoor the plan of giving the lead to Shah Shujah’s force was abandoned, 
and Sir Willoughby Cotton, leaving the 2d brigade behind, started at the head 
of the other two, on the 23d, after a halt of only three days, in the direction of 
Dadur, situated N.N.W., at the entrance to the celebrated Bolan Pass. The 
real difficulties of the march had now commenced. The route laj'^ through a 
country whjch was almost desert, and the effect of excessive fatigue and dele¬ 
terious forage on the carriage cattle became daily more and more manifest. 
Even the road between the Indus and Shikarpoor had been literally strewn with 
dead and djdng camels. What might now be expected when, in addition to 
other physical difficulties, a want of water began to be experienced? The roads 
which had been previously cut were tolerably good, but nothing could be more 
desolate than the tracts through which they led. The soil, if such it could be 
called, was merely a hard sand impregnated with salt, which crackled beneath 
the horses’ feet, and where a few stunted thorny shrubs were almost the only 
signs of vegetable life. “From Rojhan,” says Havelock, “to the town and 
mud-forts of Burahoree, extends an unbroken level of twenty-seven miles of 
sandy desert, in which there is not only neither well, spring, stream, nor puddle, 
but not a tree, and scarcely a bush, an herb, or a blade of grass.” Over this 
dead monotonous flat, where delay was impossible, the aimy hastened as 
rapidly as it could, and at Burshoree, where numerous wells had been pre¬ 
viously dug, obtained some refreshment, though the water still scantily supplied 



S51 


Chap. III.] THE * ^HAN GAMEAIGN. , ' 

waff of indifferent quality.* Head'-quarters were fixe'd at Bhaj on the 6th of a.d. im 
March. Here, water being found in abundance, and grain in sufficient quantities 
to supply imm^ate. wants, the remainder of the march to Dadur, where the 
Cutch Gundaya desert terminates, was accomplished with comparatively little 
difficultyi though *with every step in, 
advance the number) boldness, and 
dexterity of the marauders seemed-to 
increase. Exactly three months had 
elapsed since the army moved from 
Ferozepoor. While the Bengal army 
had been thus advancing. Sir John 
Keane was toiling up the right bank 
of the Indus, much obstructed by the 
nature of the ground, but suffering 
little from insufficient supplies, as a 
fleet of boats was accompanying him. 

On the 4th of March he reached Lack- 
hana, while his boats advanced as far 
as Roree. As pait of the Bengal force 
was .still stationed here. Sir John 
Keane proceeded formally to assume 
the command of the army of the Indua 
Some new arrangements were at the 
same time made. The infantry formed 
two divisions—a Bengal and a Bom¬ 
bay, the former consisting of three 
brigades, denominated 1st, 2d, and 4th, commanded by Sir Willoughby Cotton; Military ar- 
and the latter, consisting of two brigades, a 1st and 2d, commanded by Major- 
general Wellshire.. The cavalry, formed into two brigades, designated by their 
presidencies, were commanded by Brigadiers Amot and Scott. The command * 
of the whole artillery was given to Brigadier Stevenson. 

On the 14th of March, the leading column, consisting of tjie horse artillery, the 
2<1 light cavalry, H.M. 13th light infantry, and the 48th native infantry, started 
from Dadur, and passed onwards to penetmte into the Bolan Pass, which gives Tiie Boian 
the only practicable entrance into Afghanistan ft-om the south-east. It is a 
deep continuous ravine about fifty-five miles in length, intersecting the Bra- 
huick Mountains, part of the range which, breaking off nearly lit right angles 
from the Hindoo Koh, stretches; tinder different names, from north to south 
with little interruption, through nearly ten degrees of latitude. The pass is 
traversed by a river of tlie same name, the channel of which, covered -w^ith 
boulders and rounded pebbles, is the only road. On both sides, the mountains, • 
which at their greatest elevation are nearly 5700 feet above the level of the 



Thm Bolan Pash. 

From Atkinioii** 8ketcb(-i in AOihanirtan. 




352 


IIISTOEY OF INDIA. [Book VIII. 


A D. 1838. sea, alternately close and recede, sometimes leaving gaps of considerable width, 
but more frequently approaching within 400 to 500 yards, and presenting 
description abrupt precipices of conglomerate of a dull and tmiform brown colour, “as 
r^*®^*'* repulsive in appearance,” says Outram, “as they are barren in reality.” In 
some places the river is hemmed in between perpendicular rocks, which leave 
it a channel of sixty to eighty feet wide. This during the rainy season it com¬ 
pletely fills, so that an army caught in it would inevitably perish. Nor is this 
the only danger to be apprehended in these narrow gorgea The mountaineers, 
concealing themselves within the caves on each side, lie in wait for plunder, 
and seizing the fit opportunity, rush forth and make an easy prey of their 
helpless victims in the channel below. Such was the pass through which the 
British army was now to penetrate. To smooth the way, money had been 
distributed with a liberal hand among tlie mountaineei’s, but little confidence 
could be placed in their pacific professions, and it was at all events to be appre¬ 
hended that the Barukzye cliiefs, ’ now threatened with extinction, would, with¬ 
out waiting to be attacked, liasten to meet the invaders, when the very nature of 
the ground would almost to a certainty secure them the victory. Strange to 
Tt i* »uc- say, though marauders were numerous, no hostile force appeared, and the army, 
threiuietiby wliicli had cTitered the pass on the 16tli of March, finally emerged on the 24th 
army. into the Valley of Shawl, without an encounter. Three days .afterwards it 
encamped in tlie immediate vicinity of Kwettali or Quettah, the capital of the 
district, and one of the dependencies of Mehrab Khan, the Beloochee ruler of 
the province of Khelat His alleged failure to fulfil the conditions of a treaty 
made with him by Sir Alexander Burnes afterwards brought down the ven¬ 
geance of the British government upon him, and cost him his life; but it is 
difiicult to believe that if he had been as treacherous and hostile as he was said 


to be, he would not have manifested it when he might have caught our army 
among the entanglements of the Bolan Pass. 

Sir Willoughby Cotton, now under the command of Sir John Keane, had 
been ordered to halt at Quettah. This seems a simple operation, but was, under 
the circumstances, one of serious difficulty. On leaving Dadur, his supplies 
were adequate to not more than a month’s consumption. Half of that period 
had already elapsed, and the calculation now was, that were the march continu¬ 
ous and unopposed, only a few days’ supplies would remain in store when Can- 
dahar should be reached. How much then must the threatened starvation be 
increased by the halt which had been ordered? Under these circumstances 
the only e.xpedient that could be devised was to diminish consumption. 
“Accordingly,” says Havelock, “from the 28th of March, the loaf of the 
European soldiers was diminished in weight, the native troops received only 
half, instead of a full seer of ottah per diem,^ and the camp-followers, who had 


’ For illustration of a Barukzye, see p. 372 

’ The leer weighs 2 lbs.; oUah is wheaten floor prepared in a particular way. 



Chap. HI.] 


THE AFGHAN CAMPAKJN. 


3o3 


hitherto found it difficiilt to subsist oh half a seer, were of necessity reduced to 
the famine allowance of a quarter of a seer.” Some prospect of relief was 
obtained from the treaty which Sir Alexander Burnes had just concluded with 
the Khan of Khelat, who, in return for a guarantee of liis real independence by 
the British government, had agreed to yield a nominal allegiance to Shah 
Shujah, and to furnish supplies of grain and camels. These supplies were never 
given, and there was reason to suspect that the khan was craftily endeavouring 
to keep the peace with both sides, until he could see clearly which of the two 
was to win. At the same time he made no secret of his opinion. Shah 
Shujah “ought,” he said, “to have trusted to the Afghans to restore him; 
whereas he is essaying to deluge the land with Hindoostanees, an insult whidi 



jMcp-fori ,\ni> Town of QiTi:Tr.4H. Kinin V«vi* Vcnr.^ )i» Iiniia. 


liis own people will never forgive him. This will never do. You English may 
keep him by main force for a time on the inusnud, but as soon as you leave the 
kingdom, your Shah Shujah will be driven beyond its frontier. He will never 
he able to resist the storm of national and religious animosity which is already 
raised ,a£rainst him in the breasts of the Afghans.” It is rather curious that 
while Mehrab Khan, who was doubtless well informed on the subject, was thus 
declaring the unpopularity of the sovereign who was about to be imposed on 
Afghanistan, he was himself giving utterance to language which proves that 
the hatred was mutual. Mr. Macnaghten, in a letter to the governor-genei’al, 
speaking of Shah Shujah, says, “His opinion of the Afghans as a nation is, 1 
regret to say, very low. He declai-es that they are a pack of dogs, one and all, 
and as for the Barukzyes, it is utterly impossible that he can ever place the 
slighte.st confidence in any one of that accursed race. We must try and bring 
him gradually round to entertain a more favourable opinion of his subjects.” 
There was thus a double hatred to be overcome. Where, then, was the attadh- 
inent so loudly boasted in the Simla manifesto, and in which even yet both the 
governor-general and the envoy professed to have implicit faith? 

VOL. III. 


A.D. 1889. 


Threatened 

Htarvatioii. 


Ariitnul (lih- 
Hko (if Sluih 
Sliujuh ati<l 
the Afghans. 


241 



354 


HISTOEY OF INDIA. 


[Book VIII. 


A D. 1839. Sir John Keane, made aware of the necessity of an immediate advance, was 
hastening forward with an escort to take the personal command, and fixed his 
Qiiertionof head-quarters at Quettah on the 6th of April. The new arrangement, pre- 
in Aiishan viously made, now took efiect, and the two divisions of the army of the Indus, 
the Bengal and the Bombay, were placed under the immediate command 
respectively of Sir Willoughby Cotton and General Wellshire. The latter 
appointment produced some dissatisfaction. General Nott, who was an older 
major-general than General Wellshire, thought that he himself, as well as the 
Company’s service, was slighted by the preference given to his junior, appar¬ 
ently, as he alleged, for no better reason than because he was a queen’s officer, 
and remonstrated in as strong terms as the etiquette of the service would allow. 
It was in vain. The commander-in-chief adhered to his arrangement, and 
Nott, after he had even gone the length of tendering his resignation, quitted 
the divisional command which he had held under Sir Willoughby Cotton, to 
resume the command of the 2d Bengal brigade, with the additional mortifica¬ 
tion of knowing that it was to be left behind in garrison at Quettah, and con¬ 
sequently precluded from an active share in the coming struggle. 

Halt at. As the halt at Quettah had consumed eleven day.s, no time was to be lost, 

Qiwttah. a,rmy again started the very next morning after Sir John Keane’s 

arrival. It was now generally reported that the Candahar chiefs, after long 
and unaccountable delays, were at last mu.stering for the encounter. The very 
locality was named—the Kojuk Pass, almost as difficult as that of the Bolan. 
It proved a false alann; and the next rumour was that Kohan l)il Khan, 
the princij)al chief of Candahar, while reserving the main body of his troops 
for the defence of his capital, had detached a large body of men, under two 
chiefs, on a secret expedition. One of the chiefs said to have been thus detached 
was Hajee Khan Kakur, and certainly, in so far as he was concerned, the rumour 
was soon falsified, for early on the morning of the 20th April that chief entered 
the British camp, at the head of about a hundred horsemen, and tendered his 
submission to the Shah. This was only one of a series of treficheries of which 
he had been guilty, and his new friends were destined to learn that it was not 
his last. His present defection, however, which it appears had been purchased 
by a bribe of 10,000 rupees (£1000), was important, and produced so much 
consternation among the Barukjsye cliiefs, who knew not how many others 
might have sold, or w*ere prepared to sell themselves, that they abandoned 
ftoupation all idea of defence, and prepared for flight. As soon as this was understood, 
Shah Slmjah, who had been lagging in the rear, was again placed with his 
contingent in the van, and was thus enabled, in name at least, to reach Candahar 
at the head of his own troops. He made his entrance on the 25th of April, not 
oftly unopposed, but with some appearance of welcome, the sincerity of which, 
however, was very problematical. It is said indeed not to have been volun¬ 
teered, but bought by a lavish distribution of money from the Calcutta treasury. 



Chap. III.J 


THE AFGHAN CAMPAIGN. 


355 


This was a resource iu which the envoy appears to have had unbounded confid¬ 
ence, but Havelock doubtless takes a wiser view when, contrasting the results 
of success obtained by arms and by mercenary means, he says that “one hour” 
of the former “outweighs the results of months of intrigue and negotiation,” and 
tliat “the clash of steel for a- few short moments will ever gain for the British, 
iu the diffusion throughout Asia of an opinion of their strength, a greater 
advantage than all tlie gold in their coffers can purchase.” The opposite views 
thus taken may account for the very different impressions produced by the 
Shah’s reception. The envoy’s account i,s, “We have, I think, been mo.st 
fortunate every way. The Shah made a grand public entry into the city this 
morning, and was received with feelings nearly amounting to ad<u-ation.” 



Knthanck tu the Ku.niK from Paru»h.—From Atkinaoii’s Sketches in Afglminstan. 


Ha velock speaking, not of the entrance into Oandahar, but of a grand ceremony 
of jiublic recognition whioli took place on the 8tb of May, in the plains lying 
immediately to the north of it, says: “Unless I have been deceived, all the 
national enthusiasm of the scene was entirely' confined to his majesty’s imme¬ 
diate retainers; the people of Candahar are .sfiid to have viewed the whole affair 
with the most mortifying indifference. Few of them (quitted the city to be 
present in the plains, and it was remarked with justice that the passage in the 
diplomatic programme, which prescribed a place behind the thrcjne for ‘the 
populace, restrained by the Shah’s troops,’ was very superfluous.” Subsequent 
events go far to prove that Havelock’s impression is the more correct, but it is 
fair to add that he was not personally present, and that many of those who 
were present participated in the envoy’s delusion. 

On the 4th of May, by the arrival of the Bombay division, the whole forc^ 
of the army of the Indus, with the exception of those left behind in garrison or 
for observation at Bukkur, Shikarpoor, Dadur, Sukkar, and Quettah, were 


A.D. 183». 


Oocu{)atioii 
ofCandahar 


Shall Shu 
JuIi'r r«)ce|>' 
tioii. 



A 1>, 18Sd. 


TMirsuit of 
Uarukzyo 
uhiofri. 


LawleHK 
iitato of ih'* 
countiy 


Departuro 
fjvui ('an 
dahar. 


35(5 HISTORY OF INDIA. [Book VIIT. 

encamped under the walls of Candahar. The pleasantness of relaxing after 
the fatigues of a most difficult and disastrous march, and the round of cere¬ 
monies and parades kept up for the purpose of enabling Shah Shujah to feel him¬ 
self, as he expressed it, “to be a king indeed,” appear for a time to have banished 
all thought of military oi)erations, and not till the 12th of May, more than a 
fortnight after the arrival at Candahar, was it deemed necessary to look after 
its fugitive Barukzye chiefs. Brigadier Sale was then despatched in jjursnit, 
at the head of a large body of troops composiid mainly of the Shah’s contingent, 
with a sprinkling of Euro})eans. It was obviously too late, and the only result 
was to learn that had more despatch been u.sed it would have been crowned 
with success, since the chiefs with their families had been detained eight da\’s 
on the left bank of the Helmiind, unable to cioss it, and in daily fear of being 
overtaken. Sale returned from his fruitless expedition on the 28th, the same 
day on which a striking exemjdification Avas given of the lawless state of the 
country and the sanguinary spirit of its j)eople. Several parties of officei's ha<l 
gone out to enjoy a day’s fishing in the Urghundab. All of them breaking up 
in good time returned in safety, except Lieutenants Inverarity and Wilnief, who 
lingered on the bank till after sunset. The ap]>earance of armed men, suj)- 
]>oscd to belong to i>redatory gangs in the vicinity, ought to have put them 
on their guard, but with singular imprudence the\' had sent off their hoi'se.s 
with their .servants, and were not even aiuned. Proceeding heune in the clear 
moon-light, Lieutenant Inverarity, who was eon.siderably in advance of his 
com]>anion. was suddenly assailed in a defile by armed men, eut down and sav- 
agely mutilated. Lieutenant Wilmer, totally unconscious of what had ha 2 >pencd, 
had no sooner jcaehed the scene of the atrocity, than he was in like manner 
attacked, but hajuiily b^" i)arrying the. first blows with his walking-stick was 
able to fleo and reach a detachment of the Shah’s infantry. An armed party 
sent tt> the sjiot found Lieutenant Inverarity still alivtt, but so dreadfully 
mangled that he alino.st immediately exjtired. Shah Shujah, on being informed 
of the ati’ocity, strongly e,;c])ressed his abhorrence of it, and his determination to 
search out and inmish the perjletrators; at the same time, blaming the im¬ 
prudence which gave them the (»])j)ortunity of cominittiug it, he showed what 
he thought of his new subjects by rcjteatedly exclaiming to the Englisli 
officers around him, “O! gentlemen, you mu.st be more cautious here: remem¬ 
ber you aie not now in Hindoo.stan.’’ 

On the 27th of June, the day on which Runjeet Sing breathed his last, the 
army moved from Candahar, leaving garrisons there and at Oirishk, a fort 
imiuediatel}* beyond the Helmund, which Brigadier Sale had captured on his 
expedition. The guns and mortars of the siege train, after being dragged with 
almost incredible difficulty through the Bolan and Kojuk passes, were also left 
behind. As yet there had been no occasion to use them, and it seems to have 
been hence inferred that they might in future be dispensed with. This was 



Chap. HI.] 


THE AFGHAN CAMPAIGN. 


857 


rather an extraordinary inference, seeing that the fortress of Ghuznec, deemed a.u. issb. 
by the Afghans to be impregnable, lay in the very line of march, and must be 
captured previous to the advance on Cabool. It was hoped, however, tliat it 
Avould be abandoned like Candahar, or that its defences would prove far weaker oiiuziiw. 
tlian Afghan exaggeration represented. When it was reached, on tlie 21st of 
July, the appearance and the means of resistance were at once seen to be for¬ 
midable. Ghuznee stood at the extremity of a range of lulls which, slojung 
u]»war<ls, seemed to form the background to its fortifications. These cannot be 
better described than in the words of Caj)tain Thomson, the chief engineer;— 

“When we came before it, on the morning of the 21st of July, wc were veiy 
much surprised to fiijd a high ram[)ari^in good rei)air, built on a scar|)ed mou7id 
about thirtj'-five f<?et high, flanked by nnmeious toAvers. and surrounded by a 



faisse brale ami a Avet ditch. 'I’lie irregular ligine'of the enceinte gave a good 
flanking fire, Avhilst the height of the eitadid coA^ei t'd the inteidor from the com- 
nia.ndii»g fire of the hills to the nortli, rendering it nugator\ . In addition to thi.s. 
the towel's at the angles had been enlarged; screen Avails had been built belbri; 
the gates ; the ditch,,cleared out and filled Avith Avater (stated to be unlordablc), 
and an outAvork built on the right bank of the river st> as to command the bed of 
it.” A nearer vieAA' having been obtained by clearing out some gardens in front, 
Avhich the enemy had txrenpied, he obseiwes, “This was iH)t at all satisfactory; 
the Avorks Avere eA'idently much stronger than aa’c had been led f.o anticipate 
and such as our army could m)t A'enture to attack in a regula?- manner Avith the 
means at our disposal. We had no buttering train, and to attack Ghuznee 
in form a larger train Avould be required than the enemy ever possessed. 
The great height of the parapet above the plain (sixtj^ or seventy feet), with*the 
wet ditch, were insurmountable obstacles to an attack merely by mining or 
escalading.” 


Itri formid¬ 
able a|)|)eur> 
unec. 






A.D. ]639. 


Altporuativti 
of itawiult 
oti Obuziiee 
or rotreat. 


Rosoliitioii 
to usiiault. 


358 HISTORY OF INDIA. [Book. VIII. 

The British army, brouglit thus recklessly in front of a fortress of a for¬ 
midable character, and to the strength of which, according to Sir John Keane’s 
official account, the Afghans had for the last thirty years been yearly adding, 
had evidently a very gloomy prospect before it. Without regular means of 
taking the place, it must yet either capture it or commence a disastrous 
retreat. The garrison was 3500 strong, a large reinforcement from Cabool was 
expected, and the Ghiljies, through whose rugged territory, stijdded with 
mountain forts, the retreat must have been conducted, were, so far from cordi¬ 
ally welcoming Shah Shujah, disposed, like not a few of their countrymen, to 
take the first opportunity of convincing the invaders how much both he and 
they were detested by them. Most fortujiately the engineers, on closely exam¬ 
ining the works, in order to ascertain whether some irregular mode of attack 
might not be ado 2 )ted, discovered what seemed to be a tangible iJoint in the 
Cabool gateway. “The road uj) to the gate was clear; the bridge over the ditch 
was unbroken; there were good jjositions for the artillery within 350 yards of 
the walls on both sides of the road, and we had information that the gateway 
w<a.s not built up, a reinforcement from Cabool being expected.” What a num¬ 
ber of coincidences which the besiegers could not have antieijiated, and the 
existence of which must be attributed solely to their good fortune—a clear road, 
an unbroken bridge, and out of many gates a single one not built uj)! On 
this discovery, the engineers reported to the commander-in-chief “ that if he 
decided on the immediate attack of Ghuznee, the only feasible mode of attack, 
and the oidy one which held out a jn'osjject of succes.s, was a da.sh at the Cabool 
gateway, blowing the gate ojjen by bags of powder.” Sir John Keane, thus 
instructed, could not hesitate. He had in fact brought his anny into a position 
where there was no choice, and in resolving to bui'st oj)en the gate, he did not 
so much exercise his judgment sts yield to necessity. 

The resolution being formed, no time was lost in making the necessary 
2 )re 2 )arations. As the Cabool gate was on the north-east side of the fort, the 
trooj>s moved in two columns, and took u]i a fiosition so as to command both 
the gate and the road to Cabool. The latter object had become important in 
consequence of a confident statement that Dost Mahomed in person was march¬ 
ing at the head of a considerable force to attempt the relief of Ghuznee. The 
orders for the attack were issued on the 22d of July, and were mainly as follows; 
“At twelve o’clock r.M., tlie artillery will commence moving toward the fort, 
and the batteries will follow each other in succession, at the discretion of the 
brigadier oommanding. The guns must be placed in the most favourable posi¬ 
tions, with the-right above the village on the hill north-east of the fortress, and 
their left amongst the gardens on the Cabool road. They must all be in posi¬ 
tion, before daylight.”- “The storming party will be under command of Briga¬ 
dier .Sale, C.B., and \fill be composed as follows—viz. the advance to consist of 
^helight companiea of H.M.’s 2d and 17th regiments; of the (47th) European 



Chap. HI ] 


THE AFGHAN CAMPAIGN. 


3o9 


regiment, and of a flank company 13th light infantry, under the command of a.d. isao. 
Lieutenant-colonel Dennie, C.B.’' “The main column wiU consist of H.M.’s 2d 
icgiment of foot; of the (47th) European regiment, with the remainder of H.M.'s A»»auitof 
13th light infantry formed as skirmishers on the flanks; the latter will push resolved oii. 
into the fort with the rear of the main column. H.M.’s 17th regiment will be 
formed in support, and will follow the storming party into the works.” "Tlie 
whole must quit their respective encampments in columns of companies at quarter 
distance, right in front, so as to insure their arrival at the place appointed for 
the rendezvous by ttro o’clock A M.” “At half-past twelve o’clock the companies 
of the 13th light infantry, intended to act as skirmishers, will move up to cover 
in front of the gateway, and be ready to keep down any fire on the party of 
engineers who proceed to blow it open; this last party will move up to the 
gateway before daybreak, followed slowly, and at some distance, by the a.ssault- 
ing column. On the chief engineer finding the opening practicable he will 
liave the advance sounded for the column to push on; when the head of the 
column has piissed the gateway, a signal must be made for the artillery to 
turn their fire from the walls of the town on the citadel.” “At twelve o’clock 
r.M., throe companies of native infantry (48th) wiU quit camp, and move round 
the gardens on the south of the town, where they will establish themselve.s, 
and about three A M. open a fire upon the j)lace for tlie purpose of distracting 
the attentioji of the garrison.” The infantry of the division, not warned for 
duty, was to be formed as a reserve. These orders, which were to be con¬ 
sidered strictly “confidential for this night,” were to be communicated to the 
troops only in such portions “as might be absolutely necessary to secure com- 
])liance with their various provisions.” 

The explosion party, on whom, in the first instance, everything depended, oimznee 

* ^ -» •/OX etormwl. 

consisted of Captain Peat ol the Bombay, and Lieutenants Durand and Macleod 
of the Bengal amiy, three sergeants and eighteen sappers, carrying 300 lbs. of 
powder in twelve sand-bags, with a hose seventy-two feet long. Headed by 
Lieutenant Durand the party moved steadily on, laid the hose, fired the train, 
and in less than two minutes gained tolerable cover. The explosion did its 
work effectually, and Dennie, at the head of his stormers, pushed forward to 
the gap which it had made. As the garrison, having no idea of the kind of 
attack intended, were taken completely by surprise, access was gained without 
much difficulty, and announced to the camp without by three loud cheers.. 

While Sale was hastening up with the main column he was arrested by the 
information of one of the officers of engineers, who, confused and shattered by 
the explosio]^, against which, in his eagerness to witness the effect, J»c had not 
sufficiently sheltered himself, told- him that the'falling masses of stone and 
timber had so choked up the gateway that the storming party had been unable 
to enter. Crediting this information the brigadier sounded the retreat, and a 
halt took place which well nigh proved fatal. The garrison, when once aware -' 



HISTORY O^' INDIA. 


[Book VIII. 


SCO 

•A.D. 1889. of the real point of attack, rushed down to the gate, and Dennie and his party 
must soon have been overpowered had not the bugle, still sounding the advaws, 
I'etnoniu and the statement of another engineer convinced Sale that his first informant 
rtfBrigttdier \Vas mistaken.' “Forward!” therefore, was the order again given, and a 
desperate struggle took place among the ruins of the gateway. Sale himself 
made an almo.st .miraculous escape, which we must permit Havelock to narrate. 
“One of their number (tlie garrison) rushing over the fallen timbers, brought 
down Brigadier Sale by a cut in the face with his sharp shansheer (sabre). 
The Afghan repeated his blow as his opponent was falling; Init the pummel, 
not the edge of his sword this time took eflcct, though with stunning violence. 
He lost his footing, however, in the effort, and Briton and Afghan rolled 
together among the fractured timbers. Thus situated, the first care of tlie 


(iiiuzNBK. —.Fi.im Wingates .Sionuinjj of (ilniziioc ami KlicUt 

brigadier was to master the w^oapon of his adversary. He snatched at it, but 
one of his fingers met the edge of the trenchant blade. He quickly withdrew 
his wounded hand and adroitly replaced it over that of his adversary, so as to 
keep fast the hilt of his shansheer. But he had an active and powerful oppon¬ 
ent, and was himself faint from the loss of blood. Captain Kershaw of the 13th. 
aide-de-camp to Brigiidicr Baumgardt, happened, in the melee, to approach the 
scene of conflict ; the wounded leader recognized him and called to him for aid. 
Kemhaw passed his dtawn sabre through the body of the Afghan; but still the 
desperado continued to struggle with frantic violence. At length, in the fierce 
grapple, the brigadier for a moment got uppermost. Still retaining the weapon 
of his enemy in his left hand, he dealt him with his right a ctj^jjlppm his own 
sabre which cleft his skull from the crown to the eyebrowa The Mahometan 
' sliowted Ae Ullah! (O God!) and never moved or spoke again.” 

As soon as an entrance was secured there could be no doubt as to the ulti- 
^mate capture, but the fight was manfully maintained by the Afghans till 





Chap. III.] 


THE AFGHAN CAMPAIGN-' 


36i 


more than 500 of their number had fallen sword in hand. Many mose "^ere 
cut down without the walls in attempting "to escape. Among the l-OQO prisoners’ 
taken, was the governor Hyder Khan, a brother of Dost Mahomed. In the 
hope of a protracted defence the place had been provided ^with immense stores 
of grain and flour. These, together with a large number of horsesAhd-ftrms,; 
and a considerable sum in money, formed a very valuable booty. 

The capture of Ghuznee, though good fortune had certainly a large share in 
sujhieviug it, was most honourable to the British arms, not only on account of 
tlie valoui' and prowess displayed, but also of the moderation with which victory 
was used. Quarter was never asked in vain, and not a si ogle female was out¬ 
raged. This fact, so rai*e under similar circumstances, well deserves special 
record, both for its own sake, and for the important lesson which it teaches. 
No spiiit rations had been served out to the solders during the preceding fort¬ 
night. On this Havelock remarks; “No candid man of any military experi¬ 
ence will deny that the character of the scene in tlie fortress ami the citadel 
would have been far different, if individual soldiers had entered the town 


\.Shme. 


Uiiinanti 
ooudtivi of 
tbe captors 
of Ghuznee. 


primed with airack, or if spirituous liquors had been discovered in the Afghan 
depots.” In proportion to the exultation of the British was the consternation 
produced among the followers of Dost Mahomed. His son.Afzul Khan, who* 
had been hovering in the vicinity with a large force, with which he hoped to 
fall upon the besiegem when bafiied, dispirited, and exhausted by a protracted 
defence, took flight the moment he heard that Ghuznee had fallen, leaving his> 
elephants and camp equipage behind him^- His father was so enraged that he 
refused to receive him, and loudly professed his determination to maintain the Mahomed.” 
struggle to the last. In this, however, he was not serious. His desperate 
position was manifest. In the early part of the campaign, supposing that the 
main attack would be made in concert with the Sikhs by the Khyber Pass, he 
had despatched his favOurite son Akbar Khan in that direction, with the larger 
part of his forces, and Had been obliged to recall him when made aware of the 
i‘eal quarter from which the greatest jj^anger was to be ajiprehended. The 
Khyber Pass thus left unguarded made it compai“atively easy for Colonel Wade 
to advance through it, with the force of which Prince Timour, Shah Shujah’s 
son, was nominal commander. Cabool was thus about to be attacked from two 
opposite directions, and it was vain to hope that any effectual resistance could 
be oft'ered. Negotiation thei’efore seemed to be his only resource, and his 
brother Jubbar Khan, after the sanction of a council of war liad been obtained, , 
was despatched to the British camp for the pui-pose of ascertaining the kind of' 
terms that might be expected. His own proposal was to acknowledge Shah 
Shujah as his sovereign, provided he himself were guaranteed in the hereditary 
oflice of wuzeer or prime minister. This proposal seemed too extravagant to 
be listened to for a moment, ana the only thing offered was what was balled an 
honourable asylum within the British territories, on condition of immediate 
VoL. III. , 242 



A urisso. 


Fligikt of 
Dost 
liotnecl. 


8hali Shu- 
jab’a entry 
ill to ralKM»J. 


3G2 IIISTOEY OF INDIA. [Book VIII. 

surrender. When the views of the. parties were so diametrically opposed, it 
was useless to keep up the appearance of negotiation, and Jubbar Khan took 
liis departure. 

Dost Mahomed ^begaii now to exhibit the energy of de-spaii', and marched 
out at the head of his troops with a determination to give battle. It soon 
became apparent that he would be left entirely without the means. To what¬ 
ever side he looked he saw only signs of lukewarmness and treachery. Entreaty, 
remonstrance, and reproof were equally in vain, and his ranks thinned so 
rapidly that only a handful of followers worthy of confidence remained. He 
therefore made a merit of necessity, and giving a formal discharge to all whom 
he knew to be longing for it, he followed the example of his Candahar brothers, 
and fled westward on the 2d of August in the direction of Bamian. On the 
following day the British arWy, now advancing from Ghuznee, were made 
acquainted with this important fact, and in order not to repeat the blunder by 
which the Candahar chiefs had been permitted to e.scape, it wjis resolved that 
no time should be lost in commencing the pursuit. The tasX was undertaken 
by Captain Outram, then acting as aide-de-camp tt) the cominander-in-chief. 
It could not have' been in better hands, but very unwisely Hajee Khan Kakur, 
who was already suspected of being as treacherous to his new as he had been 
to his old friends, was associated with him, and having the command of the 
principal part of the trooj)S emjdoyqd, was able to throw so many obstacles in 
the way, that the pursuit again ])roved fruitless, 'fhe aimy meanwhile con¬ 
tinued its inarch without interruption, and on the 7th of August Shah Shujah, 
mounted on a handsome and richly decorated Caboolee charger, and wearing a 
dress which glittered with diamonds, emeralds, and rubies, made a triumphant 
entry into his capital. An ocean of heads,” says Havelock, “was spread out 
in every direction,” and though there were no noi.sy acclamations, “the expres¬ 
sion of countenances indicated a ready acquiescence, or .something more, in the 
new state of things.” After making his Avay with difficulty through the den.se 
files of people w'hich clioked the naiTow streets, and reaching the Bala Hissar or 
palace, the Shah liastened up the great stairca.se, and ran with childish delight 
from apartment to apartment. 'J'he gi’eat object of his ambition had been at 
last secured. After thirty years of exile he was once more seated on the 
throne. 

The governor-general, replying to the <lespatch in which Sir John Keane 
described the Shah’s entry into Cabool, expressed his high gratification. “It is 
to be hope*],” he said, “that the mca,sure which has been accomplished of restor¬ 
ing this prince to the throne of his ancestors, will be productive of iieace and 
prosperity over the country in which he rules, and will confirm the just influ¬ 
ence of the British government in the regions of Central Asia.” On this view 
further interference was unnecessary, and little more remained than to fulfil 
the promise of the Simla manifesto, by withdrawing the British troops. Uufor- 



Chap. IV.J 


THE AFGHAN CAMPAIGN. 


.%3 


tunately, the Shah’s alleged popularity had proved delusive, and could no a n. isss." 
longer be regarded by the most sanguine as sufficient to insure the stability of 
the new order of things. While hedged round by British bayonets the restored a Britisii 
throne might be safe, but were this security withdrawn it would fall as l>en8iib]« lit 
suddenly as it had been reared. In short, it was no longer possible to dispute 
the accuracy of the prediction attributed to the Duke of Wellington, that when 
Cabool was reached the most difficult part of the task which the British 
government had undertaken would only bejjin. 


CHAPTER IV. 


I’avlial witliJrawal of liritisb troops from Afylianistaii—Capture of Khclat—Surreiiilcr of Dost Malioiiu il 
- ('oniinencirijf disturbances—.Outlireak at Cabool—<iro.sa iiiismanagement-- I)is.asters. 


HAH SIIirjAH, though lie must have laid manv misgivings as sii/iiisim- 

^ « jiib’s letter 

to the future, professed to believe that the work of rcstorin;^ t<iQiioeii 
him to the throne was accomplished, and therefore deemed it 
becoming to employ .some method by whicb be conld at once 
commemorate the event, and testify bis gratitude to tho.se by 
whose instrumentality it bad been achieved. He accordingly addiessc;d a 
letter to her majesty, which, after mentioning how be bad, “by the favour of 
God and the exceeding kindness of the British government,” ascended the 
throne of his ancestors, continued thus:—“I have been for some time consider- 
hig by Avhat means I could rcAvanl the gentlemen and troops avIio accompanied 
me, for all the troubles and dangers they have undergone for my sake. T have 
now fully" resolved upon instituting an order, to be designated the Order of the 
Dooranee Empire (Nishan-Door-Dooran), to be divided into three classes.” 

The first class he wi.shed to confer on the governor-general, the commander-in¬ 
chief, the envo}'-. Sir Alexander Burnes, and Colonel Wade; the other two 
classes were to be conferred on the individuals named in an accompaiu'ing list; 
and he had, moreover, determined to have a medal struck, “commemorative of 
the battle of Ghuznoe,” and to confer it “on every officer and soklier ])resent 
on that glorious occasion.” “I have the fullest confidence,” he concluded, “in 
the kind consideration for my wishes, which is felt by my royal sister; and 1 
feel assured that she will be graciously pleased to ])ennit the gentlemen and 
soldiers above mentioned to wear the decoration which 1 shall confer upon 
them, so that a memorial of me may be preserved, and that the fame of flie 
glorious exploits achieved in this quarter may resound throughout the whole 
world.” 



3^4 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book VIH. 


A.D. 18S9. While Shah Shujah was thus assuming the airs of a mighty potentate^ and 
giving the name of empire to the comparatively limited portion of Afghanistan 
wfthdrawai wliicli nominally acknowledged his authority, his British allies were anxiously 
trooiM from Considering how far it might be possible to withdraw their troops and leave 
Affeiimiistan depend on his own resources. The hope held out by the Simla manifesto, 

that his own subjects and adherents would so rally around him as to render 
foreign aid unnecessary had been disappointed, but it was still thought that 
a single brigade, consisting of five or six regiments, might suffice. By this 
means the two capitals of Cabool and Candahar, and the important posts of 
Ghuznee, Quettah, and Jelalabad might be effectually secured, and the rest of 
the British army permitted to withdraw, the Bengal division by the Khyber, 
and the Bombay division by the Bolan Pass. It soon appeared that the force 
thus proposed to be left would be inadequate. Dost Mahomed, instead of 
continuing his flight, had found an asylum in the north, and was reported to 
be levying troops for the purpose of resuming the contest; the Ghiljies and 
several other mountain tribes were giving unequivocal signs of hostility; Shah 
Kamran, at Herat, forgetting the deliverance which had recently been procured 
for him mainly through British interference, was engaged with his unprincipled 
minister, Yar Mahomed, in intriguing with Persia; and Huasia, so far from 
abandoning the aggressive schemes which she had verbally repudiated, seemed 
bent on giving practical effect to them by an expedition against the Khan of 
Khiva. All the.se things considered, it was resolved that instead of a single, 
brigade, nearly' the whole of the Bengal division of the army should continue 
in Afghanistan. 

qq,g Bombay division of the arniy, commanded as before by General 
Kiieiat. Wellshire, commenced its march homewards on the 18th of September, 1839. 
Its movements were not intended to be wholly peaceful, for instruction had 
been given to pay a hostile visit by the way to Khelat, and punish Mchrab 
Khan for alleged infringements of the treaty which bound him to fitrnish the 
British anny with supplies?, and suppress the marauding .parties which harassed 
it on its march. The.se obligations he had not performed, but he had endea¬ 
voured to justify himself by pleading that the .state of the country rendered 
the performance of them impossible. The excuse was certainly not without 
foundation, and might perhaps have been, accepted as sufficient, had it not 
been deemed necessary to inffict punishment by way of example. In the pro¬ 
ceedings against Mehrab Khan there was therefore more severity than 
justice. A victim was wanted, and it was Mehrab Khan’s fate to furnish it. 
Accordingly, on arriving at Quettah, General Wellshire, directing the main 
body of his troops to continue their march by the Bolan Pass, proceeded, on the 
4tTi of November, at the head of ♦a detachment, mustering in all about 1000 
bayonets, together with six light field-pieces, the engineer corps, and 150 
irregular horse, and arrived on the 13th before Khelat, situated about eighty- 



Chap. IV.] THE AFGHAN CAMPAIGN. 36S'' 

five nufes to the S.S.W. It was a place of sufficient importance to be regarded a.o. i 8 « 9 . 
as the capital of Beloochistan, and in addition to the natural defence of a com¬ 
manding site, in a difficult and mountainous country, was well fortified and 
strongly garrisoned. General Wellshire indeed admits that, as in the case Of ' 
Ghuznee, its strength had been underrated. 

As Mehrab Khan, when first threatened, had been profuse in apologies and Oaptnni of 
professions of friendship, it had been rather hastily concluded that he would 
prefer submission to the risks of resistance. It now appeared that he was 
actuated by a very different spirit. When tlie invading force was within two 
marches of his capital, a letter was received from him, which left no doubt as 
to his determination to resist. It spoke, indeed, of negotiation as still j)ending, 
and directed a halt of the British troops, that an opportunity might be given of 



Khri.at— tljo Oaiulaluir Oato.— From K«nnc<ly s (.lamptiign in CatKiol. 


completing it, but at the same time breathed defiance, by threatening them with 
the conseqiiences should they presume to advance another stage. To show 
that this was no idle threat a body of Beloochce horse made their appearance 
shortly after the British had resumed their march, and without asking or wait¬ 
ing for explanation, galloped up to the head of the advancing column and 
discharged their matchlocka When‘a nearer approach brought Khelat itself 
in sight, its adjoining heights were crowned with masses of soldiers, who 
apparently disdaining the protection which the walls would have giv'en them, 
seemed preparing to try their strength in the open field. If they had any such 
intention it was soon abandoned. A few discharges of artillery compelled them 
to a precipitate flight, and allowed a small body of troops, who were rapidly 
advancing to storm the heights, to take possession of them without a struggle. 
This success was immediately followed by another of greater importance. The 
place had only two gates. One of these was seized before the fugitives, who 



HISTORY OF INDIA. 


3CG 


[Bpoi^-.y^ii. 


A.n. J8.in. were entering it in confusion, had time to close it, and the other, after a few 
rounds of shot, was so far demolished that a party, stationed for the purpose, 
c«irt;iireof rushed in and made good their footing within it. Xlm garrispn, thus cut oft' 
Kiiaist. from all means of escape, retired into the citadel, and fighting with the energy 
of despair, succeeded for a time in resisting aft attempts to force an entrance. 
Orders had therefore been given to blow open the gates by bags of gunpowder, 
but before they could be executed the artillery, placed on a commanding height 
and served with admirable precision, rendered them unnecessary’^, and the 
capture was completed. Among the slain, estimated at 400, was Mehrab Khan 
himself ; the prisoners amounted nearly to 2000. The British loss was only 37 
killed and 107 wounded. 

Armyoroo- Tliougli the Bombay division had, as already mentioned, commenced its 

ciiiiatiou in ^ 

AfgiinniBtiiii iDiU'ch liomewards on the 18th of September, the final arrangements with i-egard 
to tlie 'occupation of Afghanistan had not been announced. At length, how¬ 
ever, on the 2d of October, it was intimated by a general order that “the whole 
of the 1st (Bengal) division of infiintry, the 2d (Bengal) cavalry, and No. (i 
light field battery, with a detachment of thirty sappers, were to remain 
under the command of Sir Willoughby Cotton.” The remainder of the troops 
were to move toward Hindoostan on a day to be afterwards fixed. By a 
subsecpient order, issued on the !>th of October, the posts of the different 
portions of the anny of occiij>ation wore definitely fixed as follows:—“Her 
Majesty’s 13th light infantiy, three guns of No. G light field battery, and 
the 35th native infantry to remain in Cal)Ool. and to be accommodated in the 
Bala His.sar. The 48th native infantry, the 4th brigade and detachment of 
sappers and miners, with a ressalah of Skinner’s horse, to bo stationed at 
Jelalabad. Ghuznee to be garrisoned by the IGth native infantry, a re.ssalah 
of Skinner’s horse, and such details of his majesty Shah Shnjah's as are avail¬ 
able. The whole to be under the command of Major Maclaren. Candahar will 
have for its garrison the 42d and 43d native infantry, 4th company, 2d 
battalion artillery, a ressalah of the 4th hjcal hoi'se, and such details of his 
majesty Shah Shujah’s troo}).s as may be available. Major-general Nott will 
command.” 

ShahShujah The aiTangciiients for the occupation of the country having thus been crni- 
.leiaiai ad. pletcd, the troops not deemed necessary started for India on the 15th of October, 
accompanied by Sir John Keane, and commenced their march in the direction 
of the Khyber Pass. Shah Shujah himself also abandoned his capital to escape 
the rigours of the approaching Vinter, by removing his court temporarily to 
Jelalabad, which possesses a much milder climate than Cabool. The envo^', 
as a matter of course, accomi)anied him, but Sir Alexander Burnes remained 
behind to act as his substitute. The native administration was left in less 
Avorthy hands, and the leading officials, both at Cabool and Candahar, instead 
of reconciling the people to the new order of things, only exasperated them by 



THE AFGHAN CAMPAIGN. 


367 


■CHAA'iV'.']' 

extortion and general mismanagement. Tlie interference of the British, a.p. 1839. 
restricted as it was to remonstrance, was totally inadequate to remedy the evils 
thus produced, the pnly'eftect often being to bring the two authorities into Congratula- 
collision, and expose them to a commoq hatred and contempt. Meanwhile, the 
military successes were duly acknowledged at home. The army received the 
thanks of both Houses of Parliament, tlie governor-general, raised a step in the 
peerage, became Earl of Auckland', the commander-in-chief Baron Keane of 
Ghuznee, the envoy a baronet, Cfdonel Wade a knight, and various other dis¬ 
tinctions and promotions were distributed with a liberal hand. Notwithstand¬ 
ing many warnings to the contrary, the general belief at this time undoubtedly 
was that the principal object of the Afghan expedition had been triumj)hautly 
accomplished, and that the effect would be to-give Great Britain a decided and 
])ermanent ascendency in the countries immediately west of the Indus. 

While this flattering prospect was sanguinely entertained at home, new 
causes of apprcheixsion bad arisen. The death of Kunject Sing liad endangered ana alarms, 
our friendly relations with the Sikhs. Not only had the obligations imposed 
on them by the tripartite treaty been evaded, but the noAV government, only 
nominally held by Runjeet Sing’s imbecile son Kuruk Sing, and really admin¬ 
istered by his turbulent grandson Nao Nehal Sing, was suspected of fomenting 
disturbances in Afghanistan, and actually intriguing for the restoration of tlu- 
Earukzyes. The failure of the Russian expedition against Khiva had not yet 
been ascertained, and Bumes, insbilled at Gabool, was writing letters, in one 
of which he says, “ We have brought upon ourselves some additional half million 
of annual exj)euditure, and ere 18-K) ends, I predict that oiu'frontiei s and those 
of Russia will touch—that is, the states dejiendent on either of us will—and 
that is the same thing.” The envoy participating in the.se alarms, did not 
hesitate to declare that “unless Lord Auckland act with vigour and prompti¬ 
tude to secuj o and open our rear, we shall soon be between two fires, if not 
under them. France and Russia are advancing with only the remote contin¬ 
gency of profit to stimulate them. We are sui)iu^, whilst our inactivity will 
probably be the cause of our ruin. France, gi'atuitously supplies Persia with 
•10,000 muskets, at a time when Persia may be said to be at ww with us. I 
cannot, though I have repeatedly and eai-nestly pres.sed my request.’’ 

Tn explanation of the envoy’s complaint, it is nece.s.sai’y to mention that he Agr««t 

*/ 1 ^ game iii 

liad begun to dream of playing what he called a great game in C'entral Asia, contraiABia 
and had failed in obtaining the governor-general’s countenaiice to it. He * ' 
would have i-ushed into a war with the Sikhs for the pm'pose of compelling 
them to give a free passage at all times to the Briti.sh troops acro.ss their 
frontiera Such a passage, he alleged, was absolutely \ecessary in order to 
keep open the communications with India and Hindoostan. Not satisfied with 
thus “macadamizing” the Punjab, he would have punished Shah~Kamran and 
Var Mahomed at Herat, by wresting that territory from them, and making a 



368 'INDIA. [Book VIII. 

A.D. 1840. present of it to Shah Shujah; Another part of his plan would have been to 
despatch a force to Bokliara, who^^arbarous khan had commenced that series 
stoddart of outrages which he crowned at last by the atrocious murder of Stoddart and 
Tu B^hara^ Gonolly. By the expedition to Bokhara he wished not only to compel the 
release of Stoddart, who was then, by a gross violation of the law of nations, 
pining in a loathsome dungeon, but secure the important political object of 
severing the connection which had recently been formed between the khan and 
Dost Mahomed. The latter, after vaiious adventures, had sought an asylum 
from the former, and been received with open arms, and there was therefore 
ground to apprehend that an effort would be made at the head of a formidable 
army to re-establish the BiU'ukzye ascendency in Afghanistan. The envoy 
would have anticipated this danger, and talked of an expedition to Bokhara as 
“ conveniently feasible, if entered upon at the proper season of the year.” He 
expected, as the result, to compel “tlie Shah of Bokhara to release Stoddart, to 
evacuate all the countries on this side of the Oxus, and to pay the expenses of 
the expedition.” The execution of this wild scheme, never seriously entertained 
except by the envoy himself, was soon seen to be unnece.ssary, in so far at 
least as it wsis designed to destroy the influence of Dost Mahomed with the 
Khan of Bokhai'a. The friendship of the two chiefs dissolved of its own accord, 
an open rupture ensued, and Dost Mahomed, after being subjected to indignity 
Jis a piisoner, was glad to make his escape into the territory of the WuUee of 
Khooloom, under whose protection his own family were then residing, and by 
whose aid he hoped to gain over several Usbek chiefs to his interest. 
tijiHatiafiic- Shah Shujah and his court, as soon as the winter was past, prepared to 
i.f Afghau return to C’abool, and took their departure from Jehilabad in the latter pai"t of 
April, 1810. I'lie state of the country continued to be very unsatisfactory, and 
the envoy, unable any longer U) shut his eyes to the fact, was obliged to con¬ 
fess that on looking at the future he anticipated “anything but a beti of roses,” 
Dost Mahomed had, as we have seen, made his escape into the tenitories of the 
Wullee of Khooloom, and was thus in dangerous proximity to the Afghan 
frontiers on the north-west. It had been expected, indeed, that an event which 
had recently occurred would make hini hesitate before recommencing hostilities. 
Before his arrival at Khooloom, his family, previously resident thei'e under the 
chai’ge of his brother J ubbar Khan, had, after some negotiation, been brought 
by the latter to the outpo.st at Bamian, aiid placed under British protection, or 
in other words surrendered as prisoners, without any other stipulation in their 
favour than that of honourable treatment. Under these circumstances Dost 
Mahomed was somewhat in the position of a party who had given hostages for 
his good behaviour. It soon appeared, however, that he was not to be thus 
restrained from once more attempting to regain his power. When reminded of 
the danger to which he was exposing his family, he only answered, “I have no 
family; I have buried my wives and children;” and continued in concert with 



3G9 


Chaf. IV.] THfi 

the Wullee to levy troops for the av6wed purpose of once more trying his for¬ 
tune in Afghanistan. 

In other quarters the signs of approaching disturbance wei-e equally mani¬ 
fest. The Ghiljies inhabiting the central poi'tion of the mountainous districts 
which extend in a north-east direction between Candahar and Cabool, had 
from the first given unequivocal signs of hostility, and by the extent of their 
depredations inflicted such severe losses that it became necessary to send,a 
detachment again!9t them. It was headed by Captain Outiam, wlio did the 
duty so. effectually that many of the Ghiljie chiefs fled to the north and sought 
refuge among Dost Mahomed’s other adiierents. After remaining here for a 
few months they ventured to return, and having re-occupied their forts i-esumed 
their former practices with even greater boldness than before. General Nott, 
in command at Candahar, was obliged in consequence, in the beginning of April, 
1840, to adof)t measures for their suppression. At first the force employed for 
this purpose consisted only of a party of her Majesty’s 2d cavalry, and a few of 
the 4th local horse, in all 210 men, under Captains Taylor and Walkei", 
su]iported by a detachment of infantry, under (Japtain Codrington, and accom¬ 
panied by a body of Afghans, fimning part of the tj'oops of Shah Shujah; but 
afterwards, when the extent of the resistance to be anticipated was bettei- 
ascertained, it was detuned necessary to detach a reinforcement, consi.sting of 
lier Majesty’s .oth regiment of infantry, and foui‘ guns of the 2d troop of horse 
artillery, under Cajttain Anderson. On the IGth of May the Ghiljie chiefs, 
now in open rebellion, AA^cre found in force at Tazec, in the vicinitj^ of the 
Turnuk. When summoned to submit, they replied that they had 12,000 men at 
their command, and being fully satisfied of the justice of their cause, ha<l no 
fear of the issue. Their real number Avas about 3000, strongly ])osted on 
adjoining heights. NotAvithstanding his inferiority in numbers. Captain 
Anderson immediately prepared for the encounter. It was maintained by the 
Chiljies for some time with great gallantry, but after they had made two 
(!harges and been repulsed, in the first instance by the destructiA’e fii’e of the 
artillery and in the second at the point of the bayonet, their courage failed, 
and they fled to their mountain fastnesses. 

NotAvithstanding the severe chastisement thus inflicted, the rebellion seemed 
to gather sti’«ngth, and so large a body of insurgents had concenti-ated in the 
vicinity of Khelat-i-Ghiljie, that it Avas deemed necessary to make preparations 
against it on a larger scale. Accordingly, Sir Willoughby Cotton, in a letter to 
General Nott, appointing him “to the command of the force to be employed in 
tranquillizing the Ghijjie country,” intimated his intention to send strong 
detachments from Cabool and Ghuznee, to unite with the troops which might 
accompany him from Candahar. Nott convinced that the insurrection was dot 
so formidable as was supposed at head-quarters, and having, moreover, some 
‘apprehension of a rising in Candahar itself, took with him only a small portion 

Vot. III. 248 


A.D. 1840. 


Kx^Tcdition 
against tbu 
Ghiljies. 


Kngagemetit 
M’ith tliciij. 


Nawdia- 

turhaiieos 

tlireatoncKl 



37( HISTOKY OF INDIA. . , FBook VIII. 

A.i>. 1840. of the 4-3(1 native infantry. The event proved the accuracy of his views. 
The Ghiljies, after all their boastings, scarcely ventured to resist, and the chiefs 
who headed them either submitted or fled.. As it was hardly to be expected 
that tribes so turbulent would, if again left to themselves, remain tramjuil, it 
was resolved to keep them in check by means of a permanent force, stationed 
in the vicinity, at Hoolan Hobart, commanding a mountain ])ass of that name. 
The envoy, doubtful if tranquillity could be secui-od by tliis means, had 
recourse to others, in whicli lie had greater confidence, and agreed to pay the 
Ohiljie eliiefs 30,000 rupees (X3000) iuinually, on condition of tlieir abstaining 
from maiuuding, and giving free passage through the country. 
c<.u(.i.iiw!,v General Nott, it iias been mentioned, was ajiprehensive of a rising in t-'an- 

itiCniidaliur ., t n t • i p*!! trt 7 

uahar, and for tins reason aiiunig others relrained, when setting out for Khelat- 
i-Ghiljie, from taking with liim .-nn' large body of troojis. From letters found 



KHELAT-l-GHn-TiE.— From yalw’s T)efeiice of .lelalabad. 


in the possession of the prisoners taken at Tazee, he discovered that certain 
chiefs residing at Gandaliar were in hopes that the garrison would be so weak¬ 
ened in jiroviding for the Ghiljie expedition as to give them a favourable op])or 
tunity of rising, and massacring every Europe.an Jind Hindoo within the city. 
The fact that such a plot had been formed is a strong proof of the genera! 
hatred with which Shah Shujah and his allies were regarded. Nor is it difficult 
to find the explanation. According to Nott’s account, which even supposing 
it to be somewhat coloured, was doubtless substantially-correct, nothing could 
be more atrocious than the manner in which the government was conducted. 
Prince Timour, the Shahzada, or heir-apparent of Shah Shujah, accompanied 

by one of his brothers, was ruling at Candahar as his father’s representative. 
• • • ^ 
The mode in which he discharged this duty Nott thus describes: “ The fact is 

that the plunder, the robbery, and cruel oppression committed by the servants 

and followers of his highness Prince Timour, have been such as to outrage the 




Chap. t.V.] MISGOVE&NMENT AT CANDAHAR. 371 

feelings of the natives, and sure I am, that should opportunity offer, these cruel 
and shameful proceedings will be ret^iated upon the troops left in this country. 
Never in all history have I read of such plunder, cruelty, and oppression as I 
witnessed in this camp.” “ The houses and corn-fields of the unfortunate inhabi¬ 
tants ai-e entered, their property plundered, and the owners cut and wounded 
in the most cruel manner.” 

The cruel treatment above described took i)lace at Hoolan Robart during 
the expedition to Khelat-i-Ghiljie, but as it was under the immediate eye. of 
Prince Timour, who was personally present, he was nndojibtedly responsible 
for it. General Nott, adopting this view, Jicted upon it with his u.sual decision. 
Having caused the plundered property and the plunderers to be seized, he 
intimated to the Shahzada and Captain Nicolson, the political resident, that 
he did not wish to interfere with his highness’s servants, but as the plundered 
propei ty had been brought into his camp, the inhabitants naturally looked to 
him for redress, and therefoi’c, if those to Avhom the duty pro])crly belonged 
did not }mni.sh the robbers, he himself would. The .subse(]uent procedure is 
thus detailed in a letter to his daughters:—“The politicals blustered in the 
name of the prince. My answer was short: ‘You are in jmsession of my deter¬ 
mination, which I shall carry into effect at sun.set utdess you send your people 
to puni.sh the marauders in my presence, and as an example to all.’ Well, sunset 
came, when I had the fellows tied uj) and flogged, in presence of the poor 
inhabitants who had been plundered and robbed. I restored their property to 
them, and they went awa}’^ rejoicing. I told the juince and politicsils that 
unless a stop was j)ut to siich atrocious conduct, 1 would se])arate my camp 
from that of the prince. I fancy they have represented the whole to the Cabool 
authorities, who will not, I should think, dare to write to me on the subject. 
Yet they nnty, and how it will end T neither know nor cai’e; I will never allow 
of such scenes in a camp under my command.” 

That General Nott was right in the course which he adopted can scarcely 
be questioned, but he judged too favouiably of the “ politicals” and the “Cabool 
authoi’ities ’ when he thought that ’ they would not dare to write him on the 
subject. Captain Nicolson, who had at first protested “most strongly” against 
General Nott’s intention, and plainly told him that he would not allow the 
princes people to be punished “upon inquiiy made by others than the.piince 
himself, or liis responsible adviser myself,” lost not a moment after the punish¬ 
ment was inflicted in forwarding a complaint to the envoy. “ The prince,” he 
assured him, “ was evidently deeply hurt, and had said that ‘ though he had 
accompanied Sir C. Wade from Loodiana, and spent much of his time with 
British troops, this was the first time he had met with conduct which would 
•loubtless produce a very bad effect on the Kuzzilbashfes about his highness’s 
jierson, and lower himdn the estimation of all the subjects of the Shah.”’ On 
receiving this complaint Sir William Macnaghten fired at once. The more the 


A.D. 18<0. 


C>j»preMHi<)n 
exorci»eiJ 
by Khali 
Khiijali’B 
uffieialM. 


Nott’ft motlo 
tif represu- 
it. 



372 


IllSTOEY OF INDIA. 


[Boofi VIII. 


A I). 1840. reality of power was denied to the dynasty which he was labouiing so earnestly 
ggtablish, the more tenaciously he clung to its shadow, and he was therefore , 
Notts m«io always forward to resent any effront offered to the Shah or any of the members 
ing tiir* . of his family. In accordance with these feelings, he laid the correspondence on 
subject before Sir Willoughby Cotton as commander-in-chief, accompanying 
oMoors. a letter, in which he said, “ 1 need not dwell on the anxiety of the 

governor-general in council, that in the difficult and perilous position we occupy 
in this country, the greatest possible re.spect and tenderness should be shown- 
for the honour and feelings of his majo.sty; and should you concur with me in 
thinking that, in the act whicli has proved so offensive to the prince. Major- 

general Nott has deviated from those 
])rinciples, I have to request that you 
will be good enough to convey to liim 
your opinion in such terms as may effec¬ 
tually |)revent his falling into a .similar 
error in future.’^ Sir Willoughby ap¬ 
plied to General IMott for explanation, 
and <nj leceiving it gave his official 
opinion in very decided terms. “ The 
.system of ])lui»der which appears to hav(A 
been carried on in the canq) by the I’ol- 
lowers of the Shahzada was atrocious; 
and althoTigh I regret that Major-general 
jSb)tt was driven to the necessity of pun¬ 
ishing the prince’s servants, yet as the 
])olitical agent, to whom he states that 
he fruitles.sly applied on several occa¬ 
sions, would not check the prevailing dis¬ 
orders, it became General Ntitt’s duty to take measures to arrest proceedings so 
di.sgraceful, and tending to alienate the feelings of the pcoj)le both from the 
British troops and from his majesty’s government.’’ His concluding remarks 
deserve quotation: “I am sensible of the objects of the government in main¬ 
taining by all means the dignity of the Shah and his family, and of impressing 
upon the pe.oi)le of the country the proofs of his independence; but I presume 
that it is not intended to sacrifice the discipline and order of the army, or the 
credit of the nation for justice and moderation; and instead of being offended, 

I should humbly imagine that any prince, either European or Asiatic, would 
feel obliged to the general commanding for affording prompt justice to his ill- 
treated and oppressed peasantry.” The que.stion ought now to have been set 
at rest, but Sir William Macnaghten, describing the punishment inflicted by 
General Nott as “an unnecessary act of violence,” urged the governor-general 

* For an account of the Barukzyes, see p 352 . 



1. Khan Shf’Bkicn Khan, (’liief i>f tlic Jiuvaiishoor Knzzil- 

liBbln-M. L*. Gjiof.AM Maiiomuo, u Barukzyv. — From Harl'« Churucter 
uml Gwttuini: uf Afghainitiun. 




CHAr. rv.] EENEWAL OF DISTURBANCES. 373 

to prevent the repetition of it, “ if for no other reason than that it cannot fail 
of being prejudicial to our interests, as proving to the people of Afghanistan 
the truth of the rumours so industriously circulated by our enemies to the effect 
that the government of the country has been assumed by us, and that Shah 
Shujah-ul-Moolk is a mere puppet in our hands." Lord Auckland was only 
too much disposed to maintain the Shah’s dignity at all hazards, and to view 
any apparent .encroachment upon it with “great regret and displeasure." 
Almost therefore as a matter of course, his views coincided with those of the 
envoy, and Sir Willoughby Cotton was instructed to inform General Nott that 
his conduct in arrogating to himself “ the power of punisliing the servants of 
the Shah’s son and representative within his majesty’s dominions, where tlio 
Shahzada was actually in the exercise of the vice-regal functions, had excited" 
extreme surprise “ in the governor-general in council, and created” an impres¬ 
sion unfavourable as to his “discretion and perfect fitness for delicate duties in 
such a country.” 

The triumph thus given to the envoy, by the censure of a distinguished 
officer for an alleged encroachment on the Shah’s dignity must have been a 
poor compensation to him for the increasing difficulties of his i)osition. His 
grand .game in Asia, which would necessarily have led to new wars, ami 
increased an expenditure already felt to be overwhelming, had met with no 
countenance, and it was every day becoming nujre doubtful if Shah Shujah’s 
tlirone, hedged though it was with British bayonets, could long be maintained. 
So far from settling down into tranquillity^, the countjy was becoming more 
disturbed. The revolt of the Ghiljies, and the threatened insurrection in 
Gandahar, have been already mentioned, and in whatever dircctit)n we tuin a 
similar spirit is found to prevail. When Khelat w'as captured and Mehrab 
Khan slain, it became necessary to provide for the future government (jf the 
territory. The jdan adopted was to annex it as a dependency to Shah Shujah’s 
dominions, and give the government of it to a new khan who was willing to 
accept it on this condition, and was also l:)elieved to be sincerely attached to 
British interests. Newaz Khan, the individdal selected, belonged to a collateral 
branch of the ruling family, but this relationship, instead of conciliating his 
bcloochee countrymen, only made his acceptance of the title more odious to 
them. 'The youthful son of Mehrab Khan was not slow to avail himself of 
the strong feeling manifested in his favour, and no sooner made his appear¬ 
ance than the tribes hastened to rally around him. Though the danger 
mu.st have been foreseen, no precautions were taken. 'The insurgents easily 
made themselves masters of the capital, and with the concurrence of Newaz 
Khan himself, who to avoid a worse fate was glad to abdicate, seated Mehrab 
Khan’s son as the rightful heir upon the throne. Among the prisoners was 
Lieutenant Loveday, a British officer, who after some months of captivity' was 
barbarously murdered. 


A.n. 1840. 


Goneral 
Nott’a pro¬ 
cedure dia- 
apitmvnd 
the govor- 
nor*goin--i:t). 


New 

tui’lKViioer- 



A O. 1840. 


])c^lan«ut 
cut aff by 
^eloocluAeH. 


lU;4jor 

C’libburii’s 

•MjH^diUun 


374 ■ HlSfTcmy.OF :i^00K Vm. 

Duritig tjie various in^rrections wBioh *^oinpaniedt or ' li^owed* llie 
revolutign in" Kiielat, disaster on mbre thto one octaSion. befell Briti^'troops. 
A detachment of 50 horse and ISO foot, Under Lientenjpbnt.Oiarkbf the 2’d'Boin- 
bay gi-enadiors, while i)roeeeding froin the fort of KaRnh, situated itt .tlie\ 30 uth- 
east of Afghanistan; about twenty naUns west of the Stdimari Mountains, for the 
purpose of obtaining supplies, was suddenly attacked by a body of 2000 
Beloochees, an’d alter much unavailing gallantry, cut off to fK giah. Shortly 
afterwards tlie fort iteelf was attacked, and its small gairtisqn, ably oommalided 
by Captain BroWn of the 50th native infantry, while making a valiant defence 
was in daiiger of i)eing'starved into surrendcsr. \ Major, Clibborh ■of. tbe 1st 
Bombay .gfenadiert was therefore detached froin Sukkur on the 12tli of August 
with a convoy for its relief The convoy consid^d.of 1200 camels stnd 600 
bullocks; the escort mustered 464 bayonets, 84 rank and file of artillery, and 
three twelve-pounder howiteera At Poolajee, a reinforcement of 200 Poonah 
and Seinde in>egular horse was received, and the whole proceeded through a 
country presenting the most formidable difficulties. On the 31st of August, the 
jiass of Nnffoosk came in sight, and pre.sented an appearance by which the 
stoutest Learts wci’O appalled. The road to be traversed led ziz zag up the side 
of a pretnpitous mountain, the crest of which was croWned by a body of the 
enemy, who, as sogn as tlic convoy'- a])peared, gave notice to the surrounding 
country by setting fire to a beacon light. Though his troops were already ex- 
hau.sted by a long and toilsome march, and suffering dreadfully from thirst 



iiii: Pars ok NPFtoosK. -I'ion, Kiik sXi- 


which there was no means of allaying, Majrrr Clibborn immediately prepared to 
.storm the pass. The result was ^disastrous. After the stonming party had 
nearly gained tlic head of the pass, they were assailed by rocks and stones hurled 
down from the summit, and a murderous fire was opened upon them which 
they wore unable to return with any effect. During the confusion produced 




•Qf• ,l>I$P*C:TJEli$jSNCE8; ■ 


- 3/6 


by -this uaequal coaflict, tl|i© Jg^Iooeijefe^, pout/pg down-'fi^om th© ridges sword in A.n. i84o. 
band, hpre ^J. J)ef(^e, theih Not aatisfled \y^h tKijs cfearing the .pass, tljey ~ 
rushed into, thte plain aad advanced to the very vA\izzles of the guns 1»efbre piey 
could be disposed... Their lo&s must have.- 
been very 'great, but it opuld be bopiefar 
more easily than idiat, of tlxeir victors, of 
whom ISO-Ixadi failoQ^. . Nor, was this all.. 

T>urii)g‘the;^ietion. inbsit ef the camel-men. 
liad abscaikleil after plundering the com¬ 
missariat and tile gun-horseS were gone, so 
tiiat both tbje gUhs ^nd the.controy with the 
stores and camp equipage were necessarily 
abandoned. With the htmost difficulty, and 
tlie loss of many additional .lives, ,a retreat 
to Poolajee, more than fifty miles distant, 
was effected. 

'I’he more immediate eflect of Majoj- 
Cliljboni’s disaster was to leave the fort ol' 

Kahun Witlmut auj>plies and almo,st at tluf 
meiey' of the enemy. Cajitain Brown, who 
held it witli a garrison of only three com¬ 
panies of native infantry with one gun, was 
at last compelled to surrender, but sneceedeil 
Liy the gallaTitrv t)f his defence in obtainiim honourable terms. Simultaneous simuH.aiu! 
outbreaks took place over the whole country, and serious attacks were made on i.roak-,. 
C^uettali and other British posts. As these were repulsed without much difficulty', 
it is unnecH's.sary' to giv'c the details; but in order to show that success was in most 
iiistanees owing much uiore to good fortune and to tho discipline and courage 
of our soldiers than to any wisdom in the arrangements of their superiors, it 
may' be worth while to cpiote the following passage from a letter of Genei'al 
Nott to Sir Willoughby Cotton. After deprecating the witlidrawal of any part 
of tlie 42(1 and 43d regiments garrisoning Oandaliar, and declaring that “if any 
accident should occur to the.se regiments by detaching parties from them before 
reinforcements shall arrive, the game in this part of the Shah’s domini(uis 
would he at an end,’’ he continues thus: “Captain Beau confines his ideas to 
that miserable dog-lK>le Quettah, and dictates the ti'oops to he sent to that 
]>lace from Candahar. ‘One jvgiment of regular infantry, four guns (out of six), 

IInd 300 horse;’ (all now at Candahar), without noting the object in view! 1 
could earnestly wish the envoy and mintster to impress upon these gentlemen 
(the political rc-sidents) the propriety of at all times confining their application 
to stating the object, and leaving the means to the officer in command But 
they reverse the order of things by calling for and particularizing the number 



lJKI.OOC'IlE4>i ON THr IamiK OI T. 
From Huviu's. Atkirivuii, ami Vu« OrUch, 




^.n. 1840. 


Iiij^udicions 
mode of 
BUp)>ro^ing 
outbreaks 
in AfgliiUi- 
ifllAH. 


lb*Vc»btt inti 
in Klinl.it. 


376 HISTOEY OF INDIA. [Book VIII. 

of guns, infantiy, and cavalry, without stating the object in view. Now no 
officer of common understanding would pay the least attention to such a call. 
The officer placed at Killah Abdoollah for the purpose of watching and keeping 
open the Kojuk Pass, quits his post, takes a trip to Quettah,from whence he is sent 
with others to beat tlie enemy (so report says) out of Moostung, without having 
the means of attacking 300 men. Away they gallop; and no sooner do they 
get sight of the place than they find it necessaiy to turn round, and gallop back 
again with the enemy at their heels! Even such a silly, paltry affair must have 
a ruinous effect among the half-savage, half-civilized, but brave mountaineers. 
Whose orders is this gentleman at the Kojuk under? The province of Shawl 
was, in general orders, placed under my command; yet a serious attack has 
been made on the post of Quettah, and other attacks foolishly provoked in its 
vicinity, and the officer commanding in Shawl never reports, never sends me a 
line on the subject, although the safety of the whole country from Ghuznee to 
the Bolan, and even to Sukkur, might have been compromised, and all this in 
consequence of the unmilitary and exti’aordinary orders issued to the Shali’s 
troops. T repeat, that if this .system is to be continued, disaster must follow.” 

I'he I'evolution effected in Khelat, so serious in itself, and so dangerous as 
an examjde of successful resistance to the new order of things, could not be 
t(jlerated, and it was therefore determined either to oust Nusseer Khan. 
Meln-ab Khan’s son, from the throne which his own sword and the aft'ections of 
his countiymen had purchased for him, or at all events only to permit him to 
hold it, like his pi-e(leccs.sor, as an acknowledged dejiendant of Shah Shujah. 
In this instance, the person appointed to conduct the military operations was 
wisely selected, and General Nott, in obedience to an official despatch from the 
envoy and the commander-in-chief, dated 3d September, 1840, prcjceeded to 
take the necessiiry steps for the recapture of Khelat. 'fhe leading article in 
his instructions was as follows;—“ The terms to be offered to the rebels now in 
y)ossession of Khelat are, first, unconditional surrender, and an assurance that 
the son of Mehrab Khan will be recognized by the British government and his 
majesty Shah Shujah-ul-Moolk as the lawful chief of Beloochistan, on his 
agreeing immediately to proceed to Cabool to pay personal homage to his 
majesty, and on his agreeing to subscribe to such other conditions as it may be 
thought proper to impose.” This instmetion was very unpalatable to Nott, 
who, writing to his daughters, thus animadverted upon it: “I am disgusted. 
They most unjustly dethroned Mehrab Khan, and placed a tool of Shah Shujah’s 
in his place. Well, Mehrab Khan’s son a.ssombles his father’s followers—retakes 
Khelat; our authorities talk big for a day or two, and then send me instructions 
to offer terms to the boy, declaring that they will p^e him on his father's 
tlvrone; and thus they disgrace the character of our country. Had they taken 
this boy by the hand when he was a wanderer in the land of his ancestors, there 
would have been a generous and honourable feeling; but to bend the knee to 



Chap. IV.] 


OPERATIONS OF GENERAL NOTT. 


377 


him and his bloody chiefs 'tiow is disgraceful.” Though thus disapproving of A.n. i 840 . 
tiie terms, Nott knew his duty too well as a soldier not to do his utmost to give 
effect to them. The means at his disposal, however, seemed very inadequate. Eiiwdition 
The young khan, after rejecting the terms offered him, and swearing that he 
would revenge his father’s death, set out at the bead of 5000 men, in the direc¬ 
tion of Moostung, and on the 29th of September arrived witliin sixteen miles 
of the spot, on which, from the non-arrival of reinforcements on which he had 
been led to calculate, Nott was encamped with a force not exceeding in all 600 
men. Nusseer Khan, notwithstanding his vast superiority of numbers, did not 
venture to risk an encounter. After various movements Nott reached Moostung 
on the 25th of October, while the enemy moved rapidly on Dadur, situated 
about fifty miles to the south-east, near the eastern entrance of the Bolan Pass. 
Immediately on emerging from the pass, Nusseer Khan made preparations for 
attacking the British post at Dadui', and on two successive days (the 30th and 
31st) made ineffectual attempts to force it. He had not despaired of succeed¬ 
ing, when the approach of a considerable reinforcement, under Major Boscawen, 
compelled him to desist. So precipitate, indeed, was his departure, that several 
of his camels and tents were captured. It was on this occasion that the fate of 
Lieutenant Loveday, the jxditical resident made captive at Khelat, was ascer- i5iu-i«rt.ua 
tained. A very handsome European officer’s tent was seen standing in the Ijieuttiimiit 
deserted cam]). On entering it the body of the unfortunate office)' was dis- 
covered lying with the throat cut on a small piece of carpet, with no clothing 
exce])t a ])air of pajamas or cotton drawei's, and fastened by a chain, the 
friction of which had lacerated the ankles. The atrocious murder had just been 
committed, as the body was still waim, and a Hindoostanee attendant, who 
was weeping over it, told that Gool Mahomed, contrary, it was said, to the 
wish of Nusseer Khan, had ordered, that in the event of defeat, the last man 
i|uitting the camp should ihurder the English captive. 

'I'he terror produced by the defeat at Dadur sufficed to make an open UustMu- 

^ 1 • 1 1 honied in 

passage to Khelat, As Nott-advanced the enemy fled before him, and lie conceitwitu 
regained possession of the Beloochee cajrital without opposition. This success was of Kht«j 
preceded by another, which was of still greater consequence, and which, if it 
had been duly improved, might have permanently secured the Dooranee dynasty 
in Afghanistan. The escape of Dost Mahomed from Bokhara had infused new 
.spirit into his adherents, and a letter was intercepted, which according to the 
envoy’s interpretation of it, “im])licated many chiefs in meditated insurrection.” 

Tfie Dost himself was also actively employed irr levying troops, which, united 
with those of the Wullee of Khooloom, amounted to no contemptible ai-my. A 
descent into Afghanis4||^i was rrow openly talked of, and spread so much alaim, 
tlrat even the envoy ceased to be sanguine, and became desponding. “It, is 
reported,” he wrcfte, “that the whole coiirrtry on this side the Oxua is up in 
favour of the Dost, wlio with the Wullee, is certainly advancing in great 
VoL. III. '244 



378 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Boor VIII. 


At). 1840. 


Dost Ma- 
humetl in 
concert with 
the Wulleo 
of Klioo- 
louiii. 


Neceseity of 
reinforce* 
mento. 


strength, so much so that our troops have been obliged to fall back on Bamian, 
while we have a formidable band of conspirators in the city, and the Kohistau 
is ripe for revolt.” A strong confirmation of this alaiming statement was 
shortly after received. An attempt had been made to raise an Afghan force, 
whose fidelity to Shah Shujah might be confidently relied upon. The futility 
of the attempt was soon proved. The first regiment raised with this view, 
wiis no sooner brought into proximity with the enemy than a company went 
off with arms and accoutrements to join the Dost, and it became necessary to 
disarm the other companies, as the only effectual means of preventing them 
from following the examjile. In a letter to the governor-general, dated 12th 
September, Sir WiUiam Macnaghten pressed with additional urgency, that a 
request which he had repeatedly made for a large increase of the army of 



Bahian and Ghdounmla.— From Sale’s Befonoe of Jelalsbatl. 


occupation should be complied with, supporting his application by the ophiion 
of Sir Willoughby Cotton, who had recently given it to liim in the following 
terms :-t-“ I really think the time has now arrived for you and I to teU Lord 
Auckland, totidem verlris, that circumstances have proved incontestably that 
there is no Afghan army, and that unless the Bengal troops are greatly 
strengthened, we cannot hold the country.” Such was the ominous aspect of 
affairs, when the important intelligence arrived that Dost Mahomed was defeated 
and his army dispersed. As soon as he was known to be advancing upon 
Baiuian, Brigadier Dennie hastened forward to that post with strong reinforce¬ 
ments. He arrived on the lith of September, but was unable to obtain certain 
intelligei\ce of the enemy’s movements till the 17th, when he learned that large 
bodies of cavalry were emerging from a defile into the valley, and were at the 
distance of only six miles from Bamian. These troops were supposed to be the 




Chap. IV.] 


TtOUT OF DOST MAHOMED. 


379 


enemy’s advanced guard, under the Dost’s son Afzul Khan, and as they were a.d. i 840. 
reported to have attacked u village, it was resolved to expel them. Accordingly, 
on the morning of the 18th, the brigadier set out with a detachment, consisting OoRt Ma- 


burned 

by 

Brigadiui* 

Deniiie. 


of four companies of the 35th native infantry, four companies of the Ghoorka routed 
corps, about 400 Afghan horse, and two horse-artillery guns. This compara¬ 
tively small force, which expected to encounter only the enemy’s advance, 
found itself in front of his whole army. It occupied a series of heights, crowned 
with forts, around which the troops were clustered in dense masses. Without 
liesitation Dennie, notwithstanding the immense disparity of numbers, deter¬ 
mined to give battle. The guns immediately opened their fire, which told with 
dreadful effect, while no return could be made to it. The confusion thus 
produced in the enemy’s ranks soon became apparent. While the guns follow¬ 
ing up their advantage drove them successively from height to height, the 
cavalry rushed forward, and coming up with the fugitives, now entangled in 
the defile, made fearful slaughter. So sudden and complete was the dispersion 
of the Dost’s whole army, that he and his son only escaped by the fieetness of 
their horses. 

•This reverse so disconcerted the Wullee of Khooloom, that he gladly insured s»»)nii88i..i. 
his own safety by accepting of terms which annexed part of his ten-itories to v^iiiee of 
tliose of Shah ’Shujah, and bound him neither to harbour nor give countenance 
of any kind to Dost Mahomed, or any of his family. Thus once more a 
wanderer, Dost Mahomed fled eastward into Kohistan, where his adherents, 
always numerous, had of late been much increased by the oppressive proceed¬ 
ings of Shah Shujah's officers in levying revenue. It was impossible for him 
to raise a force with which he.could venture to take the field, and he continued 
to flit about from place to place. As there was no doubt, however, that, if not 
in Kohistan, he was intriguing with their chiefs and had received strong 
promises of support, Sir Robert Sale, accompanied by Sir Alexander Burnes, 
marched thither at the, head of a considerable force, and on the 29th of 
September came up with a large body of insurgents, posted in the fortified • 
village of Tootundurrah, situated near the entrance of the Ghorebund Pass. 

Little difficulty was felt in dislodging them, but the Dost still eluded pursuit, 
and caused great alarm by repeated reports of his dangerous proximity to 
Cabool. Sale’s next encounter with the rebels was less fortunate, and a prema¬ 
ture attempt, on the 3d of October, to storm the fort of Joolgah, met with a 
severe repulse. The fort was immediately after evacuated by the garrison, but 
the moral effect of the repulse was dreaded, and the envoy, in writing to the 
governor-general on the 12th of October, did not hesitate to represent both 
Cabool and the country as “ripe for revolt.” The Dost’s cause certainly seemed 
to gather strength. When he again raised his standard at Nyrow, many of the 
Shah’s soldiers deserted to him, and he began to move in the direction of 
Cabool. 



380 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book VITI. 


A.D. 1840. 


Btrange 
queBtioii of 
tho envoy 
UB to the 
ti*eutraoiit 
of the Dost. 


Tlie DoBt's 
surrender to 
Sir William 
Macuftghten. 


These movements of Dost Maliomed so alarmed and irritated the envoy, 
that as if he had despaired of overcoming him by honourable means, he puts 
the question to one of his correspondents, “Would it be justifiable to set a price 
on this fellow’s head?” and then adds, “We have intercepted several letters 
from him, from all which it appears that he meditates fighting with us so long 
as the breath is in his body.” It is lamentable to think that in putting the 
above question the envoy was in earnest. Not only was he meditating to rid 
himself of the Dost without any scruple as to the means, but he had even 
resolved in the event of his capture to show him no mercy. This clearly 
appears from a letter to the governor-general, in which, speaking of Sir Robert 
Sale’s proceedings in Kohistan, he coolly remarks;—“Should he be so fortunate 
as' to secure the person of Dost Mahomed, 1 shall request his majesty not to 
execute him till I can ascertain your lordship’s sentiments.” Fortunately for 
the envoy himself, and the honour of the British name. Dost Mahomed did not 
fall into his hands while these bloody thoughts were in his mind. On the 29th 
of October the. British force, encamped at Bagh-i-Alum, about twenty-six miles 
N.N.E. of Cabool, having received intelligence of Dost Mahomed’s approach 
from the north, at the head of a large body of troops, set out to meet him, and 
on the 2d of November found him posted in the vdley of Purwan. Either 
desirous to evade the conflict, or perhaps not satisfied with his position, he was 
moving off to some higher ground in the rear, when the British cavalry moved 
forward to outflank him, and left him no alternative but to fight or flee. He 
preferred the foinner, and advanced to the encounter’, at the head of a body of 
horse. Strange to say the British cavalry, native troopers, abandoning their 
officers, turned their backs, and Dost Mahomed following up his advantage, 
pursued them with great slaughter, almost within reach of the British guns, and 
then quietly withdrew. This success, however much it may have gratified his 
pride, did not blind him as to the hopelessness of the struggle in which he was 
engaged. Though he had put the cavalry to disgraceful rout, he did not ven¬ 
ture to await the attack of the main body, and hastened to place himself out of 
reach. The effect produced by this affair of Purwan was singular. Sir 
Alexander Burnes, convinced that it mast be followed by a general rising, had 
immediately written to urge a concentration of troops in Cabool, and mean¬ 
while the Dost was wending his way thither to surrender himself a prisoner. 
He had ridden from the battle-field for this very purpose, and had been twenty- 
four hours in his saddle, when Sir William Macnaghten, returning from his 
ride on the evening of the 3d of November, was accosted by an Mtendant, who 
galloped up and informed him that the Ameer was at hand. “What Ameer?” 
asked the envoy. “Dost Mahomed Khan.” And so it was. The ex-ruler of 
Cabool, dismounting from his horse, came forward, placed his sword in the 
envoy’s hand, and claimed his protection. 

Dost Mahomed, now a prisoner in the city where he had once reigned, 




Chap. IV.] 


CAPTIVITY or DOST MAHOMED. 


381 


reconciled himself to his fiite, and by his free and manly bearing, gained the a.d. i84o. 
respect and excited the sympathy of aU who came in contact with him. Shah 
Shujah indeed still cherished thoughts of vengeance, but not being pennitted to Treatment 
carry them into effect, was obliged .to content himself with applying opprobri- Maiimnod. 
ous epithets to his prisoner, and refusing to admit him into his presence, excus¬ 
ing himself on the plea that he would be unable to behave to him with common 
civility. By this conduct he at once disgraced himself and saved the Dost 
from an interview which he would have felt to be humiliating. The envoy, on 
the contrary, now returned to a better mind than when ho talked of setting 
a price on the Dost’s head, treated him with the gi-eatest kindness, and placed 
him under no more restraint than was absolutely necessary to secure his person. 



SUEBENDER OF DoST MaUOMEO TO SiR W. 11. MacNAURTEK, AT THE ENTRAKCE TO CaBOOT. FROM KiLLA KaZEE. 

From Ackiiiton's SkvtvbvK iu ArgliKtuktuu. 

This, however, was scarcely possible in Cabool, and therefore on the 12th of*^®““"'- 

_ veyed to 

JNovember, ten days after his surrender, Dost Mahomed was sent off under a Britmii 
strong escort to British India. The envoy, in a letter written after his depar¬ 
ture, not only expressed his hope that he would be “treated with liberality,” 
but enforced it by an argument, which as coming from him must be admitted 
to be something singular. “His case,” he says, “has been compared to that of 
Shah Shujah; and I have seen it aigued that he should not be treated more 
handsomely than his majesty was; but surely the cases are not parallel. The 
Shah had no claim upon us. We had no hand in dejrriving him of his king¬ 
dom, whereas we ejected the Dost, who never offended us, in siqyport of our 
policy, of which he teas the victim !" It is doubtful if the governor-general 
concurred with the envoy in volunteering a sentence of condemnation on his 
own policy, but he at all events acted generously, and granted Dost Mahomed 
a pension of two lacs of rupees (£20,000). 


382 


HISTORY or INDIA. 


[Book VIII. 


Kow iiiKur 
Feetiou. 


A D. 1841. The removal of Dost Mahomed rid Shall Shujah of the only rival who could 
have competed with him for the throne of Afghanistan with any prospect of 
Fanoioa success, and the envoy, become again sanguine, expressed his belief that the 
tranquillity of the country was now secured. On the 24th of November he' 
wrote to a correspondent that his majesty, who at one time seemed doomed to 
endure the winter of Cabool, was to start in a few days for his more genial 
(j[uaiters at Jelalabad, and added, “We shall now have a little time to devote 
to the affairs of the country, and I trust its condition will be soon as flourish¬ 
ing as 4ts poor resources will admit.” A similar impression prevailed in other 
official quarters. Sir Willoughby Cotton, anxious to return to India, now saw 
nothing to prevent him from resigning his command, and the governor-general, 
as if satisfied that all real difficulties had at length been surmounted, confeiTed 
the appointment not on General Nott, whose talents and services gave him the 
best claim, but on General Elphinstone, who by his incompetency was destined 
to teach a dreadful lesson on the subject of the abuse of patronage. 

When the year 1840 closed, the anticipated tranquillity was not fully 
realized. In Zemindawer, a district to the west of Candahar, a body of insur¬ 
gents, headed by a chief of the name of Aktur Khan, attacked and dispereed a 
detachment of the Shah’s troops, who were assisting the officers employed in 
the collection of the revenue. On the 3d of January, 1841, the insuiTectioji 
was apparently suppressed by Captain Farrington, who having been detached 
fi’om Candahar, encountered an enemy.mustering nearly 1500 men, and after 
a sharp struggle completely defeated them. The worst feature in this insurrec¬ 
tion was that it consisted of Docminees, who as hereditary rivals of the 
Barukzyes, ought to have been strenuous supporters of the new dynasty. Un¬ 
fortunately their expectations from Shah Shujah had been greatly disappointed, 
and they were ready to join in any hostile movement against him. An oj)por- 
tunity was not wanting. Yar Mahomed, exercising his ascendency at Herat, 
had come to open rupture with the Biitish resident, and threatened an expedi¬ 
tion against Candahar. As a preliminary measure he had fostered the discon¬ 
tent of the Dooranees in Zemindawer, who'se insurrection, comparatively 
insignificant in itself, became formidable by its ramifications, and the hostilities 
by which it might be followed. The envoy’s remedy would have been to fit out 
an expedition at once ag^ust Heiat, and annex it to Shah Shujah’s dominions, 
but as this was part of the “grand game” which the governor-general had 
distinctly repudiated, it was necessary to act with more moderation. When 
Aktur Khan again appeared at the head of his insurgents. Lieutenant Elliot, 
intrusted with the settlement of the district, was instructed to conciliate rather 
than fight. Acting in this spirit he offered terms, which Aktur Khan was only 
too glad to accept. The effect of thus purchasing submission, instead of com¬ 
pelling it, might have been foreseen, and was foretold by Colonel Rawlinson, 
resident at Candahar, who writing to the envoy, expressed himself in the 


Yiur Ma¬ 
homed at 
Herat. 



Chap. IV.] 


RENEWED DISTURBANCES IN AFGHANISTAN. 


383 


following terms:—“I do not anticipate that by the conciliating treatment a.o. j 84 i. 
recommended by Lieutenant Elliot, we gain any other advantage than that of 
temporary tranquillity; and however prudent, therefore, it may be at present iii«i>treo- 
to induce the rebel chief of Zemindawer to abstain from disorders by the hope, by Aktur 
of obtaining, through his forbearance, substantial personal benefits, I still think 
that when the danger of foreign aggression is removed, and efficient means are 
at our disposal, the- rights of his majesty's government should be asserted in 
that sti'ong and dignified maimer which can alone insure a due respect being 
paid to his authority." The accuracy of these views was soon confirmed. In 
the course of a few months Aktur Khan was again in arms at the head of a 
greater force than he had ever been able to muster before, threatening the 
important station of Ghiresk, on the west bank of the Helniund. Tliese insur¬ 
gents kept complete possession of the district till powerful reinforcements were 
forwarded, and even then they were not dispensed till they had tried their 
.strength in a regular battle. 

During this insurrection of the Dooranees, the Ghiljies were again in Ncwoiiiijie 
motion. Neither force nor money could wholly repress their native turbulence, 
and it had been resolved, as the most eftectual means of keeping them in clieck, 
to hold their capital of Khelat-i-Ghiljie by a British force, and strengthen its 
fortifications. The commencement of the works at once aroused the fears of 
the Ghiljies for their boasted independence, and the attitude which tlu'y 
a.ssumed made it ahno.st certain that an open rupture was contemplateil, and 
would not be long delayed. 

While matters were in this critical position Lieutenant Lynch, wlio had 
political charge of the country around Khelat-i-Ghiljie, having been insulted 
and defied in riding past a small fort in the vicinity, thought it neces.sary to 
])unish this insolence in a manner which would deter others from imitating it. 

He accordingly sent out a body of troops, who after a refusal to suiTcnder, Pi^es-iinKs 
attacked the fort and captured it, but not without a conflict in which the chief .-rntLyiicii. 
and many of his followers were slain. While the gallantry of the achievement 
was justly commeixded, the conduct of Lynch in ordering it was .severely 
censured. “ Why," exclaimed the envoy, “should we go and knock our heads 
against mud-forts? Why should we not have waited till the Ghiljies chose to 
attack us?" The governor-general, viewing the matter in a similar light, 
removed the offending officer, but it is very questionable if any degree of 
forbearance could have prevented or even delayed the insurrection. Be this 
as it may, the loss of the fort and the slaughter of its garrison were immediate^ 
followed by a foi-midable outbreak. It became necessary in consequence to 
send a reinforcement from Candahar, under Colonel Wymei-, who on arriving 
on the 29th of May at Eelmee, near the banks of the Turnuk, received intelli¬ 
gence that a large body of insurgents, headed by two chiefs, were hastening 
forward .to attack him. 'He hod only time to bring his men into position when 



384 


HISTOEY OF INDIA. 


[Book VIII. 


A. I). 1841. 


I)t9r4$at of the 
(i hiijiefl. 


of 

tranquillity. 


It proves a 
ilisappoiat* 
meut. 


the encounter took place. The Ghiljies, advancing with the greatest boldness, 
had arrived within 900 yards, when the guns opened upon them. Though 
suffering severely they still advanced, and apparently in execution of a previ¬ 
ously concerted plan, separated into three distinct columns, for the purpose of 
making a simultaneous attack on the British flanks and centre. Colonel 
Wymer, comparatively weak in numbera, and encumbered with a large convoj', 
was obliged to remain on the defensive, and allowed the cnemy to approach, 
sword in hand, to within a very short distance. The grape of the guns and 
volleys of the infantry then told with full effect, thinning and breaking the ranks 
of the Ghiljies, and driving them back with fearful loss. A first repulse, 
however, did not deter them from renewing the attack, and they maintained 
the conflict for five hours before they finally gave way. Their force was esti¬ 
mated at 5000 men, and it is said that several hundreds of these were inhabi¬ 
tants of Candahar, who went out to join in the attack, and coolly returned after 
their defeat, even bringing some of their wounded along with them. 

The severe chastisement inflicted on the insurgents successively on the banks 
of the Turnuk and at the Helmund, had the effect of producing a degree of 
tranquillity, which though far more in semblance than in reality, was so satis¬ 
factory to the envoy that he considered the prospect’ “most cheering,” and even 
ventured to describe the country as “perfectly quiet from Dan to Beersheba.” 
While he was thus lulling himself and others into a fancied security, an expedi¬ 
tion which he had sanctioned if not suggested, was being prepared against a 
district which was still in open rebellion. After the defeat at Ghiresk, Azmal 
Khan and Akram Khan, two of the insurgent chiefs, returned to their respective 
forts of Tireen and Derawut, situated about sixty miles north of Candahar. 
When summoned to submit, they answered with defiance, and began mus- 
teiing their followers for another struggle. The extent of the alarm thus 
excited, may be gathered from the fact that a large proportion of the troops in 
Candahar was withdrawn for the purposes of the expedition, and that General 
Nott, who had received instructions some time before, not “on any account to 
leave Candahar at present,'’ and conceived them to be still binding, complained 
that so large a portion of the force under his command “should have been 
ordered on what may prove to be a difficult service,” while he was not per¬ 
mitted to accompany it. The explanation returned having left him at liberty 
to act at his own discretion, he immediately set out to overtake the expedition. 
He reached the camp on the 29th of September, and on advancing into the 
insurgent districts had the satisfaction to find that the display of force had so 
overawed the insurgents as to render actual hostilities unnecessary. Chief'after 
chief appeared in the camp to make his submission, and Nott, deeming his 
presence no longer necessary, returned to Candahar. Meanwhile, in another 
quarter an insurrection of a more formidable character had broken out. The 
enormous expenditure occasioned by the occupation of* Afghanistan had drained 




Chap. IV.] 


NEW OHILJIE INSUEEECTION.' 


385 


the Calcutta treasury, and every letter from the government urged the necessity .a.p 
of large retrenchment. The envoy, perplexed how to proceed, fixed on the 
department which of all others ought to have been left untouched, and com- nhw eiiiijie 
menced by sweeping reductions of the pensions and allowances which had been 
granted to native chiefs and their followers. An increase of disaffection was 
the immediate result, and a general confederacy was formed for tlie purpose of 
resisting the deductions, or compensating for them by means of plunder. The 
eastern Ghiljies in particular, occupying the mountainous districts lying between 
Cabool and Jelalabad, made no secret of their determination to take the remedy 
into their- own hands. The sums allowed them had, they said, been fixed by 
regular compact, and the resolution to curtail them was therefore a breach of 
faith. The undertaking on their part had only been to become responsible 
for robberies committed in their own immediate districts, but the terms, the^' 
alleged, liad been changed without their consent, and tlieir responsibility had 
been made to extend to districts over which they had no control. Such were 
the grievances of which they complained, and they commenced at once to 
redress them in their own peculiar fashion. The communication with India by nxiieUitioii 

. •' of Sale, t" 

the north-east being thus rendered almost impracticable, it was determined to »ui>).ie« a. 
take advantage of the intended return of Sir Robert Sale’s brigade to Hindoostan, 
to supju'ess the Ghiljie rising, and compel a re-opening of the passes. Previous 
attempts had indeed been made, but of so absurd a nature that nothing but 
failure should have been anticipated. ITumza Khan, acting as Shah Shujah’s 
representative among the Ghiljies, was sent out by his majesty with orders to 
bring them back to their allegiance, and executed the commission with 
characteristic duplicit}^ by fostering the insurrection instead of suppressing it. 

He was in fact one of the parties aggrieved, or as the envoy expressed it, “at 
the bottom of the whole conspiracy.” The effect of negotiation was then 
attempted, and a treaty wiis actually framed, by which the Ghiljies obtained a 
concession of all their demands. This mode of patching up a peace w'as only a 
premium on insurrection, and soon proved its futility. While the chiefs 
professed submission, their followers continued in arms, and carrying on their 
predatory warfare, made it at length obvious that nothing but force would be 
effectual. On the ,9th of October Side’s brigade started from Cabool, and 
proceeded about four miles south-east to Boothauk. On the 12th two regi¬ 
ments, her Majiesty’s 13th and the 35th native infantry, with two guns, moved 
forward to Khoord Cabool, and prepared to force the j)ass of that name, which 
consists of a narrow defile, hemmed in by high and rugged rocks. The enemy 
stood prepared to dispute the entrance. They were few in number, but so 
completely sheltered by their position, that they remained secure, while they 
coolly shot down all who came within range of their muskets. * In this way 
they picked off sixty-seven men, and wounded Sale himself, by a ball which 
entered his left leg, near the ankle, shivering the small bone. The pass was 
Voi,. III. 245 



38G 


HISTOEY OF INDIA. 


[Book VIII. 


A T). iMi. however forced, and the 33lh, under Colonel Monteath, took up an advanced 
position, while the 13th, as previously arranged, fell back again on Bootliauk. 
No» ohiijio While Sale waited here for reinforcements, Monteath reported that a night 
iiisnireai.m. been made on his position at Khoord Cabool. On this occasion the 

Gliiljies mustered far stronger than before, and maintained the contest with-so 
much obstinacy and so many advantages in their favour, as to inflict a severe 
loss, aggravated by the treachery of the Shah’s Afghan horse, who instead of 
defending their lines, admitted the enemy within them, and gave them an 
opportunity of carrying off' a number of camels. 

Sir Robert Sale when reinforced hastened forward from Boothauky and again 
entering the Khoord Cabool Pass, proceeded without encountering serious oppo¬ 
sition to Jugdulluk. The real .struggle now commenced. The enemy, advan¬ 
tageously posted on the adjoining heights, opened a destructive fire, which could 
not be effectully returned, and in the face of which it would have been destruc¬ 
tion to advance. The onlj^ alternative was to send out flanking parties, which 
clambered up the heights .and dislodged the assailants, while a party undei- 
Captain Wilkinson, profiting by this diversion, pushed through the defile. For¬ 
tunately the cnemj', though they had erected breastworks in many places, had, 
perhaps from over-confidence, left the main outlet unguarded. The march 
tlie Hvitifth. therefore was resumed, and Gundamuk was reached, though not without a severe 
loss of lives and the abandonment of much camp equipage. Among the killed 
was Captain Windham of the 35th native infantry, who lost his life in perform¬ 
ing an act of humanity. The enemy, having broken in upon the rear-guard 
and thrown it into confusion, was in full pursuit, when Windham, already lame 
from a hui-t, dismounted to give a place on his charger tt) a woimded soldiep 
By this dela 3 % .and the slackening of the animal’s pace b 3 ^ a double load, he was 
unable to kee]) up with the other fugitives, and on seeing escajie to be impos¬ 
sible, turned round, faced his pursuers, .and fell fighting like a hero. 

DaUiaivB While war was thus raging, and disturbances had actually broken out or 

tvamiuiiiiiy. were threatened in other (quarters, the envoy was still dreaming of tranquillity, 
and even expressed a hope that the formidable attack made on Sale’s brigade 
was “the expiring effort of the rebels.” He was not alone in his delusion. It 
was shared in both by Sir Alexander Burnes and General Elphinstone, though 
there can now be little doubt that they were less guided by their judgments 
than lilinded by fheir wishes. General Elphinstone, broken down in constitu¬ 
tion, and perhaps also not without misgivings as to his fitness for command, had 
resigned, and with his face turned anxiously homewards was longing for the 
arrival of General Nott, who, as senior officer, was to take his place. Sir William 
Macnaghten, as a reward for the services which he was supposed to have rendered, 
hivd been appointed governor of Bombay, and was fretted by every new occur¬ 
rence which dela 3 ’ed his departure; and Sir Alexander Burnes, who had long been 
indignant at the kind of nondescript position assigned him at Cabool, had 



Ohap. IV.] 


THE CITY OF CABOOL. 


387 


gained the great object of his ambition, and was, immediately on Sir William 
Miicnaghten’s departure, to enter on the full and uncontrolled discharge of the 
duties of envoy and minister. To all these officials, therefore, the first thing 
necessary was a tranquillity which, though more apparent than real, might 
suffice to justify the completion of the new arrangements. Under these circum¬ 
stances it is easy to understand how, when warning was given of a gatheiing 
storm, they continued to see only a fe^v passing clouds. The departure of Sale’s 
brigade, depriving Oabool of a large portion of its defenders, has been already 
noticed. With similar infatuation, orders had been given to General Nott to 
send off a considerable number of his troops to Hindoostan, and three native 
regiments, together with the Bengal artillery, had actually started, when alarm¬ 
ing tidings from Cabool rendered it necessary to recall them. The revolution 
had now commenced in earnest, and the whole country had risen to retaliate on 
the invaders, who had according to the idea of the inhabitants polluted their 
soil, and were merely employing Shah Shujah as a tool to secure their own 
usur|)ation. Before ])roceeding with the details, it will be necessary to give a 
brief description of the city of Cabool, and f>f the British positions within it 
and in its vicinity. 

Cabool .stjinds at the we.stern extremity of an extensive plain about (iOOO 
feet above the level of the sea. Notwithstanding this elevation, the latitiule, 
which is only 34° north, gives a most delightful climate in summei’, am^ more 
especially in autumn, when heavy crops of grain are reaped, and all the fruits of 
the temperate zone obtained in an abundance and of an excellence not surpassed 
in any other quarter of the world. Tn proportion however to the genial, though 
soTiietimes oppressive heats of summer, ai'e the rigours of winter, which extends 
from October to March, and during which storms are frequent and snow covers 
the ground to the depth of several feet. At all .seasons earthquakes, sometimes 
of a very destructive’ character, occur. The river of Cabool, shallow, clear, and 
rapid, pursuing its course eastward to join the Indus, passes in front of the city, 
which is approached across it by three bridges; while a canal, which draws its 
water from the river and Inis a direction nearly parallel to it, furnishes the 
means of irrigation to numerous beautiful gardens and productive orchards. 
Though described as a plain, the ground in the vicinity of Cabool is A^ery much 
broken. In particular two ranges of lulls, conA^erging till they leaAm only a 
narrow defile between them, form a kind of semicircle which incloses the city 
on three sides. Advantage has been taken of these heights to fonu a line of 
battlements, which are cairied round so as to form a complete inclosure, but are 
so unsubstantially and injudiciously constructed as to furnish a very feeble 
defence. Better protection was given by the Bala Hissar, Avhich wtis at once 
a royal palace and a citadel. Occupying the acclivity of a hill on the south-east 
exti’emity of the city, it completely overlooked it, and was thus equally well fitted 
to repel the attack of an enemy or put down internal insurrection. It fomied 


A.n. 1841. 


Dolnaivo 
views as to 
traiiqiiillit-y 
of Afghan 


Tl»e city of 
Culxiol, 



A.D. 1841. 


Tho Bala 
IliaBar^ 
Cal>uoJ. 


Houses and 
streets of 
the city. 


388 HISTORY OF INDIA. [Book VIII. 

an irregular pentagon, and contained within its precincts, in addition to the 
buildings of the palace, about a thousand houses. It was thus ample enough to 
accommodate a considerable force, and from its elevation, wide ditch, and 
ramparts, strong enough, if suitably garrisoned, to resist any attack by troops 
unacquainted with siege operations. Hence Havelock, after briefly describing 
its advantages, and, it may be, from foreboding the kind of service in which the 
troo])s left in Afghanistan might be called to engage, exclaims—“Here then all 
depends, in a military point of view, on a finn hold of the Bala Hissar. It is 
the key of Cabool. The troops who hold it ought not to allow themselves to 
be dislodged but by a siege, and they must awe its population with their 
mortars and howitzeis.” Within the city itself there was little deserving of 



The BAZAAtt, Oaboul, dering tul Fruit Seaeok. —From Atkiusou'e Skotoliea in Afghanistan. 


notice except the bazaars and markets, the former starting fi-om a central square 
and extending at right angles in a series of arcades, and the latter deriving 
their chief attraction from the magnificent display of vegetables and fruits. 
The houses, for the most part of two or three stories and flat-roofed, consisted 
of a framework of wood interlacing and inclosing walls of mud; and the streets, 
many of them so narrow that two horsemen could not pass without difficulty, 
were badly paved, crooked, and dirty in the extreme. In thus huddling the 
streets together the only advantage gained was in the additional security it gave 
against a hostile assault, and the same object had undoubtedly been contem¬ 
plated in the division of the whole town into districts, each occupied by ifs own 
particular tribe or division of inhabitants, and isolated from the other districts 
by its own inclosure and gatea The whole population was estimated at about 
60 , 000 . 

Tlie Bala Hissar was, as we have seen, the key of Cabool, and the secure 



Chap. IV.] 


BRITISH CANTONMENTS AT CABOOL. 


389 


poissession of it was therefore one of the first objects to which attention was a.d. i84i. 
turned in providing for the British occupation of the capital. Lieutenant 
Durand of the engineers being employed to select the proper station for locating Proiwsai to 
the troops, at once fixed on the upper part or citadel of the Bala Hissar, but 
encountered an opposition which ultimately proved insurmountable. “The 
Biila Hi.ssai’,” said Shah Shujab, “was his palace, and its privacy would be 
oom])letely destroyed by allowing any portion of it to be occupied as British 
bari’acks.” The envoy gave effect to these objections, and Durand was ordered 
to provide accommodation elsewhere. This how'ever was no easy task, and the 
envoy, on its being represented to him that the winter would set in before it 
would be possible to execute the necessary erections, succeeded in obtaining the 
,Sliah’s consent to the original proposal of accommodating the troops in the 
citadel. On the faith of this consent the necesssiry repairs were commenced, and 
the British troops had the prospect of soon occupying a position so strong by 
nature, and so much improved by art, that no Afghan force could have made 
any impression upon it. But this was too wise an airangoment to be carried 
out. No sooner was the exectition of it seriotisly commenced than the Shah itaiojectimi. 
once more interfei'ed, and in addition to his former objections declared that the 
occupation of any part of the Bala Hissar by a foreign force would make him 
unpoj)ular with his subjects. Tins objection being the one to which of all others 
the envoy was most sensible, jirevailed. The barracks, so far as constructed 
within the citadel of the Bala Hissar, Avere appropriated by the Shah for the 
:iccommodation of'^s harem, while the Briti.sh troops were obliged to content 
them.selves with hastily prepared lodgings at its base. In this locality they 
]ia,ssed the winter of 1839-40, while the Shah and his court were at Jclalabad. 

Though far inferior to the locality originally fixed upon, the position adopted 
was not without its advantages. It commanded the acce.ss to the Bala Hissar, 
and made it easy should any alarm occAir to occupy it effectually. Unfortu¬ 
nately even this advantage was not to be retjiined, and finally, but at whose 
instigation it is difficult to say, it was resolved to erect cantonments on a spot 
now universally acknowledged to be the worst that could t.ave been chosen. 

This was a flat situated about two miles and a half to the north of Cabool, and 
nearly equidistant from the Bala Hissar at its eastern, and the Kuzzil^bash 
quarter at its western extremity. The cantonments, consisting of long ranges of cauton- 
buildings, formed a parallelogram about 1200 yards long from north to soutli, erected, 
and GOO yards wide from east to west. On the west they were bounded by the 
Kohistan road, which leads nearly due south to one of the principal city gates. 

The east side of the parallelogram was about 250 yards from the canal already 
mentioned,- while about 300 yards farther east ran the river of Cabool. The 
defences of the cantonments consisted of a shallow ditch and feeble ramparts, 
together with a round bastion at each of the anglea Immediately north of 
the cantonments were two considerable inclosures surrounded merelj' by a wall. 



390 


HISTOEY OF INDIA. 


[Book Till. 


A.n. 184J. The larger and nearer of the two was the mission compound or residency; the 
other was chiefly occupied by the dwellings of officers, clerks, and other indivi- 

Biiti»h can- duals attached to the mission. In the space allotted to the cantonments, there 

CuWji. must have been ample accommodation not only for the troops but for the com¬ 
missariat stores. But with an infatuation which looks like judicial blindness, 
tbe stores were excluded and placed in an isolated fort situated without the 
cantonments, aboxit 300 yards north of their south-west angle, and separated 
from them by a garden or orchard, which in the case of an attack would give 
cover to the assailants. Nor was this the worst. The whole of tbe cantonments 
were commanded from various heights, several of them with forts, which had 
neither been made strong enough to furnish a kind of outworks for defence, nor 
dismantled so as to be unavailable to an enemy. Beside the cantonments, 
a small camp under the command of Brigadier Skelton, the second in command, 
had been c,stabli.shed about two miles to tbe east, beyond a low range of heights 
called the Seeah Sung Hills ; and for the purpo.se of kecj)ing open the road to 
it bridges hud been thrown across both the canal and the I'iver. Tbe only 
other posts which it is necessary to notice are the Bala Hissar, almost entirely 
occupied by the Shah’s troops under the command of Brigadier Anquetil, and 
the residence of Sir Alexander Burnes, Avhere a .small body of sepoys acted as 
his escort and also guarded the ti'casury under the charge of Captain Johnson, 
the paymaster. A t an earlier period the money had for safety been removed to tbe 
Bala Hissar, but the paymaster found the distance inconvenient, and on applica¬ 
tion was at once permitted to bring the treasure back into the town, and kce]) 
it as before at his own hou.se, the envoy dashing off his permi.ssion, as if tbe 
s\ibject had been beneath his cognizance, by a sim{>le hurried remark:—“Johnson 
may, of coume, put his treasure wherever he deems it most safe and convenient.” 
The sum thus coolly bandied about without any precaution for its security 
amounted at this time to seven lacs of rupees (£70,000). 

British The cantoiunents werc completed in the autumn of 1840, and the British 

B))Ort8 in . ^ . 

Afghaiiwtiin. troops had passed the winter of 1840-41 in them in tolerable comfort, 'fhe 
sepoys indeed suflered severely from the intense cold, and the hospital soon 
became crowded with patients suffering fi'om pulmonary affections. To the 
British, on the other hand, and more especially those of them who had long 
endured the scorching hciits and deluging rains of India, nothing could be more 
grateful than the return of the seasons in the order to which they had been 
accustomed in their own native land, and though an excessive rise in prices neces¬ 
sarily curtailed them of many of their comforts and luxuries, they were able to 
pass their leisure pleasantly. Cricket, fishing, shooting, hunting, and horse-rjiciug 
gave to the most active and robust their full .share of bodily exertion; while the 
more sedate‘found endless sources of interest and instruction in acclimatizing 
plants, and trying how far it was possible to combine the.luxuries of an Afghan 
with the more substantial productions of an European garden. It is not to be 



Chap. IV.J 


APPROACHING CRISIS AT CABOOL. 


391 


denied that some, not satisfied with such pleasures, mingled with them or sub- A.n. i84i. 
stituted for them others of a very different description. Licentiousness, instead ~ 

ef being confined to those unfortunates whom depraved custom regards as its TAwntious- 
legitimate victims, was too often emboldened to violate the domestic hearth and nritisu 
seek its indulgence within the very precincts of the harem. More than one 
cliief, aware of having thus suffered in his happiness and honour, burned for re¬ 
venge, and was not to be satisfied witl; anything short of the extermination of 
the infidel Feringhees. It would be wrong, however, to attach much importance 
to this feeling. Though it did exist, and not without a cause, it is to be hoped 
that licentiousness continued to the last 
to be a. very partial exception to the 
generally good deportment of the British 
troops, and that when disaster did befall 
them, it was not in retribution for their 
own private vices but for the gross mis¬ 
management of those to whom their wel¬ 
fare was intrusted, and the tyranny and 
injustice which lay at the foundation 
of the whole British policy in Afghan¬ 
istan. 

Though a crisis had long been fore¬ 
seen by those who, looking below the 
surface, saw the causes which were work- 
ing to produce it, all the leading au¬ 
thorities, civil and military, continued as 
it were spell-bound. General Elphin- 

stone looking fondly forward, saw himself proceeding quietly under escort for Dreams of 
the British frontier; Sir William Macnaghten Inul nearly completed the pack¬ 
ing preparatory to his departure; and Sir Alexander Burnes felt so satisfied 
with the higher position on which he was about to enter, that on the evening 
of the 1st of November he did not hesitate to congiutulate the envoy on his 
“approaching departure at a season of such profound tranquillity.” Could 
he be serious? Some days previously the moonshec Mohun Lai, of whose 
intelligence and fidelity there was no doubt, had informed him of a general 
(ionfederacy among the Afghan chiefs, and emphatically warned him ag<ainst the 
danger of disregarding the threatening indications of a coming storm; and 
again, on the evening of that very day when he congratulated the envoy, the 
same individual called upon him with new proofs of the plots which the chiefs 
were engaged in hatcliing. The impression produced upon Bumes is explained 
very vaguely, but the account is that “he stood up from his chair, .sighed, and 
said that the time was not far when we must leave this country.” Another 
part of the account is, “that he did not choose to ask the envoy for a strong 



Sir W. n. Macnaghten. Bart, 

From Lk’uU'noiii V. Kyre*» l^riaoii Sketch!'*. 



392 


' HISTORY OF INDIA. {Book VlII. 

A.i>. 1841 . guard, as it would imply that he was afraid,”' and his determination, therefore, 
seems to have been to run all hazards. , The notice of warnings seemed at last 
snspicions oTily to irritate him, and he actually turned out. the son of Gholam Mahomed 
..fapiut, ^ leading Dooranee chief, who went by night to inform him of the plot, 

adding rudely and superciliously, that “we do not care for such things." 

The plot, of which information was thus with strange infatuation rejected, 
Avas now approaching its execution. The Afghan chiefe had assembled, and 
were concerting measures for the destruction of the British troops. The course 
whicfi seemed most hopeful, was to work upon the prejudices and passions of 
the people, by circulating among them extravagant rumours. "The principal 
rebels,’' wrote Sir William Macnaghten in a letter, of which a fragment only 
remains, “ met on the night before, and relying on the inflammable disposition 
of the peojile of Cabool, they gave out that it was the order of his majesty to 
put all infidels to death, and this of course gained them a great accession of 
strength." The Accuracy of this statement is questionable. It proceeds on 
the supposition that the Shah was popular in Cabool, and that his name was, to 
the party who fraudulently used it, a tower of strength. Independently of the 
extravagance of the rumour that he had issued orders for the d^truction of those 
on whom the stability of his own throne entirely depended, it is impossible to 
believe that the circulation of it gave what the envoy calls “a gi'eat accession 
of strength” to the insurgents. They were plaj’ing, in fact, a very different game, 
and their great object was to rid themselves at once of foreign aggression and 
of the obnoxious I'uler whom it had imposed upon them. But though a general 
confederacy having this object had undoubtedly been fonned, it has been 
questioned whether the actual outbreak was the result of a previously con¬ 
certed plan. The time was certainly ill chosen. By waiting for a few days a 
large portion of the troops in Afghanistan under orders for India would have 
departed and been beyond recall, whereas by premature action much additional 
risk of fiiilure was incurred. The account of a meeting held by the chiefs, though 
somewhat meagre, seems to show that the outbreak, at least at its commence¬ 
ment, was dictated as much by private revenge as by public resentment. 
Injudicious Abdoollah Khan, who, on the restoration of the Shah, had been deprived of 
of Burnea. liis cliiefsliip, iiot satisfied wifcli complaining loudly of the injustice, was at little 
pains to conceal his hostility, and lost no opportunity of intriguing against 
British interests. Burnes, made aware of his proceedings, sent him a blustering 
me.ssage, stuffed with opprobrious epithets, and^hreatening to deprive him of 
his cars. Abdoollah Khan, now complaining both of insult and injustice, thi'ew 
off’all restraint, and »t a meeting of chiefs, beld on the 1st of November at the 
house of Sydat Khan, took the lead in proposing an attack on the house of 
Bumes on the. following day. Tlie design undoubtedly was to assassinate 
every individual who ghould be /ound on the .premises.’ While Burnes’ fate 
was thus sealed, \yarnings which, duly improved, would' have secured his escape 



CHAt. ly.] MUBDEE OF BUENES. 393 

were again given him. ^ friendly native eager to save him called at his resi- ajD. mi. 
dence before, daylight, but had the mortification to see his statement received 
with incredulity. Shortly afterwards, when the insurgents had begun to conupinioy 
muster, and the stir of their movement was heard in the street, Oosman Khan, 
the Shah’s prime minister, arrived with tidings which it was no longer possible 
to dispute, and urged Bumes either to return with him to the Bala Hissar, or 
take refuge in the cantonments.. He refused to do either, but was so far moved 
to a sense of danger that he applied to the envoy for additional, troops, and 
also tried to conciliate Abdoollah Khan by a message assuring him, that if he 
would in the meantime restrain popular violence, all grievances would be 
redressed. Both applications proved ineffectual, and Burnes, together with all 
tlie inmates of his residence, were left to their fate. The.y were not indeed 
entirely destitute of means of defence. Besides himself, his brother Lieutenant 
Charles Burnes, and Lieutenant William Broadfoot, who had just arrived to 
act as his military secretary, tliere was the small body of sepoys forming his 
escort, and guarding the treasure deposited in Captain Johnson's house, imme¬ 
diately adjoining. Fortunately for himself the paymaster passed that night 
in the cantonments. 

After a furious mob thirsting for blood and plunder had filled the street in 

® ^ ^ nttiickcil. 

front of the house, and precluded all access to it, Bumes, insteafl of allowing 
ids sepoys to use their muskets, imagined that he could calm the tumult by a 
speech, and kept haranguing from the upper part of the house. It was utterly 
unavailing, and he became fully awake to the danger, when Lieutenant 
Broadfoot • fell pierced by a ball through his chest. Resistance, which used 
earlier might have been efliectual, was now seen to be hopeless. The insurgents 
had set fire to the stables, made their way into the garden, and were evidently 
preparing to force an entrance into the house. As a last resort he offered large 
.sums of money for his own and his brother’s life, and was only answered with 
the cry, “Come down into the garden.” As this would have been to meet 
instant death, the sepoys opened their fire, and were resisting manfully, when 
a native of Cashmere, who had gained admission to the house, took an oath 
ui)on the Koran, that, if the firing was stopped, he would safely convey Burnes 
and his brother to the Kuzzilbash fort, situated about half a mile to the north- 
we.st, and then held by Captain Trevor, though with a very inadequate force. 
Distrustful though he must have been of this volunteered deliverance, it was nimsoif 
a last chance, and Burnes disguised in jiative attire descended to the door, inmates 
The moment he stepped beyond it, his treacherous guide gave the signal, by 
calling out, “This is Sekunder Burpes.” In a moment both the brothers were 
in the hands of the infuriated^ mob, who literally cut them to pieces with 
Afghan knivea The sepoys now left withoyt a head made a fruitless defence, 
and were all murdered, and with them every man, woman, and child found 
on the premises. The paymaste:f’s guard shared the same.fate, and all his 
Vot. III. » ' 246' 



niSTOBY OP INDIA. 


AD. 1841. 


Tho iJiBiir* 
rectioii 
might ea^^ily 
tiave been 
BupproBBcd. 


Fjiilnm 
of fil-Ht Jit- 
tomyts. 


394 


[Book VIII. 


treasure, now amounting, however, to only £17,000, fell into the hands of the 
insurgents. 

While these atrocities were being perpetrated, how were the Shah’s and the 
British troops employed? Sir Alexander Bumes had, as we have seen, applied 
to the envoy for a reinforcement, and it is now universally admitted that if it 
had been immediately despatched, the outbreak could have been suppressed 
without difficulty. The number of insurgents did not at first exceed 200 or 
300, and their success was so doubtful, that the leading chiefe kept aloof, and 
refused to commit themselves by taking open part with them. It was indeed 
probable that the houses of Burnes and the paymaster would be forced and 
plundered, but the success would only be momentiiry, and would be followed 
on the airival of the British troops by a signal vengeance. Such appears to 
liave been the calculation both of the chiefs and of the actual insurgents, and 
it was not until to a thirst for blood and plunder a hope of impunity was added, 
that the insurrection assumed new dimensions and became truly formidable. 
Where, then, it must be .again asked, were the British troops while their 
treasury was being plundered and their companions barbarously murdered, 
almost within hearing? To the credit of the Shah, it deserves to be recorded 
that the first movement against the rioters was made from the Bala Hissar by 
his own orders and by his own troops. As soon as the distui’bed state of the 
city was communic<ated to him, he sent out his Hindoostanee regiment, with 
two gun.s, under the command of an able officer, an Indo-Briton of the name of 
Campbell. Unfortunately, instead of baking a road which would have led 
them to Bmaies’ house with little obstruction, they endeavoured to make their 
way through the heart of the city, and placed themselves almost at the mercy 
of the insurgents, by becoming entangled in narrow intricate stivets. After an 
unequal conflict, during which they are said to have lost 200 men, they com¬ 
menced a disorderly retreat, aqd would probably all have perished -had they 
not obtained an unexpected relief Brigadier Shelton had brought into the 
Bala Hissar three companies of the 54th native infantry, the Shah’s 6th infantiy, 
.and four guns, the whole force which he then had in the small camp beyond 
the Seeah Sung Hills; and on learning how the Hindoostanee regiment was 
situated, sent out a detachment which helped to extricate them, but did not 
succeed in saving the two guns. Tliis movement having been made by orders 
received from *the cantonments, we naturally turn thither to learn what con¬ 
sultations were held, and what steps taken as soon as intelligence of the insur¬ 
rection was received. 

The application by Sir Al^exander Bumes for support was received by the 
envoy at latest by. 7 A.M. His own account of f,he matter is:—“ On the morning 
of the 2d November, I was informed th.at the town of Cabool was in a state of 
commotion; and shortly afterwards I received a note from Lieutenant-colonel 
Sir A. Burnes, to the effect that his house was besieged, and begging for assist- 



Chap. IV.] INSUEEECTION AT CABOOL. 395 

ance. I immediately went to General Elphinstone.” The general’s account is:— 
“ On the 2d of November, at half-past 7 A.M., I was told by Colonel Oliver that 
the city was in a great ferment, and shortly after the envoy came and told me 
that it was in a state of insurrection, but that he did not think much of it, and 
that it would shortly subside.” It thus appears that the envoy and the general 
were in consultation on this subject about half-past 7 A.M. The former had 
been told “that the town of Cabool was in a state of commotion,” and the latter 
“ that the city was in a great ferment,” and the common impression produced 
on the minds of both was that the insurrection “would shortly subside.” Tliis, 
to say the least, was taking the matter very coolly, and prepares us for what 
appears to have been their common conclusion, that there was no necessity for 
immediate despatch. The eiiA’oy indeed says, “I suggested that Brigadiei' 



ton or Phaii Sin jAn’.s Palnci: C vbool. From liattray’H Costumes and Scenery of Afglriiu 


Shelton’s foi’ce should proceed to the Bala Hissar, thence to operate as might seem 
expedient; that the remaining troops should be concentrated in cantonments and 
l>laced‘in a state of defence, sind assistance if possible sent to Sir A. Bunics.” 
In this proposal the general appears to have readily acquiesced, but a long delay 
must have taken place, for he afterwards admits that Brigadier Shelton did not 
move into the Bala His.sar till “about 12 o’clock;” and adds with the greatest 
coolness, as if he had thus done all that could reasonably be expected—“ the rest 
of the troops were concentrated in cantonments, which arrangements occTipied the 
rest of the day.” He s.ays nothing of the a.ssistance requested by Sir Alexander 
Burnes, as if the life of a valuable public servant, the lives of the men who 
were sharing his danger, and the threatened plunder of the- army chest, were 
matters too trivial to occupy his thoughts. But even assuming that the detaob- 
ment of Brigadier Shelton was the only thing that promised to be of any 
inimediate utility, how came it that though the distance.-between the Seeah 


A.D. 1S41. 


Culpable 
delays of 
Gouerol 
Klphiiistono 
and the 
envoy. 




396 HISTOEY OF INDIA.’ [l^OE yill 

A.D. 1841. SuDg -camp and the Bala Hissar scarcely exceeded a mile it 'wqs hot completed 
tUl inid-day ? In the emergency which had arisen despatch was everything, 

Singular In- and yet nearly four hours elapse between the resolution to send the troops and 

General tlieir actual departure. General Elphinstone indeed hints at one cause of delay, 

*^***’“"to”® when he says that ‘Hhe envoy sent his military secretary, Captain Lawrence, to 
intimate his wishes and obtain the king’s sanction to this measure,” and a fuller 
explanation is given by the brigadier. “ Between nine and ten,” he says, “ I 
got a note from General Elphinstone reporting a disturbance in the city, and 
desiring me to prepare to march into the BoJa Hissar. ... I Soon after got 
another, telling me not to go as the king objected to it.” The obvious reply to 
this countermand was, that “if there was an insuirection in the city, it was 
not a time for indecLsion, and that the measures adopted must be immediate.” 
Having thus urged despatch, the brigadier received a third note telling him to 
march immediately into the Bala Hissar, when further ipstructions would be 
given him by the envoy’s military secretary. Believing everything to be now 
arranged, he was just in the act of marching oif when he received a note from 
the secretary telling him to halt for further orders. Pei’plexed at this new 
interruption, he despatched Lieutenant Sturt of the engineers. Sir Robert Sale’s 
son-in-law, to ascertain the cause; but that officer, on entering the precincts of 
the palace, was attacked in the act of dismounting from his horse by an Afghan 
youth, who inflicted three severe wounds with a dagger, and from the confusion 
of the moment or through connivance was permitted to escape. Sturt’s wounds 
happily proved of a less deadly nature than was at first feared, and he was 
carried back to tlie cantonments under a guard of fifty lancers, while the 
military secretary himself brought his own answer, which was “to proceed.” 
As already mentioned, these repeated commands and countermands so frittered 
away the time, that Shelton did not reach the Bala Hissar till mid-day, and 
then only to see Campbell and his Hindoostanees fleeing in disorder before 
infuriated and triumphant Afghans. 

itB filial «m. On perusing the above details, it is impossible to repress a feeling of indig¬ 

nation at the irresolute, we had almost said heartless, course adopted by the 
envoy and the general. The city is in an uproar, and three British officers, 
with a small body of troops, suddenly attacked by an infuriated mob, are fight¬ 
ing for their livea They implore assistance, and the application is received at 
an hour suffiaently early to enable the authorities, civil and military, to take 
the necessary steps for that purpose. At first the only question is, by what 
route shall the troops be sent? and the answer is, from the Seeah Sung camp to 
the Bala Hissar. But here a preliminary difficulty is started. Will Shah 
Shujah give his consent? and should he refuse, would it not be a complete sub¬ 
version -of the Auckland and Macnaghten policy to have recourse even to 
friendly compulsion? On such frivolous grounds the order for the march of the 
troops is delayed, in order that an attempt may be made upon the stubborn 



Chap. TV.] INSUBBECTION AT CABOOL. 3»7 

will of a monarch, who liad been placed upon his Ihrone by British bayonets, 
and could not have continued to sit upon it a single day if they had been with¬ 
drawn. ■ Negotiation is commenced, messages pass and- repass between the 
palace and the cantonments, and according to their tenor, the troops in readiness 
to march for the suppression of.the riot and the relie:^ of their unhappy com¬ 
panions in arms, are tantalized*i>y contradictory orders to Ij^ilt or to proceed. 
At last they reach the Bala Hissar, but only to be most ungraciously received 
by the Shah, who, says Shelton, “asked me as well as I could understand, w’ho 



A, Caiitoiinient. 

B, MiBsioii residence. 

B, Magazine foH (uiifiiiisheir. 
K, Coinmiaeanat fort. 

F. Mahomed 8hureef*s fort. 

G, Rikabashee fort. 

Ilf Maliiuoud Kiiau’s fort. 

T, 2ulflci(r‘8 fort. 


J, Camp at Seoah Sung. 

K, King's garden. 

L, Mnsjoed. 

M, Sjiot where the envoy was 

uinixlered. 

N, Private garden. 

O, Bazaar. 

P, Kohistun gate of city. 


I Q, Empty fort near bridge. 

11, Brigadier Anquetil’s fort. 

S, Magazine in orchard. 

T, Yubix) Khaueh. 

V, Captain Trevor’s tower. 

W, Sir A. Burnoa’ house. 

X, Lahore gate of city. 

I Z, Captain Johnson's treasury 


sent me, and what I came there for. ” There was perhaps more meaning in 
this insolent question than it heai’s on the face of it, for of what use was it to 
send troops after the mischief was already done? Had they ai'rived several 
hours earlier, as but for the irresolution which prevailed at head-quarters they 
might easily have done, they might, instead of merely saving a remnant of the 
discomfited Hiudoostanee regiment, have acted in concert with it, and penetrat¬ 
ing to Bumes’ residence, dispersed the mob before the work of I’apine and murder 
had commenced. Still as the day was only half-spent when Shelton reached 
the Bala Bisfsar, how' came it that he did little more than remain a- passive 
spectator of the progress of the insurrection?. The envoy’s answer is, that it 
had then become impracticable for a body of troops to penetrate to the neigh¬ 
bourhood of Burned’ house. Why impracticable ? Obviously because another 


A.D. 1841. 


• 

Fatal reaultH 
of the inde’:, 
cisive and 
vacillatiug 
proceodiiigR 
of Getiem) 




398 HISTORY OF INDIA. [Book VIII. 

A.D. i8«i. serious blunder had been committed in not sending a force adequate to the 
service required from it. 

Seeah Sung camp on the morning of the outbreak, there was only a 

which relief portion of the troops belonging to it. The rest were within the cantonments. 
Why, when Brigadier Shelton received the order to march, were not the 
absentees sent forward to join their comrades ? They could not be required for 
the defence of the cantonments, which were not then threatened, and within 
which nearly 4000 men must then have been concentrated; and their addition 
to the force under Brigadier Shelton might have enabled him, instead of 
remaining passive, to make at least a bold effort to accomplish the task which 
had btfen assigned him. Such an effort could hai’dly have failed of success, had 
it been seconded, as to all appearance it might and ought to have been, by a 
diversion from another quarter. General Elphinstone says that “the route by 
Seeah Sung to the Bala Hissar was considered the fittest to enter the city, but 
it was not the only route, nor, as far as one can judge from the plan, was it 
either the shortest or most practicable. The Kohistan road, along the east side 
of which the cantonments were constructed, leads in a line almost due south to 
one of the city gate.s. Had a body of the surplus troops cooped up within the 
cantonments been sent along the road, they could have arrived at the gate 
without difficulty. Passing it and proceeding onwards for about 500 yards, 
a point is reached where the road branches off to the right and left. Taking 
the latter direction by a road which crosses the liver by a bridge, the distance 
to Burnes’ house is little more tlian half a mile. Where was the imiiractica- 
bility of accomidishing this distance? Sujiposiug Brigadier Shelton to have 
been at the same time prepared to act, the effect would have been to place the 
insurgents between two fires. Would they in this case have ventured on 
continued resistance ? The undisciplined mob, seeing themselves about to be 
hemmed in between two strong bodies of regular troops, would have listened 
only to their fears and dispei'sed. Even in a less favourable view, the diversion 
fi-om the cantonments might have been made subseiwient to several important 

Nothing of obiects. On the banks of the river, a short distance above the bridge already 

ooDBequouco *' ° * 

attompted. mentioned, there was a tower occupied by Captain Trevor with a mere handful 
of men. It was of some importance to retain possession of it, because being 
situated in the Kuzzilbash quarter, it would have been the means of keeping 
up a friendly communication with the inhabitants, who were understood to be 
better aflfected towards the British than any other part of the Afghan popula¬ 
tion. Advantage might have been taken of its proximity to throw in a 
reinforcement sufficient to secui’e it from capture. Another object, of still more 
importance, might have been at the same time gained. On the right branch 
of Jihe road, about 500 yards beyond the fort already mentioned, stood a fort of 
large dimensions, in which temporary magazines had been erected for the use of 
the Shah’s commissariat. The place, though not well chosen, was defensible. 



Chap. IV.] 


INSURRECTION AT CABOOL. 


399 


and the vital importance of defending it is apparent from the fact that on the a.d. i 84 i. 
2 d of November it contained about 8000 maunds of grain. Even admitting 
that no general diversion from the cantonments could have been attempted, incomiw- 
surely the most strenuous efforts ought to have been made to save this fort Ssh 
from falling into the hands of the enemy. Yet nothing was done. Though it 
was well known that on the very morning of the outbreak it was furiously 
assailed by the inhabitants in its vicinity, and its few defenders, if unrelieved, 
must soon be overpowered, no steps were taken, or rather the only step taken 
was in an opposite direction. Captain Lawrence offered to lead two companies 
to its relief and was not permitted. 

Otlier proofs of the utter incompetency of the civil and military authorities 
to meet the storm which had burst upon them crowd upon us, but enough has 
been detailed. The only active step that appears to have been taken in addi¬ 
tion to the abortive detachment of Brigadier Shelton to the Bala Hissar, was 
to send a handful of troops into the commissariat foi-t, and thus make the 
number of its defenders amount in all to eighty. Why such a reinforcement ? 

The subsistence of the troops depended on the preservation of the commissariat 
fort, and it could not but be foreseen that it would in all probability l)e the 
very first point against which the efforts of the enemy would be most stren¬ 
uously directed, and yet, though there was a whole day during which free 
access to it was uninterrupted, and it might have been so strongly garrisoned as 
to defy assault, nothing worth mentioning was done. Not only was it allowed 
to remain isolated as before, with a garden and orchard intervening, from the 
cover of which the insurgents might open a murderous fire, but no attempt 
whatever was made to occupy and dismantle the adjoining forts by which it 
was commanded. Could it be alleged that the commissariat fort was, from 
its unfortunate position, indefensible, still there was surely an alternative. If 
it was practicable on the 2d of November to send a paltry reinforcement to it, 
it must also have been practicable, if siich a course had been deemed expedient, 
to prepare for its abandonment, by emptying it of the whole, or at least the 
most valuable part of its stores and bringing them within the cantonments. 

The penalty due for the series of gross blunders committed on the first day 
of the insurrection was not long delayed. 

While the envoy and general, with singular infatuation, frittered away the 
time, and apparently despaired of being able to effect anything with the large nom at 
body of troops under their immediate control, no time was lost in sending 
importunate messages, recalling the troops, which during the delusive interval 
previous to the insuiTection had been permitted to commence their march for 
India. By thus applying for distant aid, which owing to the state of the 
country could not possibly have arrived before the crisis was’decided, the 
authorities only practised deception upon themselves, and found excuses for not 
exerting their own energies to the utmost. The note sent to Candahar, con- 



A.D. 1841. 


Ineffectual 
application 
for aid to 
General 
Nott. 


Similar 
failure of an 
application 
to Sale. 


'400 HISTOEY OF INDIA, [Book Vm. 

sisting of A small scrap or paper inclosed in a quill, though dated the Sd of 
November, did not reach General Nott till the 14th. It required him to 
“immediately direct the whole of the troops under orders to return to 
Hindoostan, to march upon Cabool instead of Shifearpoor,” and to ‘‘instruct the 
officer who may command, to use the utmdst practicable expedition.” He was 
moreover required “to attach a troop of his majesty the Shah’s horse artillery 
to the above service, and likewise half the 1st regiment of cavalry.” Fortun¬ 
ately, as we have already seen, he had on his own responsibility, in consequence 
of alarming news from Cabool, recalled the troops which he had despatched 
under the command of Colonel Maclaren, after they had made only a single 
march. So far, therefore, as he was concerned, there was nothing to prevent 
his compliance with the peremptory order to send them off immediately to 
Cabool. There were, however, obstacles which he believed to be insurmountable, 
though the authorities at Cabool did not seem to have taken them into consi¬ 
deration, and he therefore declared that in sending the troops, he was obeying 
his superiors at the expense of his own judgment. His reasons are thus given 
in a letter to his daughters:—“First, I think at this time of the year, they (tlj^g 
troops) cannot get there (Cabool), as the snow will probably be four or five feet 
deep between that place and G^uznee; besides which it is likely they will have 
to fight every foot of the ground, from the latter to the former place; at any 
rate they will arrive in so crippled a state as to be iofaZZy unfit for service; 
secondly, they will be Jive weeks in getting there, before which everything will 
be settled one way or other; thirdly, could I have kept the troops here which 
left this morning, I could ultimately have preserved the whole of Afghanistan, 
whatever the result at Cabool may be, and now these troops can be of no use 
there, and their removal will, I fear, ruin us here, for the people to-day openly 
talk of attacking us.” “How strange,” he adds, “that, from the time we entered 
tliis country up to the present moment, we have never had a man of common 
sense or energy at the head of affah-s.” Nott had only too good reason for his 
representation of the disordered state of the country, for a very short time before 
Captain Woodbum, who was proceeding on sick leave to Cabool, was attacked 
by a party of rebels after leaving Ghuznee, and barbarously murdered; only six 
out of his whole escort of 130 souls escaping t}ie same fate. His account of the 
climate aISd proved correct, for Colonel Maclaren, after a few days’ march, lost 
so many of his Cattle by frost and snow, and found his difficulties accumulating 
so fast, that he was glad to retrace his steps. Accordingly, as might have been 
foreseen, Cabool could obtain no relief from Candahar. 

An application to Sir Robert Sale to return with his brigade was equally 
unavailing. The 37th regiment, left to guard the western entrance of the 
Khoord Cabool Pass, at once obeyed the summons, and made their appearance 
on the morning of the 3d on the Seeah Sung Hills. They had been obliged to 
contest almost every inch of their ground, but notwithstanding, greatly to tlie 



Chap. IV.] 


fcEITiCAL STATE OF MATTERS AT CABOOL. 


40t 


credit of Major Griffiths who commanded, “the^ came in,” says Lady Sale, 
“with all their baggage in as*perfect order as if it had been a mere parade 
movement.” This, however, was all the aid obtained. Before receiving the 
summons of recall Sir Roberil Sale had quitted Gundamuck, and was advancing 
on Jelalabad. The kind o;f difficulties encountered will be best explained in 
his own words. “Since leaving Cabool, they (the troops) have been kept con¬ 
stantly on the alert by attacks by night and day, from the time of their 
arrival at Tazeen they have invariably bivouacked, and the safety of our posi¬ 
tions has only been secured by unremitting labour, throwing up entrenchments, 
and very severe outpost duty; while each succeeding morning has brought its 
affair with a bold and active enemy, eminently skilful in the species of warfare 
to which their attempts have been confined, and armed with jezails which 
iiave enabled them to annoy us at a range at which they could only be reached 
by our artillery.” Anxious, therefore, though he must have been to return to 
Cabool, where his wife and daughter were sharing the common danger, he 
declared it to be impossible, for the following reasons:—“I beg to represent 
that the whole of my camp equipage has been destroyed; that the wounded 
and sick have increased to upwards of three hundred; that there is no longer 
a single depot of provisions on the route, and the carriage of the force is not 
sufficient to bring on one day’s rations with it. I have at the same time 
positive information that the whole country is in arms and ready to oppose us 
in the defiles between this city and Cabool, while my ammunition is insufficient 
for more than two such contests, as I should assuredly’^ have to .sustain for six 
days at least. With my present means I could not force the passes of either 
Jugduluck or Khoord Cabool; and even if the debris of my brigade did reach 
Cabool, I am given to understand that T should find the troops now garrisoning 
it without the means of subsistence. Under these circumstances, a regard for 
the honour and interest of our government compels me to adhere to my plan 
already formed, of putting this place (Jelalabad) into a state of defence, and 
holding'it if possible until the Cabool force falls back upon me, or succours 
aiTive from Peshawer or India.” 

Having disposed of the applications for aid, and the answers, whicli from 
the length of time that intervened, have somewhat anticipated the narrative, 
we now return to Cabool, and begin with the insertion of a letter addressed to 
tlie envoy by General Elphinstone, on the evening of the 2d November, the 
very first day of the outbreak. “ Since you left me I have been considering 
what can be done to-moiTow. Our dilemma is a difficult one. Shelton, if 
reinforced to-morrow, might no doubt force in two columns on liis way towards 
the Lahore gate, and we might from hence force in that gate and meet them. 
But if this were accomplished what shall we gain? It can be done, but.not 
without very great loss, as our people will be exposed to the fire from the 
houses the whole way: Where is the point you said they were to fortify near 

Voi.. III. 247 


A.D. 1841. 


BIr Robert 
Bale tumble 
to afford 
troops at 
Cabool any 
asHi stance. 


General 
El^Jiiniitono 
conjures up 
dilftcultieB. 



402 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book VIIT. 


A.i). 1841. Burnes’ house? If they could assemble there that would be a point of attack; 

but to march into the town, it seems, we should only have to come back again; 
Missmbio and as to setting the city on fire, I fear from its construction that is almost 
impossible. We must see what morning brings, and then think what can be 
EipWiiBtone jpjjjg rpjig occupation of all the houses near the gates might give us a command 
of the town, but we have not means of extended operations. If we could 
depend on tlie Kuzzilbashes, we might easily reduce tlic city.” In this very 
characteristic letter the writer makes a series of proposals, which if practicable 
on the morrow when the insurrection had gained head, must have been still 
more so on the day previous; but instead of deciding on any one of them he 
merely plays at hide-and-seek with them, and then goes to bed with the sage 
resolution to trust to the chapter of accidents. “We must see what the morn¬ 
ing brings, and then think what can be done,” The morning came, and with 
it, as might have been anticipated, a vast increase of the insurgents. Thousands, 
whom excess of caution had previously kept aloof, now openly declared them¬ 
selves, while multitudes, hearing of the plunder which had already been 
obtained, poured in from the neighbouring villages in the hope of obtaining a 
share. The Kohistan road, along which troops might have passed with little 
obstruction on the 2d, was now completely beset, and every step behoved to be 
taken in the face of infuriated and exulting foes. The interval of a night had 
brought no additional clearness of perception or energy of purpose to the 
general and the envoy, and instead of boldly fronting the, difficidties which 
their own imbecility had mainly created, they cowered before them. It Wiis 
not till three in the afternoon of the 3d that any attempt was made to pene- 
lUs ompi.ij- trate from the cantonments into the city. It proceeded upon the plan, which 
hiid already proved abortive, of attempting to accomplish the most important 
objects by inadequate means, and resulted in a complete failure. The whole 
force employed consisted of one company of her Majesty’s 44th regiment, two 
companies of the 5th native infantry, and two horse-artillery guns. Major 
Swayne, who commanded, encountering an opposition which convinced him 
that success was impossible, had no alternative but to retrace his steps. Besides 
the gross blander of sending out so feeble a detachment, no care had been taken 
to secure co-operation and support from the Bala Hissar. There was still 
time after this first repulse to correct the blunders which led to it, and make a 
new attempt under more auspicious circumstances, but a feeling of despondency’ 
was already beginning to prevail, and General Elphinstone once more resolved 
to wait till he should “see what the morning brings, and then think what Can 
be done.” Meanwhile, though he was supine, the insurgents were not. Captain 
Trevor, obliged to abandon his tower, was indebted to some friendly natives 
for the means" of removing his wife and seven children to the cantonments; and 
Captain Mackenzie, who commanded at the Shah’s commissariat, after keeping 
the enemy at bay for two whole days, and sending importunate but unavailing 



Chap. IV.] 


CRITICAL STATE OF MATTERS AT CABOOL. 


403 


messages for support, was compelled to quit his post as untenable, and happily a.t». isn. 
succeeded in making an almost miraculous escape. The fort, of course, with all 
its stores fell into the hands of the insurgents. 

This was to be succeeded by a similar but still more serious disaster. The Progress of 

• . 1 • • T iJisurrectioi 

insurgents were now bent on capturing the British commissariat fort, and utcabooi, 
were pusillanimously allowed to avail themselves of every facility to insure 
success. The commissariat fort, situated about 300 yards south of the south¬ 
west bastion of the cantonments, was completely commanded by another called 
Mahomed Shureef’s fort, which occupied a height on the opposite side of the 
Kohistanee roa<]. This fort, wliich from its position could direct its lire equally 
against fhe commisssuiat fort and the cantonments, being not more than 300 
yards north-west of the former, and 200 yards south-west of the latter, was 
crowded with the enemy, who were allowed to ply their jezails and matchlocks 
from its walls with deadly aim, while no attempt was made to dislodge them. 

Thus encouraged they ventured down into the lower ground and took undisputed 
[)ossession of the intervening garden. Meanwhile that fort, thus beleaguered, 
and though containing the provisions and medical stores of the whole army, 
was held by a party which, according to Lady Sale, amounted only to fifty, 
and certainly fell far short of a humked. Lieutenant Warren, the odicer in 
command, wrote that he was reduced to extremity; that his men were deserting 
him; that the enemy were mining the walls and preparing for escalade; and 
that it would be impossible for him to hold out unless reinforced. On receiving 
this letter, what was General Elphinstones resolution? One whicli nothing but biuiuitr. 
dotage could have dictated. It was not to reinforce Lieutenant Warren, but to 
detach a party of infantry and cavalry, by whose aid he might be able to 
evacuate the place. On hearing of this insane ])roposal, Captains Boyd and 
Johnson, the respective heads of the British and the Shah’s commissariat, 
waited upon the general, and pointed out that if the supplies were captured 
tlie destruction of the whole force would become almost inevitable. The 
remonstrance seemed to be eftectual, and a vigorous attempt to reinforce the 
fort was promised. It was promised, but never performed. The general, who 
had no confidence in his own judgment, looked round helplessly for advice, and 
having found counsellors as ignorant or imbecile as himself, did nothing. In 
an earlier part of the day a paltry reinforcement of two companies of the 44th 
regiment had been driven back with serious loss, including that of Captains 
Swayne and Robinson, who were shot dead on the spot; in the afternoon a 
party of the 5th cavalry, designed to assist in the mad scheme of evacuation, 
suffered still more severely. Was not this proo^ that nothing more could be 
done, and that it only remained to do on the 4th as had been done on the 2d 
and 3d—“see what the morning brings, and then think what can'be done?’* 

Such appears to have been General Eljdiinstone’s final resolution, but the 
self-complacency with which he regarded it must have been somewhat disturbed 



404 


HISTOEY OF INDIA. 


[Book VIII. 


A.D. 1841. 


The British 
commisrtH- 
riat fort 
capturod. 


Disgi'aoeful 
. niisnianugu- 
ment. 


when the commissariat officers, seeing that the promise given them had not 
been kept, entered his presence and once more pointed out the absolute necessity 
of maintaining the commissariat fort at all hazards. He at once assented, and 
was even willing, as a preliminary measure, to take possession of Mahomed 
Shureefs fort. Captain Boyd, delighted at the result of the interview, volun¬ 
teered to carry the powder to blow in the gate, and he and his commissariat 
colleague retired about midnight, under the impression that the capture of the 
one fort, and the relief of the other, would be immediately undertaken. This 
impression was all the stronger, because during the interview a new and most 
urgent a})plication from Lieutenant Warren had been officially answered by a 
note, which assured him that he should receive reinforcements by two o’clock 
in the morning. Nay, as if to make it impossible to doubt that the promised 
aid would cei'tainly be forthcoming, we learn from General Elphinstone’s own 
report that tools were “ sent overnight with a view to the introduction of rein- 
foi’cements, and the withdrawal of supplies from the store.” Though monstrous, 
it is true that the general again changed his mind, and had nothing to say in 
justification, except that the proceeding involved too much risk. The garrison, 
deceived in their expectation of support, and in danger of being every moment 
overpowered by the enemy, who had actually attempted to fire the gate and 
escalade, used the tools which had been sent for a veiy different purjjose—in 
digging a hole from the interior, and through it made their escape. The scene 
presented by the cai)tured fort is thus described by Captain Johnson;—“The 
Godown fort was this day something similar to a large ant’s nest. Ere noon 
thousands and thousands had assembled from far and wide, to participate in 
the booty of the English dogs, each man taking with him as much as he could 
carrj'—and to this we were all eye-witnesses.” Even Shah Shujah, looking 
down from the battlements of the Bala Hissar in amazement and consternation 
at this extraordinary scene, could not help exclaiming, “Surely the English are 
mad! ” The soldiers were of course indignant when their means both of subsist¬ 
ence and relief in distress were thus ignominously carried off", and called to 
be led against the contemptible enemy, who were parading their spoils before 
their very faces. Tlie general, however reluctant, was unable to resist the call 
thus made upon him, and within three hours of the loss was dreaming of 
repairing it by an attempt to storm Mahomed Shureef’s fort. In a note to the 
envoy, dated 5th November, 5 A.M., he thus announced his intention:—“We 
will first try to breach the place, and shell it as well as we can. From infor¬ 
mation I have received respecting the interior of the fort, it seems the centre, 
like our old bazaar (another fort only about a hundred yards from the can¬ 
tonments), is filled with buildings; therefore if we succeed in blowing open 
the* gate, we' should only be exposed to a destructive fire from the buildings, 
which from the state of preparation they evince, would no doubt be occupied 
in force, supported from the garden. Carrying powder bags up under fire 



Chap. IV.] MISMANAGEMENT OF GENERAL ELPHINSTONE. 


405 


would have a chance of failure. Our men have been all night in the works, a.d. 184 i. 
and tired and ill fed, but we must hope for the best.” He thus conjures up a 
host of difficulties which seem to make the attempt almost desperate, and then Misnmuage- 
when the moment of action arrives, instead of proportioning the force to the cenena 
duty imposed upon it, sends out only fifty men of the 44th, and 200 native 
infantry. Apj)arently anticipating failure, Jie stands in the gateway of the 
cantonments as if to be the first to announce it, and takes advantage of the 
first blunder to recall the detachment. The attsick must indeed have been 
forced upon him, for there is proof, that he had already begun to meditate a 
very different mode of deliverance. 

In the above letter of General Elphinstone, addressed to the envoy, early Hoiwgmsto 
in the morning of the 5th November, the following passage occurs:—“ It behoves - 
us to look to the consequences’of failure; in this case I know not how we are 
to subsist, or, from want of provisions, to retreat. You should therefore con¬ 
sider what chance there is of making terms, if we are driven to this extremity.” 

If such was his language on the very third day of the insurrection, what was 
henceforth to be expected but disgrace and ruin in their most hideous forms? 

He had an arm}"^ which, handled by such men as Sale and Nott, would have 
sufficed to clear the district of every rebel Afghan who dared to show his face, 
and he keeps it cooped up within cantonments, timidly whimpering about 
difficulties, till ho has broken the spirit of his men, taught them to dread an 
enemy whom they previou,sly despised, and thus prepared them for eVery species 
of humiliation. On tlie following day, writing as before to the envoy, he recui-s 
to the subject which was now evidently uppermost in his ibind, and as if the 
resolution to treat had been already taken, seems only anxious that the nego¬ 
tiations should not be protracted. This was the more inexcusable, as on this 
very day (the 6th) the prospect had improved. Captains Boyd and Johnson 
liad exerted themselves to the utmost to compensate for the loss of the commis¬ 
sariat stores, and with so much success, by extensive purchases in the neigh¬ 
bouring villages, that the danger of starvation was no longer imminent. Nor ‘ 

was this the only success which crowned the labours of this day. Mahomed ^ partial 

^ 8UCce«H. 

Shureef s fort, which had been the subject of so much discussion, and the scene 
even of some disgraceful repulses, was taken -at last in a manner which showed 
that had a proper spirit been evinced at the outset, the insurrection might 
liave been put down before it assumed the character of a great national move¬ 
ment. After Lieutenant Sturt had so far recovered from his wounds as to be 
again fit for duty, he obtained permission to open upon the fort with three 
nine-pounders, and two twenty-four pounder howitzers. By twelve o’clock an 
excellent breach was effected, and the assault was made with so much 
impetuosity that the enemy, after a short resistance, abandoned the place. 
Lieutenant Baban of the 44th, while waving his sword on the highest point of 
the breach, which he had been the first to mount, was unfortunately killed, and 



406 


HISTOEY OF INDIA. 


[Book VIII. 


A.n. iki. with him other eighteen of the assailants, besides several wounded; but the 
’ troops had been so long strangers to success that general joy was diffused, and 

Piirtiai Bvic- at the request of the envoy, who was anxious to show that valour would not 
Hritisii. go unrewarded, a sepoy private who had distinguished himself was imme¬ 
diately promoted to the rank of sergeant. Before the enemy recovered from 
their consternation, two gallant charges were made, the one by a party of 
Anderson's horse, who rode straight up the ridge on the right, and the other by 
the 5th cavalry, who made a similar attack on the left. The effect was to l^eiu 
the enemy in between the two corps, and give an opportunity of forcing them 
to a general action under circumstances so unfavourable that their defeat must 
have been almost certain. The idea of a victory, however, was so far beyond 
the highest aspirations of the general, that he once more sat down to addre.s.s 
the envoy in language which could not have been more desponding if lie had 
General Sustained another signal defeat. “We have temporarily, and I hope jicrmaii- 
etone'e cutly, got over the difficulty of provisions. ()ur next consideration is ammuiii- 
^midiess ^ vciy serious and indeed awful one. We have expended a great 

quantity; therefore it becomes worthy of thought on your part how desirable 
it is that our operations should not be protracted by anything in treating that 
might tend to a continuance of the present state of things. Do not suppose 
from this I wish to recommend, or am advocating humiliating terms, or such 
as would reflect disgrace on us; but this fact of ammunition must not be lost 
sight of' At this time the ammunition in store was sufficient to last twelve 
months, and therefore alarm in regard to it was utterly groundless. Yet on 
this creation of his own brain he urges upon the envoy the hasty conclusion of 
a treaty which, though he disclaims it in words, he could not but be well aware 
must be “humiliating,” and “such as would reflect disgrace on us.” As if he 
had not made his fears sufficiently palpable, he added the following lugubrious 
postscript;—“Our case is not yet desperate; I do not mean to impress that; 
but it must be borne in mind tliat it goes very fast.” The words are so enig¬ 
matical that it is difficult to decipher their meaning. . According to grammatical 
structure it is the “case” that was going very fast, but not improbably he was 
only calling the envoy’s attention once more to the alleged deficiency of 
ammunition. After all, whatever be the interpretation adopted, the gist of the 
warning was, “We are in a dilemma from which there is no hope of escape by 
honourable and manly means. Fighting is of no use. Try diplomacy, and. do 
not stand upon punctilios, for if it Mis our case is desperate.” 

Sir William Macnaghten was only too much disposed to adopt the course 
thus recommended. He had oft^** found money succeed when all other 
resources failed, and he therefore began to try what could be effected by dis¬ 
tributing it-with a liberal hand. He could not indeed hope to conciliate all 
the chiefs by this vulgar process, and he therefore resolved to employ it for the 
purjiose of sowing dissension among them, and thus breaking up their confeder- 



(JnAP. IV.] 


SIR W. MACNAGHTEN’S POLICY. 


407 


acy. It was well known that, though at present leagued in a common cause, a n. i84i. 
mutual jealousies and suspicions abounded among them. In particulai- the 
Kuzzilbash or Persian party, separated as Shiites from the other inhabitants ofe»™y 
Afghanistan, who were bigoted Soonees, dreaded the tyranny which the latter bribery, 
might exercise over them if tlie Biitish were expelled, and thus furnished the 
envoy with an opportunity of giving his Machiavellian policy a full trial. The 
very agent fitted for the purpose had been accidentally provided. Mohun Lai, 
tl>e caoonshee of Sir Alexander Bumes, had saved his life when his master was 
murdered, by taking shelter under the garment of a Kuzzilbash chief of the 
name of Mahomed Zemaun Khan. Another still more iiifluential chief of the 
same party, Khan Shereen Khan, had 
afterwards taken him under his protec¬ 
tion, and he was residing with him on the 
7th of November, when the envoy, follow¬ 
ing up a correspondence Avhieh had been 
previously commenced, wrote authorizing 
liim to a.ssurc his friends Khan Shereen 
Khan and Mahomed Kumyo, that if they 
performed the service, the payment would 
certainly be forthcoming, £10,000 to the 
former, and £5000 to the latter, “besides 
getting the present and everything else 
tlicy require.” In the same letter he 
added, “ I hope that you will encourage 
Mahomed Yar Khan, the rival of Ameer- 
oolah; assure him that he shall receive the 
ehiefship, and all the assistance necessary 
to enable him to support it. You may give promises in my name to the extent PropcmiHof 
of 500,000 rupees (£50,000.) ” The nature of the service expected is not here tiou. 
explained, but light is thrown upon it by a letter, written two days before to 
Mohun Lai, by Lieutenant John Conolly, who, though then with the Shah in 
the Bida Hissar, was the envoy’s nephew and assistant, and in constant com¬ 
munication with him. Conolly’s letter contained the following passages:—“You 
can promise one lac of I’upees to Khan Shereen, on the condition of his killing 
and seizing the rebels, and arming all the Seeahs, and immediately attacking 
all rebels.” “Hold out promises of reward and money; write to me very 
frequently. Tell the chiefs who are weK disposed to send re.5pectable agents to 
the envoy. Try and spread ‘nifak' (diss^sion) among the rebels.” “P.S. I 
promise 10,000 rupees for the head of each of the principal rebel chiefs.” 

On comparing the above two letters, the envoy’s is seen to be the comple¬ 
ment and confirmation of his assistant’s. Mohun Lai, though he had no scruples 
as to the kind of employment given him, naturally desired the written authority 



Muuun T^al.—F rom portrait prefixed to his 
Lif«j of Dost Mahomed Khan. 



A.D. 1841. 


Proposals to 
assassinate 
the reliel 
chieib. 


I>id the 
eiii'oy sanc- 
tidh them ? 


408 HISTORY OF INDIA. [Book Vlll. 

of the envoy himself, and he" received it in the form of a guarantee that the lac 
prpmised through Conolly fo Shereen Khan, for “killing and seizing the rebels,” 
would be paid as soon as the work was done. So far, there is no room for 
doubt that the envoy and assistant perfectly understood each other and were 
noting in concert. .* Even the postscidpt of Conolly’s letter, horrible though its 
puiport undoubtedly is, is not so unlike some of tlie suggestions which the en\*oy 
Avas accustomed to throw out in moments of rage and despondency, as to make 
it improbable“Wiat he sanctioned Conolly’s atrocious olfer of £1000 for the head 
of each of the principal rebel chiefs. "We have Jilready seen the envoy, ’#hen 
in alarm at the movements of Dost Mahomed, seriously asking, “ Would it be 
justifiable to set a price on this fellow’s head?” and between such'a question, 
and the offer of blood-money, the difference is not so great as to make it incred¬ 
ible that the individual who projiosed the one also sanctioned the other. What 
gives peculiar interest to the latter case is, that Conolly’s ofter was act6d upon. 
Within a month Abdoollah Khan and Meer Musjedee, two chiefs Avho had been 
specially maiked out as the first victims of assassination, were both dead, and 
under circumstances so suspicions, that the blood-money was actually claimed 
by the wretches hired to"assassinate them, and was only evaded b^’^an abom¬ 
inable subterfuge. Abdoollah Khan was wounded in battle, not however by a 
British musket, but by an Afghan jezail in the hands of one of Mohun Lai’s 
hired assassins, who after dogging his steps aimed at him from behind a wall. 
The murderer, when it was thought the wound might not prove mortal, promised 
to complete the work -by poi.son. So the story goes. However much its 
accuracy may be doubted, it is certain that the hired assassin Abd'ool Aziz 
claimed the price of blood, and Mohun Lai refused it on the ground that the 
head for which alone the m 9 ney was to be paid, had not been bi’ought him. 
The manner of Meer Musjedee’s-death is more obscure, but in his case also-the 
price of blood waia claimed by a hired assassin, who swore that he suffocated 
him in his sleep, and was only refused by Mohun Lai on the same disgraceful 
quibble as before. One woiild fain keep the envoy free from all connection 
with these atrocious -proceedings, and it has not only been suggested that 
Conolly made his inhuman offer at the suggestion of Shah Slmjah alone, but 
a letter has been produced in which the envoy, writing to Mohun Lai" a few 
days after the murder of the tWo chiefs, said, “ I am sqrry to find from>%ouv 
letter of'last night that you should have supposed it was ever my object to 
encourage assassination. The rebels are very wicked men, but we must not 
take unlawful means to destroy them.” In passing judgment on the case, due 
weight should be given to this unequivocal disclaimer, for unfortunately the 
envoy had already too much to answer for, and he should not be burdened 
with an additional load of guilt, ^ long as it is possible to doubt whether he 
actually inourred it. 

"While General Elphinstone was counselling submission, and the envoy was 



Chap. IV.], DISASTERS IN KOHISTAN. 409 

endeavouring to put off the evil day by a lavish distribution of money, the 
insurrection continued to spread rapidly ot^er the whole country, and leave the 
British troops at the different stations little more than the ground which they 
actually occupied. In Kohistan, where the party of Dost Mohanied had always 
mustered strong, the Ghoorka regiment posted at Charikur was furiously 
assailed and tlu‘es»tened with annihilation. Fortunately Eldred Pottingej’, the 
hero of Herat, who was acting as political agent on the Turkistaii frontier, 
occupied the castle of Lughmanee, only two miles distant, and succeeded after a 
desperate struggle in uniting his handful of troops to the Ghoorkas commanded 
by Captain Codrington. The cidsis, however, had only now arrived. Large 
bodies of the enemy immediately surrounded the fortified barracks of Charikur, 
and continued to press on wdth so much determination, that an effort to 
dislodge them became absolutely necessary. For this purpose Pottinger, once 
more in the character of an artillery officer, moved out with a field-piece, and 
was almost immediately disabled by a musket-shot in the leg. Codrington 
was still more unfortunate. While gallantly heading his little band against a 
torrent of the enemy who were sweeping everything before them, he fell and 
was carried back mortally wounded. Only one alternative remained. The 
ammunition was nearly exhausted, and the soldiers, reduced to 200 fighting 
men, having emptied their la.st pool of w'ater, were perishing with thirst. It 
was therefore resolved to evacuate Charikur, and endeavour by a rapid unen¬ 
cumbered march to reach Cabool. This resolution, dictated by despair, could 
hardly have been exjiected to succeed. On the very fii'.st march, all order was 
lost. Pottinger and Haughton, suffering from wounds, and believing that they 
could be of no further service, put spur's to their horses, and after rrrany hair- 
brearlth escapes reached the cantonments at Cabool. The retreating party, thus 
left, was irrrmediately headed by Ensign Rose and the medical officer Dr. Grant, 
atrd struggled orr till it reached Kardurrah. Here it was overwhelmed by 
a furious onset of the enemy and cut to pieces. Ensign Rose, who was among 
the slairr, sold his life dearly, havirrg killed four of the enemy with liis owrr 
hand. Dr’. Grairt’s fate was still iirore melancholy. After cscajring from Kar¬ 
durrah, he had arrived within three miles of the cantonments, when he was 
seized by some wood-cutters and barbarously murdered. 

General Elphinstpne had repeatedly applied to be relieved from a po.sition 
for which he felt that he was not qualified. It is said indeed that he was 
sent out to India with a view to this very appointment. If .so, it must have 
been in all probability of his own seeking. It was at once an honourable and 
a lucrative post, and he doubtless thought himself a most fortunate man when 
he was made commander-in-chief of the army of occupation beyond the Indus. 
A short trial, however, seems to have satisfied him that he was not in bis 
right place, and he had not only the honesty to confess it, but had obtained 
permission on medical certificate to return to India. He had, as he expressed 
VoL. HI. 848 


A.D. 1841. 


Hpreofl of tlko 
insurrection. 


Disasters of 
British 
army. 


Infirmities 
of General ” 
Elx>hinatoiie. 



4.10 


UISTOEY OF INDIA. 


[Book VIII. 


A 1 ). 1841. it, been “unlucky in the state of his health.” Fever and rheumatic gout had 
made him almost a cripple, and on tlie 2d of November, the first day of the 
iiifimiitiBK outbreak, he had, as he himself relates, “ a very severe fall—the horse falling 
iiii>uinstoue.upon him.’' This unfortunate accident, added to his other infirmities, seems to 
have completely shattered him in mind as well as body. His personal courage 
never appears to have failed him, but any clearness of thought and energy of 
purpose which he may at any time have possessed were entirely gone. Succes¬ 
sive resolutions flitted .across his mind like mere phantom.s, and not unfre- 
quently after long hours of consultation he would change all his arrangements 
on the casual remark or frivolous objection of some one of the most forward 
and least qualified of his counsellors. These defects were only too appai'ent. 
Even the common soldiers s.aw them, and murmured when they saw themselves 
in danger of being sacrificed through the incompetency of their commander. 
It was necessary therefore that some steps should be taken, though it was a 
matter of some delicacy. So long as General Elphinstone found himself capable 
of acting at all, he felt bound to retain his command till either General Nott, 
for whom he had written, or some other reguhirly appointed ofticei’, should 
arrive to supersede him. The utmost therefore to which his consent could be 
obtained was to call in Brigadier Shelton as the .second in command, and allow 
the heavie.st and most active duties to be jierformed by him, .as a kind of 
deputy-commander. 

iiosh.iros Much being expected, from this new arrangement, no time was lost in acting 
uiand with upon it, and Brigadier Shelton, about four oix the inoming of the 9th ol 
g,November, received orders to quit the Bala Hissar and come into canton¬ 
ments, with the Shah's 6th infantry and a six-pounder gun. He started 
in little more than two hours after, and as he himself s.ay8, “ marched in 
broad daylight, without the enemy attempting to dispute my passage.” This 
fact .seems to indicate that it was necessary only to show a bold fi’ont in 
order to keep the enemy at bay, and clear the communication between tlie 
city and the cantonments. The brigadier’s first impressions on arriving were 
anything but favourable. “ I was cordially received,” he says, “ bxxt could 
read anxiety in every countenance, and they had then only three days' 
provisions. I w.as sorry to find desponding conversations and remarks too 
generally indulged, and was more grieved to find the troops were dispirited.” 
On going round the cantonments he “found them of frightful extent, with a 
rampart and ditch an Afghan could run over with the facility of a cat, with 
Character of many other serious defects.” The brigadier complains of the general indulgence 
Shelton, of “ desponding conversations and remarks,'’ but it is to be feared that he was in 
this respect one of the principal offenders. He had seen much service, and 
was possessed of indomitable courage, but his harsh and ungracious manner 
made him unpopular with all classes, and his judgment was by no means so 
excellent as to justify the unbounded confidence which he himself placed in it. 



Chap. IV.] 


THE RIKABASHEE FORT. 


ill 


A temper of a very different kind was required, and by the want of it, he in a A.n. is4i. 
juanner neutralized all the good of which he might otherwise have been 
capable. General Elphinstone’s vacillation was provoking in the extreme, but Hripuiier 
conciliation tempered with firmness might easily have overcome it, and we 
cannot read their statements without feeling that, though there were faults on 
iToth sides, the brigadier’s conduct admits of least excuse. 

On tlie 10th of November, the day after Brigadier Shelton’s arrival, an 
ofiensive movement was resolved upon. It was to be directed principally 
against what was called Rikabashee’s fort, which was situated so near the 
cantonments that the men in the biistions were shot down at their guns. 

The force allotted was in this instance commensurate with the supposed diflS- 
culties of the service, and the l)rigadier was occupied in telling off the 2000 
men of all arms, when he heard General Elphinstone observe to his aide-de- 
camp, “I think we had better give it up.” “Then,” rejdied the aide-de-camp, 

“why not countermand it at once?” This was enough, and the countermand was 
given. By the intervention of the envoy the attack was again ordered, but un¬ 
happily two whole hours had been lost, during which the spirit of the assailants 
had been damped by forebodings of failure, and the enemy had strengthened 
their means of defence. The plan was to blow open the gate. Unfortmiately 
the explo.sion onl^'^ blew open a small wicket, through which the stormers 
found it extremely difficult to pass in the face of a hot and deadly fire. 'J’he 
tew who succeeded having made their way into the interior, struck terror into I'inieuitit 

^ ^ ^ ^ .•iiui tliauh- 

the garrison, who hastened to escape by the other side. At this very time the t,«. 
cry of “cavalry,” accompanied by a sudden charge of Afghan horse, had pro¬ 
duced a .similar panic among the .stormers outside the wicket, and Euro})eans and 
sepoys in one confused ma.ss turned their backs and fled. On this occasion the 
brigadier did good .service. Disdaining flight, he more than once rallied the 
fugitives, and by the aid of the artillery, which now began to tell, compelled 
the Afghans to retire. During this conflict outside the fort, the small number 
i>f the assailants who had gained admission were in a most perilous position. 

'file garrison, who had fled in the belief that the whole storming party had 
entered, soon discovered their mistake and hastened to return. To prevent 
thi.s, the gate by wliich they escaped had been closed by securing its chain 
with a bayonet. This was but a feeble oTistacle, and the enemy came once 
more into deiully conflict with the few individuals opposed to them. (Colonel 
Mackrell fell by a wound which shortly after proved mortal; and Lieutenant 
Bird, with two sepoys of the 37th native infantry, took refuge in a stable, which 
they barricaded, and defended so lieroically, that they shot down thirty of their 
assailants, and on the final capture of the foit wei’e found unscathed, 'f he fall 
of the Rikabashee compelled the enemy to abandon several neiglibouring forts, 
in which a considerable quantity of grain was found. 

The name of victory is always cheering, but there were so many drawbacks 



412 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book Till. 


A.I). ISII. 


Qiiosijon of 
ABsasBiTia- 
tiou a^aiii 
niootoil. 


A new 
tieii taken 
lip l)y the 
♦♦neniy. 


to that of the 10th that tlie spirits of the troops were little revived by it, and 
the envoy, as if despairing of more honourable means, became more active 
than ever in plying his wily policy. The very next day John Conolly wrote 
to Mohun Lai as follows:—“There is a man called Hajee Ali, who might 
be induced by a bribe to try and bring in the heads of one or two of the 
Musjids. Endeavour to let him know that 10,000 rapees (£1000) will be 
given for each head, or even 15,000 rupees (£1500). I have written to him 
two or three times.” And that Mohun Lai might be urged to gi-eater exer¬ 
tion, the envoy himself again took pen in hand and wrote to him thus:—“You 
tu’e aware that I would give a reward of 10,000 rupees for the apprehension of 
Ameer-oollah Khan, and such of the Dooranee rebel chiefs.” Attempts have 
been made to distinguish between the two commissions thus given to Mohun 
Lai, and it has been said that the blood-money otfered by the one was not con¬ 
templated or sanctioned by the other. Be this as it may, it is quite certain 
that Mohun Lai had no idea of any such distinction, and therefore having some 
doubts as to the mode of proceeding, he wrote directly to the envoy for explana¬ 
tion, telling him that “he could not find out by Lieutenant Conolly's notes how 
the rebels are to be assassinated, but the men now employed promise to go 
into their houses and cut off their heads, when they may be without attendants.” 

On the 13th of November the enemy appeared in force on the Behmaroo 
Hills, situated to the north-west of the cantonments, and opened an annoying 
fire from two cajitured guns which they had ])laced in a commanding position. 
On this occasion tlie envoy displayed more of the military spirit than either 
the general or the brigadier, and insisting, in opposition to both, that a vigorous 
attempt should be made to drive back the enemy and recapture the guns, carried 
his point. At four P.M., the earlier part of the day having beeii wasted in idle 
debate, Shelton proceeded on the service at the head of a strong detachment, with 
two guns. The troops moved in three columns and in difierent directions. Un¬ 
fortunately the more serviceable of the two guns stuck fa-st in a canal, and though 
the other gun did good execution, the advanced column of infantry, broxight into 
collision with the Afghan cavalry sooner than was intended, appears to have lost 
all presence of mind. When, at the distance of only ten j^ards they might have 
poured in a destructive volley, they fired wildly without taking aim, and were 
immediately enveloped in a whhlwind of cavalry, who charged through and 
through their ranks, and drove them in confusion down the slope. 'J’his omin¬ 
ous and disastrous commencement did not, however, decide the fortune of the 
day. At the foot of the hill they reformed behind the reserve, and in a new 
attack regained the honour which they had lost. Aided by Eyre’s guns, both 
of which were now in full operation, and a gallant charge of Anderson’s home, 
they carried the height, and with it the two guns which had been the great 
object of contention. So far they were entitled to claim the victoiy, though it 
must be admitted that they failed to reap the full fruits of it. As night was 



Chap. TV.] 


VARIOUS ALTERNATIVES PROPOSED. 


413 


beginning to fall, and the enemy began again to press forwards, only one of the a.d. isn. 
guns could be brought into cantonments. The other was abandoned after being 
.spiked, and some loas was sustained before the troops could effect their return. i'«»)ioii8 

* ^ ^ * RHCC^ of 

Shortly afterwards intelligence arrived which spread a gloom over the canton- atteiniit t<i 
nients, and shut out almost the only remaining ray of hope. The envoy, onom'vr 
who had received no distinct tidings of Sale’s brigade, buoyed himself with 
tlie idea that it might be actually advancing to their relief, but on the I7th of 
November it became certain that no such aid was to be obtained. On ascertain¬ 
ing thi.s he addressed a letter to General Elphinstone, in whicli he ciutered into 
a detail of the various alternatives which it might be po.ssible to adoj)t. The}"^ 
might retreat in the dii'ection of Jelalabad, or retire to the Bala Hissar, or 
attempt to negotiate, or continue to hold the cautouments. He declared his 
leaning to be in favour of the fourth. “Upon the whole I think it best 
to hold on where wo are as long as possible, in the ho])e that soniethiiig may of the can 
turn up in our favour.” “In eight or ten days more we shall b<\ better able ,e™,iv„auii 
to judge whether there is any chance of an improvement in our ])ositlon.” 

It was most unfortunate that the envoy, instead of thus trusting to the 
fliapter of accidents, did not at once decide in favour of the second alternative 
—retirement to the Bala Hissar. It was in fact the only remaining chance 
of escape from destruction. Once within it the troops would have liad an 
impregnable po.sition, and freed froin the harassing laboui- which the defence 
of the cantonment incessantly entailed upon them, must have been able by 
means of the stock of provisions already stored in the citadel, and the addition 
which might have been made to it by suitable exertion, to pass the winter in 
security and tolerable comfort. Tlie envoy doubted if the heavy guns could 
be brought into the Bala Hissar, and foresaw a deficiency both of food and 
firewood to cook it. The general and the brigadier, now apparently intent on 
retreat with or without capitulation, secondetl these objections, and added 
others, of which the only one not absolutely frivolous was the alleged difficult^' 
of transporting the sick and wounded. 

The loss inflicted on the enemy on the 13th had curbed their audacity, and Newattcmiii 
for some days they gave comparatively little annoyance. Latterly they began oieomin.v. 
to resume their aggressive attitude, and by taking possession of the village of 
Behmaroo, situated at the north-east foot of the Behmaroo Hills, cut off one of 
the main sources from which the British had been drawing supplies. In order 
to dislodge them, it was resolved to send out a strong force before (laybreak 
on the morning of the 23d. The most remarkable fact in j egard to the com- 
])Osition of the force is that it had only one gun. A general order, issued while 
Marquis Hastings was governor, enjoined that under no circumstmices, unless 
where a second could not be obtained, were le.ss than two guns to be taken 
into the field. The propriety of this rule, sufficiently obvious in itself, was 
destined this day to receive a striking confirmation. 



414 


HIStOKY OF INDIA. 


[Book VIII. 


A.D. 1841. Brigadier Shelton, at the head of the force, marched out of cantonmente at 
. ♦ two in the morning, and the solitary gun, having with some difficulty been 
FaUaroof bi’ought into position on a knoll, opened with grape on an inclosure of the 
* the AfgiimiB. village, which seemed to be the enemy’s principal bivouac. Had the surprise 
and confusion thus produced been improved on the instant, there seems no 
doubt that the village might easily have been carried, but through some blunder 
the attack was delayed, and then through some other blimder so improperly 
made that it failed. Meanwliilc the enemy had begun to ply their jezails, and 
thousands of the insurgents, made awai'e that a battle was raging, hastened 
from the city across the hiUs to take part in it. The advantage obtained from 
the daikness was now lo.st, and as the day dawned the parties o]>po.sed to each 



.Ti:zaii,s.^ —From Hui't’s Cliaracter and Coatiiine of Afghanistan. 


other became well defined, the Biitish occupying one hill and the enemy 
another, only separated liy a narrow gorge. The fire having become hot anil 
galling, the brigadier left five companies on the extremity of the hill overhang¬ 
ing the village, and cros.sing the gorge with the remainder of the force and the 
lirigiMiior <ra,ine<l the brow of the enemy’s hill. Here he formed his infantry 

•Sholbrn’s . ” . . 

MiiaamiiiKo into two sqxiares, and crowded his cavalry behind them. This arrangement, 
ujuBuufit. which has been .strongly and justly censured, did not produce much mischief so 
long as the gun, nobly worked by Sergeant Mulhall, continued to tell upon the 
Af^ian masses. At length, hoAvever, when incessant firing had made it unser¬ 
viceable, a severe penalty was ])aid for the folly of not having provided anothei- 
to supply its ])hu!e. The Afghan jezails carrying much fiirther than the British 
muskets, poured in a fire which could not be returned, and made tlreadful 
liavoc in the stpiares. Wliy these, and the cavalry in theii" rear, were thus 
kept in a position where they could not act with effect, and stood merely as 
marks to be shot at, has nevei' been satisfactorily explained. The result was 
disa.strous. The spirit of the troops was broken, and they became incapable of 
re.sisting any sudden impulse of terror. It was not long before the panic, for 
which they were thus ])reparcd, seized them. A party 4>f Afghans, headed by 

' The jezail is a long matchlock gun, with a forked the more so as its range far exceeds that of a 
rest enabling the marksman to take good aim. It ' musket.—Hart’s Character and Cuatume of Afghan- 
is a formidable weapon in mountainous countries, i»tan. 



Chap. IV.] 


ROUT OF BRITISH TROOPS. 


415 • 


some fanatical Ghazee.s, taking advantage of an eminence which concealed the a.d. ]R4t. 
movement, made a sudden rush from behind it. In an instant all was confu¬ 
sion in the British ranks, and both infantiy and cavalrj', when ordered to Thu Briti»ir 
charge, shamefully turned their backs and fled. The brigadier and other officers, aViL-v 
while the buUets were flying thick around them, vainly endeavoured to stop 
the fugitives. One of the first consequences was the captixre of the solitary 
gun by the enemy. Their triumph, however, was short-lived. When every¬ 
thing seemed lost, the brigadier had the presence of mind to order the halt to 
l^e sounded. The men mechanically obeyed, reformed, and returned to the con¬ 
flict. It was now the turn of the Ghazees to flee and leave the captured gun 
behind them. The conflict still continued with alternations of succes.s, but .os 
the capture of the village for which it was commenced had become imjxossible, 
it was suggested to the brigadier, that as the spirit of the troops could no 
longer be trusted, the wisest course would be “to return to cantonments while 
it was .still possible to do so with credit.” “Oh no! we will hold the hill .some 
time longer,” was his answer, and there he stood sacrificing valuable lives while 
no possible advantage could be gained by it. If this was mere bravado, it was 
tlearly paid for. Another Ghazee rush was followed by a second panic, and the 
great body of the British troops were driven back in the utmost coufu.sion. 

Wo completely indeed were fugitives and pursuers mingled, that the canton¬ 
ments themselves must have fallen had the Afghans known ln)W ti) imjwove 
their advantage. 

Brigadier Whelton, in narrating the above events, coolly remark,s, “This ^''lextori.n 

. . .i)«rotioiiK 

(u)ucluded all exteiior operations.” The British trooj).s ])ining with cold and abaiia.juuii. 
hunger, exhausted by incessant fatigues, and broken in spirit, had refused to 
follow their officers, and been seen in dastardly flight before an enemy whom 
they had been aecastomed to despise. What then coidd be expected from 
further conflict except additional disgrace and di.saster? The question of retire¬ 
ment to the Bala Hissar was indeed still open, and the Shah, who had formerly 
refused to entertain it, being now fully alarmed for his jxersonal safety and that 
of his family, uiged its immediate occupation by the British troops, as the 
only remaining means of safety. The envoy, though strongly inclined to the 
same opinion, was haunted by so many apprehensions that he yielded without 
much difficulty to the objections of the military authorities. 

When the proposal to move into the Bala Hissar was rejected, there must noM.iuti<m 

1 % * * . 1 * • T come to to 

iKive been some mention of a resource deemed preferable to it, and we are not treat for 
left long in doubt as to what it was. The envoy had resolved to attempt to 
obtain terms from the insurgents, and having ascertained their willingness to 
treat, called upon General Elphinstone for his opinion “as to whether, in a 
military point of view, it is feasible any longer to maintain our position in tliis 
country.” The opinion, which was previously well known, was given officially 
in the following terms:I beg to state that having held our position here for 



A D. 1841. 


cimie to to 
tr^iii for 

tontm. 


ArroKfiut 
(imnaitdR i>f 
tho eiioiiiy. 


Ruiiioiirt 

delay. 


41(5 HISTORY OF INDIA. [Book VIII. 

upwards of three weeks iii a state of siege, from the want of provisions and 
forage, the reduced state of our troops, the large number of wounded and sick, 
the difficulty of defending the extensive and ill-situate<l cantonment we occupy, 
the near approach of winter, our communications cut otf, no prospect of relief, 
and the wliole country in arms against us, I am of opinion that it is not feasible 
any longer to maintain our position in this countiy, and that you ought to 
avail yourself of the offer to negotiate which has been made to you.” Thas 
sanctioned, the envoy immediately despatched a message to the Afghan chiefs, 
requesting them to appoint deputies to discuss the preliminaries of a treaty. 
The meeting wfis fixed for the following day (the 25th November), and was 



Bala ILiusar anp City of Cabooi..—F rom Atkin&on'B Skciclies in ArglianiNtau. 


held at an intermediate spot, Sultan Mahomed Khan and Meerza Ahmud Ali 
representing the Afglians, and Captains Lawrence and Tievor the British. 
The former at once assumed a tone so arrogant, that aftei’ two hours’ discu.ssion 
no progress had been made. At last they asked to see the envoy himself, and 
had an interview with him in a guard-room in one of the gateways of the can¬ 
tonments. It was unavailing. The Afghan chiefs demanded that the Biitish 
should sunender as prisoners of war, and deliver up all their arm.s, ammunition, 
and treasure, and when these terms were indignantly rejected, departed, utter¬ 
ing menace.s. 

Negotiation having failed, both parties seemed resolved to wait the progress 
of events, and for some days no active measures were taken. But delay, while 
it improved the position of the enemy, was absolutely ruinous to the British. 
Their supplies were consumed much faster than they could replace them, and 
the obvious consequence was that they must ere long be absolutely starved out. 
The troops meanwhile were becoming disorganized, and disgraced themselves. 






Chap. IV.] 


PUSILLANIMOUS CONDUC!T. 


417 


on moi’e than one occasion, by despicable cowardice. Thus, on the Uth of a d. 1841; 
December, Mahomed Shureef's fort, which it had cost so much to gain, was 
recaptured by the enemy without an effort. Its garrison of J 00 men, on seeing now j>r<.- • 
some Afghans, who had mounted to the window by using their crooked sticks 
as .scaling ladders, show their heads, abandoned their posts, and fled back pell- 
mell to tbe cantonments. Lady Sale says, “They all ran away as fast as they 
could. The 44th say that the 37tb ran first, and as they were too weak they 
went too.” But according to Lieutenent TIawtrey, who commanded, “There 
was not a pin to choose—all cowards alike.” “Our troops,’' wrote Macnaghten, 

“are behaving like a pack of despicable cowards, and there is no spirit of enter¬ 
prise left among us.’' In this dilemma, the envoy di,splayed a far more manly 
.spirit than his military coadjutors. While tbe latter did nothing but croak 
and reiterate the humiliating word negotiate, he returned to the alternative 
of gaming the Bala Hi,s.sar tis at once the safest and most honourable, urging 
that the sick and wounded might be .sent off under the cover of night, and 
that then, after destroying all the ordnance and stores that could not be 
removed, they might light their way. This was his proposal on the Gth of 
December, but the general discountenanced it, and saw no possibility of lelief 
except in what he was pleased to call “honourable terms.” These, he thought, 
might still be obtained, but “after leaving cantonments, terms, I should 
.siippo.se, are quite out of the question.” 

The envoy, most reluctant to announce a final decision, lingered on till the eoiiferoiioc 
11th, when there was just enough of food for the day’s consumption of the Afeimi. 
fighting men, and then opened the negotiation. The conference took ydace on 
the banks of the Cabool, nearly a mile from the cantonments. It was attended 
by Akbar Khan and most of the other Afghan chiefs on the one jrai t, and by 
tlie envoy, accompanied by Captains Lawrerute, Trevor, and Mackenzie, with a 
small escort, on the other. After the first salutations, the envoy pi’oduced and 
read the draft of a treaty which he had previously pi’epared. It consisted of 
a. yireamble, and eighteen separate ’articles. They were in substance, that the 
troops now at Cabool would repair to Peshawer, and thence to India with all 
practicable expedition, the Sirdars engaging to keep them unmolested, to treat 
them with all honour, and furnish “all possible assistance in arms and pi'ovi- 
sions;” that all the other British troops in Afghanistan should evacuate it as soon 
as the necessary arrangements could be made; that Shah Shujah should have 
the option of remaining in Afghanistan, ort a maintenance of not less than a 
lac of rupees per annum, or of accompanying the British troops; that on the 
safe arrival of the British troops at Peshawer, ari’angements should be made for 
the immediate return of Do.st Mahomed and his family, with all other Afghans 
now detained in India, and that at the same time the family o*f the Shah, 
if his majesty elected to accompany the British troops, should be allowed, 
to return towards India; that from the date on which the.se articles are agreed, 

Vox,. Ill, 



418 


HistoRY OF India. 


[Book VIIT. 


A-a i»4i. 


Draft of a 
treaty »»ub* 
niitted by 
the DritiHh. 


It id OHtOllHI* 

bly a(;oe])ie(l 
by the 
AfghaiiH. 


“the British trobps shall be supplied with provisions, on tendering payment for 
the same; ” that “ the stores and property formerly belonging to Ameer Dost 
Mahomed Khan shall be restored,” and all the property of British officers left 
behind shoidd be carefully preserved, and sent to India as opportunities may 
offer; and that, “notwithstanding the retirement of the British troops from 
Afghanistan, there will always be friendship between that nation and the 
Knglish, so much so, that the Afghans will contijiict no alliance with any other 
foreign power without the consent of the English, for whose assistance they will 

look in the hour of need.” 

The treaty was read with only a single 
inteiTuption from Akbar Khan, who showed 
already what he was meditating, by observing 
on the article which engaged the Sirdars to 
supply provisions, that there was no occasion 
for supplies, as the march from the canton¬ 
ments might be commenced on the following 
day. The other chiefs checked his impetuosity, 
and after the reading was finished proceeded 
to discuss the articles separately, with some 
a 2 )pearance of moderation. It is difficult in¬ 
deed to discover anything to which they could 
seriously object. The treaty placed the British 
troops entii-ely at their mercy. It was in fact 
just what the chiefs had asked and the envoy 
indignantly spumed at the first interview—an 
unconditional surrender. He himself, no doubt, thought very differently, and 
could see nothing woi'se in the transaction than that “by entering into tenus, 
we are prevented from undertaking the entire conquest of the country.” This, 
however, was now past hoping for, and he could therefore look at the treaty 
with some degree of self-complacency. “The terms I secured were the best 
obtainable, and the destruction of 15,000 human beings would little have 
benefited our country, whilst the government would have been almost compelled 
to avenge our fate at whatever cost We shall part with the Afghans as 
friends, and I feel satisfied that any government which may be established 
hereafter, will always be di.sposed to cultivate a good understanding with us.” 
Such was the flattering side of the picture. But it had also a dark side. The 
Afghans were notoriously avaricious, crafty, and vindictive, and where was the 
guarantee that after agreeing to the terms they would fulfil them? The British 
troops were to evacuate the cantonments iji three days. This done they would 
be" entirely at the mercy of foes, who would have the option of exterminating 
them, either by starvation or the sword; 

The first measure adopted in fulfilment of the treaty was not of a kind to 



Maiioml:i> Akbati Khan. 

From Lieutenant T. £yr«*i l^rison Sketches. 



Chap. IV.] 


BESTTLTS OF TBEATY WITH THE AFGHANS. 


419 


EvacuAtton 
of tlio Hiila 
Hisaar. 


inspire confidence. The British troops in the Bala Hissar, about 600 in number, A.bi i84i. 
were to evacuate it on the 1 Sth of December, and proceed to the cantonments. 

It was most desirable that their store of grain, amounting to 1600 maunds, 
should not be left behind, and every exertion wfis made in preparing for its 
removal. Unfortunately, .so much time was consumed in this operation that 
the day wore away and night had fallen before the troops were prepared to 
march. Akbar Khan, who had undertaken to be their giiide and protector, had 
his men in waiting for that purpose. Part of these, as soon as the British 
emerged from the gate, made a rush at it, ai^parently for the })urpo.se of forcing 
an entrance. The garrison within succeeded in closing it, and then having 
manned the walls commenced a destructive fire, without attempting to distin¬ 
guish between friend and foe. After this untoward event Akbar Khan declared 
that he could not guarantee the safety of the troops if they persisted in march¬ 
ing at that late hour, as the Seeah Sung Hills, along which they must ])ass, were 
bristling with Ghiljies, whom it would be impossible to restrain. The result 
was that the British troops, most of them sepoys, were obliged to remain outside 
the walls, devoid both of food and shelter, and exposed to the rigours of a 
winter iiight, such as they had nevei’ endured befoie. Worse would have 
befallen them had Akbar Khan j)roved treacherous, but he kept his faith, and 
enabled them, though thoroughly exhausted, to reach the cantonments in .safety 
on the following morning. 

The third day, the one api)ointetl for the evacuation of the cantonments, 
had now arrived, but this was at once acknowledged to be impossible. The 
chiefs, under the pretext that they had no security for the evacuation, declined 
to furnish the supplies which they had promised, while the British piotested 
that they would not or could not move without them, and nearly a week of 
the time during which they ought to have been hastening home by rapid 
marches was lost. The effect of the delay was di.sastrou.s. On the 18th of 
December snow began to faU, and covering the whole country around to the 
depth of several inches, indicated that winter had fairly set in. While the 
difficulties of the I’etreiit were thus indefinitely increased, the tenure of the 
cantonments was rendered far more precarious by giving up possession of the 
forts which commanded them. This was demanded by the Afghans as a pledge 
of sincerity, and the envoy and general, after a consultation, pusillanimously' 
complied. It is but fair to confess, that though the Afghans clearly foresaw 
the advantage which they might derive from delay, the blame was not wholly 
theirs. The envoy, even after he had signed the treaty, ceased not to wish 
that something might turn up that would enable him to evade its obligations, 

Sind was not indisposed to employ means for this j)urpose which cannot be 
otherwise characterized than as unscrujjulous and dishonourable.* The return 
of Colonel Maclaren to Candahar, after a vain attempt to ]»enetrate across the 
country, was not known at Cabool till the 19th of December, and therefore uj) 


F»>rl.a OGni- 

liBiudiiiK 

tho caiitoii- 
luciiiK ro- 
Higjied tu 
oneiny. 



AD. 1841. 


New in- 
trigiiee of 
the envoy, 


TieuchercjU'i 
corresiKJini- 
euce witli 
the Gliiljies 
tnid Kuzzil’ 
buahuK. 


420 HISTORY OF INDIA. [Book VIII. 

to that day be had postponed issuing any order in concert with the general for 
tlie evacuation of Gliuznee, Candahar, and Jelalabad. This was now done, but 
the envoy disappointed in one hope clung to another. The treaty provided for 
the abdi(Sition of tlie Shah. Who then was to be his successor? The answer 
was left indefinite, and revived the old jealousies of the Afghan tribes. The 
Barukzyes and their adherents claimed to be restored to their ancient ascen¬ 
dency, wliile the Ghiljies and Kuzzilbashes, dreading this as the worst event 
that could befall them, would willingly have retained Shah Shujah, in the 
ex])ectation of being able to use him as their tool. The envoy, in order to 
profit 1 ) 3 '- this dissension, did not hesitate to foment it, and began to scatter 
bribes on all hands. He thus entangled himself in a web of intrigue, which 
cost him his honour and his life. One is almost ashamed to relate how a high 
British functionaiy, after binding himself by treaty, could quibble iijion its 
obligations. 

Though the 22d of December had been fixed for the departure of the 
British troops, the envoy was engaged up to that very day, by means of his old 
agent Mohuu Lai, in a treacherous coirespondence with the Ghiljies and Kuzzil¬ 
bashes. On the 20th he wrote, “You can tell the Ghiljies and Khan Shereen, 
that after they have declared for his majesty and us, and sent in 100 kurwai’s' 
of grain to cantonments, 1 shall be glad to give them a bond of five lac.s of 
rupees.” On the 21st he explained himself more fully. “In conversing with 
anybody, you must say distinctly that I am readj' to stand by n)}^ engagement 
with the Barukzy'es and other chiefs associated with them, but that if any 
]>ortioji of the Afghans wish our troops to remain in the country, I shall think 
myself at liberty to break the engagement which 1 have made to go awa^', 
which engagement was made believing it to be in accordance with the wishes 
of the Afghan nation. If the Ghiljies and Kuzzilbashes wish us to stay, let 
them declare so openty in the course of to-morrow, and we will side with them. 
The best proof of their wish for us to stay is to send us a large quantity of 
grain this night—100 or 200 kurwars. If they do this and make their salaam 
to the Shah earty to-morrow, giving his majesty to understand that we are along 
with them, I will write to the Barukzyes and tell them my agreement is at an 
end." In another letter, written in the course of the same day, he repeated 
the extraordinaiy doctrine that he should think himself at libeity to break his 
agreement, “ because that agreement was made under the belief that all the 
Afghan ])eople wished us to go away.” He had the precaution, however, 
to add, “ Do not let me appear in this matter.” It is hardly necessary to give 
the reason. At this very time he was engaged in a similar intrigue with the 
Barukzyes, and had shown his friendship for Akbar Khan by making him a 
present of his carriage and horsqs. 

' The kurwwr of graiii was a measure weigliing about 700 lbs., and consequent]; rather more than ton 
bushels. 



CftAP. IV.J INTEIGTJES OF SIB W, MACNAGHTEN. •421 

The game which the envoy was playing could hardly l^ave been expected, 
and certainly did not deserve to succeed. While he was pluming himself on 
his dexterity in keeping it secret, the Afghan chiefs knew it all, and proceeded 
as they were well entitled to counterwork him. He accordingly received new 
overtures from the Barukzyes, and was easily caught by them, as they proinise<l 
more tlian he was anticipating from the rival intrigue. He therefore intimated 
to Mohun Lai that “the sending grain to us just now would do more harm 
than good to our cause, and it would lead the Barukzyes to suppose that 1 am 
intriguing with a view of breaking my agreement.” This reads ludicrously 
after the specimens of double-dealing already given, but the envoy, as if 
totally unconscious of anything of the kind, thus concluded a letter to Mohun 
Lai:—“It would be very agreeable to stop here for a few months, instead oi' 
having to travel through the snow; but we must consider not what is agreeable 
hut what is consistent with faith.” If these words have any meaning it is that 
the envoy held himself bound by the treaty, and would be guilty of a breach of 
faith by breaking or evading it, and yet, at this very moment, he was deep in 
an intrigue with Akbar Khan with this very object. 

On tlK^ evening of the 22d of December, the date of the letter last quoted, 
Cfiptain Skinner came from the city into cantonments, accompanied by 
a first cousin of Akbar Khan and a Lohanee merchant, who was believed to be 
a friend of the British. They were the bearers of a new string of propo.sals, 
of such a nature that Captain Skinner remarked, half jocularly, to the envoy, 
that he felt like one loaded with combu.stibles. Their main purport was that 
the Briti.sh troops, having been drawn uji outside the cantonments, Akbar Khan 
and the Ghiljies would unite with them, and on a given signal attack the fort 
and seize the person of Ameen-oolah Khan, who was known to be the original 
contriver, and had throughout been a ringleader of the insuiTection; that Shah 
Shujah should still be king; and that the British troops should remain till 
spring, and then to save their credit withdraw of their own accord. In return 
for his jiart in this plot, Akbar Khan should be recognized as Shah Shujah’s 
wuzeer or prime-minister, and should moreover be guaranteed by the British 
government in a present payment of thirty, and an annual pension of four lacs 
of ruj)ees. One part of the proposal was to present Ameen-oolah’s head to the 
envoy for a fixed price. This he at once rejected, but he grasped at the other 
proposals, and assented to them by a writing under his own hand. The follow¬ 
ing morning, the 23d, was fixed for holding a conference with Akbar Khan, 
and completing the arrangements. 

Often had the envoy been warned of the danger of intriguing with Akbar 
Khan, but he had apparently made up his mind to risk all on a single chance, 
rather than prolong the susj>ense and agony which wei-e making existence intol¬ 
erable. After breakfast he sent for Captains Lawrence, Trevor, and Mackenzie, 
and told them to prepare to accompany him to a conference with Akbar Khan. 


A.f>. 18.11. 


Counter 
iiitriguoK of 
the Afghaiiti. 


Kxtrjuo'riin- 

.'iry 



422 


HISTOEY OF INDIA. 


[Book VIII. 


A.D. 1841 


Infatnation 
of the envoy. 


He ))ix>coe(lK 
to a confer- 
ence with 
AkbarlChuji. 


Mackenzie, who ha<J* found him alone, having/or the first time learned his inten¬ 
tions, exclaimed *‘lt is a trap.” He abruptly stnswered, “ Leave me to manage 
that; trust me for that.” As yet General Elphinstone had been kept wholly 
in the dark, but the envoy, now on tbe point of setting out, sent for him and 
explained the nature of the intrigue. Startled, and far from satisfied with the 
explanation, the general asked what part tlie other Barukzye chiefs had taken 
in tbe negotiation, and was simply answered “they are not in the plot.” “ Do 
you not then apprehend treachery?’ rejoined the general. “None whatever,” 
was the reply; “ I am certain the thing will succeed. What I want you to do 
is to have two regiments and guns got quickly ready, and without making any 
.show, to be prepared the moment required to move towards Mahomed Khan’s 
fort.” With more good sense and greater firmne.ss than he usually displayed. 



Mahomed Khan's Foet.— From Solo's Defeuce of JoIalaKail 


the general continued to remonstrate till the envoy, rather rudely, cut him 
short by exclaiming, “Leave it all to me; I understand these things, better 
than you do.” 

About noon of the 23d the envoy jiassed out of cantonments, accompanied 
by Lawrence, Trevor, and Mackenzie, and escorted by a few horsemen. The 
place of meeting was about GOO yards east of the cantonments, not far from the 
banks of the river where it is crossed by a bridge. It was situated on a slo])e 
among some hillocks, and was marked out by a number of honse-cloths, which 
had been spread for the occasion. While passing along, the envoy remembered 
that a beautiful Arab horse, which he had purchased from the owner at a high 
price, with the intention of presenting it to Akbar Khan, who was known to 
have coveted it, had been left behind. He therefore desired Captain Mackenzie 
to return for it, and in the meantime conversed with the other two officers on 
th^ subject which was nearest his heart. He was playing, he admitted, for a 
heavy stake, but the prize was worth the risk. Unable, however, to suppress 
misgivings, he is said to have remarked, “ Death is preferable to the life we 



Chap. IV.] 


423 


SIE W. MACNAG^TEN MURDEEED. 

• * 

are leading now.” After the ysuaj salutations and some conversation on liprse- a.d. i 84 i. 

back, during which Akbar Khan was profuse in his thanks for the present of 

the Arab steed, and also for tliat of a hand.some pair of double-bairelled pistols, conforence , 

I'-i,., ^ *11 Akbiu- 

which he had admired at a previous meeting, the parties repaired to the spot Khan, 
provided for their reception. The envoy reclined on the slope, and Trevor and 
Mackenzie seated themselves beside him, but Lawrence, whose suspicions were 
{dready awake, continued standing behind liim, till, as the only means of 
avoiding the importunity of the chiefs, who urged him also to sit, he knelt on 
one knee ready to start in a moment. Akbar Khan opened the confei-ence by 
an abru 2 >t question. “Are you ready,” he a.sked, “to carry out the 2 )roposals‘of 
the previous evening?” “Why not?” replied the envoy. Meanwhile, the 
Afghans crowding round, Lawrence called attention to the susj)icious circum¬ 
stance, by observing that if the conference was meant to be secret the intruders 
ought to bo removed. Some of the chiefs made a show of clearing a circle with 
tiieir "whips, but Akbar Khan intor 2 )o.sed, saying that their presence couhl tlo 
no harm, as they were all in the secret. What this secret was did not remain 
a moment in doubt. The envoy and his companions, suddenly seized from 
behind, were rendered incapable of any effectual I’esistance. The three officers 
were immediately dragged .away and ])laced each behind a mounted Afghaii 
chief, who rode off at full .s])eed in the direction of Mahomed Khan’s fort. 

Captain Trevoi' unfortunately lost his seat, and w.as cut to pieces by Ghazees; 

(Japtains Lawrence and Mackenzie w^ere lodged in the fort. Meanwhile, the'Ji"" 
envoy had been seized by Akbar Khan, and was .struggling desj)erately with 
him on the ground. Tt is said, })robably with ti uth, that his antagoni,st me.ant 
only to drag him off like his com]ianious, and that it was not till resistance had 
exasjwrated him, that he drew a jnstol, one of those just ju-esented to him, and 
shot him dead. During the struggle wonder and horror were strongly dcj)icted 
on the envoy's uf)turned face. The only words he was heard to utter were 
“As barae Khoda” (For God’s sake). In the fearful tragedy which thus 
terminated the life of Sir William Macnaghten. the most mel.ancholy circum¬ 
stance is that, whether because misfortune had unhinged his mind or weakened 
his moral principles, he wfis engaged at the time of his de<ath, not in the faithful 
<li.schargc of his duty, but in a course of tortuous policy, which every honour¬ 
able mind must re^mdiate. 

The murder of the envoy comj^letely changed the relations previously formed 
between the Afghans and the British, and left it o})tional for the latter to 
choose their own course, independent of the obligations previou,sly contracted 
by treaty. The highest representative of the government, an ambassador 
whose very office hedged him round with a sacredness which all nations, not 
absolutely barbarous, recognize and revere, had been decoyed into an ambush 
and treacherously murdered. With a people capable of doing such a deed, and 
boasting of it after it was done, engagements, however solemnly made, were 



424 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book VIII. 


A.I). 1842. 


Xegotiatioiift 
renewal 
after mur- 
ilerofSirW. 
^F.acnag]ltell. 


Kvocitation 
of the eaii- 
loiinioiitH. 


useless, and all therefore that now remained for the British was to avenge’their 
wrongs, or at all events, if that was beyond their power, to become once more their 
own protectors, and trust to nothing but Providence and their own stout hearts 
and swords. Such was evidently the course which was at once safest and 
most honourable, but it was not that whicb the military authorities prepared 
to adopt. At first they would not believe that the envoy had been murdered, 
and instead of taking the necessary means to dispel all doubt on such a subject, 
sent round an officer to calm the alarm which was generally felt, by intimating 
at the head of each regiment that though the conference had been interrupted 
by the Ghazees, and the envoy Avith tlie officers who accompanied him had 
been removed to the city, their immediate return to cantonments might be 
expected. Tlie following day dissipated these delusions. A letter from Captain 
Lawrence made knoAvn the full extent of the atrocity, and at the same time, 
strange to s.ay, contained overtures from the murderers for a renewal of nego¬ 
tiation. Instead of revolting at the very idea, the proposals were eagerly 
embraced. They differed little from the envoy’s treaty, but when the chiefs 
found that they had only to a,sk in order to obtain, they immediately rose in 
their demands, and in returning the draft, apj)ended to it four additional 
ai ticles. “1st, Whatever coin there may be in the public ti’easury must be 
given u]>. 2d, All guns must I)e given up cxcej)t six. 3d, The mirskets in 

excess of those in u.se with the regiments must be left behimi. 4th, General Sale, 
together with his wife and daughter, and the other gentlemen of rank who arc 
married and have children, until the arrival of the Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan 
and ,the other Afghans and their families, and Dooraiu'cs and Ghiljies from 
Hindoostan, shall remain as gne.sts with us.” These humiliating articles, after 
a fruitless attem]4t to modify them, were submitted to, except the last, and 
even it Avas not comidied Avitlmnerely because it could not be enforced. 

On the Oth of Januaiy, 1842, the British troops, after waiting in vain for 
the safeguard which the Afghan chiefs had promised to provide, marched out 
without it through a large opening which had been made on the preA’ioAis 
evening in the rampart of the cantonments, to facilitate their egress. The total 
number of those Avho thus quitted the cantonments amounted to about 4500 
lighting men, and 12,000 followers. The march of such a body at such a .season, 
through a rugged mountainous countiy, was in itself a tuost perilous undertakiilg, 
and there Avere other circumstances connected with it which made it all but 
desperate. The Newal) Zemaun Khan, whom the Afghans had set up as their 
king, Avrote Pottinger warning him of the danger of setting out without the 
promised stifeguard, but it was too late to recede, and the unwieldy mass began 
to move. The same fatality which had hitherto frustrated all their operations 
waa again nianifest; and while time was everything, so many delays were 
interposed that the rearguard were not able to quit the cantonments till six 
o’clock P.M., and after a fierce conflict with Ghazees and plunderers, and did not 



Chap. IV.] 


THE KHOOED CABOOL PASS. 


425 


reach their encamping ground, on the riglit bank of the Qabool near Begmmee, a.d. 1842 . 
till two hours after midnight. This first march sufiSiced to reveal insuperable 
difficulties. 

Wlien the morning of the 7th dawned, a fearful scene was presented. Many Fcarfiu 

(lisastdrH. 

of the Hindoo women and children, exhausted by fatigue and cold, had sunk 
ilown on the snow to die. Discipline was rapidly disappearing, and it was 
evident that ere long the whole force would become disorganized. Horses, 
camels, and baggage ponies, soldiers and camp followers, were huddled together 
in an inextricable mass. Mcanwhilb fanatic and marauding bands kept hover¬ 
ing on tlie flanks, and seized every opporfunity of slaugliter or plunder. The 
only chance of safety would have been a rapid march, by which the j>ii,s8es 
might have been cleared before the enemy could effectually obstruct them, but 
this was now inipo.ssible. Zemaun Khan having again ])romiscd to disperse 
the plunderers and send supplies of food and fuel. General El})hinstone was 
induced to order a halt at Boothauk. It was his intention to have continued 
the march during the night, had not the appearance of Akbar Khan on tlie 
scene caused him to abandon it. The Afghan cliief was at the head of about 
CiOO horsemen, and on being communicated with, announced that he had come 
to act as a safeguard, and at the same time to demand hostages for the evacua¬ 
tion of Jelalabad. Till these were given, and Sale’s brigade .should have 
actually retired, he was instructed to detain the retreating force, and furnish 
tliem in the interval with all necessary supplies. After tliis annouiicemeiit, it 
could scarcely be doubted that the extermination of tlie wliole force wa.s 
intended. Another bivouac on the snow during a night of intense cold, wyuld 
almost suffice foi- this purpose, and hence the only chance of e.sca j>e was to push 
on at all hazards, without an hour’s delay. Such, however, was not the resolu¬ 
tion of General Elphinstonc, who first oi’dered the halt, and then endeavoui ed 
to make tenns. Ultimately, after another night of hoiTor had been spent, 

Akbar Khan condescended to accept of Major Pottinger and Captains Lawrence 
and Mackenzie as ho.stages, and to permit the continuance of the I’etreat to 
Tezeen. Could this place have been reached, one of the greatest difficulties of riio Kuoimi 

^ CjiboolPuHs 

the route would have been surmounted, inasmuch as the Khoord Cabool Pass, 
stretching for about five miles through a narrow gorge, hemmed in by precipi¬ 
tous mountain ridges, would have been cleared. No sooner however was the 
gorge entered, than the mountaineers rushed down to the attack, and a fearful 
massacre commenced. Akbar Khan, who had promised protection, seemed will¬ 
ing to afford it, but It was beyond his power, and the British force, now a mere 
rabble of fugitives, were shot down by liundreds, almost without any attempt 
at resifstance. About 3000 persons are said to have perished in this dreadful 
pass. The English ladies accompanying the advance, though exposed to the 
murderous fire of the Afghan marksmen, escaped unhurt, with the exception of 
Lady Sale, who was struck by a ball which lodged in her wi-ist. 

VoL. III. 


850 



426 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book VIIT. 


A.D. 1842. 


l.)«livory of 

f ho iuarri< 5 d 

olHcera and 
their faxni 
lies ti> 
AkharlChaii 


The remnant of t^ie forc,e reached Khoord Cabool fort on the evening of the 
8th, but it was not to obtain any mitigation of their sufferings. “We had 
ascended,” says Lieutenant Eyre, “to a still colder climate than we had left 
behind, and were without tents, fuel, or food.” The consequence was, that “ an 
immense number of poor wounded wretches,” whose groans of misery and 
Jistress assailed the ear from all quarters, “ wandered about the camp destitute 
of shelter, and jierished during the night.” On the 9th, before sunidse, the 
camp was again in motion, and three-fourths of the fighting men, without 
waiting for orders, pushed on in advance with the camp followers. The remain¬ 
ing troojis liad afterwards marched and jiroceeded about a mile, when another 
of those fatal lialts was ordered. It had been made as before at the suggestion 
t)f Akbar Khan, on a leuewed assurance of protection and supplies, and was 
preliminary to a compliance wdtli a startling proposal whicli accompanied it. 
During tlie negotiation at Cabool, the Afghan chiefs had demanded the delivery 
of the married gentlemen and their families as hostages. I'his was evaded at 
the time, but the demand had never been lost sight of, and was now renewed. 
The jiroceedings of the previous day furnished a plausible pretext, both to 
Akliai- Khan fo)‘ making the proposal, and to (General Elphinstone for grantijig 
it. The lattei- indeed has removed all doubt as to the motives which influenced 
him, by a written .statement, in which he justifies his compliance on two 
grounds: fli'st, because he desired “to I'cmove the ladies and children, after the 
horrois they had already witnessed, from the fuither dangeis of our canij^, ’ and 
secondly, because he hoped “that as from the very commencement of the nego- 
tiatiou.s, the Sii'dar had shown the gi’eatest anxiety to have the mai’ried peoj>le 
as hostagijs, this mark of trust might elicit a conesponding feeling in him." 
Judging by the event, it is impossible to deny that the first reason was well 
founded. The ladies and children had passed unscathed through a shower of 
Afghan balls, but the repetition of such a miraculous escape was more than 
could be ho])ed for, and to expose them to the dangers of another murderous 
conflict would have been to throw away then last chance of .safety. It was 
indeed a horrible alternative, and we can better conceive than exjness the 
feelings of Lady Macnaghten when told that she was to quit British protection, 
and become what was called the “guest ” of the man who liad murdered her 
husband. There was indeed .some guarantee for their personal safety, in the 
fact that Akbar Khan’s own family were in the hands of the British, and it 
therefore seems that the general’s first reason ought to be su.stained. On his 
second reason, a different judgment must be passed. After the experience he 
had had of Akbar Khan, it was mere fatuity to imagine that any “mark of 
trust might elicit a corresponding feeling in him.” 'I’lie necessity which justi¬ 
fied the surrender of the ladies did not apply at all to their husbands, and one 
is puzzled to understand why they, instead of remaining at their posts to share 
the common danger, wei-e also sent off to become the “guests” of Akbar*Khan. 



Chap. IV.] 


RETREAT TO JUODULTJCK. 


427 


The command to halt on the morning of the 9th was disapproved by the 
whole force, and Shelton, in order to give effect to a personal remonstrance 
against it, declared that it would involve their entire destruction, whereas 
another day’s march would carry them clear of the snow. The general listened, 
but refused to be convinced. The consequence was, that the native soldiers 
took what seemed the only remedy into their own hands, ami prepared to 
desert. The example had previously been set by the Shah’s cavalry, and they 
were not slow in following it. On the morning of the 10th, when ihe march 
was resumed, the native regiments bad almost melted away. “ The European 
soldiers,” says Eyre, “were now almost the only efficient men left, the Hindoo- 
stanees having all suffered more or less from the effects of the frost in their 
hands and feet; few were able even to hold a musket, much less to pull a 
trigger: in fact, the prolonged delay in the snow had paralyzed the mental and 
bodily powers of the strongest men, rendering them incapable of any useful 
exertion. Hope seemed to have died in every breast; the wildness of terror 
was exhibited in every countenance.” The end was now fast approaching. 
The enemy hovering on the heights were watching their opportunity, while the 
iiiextricable mass below kept moving onward as if mechanically and unconsci¬ 
ously to inevitable destruction. At a narrow gorge between two precipitous 
liills, where the promiscuous crowd of disorganized sepoys and camp folloAvers 
were so huddled together that they could neither recede nor advance, the 
slaughter was renewed, and barbarously continued till, of the 1G,00() persons 
who stai’ted froivi Cabool, le.ss than a fourth remained. The sepoys were 
entirely annihilated, and the Europeans Avere not able to muster of fighting 
men more than 250 soldiers of the 44th, 150 cavalrj’-, and 50 horse aj'tillery- 
nien, with one gun. On observing the slaughter at the gorge. General Elphin- 
.stone called upon Akbar Khan, who had stood aloof, to make good his promises 
of protection. The oft-repeated answer was returned that he could not, and 
along with the answer a new humiliating proposal: let the British lay down 
their arms, and he would uiideidake to save their lives. There was still spirit 
enough remaining to treat this proposjil as it deserved, and the march was 
resumed. By a rapid movement the defile, where so many of the camp followers 
had already perished, was reached, but before it could be cleared the enemy 
opened a destructive fire on the rear. Shelton, who commanded there, gave 
another proof of his unflinching courage, and being seconded by a handful of 
men who stood by him, as he expresses it, “nobly and heroically,” gained 
another short respite for the whole. Akbar Khan, when again appealed to, 
having only renewed his ignominious propo.sal, it was determined to move on 
dugduluck by a rapid night march. This, under the most favourable circum¬ 
stances, could only be effected by throwing off the camp followers and leaving 
them to their fate. The march was resumed-with this view as quietly as possi¬ 
ble, but the deception which stern necessity alone could justify did not succeed. 


A.D. 1842. 


IIorrorB of 
tUo retreat 
upon Jug- 
ihiluck. 



428 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book VIII. 


A.D. 1842. 


Tmichorous 
oomluct of 
AkbtirKhati 


MunlcrouH 
{-.Kack liy 
tlicCiliiljies. 


and the fighting men found themselves cumbered as before with an unmanage¬ 
able rabble. Little molestation, however, was experienced for some miles, and 
the advanced guard after halting at Kuttur Sung for the arrival of the rear¬ 
guard, pushed on for Jugduluck, still ten miles distant. It was reached at last 
by the advance guard, without much obstruction, but not without the greatest 
difficulty by the rearguard, who, commanded as before by Shelton, fought 
their way manfully, contesting every inch of ground. 

At Jugduluck the survivors of the British force, now few in number ami 
exhausted with fatigue, found a temporary shelter behind some ruined walls, 
and were endeavouring to snatch a little repose, when they weie suddenly 
aroused by volley after volley poured from the adjoining heights into the heart 
of their bivouac. They were in consecpience obliged to quit it, and make ont; 
Ijold effort to clear the ground before them. It succeeded, and the troops when 
night clo.sed, were able again to seek the shelter of the ruined walls. Mean- 
wliiJe Akbar Khan was preparing a new act of treachery. On being once more 
appealed to for pi-otection, he sent a message inviting a conference with General 
Elphiirstone, Brigadier Slielton, and Captaiii Johnstone. They went, and after 
being received with tlie greatest apparent kindness and hospitality, fouml 
themselves in his tiap. .lelalabad wjis not yet evacuated in terms of the treaty, 
and lie meant to detain them as hostages. Idic general, whose sense of honour 
notwithstanding all his Idunders remained as keen as ever, endeavoured to 
procure his OAvn return, by pleading that disajipearance from the army at such 
a time woidd look like desertion, and disgrace him in the eyes of his country¬ 
men; but Akbar Khan was not to be moved, and detained all tlie three officers. 
On the morning of the 12th the conference was resinned, and the trooj)s pro¬ 
longed their halt to await the issue. The only object of the detained Britisli 
officers was to save the small remnant of the force still surviving, and the}' 
not only earnestly implored Akbar Khan’s interposition, but engaged Mahomed 
Shah Khan, his father-in-law, and a Ghiljic chief of influence, to purchase the 
forbearance of his savage countrymen at the price of two lacs of ru))ees. Aftia- 
much discussion, during which it became manifest that the Ghiljies were thirst¬ 
ing as much for blood as for money, Mahomed Shah Khan arrived about dusk, 
and intimated that all was finally and amicably arranged for the safe conduct 
of the troops to Jelalabad. Tlic announcement had scarcely cscajied his lips, 
when the lie was given to it by a sound of firing. It came from the direction 
of the British bivouac, and told that the Ghiljies had resumed their murderous 
work. 

The firing announced that the enemy were on the alert waiting to pounce 
upon their victims, but the soldiers displayed so much determination, and 
inflicted sucli severe, chastisement on the most forward of the plunderers, that, 
the first part of the march was effected without serious loss. A fearful struggle 
however awaited them. They had still to clear the pass of Jugduluck, uj) 



ciiAr. rv.] 


DISASTEOUS CONFLICT. 


4S9 


which the road climbs by a steep ascent between lofty precipices. By incredible a.d. i 842 . 
exertion the summit was nearly gained, when a sudden turn brought them in 
front of a barricade foiined of shrubs and branches of trees. To penetrate it Anniinia- 
seemed impossible, and either to halt or recede was inevitable destruction, since nruisiifor™ 
the enemy, who had been lying in ambush, were already busy with their long 
knives and jezails. It was a most unequal struggle, and terminated in the 
almost total extinction of the force. Brigadier Anquetil, Colonel Chambers, 
and ten other officers, here met their deatlis. Dmlng the conflict, about twenty 
officers and forty-five privates managed to clear the bairicade and make their 
way to Gimdamuck at daybreak of the 13th. The respite thus obtained was of 



Jumn'ucK. wliuro CJcneml Jillijliiiistonc iiiaiU? lji»s Iju-st stand. Froiu Kuttraj’& (’^tunio:s and Scuuny «>f Afgh.itn.’itan. 


short duration. The enemy began to ))our in from all quarters, and their 
intended victims had become incjrpable of resistance, as not more than two 
rounds of ammunition to each man remained. Wliat was to be done? Obvi¬ 
ously the only alternatives were to make tenns, or if these were refused, to sell 
their lives as dearly as possible. The former alternative seemed not unattain¬ 
able, for shortly after their arrival a messenger arrived with overtures from the 
chief of the district. Maior Griffiths, now the senior officer, set out to have an Mtissaoreof 

•' . Aligiir Orif- 

interview with the chief, and was only on the way, when the blood-thirsty mob (uiwandiiis 
broke in upon his little band and massacred every man of them, except Captain 
Souter of the 44th and a few privates, who were made prisoners. A few officers, 
who had quitted the column at Soorkhab and continued in .advance of it, still 
survived. As they proceeded, one after another perished, .and at Futteahbad 
their number was reduced to six. Being now only sixteen miles from Jelala- 
b.ad, their final deliverance seemed at hand, but the me.a.sure of disaster w.as 
not yet complete. In the viciixity of Futteahbad a ti’cacherous bffer of kind¬ 
ness threw them off their guard. While snatching a hasty meal to strengthen 
them for their remaining fatigues, they were attacked bj- a party of armed 



430 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book VIll. 


A.O. iM*. men. Two of their number were immediately cut down, and three, overtaken 
after an ineffectual flight, shared the same fate. Dr. Biyden, now the only 
Arrival BurvivoT, having providentially escaped, pursued his journey. He rode a pony 
atjiuiabod SO jadcd tlnit it could Bcarcely carry him, and on which, as he was both wounded 
wv’l^rftw and faint, lie was hai'dly able to keep his seat. At length, however, on coming 
fom!*'' within aiglit of Jelalabad, he was descried from the walla The Britisli garri¬ 
son there, though without any certain information on the subject, knew as 
much U.S tilled them with the most dismal forebodings as to the fate of tlie 
(labool force, t^Joloiiel Bennie, wlio had ventui'cd, one cannot help thinking, 
Homewliai unadvisedly, to ]>redict that only one man would escape to announce 
the destruction of all the rest, no sooner heard that a solitary and apparently 
exhausted rider, recognized by his dress and ajipearance to be a British officer, 
was apiiroaching, than he exclaimed, says Mr. Gleig, in a voice which “sounded 
like the response of an oracle, ‘Did J not say so? Here comes the messenger.’ ” 
A paity of cavalry immediately hastened out to Br. Bryden’s relief. He wa.s 
tfio much exhausted to be able to give any details, but told enough to confirm 
their worst fcara, A British force had been completely exterminated, and the 
British ai'ins had sustained a disgrace greater fat than had ever befallen them 
in any previous Indian campaign, ft was some small relief however to learn 
that Bennie’s prophecy, if he ever uttered it, was not literally fulfilled. Instead 
of one, there were several survivoi??, and among them the very persona in 
whom the deejiest interest was felt. The British ladies and children thougli 
C 4 vptive« were still alive, and might 3 'et he recovered. They were so in fact, 
but as it was after a considerable delay, the dtitails properly belong to a more 
advanced part of the narrative. 



CHAPTER V. 

Opcralioiin in lUfTrroiit parte of Afghanistan—Sale at Jelalalml—Cunflieta in the Khylicr I'ann—Nott 
at (yaodabsr—Views of the Indian Government • Cancluaiou of l^ord Auckland'H adininistratiuli^— 
TjodI EUenliorough governor-general—I’niposoil uvaeuntion of Afghaniatan—Uouhlo advance up>n 
('almol by Gcncraht Pollock nn<l Nott—llocaplure of Ghuznee—lie-occupation of CalaKiI—Tlccovcry 
of Brltuli jtriaonurs—ISvacuation of A fghai detail -Lord Ellenleirough’H prucIamatinnB. 

HE formidable difficulties encountered by Sir Robert Sale in 
marching bis brigade from Cabool to Jelalabad have already 
been referred to, with his consequent refusal to risk its en¬ 
tire lass by endeavouring to retrace his steps, in compliance 
. with the urgent importunities of the envoy. Wlicn the first 
order to return was received on the 10th of November, the brigade was 
encamped in the valley of Gundamuck. Previously, however, it had been so 









Chap. V.] 


SA].E’S BRIGADE ENTERS JELALABAD. 


431 


roughly handled, and was so imperfectly provided with the provisions and 
military stores which would be absolutely required in marching back through 
one of the most difficult countries in the world, and in the face of a population 
understood to be almost universally hostile, that a council of wai’, summoned 
to consider the important subject, decided, though not unanimously, that the 
march on Jelalabad ought to be continued. Even this could not be effected 
without sacrifice. In order to move as lightly as possible, it was necessary 
to leave a large amount of valuable proi)eity in the cantonments at Gunda- 
muck, and in the absence of better custodiers to intrust it to the chaige of a 
body of the Shah's irregular cavalry. The result, which was probably not 
unforeseen, immediately followed. The Janbaz, such being the name by which 
these cavalry were designated, lost no time in fraternizing with the insurgents, 
the cantonments were burned down, the property tlisappeared, and the insur¬ 
rection itself spread wider and wider over all the surrounding districts. 

The brigade resumed its mareli on the 11th of Novembei', and the insui- 
gents, probably not yet fully pi-oj>ared foi' action, ofiered little obstruction. 
()u the morning of the 12th, it beciune obvious that a different course M as to 
he ]>ursucd By day-break the adjoining hills were covered with aimed men, 
Avatching their opjiortunity to descend and sweep all before them. 'fhe task 
of keejaug them in check was intrusted to Colonel Dtmnie, who, after a kind 
of running tight had for some time been ke])t up, had recourse to a nianu-uvre. 
Placing the cavalry in ambush, be led out the infantry to the attack, with 
instructions suddenly to wheel round when about to come into actual colli.sion 
with the enemy, as if a panic had .seized them. The enemy mistaking the feint 
for a real fiight, raised a wild shout, and to complete their Auctory rushed into 
the low ground. A charge from the cavalry tlrrew them intr.) irretrievable 
confusioit, and they tied lea\’ing the valley covered Avith their dead. After this 
decided check, no further oppo.sitioir Avas made to the march of the brigadr', 
Avhich entered Jelalabad on th(‘ 13th of January, and took unchallenged 
pos,session of it. Sale’s intention was to hold it as an intermediate, jiost, fronr 
which reinforcements received frmn India by way of Peshawer might be 
forwarded to Cabool, arrd Avhere, .should the retirement of the Cabool for-ce 
itself become nece.ssary, it nright find a haven of safety. 'I'he nature of the 
task which he had thus undertaken cannot be better explaitred than in his own 
words. “1 found the walls of Jelalabad in a state Avhich might h.a\’e justified 
despair as to the possibility of deferrding them. The enceirrte was far too 
extensive for my small force, embracing a circumfei’cnce of upAA’ards of 2300 
yards. Its ti'acing was vicious in the extreme. It had rro jrai-apet exceptiirg 
for a few hundred yards, which then was not more thair two feet high. Earth 
and rubbish had accumulated to such an extent about the ranrjrarts, that th'ere 
were roads in various directions across and over them into the country. There 
was a .space of 400 yards together, on which none of the garrison could show 


A.D. 18'I2. 


tSliio’H 

brigade ooii- 
tiiiueB itM 
luurch it) 
JoluJabaii. 


\t>* aiTival 
thoi'K, 



432 


HISTOEY OF INDIA. 


[Book VIII. 


A.D. 1842. 


JSalo’a 
brigade at 
Jalalabad. 


Its daiigei' 

OUH iMlHitb II. 


themselves excepting at one spofrT' the population within was disaffected, and 
the whole enceinte was suiTOunded by ruined forts, walls, mosques, tombs, and 
gardens, from which a fire could be ojiened at twenty or thirty yards.” After 
the above description, it is almost superfluous to observe that the difficulty of 
holding such a place was certainly not less than that of defending the British 
cantonments at Cabool. Fortunately, however, a very different spirit prevailed, 
and tlie very same circumstances which General Elphinstone mismanaged so as 
to bring disgrace and ruin on the Cabool force, sufficed to make Sir Robert Sale 
and his brigade a band of heroes. 

As soon as Jelalabad was entered, it became a (question whether the whole 
city ought to be lield, or whether it would not be more })rudent to retire 
into the citadel, which might be much more easily defended, and was ample 
enough to afford .sufficient accommodation. Strong reasons for the latter 
course were not wanting, but the former and bolder course was preferred, 
and it was determined not to yield uj) an inch of the city cxcei)t under dire 



Jki^alabad.—F rom .MaK.>oir8 Nurrative of J(mn»ey» in lielout^biBbui. 


compulsion. The state of the city when this resolution w<is formed has already 
been described, and notice must now be taken of several circumstances by which 
the difficulty of defence was greatly iircreased. When the brigade entered the 
city, the provisions for men and horses fell short of two days’ supply, and the 
.suri’ounding country, from which alone additional supplies could be looked for, 
was so ct>inpletely in the hands of the insurgents that not fewer than 5000 of 
them were seen crowning the adjoining heights. It was in vain to think of pro¬ 
ceeding with the defences, while the workmen would only have afforded a sure 
aim for Afghan . marksmen. The first thing necessary therefore was to give the 
insurgents a le.sson which would teach them to keep their distance. A general 
attack was accordingly arranged, and on the 14th of November Colonel 
Monteith of the 35th Bengal native infantry, moved out at day-break at the 


Chaf. "V .) 


DEFENCE OF JELALABAD. 


433 


head of 300 of her Majesty’s IStb, 300 of the 36th native infantry, 100 sappers a d. i 842 . 
and miners, 200 of the Khyber corps, a squadron of the 5th light cavalrj^ a few 
irregular horse, and three guns, in all 
about 1100 fighting men, to give battle 
to an enemy which outnumbered them 
fivefold. The boldness of the enterprise 
was justified by it^iifeccess. The enemy 
gave way at every point, and sufFere<l 
so severely in their flight that a fort¬ 
night elapsed before they again ven¬ 
tured to show themselves in force. 

The enemy having recovered from 
the terror of their defeat, l)egan again 
to press so close upon the defences that 
another chastisement was deemed ne¬ 
cessary. The task was intrusted to 
Colonel Dennie, who made a vigorous 
sortie on the 1st of Decembei-, and put 
the insurgents once more to disgraceful 
rout and terrific slaughter. But while 
Sah; and his brigade were thus main¬ 
taining the honour of the British arms, the tidings from Oabool were assuming a 
darker hue, and on the 9th of January a letter arrived which disclosed the full 
(ixtent of the calan^ty. This letter, dated 29th December, 1841, was signed by 
Eldi ed Pottinger, in charge of the Cabool mi.ssion, and W. K. Elphinstone, major- 
general, and addre.ssed to Captain Macgregor. The bearer of it was an Afghan oniarforthe 

, ddlivory of 

horseman. It was in the following terms:—“It having been found necessary Joiaiabadto 
to conclude an agreement founded on that of the late Sir W. H. Macnaghten, 
for the evacuation of Afghanistan by our troops, we have the honour to re<picst 
that you will intimate to the officer commanding at Jelalabad, our wish that 
the troops now at that place should return to India, commencing their march 
immediately after the receipt of this letter, leaving all guns the property of 
Dost Mahomed Khan with the new governor, as also such stores and baggage 
as there may not be the means of carrying away, and the provisions in store for 
our u!^*on arriving at Jelalabad. Abdool GhufFoor Khan, who is the bearer 
of this letter, will render you all the assistance in his power. He has bee^ 
appointed governor of Jelalabad on the part of the existing government.” This 
letter certainly ])laced both Macgregor and Sale in a dilemma, but their mode 
of extiicating themselves, subsequently a])proved by government, will now be 
condemned by none. The following was their joint answer, returned on the 
same day:—“We have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter 
of the 29th ult., which^you therein state was to be delivered to us by Abdool 
VoL. ifl. 261 



MaJOR‘0£NRKaL Sill llOBEIlT Salf., GC.H. 
Fruin a portrait by H Moseley. 



431* 


HISTOEY OF INDIA. 


[Book VIII. 


A D. 1842. Ghuffoor Khan, appointed governor of this place by the existing powers at 
Cabool. That communication was not delivered to us by him, but by a mes- 
onicriiisro sengcr of his, and tliough dated 29th December, 1841, has only this moment 
the doUT(;r.v reached n.s. We have at the same time positive information that Mahomed 
Akbar Khan has sent a proclamation to all the chiefs in the neighbourhood, 
AfKiiaiiB. urging them to raise their followers for the })ur|iose of intercejiting and destroy¬ 
ing the forces now at Jelalabad. Under these circumstances, we have deemed 
it our duty to await a fui-ther communication from yon, which we desire may 
j)oiut out the secuiit}' which may lai given for our safe^ march to Peshawer." 
Only four days after this answer, the arrival of Dr. Er^ deu made it im])Ossil)Ie 
to doubt the propriety of the course which had been adopted. The evacuation 
ol‘Jelalabad would have j)rocui’cd no relief to the Cabool force, whose destruc¬ 
tion had already' been all but consummated, and would oidy have been a new 
triumjih to Afghan treacheiy. 

Aftci' the above refusal to retire voluntarily from Jelalabad, it became 
<loubtful if it would be possible to retain it. The insurgents, afraid again to 
i i.sk an encounter in the open held, endeavoured to shake the fidelity of the 
treojis by insidious offers, which were sf) far succe,ssful that it was deemed 
necessary “as a measure of prudence, to get rid first of the corps of the Khyber 
rangers, and next of the detachment of jezailchees, and a few of the Afghan 
sajijiers, and a body of Hindoostanee gunners who bad foraieily been in the 
employment of Dost Mahomed Khan.’’ This diminution of the ganison, though 
it doubtless added to its real strength by making treachery more difficult, had 
this obvious disadvantage, that it threw “additional labouES on the remaining 
troops, who, reduced to half rations, Avere already tasked beyond their strength. ” 
naAniota At tliis A’ciy time the disheartening intelligence arrived that a jirospect of 
foTOi in uio succour wliiclj had cheered them amid their [irivjvtions Avas not to be realized. 

Four regiments had been de,spiitched from India, under the command of Brigadier 
Wyld, to the relief of Jelalabad. This force, which with some additions made 
to it amounted to 3500 men, arrived at Peshawer on the 27th of December, 


and shortly afterwards adAwiced to Jmnrood, near the entrance of the Khyber 
Pass. The Khyberees haA'ing been previously gained by Akbar Khan, 
Brigadier Wyld had to force his way in sjiite of them. Accordingly on the 
15th of January, 1842, he entered the pass, and succeeded so far as to carry the 
fort of Ali Mu.sjid, Avhich commands the most difficult portion of it. This 
however was the limit of success, and he was obliged, after sustaining seveiv loss 
both by casualty and desertion, to make a disastrous retreat. This serious 
disappointment to the defenders of Jelalabad was soon followed by a disaster" 
which no human efforts could ha\’e aA’erted. By unceasing labour they had 
destroyed an immense quantity of cover for the enemy, by demolishing forts 
and old Avails, filling up ravines, cutting down groves, &c., had raised the para¬ 
pets to six or seven feet high, repaired and widened the rampai*ts, extended the 



CiiAr. V.J 


DEFENCE OF JELALABAD. 


435 


bastions, retrenched three of the gates, covered the fourth with an outwork, a.o. 1842. 
and excavated a ditch ten feet in depth and twelve in width, and were con¬ 
gratulating themselves on being now secure against any Afghan attack. “But.” rmmeiuions 
to borrow again from Sir Kobert Sale, "it pleased Providence on the lOtli of ntjBiriat.,u 
February to remove in an instant this ground of confidence. A tremendotis 
earthquake shook down all our parapets, built up with so much labour, injured 
several of oui* bastions, cast to the ground all our guard-houses, demolished a 
third of the town, made a considerable breach in the rampart of a curtain in 
the Peishawer face, and reduced the Cabool gate to a shapeless mass of ruins. 

It savours of romance, but it is a sober fact, that the city was thrown into 
alarm within the .space 
of little more than one 
month, by the repeti¬ 
tion of full one hun¬ 
dred shocks of this 
ien ific phenomenon of 
nature.” 

The garrison of Je- 
ialabad lo.st not a day 
in commencing to re¬ 
pair the damage done 
to the fortifications, 
but Akbar Klian, now 
no longer employed in 
the extermination of 
the Cabool force, was 

also on the alert, and made hi.s appoar.ance with a hirge body of troops at Jilur- Fortifl«i 
kail, about seven miles distant. The previous defeats sustained by his country- j^ircir 
men had taught him the dangei’ of immediate a{)proach, and he therefore con¬ 
tented himself at tii’st with endeavouring to cut off the foraging parties of the 
garrison. After a short time, he ventured on a bolder course, and having formed 
two camps, one with his head-quarters two miles to the w’est, and the other 
about a mile to the east, invested the city and established a rigorous blockade. A 
•series of skirmishes ensued, most harassing to the British, whose only object 
was to protect their parties, but invariably to their advantage, the Afghans 
never risking an encounter without paying deaiiy for their I'.ishness. On the 
1 Oth of March, from a suspicion that the enemy had begun or were pr eparing 
to run a mine, a vigorous sortie was made on the following morning, and ter¬ 
minated as usual in the flight of the Afghans after considerable loss. This 
success freed the garrison from any danger of immediate attack, but, did fiot 
otherwise improve their position, which was becoming more and more critical 
from a deficiency both of provisions and military'^ stores. The former deficiency 



Tout df Aia Musjid, in the K.lijlwr Pass.- From Lieutenant \V. Harr’s 

Ma:ch from IVlhi to retbawer nn«] Cabool. 




436 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book VIII. 


A.i). 1842. waa considerably relieved on the 1st of April, by a well-conducted sortie, which 
captured several large flocks of sheep; the prospect of supplying the latter was 
also brightening, as it was known that a large force which had assembled at 
Peshawor under General Pollock had already started. 

Defeat of the Qn the Gtli of April Akbar Khan fired a royal salute. On inquiring into 
the cause, different accounts were given. One was that it was in honour of a 
victory gained over General Pollock in the Khyber Pass; another that it was 
])reparatory to Akbar Khan's departure, who had resolved to break up his camp 
and hasten to Oabool, to take advantage of a new revolution which had taken 
]i]ace there. In either case, it seemed advisable that the Afghan camp should be 
attacked, and accordingly at daybreak of the 7th, a large for ce, formed into three 
columns, moved out from the western gate of the city. Akbar Khan prepared 
Ibr the encounter by drawing up his troops, estimated at about 6000 men, in 
front of the cam)>, resting his right on a fort, and his left on the Oabool. The 
central column directed its efforts against the fort, which from the annoyance it 
liad formerly given, it was deemed of primary importance to capture. The 
struggle was severe, and cost Colonel Jlennic his life. He had led his column 
with his usual gallantry, and after yiassing the outer wall Avas endeavouring to 
y)enetrate *to the interior, when he fell mortally wounded. Meanwhile Caj)tain 
Havelock had penetrated the enemy’s extreme left, and was engaged in dubious 
conflict, when the recall of the 13th from the fort gave him a seasonalde relief, 
and a combined attack was made on the camp. The result is thus told by Sir 
Robert Sale;—“We have made ourselves masters of two cavalry standards, 
recaj)tured four guns lost by the C’abool and Gundamuck foice.s, the restoration 
of which to our government is a matter of much honest exultation among our 
troops, seized and destroyed a great quantity of material and ordnance stores, 
and burned the whole of the enemy's tents. In short, the defeat of Mahomed 
Akbar in open field, by the troops whom he had boasted of blockading, has been 
complete and signal.” General Pollock was now at hand, and on the 1 Gth of 
April, only nine days after the garrison had gained their last laurels, they bad 
the happiness of receiving him and the ample succours he brought along with 
him within their gates. A few details of his march and the obstacles he 
successfully encountered, will form an appropriate appendix to the heroic 
defence of J elalabad. 

st»te of General Pollock reached Pc,shawer on the 5th of February, 1842, and found 

Pchiiawtti. the state of tlie troops there even worse than the sinister reports which 
met him on his journey had represented. Wyld’s defeat had filled them with 
dismay, and delegates from different regiments of his brigade were holding 
meetings by night for the purpose of resisting any order which might be given 
to advance, ‘ While this disaff'ection continued, no success was to be expected; 
arid the question therefore was, whether he should wait for reinforcements which 
he knew to be on the march, or start with such materikls as he had, at the 



(!iiap. V.] 


JELALABAD BELIEVED. 


437 


risk of “disaffection or cowardice.” Prudence counselled him to wait, but 
Sale’s urgency left him no alternative, and the march was commenced. His 
force was intended to amount in all to 12,000 men, but 4000 of these, chiefly 
Europeans, had not yet joined, wliile a considerable poition of the 8000 actually 
assembled were Sikhs, in whom little confidence could be placed. 

Before starting, attempts had been made to gain the Khyberees, and part 
of a stipulated bribe had been paid in advance, but the mauiauding habits of 
the mountaineers were too strong to be overcome, and it soon became obvious 
tliat force would be necefssary. Accoi'dingly after reaching Jumrood, General 
Pollock started about half-pfist three on the morning of the 5th of April, in dim 
twilight, and with sdl possible secrecy. Immediately at the entrance of the 
pass the Khyberees had erected a strong barricade. It might have been .stormed, 
but the more effective plan was adoj)ted of turning it, and two columns of 
infantry began to crown the heights on cither side. The mountaineers, aston¬ 
ished at seeing themselves thus compelled to maintain a hand-to-hand fight 
on ground where, from deeming it inaccessible, they had never dreamed of being 
attacked, soon gave way. The barricade thus left without defenders was easily 
siinuounted, and the main body of the foi'ce encumbered with its long string of 
baggage, began to move slowly along the defile. Before evening closed, AH 
Mif'sjid was reached, and found to be evacuated. The key of the pass being 
thus secured, no fuiiher difficulty of a serious nature was experienced, and the 
ixdief of the garrison, after its five months of severe privation and heroic daring, 
was triumphantly achieved. ITow different its fate from that of the wretched 
fugitives from CJabool! 


A I). 1812.' 


Oeriora} 

P<i] lock’s a<]- 
vanco from 
I'enhawer. 


Tlie KJiybor 
PafiB fortJed 
aiiil Jolula- 
had relieved 


While the honour of the British arms was maintained, and the disgrace of oimznee 
('abool partly retrieved at Jclalabad, the tidings received from the south and 
south-west were of iv mixed character. JMott was nobly doing his part at 
(^andahar, but Ghuznee had fallen into the hands of the insurgents. Maclaien’s 
brigade, which Nott against his better judgment had detached to Oabool, after 
a vain attempt to advance, retraced its stej)S, and reached Candahar on the 8th 
of December. The necessity of the return can scarcely be di.sputed, and j’et it 
was in one respect most unforhmate. Ghuznee had been invested by the sur¬ 
rounding tribes as early as the 2()th of November. It was ill provided either 
for a siege or a blockade, and the ganison therefore learned with no .small 
delight that the enemy, alarmed at the advance of Maclaren, had suddenly 
retired. Colonel Palmer, the officer in conunand, availed himself of the respite 
to improve the works and lay in supplies, but had done little when the enem,y, 
encouraged by Maclaren’s retirement, reappeared. An act of humanity, praise¬ 
worthy in itself though injudicious under the circumstances, added greatly to 
the difficulty of the defence. The townspeople, instead of being turned out, 
were allowed to remain, and repaid the kindness thus shown them by admitting 
their countrymen outside through a hole which they had dug in the wall. The 



438 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book VIII. 


A.i). 1842 . consequence was that the garriison were compelled on the 17th of December to 
shut themselves up. within the citadel. There they continued to maintain 
(ihiuiiiuo themselves with the utmost difficulty till a letter of similar import to that 
tho Af^lal'w.sent by Pottinger and Elphinstone to Jelalabad arrived. Under the circum¬ 
stances the commandant could hardly have been expected to imitate the spirited 
refu.sfd of Sale and Macgregor to comply with the letter. He therefore on the 
Ist of Marcli entered into an agreement to evacuate the place. Ultimately the 
.sepoys of the garrison, who had thrown discipline aside, perished almost to a 
man in an attempt to force their way across the country to Peshawer, which 
they ignoiantly imagined to be oidy fifty or sixty miles distant; and their 
British officers, whf) had surrendered on the futile promise of “ honourable treat¬ 
ment,” remained in rigorous 
confinement. 

At Candahar, though the 
British force mustered nearly 
OOOO men, tinder the com¬ 
mand of an officer of indomi¬ 
table .spirit and di.stingui.shed 
ability, tlie state of affairs was 
very alarming. “ The good 
people here,” wrote General 
Nott, “are anxiou.sly looking 
for the result of the affairs at 
Cabool, when, .should they be 
against us, they will try their 
strength.” It was not merely 



UlllTIHlI COAIMANDANT W SlIAH SlItUAIl’s JaNBAZ CaVAUIY, M. AIkER 
IIUMzir <ir Irr Janhaz C-AVAi-nv. - Fioiii Hart's Charai’tvr and (.lostunic' uf Argliaiiistan. 


open hostility, but treachery 


also that was to be dreaded. 


stall- of Of the latter a specimen was given on the 27th of December. Two corps of janhas 

(. .uuiahar. or Afghan cavalry in Shah Shujah’s service, after mimlcring one British officer 
and mortally wounding another, moved off with a (juantity of treasure which 
had been intrusted to them. I'liis was the forerunner of more .serious defections. 


Only two days after the mutiny of the janbaz. Prince Sufder Jung, a younger 
son‘of Shah Shujah, tumed traitor, and joined Atta Mahomed, who, having been 
sent by the chiefs at Cabool into Western Afghanistan to raise the country, had 
encamped beyond the Urgandab, about forty miles north-west of Candahar. 

In a previous part of the above letter Nott had pledged himself that if 
Sufder Jung and his rebels ajiproached within twelve or fifteen miles of the 
city, he would move out and disperse them. The case supposed occurred much 
sooner than any had imagined. On the 12th of January, only four days after¬ 
wards, Sufder Jung and Atta Mahomed advanced within fifteen miles of Can¬ 
dahar at the head of a force estimated at 15,000 to 20,000 men, and took up a 




CHAr. V.] 


DEFENCE OF CANDAIIAR. 


439 


strong position on the right bank of the Urgandab. Nott lost no time in a d. 1842. 
redeeming his pledge. Starting at the head of a force consisting of five and a 
half regiments of infantry, the Shah's 1st cavalry, a party of Skinner's horse, Atgium finv.,- 
and sixteen guns, he came in sight of the enemy after four hours’ march over 'ieir'oili- 
a very difficult country. Without waiting to recruit tlieir exliausted .strength, 
tlie British troops immediately rushed to the encounter, by ci-ossing the river. 

The enemy, scarcely waiting to receive them, broke and fled, but were not 
alh)wed to escape without severe chastisement. 

Tlie .season for operations in the field wa.s now past, and the two armies .Mutual 11..- 
seemed not indisposed to susj)end hostilities; the British troops holding the city. • 

while the insurgents, now openly headed by Meerza Ahmed, a Dotirance chief, 
('stablished their camp at no great distance. Intelligence of the envoy’s murder 
was received at Candahar for the first time on the 30th of January, and ]>re- 
pared the garrison for still more dismal tidings. During tlit! su.spension ol' 
hostilities Nott had been unremitting in his exertions, and not only improved 
the fortifications, but laid in a stock of provisions for five months. He had 
never de,spaired of being able to maintain his position, and from his recent 
victory had reason to be more sanguine than ever, when the letter of Pottingei- 
a,nd Elphiustone directing the immediate evacuation both of Candahar and of 
Khelat-i-tlhiljie arrived. It was addressed to Major Rawlinson as politic.-d 
resident, and was similar in import to that sent to Jolalabad. 

Major Rawlinson did not recognize the authority of the order to evacuate, oi<i'i t.. 
but thought that, taking all circumstances into consideration, it would be (aiJiai.",' 
de.sirable .so far to act upon it as to make it the basis of a negotiation, the terms 
of which might enable the British government, even in the (ivent of letiring 
from Afghanistan, to retain a certain degree of political infiuence. Nott had no 
patience with this temporizing policy, and in answer to Rawlinson's official 
letter on the subject of evacuation wrote as follows:—“ I have only to re})eat 
that I will not treat with any person whatever for the retirement of the British 
troops from Afghanistan, until I .shall have received instructions from the 
supreme government. The letter signed ‘ Eldred Pottinger ’ and ‘ W. K. Elphin- 
stone ’ may or may not be a foigeiy. I conceive that these officers were not 
free agents at (^abool, and therefore their letter or order can have no weight 
with me. ” 


In order to hold Candahar and also attack the insurgents encamped in its I’reiwratious 

, T • 1 /• 1 • fur 

Vicinity, it became necessary as a preliminary measure to expel irom the city 
all who were known or believed to be disaffected. In this ju’edicanient 
stood almost all the families of pure Afghan descent, and accordingly on the 3d 
of March an order was issued for the expulsion of about 1000 families, contain¬ 
ing according to the ordinaiy calculation .5000 to GOOD individuals.' No direct 
opposition was experienced, and the clearance was completely effected by the 
Gth. The very next day, the other part of the design was proceeded with, and 



440 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book VII I. 


A.I). 1842. 


Afghan at- 
tompt to 
take Oanda- 
har by 
straiagijtm. 


It is fnis- 
trattvi. 


Nott, leaving only about 2600 men to garrison the city, marched out with the 
remainder of his force to attack the enemy. In proportion as he advanced they 
retired, first across the Turnuk, and then across the Urgandab, keeping always 
so far in front as to prevent our infantry from coming in contact with them. 
Tliis they were the more easily enabled to do, as in their whole force of 12,000 
tliey had ii])wards of 6000 well-mounted cavalry, while the Biutish had only 
a single wing of the Shah’s horse. At last however, on the 9th, the artillery 
came near enough to open with effect, and the enemy broke and fled. It soon 
appeared that this flight was part of a premeditated plan; for instead of remov¬ 
ing to a greater distance, the Afghans made a circuit wliich brought them into 
the British rear, and hastenwl back to Candahar. The object was to cany it 
ly assault wliile the greater part of the gamson was absent. Accordingly early 
on tile loth, large bodies of tlie enemy made their appearance, and began to 
occupy the cantonments and gardens in the vicinity. During the day their 
numbers continued to increase, and towai’ds evening Sufder Jung and Meerza 
Ahmed anived. There could now be no doubt that an immediate attsxck was 
intended, and the garrison exerted tlicmselves to make everything secure. It 
woukl seem however that sufticieut caution had not been used. After sunset, 
a. villager, pretending to bt; from a great distance, came up to the Herat gate 
with a donkey-load of faggots, and asked to be admitted. As the gate had 
been previously closed for the night, he was refused, and threw down his load 
against the gate, muttering that he would leave it there till morning. His 
conduct under the circumstances ought certainly to have aroused suspicion, but 
no notice was taken of it, and the faggots were allowed to remaiiu Shortly 
afterwards a party of the enemy stole up and poured oil and ghee, over them. 
A similar process at the citadel gate was tmly accidentally defeated. The 
tifiicer ill charge of this gate* was proceeding to fasten it, when something 
inducing him to look outside, he perceived several faggots laid against it. It 
immediately struck him that they had been placed there for some bad purpose, 
and he ordered them to be bi’ought within. About eight o’clock, the faggots 
placed at the Herat gate burst suddenly into a flame, and set fire to the gate 
itself", which burned like tinder. The enemy immediately rushed forward and 
attempted to force an entrance. In this thej’ were frustrated, mainly by the 
presence of mind of the commis.sary-goneral, who seeing the danger threw open 
the stores and formed a barricade on the gateway by means of bags of flour. 
The enemy still persisted, and even gained the barricade, but were met with 
such a deadly fire that after repeated attempts to assault, they finally drew off" 
Had they been able, as they intended, to make simultaneous and equally deter¬ 
mined attacks on the othei’ gates, the result might have been different. 

■ It will liow be necessary to withdraw a little frmia the scene of military 
Operations, and attend to the proceedings of the Indian government.’ The 
position of the governor-general, in consequence of the disasters in Afghanistan, 



Ch 4P. -y-] LOHD AUCKLAND’S MEASUEES. 441 

was rendered still more embarrassing by the state of political parties at. home. 
The Whig ministry was tottering to its fall, and was about to be succeeded by 
a Conservative ministry, which having made political capital out of the blun¬ 
ders in Afghanistan, would be obliged in mere consistency, if not from convic¬ 
tion, to adopt a different line of policy. Lord Auckland was not the man to 
struggle successfully against the difficulties of such a position, and his former 
confidence was succeeded by diffidence and vacillation. He could not now 
hope that the government, on his resigning it, would be carried on in accord¬ 
ance with his views, and he seems to have resolved to conduct it in future in 
such a manner as would be least embarrassing to his successor. The outbreaks 
which were constantly occurring 
in Afghanistan, as if to belie the 
envoy’s promises of tranquillity, 
destroyed all hope of a permanent 
settlement before his successor 
should arrive; and when to these 
was added the astounding intelli¬ 
gence that the wliole country had 
risen in rebellion, and that the 
British army, so far from being 
able to occupy it effectually^ would 
in all probability have to fight 
their way out of it, the governor- 
gtmeral and his council lost no 
time in announcing their deteruii- 
nation to shun the conflict. Ac¬ 
cordingly the only orders issued to 
Sir Jasper Ni colls, the commander- 
in-chief, were to forward troops to Peshawer for the purpose of assisting the 
army in its expected retirement. At first it was supposed that one brigade 
would suffice for this purpose, but ultimately, not without some demur on the 
[)art of the governor-genei’al, it was deemed expedient to detach a second 
brigade. Major-general Pollock, appointed to the command, hastened forward 
to Peshawer, under the impression that the only task assigned him was to 
relieve Sale’s brigade, then beleaguered in Jelalabad, and facilitate the imme¬ 
diate evsicuation of Afghanistan. In the south General Nott’s command was 
continued, and both officers, contrary to what had hitherto been the usual order 
of precedence, were no longer to be subordinate, but superior to tlu; political 
residents within their respective commands. The •xpediency of ^this arrange¬ 
ment, in unsettled countries where the sword waslfce only arbiter, cannoC be 
questioned, but it rah so counter to existing prejudioes/and interests, that some 
credit is due to Lord Auckland’s government ffor having'resolved to adopt it. 

VOL. III. 



Gicnkral PoLi/xiK.—From a portrait by G. H, Fortl. 


A.D. 1842. 


Views of 
goverutueiit 
on learning 
the Afghan 
dimister. 


9iMt 



442 


HIST6EY of INDIA. 


[Book VIIL 


A.D. 1842. 


First pro- 
ciamatioii 
I>romising 
vigorous 
nioasui'tis. 


Sii1«oqnuui 

cIc}4i)on«luiu-y 


At the date of the resolution conferring new, and to some extent discretion¬ 
ary powers on the military commanders, the full extent of the Cahool disaster 
was not known at Calcutta, but on the 30th of January lettei-s were received 
which destroyed all hope, and made the reality even worse than had been 
apprehended. Severe as the blow must have been felt, not a day was lost in 
officially publishing it to the world, and at the same time pledging the govern¬ 
ment to the adoption and steadfast prosecution of the most active measures 
“for expediting powerful reinforcements to the Afghan frontier, and for assist¬ 
ing such operations as may be required in that cpiarter for the maintenance 
of the honour and interests of the British government.” A proclamation, 
issued from Fort William on the 31st, after making the above declaration, 
and adding that “ the ample military means at the disposal of the British 
government will be strenuously applied to these objects, so as at once to sup¬ 
port external operations and to cause efficient protection for its subjects and 
allies,” continued thus, “ a faithless enemy, stained by the foul crime of assassin¬ 
ation, has through a failure of supplies, followed by consummate treachery, been 
able to overcome a body of British troops, in a country removed by distance 
and diffieffities of season from the possibility of succour. But the governor- 
general in council, while he most deeply laments the loss ftf the brave officers 
and men, regards the pjirtial reverse only as a new occasion for di.splaying the 
stability and vigour of the British power, and the admirable spirit and valour 
of tiie British Indian army.” 

The resolution displayed in the above ])roclaraatit)n was but feebly foliowe<l 
up, and the governor-general soon relapsed into a state of despondency and 
])erplexity. There was no doubt much to emban-ass him. He had no wish what¬ 
ever to interfere with his successor’s policy, and yet he would fain, before taking 
his departure, have achieved some success which might partially retrieve the 
honour of the British arms. Fortune however seemed to have entirely' forsaken 
him, and the last military operation of importance undertaken during his 
government pi'oved a disaster. Brigadier Wyld had entered the Khyber Pass, 
only to be ignominiously driven out of it. No wonder, that Lord Auckland’s 
heart sank within him, and that he now sjiw no alternative but immediate 
evjicuation. In a letter dated 19th Februaiy, 1'842, he wrote as follows;— 
“ Since we have heard of the misfortunes of the Khyber Pass, and have been 
convinced that from the difficulties at present opposed to us, and in the actual 
state of our prejmrations, we could not expect, at least in this year, to maintain 
a position in the Jelalabad districts for any effective purpose, we have made 
our directions in regard to withdrawal from Jelalabad clear and positive, and 
we shall rejoice to learn that Major-general Pollock will have anticipated these 
more express orders, by confining his efforts to the same objects.” In this 
desponding spirit Lord Auckland’s administration closed. Lord Ellenborough, 
his successor, having arrived at Calcutta on the 28th of February. 



Chap. V.] 


LORD ELLENBOEOUGH, GOVERNOR-GENERAL. 


443 


The new governor-general, having previously held the olBce of president of a.i). mz. 
the Board of Trade, was not ignorant of the nature of the duties on which he 
entered, and possessed both the talents and the information which should have Aack- 

enabled him to discharge them with success. Circumstances also were on the oe«jded i>y 
whole greatly in his favour. He was not at all responsible for the policy which 
had issued in disaster, and while every measure by which he might in any 
degree improve the position of affairs would redound to his credit, any want 
of success would be attributed to the blunders of his predecessor, rather than 
to any new blundera committed by himself. At first, however, he seems to 
have found some difficulty in coming to a decision, since a fortnight elapsed 
before even his council received any distinct intimation of the com-se which he 
meant to pursue. In a letter dated the 15th of March, and addressed by him 
as governor-general in council to the commander-in-chief, he took a rapid 
survey of previous events, and arrived at the conclusion that the tripartite 
treaty, in consequence of the suspicious conduct which Shah Shujah had been 
latterly pursuing, was no longer binding, and that therefore there was no obli¬ 
gation on the British government to “ peril its armies, and with its armies the 
Indian empire,” in endeavouring to carry out its provisions. “Whatever course roikyofti,e 
we may hereafter take must rest solely on mditary considerations, and hence, noi-geuorai. 
in tlie first instance, regard mu.st be had to the safety of the detached bodies 
of our troops at Jelalabad, at Ghuznee, at Khelat-i-Ghiljic, and Candahar; to 
the security of our ti’oops now in the field from all unnecessary risk; and finally 
to the re-establishment of our military reputation, by the infliction of some 
.signal and decisive blow upon the Afghans, which may make it appear to them, 
and to our own subjects, and to our allies, that we have the power of inflicting 
punishment upon those who commit atrocities and violate their faith; and that 
we withdraw ultimately from Afghanistan, not from any deficiency of means 
to maintain our position, but because vve are satisfied that the king we have 
set up has not, as we wore erroneously led to imagine, the support of the nation 
over which he has been placed.” 

Nothing could be Clearer or more dignified than the course of policy indi- tot pro- 

• , ° ^ ^ JliiHe belied. 

cated by tins lettci', and there was every reas'ou to believe that it would foz-th- 
with be acted upon, as it was subscribed by all the members of council except 
the commander-in-chief, to whom it was addressed, and whose views were 
I'elieved to be in accordance with it. On the part of the governor-general 
himself there was abundance of activity and ajiparent determination. To be 
nearer the scene of action he started from Calcutta on the Gth of April, and 
proceeded for the north-west. By leaving his council behind he broke loose 
from official trammels, and obtained what he seems to have eagevly desired, an 
opportunity of displaying the full extent of his own unaided abilities. On reach¬ 
ing Benares his independent activity commenced by the announcement of views 
which, to say the least, gave no great promise either of firmness or consistency. 



444 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book YTTI. 


A.I). 1842. 


Chanty t)t 
laiiguago by 
Lunl Klleti* 
borough, 


(leneral 
EiiKlaTidV 
(lufoatin the 
Kojuk PiiKH. 


At Calcutta he had, in concurrence with his council, declared it to he one of the 
main objects of government to re-establish “our military reputation by the 
infliction of some signal and decisive blow upon the Afghans;” at Benares he 
spoke a language and issued oi’ders dictated by a very diflferent spirit. It was 
now his “deliberate opinion” that it is “expedient to withdraw the troops 
under Major-general Pollock and those under Major-general Nott at the 
earliest practicable period, into positions wherein they may have certain and 
(vasy communication with India. That 02)inion is founded upon a general view 
of our military, political, and financial situation, and is not liable to be lightly 
changed.” In accordance with this general view, the instructions given to the 
Jormer general were to withdraw from Jclalabad and retire upon Peshawer, 
and to the latter to withdraw the garrison of Khelat-i-Ghiljie, evacuate Can- 
daliar, and “take u]) a jrosition at Quettah until the season may enable you to 
retire uf)on Sukkur.” 

This sudden cliange of the governor-general’s “ deliberate ojriniou,” can 
only bo accounted for by new intelligence which he had received from Afghan¬ 
istan, and which,- by its checjuered character, threw him into peiiflexity. 
While cheered by accounts of the triuini)hant defence of Jelalabad, the disper¬ 
sion of Akbar Khan’s camp, and the junction of Sale and Pollock, he learned 
that these successes in the north were counterbalanced by disasters in the 
south. Glmznee had fallen, and though Khclat-i-Ghiljie, which was considered 
far less tenable, continued to make a gallant defence, a new defeat had been 
sustained by the British {inns. Brigadier England, then commanding the Scinde 
field force, had been ordered, as foimerly mentioned, to march from Dadur 
through the Bolan Pass towards Quettah, and thence penetrate through the 
Kojuk Pass for the jnirpose of reinforcing General Nott, and conveying to him 
supplies of treasure, ammunition, and medicines. He had Avith him only five 
comjianies of her Majesty’s 41st, six coiuj)anies of Bombay native infantry, a 
troop of Bombay ca^^alry, fifty Poonah horse, and four horse-artillery guns. 
On the 28th of March he arrived at the entrance of a defile leading to the 
village of Hykulzye, Avlicro he intended to halt for the remainder of his brigade, 
Avhich was then advancing through the Bolan Pass. In the ho2)e that General 
Nott would send tAA O or three regiments to the Kojuk Pass, he had resolved 
to halt in the Pisheen valley till they should arrive; and it was only after 
learning that no such co-operation was to be expected that he had moved 
forward towards Hykulzye. This movement wjas made without due considei-a- 
tion. He had been distinctly warned that the enemy were preparing to dispute 
his passage; and yet, instead of waiting for the arrival of his whole brigade, 
he continued rashly to advance, in total ignorance of the country, and with so 
little precaution that he Avas not CA^en aware of the presence of the enemy till 
he was almost in contact Avith them. The result was an unequal conflict, 
during which 100 out of his small party of 500 ■were killed or wounded, and be 



Chap. V.] 


DEFEAT IN KOJUK PASS. 


445 


was compelled to give way. On the following morning he ordered a retreat, d. i 842. 
and continued it as far as Quettah, whore he began to entrench himself as if ~~ 
pursued by an overwhelming force. The moral effect of this defeat was far oenerai 
more damaging than the actual loss. Indeed the governor-general distinctly 
ascribed to it his change of policy. “ The severe eheck experienced by Briga¬ 
dier England’s small corps on the 28th ultimo—an event disastrous as it was 
unexpected, and of which we have not yet infonnation to enable us to calculate 
all the results—has a tendency so to cripple the before limited means of move¬ 
ment and of action which were possessed by General Nott, as to render it 
expedient to take immediate measures for the ultimate safety of that officer’s 
eorjis, by withdrawing it at the earliest practicable period from its advanced 
position into nearer communication with India.” 

Both to Pollock and Nott the peremptory orders to withdraw were mor- ooncrid 
tifying in the extreme, and neither of them was slow in giving utterance to his tiuli of tho 
feelings. So anxious indeed was the former to retain his position, in the hope gone^"r 
that the governor-general might yet adopt a more manly policy, that he dexter- 
ously availed himself of a deficiency of carriage, and declared that until it was 
supplied he had not the means of retiring to Peshawer. To Nott, who had 
rej)eatedly declared himself in similar terms, the order to withdraw must if 
j)ossible have been still more mortifying. Brigadier England after his igno¬ 
minious retreat seems to have settled it in his own mind that he wfis never 
more to attempt to penetrate the Kojuk Pass, and thus coolly addressed his 
superior officer:—“ Whenever it so happens that you retire bodily in this direc¬ 
tion, and that I am informed of it, I feel assured that I shall be able to make 
an advantageous diversion in your favour.” This letter completely exhausted 
Nott s patience, and called forth a severe reply, in which he said—“ 1 think it 
absolutely necessary that a strong brigade of 2500 men should be immediately 
jiushed from Quettah to Candahiir with the supplies noted in the foregoing 
jmragraph. I therefore have to acquaint you that I will direct a brigade of 
three regiments of infantry and a troop of horse artiUeiy, with a body of 
cavalry, to march from Candahar on the morning of the 25th instant. This 
force will certainly be at Cliummun, at the northern foot of the Kojuk, on the 
itioi-ning of the 1st of May, and possibly on the 30th of this month. I shall 
therefore fully rely on your marching a brigade from Quettah, so that it may 
reach the southern side of the pass on the above-mentioned date.” The XBwadv.'uicc 

. , , * .A of General 

brigadier, not daring to disobey this peremptory order, started again from Eiitdand 
Quettah on the 26th of April, and must have been almost as much mortified K(^fi’ai«. 
as gratified to find that the fears which haunted him were imaginary. At 
Hykulzye, which was reached on the 28th, the enemy occupied the same 
barricades, and in greater force than before; but it was only £o show how 
utterly unable they were to cope with British troops properly handled, fdr 
after little more than a show of resistance they turned their backs and fled. 



A.l). 1842. 


Irritation 
ocrasioned 
to Ooiieral 
Nott by 
order to 
retire. 


Lord Elicn- 
b6i*onjrirH 
niiftgivinge. 


44G HISTOEY OF INDIA. [Book VIII. 

On the 30fch he aniveJ at the southern entrance of the Kojuk Pass, and 
sending his advance-guard along the heights, had the satisfaction to find those 
in front already occupied by the Candahar troops. The united brigades con¬ 
tinued their march without interruption, and reached Candahar on the 10th of 
May. It was at the very time when Nott had received the supplies, the want 
of which had kept him almost inactive, and was in hopes of being able to 
advance to the relief of Khelat-i-Ghiljie, and perhaps at the same time strike a 
blow which might in some measure retrieve the honour of the British arms, 
that he received official information of Lord Ellenborough’s retrograde policy, 
which was in fact nothing more than a reiteration of the cuckoo note “ With¬ 
draw.” His mortification appears to have been so great that he could not 
trust himself to give utterance to it, and he therefore simply replied on the 
17th of May—“These measures shall be carried into effect, and the directions 
of his lordship accomjdished in the best manner circumstances will admit of” 
His real feeling was doubtless expressed by Major Rawlinson, who on the 
following day wrote to Major Outram, “ The peremptory oi-der to retire has 
come upon us like a thunder clap. No one at Candahar is aware of such an 
order having been received except the general and myself, and we must preserve 
a profound secrecy as long as possible.” He added the reason for this secrecy 
—“ When our intended retirement is once known, we must expect to have the 
whole country up in arms, and to obtain no cattle except such as we can 
violently lay hands on. If the worat comes to the worst we must abandon all 
baggage and stores, and be content to march with sufficient food to convey us to 
Quettah.” Notwithstanding these apprehensions, Nott, feeling that the per¬ 
emptory orders of the governor-general deprived him of all discretionary power, 
proceeded to carry them into execution, and on the 19th of May despatched a 
brigade which he had prepared for the relief of the garrison of Khelat-i-Ghiljie 
to assist the gan-ison in evacuating the place after destroying its ■<Forks. This 
was indeed a humiliating employment. Only two days before the garri.son, 
which, under the command of Captain Halket Craigie, had made a most meri¬ 
torious defence, had crowned all their previous achievements by the repulse of 
a formidable assault, during which 500 of the enemy are said to have fallen, 
and now the only result was .something like an ficknowledgment of defeat by 
an abandonment of the place as no longer tenable. 

Lord Ellenborough, while he scarcely omitted an opportunity of repeating 
his unaltered “determination to withdraw,” was not without niisgivings as to 
its soundness. He was well aware that it was generally reprobated, and that 
the best Indian authorities, civil and military, were unanimous in condemn¬ 
ing the evacuatioir of Afghani.stan, at least until the English captives were 
released, and some blow struck which would show to all the world that the 
British government was perfectly able, had it so willed, to retain possession of 
the country. At first his lordship affected to despise public opinion, and refer- 



Chap. V.] 


SHAH SHUJAH. 


447 


ring to the opposition experienced from distinguished officials, expressed himself A.n. 1842. 
thus vauntingly:—“The danger is in the position of the army, almost without 
communication with India, too far off to return quickly at any season, xmable 
from the season to return now, without adequate supplies of food or courage, governor 

goiioi*al’a 

This is the danger which all the great statesmen in India would perpetuate iv.iu j . 
if they could, and while they maintain it, destroy the confidence of the 
.sepoy and ruin our finances. If I save this country, I shall save it in spite of 
every man in it who ought to give me support, but I will save it in spite of 
them all.” These were mere words. At the very time when his lordship 
used them, he was beginning to feel his position untenable, and preparing to back 
out of it, provided he could devise some means by which he could save or at 
least seem to save his dignity sind consistency. 

By the treaty concluded between the British authorities at Cabool and the Fate ofshaii 
Afghan chiefs, Shah Shujah had the option of returning to India or of continu¬ 
ing in temporary possession of the Bala Hissar. He chose the lattei’, because 
lie had been flattered into the belief that the chiefs would still recognize him 
as their lawful monarch. The effect of this arrangement was only to make 
him a tool in their hands, and to place him in a dilemma, from which far more 
wisdom than he posse.ssed would not have sufficed to extricate him. There 
was an irreconcilable enmity between the Afghans and their British invaders, 
and it was therefore impossible for him to retain the friendship of botli. There 
is little reason to doubt that if he could have been sure of the fidelity of his 
countrymen, he would at once have given them the preference, and forgotten 
all the obligations which he owed to the British government. But as it was 
only too jnobable that he might be agiiin compelled to apply to it for an 
asylum, his true policy seemed to be to avoid as far as possible coming to 
an open rupture with either the British or the Afghans. His own letters com¬ 
pletely furnisli signal proofs both of his cunning and his perjdexity, but it is need¬ 
less to give any details. He was totally unworthy of the support which the 
Bi-itish government in an evil hour had resolved to give him, and he was now 
endeavouring to [day a double game, in wliich it was hardly possible for him 
not to be a loser. He was safe only while he remained within the Bala Hissar, 
and therefore the chiefs who were bent on his destruction used every means in 
their power to allure him beyond its walls. This was no easy task, as he was 
aware of his danger, but they succeeded at last by throwing doubts on his 
sincerity, and insisting that he could only wipe off the suspicion by placing 
himself at the head of the Afghan troops, and accompanjdng them to Jelalabad, 
on a projected expedition to expel the British. A reluctant consent having 
been wrung from Iiim, and his personal safety having been guaranteed by the 
most solemn oaths, he moved out of the Bala Hissar on the 4tli of April, and 
in the course of the same day returned to it unharmed. The fact seemed to 
prove that his fears were groundless, and it was therefore annoxinced that on 



448 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book VIII. 


A.D. 1842 . the following morning lie would review his troops encamped at Seeah Sung, 

' and forthwith start with them for Jelalabad. He kept his word, and having 
Murder of dcscendcd at an early hour from the Bala Hissar, under a salute and with all 

Slialh Shqjah. i i i i . o 

the insignia of royalty, was proceeding towards the camp, when a party of 
Afghan marksmen starting suddenly from an ambush levelled their pieces 
an<l filed a murderous volley. Shah Shujah’s death must have been instan¬ 
taneous, as one of the balls had entered his brain. Shujah-ul-Dowlah, son of 
the Newab Zemaun Kliari, who had plotted the assassination, hastened up to 
satisfy himself that the deed was done, and stood gazing at it while others of 
the assassins busied themselves in stripping the dead body of its jewels, and 
then threw it into a ditch. It would seem however that the assas.sins had mis¬ 
calculated their strength, for before the night closed, Futteh Jung, the second 
son of Shah Shujah, was earned to the Bala Hissar and jiroclaimed king. He 
was able in consequence to rescue his father’s body from fuiiher indignity, and 
to bring it back to the palace, where all the honours of royal sepulture were 
bestowed upon it. The elevation of Futteh Jung was followed by a state of 
anarchy, during which the guns of the Bala Hissar were opened on the city, 
and rival factions met in deadly conflict in its streets. The details however 
are devoid of interest, and we therefore proceed to exhibit a new phase of the 
governor-general’s policy. 

Tiieoid.'r (o After leaving his council, as already seen, at Calcutta, Lord Ellenborougli 
fromAf- had taken the additional step of becoming his own commauder-in-chief, and as 
firtuuiiy' forgotten, or was di.sp 08 ed to ignore the fact that that office was still 

muudwi held by Sir Jasper NicoHs, began to communicate his orders dix’ectly to 
Generals Pollock and Nott. Lord Ellenborougli, b}’^ his last instructions, had 
consented, at least by implication, that Pollock should not l etire from Jelalabad 
till October, and on this ground had {^ven Nott to understand tluit a similar 
delay on his jiart would not be objected to. While thus obviously changing 
his policy, he was most anxious to disguise the fact, because he ap^iears to 
have dreaded nothing so much as a candid admission that he had receded 
from a resolution which he had once formed, and even declared to be immut¬ 
able. Accordingly he continued to address letters to the two generals, in which 
he never failed to remind them that “ withdraw ” was still his watchword, and 
yet in these very letters express permi.ssion was given to the one to advance 
ujion Cabool, and to the other to meet him there, after a march through the 
heart of the countiy, by way of Ghuznec. The inflexible resolution to with- 
ilraw, and the permission to advance, look very like a contradiction, but Lord 
Ellenborougli had succeeded in reconciling them by a very extraordina^ device. 
“Withdraw” was still tlie order of the day, but there were ditferent modes of 
effecting it.' General Nott, fqc. instance, instead of taking the shortest road, 
and retiring into Scinde by’TOp Bolfe Pass, might prefer to go a thousand 
miles about, and after traversing A^hanistan from south to north, reach India 



Chap. V.] 


LORD ELLENBOROUGH’S ALTERED lI^OLICY. 


440 


by the Khyber Pass and the Punjab. Some may say that to speak of such a a,d. 1842 . 
march as a “ withdrawal,” was a mere play upon words—^in short, a despicable 
(quibble. The governor-general thought diiferently, and saw in this very quibble letter from 
the means of at once saving his own consistency, and retrieving the, honour of iior-goiieml 
tlie British arms. As the device, whatever may be thought of it in other Nott*"*™* 
respects, is original, his lordship must be permitted to explain it in his own 
words. In a letter to General Nott, dated Allahabad, 4th July, 1S42, he 
wrote as follows:—“Nothing has occurred to induce me to change my first 
opinion, that the measure commended by considerations of political and military 
prudence, is to bring back the armies now in Afghanistan at the earliest period 
at which their retirement can be effected, consistently with the health and 
efficiency of the troop.s, into positions wherein they may have easy and certain 
communication with India; and to this extent the instructions you have 
j-cceived remain unaltered, but the improved position ef your army, with suffi¬ 
cient means of carriage for as large a force as it is necessaiy to move in 
Afghanistan, induce me now to leave to your option tlie line by which you 
shall withdraw your troops from that country.” His lordship next proceeded 
to canvass the merits of the only two lines supposed to be practicable—the one 
by Quettah and Sukkui’, and the other by Ghuznee, Cabool, and Jelalabad. 

By the former, “there is no enemy to oppose you,” and “the operation is one 
admitting of no doubt as to its .succes.s.” On the other hand, “if you determine 
upon moving ujion Ghuznee, Cabool, and Jelalabad, you will require for tlu'i 
transport of provisions a much larger amoufcit of carriage, and you will be 
juactically without communications from the time of your leaving Candahar, 
dependent entirely upon the courage of your army for the ojiening of a new 
communication by an ultimate junction with Major-general Pollock.” . After 
adding more in the stime strain, his lordship continued thiis:—“I do not‘under- ojitiw 
value the aid which our government in India would receive from the successful ’’ 
execution of a march through Ghuznee and Cabool, over the scenes of our late 
disasters. I know all the effects which it would have on the minds of our 
soldiers, of our allies, of our enemies in Asia, and of our countrymen, and of 
all foreign nations in Europe. It is an olject of just ambition, which no one 
more than myself would rejoice to see effected; but I see that fiiilure in the 
attempt is certain and irretrievable ruin, and I would inspire you with the 
nece.ssary caution, and make you feel that, great as are the objects to be 
obtained by success, the risk is greaf^also.” It was scarcely fair to blow hot 
and cold in this maYmcr, and instead of dictating the course to be adopted, to 
throw the whole responsibility of selection on the military commander. It is 
easy however to see that Loi'd Ellenborough, while professing to leave the 
question open, had not only decided it in his own mind, but was perfectly 
satisfied that on the part of Nott there would'not be a moment’s hesitation. 
Accordingly, the greater part of his letter proceeds on the assumption that 
VoL. III. 258 



450 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book till. 


A.D. 1842. 


IiiStriictiouH 
n^l^ardiiig 
the gates of 
the Tem])lt) 
ofSomnaiith, 


Nott’aman^h 
from Caiula- 
liar towards 
(iliuztiee. 


‘First en- 
cotmter 
with tlio 
enemy. 


the longer, but more honourable route, would certainly be chosen. “ If you 
should be enabled by a coup de main to get possession of Ghuznee and Cabool, 
you will act as you see fit, and leave decisive proofe of the power of the British 
army, without inij)eaching its humanity. You will bring away from the tomb 
of Mahmood of Ghuznee his club which hangs over it, and you will bring away 
the gate.s of his tomb, which ai’c the gates of the Temple of Somnanth. These 
will be just trophies of your successful marcli.” Apparently as an additional 
inducement to choose the Ghuznee route, Nott was informed that a copy of his 
letter would be foiwarded to Pollock, with instnictions to make a forward 
movement to facilitate his advance, and that the operations of the two armies 
would be combined upon theif approach, “ so as to effect with the least possible 
loss the occupation of Cabool, and to keep open the comniunication between 
Cabool and Pe.shawer.” 

The original instructions of the governor-general to retire from Afghanistan 
by the nearest practicable route having been virtually withdrawn, the two 
generals did not hesitate for a moment to accept the re.sponsibility which was 
somewhat selfishly and ungcnevonsly thrown upon them, and had no sooner 
been itiade aware by correspondence of their mutual resolves than they began 
to execute them. Nott, as having the longer march to perform, was the first 
to move. Having despatched Brigadier Englaixl with five regiments and a 
half, twelve guns, and some cavalry, for the ]mrpose of returning by the Bolan 
Pass, he himself prepared to take the much longer and more difficult route with 
the I’emainder of his force. Candahar was finally evacuated on the 7th of 
August, and on the 0th Nott made his first march northward in the direction 
of Ghuznee, A proclamation by which he assured the population “of protec¬ 
tion, and of payment for every article,” was attended with the best effects, 
and the march continued undisturbed as far as Mookur, 130 miles, north-east 
of Candahar, and 40 miles 8.S.E. of Ghuznee. This place was reached on 
the 27th of August. By this time the enemy had made their appearance in 
some force, and there was every reason to believe that a conflict was at hand. 
Shumsooden, the governor of Ghuznee, was in the field at the head of a con¬ 
siderable force, and had taken up a position which is said to be the most 
defensible-on the entire road between Candahar and Cabool. On the 28th of 
August the first actual .skirmish took place, and with a result not at all 
creditable to the British arms. The grass-cutters had been sent out for forage, 
and-were thus engaged wheii it was reported to the officer in charge of them 
that the enemy had come ^^ddenly upon them and were cutting them to pieces. 
He at once moved o\it with all the cavalry at his disposal, and on finding that 
ft was a false alarm went forward to reconnoitre. When about three miles 
from the camp he fell in with a small body of infantry, and having easily put 
them to flight was tempted to follow in pursuit. He was thus brought to the 
foot of a range of hills, and on winding round one of them was surprised to 



CllA’p. V.] 


GENEEAL NOTT’S VICTOEY/ 


451 


find them crowned by a considerable number of jezailchees, who immediately 
opened a galling fire. There, was nothing for it but retreat, which was made in 
good order, until a kind of panic was produced by a charge of about 150 of the 
enemy’s horse, and the British troopers actually turned and fled. On seeing 
the approach of the British main body, the enemy, satisfied with what they 
had already achieved, moved off. 

The effect of the affair of the 28th was to add greatly to the number of Shum- ■ 
sooden’s troops, and at the same time to in¬ 
spire him with so much confidence that he 
began to think of assuming the off’ensive. 

Accordingly on the 30th, while Nott was 
marching on Ghoaine, the Afghan governor 
moved parallel to him, and took up a position 
on the hills to the right. To tempt him to a 
fair trial of strength, Nott, about three in the 
afternoon, moved out with one half of his 
force. The challenge was at once accepted, ' 

and a battle was fought, which cannot' be 'wfc ■ 

more briefly or fairly described than in the 
general’s despatch. “The enemy advanced in 
the most bold and gallant manner, each divi- 

sion cheering as they came into position; _1': ' 

their left being upon a hill of some elevation, .. 




ilMT. 




their centre and right along a low ridge, until 


their flank rested on a fort filled with men. 

They opened a fii-e of small arras, supported 

by two sij^L-pounder horse-artillery guns, which were admirably serv’ed; our 
columns advanced iipon the different points with great regularity and steadi¬ 
ness, and after a short and spirited contest, completely defeated the enemy, 
capturing their guns, tents, ammunition, &c., &c., and dispersing them in eveiy 
tlirection; one hour more daylight would have enabled me to destroy the 
whole of their infantry. Shumsooden fled in the direction,of Ghuznee, accom¬ 
panied by about thirty horsemen.” 

This victory allowed the British force to advance without further interrup¬ 
tion to Ghuznee. “ On the morning of the 5th instant,” says Nott, “ I moved 
on to Ghuznee. I found the city full of men,, and a range of mounttiins 


Defeat of til© 
Afghans. 


Recajrtnre 
of Gliifeiiee. 


running north-east of the fortress covered by heaVy bodies of cavalry and 
infantry; the gardens and ravines near the town were also occupied.” “ I at once 
determined on carrying the enemy’s mountain positions before encamping my 
force. The troops ascended the height in gallant style, driving the enemy 
before them until every point was gained. The village of Bullool is sitiiate’d 
about 600 yards from the walls of Ghuznee, upon the spur of the mountain to 



452 


mSTOEY OF INDIA. 


[Book VTII. 


A D. 1842. 


Roospturu 
of Ohuzuoo. 


NotfH vic¬ 
tory at. 
Maidaii. 


Tiiiwnpliaiit 
uiarch of 
CfOiieral 
rollock. 


the north-east, and observing it to be a desirable spot for preparing a heavy 
battery, to be placed 300 paces in advance, I ordered it to be occupied by two 
regiments of infantry and some light guns, and retired the columns into camp. 
The engineer officers, sappers and miners, and infantry working parties, were 
employed under the direction of Major Sanders, during the night of the 5th, in 
erecting a battery for four eighteen-jiounders. These guns were moved from 
the camp before daylight on the morning of the 6th, but before they had 
reached the position assigned them, it was ascertained that the enemy had 
evacuated the fortress.” Possession of the place being thus obtained, what was 
called the work of retribution commenced by blowing up the fortifications, 
and setting fire to the principal buildings. The anxiety of tlie governor-general 
to obtain the club and shield of Mahmood of Ghuznee, and the gates of his 
tomb, said to be those of the ancient Hindoo temple of Somnauth, was not 
forgotten. In regard to the club and shield, his lordship could not be gratified, 
as tlicy had di.sappeared some time before; but he was delighted above measure 
on learning that the gates were secured, and expressed his deliglit in a private 
letter to General Nott, abounding in minute and frivolous details as to the 
mode ill which the gates were to be paraded on the march, and canded to their 
final destination. 

After the capture of GhuzriBe Nott continued his mareh and met with no 
opposition till the 14th of September, when on arriving at Maidan, only twentj^ 
miles south-west of Cabool, h© found Shumsooden, Sultan Jan, and other 
Afghan chiefs, prepared to dispute his further progress. Their force, estimated 
at about 12,000 men, occupied a series of heights commanding the line of road. 
It was immediately attacked. The result is given in a single sentence of Nott’s 
despatch on the subject: “Our troops beat them and dislodged them in gallant 
style, and their conduct affoi’ded me the greatest satisfaction.” This was the 
last affair of any consequence in which the Candahar force was engaged. The 
march of the ITtli September brought it within five miles of the capital, Avhich 
was already in the occupation of General Pollock, of whose triumphant march 
a brief account must now be given. 

The force under General Pollock, mustering about 8000 men, made its first 
march from Jclalabad on the 20th of August, and reached Gundamuck on the 
23d. Here, as the enemy appeared in some force, several days were spent in 
desultory operations not of sufficient importance to deserve detail, and it was 
not till the 7th of September that the march was resumed by the first division 
under Sir Robert Sale, while the second division under General M'Caskill 
prepared to follow next day. On the 8th when the advance reached Jugdu- 
luck, large bodies of the enemy were seen occupying the heights which formed 
an.amphitheatre inclining to the left of the road. Without waiting the arrival 
of the second division Pollock immediately ordered the attack. It was for 
some time met with great firmness, the enemy steadily maintaining their posts 



Chap. V.§ 


CABOOL RETAKEN. 


453 


while the shells of our howitzers were burating among them, but the impetuous a.d. isms 
gallantry of the assailants, composed chiefly of the old Jelalabad gan-ison, was 
irresistible, and a complete victory was gained. The success of the first division The Afuimn 
materially facilitated the progress of the second, and both divisions again united re«>ive to 
at Tezecn on the 11th. The Afghan chiefs, having become convinced of tbeii- linTOio,*,'.' 
inability to offer any effectual resistance, held a conference, and resolved to 
endeavour to save themselves by submitting to terms. With this view Akbar 
Khan, who held Captain Troup as one of his prisoners or ho,stages, sent for him 
and told him that he was immediately to proceed to Gundamuck to General 
Pollock, and offer on the part of the Afgliaii chiefs submission to any tenns he 
might be pleased to dictate, provided he would stay the advance of his anny on 
Cabool. Troup knowing that' the time for negotiation had passed, represented 
the utter uselessness of the proposed journey. Akbar Khan appears to have 
taken the same view, for immediately on learning that the British force was 
halting in the Jugduluck Pass, and might probably be entangled in it, he 
moved his camp from Boothauk to Khoord Cabool, and then ha.stened forward 
to Tezeen. Here the British position was by no means free from peril. It was 
in the bottom of a valley completely encircled by hills. Some of these hail 
been pimdently occupied, but many others remained, of which the enemy 
hastened to avail themiselves by posting lai'gfe bodies of jezailchees on them. 

Such was the state of matters on the 13th of September, and it became neces¬ 
sary to decide whether this valley, where the bones of one Bi-iti.sh force alreadj’^ 
lay bleaching, was again to become the scene of a similar disaster; or whether, 
on the contrary, it was to witness the retrieval ef the honour of the British 
arms, and the signal punishment of Afghan perfidy and cruelty. 

The circumstances in which this battle was about to be foufjht were sufficient 
to call foi*th the utmost energies of the combatants on both side.s. The Afghans, 
elated with their previous success on the same spot, hoped that they wore to 
achieve a second and still more glorious victory, while they also knew that 
defeat would involve the loss of their capital, and it might be the loss of their 
national independence. The British were animated by still sti'onger motives. 

Their companions in arms whose remaijns lay scattered ai-ound them were 
calling aloud for vengeance, and the only quo,stion now was, whether by 
victory they were to give a true response to this call, or by defeat to be in like 
manner extenninated. The battle began with a body of Afghan horsi^, who, 
tempted by the baggage in the plain, descended in the hope of plunder. Before 
tliey could effect their object they found themselves in a whirlwind of British 
cavalry, who at once threw them into confuision and put them to disastrous 
flight. In the meantime the British had climbed the heights, and trusting only 
to tfie bayonet were carrying everything before them. The* enemy thus 
deprived of the double advantage which they expected to find in their elevated 
position and the long range of their jezails, made a very ineffectual resistance. 




-HtSTOBY OF INDIA. [B8oK VIII. 


'A.D. 1842. As soon Rs 'they.'sa^ tluitf tfie British had cleared the ascent they acknowledged 
their ,defeat and dispersed. Akbar Khan fled almost unattended to tlie 
R»o»i>tn« Ghorebund “valley, leaving his troops to seek their safety wher^ they could; 

while General Pollock continued Ms march without further interruption through 
Khoord Cabool and Boothaijk, and encamped on the 15th of September on the 
race-courae at Cabool. On the following day he proceeded to the Bala Hissar 
and planted the British colours on its ramparts. 

The Jelalabad and Candahar forces having now triumphantly effected a junc¬ 
tion by means of a mutual advance, wliicli according to the governor-general was 

j.not, and was never meant to be an ad¬ 


vance at all, the principal thing now 
remaining was to commence the real 
withdrawal by evacu<ating Afghanistan 
and 1 ‘eturning to India. There were 
still, however, several objects of import¬ 
ance to be accomplished, and to these it 
will be necessary to advert. The first 
undoubtedly was the release of the cap¬ 
tives. The manied families were, as has 
liecn already, related, committed to the 
chaige of Akbar Khan on the 9th of 
January, 1842. He was bound by ex¬ 
press promise to protect them from harm 
and conduct them in safety to Jelalabad, 
which the unfortunate Cabool force was 
vainly endeavouring to reach. On the 
11th they were conducted over ground 
Tower AT thickly sti’ewed with the mangled re¬ 

mains of their slaughtered countrymen, 
Ariveiitiiros and lodged in the fort of Tezecn. On the 13th when they were taken to 

of t)io 

Kngiish Jugduluck, they found General Eljihinstone and Captain John.son, who bad 
oAptives. detilined as hostages for the ^jvacuation of Jelalabad. They were after¬ 

wards earned from place to j>lace in Akbar Khan’s train, and on the 17th were 
lodged in the fort of Budeeabad, belonging to Mahomed Shah Klian, Akbar 
Khan’s father-in-law. Here Akbar Khan left them, and they continued to 
re.side for nearly three months, suffering many privations, but also enjoying 
some comforts, of which none were more highly prized than the privilege of 
meeting together every Sunday for religious service. Shortly after Sale’s 
signal defeat of Akbar Khan, his father-in-law anived with a kvrge party of 
followers, and announced to the captives that they were immediately to depart 
frhm Budeeabad. Of their new destination he said nothing, but like a mean- 
hearted wretch he bu,sied himself in plundering them. Thus stripped of every- 




Chap. V.] . 


THE ENGLISBf CAFTITJES. 


‘455- 


thing of value, the whole of the captives were removed under a-guard of fifty a.d. i842, 
.^fghans, and commenced a nyrsterious journey, no one- knew whither. After ^ 
various movements they-were brought back to Tezeen on'the 19th of April, AdTontuiw 
and remained-there till the 22d, when they were carried off towards the moun- Kugu«ii 
tains and dodged in a place called Zandah. The only pei'sons left behind were “‘i’*"®'- 
a few invalids, one of them General Elphinstoue, who was completely broken 
down by disease and anxiety, and a few days after breathed his fast. 

On the 23d of May the captives were brought down from Zandah and 
lodged in a foi-t belonging to a chief of the name of All Mahomed, on the banks 
of the Loghur, only about three miles from Cabool. Here their privations were 
far fewer than they had been at any previous period of their captivity, and 
they were even permitted to exchange visits with the British hostages detained 
in the Bala Hissar. Ever and anon, however, they were alarmed by rumours 
that Akbar Khan was about to carry them off to Turltestan. These rumours « 

luoval to 

were only too well founded, for on the 25th of August they were ordered to namiau. 
start for Buinian under an escort of 300 men. They reached it on the 3d of 
September. In the intention of Akbar Khan this was only the first stage of their 
jem-ney to a hoj)eless captivity beyond the Hindoo Koosh, but the inhuman 
design wiis happily frustrated. Saleh Mahomed, the commander of the escort, 
was not inaccessible to a bribe, and on the lltli of September, after ])j oducing 
a letter from Akbar Khan, instructing him to convey his prisoners to Kooloom 
and deliver them to the Wullee, concluded by intimating that he had just 
received a messsage sent by Molvun Lai, through one Syud Moorteza Shah, 
])romisiug that if be would lelease the piisoners, Gciieral Pollock would make 
)dm a ])i-e.sent of 20,000 rupees, and guarantee him m a j)ension for life of 1000 
ruj)ees a month. “Now,” continued Saleh Mahomed, “I know nothing of 
General Pollock, but if you three gentlemen (Pottingei-, Lawrence, and Johnson) 
will swear by your Saviour to make good to me what Syud Moorteza Shah 
states that he is authorized to offer, 1 will deliver you over to yoiu' own ])eople.” 

It was not the fii-st time that a similar proposal had' been mooted, and as it was 
now made in earnest it wjis at once accepted. An agreement was accordingly 


drawn out in Persian, and signed, by' Measrs. Pottinger, Johnson, Mackenzie, settingtiicm 
and Lawreime. It was to the following effect:—“Whenever Saleh Mahomed 
shall free us from the power of Mahmued Akbar Khan, we agree to make him 
a pre.sent of 20,000 rupees, and to pay him monthly the sum of 1000 rupees ; 
likewise to obtain for him the command of a regiment in the government 
service.” The four officers having thus bound themselves personally, it Wiis 
only fair that their responsibility should be shared by their fellow-captives. 

This was accordingly done -by a re^ti^t agreement in the following terms, 
dated “In our prison at Bamian, lltL'^ipt^nber, 1842:” “We whose signa¬ 
tures are hereunto attached, do bind ourselv^es to pay into the hands of Majdr 
Pottinger, and Captains Lawrence and Johnson, on condition of our release being 



456 


HISTORY OBT INDIA. 


*A.I>.'l842.' 



Arraiige- 
mente for 
^tting t2ie 
English 
vaxitivoB at 
liberty. 


Their rmal 

^ rui*vno.> 


{Book VIII. 


effected by an arrangement with Saleh Mahomed Khan, such a number of 
month’s pay and allowances as they shall demand'froni us—isuch pay and. 
allowances to'be rated by the scale at which, we shall find ourselves entitled to 
draw from the date of our release from captivity. We who are married do 
further agree to pay tiie same amount for our wives and families' as-for our¬ 
selves. We whose husbands are absent do pledge ourselves in pjjoj^rtion to 
our husbands^ allowances. We who are widows (Lady M^naghten and Mrs. 
Sturt) do pledge ourselves to pay such sums as may be demanded from us by 
Major iPottinger, and Capbiins Lawrence and Johnson, in furtherance of tlie 
above scheme.” 

No time was lost by Saleh Mahomed in carrying out his part of the agree¬ 
ment, foiv the British flag was immediately hoisted on the fqrt,-and active 



ViLi.AOM OK UnotiNDEH.- Froiu Atkinsou's ^kotebes in AfgliawlHlaii. 


preparations were made to put it in a state of defence, and fnri»ish it with tbe 
necessaiy supplies. This happily proved to be a woik.of supererogation, for on 
the 1.5th of September a homeman arrived with the glad news of Akbar Khan’s 
defeat by General Pollock at Tezeen. The resdlution, immediately taken, w.os 
to quit the fort and start for CabooL They had made their first day’s journey, 
and were bivouacking in the clear moonlight, when another horseman arrived, 
to intimate that ®r Richmond Shakespere, General Pollock’s military secretary, 
at the head of GOO Kuzzilbash horse, was hastening to their relief. His arrival 
on the 17th put an end to all their fears, and ;nade them feel that they were 
prisoners no longei'. An agreeable surprise was still reserved for them. On 
the 20th, v^hen nearing Urgundeh, a large body of British infantry and 
cavalry was perceived, and proved to be a portion of Sale’s brigade, with 'the 
hero himself at its head. The meeting may be better conceived than described. 

Shortly after the i-eoccupation of Cabool, it was deemed expedient to send 








CAPTmBE OF ISTAUF. 


457 


Chap. V.] 


General M-Caskill with a detachment against Istalif in the Kohistan, where' a.d. 18 ^ 
Ameen-oollah Khan was reported to be collecting the remains of Akbar Khan’s ' • 
defeated army. As the place, situated about twenty miles N.N.W. of Cabool, Eipedition 
on a spur of the Hindoo Koosh, was supposed by the Afghans to be almost latauf. * 
impregnable, and had in conse<iucnce been selected by. then^ as a safe asylum 
for their families ‘and' deposit for their treasure, considerable resistance was 
anticipated, and the force employed was proportionably largo. .M'Caskill arrived 
witliin four miles of Istalif on tlie 28th of September, and found that its 
strength had appai'ently not been overrated. The town rose in terraces on the 
slope of a mountain, and besides being protected by numerous forts, was accessible 
only by surmounting heights sej)aratcd by deep ravines, or tljreading narrow 
passages lined on each side by strong inclosure walls of vineyards and gardena 
Fortunately the enemy, confident in the strength of their position, had not 
been very careful in making their arrangements for defence, and when the 
British troops advanced on the morning of the 29th to the attack with the 
greatest gallantry, they, soon cleared the approaches. The assault immediately 
followed, and was completely successful. In the town much booty was found, 
and outrages must doubtless have been committed, but the victors apj)ear t() 
liUve conducted themselves with singular moderation, and were able indignantly 
to repel-the calumnious charges of barbarity that wei*e afterwards brought 
against them. After burning down about a third part of the town. General 
M'Caskill marched northwjti*! to Charikur, which was likewise burned down, 
as a kind of wild I’evcnge for the annihilation of a British force in its vicinity. 

Futteh Juiig, who on the murder of his father had been set up as a puppet rupiwt 
king', had soon been displaced, and after sufi’ering imj)risoument, had found his cabooi. • ' 
way in a state of utter destitution to General Pollock’s camp at Gundamuck. 

His reception was friendly, and he was even encoiiraged to hope that British 
influence would yet leinstate him. He accordingly accompanied the British 
force to Cabot)l, and formed a prominent object in the cavalcade which marched 
through the town to take possession of the Bala Hissar. When the British flag 
was hoisted on the ramparts, he had already seated himself on the nuisnud, 
and again perflu-ined a ceremony of installation, at which, not very wisel}"^, the 
principal Biatish officers assisted. Pollock sitting in a chair of state on the 
right and M'Caskill on the left of the throne. The countenance thus afforded 
him was of little avail, and when he saw himself about to be thrown on his 
own resoiu’ces by the approaching departure of the British army, he announced 
his wish to return with it. rather than wear a crown which he knew would 
soon cost him his life. The throne was thus once more vficant, and it was 
deemed necessary to fill it. A candidate was found in the young prince Shah- 
poor, another of Shah Shujah's sons, who, undeterred by the examples of his 
father and brother, had ambition enough to risk a similar fate. It vras riot 
long before he expeirenced it, for the British forces had not reached India when 
VoL. III. ' 254 



458 


HISTOEY OF INDIA. 


[Book VIII. 


A.D. im 


Destruction 
of tlie OrtHib 
Dazanr. 
Cabool. 


lOvacnntiun 
of Afgiian- 
iHbuu. 


the news of his dethronement arrived. One thing however his accession had 
secured. The Bala Hissar, which had been doomed to destruction, was saved, 
and the retribution which it liad been judged necessary to inflict on the capital 
of Afghanistan foi- the cruelty and treachery of its inhabitants, fell chiefly on 
the Great Bazaar, one of tlie finest of its kind in the East, which, after an 
ineffectual attempt to destroy it piece-meal by mechanical agency, was blown 
uj) with gunpowder. There was something wanton in thus destroying a build¬ 
ing solely devoted to purposes of trade and commerce. The only excuse for 
selecting it was, that the mutilated remains of Sir William Macnaghten had 
been exposed and ignominiously ti'eated within its walls. 

The British army finally quitted Cabool on the 12th of October, 1842. The 
advance of both divisions had been a series of trium 2 >hs, and Lord Ellenborough 
was all iiii])atience to j)ublish them to the world in official proclamations. When 
intelligence of the re-occupation of Cabool reached him, he was residing at 
Simla, and immediately pre 2 >ared the necessary document. On the 1st of 
October he submitted it t<j Sir Jasper Nicolls, and on the veiy same day he 
signed it. In tlu; date and ])lace of execution there was a cuiious coincidence, 
which his lordshiji doubtless 2 )erceived, and of which he was not unwilling to 
take advantage. Exactly four years before, on the very same day, and from 
the very same room, Lord Auckland had is.sucd his manifesto exjilaining the 
grounds on which ho had undertaken the Afghan war. The contrast between 
tliaJ document and the one now issued was very stiiking, and could not pos.si- 
bly hav(i been oveiiooked, though no siiecial reference had been made to it; but 
Lord Ellenborough deemed it necessary to be still more explicit, and without 
extictly saying it in words, took care to let the world know that he was a far 
wi.ser and more succes.sful statesman than his predecessor. In no other way 
can we account for the aji^^carance of the fu’oclamation with the date 1st October. 
It was not issued for many days after, and had it not been antedated, might 
have communicated the gratifying intelligence that the English (iaptives, about 
whose fate the jmblic mind had been kc])t anxiously on the stretch, were at 
length released. This fact which was not known to his lordship on the 1 st of 
October, Avas known to him when he issued his jmoclamation, but he could not 
mention it without either committing an anachronism, or altei-ing the original 
date. The latter alternative his vanity would not permit him to adopt, and 
therefore his proclamation when it appeared ignored the most interesting fact 
which he could have inserted in it, and even left it to be infeired, as Nott 
expressed it in his gruff way, that “the ca^jtives had been thrown overboard 
by the government.” 

Having issued his proclamation. Lord Ellenborough might have felt that 
his part in connection with the Afghan war was played out, and that nothing 
more remained than to allow the troo^js to take up their different stations, and 
then await the honours which the crown might be pleased to confer as rewards 



Chap. V.]. 


THE GATES OF SOMNAUl’H. 


459 


for distinguished services. Unfortunately for himselfj his lordship took a very a.d. 1842. 
different view of the course to be adopted. The gates of Somnauth, about 
which he had been so puerile and minute in his instructions, and to which he U)ni nucn- 
attached so much importance that he had required Nott to guard them as he 
would his colours, had been transported to the frontier. It was now necessary 
]iublicly to announce their arrival, and acquaint the world with the mode in 
which they were to be disposed of, and forthwith appeared an address in which, 
indulging in extravagant orientalisms, he sets himself at open varianee with good 
taste, right feeling, and sound policy. As a specimen of this miserable effusion, 
and in justification of the censure passed upon it, it will suffice to quote its 
commencement* 

“From the Governor general to all the Prince.s, and Cljiefs, and People of 
India. 

“Mv Brothers and my Friends, —Our victorious army bears the gates of 
the temple of Somnauth in triumph from Afghanistan, and the despoiled tomb 
of Sultan Mahomed looks upon the ruins of Ghuznee. The insult of 800 years 
is at last avenged. The gates of the temple of Somnauth, so long the memorial 
of your humiliation, are become the proudest record of your national glory, the 
proof of your superiority in aims over the nations beyond the Indus. To you, 

])rinces and chiefs of Sirhind, of Rajwarra, of Malwah, and of Gujerat, I shall 
commit this glorious trophy of successful war. You will yourselves with all 
honour transmit the gates of sandal wood through your respective territories, 
to the restored temple of Somnauth. The chiefs of Sirhind shall be informed at 
what time our victorious army will first deliver the gates of the temple into 
their guardianship, at the foot of the bridge of the Sutlej.” 

When t. “proclamation of the gates’' appeared, it was received with many 
doubts of its genuineness. These, however, were only too soon dispelled by the 
stubborn fact, and it only remained for his friends to blush, and his opponents 
to exult and laugh at the folly of which he had been guilty. The story of the 
gates would not be complete without mentioning that Lord EUenborough, when 
he indited what the Duke of Wellington called his “song of triumph,’ was 
totally in error as to the point of fact. The gates were not those of Somnauth, 
and their date was much more recent than the time of Mahmood of Ghuznee. 



4G0 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book VIII. 


CHAPTER VL 

Relations with Wcinde—Lord iSUonlxjrough’s policy in reganl to it—New treaty — Proceedings of Sir 
(lharles Napier—Capture of Emaumgluir — British residency at Hyderabad attacketl—Battles of 
Afeanee and Dubba—Subsequent proceedings—Annexation of Scinde—Relations with Scindia— 
Hostilities commenced—Victories of IVlabarajiioor and Puniar—New treaty with Scindia—Abrupt 
recall of Lord Ellenborough. 


URINCJ the pre])aratious for the final evacuation of Afghanistan, 
Lord Ellenborougli’s attention had been particularly drawn to 
Scinde. Though tlie nature of the government of this territorj’’, 
and the relations established with its Ameers or rulers, were 
formerly explained, a brief recapitulation will not be unnecessary. 
A.D. 1842. The population consisted chiefly of Scindians proper, Avitli a considerable inter¬ 

mixture of Hindoos and Beloochees. The last had long been the dominant 
iioiations race, but a change had at no distant period taken place in the ruling dynasty, 

by the substitution of the Tal})oora tribe for that of the Kalloras. The govern¬ 
ment was a kind of family confederation. The Talpoora chiefs, when they first 
obtained supremacy, ivere four brothers, who portioned out the country' into 
four separate independencies, one for each brother, though they still continued 
so closely related, that they might be said to govern in common. By the 
death of one of the brothers without issue, the number of reigning families was 
reduced to three,, and on the death of Ali Moorad, the last surviving brother, 
in 1833, family dissensions broke out, and were not suppressed till the country 
n* native had been subjected to the calamities of .a civil war. By the ultimate arrange- 
goverimieiit. government still remained vested in the three families, at the head 

of which respectively w'ere ‘Nusseer Khan at Hyderabad, Roostum Khan at 
Khyrpoor, and Shere Mahomed Khan at Meerpoor. Between these Ameers, 
though they all claimed to be independent, degrees of precedency were recog¬ 
nized, and Roostum Khan, perhaps because he was the oldest, and nearest to 
tlie original stock, was regarded as their head. These three Ameers, considered 
as the rulers of their respective families, were all independent princes, but each 
exercised his authority under considerable limitations, as he was not entitled 
to act without consulting with the other members of his own family. In this 
way, Roostum Khan had for his colleagues in the government at Khyrpoor 
Nusseer Khan, Ali Moorad Kban, and Shakur Khan, and Nusseer Khan at 
Hyderabad, Shahdad Khan, Hussein Ali Khan, Mahomed Khan, and Sobhdar 
Khan. 

The importance of the commerce of Scinde liad early engaged the attention 











Chap. VI.] 


HELATIONS WITH SCINDE. ‘ 


4Gl 

of the East India Company, and they had been permitted, though not without a.u. isss. 
much hesitation on the part of the native authorities, to establish an agency ~ ~ 
at Tatta, near the mouths of the Indus. Owing to misunderstandings -and commorciai 
occasional acts of caprice and violence, this agency never made much progress, s^io*'*' 
and was at last withdrawn. The subject, however, was not lost sight of, 

!ind after several less important attempts to establish more extensive commercial 
relations with Scinde, Lord William Bentinck, then govenior-general, despatched 
Colonel (afterwards Sir Henry) Pottinger on a special mission to Hyderabad. 

The main obstacle to bo overcome was a suspicion on the part of the Ameers, 
that conquest rather than commerce was intended, and accordingly, when a 
treaty was at length concluded, special articles were introduced for the })uq')Ose 
of allaying the apprehensions thus not iinnatumlly entertained. Nothing could 
be more explicit than these articles, which, notwithstanding subsequent arrange¬ 
ments, i-emained intact, and were in full force in 1838, when Lord Auckland, 
having finally adopted his fatal Afghan policy, began to inaugurate it by doing 
wholesale injustice. The articles forbade the transport of troops and military 
stores by the Indus, but as this mode of transport seemed necessary. Lord 
Auckland, by his simple fiat, set the treaty aside, and intimated to the Ameers 
that, as he found it inconvenient to fulfil, he had resolved to violate its obliga¬ 
tions. The Ameers, after struggling in vain against this injustice, were obliged 
to succumb, and then learned that much worse was in store for them. At the U'rdAuck 

. 11 1 1 • 1 • 1 • laiid’H dlK- 

very time when the governor-general was openly violating solemn treaties regard of hb 
because he could not conveniently obseiwe them, he did not hesitate to station 
a body of reserve at Kuirachee, for the avowed purpo.se of keeping the Ameers 
in check. This was but a preliminary step to a forced treaty, by which they 
w(;re not only deprived of their indej)endence by the admission of a subsidiary 
force, but taken bound to pay for this force a .sum of three lacs per annum. 

It was in vain that one of the Ameers, taking the previous treaties from a box, 
indignantly asked, “What is to become of all these?” and then observed that, 

“ since the day that Scinde has been connected with the English there has 
always been something new; your government is never satisfied; we are 
anxious for your friendship, but we cannot be continually persecuted; we have 
given a road to your troops through our territories, and now you wish to 
remain.” An army was at hand to impose the treaty, if it was not voluntarily 
accepted, and the Ameers had no alternative but to resign their inde]>endence, 
by agreeing to accept and pay for a subsidiary force, and at the same time 
deprive themselves of what they regarded as a main source of their revenue, 
by abolishing all tolls on boats navigating the Indus. 

Lord Ellenborough was so well aware of the injustice with which the 
Ameers had been treated, that he had declared it “ impossible to believe that 
they could entertain friendly feelings,” and he might therefore have bedh 
expected to make some allowance for them, if, during the tragedy which was 



A.l) 1842. 


Iwonl Ellen- 
bomugh'i} 
instructions 
to Sir 
Charles 
Nainor ro- 
ganliiig the 
Atnoers of 
Sciiule. 


Ileiioi't )>y 
Sir Ouirles. 


402 HISTORY OF INDIA. [Book VIII 

acted in Afghanistan, they had manifested feelings of an opposite nature. 
This, however, was a degree of generosity for which he was not prepared, and 
hence, while he admitted that “ we would not be justified in inflicting punish¬ 
ment upon the thoughts,” he issued his instructions on the subject to Sir Charles 
Napier, wlio had been appointed to the chief command in Scinde, in the 
following terms: *• Should any Ameer or chief with whom wc have a treaty of 
alliance or friend.ship, have evinced hostile designs against us, during the late 
events, which may have induced them to doubt the continuance of our power, 
it is the present intention of the governor-general to inflict upon the treachery 
of such ally and friend so signal a punisliment as shall effectually deter others 
from similar conduct.” He was pleased, however, to add that " he would not 
proceed in this course without the most ample and convincing evidence of the 
guilt of the accused,” and hence Sir Charles Napier con.sidered it as his first 
business to ascertain whether such evidence could be found. The result was 
communicated in a paper entitled “ Return of Complaints,” in which the 
delinquencies of every particular Ameer were carefully enumerated. 

This return of complaints Sir Charles Napier accompanied with a lengthened 
report, which commenced as follows: “ It is not for me to note how we came 
to occupy Scinde, but to consider the subject as it stands. We arc here by 
right of treaties entered into by the Ameers, and therefore stand on the same 
footing as themselves; for rights lield under treaty are as sacred as the right 
which sanctions that treaty. There does not appear any public protest regis¬ 
tered against the treaties by the Ameers; they are therefore to be considered as 
free expressions of the will of the contracting parties.” Having thus cleared 
the way by promulgating a theory which he knew to be, in this instance at least, 
totally at variance with fact, he proceeded to argue, that a rigid adherence to 
treaty ought to be exacted from the Ameers, because the efl'oet would be, “ to 
favour our Indian interests by abolishing barbarism and ameliorating the 
condition of society,” and in short, obliging the Ameers to do “ that which 
honourable civilized rulers would do of their own accord” But here an impor¬ 
tant question arises. Would a rigid adherence to treaties suffice for the accom¬ 
plishment of the objects contemplated by them? The government of the 
Ameers, “hated by its subjects, de.spotic, hostile alike to the interests of 
England and of its own people, a government of low intrigue, <and so constituted 
that it must fall to pieces by the vices of its construction,” will be constantly 
coming into collision with us. The consequence may easily be foreseen. “ The 
more powerful government will at no distant period swallow up the weaker;” 
in other words, Scinde must sooner or later form part of British India. If so, 
“ would it not then be better to come to that result at once?” To this question, 
proposed by himself, Sir Charles Napier gave the following amwer: “ / think 
it would he better if it can he done with honesty.”, This point of honesty, 
which at first sight looked formidable, was easily disposed of by the following 



CHAr. VI.j RELATIONS WITH SCINDEt 463 

simple consideration. “ The refi’actory Ameers break the treaty to gratify A.n. i842. 
their avarice, and we punish the breach. I perceive no injustice." " 

In the interval, while awaiting Lord EUenborough’s final answer. Sir Charles oppmaivo 
Napier saw plainly that the Ameers were mustering their forces, and would 
not submit to the terms about to be proposed to them, without making a trial 
of their strength. He made liis prepaiations accordingly, and with full confid¬ 
ence in the issue, though he knew that in point of numbers his little force 
would be a mere handful compared 
to that of the enemy. On the 2d of 
December the treaty, as Lord Ellen- 
borough had finally sanctioned it, 
was transmitted to Hyderabad, and 
on the 4tli to Khyrpoor. Its terms 
were harsh in the extreme, and still 
more humiliating than harsh. In 
addition to the cessions of territory 
•Icmanded, the Ameers were to be de¬ 
prived of one of the mo.st generally 
recognized ju'ivileges of sovereignty, 
that of coining money in their own 
name. In future the British govern¬ 
ment would appropriate this privilege 
to itself, and establish a currency iji 
which the coins were to bear on one 
side “ the effigy of the sovereign of 
England." In short every article in 
the treaty \j’as worded as if the ob¬ 
ject had been to provoke a refusal, 
and then take advantage of it. We 

can easily understand that the Ameers received the treaty “with great 
apparent disgust," and that for a time nothing was talked of in their dur¬ 
bars but wax, “open or concealed." Prudence, in the meantime, suggested 
the latter, and the unfailing resource of negotiation was resorted to. This 
deceived no one, and least of all Sir Charles Napier, who on the 9th of 
December sent a letter to the Ameers of Khyrpoor, in which he thus addressed 
them:—“Yom- submission to the orders of the governor-general, and your 
friendship for our nation, should be beyond doubt, because you have solemnly 
assured me of the same. We are friends. It is right, therefore, to inform you 
of strange rumours that reach me. Your subjects, it is said, propose to attack 
my camp in the night time. This would of course be without you! knowledge, 
and would also be very foolish, because my soldiers would slay those who 
attacked them; and when daj’’ dawned I would march to Khyrpoor, transport 



Likiitksant-Gkni.iiai. Sib CjiARi.iis Nai'Iek. 
From a ftortralt by Smart. 



4()4 


HISTpftY OF INDIA! 


[Book VITl. 


A.D. 1842. 


The Ameers 
of Sciuda. 


■I’hoir pr«»* 
ftfSBIKl 8llb- 

iumI Houret 
liiMtilit.v 

the 

JiriiiKh. 


Praitaratioim 

forhoaiilitiea. 


the iuhabitants to Sukkiir, and destroy your capital city—^with exception of 
your highnesses’ palace, which I would leave standing alone, as a mark of my 
respect for your liighnesses, and of my convidtion that you have no authority 
over your subject. I should also entrench so far on your highnesses’ treasury 
as to defray the expense of this operation; because it is just that governors 
should pay for the mischiefs their subjects inflict on their neighbours. 1 there¬ 
fore advertise your highnesses of the destruction which such an attempt on my 
eam[) would inevitably draw down upoii Khyrpoor, in order tliat you may 
\\ arn your people against committing any act of hostility.”. 

These menaces, notwithstanding the jocular terms in which they are 
exjiressed, wei’c not lost u])on the Ameers, who at once redoubled their profes¬ 
sions of submission and tbeii’ preparations for hostilities. Sir Charles Napier 
therefore announced to them that he would proceed forthwith to occupy their 
territory, and with this view began on the 10th of December to convey his 
troops across the Indus from Sukknr. Mec;r Roo.stnm, the turbaned Ameer, a 
feeble and imbecile old man, above eighty years of age, was in the greatest 
alarm. He knew that his brother Ali Moorad, by sti-ong professions of sul •mis¬ 
sion, had gained the ear of the British commander, and was intriguing to 
su]>plant him. According to the form of government established in Scinde, 
Ali Moorad was entitled t(J bo his .succe.ssor, but even this Meer Roo,stxnn was 
not dispensed to concede, and he had set bis heart on securing the succe.ssion to 
the turban to his (►wu son. After crossing to the left bank of the Indus, and 
encam[)ing at Roree, Sir Charles Napier was within a march of Khyi-pooi-, 
whicli is only ten miles to the south-west. This brought matters to a crisis, 
and Meer Roostum wrote to say that, feeling himself powerless in the hands of 
his own family, he had resolved to esca[)e to the British camp. As it was feared 
that his presence there might pi’ove a source of embaiTassment, ,the answer 
returned to his proposal was that he would find a more appropriate asylum in 
the camp of Ali Moiwad. Either in consequence of this answer or some more, 
private arrangement, Meer Roostum took refuge in his brother’s fort of Deejee- 
kote, about ten miles south of his capital. Meanwhile Meer Roosturu’s formal 
acceptance of the new treaty and all its rigorous and humiliating exactions 
having been obtained, lu; was henceforth to be regarded as a Briti.sh ally, and 
the tenitory of Upper, Sciutle, of which Kliyqioor was the capital, became 
entitled to the benefit of British ])rotection. A necessary consequence was that 
thos(^ chiefs who x*efused to follow in Meer Roostum’s wake, and submit to the 
ti’eaty, were held to be public enemies. The leading malcontents were Meer 
Roostum’s son and nephew, who instead of submitting fled to their forts in the 
desert. The most important of these wsis Emaumghur, situated about eighty 
miles south-elist of Khyrpoor, and nearly 100 nortli-east of Hyderabad. Here a 
considerable body of troops had assembled under the.se two leaders, who believ¬ 
ing their position unas.sailable, in conseejuence of the difficulty of reaching it, 



Chap. 


REIATIONS WITH 


465- 


deemed it'.' hq' longer'iiecessaiy to conceal their hostile inientionis. Sir Charles a.d. ws.. 
Napier determined, to teach them that they were not so secure as they imagined, 
and immediately "began to prepare an expedition against Emaumghur. 

While preparing for the expedition the British commander was somewhat 
disconcerted by the escape of Meer Eoostum, apparently with Ali Moorad’s 
connivance. The point is not of much consequence, but as Ali had previously 



Mei!:u Mahomed. Meer Nussber Khan, and Mber Nodr Mahoud, ihroo principal A-mcora of Boiude. 

From engraving In XUattrated Loitdan Newt. 


induced or compelled his brother to resign the turban to him in the most formal Kxpedition 
manner, the probability is that he wished to make his possession more secure ^mul- 
by frightening Meer Roostum into a flight which would leave him sole master. 

At first it was supposed that a change of plans would be necessary, as the 
enemy were reported to be mustering in great strength at a place called Dhinjce, 
but it .was ultimately found that thei’e was no necessity to deviate from tlfe' 
original plan, and the march into the desert was commenced. As the Duke 
of Wellington afterwards declared the march upon Emaumghur “ one of the 
most curious military feats which I have ever known to be performed, or have 
ever perused an account of in ray life,” some details of it will naturally be 
expected. The plan adopted cannot be better described than in Sir Charles 
Napier’s own words:—“My plans are fixed to march to the edge of the desert; 
then encamp, select 500 of the strongest Europeans and natives, mount them 
on camels, and load all my other camels with water, except a few to carry 
rations. My camel battery also shall go, and as many irregular horse as it shall 
be prudent to take, and then slap upon Emaumghur in the heart of the desert; 
if it surrenders, good; if not, it shall have such a hammering as shall make the 
tire fly out of its eyes. While this is going on, my camels shall go back for 
provisions, and water is abundant at Emaumglmr. My expectation is that 
four shells, out of the four hundred, with my battery, will produce a surrendei’, 
to say nothing of an escalade, for which J am prepared.” 

Leaving Khyrpoor, Sir Charles Napier arrived on the 3d of January, 1843,*at 
Khanpoor, and on the 4th at Deejeekote. On the following day he made his 


VoL. III. 


m 



A n. 184;^. 


Expedition 

againet 

Emaum- 

ghur. 


ProcoodiiiKH 
at Mydora 


Sir Clinrkis 
Na]>ior 
advaiicue 
ni^n it. 


466 history OF INDIA. [Book VIII. 

final arrangements for crossing the desert. “ On the night of lire 5th we 
moved with 350 of the 22d regiment (queen’s), all mounted on camels, two 
soldiem on each. We Lave two 24 lb. howitzers, with double teams of camels, 
and two hundred of the Scinde horse, and provisions for fifteen days; water 
for four.” On the 7th Choonka, twenty-five miles firom Deejeekote, was 
reached. Tliough the enemy had repeatedly shown himself, no opposition was 
enQountered, and at last, on arriving on the 12th before Emaumghur, it was 
found to be evacuated. The fort, built of burned brick in the form of a square 
with round towers, from forty to fifty feet high, and inclosed by an exterior 
wall, was of great strength, and capable of resisting any force without artillery. 
In this arm, liowever, Sir Charles was, as we have seen, well provided, and 
must therefore have made good the capture, though it might have been preceded 
by a perilous delay. Having halted only so long as was necessary to shatter 
Emaumghur to atoms, with 10,000 lbs. of gunpowder, the expeditionary force 
retraced its steps, and on the 21st of January arrived at Peer Abubekr, 
situated within Scinde proper, eight miles south of Deejeekote, on the road 
from Khyrpoor to Hyderabad. 

Having been joined by the troops which he had left at Deejeekote, Sir 
Charles commenced his march southward in the direction of Hyderabad, hoping 
that the con.sternation produced by the capture and destruction of Emaum¬ 
ghur would smooth the way and render actual hostilities unnecessary. At the 
outset it seemed that this hope was about to be realized. The Ameers, afraid 
to commit themselves to a final rejection of the treaty, professed their willing- 
neas to accept it, and even fixed the day on which they were formally to sign 
it. Procrastination, however, was their object, and they managed to weave' 
vaiious pretexts for delay. Major Outram, who was conducting the negotiation 
on the part of the British government, gave them more credit for sincerity 
than they deserved, and even became so far their dupe as to propose that Sir 
Charles Napier should leave his army behind and come in person to Hyderabad. 

“This,” said the commissioner, “will remove all difficulties.” “Yes,” was the 
reply, “and my head from my shoulders.” That in this instance the militaiy 
had formed a more correct judgment than, the political officer was soon made 
manifest. On the 12th of February, twenty-five Beloochee chiefs of the M urree 
tribe, with their followers, being taken in arms, were arrested. On Hyat Khan, 
who held the chief command, was found an order fi-om Mahomed Khan, one of 
the Hyderabad Ameers, directing him to assemble every male able to wield a 
sword, and join Ms victorious Beloochee troops at Meanee on the 9f/i. On 
the very day when this discovery was made, the Ameers met in full durbar, 
and with the exception of Nusseer Khan of Khyrpoor, signed what was justly 
styled a penAl, and was to them a most obnoxious treaty. This, which ought 
t6 have been the conclusion of a peaceful airangement, was only the consumma¬ 
tion of a system of duplicity. The Ameers had only been endeavouring to gain 



Chap. VI.]. WAR WITH SCISTDE. ' 467 

time to edinplete their military preparations. These, however, they were at 
last obliged, to precipitate, as Sir Charles Napier, too-, well aware of their real 
intentions, refused - to listen to their procrastinating jpleas, and was mpidly 
advancing on Hyderabad. On the 16th of February he reached New Halla, 
about thirty miles north of Hyderabad, and there learned that instead of wait¬ 
ing for his nearer approach the' Ameers had commenced actual Ijostilities by a 
formidable attack on the British residency in that capital. Fortunately the 
few troops within the inclosui’e, though not exceeding in all 100 men, after 
gallantly resisting all the attempts of an enemy, estimated at 8000, to force an 
entrance, were able, when their ammunition was nearly expended, to embark 
on board a steamer which lay in the river, and thus escaped the slaughter to 
which the 'Beloochees had doomed them. 

The sword being now the only aibiter. Sir Charles Napier moved his csimp 
first to Muttaree, and then to Meanee. The latter place, situated only .six 
miles north of Hyderabad, was reached on the 17th of Fcbruar 5 ^ and was 
destined, ere that day closed, to become famous in the military annals of British 
India. When at Halla, the British commander had a choice of two roads, one 
by the river which would bring him directly in front of the enemy, leaving 
their rear open; and the other by Jamhallaka Tanda, which would turn their 
right, and force them to fight with their back to the Indu.s. His inclination 
was to take the latter, bccau.se, to use his own words, “ if victorious, I should 
utterly extirpate the Beloochee army, and I am as sure of victory as a man 
who knows that victory is an accident can be.” Nothing can show more 
clearly how happily his well-known Iiardihood was tempered with caution 
than the conclusion at which he arrives. It must be given in his own words. 
After mentioning the strong temptation to choose the Jamhallaka Tanda 
road, he ^ays: “ It is dangerous—1. Because 2800 men will be oi)posed to 
25,000 or 30,000, and these are stiff odds. 2. A reverse would cast me off from 
the river and my supplies. 3. A repulse would add 20,000 men to the enemy; 
for barbarians hold no faith with the beaten, and numbers are now abiding the 
issue of the first fight. . . . All the doubtful would on a repulse turn upon 
us, and certainly it is no over-estimate to say, that with a beaten force I should 
have to fight a way to Snkkur through 50,000 men.’' In regard to the river 
road, he says: “ It is shorter, and my right flank is secure; if worsted, my 
provisions are safe in the steamers; the nearer the river the more ditche.s, and 
as the Ameers have most cavalry that suits me best. ’I’hey have 20,000 
horsemen; mine are but 800, and a victory will not therefore be so decisive; 
still I can pursue them with vigour. Yes! I will march along the river and 
trust to manoeuvring in the battle for turning their right, without losing the 
river myself.” 

The British force, mustering 2800 men of all arms, with twelve pieces bf 
artillery, started from Muttaree at four in the morning of the 17th, and after 


A.f). 1848. 


Advailoe oiT 
TTyderabud. 


I^rejiAratioim 
for battle. 



A.D. iSw. 


Victory of 
Meaiiec. 


Siioro Mu- 
liomeil Htill 
ill arma. 


408 UISTOaY OF.INDIA. [Book'THI. 

aiuarch of four houra, discovered the eireiBy:^roug]y^ posted,, of 

their flanks covered with a wood,, and in froiit-'ttie bed-^of tb pvierj-^Ow .rfry, hut 
with a high bank. At 9 A.M. the British ' were formedii^.brder and' 

began to advance from the right in echelons of'battalious, tJie-'arliHery'ajitfher 
raaje.sty’s 22d regiment in line forming the leading 'echaiofr, ;<hd SStttTnative 
infantry the second, the 12th native ihfantiy the third,; and thedst ^enadier 
native infantry the fourth. ‘ The 9th Bengal light cavalry foimed the reserve-’ 
in rear of the left wing, and the Pppnah horse, together; with four'-oornpanies of 
infantry, guarded the baggage. “In this order of battle,” says-Sir ^Chasrles 
JMapier, “ we advanced as at a review, over a fine plain sW^it by tire Cannon of 
the enemy.” The distance between the two lines being not more tbaJijlflOfl 
yards, wa.s .soon traversed, and the battle became general along tho'b'ank of the 
river. The combatants coming at once to close quarters, “ fought ^for tliree 
liours or more with great fury, man to man. Then,” continues the despatch, 
“ was seen the superiority of the musket and bayonet over the swordj and 
sliicld, and matchlock. The brave Beloochees, first discharging their matchlocks 
and pistols, (la.shed over the bank with* de.s]wrate resolution, but ■'down went 
tliese bold and .skilful swordsmen under the su[)erior power of the musket and 
bayonet.” At one time the 22d, 2.5th, and 12th regiments were almost over¬ 
borne by the courage and numbers of the enemy, but a brilliant charge by the 
9tli Bengal cavalry and tlie Sciudo horse completely relieved them, by forcing 
the right of the enemy’s line, capturing a standard and several pieces of 
artillery, and even driving a large body of horse beyond their own camp. 

“ This charge,” .says Sir Charles, “ decided in my opinion the crisis of the action, 
for, from the moment the cavalry were seen in rear of their right flank, tlu' 
resistance of the enemy slackened, the 22d regiment forced the bank, the 25th 
and 12th did tlie same, the latter regiment capturing .several guijs, and the 
victory was decided.” The lo,ss of the British was 25fi killed and wounded; 
that of the enemy was estimated at 5000. The results of the victory were the 
capture of the whole of the enemy’s artillery, ammunition, standards, and camp, 
with considerable stores and some treasure, the personal submission of the 
Ameers, wlio yielded themselves np as prisoners of war, and the surrender of 
Hyderabad, on the great tower of which the British flag was hoisted on the 
20fch of February. 

Notwithstanding tlie .sidendid victory of Meanee, the war was not yet 
terminated. Shere. Mahomed of Meerpoqr, the most talented of all the Ameers, 
was on the way to join his confederates when he learned their .signal defeat. 
The British commander offered to accept his submission on the same terms as 
the other Ameers, but he disdained to yield, and kept the field at the head of a 
force whicli edntinued to accumulate till it amounted to about 20,000 men. 
For some time after his victory. Sir Charles Napier was not able to muster a 
disposable force of 2000 men. and therefore, instead of entering on a new cam- 



409 


VI.] 


WITH' SCJINDE. 


pai^j prtldeiltly. fa^ed^ an-efttrbnched camp on the left bank of the Indus, a.d. ms. 
and alsor QOil^tffutited & fort on the right bank) ae a protection to the-steamers 
w-hich,jC%^bd bto-supplies. HbreJie'rciSaained waiting for reinforcements, andsheroMa- 
consBling'hiiftself'with’-the reflftetion f “-If he (Shere Mahomed) assails my luanna!**" 
works,'h^-will be^^aten] if he does not, the delay will exhaust his money, 
seeing’that*.the iBeloechees ^ire as-rapacious as they are brave.” He had 
riot misdalculXted. The* . .'' ■ 


Amber • gr^iially ap 
preached ne&^r and' pear- 
er, and seeing no appear¬ 
ance of Ixeing attacked, be¬ 
came so confident of suc¬ 
cess, , that on the ■ 15th pf 
March, when only.-tW^e 
mUes distant, he sent a 
letter ofiering to allow the 
British to qfiit the country 
on liberating the Ameers, 
and restoring what they 
had tr^ken. “Just as*his 
messengers delivered this 
letter-,” says Sir Char-les 
Napier-, “ the evening gun 
was fired. There, said I, do you hear that? Ye.s. Well, that is your answer-.” 

On the 21st of March the exrrected reinforcements ar-rived, and the British victory .-a 
force, increased to 50(>() men, immediately prepared to assume the offensive. 

With this .view it moved from Hyderabad at daybreak of the 24th, and after a 
march of four miles ai-rived at Dubba. Here the enemy, consisting of 20,000 
men of all arms, were found .strongly posted behind a kind of double nullah, 
formed by two deep parallel ditches, the first H feet deejr and 22 feet wide, anti 
the second 17 feet deep and 42 feet wide. Betweeir the two was a bank 
4.3 feet wide. The attack was immediately commenced, the whole of the Br itish 
artillery opening on the enemy’s position, while the line led by her inrvjesty’s 
22(1 advanced in echelons from the left. In a short tiirre the enenty were seeit 
moving considerable bodies to their left, asid apparently retr eating, us if rrnable 
to stand the cross fire of the British artillery. This moment was chosen to 
order a charge, which was made with the greatest gallantry and success by the 
3d cavalry under Captain Delaraain, arrd the Scinde hor-sc under- ( Vrptain Jacob, 
who crossed the nullah and pursued the retreating enemy for several miles. 

While this was passing on the right, her majesty’s 22d gallantl;^ attacked.tire 
nullah and carried it, thorrgh not without considerablo loss. The 22d wrjre 
closely followed by the 25th, 21st, and 12th native infantry, and the victoi-j- 



North wi-a^T Faok ok the Fort or IJyder.vrai). 
From Kdwttrds' ^Sketches In Scindc. 



A.D. 1848. 


Viutoi^; 

Dtibba. 


(.'apturo i>f 
Omerkott*. 


Atinexatioa 
of ijciiuUi. 


'470 HISTOflY OF INi)U. CBook VIII. 

was -decided. Qn the 26th the llritish three tvas again in motion, and amved 
on Jibe 27th'nt Shere Mahomed’s capital, Meerpoor, of which possession was 
immediately.taken. Sir .Charles Napier was afraid to advance &rther, being 
obii^d, as he.-says, “to watch the Indus, which will soon swell, and may cut 
me piF by the inundation.” Unwilling, however, not to reap the full fruits of 
.his victory, he sent a squadron of cavalry, on the 28th of March, to recemnoitre 
Omei’kote, a fort situated in the desert, about 100 niiles east of Hyderabad, 
and on the following day detached Cajjtain Whitlie, with his battery, to make 
progress so far as water could be found. The report of the reconnoitring party 
was, that Omerkote was defended by 4000 men, and, on the faith of it, an 
express was immediately sent after Whitlie ordering him to return. This was 
unfortunate, for the real fact was that Omerkote had been abandoned. As soon 
as this wiis known, a second express was sent off countermanding the first. By 
this time, however, Whitlie, who had received the first express, was acting upon 
it, and had only consented to halt at tlie urgent request of CaptainBrown, who, 
feeling sure that the order to return had been given under misapprehension, 
volunteered to ride back to head-quarters and return with new instructions. 
This feat he successfully performed. The result was, that Major Woodburn, 
who had succeeded to the command, hastened forward to Omerkote, and found 
it without defenders. The importance which the Britisli commander attached 
to tliis capture, a 2 )pear 8 not only from his having i)rcvious]y declared, “ I will 
have it if it costs another battle;” but also from his speaking of it in such terms 
as the following; “ Omerkote is oum . . . This completes the conquest of 
Scinde; every place is in my possession, and, thank God! I have done with 
w'ar. Never again am I likely to see a shot fired in anger.” It will be after¬ 
wards seen that in these anticipations he was too sanguine, but in the meantime 
it will be necessary to give some exj)lanation of the main ground oq which he 
founded them. 

The obnoxious treaty which tljo governor-general had sought to impose on 
the Ameers ceased to be aj)plicable to the actual situation of affairs after the 
victory of Meanee and the .surrender of the Ameers as j)risoners of war. By these 
events the old constitution of Scinde was virtually abolished, and it became neces¬ 
sary to provide a substitute for it. What this was to be was first publicly 
announced March 5, 1843, by a “ notification ” which concluded in the following 
terms:—“Thus has victory placed at the disposal of the British government the 
country on both banks of the Indus from Sukkur to the sea, with the excei)tion 
of such jiortions thereof as may belong to Meer Ali Moorad of Khyrpoor, and 
to any other Ameer who may have remained faithful to his engagements.” In 
other word.s, Scinde with the exception above mentioned was henceforth a 
province of British India. 

• Sir Charles Napier believing that with the capture of Omerkote the conquest 
of Scinde was completed, had said that he did not expect to be obliged to fire 



Chap. VI.] WAB Wlte SCINDB.'' ' 471' 

another shot. In the course qf‘a short time he was qbhged to modify .this ad. 1843 . 
expectation. Shere Mahomed, returning from the desert to- Whioh' he had fled, 
once more raised his standard, and was able towards .the end of'April to take continued 
post With 8000 men at Khoonera, about sixty miles north-ea^t oi iiyderabad/ of share 
Shah Mahomed his brother had also mustered a force of several thousands, with 
four guns, and gone down to Sehwan with the view of crossing the Indus.and - 
taking part in a preconcerted insurrection at Hyderabad. Meer Hossein, Meet 
Roostum’s son, was in the desert at Shaghur with a body of 2000 men, and in 
(!oncert with several refractory killedars was menacing Ali Moorad at Khyrpoor. 

The delta of the Ganges was traversed by predatory roving Beloochees to the 
number of about 20,000; and to the east of the delta, beyond the Poorana 



Entrance to Town of Sbhwan, witli Tomb of LjU Shaz Ba'z.—Pn>m Edwards* Skoiches in Suindo. 


branch of the river, a tribe mustering some 5000 was threatening to intercejit 
tlie communications with Bombay. Instead of uninterrupted tran(i[uillity, 
therefore, everything foreboded a new struggle, and called for the immediate 
adoption of decisive measures. Shere Malioined was by far the most formid¬ 
able of all these insurgent cliiefs. His actual force was the largest, and there 
was reason to fear that he might be able to double or triple its numbers by 
])enetrating into the delta of the Indus, which formed the principal part of his 
original territory, and where he had only to appear in order to rally all the 
predatory hordes around his standard. 

The first actual encounter, however, was not with Shere Mahomed, b\it Encounter 

«itli Slinli 

Shah Mahomed his brother. This chief, hearing of the airival of Colonel Wahoiuca, 
Roberts at Sehwan and his preparations to cross the river, hastened forward at 
the head of 3000 men, in the hope of taking him at an advantage. In this, he 
completely outwitted himself, for Roberts came upon him by surprise, aifd 
besides dispersing his force and burning his camp, took him prisoner and sent 





A.D. 1848. 


Dofoiit of 
Sliero 
Mahomed. 


({elation^ 
with Wciiid; 


472 HISfOtlY OF-INDIA. [Boot Vllt. 

l>im on to Hyderabad. His ariivai here ivas most oppQrtune,' lor the intended 
insurrection, of which he was to be .one of tbe main support^ was immediately 
abandoned in despair. This success was soon followed by, another of still greater 
consequence. Sir Charle.s, anxious to put down Shere Mabomedf. had marched 
out of Hyderabad in the veiy middle of the hot season. His sufferings and 
those of his troops were dreadful, and on the 15th of June, he and forty-three 
other Europeans were struck down by sun strokes. Within three hours they 
were all dead except himself Speaking of this wonderful escape, he attributes 
it to his temi^erate habits; “I do not drink, that is the secret; the siin had no 
ally in the liquor amongst my brains/’ but at the same time mentions another 
circumstance which he says “ roused me from my lethargy as much as the bleed¬ 
ing.” Tliis was a message from Colonel Jacob, intimating that he had encoun¬ 
tered Shere Mahomed, defeated him and dispersed his foi’ces without the loss of 
a single man. Everytliing like open hostility was now at an end, and the 
British commander had at length the full opportunity which he had earnestly 
desired, to devote himself, as governor of Scinde, to the. work of internal im¬ 
provement. It is not too much to say that in this department he displayed 
administrative talents of the highest order. The powers conferred upon him 
by Loj'd Ellenborough were almost absolute, and he used them under cii cum- 
stances of great difficulty, in repressing crime, encouraging industry, and 
develo 2 )ing the resources of the country by opening new channels of communi¬ 
cation and irrigation, and bringing under cultivation fertile tracts, which the 
Ameers had converted into sldhanjahs cy hunting grounds. His administration 
will again eoiTie under notice. Meanwhile it Is necessary to attend to the 
proceedings of the governor-general in a different quarter. 

Junkojee Row Scindia, who succeeded by adoption in 1827 to Dowlut Row 
Scindia, died childless on the 7th of February, 1843. Two years before, he had 
become subject to attacks of illness, which it was believed must ultimately 
prove fatal, and it therefore became necessary for the British government to 
jjrovide for their interests at the court of Gwalior in the event of his demise. The 
maharajah was, like his predecessor, childless. His wife, the mahanmee, was 
daughter of a jierson named Jeswunt Row Goorpurra, and only twelve years of 
age. While the illness of the sovereign and the youth of his wife thus left the 
government without a proper head, the administration was intrusted to a regency 
of five individuala Among these the Mama 3ahib, the maharajah’s maternal 
uncle, who had at one time been sole regent, still possessed the greatest influ¬ 
ence, but it was very doubtful if he would be able to retain it after his nephew’s 
death, as all the persons composing the regency were notoriously at enmity 
with each other. Colonel Spiers, the resident at Gwalior, in communicating 
these facts td Lord Auckland, in February, 1841, suggested that he should be 
authorized, in the event of the maharajah’s death, to recommend to his widow 
the adoption of the nearest heir of Scindia’s family, and that on this adoption 



Chap; VI.] RELATIONS' V^ITH"^ SCINDIa! 473 

“the mother and her adopted son shotild be Supported by the British govern- a.d. i 843. 
inent from foreign and domestic enemiesr”. The answer was, that in the event 
of the maharajah’s death “ without male issue, or the delegation of authority 

. witl,.Solnilia. 

to lus widow, to adopt a son, the proper course for the resident would be to 
“make known the willingness of the British government to recognize an adop¬ 
tion from the family of Scindia, which may be made by his widow, with the 
consent of the leading chiefs of tlie durbar.” 

The day after the maharajah’s death, the resident received two pressing 
messages, earnestly requesting his presence at the palace. On arriving there he 
found assembled the ministers and all the influential persons about tlie court, 
and was informed that the Tara Ranee (the late maharajali’s widow, whom they 
acknowledged as their sovereign mistress), themselves, and also those then 
present, had selected as successor to the gnddee, Bhageerut Row, a boy about niiaKTOrut 

♦ • A ^ < liOlV H AHO** 

eight or nine years of age, and the nearest in bl<x>d in the family to the late coBsion to 
maharajah. On the 9th of Februaiy the resident wrote as follows:—“The 
maharanee and the boy she has selected may be still considered as children; it 
may therefore appear to the governor-general requisite that a regency should 
be appointed; the present ministry certainly do not possess the confidence of 
the army or of the people. The Mama Sahib (the maternal uncle of the late 
maharajah) appears to me to po.ssess the greatest influence of any person about 
this court, and seems ti> be attached to our interests; ho would perhaps be the 
peraon best calculated to place at the head of the regency.” In replying to this 
letter. Lord Ellenborough expressed great satisfaction that the Tara Ranee had 
“adopted, with the apparently general concurrence of the chiefs and people,” 
the boy whom he “had himself deemed to be nearest in blood to the late maha¬ 
rajah,” but added, “The adoption of a boy too young to administer the govern¬ 
ment necc^psarily creates anxiety as to the selection of the ministers by whom 
the government is to be carried on, and the governor-general awaits with much 
interest the communication he expects shortly to receive on that head.” In Mamasahib 

^ ^ ^ regent. 

another letter, dated only three days later, he entered more fully on the subject of 
the regency. He considered that “it would be most for the benefit of the Gwalior 
state, that the regency should be confided to one |)erson, in whom, during the 
minority of the maharajah, may reside all the authority t)f the state. It would 
be for the regent to nominate the ministers, and they would be responsible to 
him.” Having thus given his o 2 jinion in favour of a single regent, invested 
with all the authority of the stirte, the governor-general ventured on still more 
delicate ground, and declared he would ‘ ‘ gladly see the regency confeixed upon 
the Mama Sahib.” This recommendation a 2 >pear 8 to have been effectual, and on 
the 23d of February, after the young maharajah had beeniflaced on theguddee, 
it was officially proclaimed by the ministers, with the full concurrence of the 
Ranee, that the Mama Sahib had been nominated regent. 

On receiving notice of this appointment, the governor-general gave the 
VoL. Ill, 286 



474 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book VIIT. 


A.D. 1843. 


Mama Saliib 
rouogiiized 
oa re^nt of 
Scindia by 
the liritieh 
governnieut. 


Declines the 
military aid 
I>roffere<l by 
the govor- 
tior-gonoral. 


resident the following instruction:—“You will inform tlie Mama Sahib, that 
having understood from you that he has, in yoUr presence, been nominated 
regent of the Gwalior state, 1 recognize him as the responsible head of that 
state, and am prepared to support bis authority.” At the time when Lord 
Ellenborough thus pledged himself to the regent, he was not unaware of the 
extent to which it might involve him in the internal affairs of Gwalior. Not 
only was the pay of the troops heavily in arrear, while the available funds 
were insufficient to meet it, but an infantry brigade of three battalions had 
manifested a mutinous spirit. One of these battalions, under a native com¬ 
mandant named Ishuree Sing, when proceeding into Malwah, had before quitting 
the Gwalior territory been guilty of several outrages. The resident advised 
that an example should be made of its commander, and the late maharajah gave 
orders that he should be recalled, and on his anival at Gwalior, be not only 
dismissed the service, but confined in the fort. Ishuree Sing probably suspected 
what was intended, and therefore, instead of returning alone, as he had been 
peremptorily ordered to do, he brought his battalion along with him. Having 
committed himself by this bold step, he succeeded in gaining over the other 
two battalions of the brigade, and engjrging the whole three to make common 
cause with him. The governor-general, fully alive to the danger of these pro¬ 
ceedings, wrote a second letter to the resident, which refeiring to the foianer, 
concluded as follows:—“The governor-general did not acquaint you that he was 
prepared to support the authority of the regent, without taking at the same time 
the necessary preliminary steps to enable him to give at once the most effectual 
support if it should be desired. It is inconvenient that there should be pro¬ 
tracted suspense on this point, and the governor-general is anxious to know, 
as soon as possible, whether the state of affairs at Gwalior is such as to render 
it improbable that his immediate aid will become necessary to sjq>port the 
regent’s authority.” The thing intended could not now be mistaken. The 
governor-general by “support” meant armed intervention, and was ready, at a 
moment’s notice, to march an army into Scindia’s temtory, for the purpose of 
helping the newly appointed regent to inflict punishment on a mutinous brigade. 
Fortunately Lord Ellenborough’s military ardour was neutralized by the 
prudence of the regent, who “hoped he might be pardoned for stating that he 
would prefer awaiting his own time for the punishment of Ishuree Sing,” inas¬ 
much as the calling in of Britisli troops “might cause a serious disturbance 
throughout the whole army,” and “lose him that populai-ity and confidence 
which the officers and troops of it certainly at present appear to repose in him.” 
His lordship could hardly have been pleased with this rebuff, which by implica¬ 
tion charged him with a readine.ss to hurry into hostilities, which might have 
set4he whole'state of Gwalior in a flame. He had however the good sense to 
abandon his design, though he had gone so far as to have actually taken several 
measures “ for the purpose of concentrating a preponderating force.” 



Chap. VT.] 


RELATIONS WITH SOINDIA. 


475 


Meanwhile the court of Gwalior was the scene of intrigues, which though a.d. ists. 
paltry in themselves were" paving the way for important changea In these 
intrigues a woman of the name of Nurunjee took a leading part. She was in coun 
the confidence of the ranee, and had acquired such an ascendency over her iiUuwtho 
that the regent felt his own authority to be in danger, and was considering how 
he might be able to remove her and her faction from the palace. The governor- 
general, after being thwarted in an important military operation which he had 
contemplated, was in no humour to listen to the detail of petty intrigues, and 
therefore wrote as follows when they were communicated to him by the 
resident:—“The governor-general intended to advise and to approve the selec¬ 
tion of a sole regent having all the authority which, according to our English 
understanding of the woi’d, aj^pertains to his office as tlie responsible head of 
the government; and he will stiU indulge the hope that no little views and 
interests will be pei'mittcd to intervene, and to deprive the state of Gwalior of 
the only sort of government which, during the minority of a young uneducated 
boy adopted by a girl, can maintain the dignity of the family of Scindia, and 
the efficiency of the administration of the state.” The woman Nurunjee was 
induced to retire, after making an excellent bfirgain for herself, but it soon 
appeared that a still more formidable intriguer was resident in the palace. 

This was the Dada Khasjee Walla, who had originally aspired to the regency, 
and was labouring incessantly to undermine the Mama Sahib, whose position in 
consequence became untenable, and he was obliged not only to resign the 
regency, but to retire into the Deccan. 

No new regent or minister having been appointed after the expulsion of Mama Now form 
Hahib, the resident suggested, that as the maharanee held durbars daily, the tmtion. 
best mode of conducting ofiicial intercourse would be by direct communication 
with herself The governor-general caught at this suggestion, and was inclined 
to think that this direct mode of communication, while there was no ostensible 
minister, might be that which would practically give the resident “the most 
beneficial influence over the government.” Having come to this conclusion he 
retracted the contemptuous opinion he had previously expressed, and declared 
it to be his impression “that the maharanee is a very sensitive and somewhat 
impetuous girl, but that she is by no means without a good disposition; and 
that with her character, anything may be made of her according to the manner 
in which she is approached and treated.” Meanwhile the Dada Khasjee Walla, 
who continued in high favour with the maharanee, had not lost sight of Mama 
Sahib, and accordingly when the ex-regent halted in his journey southward at 
Seronge, the capital of a small native state, he meditated sending a body of 
troops into that territory to seize him. Hearing of this design the governor- 
general determined not to allow the rights of an ally to be infringed b/ an 
unprovoked aggression, and therefore instructed Colonel Spiers that if he had 
the least apprehension of any intention of the de facto government of Gwalior 




A.P. 1843 


AfFain* <»f 
Bcindia. 


Intri^iOH of 
the J)adn. 
Khtisjoo 
Walla. 


Holivory of 
Ilia person to 
t)ie Britisli 
fnistratei). 


476 HISTORY OF INDIA. [Book VITT. 

to violate the territory of Seronge, he would “address the maharanee herself, 
and refer her highneas to the concluding sentence of the governor-general’s 
proclamation of the 1st of October, 1842, wherein his lordship made this declara¬ 
tion : ‘Sincerely attached to peace for the sake of the benefits it confers upon the 
people, the governor-general is resolved that peace shall be maintained, and he 
will direct the whole power of the British government against the state by 
which it shall be infringed.’ ” 

The Dada Khasjee Walla, thus interdicted from gratifying his vindictive 
temper on a personal rival, showed hLs rage and disappointment by exerting 
himself in opposition to British interests, and the governor-general in conse- 
(juence became convinced that the tranquillity of Gwalior could only be secured 
by liis removal. At first his lordship had expressed himself in such a way as 
seemed to imply that a simple removal would satisfy him, but ultimately on 
passing in review all the delinquencies of the court favourite, he declared his 
conviction that “the mere dismissal of the Dada Khasjee Walla, after all that 
has passed, would not be sufficient to afford security against similar intrigues 
to that in which he has been the mover, and to place the relations between the 
two governments upon a satisfactory footing.” He therefore instructed the 
resident to demand, as the only condition of friendly intercourse with Gwalior, 
that the Dada should not only be dismissed, but banished for ever beyond the 
limits of the Gwalior territory. 

On the very day preceding that on which the governor-general gave the 
above instruction to the resident, the Dada was a prisoner in the hands of the 
chiefs who had all along opposed him. Feeling convinced that while he was 
at the head of affairs, friendly relations with the British government would 
never be re-established, they had determined to keep no terms with him. His 
t)wn fears and those of the ranee, whose favour for him had suffered no diminu¬ 
tion, led to . a kind of compromise, and he was given up after stipulating that 
he should not be maltreated. It was hoped that the next step would, be to 
deliver him into British custody, but an unexpected obstacle arose. The troops 
who had been gained over to the Dada mustered in full force, and having 
surrounded the campoo where he was confined, threatened to take him away 
by force if he were not voluntarily given up. A collision thus became imminent, 
but the parties were so equally matched that they both deemed it prudent to 
temporize, and hence, as the resident reported, “during the whole of these 
disturbances not a sword has been drawn nor a drop of blood spilt.” The 
result was that the Dada, though he still remained in custody, could not be 
delivered to the resident at Dholopore, as the chiefs who seized him wished and 
had intended. The ranee still stood by him, and even when warned that if 
he was not delivered the British troops would certainly advance, displayed 
considerable ability in arguing the case with a moonshee, whom the resident 
had sent to remonstrate with her. 



Chap, yi.] 


RELATIONS WITH SCINDIA. 


477 


On the 1st of November, the governor-general, who was about to leave Fort A.n. 1843. 
William for the north-western provinces, lodged an elaborate minute, in which 
lie plainly showed that his designs in regard to Gwalior were of a more sweeping Mmtarypre 

^ 00 paratioiiB 

character than he had yet ventured to confess. After adverting to the fact to enforce 
that “the British government has now, for many years, assumed the rights d^m^yoT 
and performed the obligations of the paramount power in India within the 
Sutlej,” and that it was impossible therefore “to take a partial and insulated 
view of our relations with any state within that limit,” he proceeded to show 
tliat “the state of Gwalior is altogether peculiar,” and that in the event of dis¬ 
turbance within it, intervention was “not only justifiable, but absolutely 
necessary.” Having laid down this principle, his lordship proceeded to apply 
it. “When the existing relations between the state of Gwalior and the British 
government are considered, it is impossible to view the expulsion of the Mama 
Sahib, and the elevation of the Dada Khasjee Walla to the ministry, otherwise 
than an affront of the gravest charaeter offered to the British government, by 
that successful intriguer in the Zenana of Gwalior, and by the disorganized 
army by which he hsis been supported,” still, “under ordiixary circumstances, 
we might perhaps have waited upon time, and have abstained from the adoption 
of measures of coercion,” but the circuimstances were not ordinary. The Sikhs, 

HO longer friendly, have within three marches of the Sutlej “an army of 70,000 
men,” and though “it may perhaps be expected that no hostile act on the part 
of this array will occur to produce a war,” it would be “ unpardonable ” not to 
take every precaution against it, and “no precaution appears to be more neces- 
.sary than that of rendering our rear and t)ur communications secure by the 
re-establisliment of a friendly government at Gwalior.” The expulsion of the so^emor- 
Dada was therefore oidy the first of a series of measures which are thus enumer- policy, 
ated in the conclusion of the minute:—“To obtain reparation for an affront, 
which if left unpunished would affect our reputation and our influence at every 
durbar in India; to secure the tranquillity of oxxr frontier and of that of our 
allies by the future cordial co-opci-ation of the officers of the durbar of Gwalior 
in its preservation; and to diminish an army, which is the real master of the 
Gwalior state and placed within a few marches of our second capital—these 
appear to be the just and legitimate objects to be held in view; but the time 
and manner of their accomplishment must, as I have said, depend upon circum¬ 
stances, and be governed by a general view of our position in every part of India.” 

The governor-general arrived at Agra on the 11th of December, and im¬ 
mediately “decided upon moving forward the whole of the troops with as little 
delay as possible.” On the following day he addressed the maharanee, and' 
gave her the first distinct intimation that he had risen in his demands. “ The 
British government can neither permit the existence, within tfie territories of 
Scindia, of an unfriendly government, nor that those territories should ’be 
without a government willing and able to maintain order, and to preserve the 



47S 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book VIII. 


A.l>. 1843. 


Movomeiit 
of British 
tniopB to¬ 
wards the 
fnintier of 
Hoindia. 


C^insteniu- 
tiou at 
(iwalioi*. 


relations of amity with its neighbours. The British government cannot permit 
any change in the relations between itself and the house of Scindia, which 
have for forty years contributed to the preservation of the peace of Central 
India. Compelled, by the conduct which your highness has been advised to 
adopt, to look to other means than those of friendly remonstrance for the pur¬ 
pose of maintaining those relations in their integrity and spirit, I have now 
directed the advance of the British armies, and I shall not arrest their move- 



OwALTOti From an original skctclt in iiossestiion of Iloyal Asiatic Society'. 


inent until I have full security for the future tranquillity of the common fron¬ 
tier of the two states, for the maintenance of order within the territories of 
Scindia, and for the conducting of the government of those territories in 
accordance with the long-established relations of amity towards tlie British 
government.” 

This letter, which produced the greatest consternation at Gwalior, was im¬ 
mediately followed by the actual surrender of the Dada, who was sent forwanl 
under charge of an escort, and brought on the 18th of December into the British 
ciimp. The maharanee seems to have expected that the delivery of the Dada 
would be acce 2 )ted as a sufficient compliance with the demands of the British 
government, and therefore, in answering the governer-general’s letter, expressed 
her earnest wish that the march of the British army might be arrested, and 
official intercourse resumed by the return of the resident to Gwalior. At the 
same time she availed herself with some dexterity of a declaration of his lord- 
ship, to the effect “that he was fully determined in his proceedings, in regard 
to Gwalior, to maintain in all their integrity the conditions of the existing 
treaties betwe'en the two states.” This declaration, which the governor-general 
had volunteered only two days previously, certainly pledged him to all which 
the maharanee understood by it when she thus expressed herself;—“Your lord- 



CHAP. VI.J 


RELATIONS WITH SCINHIA. 


479 


ship’s purpose that the treaties and engagements which have been in force for a.d. i 843. 
forty years shall not be changed or interfered with, is gratifying. This purpose ~ 
has its origin in the good feeling and integrity of your lordship. The parties uitorior 
to all these treaties and engagements felt the fullest confidence in them; for govmior- 
the good faith of the British government is well known. ” This home-thrust 
his lordship appears to have ha^ some difficulty in parrying, for in a subsequent 
letter to the maharanee, after telling her that “the delivery of the Dada 
Khasjee Walla is tlie best indication of the sincerity of your highness’s friend¬ 
ship,” he veiled his future intentions under such vague expressions as these:— 

“I have, myself, no more earnest wish than that of re-establishing the good 
understanding between the two states, and of giving it a firmer basis.” To the 
resident, now Colonel Sleeman, who had succeeded Colonel Spiers, he was 
mucli more explicit. “He was gratified,” he said, “bj'^ the delivery of tlie Dada, 
but was no longer disposed to accept it as sufficient atonement for tlie past, or 
security for the future. The British annies could not be arrested without a 
guarantee for the maintenance of tranquillity on the common frontier, and the 
establifshment of a government willing and able to coerce its own subjects, and 
maintain the relations of amity.” 

As the governor-general professed to be advancing with no hostile intentions NiKotiutioiw 

y r* 1 * -y y t i y fiH’ IHl ititer 

to the Gwalior state, it was pro])osed that tlie young maharajali, with the view witli 
maharanee and chiefs, should come out to meet him, “in the manner usualty tajah. 
observed on the occasion of a fi'iendly visit to the governor-general by the l uler 
of the Scindia state,” and that then the whole should proceed to Gwalior as if 
the governor-general wei'e returning the visit. A meeting was accordingly 
held on the 2()th of December, at Dholepore, in the governor-generars tent, for 
the purpose of making the necessary arrangements. The governor-general took 
part in the^ conference, which was attended on thii part of Gwalior by the chiefs 
Ram Row Phalkeea and Sumbajee Angria, and the vakeel Bajee Row. The main 
jioint discussed was the place of meeting. The chiefs began by assuming that 
the meeting would take place on his lordship’s present encamping ground at 
Dholepore. “ This,” they said, “was the usual place where all former governors- 
general had been met by the rajahs, on occasion of their visits to Gwalior,” and 
“any deviation from that e.stablished usage would detract from the honour of 
the maharajah.” The governor-general having replied that as the maharajah 
was not here, and delay was impossible, hi.s camp would niove on as soon as 
the whole of the army had joined the head-ipiarters, and that his meeting with 
the maharajah might “ take place at such sjiot as they should both arrive at on 
the same day.” The chiefs showed the impoi’tance which they attached to tlie 
place of meeting, by urging “that if the governor-general, with the commander- 
in-chief and the British army, passed the Gwalior frontier before fhe mahai'£^ah 
had a meeting with his lordship, it would be a breach of all precedent, and 
eternally disgrace the maharajah and the government of Scindia.” When his 



480 


HISTOBY OF INDIA. 


[Book VIII. 


A.D. 1S43. 


Negotiations 
for au inter-' 
view with 
the maha¬ 
rajah. 


March of 
British 
trooi)s into 
Sciudla'H 
territory. 


Advance of 
the British 
army. 


lordsliip still refused to delay, the chiefs represented “that if the British army 
crossed the frontier before the meeting with the maharajah, the troops of 
Gwalior, who were already in a state of the utmost aland, Would believe that 
the governor-general was coming, not as a friend, but with a hostile purpose,” 
and “they implored him with joined hands, to weigh well the step he was 
taking,'” since, in their opinion, “ the most seyous consequences depended on 
the passing of the British army across the frontier before the meeting.” Find¬ 
ing that the resolution to move on was irrevocable, the chiefs asked “ to know 
the longest time his lordshij) could give the maharajah to come out and meet 
him here.” The answer was as follows:—“ If the maharajah should meet the 
governor-general at this ground on the 23d instant, prepared to ratify a treaty 
drawn up in accordance with the principles laid down in the paper which had 
been placed in the hands of the chiefs, the details of which should be prepared 
to-morrow, and they would guarantee that his highness should do so, the army 
should not pass the river Chumbul (the boundary between the two states) till 
after that day; but that if his lordship were induced thus to delay the passing 
of the troops for two days, and the chiefs should fail to redeem their guarantee, 
a heavy fine, in addition to the account which was already to be charged to 
them, should be imposed.” The governor-general says he offered these terms 
because he had “every disposition to meet any reasonable wish of the chiefs,” 
but one cannot help thinking that if he had really had this “disposition,” he 
would have taken a different way of proving it. As must have Ijecn anticipated, 
the terms were declined. 

On the 2l8t of December, the first brigade of the British .army crossed the. 
Cliumhul, and encamped about six miles to the south, hej^ond the defiles and 
ravines. The head-quarters, with the governor-general’s camp, followed on the 
22d, and by the 26th the. whole of the right wing of the army, with the heavy 
guns, had crossed, and had been jdaced in position at Hingona. Up to the 
27th, it wiis considered probable that the Gwalior troops, notwithstanding their 
vaunts and menaces, would not venture to oppose the British advance, though 
circumstances were not wanting to suggest and justify an opposite conclusion. 
On the 25th, Bapoo Setowlea, who had been appointed prime-minister, and 
])rofessed his earnest desire for the restoration of friendly relations on the veiy 
terms which had been offei-ed, suddenly quitted the British camp, in which In- 
had arrived to coriduct the negotiations on the part of the durhai-. He pro¬ 
ceeded to Dhunaila, and there, in an inteiwiew with Colonel Sleemiin, .attri¬ 
buted his departure to a summons from Gwalior, where he would, if possible, 
“defeat the machinations of ill advisers, and prevent hostilities.” The fact, 
as proved by his subsequent conduct, was that the object of his journey was 
not to preveiit hostilities, but to take a prominent part in them. On the 26th 
it was ascertained that troops and grins were leaving Gwalior, in the direction 
both of Chandore and Hingona, in the former to encounter General Grey, who 



Chap. Vi.] 


IIOSTILITIES COMMENCED: 


481 


wjis advancing with the left wing of the army thtough Bundelcuhd, and the a.d. ms, 
latter to resist the fiirther progress-of the right wing under the commander-in- 
chief. - On the.same day, Sumhajee Angria, another of the Gwalior negotiators, Disaffection 
imitated the example of his colleague Bappo Setowlea, and suddenly.disappeared ** * 
from tlje British caliip without giving any intimation of his intention. These 
facts seeitned to indicate that both the chiefs and the troops had for the time 
forgotten. their dissensions, to- unite in resisting what they regarded as an 
unjustifiable invasion of their native soil, and that therefore the British army, 
instead of having only to chastise a mutinous section of the Gwjdior troops, 
would be opposed by the whole military 
power of the state. Both the governor^ 
general and the eoinmander-in-chief, 
however, wore reluctant to abandon the 
idea of a peaceful campaign, ami con¬ 
tinuing to hope for it, appear to have 
been to stnne extent taken by surprise 
when hostilities actually commenced. 

On the 28th of December, when a 
.small reconnoitring j)arty were examin¬ 
ing the ground at a short distfuico irom 
Chounda, where the Mahratta army had 
taken U 2 > a strong position, the fire from 
the batteries was suddenly opened upon 
them. Whatever room there might have 
been for doubt before, there could be 
none now. The Gwalior troops, so far 
from succumbing without a struggle, 

had taken the initiative, and sent their defiance from the mouth of their noBtiiitio» 
guns. Sir Hugh Gough, the commander-in-chief, was not slow to accept it, 
and both armies immediately j)re])ared for battle. The inequality in point 
of numbera was not so gi’eat as usual in battles in India, the British troops 
mustering about 14,000, with 40 guns, and the Mahrattas 18,000, with 100 guns. 

By eight o’clock on the morning of the 29th, the whole British troops, after mwieof Ma- 
passing over a country rendered extremely difiiciilt by tleep ravines, and cross¬ 
ing the Kohary in three columns, were in their appointed places about a mile 
in front of*Maharajpoor. I’his place, contrary to expectation, avjis found oc*cu- 
pied by the Mahrattas, who during the previous night had taken jwssession of 
it with seven regiments of infantry, each with four guns, which they had 
entrenched. These immediately opened on the British advances^ and rendered 
necessary a change of plan, which is thus described by the comman(fer-in-cKief: 

—“Major-general Littler’s column being exactly in front of Maharajpioor, I 
ordered it to advance direct, while Major-general Valiant’s brigade took it in 
Vot. Ill, 267 



IdKUTENANT GENERAL. LoiU> GoDGII. 
From an engraving by J - R. Jackwu. 



A.l). 1843i 


Battle of Mu- 
liarajpooi*. 


71attle of 
rimiiiar. 


Itigorous 
tormB die- 
luted to 
Gwulioi*. 


482 HTSTOBY OF INDIA! [Book Fill. 

reverse; both supported by Major-general Dennis’s column and the two light 
field batteries. Your lordship must have witnessed with the same pride and 
pleasure that 1 did, the brilliant advance of these columns under their respective 
leaders, the European and native soldiers appearing emulous to prove their 
loyalty and devotion; and here I must do justice to the gallantry of their 
opponents, who received the shock without flinching, their guns doing severe 
execution as we advanced; but nothing could withstand the rush of British 
soldiers. Her majesty’s 39th foot, with their accustomed dash, ably supported 
by the 56th regiment native infantry, drove the enemy from their guns into 
the village, bayoneting the gunners at their posts. Here a most sanguinarj' 
conflief ensued; the Mahratta troops, after discharging their matchlocks, fought 
sword in hand with the most detennined courage. General Valiant’s brigade 
with equal enthu.siasm took Maharajpoor in reverse, and twenty-eight guns 
were captured by this combined movement: so desperate was the resistance, 
that very few of the defendei-s of this very strong position escaped. During 
these operations, Brigadier Scott was opposed by a, body of the enemy’s 
cavaliy on the extreme left, and made some well-executed charges with the 10th 
light cavah-y, most ably supported by Captain Grant’s troop of horse artillery, 
and the 4th lancers, capturing some guns and taking two standards, thus 
thretitening che right flank of the enemy.” After the decisive success at Maha¬ 
rajpoor, the entrenched ])Osition of Cliounda was carried, and the victory was 
complete, the enemy having dispersed and fled, with a loss of 3000 in killed and 
wounded, and of 56 pieces of ordnance, 43 of them of brass. The British loss 
also was severe, amounting in all to 7.97 in killed, wounded, and missing. 

While the main body of the British army was gaining the victory of 
Maharajpoor, the left wing, under General Grey, which had crossed the frontier 
from the south-west, and pushed on rapidly to Punniar, which is only twelve 
miles frtmi Gwalior, was there achieving a similar success again.st another 
Mahratta force of 12,000 men, with forty guns. 

After these victories all idea of further re.sistance was abandoned, and it 
only remained for the governor-general to give effect to his designs in regard 
to Scindia’s dominions. Hitherto he had always taHced of Gwalior as an 
independent state, but he now acted as if he Inui conqjiered it, and not only set 
the rights of the maharanee fiside, but changed the form of its government. In 
future she vuis to be only a ])en8ioner with three lacs of revenue, and no 
political authority, and the administration was to be carried on during the 
maharajah’s minority by what was called a council of regency, in regard to 
which it was stipulated that it “ should act in accordance with the advice of 
the British resident, and that its members should not be liable to be changed, 
or vacancies occasioned by the death of its membei-s filled up, except with the 
sanction of the government of India.” This stipulation, which virtually 
converted Scindia’s dominions into a British dependency, was forthwith secured 



Chap. VJ.] LORD ELLENBOBOTOH EEOALLED. 4B8 

by a regular treaty, which was not so much negotiated as dictated and imposed 
by the govemoy-general at Gwalior. It consisted of twelve articles, of wliicb, 
in addition to the above stipulation, tlie most important were those which 
limited the number of the Gwalior army to 9000 men, of whom not more than 
3000 were to be infantry, with twelve field-guns and 200 gunners with twenty 
other guns; and supplied the place of the troops disbanded by a large increase 
of the contingent or subsidiary force, provided by the British, and paid for by 
the Gwalior government. The foii of Gwalior was in future to be garrisoned 
by the contingent, and Brigadier Stubbs, who commanded the contingent, was 
moreover appointed com¬ 
mandant of the maharajah’s 
forces. Truly might the 
governor-general boast that 
the result of the victories 
gained over the Gwalior 
troops had been “the secure 
estjiblishment of British su- 
pi-emacy,” but truly also 
might it at the same time 
have been declaimed that this 
result had only been ob¬ 
tained by vigorously exer¬ 
cising all the rights of con¬ 
quest while hypocriticfilly 
disclaiming them. 

While the governor-general wms carrying matters witli a high hand at the 
court of Gwalior, he was himself undergoing a severe ordeal in the court of 
directors. By his absurd proclamation of the gates, he had destroyed confidence 
in the soundness of his judgment, and the wliolc course of his administration 
so little accorded with the pacific policy to which he hjid pledged himself on 
leaving England, that serious doubts began to be entertained as to his fitness 
to govern India. His policy in regard to Scinde was particularly objected to. 
He had concocted a serie| of charges against the Ameers on insufficient evidence, 
and then made them tfie pretext for impo.sing a penal treaty, to wdiich he 
might have foreseen that they never would submit without coercion. In this 
way, when the exhaustion of the Indian treasury by the disasters of Afghanistan 
made it most desirable that peace should be maintained, he provoked a war of 
the most formidable description, which, but for the singular ability of the 
military commander, might have proved ruinous, and which, after the most 
brilliant victories, had only added to our already overgrown Indian empire a 
tract* of territory which for years to come would not pay the expense ’ of 
goveming it. His policy in Gwalior was of a similar description, and there 



Tiik Kino op (Jwaiacui. —From Soltykolf, Yuj-age Uaiie riiule. 


A.D. 1843. 


Toima dic¬ 
tated to 
Gwalior. 


Ijorci Kllon- 
borougli re¬ 
called by the 
directoi’a. 



A^. 18<4. 


T^rd Kllen-' 
borough’s 
rouall. 


Character of 
his adiniuis- 
trati 


484 HISTOEY or INDIA. [Book VIIl. 

was rec^son to suspect, from hints which he had thrown out, that he was medi¬ 
tating st greater war than any he had yet carried on. Such were the leading 
public grounds on which Lord Ellenborough was assailed, but he might perhaps 
have passed imscathed through the ordeal to which they subjected him, had 
he nut imprudently provoked jealousies and animosities between the two great 
branches of the public service, by the mode in which his patronage was distri¬ 
buted. Lord Aucklaixd had set him the example of making the political 
subordinate to the military department, when special circumstances seemed to 
require it; but this, which had hitherto been the exception, was made by Lord 
Ellenborough the rule, so much so indeed, that he both sjxoke and acted as if 
he thought that the first qualification for office of any kind was to be a soldier. 
Conduct thus systematically pursued was naturally re.scnted by the civil 
service, and his lordship arrayed against him.self many of the ablest and most 
influential of Indian officials. The effect of this ho,stility .soon became apparent 
at the India House, and the question of recalling the governor-general was 
seriously mooted among the directors. This power of recall they undoubtedly 
jxossessed, and though they had never before exercised it, they saw so much to 
<lisapprove in the mode in which the government of India was conducted, that 
nothing but the urgent remonstrance t)f the British cabinet pi’evented them 
from exercising it. At last, howeA'er, even remonstrance proved unavailing, 
and on the 21st of April, 1844, Sir Robert Peel, then prime-minister, announced, 
in amswer to a question put to him by Mr. Macaulay, “that on Wednesday 
last her majesty’s government received a communication from the court of 
directors that they had exercised the jxower which the law gives them to recall 
at their will and ])le.'isure the Governor-general of India.” This announcement 
is said to have been received with loud cheers from the opposition benches, 
though it could hardly be called a party triumph, as eighteen of the twenty- 
four directors were supporters of the ministry, and yet the vote of recall had 
been unanimous. This fact affords a strong presumption that it was not 
dictated by factious or improper motives, but as the papers which could have 
explained the whole matter were withheld, on the ground tliat they could not 
be made public without injury to the public service, we are necessarily left 
to conjecture. This is so far unfortunate for the directors, as it left them 
without the means of replying effectively to a sjieech made against them in 
the House of Lords by so high an authority as the Duke of Wellington, who 
stigmatized the recall as “an act of indi.scretion at least,” and as “the most 
indi.screet exercise of power” he had ever known. 

The deep mortification felt by Lord Ellenborough at his abrupt recall, was 
allayed to some extent on finding that he was to be succeeded by his own 
brother-in-law, who would naturally be more tender of the reputation qf Ijis 
predecessor than could have been expected froth a stranger, and would innovate 
as little as possible on the policy which he had pursued. That this was the 



Chap. VII.] 


mR .HENKY HARDINGE. 


485 . 


view taken by Lord Ellenborough himself appears from one ot his letters to 
Sir Charles Napier, “You will have heard that the court of directors has 
done as I expected. I am recalled. Fortunately Sir Henry Hardinge is my 
successor, and he will carry out all my views with the advantage of having 
military experience.” Military experi¬ 
ence seems indeed to have been regarded 
by his lordship as the most essential 
qualification of the Governor-general of 
India, and hence, during his whole ad¬ 
ministration, he had done little more than 
(mdeavour to acquire it. Under the in¬ 
fluence of this ruling passion he liad 
turned his back on the seat of govern¬ 
ment at Calcutta, as if he had no civil 
duties to perform. It were vain there¬ 
fore to search the annals of his govern 
nient for any important internal reforms. 

For these he had little time, and, it is to 
be presumed, still less taste, since he 
took care, in the course of a speech 
delivered at a farewell entertainment, 
to make the following announcement: “The only rcgi-et 1 feel at leaving 
India is that of being separated from the army. The most agreeable, the 
most interesting period of ray life has been that which I have j»assed here in 
cantonments and in camps.” 



Viscount Harutnoe. 

Alter a portrait to* Sir IV Roiie, IhA- 


CHAPTER VII. 


Sii- Honry Hardinge goveruor-gener.al—His first measures—^Tlireateniug aspect of affairs in tlie I’unjal)— 
State of the court of Lahore—Disorder and military ascendency—British frontier thi-eatened— 
Assemblage of troops—Invasion of the British territories and commencement of hostilities -Battle 
of Moodkee—Battle of Ferozesliah—Battle of Aliwal—Battle of Sobraon—Termination of tlu; first 
Punjab war—Treaty of jxsace—Proceedings in Scinde—Sir Charles Napier’s hill campaign—Resig¬ 
nation of the governor-general. 

N the 14th of July, 1844, Lord Ellenborough left Calcutta, 
tind on tlifi 23d of the same month. Sir Henry Hardinge anived, 
and entered immediately on the duties of his office. The first 
months of his government were employed in making judicious 
armngements for replacing the civil service in its proper position; 
in removing grievances, and at the same time maintaining strict discipline *in 
tlie native aimy; in promoting education, and in opening up new sources of 



A n. 1844.- 


Character of 
Lord EUeii> 
borough's 
miniinistra' 

tioii. 


Lotd 

lianliuge'a 

liolicy. 





A.D. 1S44 


Unfriendly 
relations 
witJi tlio 
Miklm. 


Rai)id 8UO- 
cessioii of 
nilors in 
Ijuhore. 


48!B HISTOEY of INDIA. [Book VIII. 

prosperity by encouraging steam navigation and the construction of railways. 
While he was thus engaged in peaceful measures, it was daily becoming 
apparent that he would soon be obliged to abandon them for others of an 
opposite character. The Punjab had fallen into a state bordering on anarchy, 
and a large Sikh army, wluch defied all control, had assumed a menacing 
attitude on the British firontier. 

After tlie death of Runjeet Sing in 1839, the friendly relations which he 
had always carefully maintained underwent a sudden change. His son 
Khurruk Sing, who succeeded him, possessed none of his talent, and ruled only 
in name under his own son Nonehal Sing. This youth was unfortunately as 
hostile as his grandfather had been friendly to British interests, but before his 
hostility could be fully developed he was killed by a stone or beam which fell 
upon him as he was pas,sing under a gate. This tragical event, though repre¬ 
sented as an accident, was in fact a murder, which had been planned for the 
j)urpose of securing the throne for another claimant. This was Shere Sing, who 
was by repute one of Runjeet Sing’s sons, but not acknowledged by him, because 
he suspected his wife’s fidelity. Still, however, his status had been so far 
recognized that he was allowed to rank as one of the Lahore princes, and hence 
when both Khurruk Sing, who had jireviously died, and Nonehal Sing were 
removed, he had no difficulty in finding numerous supporters. Among these, 
by far the most infiuential was Dhyan Sing, who had been prime-minister to 
Runjeet Sing, and hated Khurruk Sing and his son for having dismissed him in 
order to make way for a worthless favourite. Notwithstanding this support 
Shere Sing failed at first to obtain the object of his ambition. His opponent 
was Chund Koonwur, Khurruk Sing’s widow, who having placed herself at the 
head of a powerful party, drove him from the capital, and was proclaimed 
queen. By the advice of Dhyan Sing he withdrew from the contest to wait 
his opportunity. He had not to wait long, for the ranee’s government proved 
a failure, and the old wuzeer having persuaded the soldiers that they ought not 
to submit to .a woman’s rule, Shere Sing was recalled. The ranee, still in 
possession of the capital, prepared to resist his entrance, till the desertion of the 
troops convinced her that her cau.se was hopeless. 

Shere Sing proved unworthy of the throne to which he had been raised. 
He hiid long been addicted to vicious indulgences, and shortly after his eleva¬ 
tion, having thrown off all restraint, became a mere drunkard and debauchee. 
The pernicious consequences were not at first fully developed, as Dhyan Sing, 
in whom all power now centred, was an able admini.strator, but ultimately the 
intrigues of Shere Sing’s boon companions began to prevail, and the wuzeer 
was not only threatened with disgrace, but furnished with evidence which 
coq,vinced him that his life was in danger. Under the influence of these fears 
he sanctioned the assassination of the maharajah. This assassination was 
immediately followed by that of his son Pertaub Sing. Dhyan Sing himself 




Chap. VII.] 


MILITABY DESPOTISM IN LAHORE. 


487 


was not permitted to escape, and was shot dead by Ajeet Siug, the same cliief a.d. ima.- 
who had murdered his master. After all these atrocities, and a short interval, 
during which a kind of anarchy prevailed, Dhuleep Sing, another son of 
Runjeet Sing, was placed upon the throne, and Heera Sing, the son of the 
murdered wuzeer, succeeded him as prime-minister. The army, now conscious 
from the part which they had played in effecting these changes that the whole 
jjower was in their hands, began to clamour for increased pay, and never hesi¬ 
tated, whenever their demands were refused, to take summary vengeance on the 
individuals obnoxious to them. In this way Heera Sing met his deatlj, and 
his successor Juwaheer Sing, the uncle of the new maharajah, who was a mere 
hoy, shared the same fate. By this last event the government of Lahore Avas 
left without any administrative head, and the ranee, Dhuleep Sing’s mother, 
in her capacity as guardian, assumed the direction of affairs. Her authority, 
however, was merely nominal, and all real power was usurped by the army, 
who exercised it by means of delegates called punches. These issued their I’owc. <.f ti.e 

amiv. 

imperious mandates, which the ranee and her advisers, however reluctant, durst 
not refuse to obey. The course which this military despotism could hardly fail 
to take had for some time been foreseen. The soldiers wore sufficient in 
iiumbei’s to form a mighty host, and possessed inexhaustible supplies of military 
stores; but there was no field on which they could display their prowess and 
enrich themselves with plunder, unless they were to invade the British terri¬ 
tories. The temptation was under the circum,stances irresistible, and notwith¬ 
standing the aversion of the ranee she was obliged to give a formal assent to 
this unprovoked war. While this was the general resolution of the army, and 
in appearance at least that of the government also, Gholab Sing, the chief of 
Jurnmoo, and brother of the murdered wuzeer, Dhyan Sing, managed to keej> 
aloof and dexterously play a double game, professing secret friendship to the 
British government, while externally complying with the demands of the aimy 
so as not to bring down its vengeance. 

While these crimes and revolutions were taking tdace at Lahore, and a J"'™'"'*"'' 

1 1 . -I * UritiBh ti-r 

lortDidable araiy, subject to no control, was assembled on the frontiers^ the riioryi)yu 
British could not remain as unconcerned spectators, and run the risk of being 
overwhelmed by the bursting of a storm for which they had made no prepara¬ 
tions. Lord Ellenborough had placed the threatening aspect of affaire in the 
Punjab in the foreground, when seeking to justify the coercion he was about to 
use towards Gwalior, and the force then employed had been pushed forward to 
tiike up centrical positions at Ferozepoor, Loodiana, and Umballa. So strong, 
however, was the known desire of the directors for a period of peace, that Sir 
Henry Hardinge proceeded with the utmost caution, and had barely completed 
the necessary measures of precaution when the time for action arrived. Having: 
leached Umballa on the 2d of December, 1845, he moved with his camp on the 
Cth towards Loodiana, to fulfil his previously announced intention of visiting 



A.D. 1845. 


PrticUnia 
tion of th«* 
govoriM*r- 
general. 


I'repjirjitioiis 

for bivttlu. 


488 HI8T0RY OF INDIA. [Rook VIIT. 

tlie Sikh protected states, according to 4he usual custom of Ms predecessors. 
Hi« movements were made in as peaceful a manner as possible, because he was 
not only anxious not to furnish the Sikhs with any pretext for hostilities, but 
had not ceased to hope for an amicable settlement. He only deemed it probable 
that some act of aggression miglit be committed by parties of plunderers, for 
the purpose of compelling the British government to interfere, and as nothing 
was further from Ms wish than to be thus involved in war, he resolvfed to carry 
his forbearance as far as possible. The wisdom of this resolution may be ques¬ 
tioned. A more spirited conduct might liave made the Sikhs pause, whereas 
forbearance, being only regarded by them as a symptom of fear, probably 
hastened the crisis. On the 13th of December information was received that 
the Sikh army had crossed the Sutlej, and was concentrating in great force on 
the left bank of the river within the British territory. On the same day Sir 
Henry Hardinge issued a proclamation which concluded thus:—“The Sikh 
anny has now, without a shadow of provocation, invaded the British tenitories. 
The governor-general must therefore take measures for effectually protecting 
the British provinces, for vindicating the authority of the British government, 
.and for punishing the violators of treaties and the disturbers of public peace. 
The governor-genei’al hereby declares the possessions of Maharajah Dhuleep 
Sing on the left or British banks of the Sutlej confiscated or annexed to the 
British tendtories.” 

Ferozepoor was at this time held by a body of about 10,000 troops, with 
twenty-four guns, under command of General Sii- John Littler. This place 
being only fifty miles S S.E. of Lahore, and thrice as far north-west of Umbalhi, 
where OJi the 11th of December Sir Thomas Gough, the commander-in-chief 
had his he.ad-quarters, was seriously threatened the moment the Siklrs, headed 
by an able leader of the name of Tej Sing, had crossed the Sutlej. Their 
designs upon it were indeed at once manifested, for they immediately invested 
it on one side, while the remainder of their force jjrocecded ten miles in advance 
to Ferozeshah, evidently for the purpose of intercepting the forces now advanc¬ 
ing for its relief from Umballa and Loodiana. On the IGth of December the 
two British divisions thus advancing formed a junction at Bussean, ami 
continued their march in the direction of Moodkee, which is only twenty-five 
miles south-east of Ferozepoor. It was reached on the 18th, and as the few 
Sikh cavalry who occupied it retired as the British advance appeared, it was 
not supposed that an enc.ounter was at hand. Under this impression the 
British ti'oops took up their encamping ground, and were preparing refresh¬ 
ments after a fatiguing march of twenty-two miles, when .scouts arrived with 
the intelligence that the enemy were hastening forward, and were only three 
miles distant. They had, it appeared, begun to entrench themselves at Feroze¬ 
shah, and on learning the arrival of the British at Moodkee, resolved at once 
to assume the aggressive, in the belief that they would not have to encounter 



Chap. VII.] BATTLE OF MOODKEE. 489 

the whole British force, but only its advanced guard. The equality of numbers 
was much nearer than they supposed, for the British mustered 12,350 rank and 
lile, and forty-two guns, while the Sikhs did not amount to more than 30,000, 
with only forty guns, most of the latter, however, of much heayier metal than 
those of the British, 
which were merely 
the six-pounders of 
the horse-artillery. 

It was about 
three in the after¬ 
noon when the ap¬ 
proach of tlie enemy 
was announced, and 
the British troops, 
already in a state 
of great exhaustion, 
liad not more than 
sufficient time to 
get under arms and 
move to their posi¬ 
tions, when they 
were ordered to ad¬ 
vance to the attack. Tliey had not proceeded above two miles when they 
found the enemy in position. The battle, which immediately commenced, 
is thus described in Sir Hugh Gough’s despatch: “ The country is a dead 
flat, covered at short intervals with a low, but in some places thick jhow 
jungle, and dotted with sandy hillocks. The enemy screened their infantry 
and artillery behind this jungle, and such undulations as the ground 
afforded, and whilst our twelve battalions fonned from echelon of brigade 
into line, opened a very severe cannonade upon our advancing troops, which 
was vigorously replied to by the battery of horse-artillery under Brigadier 
Brooke, which was soon joined by the two light field-batteries. The rapid and 
well-directed fire of our artillery appeared soon to paralyze that of the enemy; 
and, as it was necessary to complete our infantry dispositions without advancing 
the artillery too near to the jungle, I directed the cavalry, under Brigadiers 
White and Gough, to make a flank movement on the enemy’s left, with a view 
of threatening and turning that flank if possible. With praiseworthy gallantry 
the 3d light dragoons, with the 2d brigade of cavalry, consisting of the body¬ 
guard and 5th light cavalry, with a portion of the 4th lancers, turned the left 

' 1, From a suit of armour iu the Tower of Lou- 3, A chief on horsehaok, from Soltykoff’s Halitantg 
^on* 2, An Akalee, from the Honourable Miss de PInde. i and 6, Soldiers, from the Hon. C. S, 
Eden’s Portraitg of the Prince* and People of India. Hardinge’s Becollectione of India. 

Vot. III. 



GitouP or SiKUS.i 


A.D. lS4r> 

Battle of 
Mooflkee. 


268 



490 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book VIII, 


A.D. 1845. 


Battle of 
Moodkeo. 


Battle of 
ForcuseeUah. 


of the Sikh army, and sweeping along the whole rear of its infantry and guns, 
silenced for a time the latter, and put their numerous cavalry to flight. Whilst 
this movement was taking place on the enemy’s left, I directed the remainder 
of the 4th lancers, the 9th irregular cavalry, under Brigadier Mactier, with a 
light field-battery, to threaten their right. This manoeuvre was also successful. 
Had not the infantry and guns of the enemy been screened by the jungle, these 
brilliant charges of the cavalry would have been productive of greater effect. 
When the infantry advanced to the attack. Brigadier Brooke rapidly pushed on 
his horse artillery close to the jungle, and the cannonade was resumed on both 
sides. The infantry, under Major-generals Sir Harry Smith, Gilbert, and Sir 
John M'Caskill, attacked in echelon of lines the enemy’s infantry, almost 
invisible amongst wood and the approaching darkness of night. The opposition 
of the enemy Avas such as might have been expected from troops who had 
everything at stake, and who had long vaunted of being irresistible. Their 
ample and extended line, from their great superiority of numbers, far outflanked 
ours, but this was counteracted by the flank movements of our cavalry. The 
attack of the infantry now commenced, and the roll of fire from this ])Owerful 
arm soon convinced the Sikh army that they had met with a foe they little 
expected; and their whole force was driven from position after position with 
great slaughter, and the loss of seventeen pieces of artillery, some of them of 
heavy calibre; our infantry using that never-failing weapon, the bayonet, 
wherever the enemy stood. Night only saved them from worse disaster, for 
this stout conflict was maintained dui-ing an hour and a half of dim starlight, 
amidst a cloud of dust from the sandy plain, which yet more obscured every 
object.” The victory though glorious was dearly purchased, the British loss 
amounting to 872, of whom 215 were killed and G57 wounded. Among the 
former were two officers, who had acquired distinction in Afghanistan—Sir 
John M'Caskill, who was shot dead while gallantly leading his division, and 
Sir Robert Sale, who was fatally wounded, and survived only a few days. 

The British troops having returned to their camp at midnight, halted during 
the 19th and 20th. During this interval two heavy guns reached Moodkee, 
escorted by her majesty’s 29th, the 1st European infantry, and the 11th and 
41st native infantry, and an express was sent off to Sir John Littler, directing 
him to join with as many troops as he could safely bring, without compromis¬ 
ing the safety of Feroze})oor. He immediately staidicd with 5000 foot, two 
regiments of cavalry, and twenty-one field guns, and on the 21st succeeded in 
forming a junction with the main army, which, disencumbered of its baggage, 
Avhich had been left with the wounded at Moodkee under sufficient protection, 
was now hastening to the attack of the entrenched camp at Ferozeshah. Dur¬ 
ing the operations which followed, the governor-general, who had volunteered 
to act as second in command, had charge of the left wing of the army, while 
the commander-in-chief personally conducted the right. The British force 



Chap. VII.] 


BATTLE OF FEROZESHAH. 


491 


consisted of 16,700 men, and sixty-nine guns, chiefly horse-artiflery; the Sikhs 
mustered about 60,000 men, with 108 pieces of cannon of heavy calibre. This 
superiority of numbers was not the only advantage of the enemy, for they 
occupied an entrenched camp, which extended in the form of a parallelogram, 
about a mile in length and half a mile in breadth, and included within its area 
the strong village of Ferozeshah. For a description of the operations we must 
again have recourse to the commander-in-chief’s despatch. “A veiy heavy 
cannonade was opened by the enemy, who had dispersed over their position 
upwards of one hundred guns, more than forty of which were of battering calibre; 
these kept up a heavy and well-directed fire, which tlie practice of our far less 
numerous artillery, of much lighter metal, checked in some degree, but could not 
silence; finally, in the face of a storm of .shot and shell, our infantiy advanced 
and carried these formidable entrenchments; they threw themselves upon their 
guns, and with matchless gallantry wrested them from the enemy, but when the 
batteries were partially within our grasp, our soldiers had to face such a fii’c of 
musketry from the Sikh infantry, arrayed behind their guns, that in spite of 
the moat heroic effbi’ts, a portion only of the entrenchments could be carried. 
Night fell while the conflict was everywhere raging. Although I now brought 
up Major-general Sir Harry Smith’s division, and he captured and long retained 
another point of the position, and her majesty’s 3d light dragoons charged and 
took some of the most formidable batteries, yet the enemy remained in posses¬ 
sion of a considerable portion of the gr’eat quadrangle, whilst our troojw, inter¬ 
mingled with theirs, kept possession of the remainder, and finally bivouacked 
upon it, exhausted by their gallant efforts, greatly reduced in numbers, and 
suffering extremely from thirst, yet animated by an indomitable spirit. In 
tins state of things the long night wore away. Near the middle of it one of 
their heavy guns was advanced, and played with deadly effect upon our trooj^s. 
Lieutenant-general Sir Henry Hardinge immediately formed her majesty’s 
80th foot and the 1 st European light infantry. They were led to the attack 
by their commanding ofiicers, and animated in their exertions by Lieutenant- 
colonel Wood (aide-de-camp to the lieutenant-general), who was wounded in 
the outset. The 80th captui’ed the gun, and the enemy, dismayed by this 
counter-check, did not venture to press on further. During the whole night, 
however, they continued to harass our troops by fire of artillery, wherever 
moonlight discovered our position. But with daylight of the 22d came retribu¬ 
tion. Our infantry formed line, supported on both flanks by horse-artillery, 
whilst a fire was opened from our centre by such of our heavy guns a.s 
remained effective, aided by a flight of rockets. A masked batteiy played 
with great effect upon this point, dismounting one piece and blowing up our 
tumbrils. At this moment Lieutenant-general Sir Henry Hardinge placed 
himself at the head of the left, whilst I rode at the head of the right wing. 
Our line advanced, and unchecked by the enemy’s fire, drove them rapidly out 


A.D. 1845. 


Battle of 
Ferozeslialb 



A.D. 184A 


Battle of 
Feroxeehah. 


Critical poai- 
tion of the 
British. 


492 HISTOEY or INDIA. [Book VIII. 

of the village of Ferozeahah aud their encampment; then changing front to its 
left, on its centre, our force continued to sweep the camp, bearing down ail 
opposition, and dislodged the enemy from their whole position. The line then 
halted, as if on a day of manoeuvre, receiving its two leaders as they rode along 
in front with a gratifying cheer, and displaying the captured standards of the 
Khalsa army. We had taken upwards of seventy-three pieces of cannon, and 
were masters of the whole field. The force assumed a position on the ground 
which it had won, but even here its labours were not to cease. In the course of 
two hours. Sirdar Tej Sing, who had commanded in the last great battle, brought 
up from the vicinity of Ferozepoor fresh battalions, and a large field of artillery, 
supported by 30,000 Ghorepurras, hitherto encamped near the river. He drove 
in our cavalry parties, and made strenuous efforts to regain the position t)f 
Ferozeshah. This attempt was defeated; but its failure had scarcely become 
manifest when the sirdar renewed the contest with more troops and a large 
artillery. He commenced by a combination against our left flank, and when 
this was frustrated, made such a demonstration against the captured village as 
compelled us to change our whole front to the right. His guns during this 
manoeuvre maintained one incessant fire, while our artillery ammunition being 
completely expended in these protracted combats we were unable to answer 
him with a single shot. I now directed our almost exhausted cavaliy to 
threaten both flanks at once, preparing the infantry to advance in support, 
which apparently caused him suddenly to cease his fire and to abandon the 
field.” 

It is obvious from the above despatch, and the inferences which though 
not mentioned may be legitimately drawn from it, that the British army was 
at one time in great j)eril, and that had the Sikhs di.splayed as much skill in 
taking advantage of their position as valour in defending it, the ^operations 
which teraiinated so honourably for the British arms on the 22d, might have 
had a very different termination on the 21st, On the evening of that day, the 
Sikhs not only retained po.ssession of a large portion of their entrenched camp, 
but their cavalry and infantry ke])t moving about, harassing and firing on the 
British as they lay bivouacked, and feared to make any return lest it should 
only discover their position and increase their danger. “ Thi.s,” as Maegregor 
justly remarks in his Uisten'y of the Sihhs (vol. ii. p. 105), “was a fearful 
position to be in, and from the intervals between the European infantry regi¬ 
ments and the native brigades with them being left vacant, there was no 
possibility of forming a line, or acting in concert; portions of one regiment got 
mixed up with more of another in the entrenchment, and in the darkness of the 
night could not regain their respective positions. If a regiment had attempted 
to move right or left in search of another, the Sikh guns were sure to be 
directed to the spot; and where the 50th bivouacked, Sir Hany Smith, with 
admirable prudence, forbade a shqt to be fired in return for any that might be 



Chap. VII.] 


BATTLE OF ALIWAL. 


493 


directed against his position. The white covers weye taken off the caps which a.d. i845. 
served as marks for the enemy, and every means adopted for keeping the men 
out of the hostile fire. The gallant soldiers who had, at the point of the critical posi- 
bayonet, captured the batteries of the Sikhs, were thus glad to actually conceal 
themselves under the darkness of night. It was not flight, but as near an 
approach to it as can well be conceived; and no wonder if, at this time, the 
Governor-general of India felt the precarious position of the troops. Never in 
the annals of warfare in India had matters attained such a threatening crisia” 

A victory so obstinately contested was of 
necessity dearly purchased. The British 
loss amounted to 2415, of whom 694 were 
killed, and 1721 wounded; the loss of the 
Sikhs was roughly estimated at four times 
that of the British. 

On their defeat at Ferozeshah the 
Sikhs had hastened to place the Sutlej be¬ 
tween themselves and their conquerors. 

Their expectation was that they would 
be immediately puraued. Thi.s, however, 
was deemed impracticable, or at least 
imprudent, until Sir John Grey, who was 
advancing from Meerut with an auxiliary 

force and a powerful battering train majob-gesebai, sib harby g. w. smith, g.c.b. 

.should arrive. Emboldened by this de- 

lay, which they mistook for fear or indeci.sion, the Sikhs prepared to nattioof 
recross the river, and with this view began to construct a new bridge of boats 
a little below Hurreekee. Meanwhile, Sir Harry Smith had been detached 
with a single brigade of his division, and a light field-battery, against the town 
and fort of Durrumkote, situated on the road from Ferozepoor to Loodiana 
No sooner had this task been successfully accomplished than it became necessary 
to march to the relief of Loodiana, which was held by only three battalions of 
native infantry under Brigadier Godby, and was threatened by Runjoor Sing 
at the head of a body of 10,000 Sikhs, who had crossed the Sutlej at Phillour, 
and entrenched themselves in the vicinity. Sir Harry started with his small 
force from Durrumkote, and proceeding along the direct road to Loodiana was 
encountered by Runjoor Sing, who, relying on his vast superiority of numbers, 
endeavoured to intercept his progress by moving in a line parallel to him, and 
at length opening upon him with a furious cannonade. The British commander, 
unable to reply effectually, was obliged to submit to the loss of a large portion 
of his baggage, but succeeded, by a series of dexterous manoeuvres, in effecting 
his communication with Loodiana. In addition to the reinforcement obtained 
from Brigadier Godby, he shortly after obtained another of still more conse- 




A D. 1845 


Battle of 
AUwal. 


494 HISTORY OF INDIA. [Book VIIT. 

. quence by the arrival of his second brigade, "which had moved to his support 
under Brigadier Wheeler. It was now Sir Harry’s turn to assume the offensive, 
and Runjoor Sing retired to his entrenched camp. Even at this time he had a 
great superiority of force, for the British only mustered about 10,000 men, with 
thirty-two guns, while the Sikhs had 15,000 men, with fifty-six guns. On the 
2Gt]i of January, 184G, this disparity was still further increased by the arrival 
of 4000 regular troops, twelve pieces of artillery, and a large force of cavalry. 
Thus strengthened, Runjoor Sing was obliged to yield to the impatience of his 

troops, who imagining 
that the British retreat 
from the cannonade and 
submission to the loss of 
their baggage was equi¬ 
valent to a confession of 
their inability to main¬ 
tain the conflict, were 
confident of obtaining an 
easy victory. They ac¬ 
cordingly began to ad¬ 
vance, and on the 28th, 
when the Britisli came 
in sight of them, stood 
drawn up close to the 
village of Aliwal, about 
eighteen miles west of 
Loodiana, their left rest¬ 
ing upon their entrench¬ 
ed camp, and their right 
occupying a ridge. After 
some manoeuvres, “per¬ 
formed,” says Sir Harry Smith, “with the celerity and precision of the most cor¬ 
rect field-day,” the British line advanced, but, continues the despatch, “scarcely 
had it moved forward 150 yards when, at ten o’clock, the enemy opened a fierce 
cannonade from his whole line. At first his balls fell short, but quickly reached 
us. Thus upon him, and capable of better ascertaining his position, I was com¬ 
pelled to halt the line, though under fire, for a few moments, until I ascertained 
that by bringing up my right, and carrying the village of Aliwal, I could with 
great effect precipitate myself upon his left and centre. I therefore quickly 
brought up Brigadier Godby’s brigade, and with it and the 1st brigade, under 
Brigadier Hicks, made a rapid and noble charge, carried the village and two guns 
of large calibre. The line I ordered to advance, her majesty’s 31st foot and the 
native regiments contending for the front, and the battle became general The 



a a, Firat Britisli line, 
h 1>, Advance to attack. 

€ c, Position after breaking enemy's 
lino. 

d (1, Sikh cavalry threatening the left 
flank. 

e e, Colonel Cnreton turning the left 
flank of the enemy, 
f f. Charge of throe trooj[» of 8d light 
cavalry, tinder Major Angelo, 
g g, Cliarge of right wing of the ICth 
laiicei-B. 


h h, Charge of 3d squadron, 
m m, Cliargu of 4th squadron, 
n n, Charge of 3d cavalry, 
oo, Advance of two tmojiB of fl.A., 

wit.1i font, niid 5int.1i N f 

p p, Left wing, after driving the ene* 
niy from Boondra. 

q q, Village of Aliwal stormed by the 
Slst Foot and Nussereen bat. 
r r, Batteries (not occupied). 

& B, Final i)osition of the British after 
the battle. 





Chap. VII.] 


BATTLE OF SOBEAON. 


495 


enemy had a numerous body of cavalry on the heights to his left, and I ordered a.d. 1845 . 
Brigadier Cureton to bring up the right brigade of cavalry, who in the most 
gallant manner dashed in among them, and drove them back upon their infantry. Battle of 
Meanwhile a second gallant charge to my right was made by the light cavahy 
and the body-guard. The Shikawatee brigade was moved well to the right in 
support of Brigadier Cureton. When I observed the enemy’s encampment, and 
saw it was full of infantry, 1 brought upon it Brigadier Godby’s brigade by 
changing front, and taking the enemy’s infantry in reverse. They drove them 
before them, and took some guns without a check. Brigadiers Wheeler and 
Wilson had in the meanwhile been equally successful on their side in driving 
back the troops, and capturing the guns of the enemy, and noticing remained 
but to dispossess them of the neighbouring village of Boondra, which they had 
strongly occupied in order to cover their retreat, and secure their passage across 
the river.” • This service having been gallantly achieved, “the battle,” continues 
the despatch, “was won, our troops advancing with the most iierfect order to 
the common focus, the passage of the river. The enemy completely hemmed 
in were fleeing from our fire, and precipitating themselves in disordered masses 
into the ford and boats in the utmost confusion and consternation. Our eight- 
inch howitzers soon began to play upon their boats, when the debris of the 
Sikh army appeared upon the opposite and high bank of the river, fleeing in 
every direction.” 

The main body of the British army moving up by the left bank of the strong jnm 
Sutlej, encamped on the 18th of January in the vicinity of Khodawala, nearly sikiw, 
opposite to the point where the Sikhs had constructed their new bridge. 

Having been permitted to complete this work without molestation, they had 
greatly strengthened it by a tete de pont, thrown up with much military skill 
on the left bank, and then proceeded, under the direction, it is said, of a Spanish 
engineer named Hobron, to convert it into an entrenched camp of the most 
formidable description. The disasters which they had already experienced in the 
field left them no inclination to pursue that plan of warfare; but the stout 
resistance which they had been enabled to make under cover of their entrench¬ 
ments at Ferozeshah, had convinced them that within the walls of a new camp 
of still stronger construction they would be able to repel any attack that could 
be made upon them. They had accordingly occupied it with 30,000 of tlieir 
best troops, and lined its battlements with a numerous and powerful ai-tillery. 

The British army, after waiting at Khodawala for the arrival of heavy ordnance 
and the junction of Sir Harry Smith with his victorious force, moved out of 
camp at three in the morning of the 10th of February. The Sikhs had con¬ 
centrated their whole force within their entrenchments. It had been intended 
that the British battery and field artillery, which was arranged in an extended 
semicircle, so as to embrace all the Sikh works within its fire, should commence 
its caaanonade at daybreak, but so heavy a mist hung over the plain and the 



496 


HISTOEY OF INDIA. 


[Book VIII. 


A.D. 1845. 


Hattie of 
Sobraon. 


Sketch to illustrolc. 
THE BATTLE OF 

SOBEAOIsr 
FchlO^^OSie. 



river that it became necessary to wait till the rays of the sun had cleared it 
away. Meanwhile the different corps had taken up the positions previously 
assigned to them. After describing these positions the despatch continues:— 
“About nine o’clock Brigadier Stacey’s brigade, supported on either flank by 
Captains Horsford and Fordyce’s batteries, and Lieutenant-colonel Lane’s troop 

of horse-artillery, moved 
to the attack in ad¬ 
mirable order. The in¬ 
fantry and guns aided 
each other correlatively. 
The former marched 
steadily on in line, which 
they halted only to 
correct whefi necessary. 
The latter took up suc¬ 
cessive positions at the 
gallop, until at length 
they were within 300 
yards of the heavy 
batteries of the Sikhs; 
but notwithstanding the 
regularity, and coolness, 
and scientific character 
of this assault, which 
Brigadier Wilkinson well supjwrted, so hot was the fire of cannon, musketry, 
and zumboorucks (camel-swivels) kept tip by the Khalsa troops, that it seemed 
for some moments imposisible that the entrenchments could be won under it; but 
soon persevering gallantly triumphed, and the whole army had the satisfaction 
of seeing the gallant Brigadier Stacey’s soldiers driving the Sikhs in confusion 
before them within the area of their encampment. The 10th foot, now for the 
first time brought into serious contact with the enemy, greatly distinguished them¬ 
selves. This regiment never fired a shot till it got within the works of the enemy. 
The onset of her majesty’s 63d foot was as gallant and effective. The 43d and 
59th native infantry, brigaded with them, emulated both in cool determination. 
At the moment of this first success I directed Brigadier the Honourable T. Ash- 
burnham’s brigade to move on in support, and Major-general Gilbert's and Sir 
Harry Smith’s divisions to throw out their light troops to threaten their works, 
aided by artillery. As these attacks of the right and centre commehced, the 
fire of our heavy guns had first to be directed to the right and then gradually to 
ce^, but at one time the thunder of full 120 pieces of ordnance reverberated in 
this mighty combat through the valley of the Sutlej, and, as it was soon seen 
that the weight of the whole force within the Sikh camp was likely to be 


A A, nhtitth camp. 

2i B, position iiroparatory to attack. 
C O, Heavy ai’tillery. 

I) 1>, TruopB ill the attack. 

E £, Trooiia on the defeat of tlie 
enemy. 

F, Enemy's bridge broken down. 


0, Retreat of tlie enemy, driven into 
tJie deep ford. 

IT TI, Exterior main line of enemy's 
entrenchments. 

1 I, Second and third linee ditto. 

J J, Fourth line ditto. 

K, TeU (le ly/nt. 







Chap. VII.] BATTLE OF SOBEAON. 497 

thro-vm upon the two brigades that had passed its trenches, it became necessary 
to convert into close and serious attacks the demonstrations with skirmishers 
and artillery of the centre and right, and the battle inged with inconceivable 
fury from right to left. The Sikhs, even when at particular points their 
entrenchments were mastered with the bayonet, strove to regain them by the 
fiercest conflict sword in hand. Nor was it until the cavalry of the left, under 
Major-general Sir Joseph Thackwell, had moved forward and ridden through the 
openings of the entrenchments made by our sappers in single file, and re-formed 



as they passed them, and the 3d dragoons, whom no obstacle usually held formid¬ 
able by hoi-se appears to check, had on this day, as at Ferozesliah, galloped over 
and cut down the obstinate defenders of batteries and field-works, and until the 
full weight af three divisions of infantry, with every field-artillery gun which 
could be sent to their aid, had been cast into the scale, that victory finally 
declared for the British. The fire of the Sikhs first slackened, and then nearly 
ceased, and the victors then pressing them on every side precipitated them in 
masses over their bridge and into the Sutlej, which a sudden rise of seven inches 
had rendered hardly fordable. In their efforts to reach the right bank through 
the deepened water, they suffered from our horse-artillery a terrible carnage. 
Hundreds fell under this cannonade; hundreds upon hundreds were drowned in 
attempting the perilous passage. Their awful slaughter, confusion, and dismay 
were such as would have excited compassion in the hearts of their generous 
conquerors, if the Khalsa troops had not, in the early part of the action, sullied 
their gallantry by slaughtering and barbarously mutilating every wounded 
soldier whom, in the vicissitudes of attack, the fortune of war .left at their 
mercy. I must pause in this narrative, especially to notice the deteimined 
hardihood and bravery with which our two battalions of Ghoorkas, the Sirmoor 
and Nusseree, met the Sikhs wherever they were opposed to them. Soldiers of 
VoL. III. 268 


A.D. 1846. 


Battle of 
Sobraoii. 


Overthnm' 
of the SiklM 





498 


HISTOEY €fF IN-BlJJj ’ 


. A‘.r im. 


Battle of 


.Hubnu salon 
of thu BikliH. 


'J'ornm dirt» 
tod trf> thoiu 
in thoir own 
capital. 


small stattire but indomitable spirit. they vied itt .ardent icodrage- in the cbarge 
with'the ^^enadiers of our own nation, and, armed with the short weapon of thejr 
mountains, were » terror to the Sikhs throughout this ^eat combat. SJxty'- 
seven pieces of cannon, up;^ards of SOO camehswivds (zuinbooruOks), numierous 
standards, and vast munitions .of wtir,-captured by our troops,'a.r4 the pledges 
and trophies of our victory..”.. It was indeed a victory most honourable to the 
British arms, and was well described by the governor-general as one of the 
most daring exploits ever achieved; “,hy which in open day a triple line of 
breastworks, flanked by formidable redoubts bristling with artillery, manned 
by thirty-two regular regiments of infantry, was assaulted and carried.” The 
Britbh-loss, which under the circumstances could not but be serious, amounted 
ill Trilled an,d 'funded to 2383; the Sikh loss in the action and in crossing the 
riyer .was estimated at nearly 10,000 men. - 

Great was cohstemation in the Lahore durbar when news of the com¬ 
plete oveitbrow at Sobraon anived. Further resistance was at once seen to be 
hopelessi and notliing .i^mainod but to tiy the effect of negotiation. Gholab 
Sing, who had been, playing the double game formerly referred to, now endea¬ 
voured to-profit by it, and on receiving full powere from the ranee and tlie 
durbar, proceeded to the British camp at the head of a deputation, in the hqpe 
of lieiiig able to act the part of mediator. He airived on the 15tli of Febj’uary, 
while the governor-general was still at Ku.ssoor, and w'as immediately put in 
possession of tlie terms which it had been r(\solved to enforce. He at oiict' 
declared that he was empowered and prepared to accept them, but when bo 
ex])ressed an earnest wish that the .army would now halt, and not advance 
nearer to the capital, the goveruor-gciieral, so fiir from assenting, distinctly told 
him that the treaty, if signed by him at all, would be signed only at Lahore. 

On the 22d of Februaiy, after a brigade of British troops with the 
commander-in-chief at their head had taken militaiy possession of the 
citadel, tlie govenior-genei'al issued a proclamation which commenced thus: 
“The British army has this day occupied the gateway of the citadel qf Lahore, 
the Biulshaliee Mosque, and the Hoozooree Bagli. The remaining part of the 
citadel is the residence of his highness the maharajah, and also tliat of the 
families of the late Maharajah Runjeet Sing, for so many years the faithful ally 
of the British government. In consideration of these circumstances no troops 
will be.posted within the precincts of the palace gate. The aimy of the Sutlej 
has now brought its operations in the field to a close by the dispersion of the 
Sikh army, and the military occupation of Lahore, preceded by a series of the 
most triumphant successes ever recorded in the military history of India. The 
British government, trusting to the faith of treaties, and to the long subsisting 
friendship between the two states, bad limited military preparations to the 
defence of its own frontier. Compelled suddenly to assume the offensive by 
the unprovoked invasion of its territories, the British army under the command 



Chap: vitj ■'rBSAtir'^9® 

of ita distinguished leader‘lias in sixty days defeated the Sikhs in four general ;vd. isia, 
actions, has captured 220 .pieces of finld-artilleryj. and is now at the capital, 
dictating to the lialwre durbar the terms of a treaty, the conditions of which Terms im- 
will teftd to secure thte British provinces from tlm ..repetition of a similar 
outrage.” On the following day at a public durbar, attended by the maharajah 
with his principal ■ 
officers and a numer¬ 
ous suite, the new 
treaty was signed 
and ratified. Of its 
sixteen articles, the 
most important nrere 
those which coufi.s- 
eated all tlifi Sikh 
territories on the loft 
bank of the Sutlej, 
and also the whole 
of the fcr-tflo tract 
on the right bank, 
situated between tire 

Sutlej and Beas, and The Kntbv to luVHonE.- From Uio ITon. C. fl. Ilnrdinge's Ttecollncfioim of Imlm. 

known by the name 

of the Jalindar Doab; stipulated for an indemnity of a crore and a half of mpees 
(£1,500,000), the half oi' fifty lacs to be paid immediately, and tlio croie to be 
discharged by ceding as an equivalent for it “all the hill country between the 




Sikh Guns, captuml at Lahore.—From original^ in Gxiard Chamber, Windaor Ca»tle. Akalek’h (,’ap, 
StXH flNixfjMi, and MATCHLUcKa^-From originals In Tovrer ol London. 


Beas and the Indus, including Cashmere and Huzareh;’’ and while providing 
for the immediate disbandment of the mutinous troops, limited the Lahore army 
in future to twenty-five battalions of infantry, of 800 bayonets each, with 12,000 
CJivalry. 




A.i>. 1840. 


Arrsugt)' 

mentfi.with 

Gholab 

Sing. 


State of 
affaira iu 
BcinOe. 


500 HISTORY OF-INDIA. [Book VIIL 

By the 12th and 13th article, Gholab Sing was to be recognized “as an inde¬ 
pendent sovereign over the territories which the British may make over to him,” 
and “all disputes between Gholab Sing and the Lahore government were to be 
referred to the British.” These articles rendered it necessary to enter into a 
treaty with Gholab Sing himself. It was concluded at Umritsur on the 16th of 
Marcli, 1846, and consisted of ten articles, of which the most important were the 
1st and 3d, by which the British government transferred to him and the heirs 
male of his body, in independent possession, “ all the hilly or mountainous country 
with its dependencies situated to the eastward of the river Indus, and westward 
of the river Ravee, including Chumba, and excluding Lahool, being part of the 
tenitory ceded to the British government by the Lahore stateand ho in con¬ 
sideration of this transfer agreed to pay to.the British government “seventy-five 

lacs of rupees, fifty lacs to be paid on the 
ratification of this treaty, and twenty-five 
lacs on or before the 1 st of October of the 
current year, A.D. 1846.” The Lahore dur¬ 
bar, aware that the troops had hitherto 
been their masters, were afraid of the con¬ 
sequences of disbanding tbem, and peti¬ 
tioned the governor-general to leave a 
body of Biitish troops in th& capital. Ho 
consented, though not without some de¬ 
gree of hesitation, and a supplementary 
treaty was in consequence concluded on 
the 11th of March. It consisted of eight 
articles, of which only the first three de¬ 
serve notice. By these it was agreed tliat 
the British government “shall leave at Lahore, till the close of the current year, 
A.D. 1846, such force as shall seem to the governor-general' adequate for the 
purpose of protecting the person of the maharajah and tlie inhabitants of the 
city of Lahore during the reorganization of the Sikh array;” and that the force 
thus left “shall be placed in full ])ossession of the fort and city of Lahore, and 
that the Lahore troops shall be removed from within the city.” The Lahore, 
government further engaged to pay all the extra expenses incurred by this 
arrangement, and “to apply itself immediately and earnestly to the reorganiza¬ 
tion of its army according to the prescribed condition.” 

The engrossing importance of the Sikh war has for the time withdrawn our 
attention from Scinde, where Sir Charles Napier was still displaying consum¬ 
mate skill both as an administrator and a warrior. The recall of Lord Ellen- 
borpugh, who had ti-eated him with the utmost confidence, and with whose policy 
he had openly identified himplf, made him doubtful whether he ought not at 
once to resign a position from which the known disapproval of some of his 




Chap. VII.] 


THE CUTCHEE HILL TEIBES. SQl 

measures by the court of directors made it probable that he would sooner or a.d. 1844 . 
later be driven; but he manfully and wisely resolved, though suffering severely 
from the cMmate, to remain at his post, and not willingly quit Scinde till state of 

* in 

he could truly say that his conquest of it was complete. As yet tlxis could not scinde. 
be said, since among the Cutchee Hills, to the north of Shikarpoor, there were 
several hill tribes capable of mustering many thousands of marauders, and ever 
and anon carrying devastation within the frontiers of Scinde. Among these the 
Ameer Shere Mahomed after his defeat had sought an asylum, and it was there¬ 
fore not impossible that while indulging their pillaging habits they might 
become the nucleus of a political confederacy, designed once more to revolu¬ 
tionize Scinde, and again subject it to the tyranny of the Ameers. Influenced 
at once by a desire to protect the peaceful inhabitants of his government from 
their half-savage invaders, and defeat the designs of those who fomented these 
frontier disturbances for political purposes. Sir Charles Napier drew up the plan 
of a Hill Campaign. The difficulties were of no ordinary kind, but he was the sir Charles 

-1 • 1 1 -I • 1 1 • 1 Napior'shill 

very man to surmount them, and mingled so much prudence with his diiring campaign, 
that his jilan was apjiroved successively by Lord Ellenborough and Sir Henry 
Hardinge. When preparing for this expedition, which he deemed of sufficient 
importance to demand his personal presence, he proceeded to Sukkur, and was 
there delayed for some time by an endemic which made fearful ravages among 
the troops, and more especially among the 78th Highlanders, who- had been 
recently brought up from Kurrachee, and were not at all inured to the climate. 

So great was the mortality that on the 19th December, 184-4, he Avrote as 
follows:—“I have lost the 78th. That beautiful regiment arrived here in high 
health, and every other part of Scinde was healthy; but the first week in 
November they began to grow sickly, and here they are bodily in hospital, 
about 200 dead, men, women, and children I am sending them away as fast 
as I can to Hyderabad. As to any movement against the hill tribes at this 
moment, I have no men. This place is just a depot of fever—not a man has 
escaped.” After a time spent in repairing the loss thus sustained by a visitation 
which no human sagacity could have foreseen or prevented, the final airange- 
nients were completed. 

Cutch Gxmdava, situated to the north-west of Scinde, and belonging to the Physical 
Khan of Khelat, is connected with the lower Indus by a range of singularly cutchGim- 
rugged rocks called the Cutchee Hills, stretching nearly due west from the 
river towards the Bolan Pa&s. These hills were inhabited by numerous fierce 
predatory tribes, under the names of Muzarees, Bhoogtees, Jackranees, Doomkees, 
Kujjucks, &;c., who could bring about 18,000 warriors into the field, besides 
their armed servants, and made it their boast “ that for 600 year.s no king had 
ever got beyond the first defiles in their land, though some had tried with 
100,000 men.” Tliis immunity they owed chiefly to the rugged precipices 
v/hich rendered their country impassable, and the surrounding deserts which 



A.D'. 1B44. 


BirOimrleilf 
Napien's .., 

QiVtMOl OOTp». 


Jiiliabitants 
of Catch 
(rutuluva. 


'/50S^ HISTOKY of INDIA. IBook Vlll. 

r^deared it almost inaccessible. To the south, by which it was now Id be 
approached, la3’' the desert oif Khusmore, stretching between the Hala Mountains 
and the. Indus in a north-east direction, with a breadth of about eighty miles. 
Tq an ordinary army, owing to the want of water or the erection of hill-forts 
wherever its few springs occurred, the passage of this desert presented the 
most formidable difficulties; but against these Sir Charles Napier had in some 

measure provided, by the forma¬ 
tion of a lighting camel corps, on 
the model of the dromedary corps 
employ^ed by the first Napoleon in 
Egypt. In this corps, intrusted 
to the command of Lieutenant 
Fitzgerald, each camel carried two 
men, the one armed with carbine 
and sword, the other with a mus- 
(juetoon and bayonet. One man 
guided the animal and fought from 
its back, the other acted as an in¬ 
fantry soldier, because the robber-s 
were accustomed to fire from the 
fissures and holes in the plains, 
where neither sword nor lance 
could reach them. If assailed by 
superior numbers the camels were to kneel in a ring, with their heads inwards, 
and pinned down so as to furnish a bulwark for the men. The camels, more¬ 
over, carried the men’s cooking utensils and packs, “ and thus,” says Sir William 
Napier, from whose Administration of Scinde this account is taken, “a body 
of soldiers capable of acting as infantry when required, having no tents, com¬ 
missariat, or baggage to einbairass them, could make marches of sixty miles 
in twenty-four hours, even with the bad camels at this time furnished by Scinde; 
but of eighty or even ninety miles with finer animals.” 

Besides being favoured by the difficulties of their country, the liill-men were 
by no means contemptible as warriors. “Every man,” says Sir Charles Napier, 
“has his weapon ready, and every man is expert in the use of it. They cannot 
go through the manual and platoon like her majesty’s guards, but they shoot 
with unerring aim; they occupj’- a position well, strengthen it artificially with 
ingenuity, and their rush on a foe with sword and shield is very determined. 
They crouch as they run, cover themselves admirably with their protruded 
shields, thrust,them in their adversaries’ faces, and with a sword like a razor 
giye a cut that goes through everything.” The most noted of their chiefs, Beja 
Khan, had long been a terror to the frontier districts of Scinde by the number 
and success of his marauding expeditions, and had recently added greatly to 



hlxpRBSs Camel Troobeh. Om Ibreoular Cavaijiy. 

From original drawing in Library of East India Company. 



Chap, yit] THE CUTCHEE HILL TEIBES. 

hte penown among Lis- countrymen by the repulse of -an injudicious atteinpt tb/ a.d. ig45. 
surprise him in his fort of PoOjajee, situated near the western extremity of the- 
Outchee Hills. Fitegerald of the camel corps, who had once resided at Poolajee, 
believed that his knowledge of the place would enable him to take Beja in his 
bed. With this view a detachment, consisting of 500 horsemen under Captain 
Tait, and 200 of the camel corps under Lieutenant Fitzgerald, was sent to make 
a forced march across the desert. The result was that they* lost their way, and 
on arriving at eight in the morning exhausted with fatigue, found Beja, who had 
been fully apprised of their design, prepared to receive them with a garrison of 
several hundred matchlock-men. The surprise proved a complete failure, and 
after some loss a retreat became necessary, which must have terminated in 
disaster had not water been found at an abandoned post which had been foitu- 
nfitely overlooked by the enemy when filling up the other wells. 

Shortly after this repulse the spies returned with intelligence that the tribes, 
elated by Beja’s victory, were assembling in great numbers around Poolajee, and «epoya. 
were talking of bringing back Shere Mahomed into Scinde. About the same 
time the Jackranees and Doomkees made a successful incursion; and, as if to 
complete the list of misfortunes, a mutinous spirit was manifested by the native 
troops at Shikarpoor. When ordered to proceed from the north-west provinces 
to Upper Scinde, they had insisted on higher allowances, on the ground that 
Scinde was no part of India, and that they would therefore when there be on 
foreign service. Accordingly, some time after reaching Shikarpoor, when the 
lower pay was ottered, the G4th native infantry refused it, alleging, and as it 
turned out truly, that Colonel Mosley, their commanding officer, had promised 
them the higher rate. The danger was that the other Bengal regiments at 
Shikarpoor would follow the same course, but this was happily prevented by 
the decisive measures of Brigadier Hunter, who, on finding pei-soiial remon¬ 
strances vain, and being even assailed by missiles, brought out the whole 
garrison of Sukkur, to which place the mutinous regiment had been moved by 
his orders, seized thirty or forty of the mutineers, and having disarmed the 
rest, compelled them to cross to the left bank of the Indus. 

The alarms produced by the mutiny, and the renewed ravages of the Cutchee 
Hill tribes, made it most desirable that the campaign should no longer be «ani«iifn. 
delayed; and accordingly, on the 13th of January, 1845, it was opened by an , 
advanced guard of cavalry and guns, which marched under the general himself 
from Sukkur to Shikarpoor, and on the 15th airived at Khangur. Jacob, who 
had started with the left wing from Larkhaua, arrived on the same day at 
Rojan. The left wing and centre then proceeded northwards in parallel lines, 
at the average distance of about twenty miles from each other, the former to 
Shapoor, where Beja Khan was reported to be in force, and the lattor to 
Ooch. On the 18th the general arrived in the vicinity of Ooch, and tiras 
relieved from some anxiety wliich he had felt on accoimt of a detachment 



A.D. mo. 


Sir Chiurles 
Napier's hi'l 
oamiiaign. 


IntemiU re^ 
forma of the 
goveniur- 
geiieriil. 


604 HISTOEY OF INDIA. [Book VIII, 

which had preceded him, by learning that Captain Salter, who commanded it, 
had on the previous night defeated 700 hill-men, led by the Jackranee chief, 
Deyra Khan. Intelligence equally gratifying wa-s at the same time received 
from Captain Jacob, who had surprised and totally defeated a body of hill-men 
under Khan Beja’s son. Wullee Chandia, a friendly chief, had also been suc¬ 
cessful at Poolajee; and thus at the very outset Beja Khan and his confederates 
had sustained a triple defeat, under the terror of which they at once abandoned 
the western and took refuge among the eastern hills. This movement neces¬ 
sitated a corresponding change in the plan of the campaign. Salter remained 
at Ooch; Jacob was detached to Poolajee and Lheree, to co-operate with Wullee 
Chandia in overawing the Khelat tribes; and the infantry, the artillery, and 
all the supplies were directed upon Shapoor, where a magazine for fourteen 
days’ consumption was formed. In this position the array occupied two sides 
of a square, the one menacing the passes from the desert on the south, and 
the other commanding the western mouths of the long parallel valleys which 
run eastward toward the Indus. The real pursuit of Beja now commenced, 
and proved one of the most remarkable that was ever undertaken and success¬ 
fully performed by disciplined troops. It had usually been taken for granted 
that such troops would have no chance in warring with hill-men among the 
rugged precipices and narrow ravines of their native hills, but it was now 
shown that under a skilful and energetic leader their superiority there was 
almost as decided as in the plains. It is impossible, however, to Bafcke the 
details intelligible without occupying far more space than their relative import¬ 
ance would justify, and it must therefore suffice to mention that Beja and his 
confederates, hemmed in on all sides and threatened with starvation, had no 
alternative but unconditional surrender. This event, which took place on the 
9th of March, ended the war. 

During tlie year 1847, though the intrigues of the ranee at Lahore for 
the purpose of dethroning the council of regency rendered it necessary to 
remoye her to a distance from the capital, the genei’al tranquillity of India was 
not disturbed, and the governor-general was permitted to give his almost un¬ 
divided attention to internal improvements. Among the acts of his government 
none did him higher honour, or was in its effects, direct and indirect, more 
beneficial, than that by which he prohibited the Christian part of the population 
from labouring on Sunday. Education also i-eceived new encouragement, and 
the natives were made to feel that nothing but the want of qualifications, which 
it would be their own fault if they did not acquire, could henceforth exclude 
them from employment in the public service. The finances, previously deranged 
by the enormous sums which had been wasted in Afghanistan, and not im¬ 
proved by the military tastes and expensive shows of his predecessor, were again 
brought into order; while in the erection of public works, and particularly in 
the liberal patronage bestowed on railway companies, a solid foundation was 



Chap. VIII.] 


LORD DALHOUSIE GOVERNOR-GENERAL. 


'505 


laid for general prosperity, and as its consequence a large and permanent increase a.d. i 847 . 
of revenue. Through undue partialities, capriciously if not tyrannically indulged, 
jealousies and heart-burnings had been introduced into every branch of the ciosoofLord 
public service. He threw oil upon the troubled waters, and merited the hon- adminiatiu 
Durable title of Peace-maker. The termination of such an adminstration was 
indeed a calamity, and we cannot wonder at the general regret which was felt 
when, at the end of little more than three yeara from the date of his entrance 
upon office, he announced his intention to resign. It only remains to add that . 
his services, as well as those of his gallant colleagues in the Punjab war, were 
duly acknowledged at home. The governor-general became Viscount Hardinge, 
tlie commander-in-chief Lord Gough, and the victor of Aliwal a baronet. 

These honours were doubtless well earned, but there was another whose merits 
were as great as theirs, and it would be difficult to give any satisfactoi-y answer 
to the question. Why was not Sir Charles Napier also rewarded with a 
jieerage? 


CHAPTER VIII. 


The Karl of Dalhousic governor-general—Soooiid Punjab war—Siege of JVJuoltan—Defection of Shero 
Sing, and conaequeut raising of the siege—Keiudse at llaniiniggur • Siege of Mooltan reBiunecl- 
Tta capture—Subsequent military operations —Battle of Chillianwalla — Victory of Gujerat - 
Amiexathiii of the Punjab—Sir Charles Najiior’s return to India as c<»mmander-iu-cliief* 



In the end of 1847, when Viscount Hardinge quitted India, and the 
^ !^arl of Dalhousie arrived to assume the reins of government, the goveninr- 
Punjab seemed to be settling down into a state of tranquillity. It was, 
however, only the lull before the stonu, which at length suddenly 
broke out in the south-west, in the jirovince of Mooltsin. Here 
Bawuu Mull, a chief of great ability, had been succeeded as dewan, in 18-1*4, by 
his son Moolraj, who, following out the ambitious designs of his father, aspired 
almost openly at independence. His succession had been confirmed at Lahore, 
on the understanding that lie would pay into the treasury a slump sum of thirty 
lacs of rupees. Taking advantage of the confusion which prevailed, he not only 
liiiled to pay this sum, but withheld the i-egular revenue. It was in conse¬ 
quence resolved to call him to account, and Lai Sing, the prime-minister, 
despatched a body of troops for this purpo.se. Moolraj resisted, and an 
encounter took place, in which the Lahore troops were defeated.^ Ultimately, 
through British mediation, an arrangement was made, by which Moolraj allowed 
t)ie withdrawal of a considerable tract of territory previously included in his 
government, paid a large sura in name of arrears, and became bound for an 

VoL. III. jjgjj 












506 


HISTOKY OF INDIA. 


[Book Till. 


A.D. 1848. amount of revenue, which though derived from a diminished territory, exceeded 
that which had been previously paid for the whole. Tliis latter obligation was 
restricted to the three years commencing with the autumn crop of 1847, and 

was in fact equivalent to an obligation on 
the part of Moolraj to farm the revenue 
for that period. Soon after undertaking 
the obligation he repented of it, and in 
November, 1847, during a vi.sit to Laliore, 
expressed to Mr. John Lawrence, who had 
succeeded his brother Henry as resident, 
his desire to resign the charge of the Mool- 
tan province. He was advised to recon¬ 
sider the matter, but took his own way, 
and sent in a formal resignation to the 
durbar. This the resident would not allow 
them to accejit, as it was accom 2 )anied with 
conditions which were deemed inadmissi- 
l»kii daluousie. -Frompriutnrtcrd. uidatioua. blo. A fcw da 3 ''s later Moolraj again ten¬ 
dered his resignation to tlie resident, giving 
uosiKiititio)! as his reasons—1st, That the new custom arrangements of the Punjab interfered 
seriously with his revenue; and 2d, That his power of coercing the jieoiile had 
become insufficient, inconsequence of the right of apjieal to Lahore, which had 
been recently conferred uiion them. The latter was the iirincipal reason, for 
under this right of ajqieal his exactions, which had befoie been unlimited, w’en; 
restrained; and he even offered to withdraw his resignation, on a promi.se that 
in future no complaints from Mooltan would be received. This being of coui’se 
refused, he declared his determination to resign, and ask(;d only two.things, the 
one a guarantee that, on his resignation, a jaghire would be given him, and the 
other that his resignation should in the meaiitime be a seciet. Mr. Lawrence 
could not guarantee the jaghire, though he gave him to understand that it would 
be favourably consi<lered; the jiromise of secreciy he gave in a wu-itten docu¬ 
ment, which, however, contained the reservation that he should inform his own 
government and his political subordimitc^.s. 

On the 6th of March, 1848, Sir Frederick Cnnie ariived at Lahore to 
assume the office of resident. Before his arrival, Mr. Lawrence had written to 
Moolraj, telling him that if he repented his resignation he bad now an oppor¬ 
tunity of withdrawing it. His reply Avas that he had not changed his mind. 
The new resident having at once taken up the question of resignation, jjrojjosed 
to consult the durbar resj)ecting it. Mr. Lawrence objected because of the 
prymise of secrecy he had given, but the objection was overruled, and Sir 
Frederick, after Moolraj had repeated his wish to resign, laid the matter before 
the council of regencj'. The resignation was in consequence accepted, and 




Chap. VIIT.J 


NEW SIKH WAR. 


507 


Khan Sing, the newly appointed dewan, set out for Mooltan. He was accom- 
jianied by two British officers—Mr. P. A. Vans Agnew of the civil service, and 
Lieutenant W. A. Anderson of the 1st Bombay fusiliers. Chiefly as an escort, 
but partly also to supply the place of a portion of the Mooltan troops, which 
were to come to Lahore, Mr. Agnew had with him the Ghooika regiment, 
above GOO strong, 500 to GOO cavalry, regular and irregular, and a troop of 
horse-artillery. These trooj^s marched by land, wlule tlie British officers 
proceeded by water. In this way the officers and the troops met for the first 
time on the 18th of April, at the Eedgah, a s 2 )acious Mahometan building 
within cannon-shot of the north face of Mooltan fort. In the course of the 18th 
Moolraj paid two visits to the Eedgah, and arranged that the fort should be 
given up to the new dewan. Accordingly on the following morning. Sirdar 
Khan Sing and the two British officers accompanied Moolraj into the fort, 
received the keys, put two of the Ghoorka companies in jiossession, idaced their 
own sentries, and after endeavouring to allay the manifest discontent of the 
garrison at the change by ])romiscs of service, prepared to l eturn. They had 
passed the gate and entered on the bridge over the ditch, when one of two of 
Moolraj’s soldiers, who were standing on it, rushed at Mr. Agnew, knocked him 
off his horse with his spear, and then inflicted two severe wounds with his 
sword. Before he could complete the murder the assassin was tumbled into 
the ditch by a ti’ooper of the escort. Moolraj, instead of interfering, forced his 
horse through the crowd, and rode ofl’ to his residence of Am Khus, situated 
outside the fort. Lieutenant Anderson, who had as yet escaped, was afterwards 
attacked by some of Moolraj’s personal attendants, who wounded him .so 
severely that he was left for dead, till some of the Ghoorkas found him, and 
carried him on a litter to the Eedgah. Thither, too, Mr. Agnew had been 
l>rought by the assistance of Khan Sing, and of Rung Ram, Moolraj’s brother- 
in-law, particularly the latter, who placed him on his own elephant, and hurried 
otl' with him to the camp, rudely binding up his wounds as thej'^ rode along. 
Mr. Agnew was able to report these occurrences to the resident, and also to 
write off for immediate assistance to Lieutenant Edwardes, who was employed 
with a small force in settling the country and collecting the revenue i]i the 
vicinity of Leia. He also addressed a letter to Moolra,], calling upon him to 
prove his own innocence, by seizing the guilty parties and coming in person to 
the Eedgah. In his answer Moolraj denied his ability to do either. “ All the 
garrison, Hindoo and Mahometan, were,” he said, “in rebellion, and the British 
officers had better see to their own safety.” At this very time ho was j^residing 
over a council of his chiefs, while the garrison, composed indiscriminately of 
Afghans, Hindoos, and Sikhs, were taking the oath of allegiance to him in the 
iorms prescribed by their different religions. 

Whatever may have been Moolraj’s original intention.s, he was now in open 
rebellion. On the evening of the 19th, the whole of the carriage cattle 


A.D. 1848. 


KImii Ring 
new <ltiwaii 
at 


naibaniUH 
murtier of 
two Jiritlsh 



508 


HISTOBY OF INDIA. 


[Book VIIT. 


A.D. 1848. 


MoolraJ iti 
ojwii i-ebel- 
lion. 


IiihI wlvivnuu 
of British 
force ujMtii 
JVIooltaii. 


belonging to the escort were carried off Escape being thus precluded, nothing 
remained but to put the Eedgah as far as possible into a state of defence. With 
this view all the soldiers and camp followers were called within the walls, and 
six guns, which had been brought from Lahore, were placed in battery. The 
case was almost desperate, but there was still a hope that if the place could be 
maintained for three or four days succour might arrive. Unfortunately the 
worst was not yet known. When on the morning of the 20th the guns of the 
fort opened on the Eedgah, the six guns stationed there replied with only a 
single round, and then ceased. The Lahore artillerymen had refused to act, 
and the efforts to seduce the troops from their fidelity were so successful, that 
when evening arrived the whole had deserted except Khan Sing, eight or ten 
troopers, and the moonshees and domestic servants of the British ofiicers. All 
idea of resistance was now abandoned, and a message was sent to Moolraj to 
treat for surrender. The utmost that could be obtained from him was that the 
officers should quit the country, and the attack upon them should cease. It 
would seem that even before these terms could be communicated to the inmates 
of the Eedgah, the soldiex’s and mob had taken the decision into their own 
hands, and were not to be ssitisfied without blood. Rushing in with horrible 
shouts, they made Khan Sing prisoner, and barbarously murdered the two 
British officers. This atrocious crime Moolraj made his own by conferring 
rewards on those who had taken the load in perpetrating it. 

The resident at Lalioro receiving intelligence of the attack on the British 
officers only two days after it occurred, and under the impression that the 
mutiny liad no ramifications, and was in all j)robability not countenanced by 
Moolraj, immediately “put in motion upon Mooltan, from different points, 
seven battalions of infantry, two of regular cavalry, three troops and batteries 
of artilleiy, and 1200 irregular hor.se.” On the 23d, when the full extent of the 
revolt was better understood, he saw that the above Sikli force would be 
altogether inadequate, not merely from the smallness of its numbers, but a more 
alanning cause—its doubtful fidelity. 

To meet the emergency Sir Frederick Currie at first determined on moving 
the British moveable column from Lahore upon Mooltan. Immediately after¬ 
wards, on learning the barbarous murder of the two Britisli ofiicers, and the 
treachery of tlieir native escort, he abandoned this determination, because he 
suspected that the other troops of the durbar might act a similar part, and that 
any Briti.sh force sent for support and succour would find supposed friends as 
well tis foes united against it. “I could not,” he wrote, “consent xmder any 
circumstances to send a British force on such an expedition, whatever may be 
the result and consequences of the state of things which will follow to the con¬ 
tinuance of the Sikh government.” Notwithstanding this decided language, a 
declaration by the Sikh rulers of their inability without British aid to coerce 
Moolra], and bring the perpetrators of the outrage to justice, sufiiced to bring 



Chap. VIII.] 


NEW SIKH WAE. 


509 


the resident back to his original intention, and he accordingly addressed a letter a.d. isir. 
to Lord Gough, the commander-in-chief, then at Simla, in which he said:—“In 
a political point of view, I am satisfied that it is of the utmost importance to Low* o™sh 
the interests of British India that a force should move upon Mooltan, capable ngninst 
of I’educing the fort and occupying the city, irrespective of the aid of the durbar ' 
troops, and, indeed, in the face of any opposition which those in that quarter 
might present in aid of the enemy. It is for your lordship to determine, in a 
military point of view, the possibility of such operations at this season of the 
year.” The resident was evidently inclined to think them 2 >ossible, but Lord 
Gough at once decided otherwise. “ There can be no doubt that operations 
against Mooltan, at the present advanced period of the year, would be uncertain 
if not altogether impracticable; while a delay in attaining the object would 
entail a fearful loss of life to the troops engaged, most injurious in its moral 
effects, and highly detrimental to those future operations which must, I apjn-e- 
hend, be undertaken.” The governor-general in council concuned in this 
opinion, and the proposed campaign was accordingly delayed. Meanwhile, 
however, military operations were actively earned on in another (juaiter. 

Lieutenant Edwardes, who was at Dera Futteh Khan, on the left bank of .viiiitarj 
the Indus, on the evening of the 22d April, when he i-eceived Mr. Agnew’s note on'.lcnt 
calling for assistance, instantly mustered his force, amounting in all to twelve; 
infantry companies, and about 350 sowars, with two guns and twenty 
zumboorucks, and prepared to cross the river at the ferry of Leia, intending to 
hurry on to Mooltan, a distance of ninety miles. At the same time he wrote to 
Lieutenant Taylor, who was with General Van Cortlandt, an officer in the 
Sikh service, in Bunnoo, for a regiment of infantry and four guns. Having 
crossed on the 24th, he moved on to Leia and took peaceful ])osscssion of it, 

Moolraj’s governor retiring as he advanced. He had resolved to entrench him¬ 
self at Leia, and await the ajjproach of Moolraj, who was said to have crossed 
the Chenab for the purpose of opposing his further progress, when an important 
document fell into his hands. It was an address from the Sikh deserters in 
Mooltan to the Sikh regiment under his command, calling upon them to 
imitate their example. On receiving this document and learning that before it 
reached him it liad probably been seen by every man in the regiment, the 
confidence of Lieutenant Edwardes in his Sikh soldiers was gone. He resolved, 
therefore, to delay advancing, and wait the arrival of General Cortlandt with 
reinforcements, while he also increased his own force by recruiting among the 
Afghans, who had no feelings in common with the Sikhs. He was thus 
employed when he received intelligence that Moolraj had actually crossed the 
Chenab with about 5000 men, and eight heavy guns, and would reach Leia by 
the 1 st of May. Doubting the fidelity of two-thirds of his men, Lieutehant 
Edwardes deemed it prudent to avoid the encounter, and recross the Indus with 
the view of halting under cover of the fort of Girang. Here he was joined on 



HISTORY OF INDIA. 


510 


[Book VIII. 


A,D. 1818 . the 4tli of May by General Cortlandt, with Soobdan Khan’s infantry regiment 
of Mahometans, and six horse-artillery guns. 

KuccesBes of By the 19th of May a British force assembled, mustering in all about 4000 
Kawmte* men who were believed to be faithful, and about 800 Sikhs who were known to 
1)0 disaffected. The artillery consisted of ten guns and twenty-nine zumboorucks. 
This force Avas far outnumbered by that of the enemy, but a strong diversion 
had already been or was about to be made by the Nawab of Bhawulpoor, who 
with his usual fidelity was advancing to cross the Sutlej and threaten Mooltan. 
So str ong did Lieutenant Edwardes now feel, that on the 20th of May, he wrote 
to the resident, “I am prepared to undertake the blockade of that rebel 
(Moolraj) in Mooltan for the rest of the hot season and rains, if you should 
honour me with that commission, and order Bhawul Khan to assist me.” For 
caiitnrcof the present, however’, the main object was the capture of Dera Ghazee Khan, 
Ki™u.' ” and this Avas happily effected in a mode as gratifying as unexpected. The 
countiy around Dera Ghazee Khan had been given by Moolrsij to a native of 
the name of Julal Khan. Khowrah Khan, a powerful chief, who was his 
bitter enemy, immediately made his submission to the British, and sent his 
son Gholam Hyder Khan with a contingent. This youth, who was accompanying 
General Cortlandt, volunteered on the 20th to go on in advance, raise his father’ s 
elan, and A\Mthout any other assistance driA^c Lunga Mull across the Indus. The 
general, Avithout attacliing much importance to the offer, accepted of it. Gholam 
Hydei’ Khan was as good as his Avord, and having with his father’s consmit 
raised the clan, prepared for the encounter. Lunga Mull, Cheytun Mull, and 
Julal Khan, at the head of the Lrrgharee tribe, did not decline the challenge, and 
a bloody and obstinate conflict ensued. It commenced with a night attack on 
the 20th by Gholam Hyder Khan, but renrained undecided till the following 
morning, when his clan attacked their enemies sword in hand apd gained a 
complete victory, killing Cheytun Mull and making Lunga Mull prisoner. 
Some of the fugitives who ha<l taken refuge in the fort capitulated, on con¬ 
dition of being permitted tt) ci’oss the river, and the whole place was yielded 
ujA without further op])osition. 

Ansi'iiarj- After the defeat at Dera. Ghazee Khan, the division of Moolrai’s force Avhich 

force of the 

Kimi. of had been Ijigher up the Indus Aiiovcd <loAvn towards that place, and took up a 
position on the left bank opposite to it at the village of Koreyshee. Their 
object had been to seize a fleet of boats which had been collected by Lunga 
Mull, .and thus obtain means of efl'ecting the passage. In this they were 
disappointed, and the two armies remained opposite to each other with the 
broad river rolling between them. This state of inaction was interrupted by 
the movements of Bhawul Khan, who in the beginning of June crossed the Sutlej, 
with the desi^ of moving on Soojabad, which is only twenty-five miles south 
by west from Mooltan. The effect was to draw off the enemy from Koreyshee, 
and leave the passage of the river open to the Britisli force, which had no lack 



Chap. VIII.] 


NEW SIKH WAR. 


511 


of means, in consequence of having secured the fleet of boats above mentioned. A.n. i848. 
The main obstacle was a peremptory order of the resident not to quit the 
right bank, but this was removed at the earnest request of Bhawul Khan, who A»*iiinr.v 

® ^ ri^i • « lorcooftho 

was now anxious for support. Ihe Indus was ixccordingly crossed without Kimnof 
delay, and the whole force proceeded south-east to Khangur on the right bank 
of the Chenab or Jhelum, the river after their junction being designated indis- 
ci iminately by either name. Meanwhile the Mooltan force had been concen¬ 
trated, and was advancing on Soojabad, with positive orders from Moolraj to 
fight Bhawul Khan before the British could come to his aid. 

The relative sti’ength and position of the three armies are thus described 

]>(>aition of 

by Lieutenant Edwardes, in his work entitled A Year in the Punjab (vol. ii. tiioditfamst 
]>. 370, 377):—“The rebel army, of from 8000 to 10,000 lior.se and foot, and ten 
guns, commanded by Moolraj’s brother-iii-law Rung Ram, and the Daoodpotra 
(Bhawulpoor) army of about 8000 horse and foot, eleven guns and thiiiy 
zuraboorucks, commanded by Futteh Mahomed Khan (Ihoree, were on the left 
hank of the Chenab; and my foj’ce, consisting of two divisions (one of faithfid 
legulars, foot and artillery of the Sikh service, about 1500 men and ten guns, 
under General Cortlandt, and another of about 5000 irregulars, horse and foot, 
and thirty zumboorucks under my own personal command), was on the right 
hank. Rung Rain’s canq) was pitched across the highroad to Mooltan, three 
miles south of Soojabad; Futteh Mahomed’s at Goweyn, fifteen miles farther 
south ; and mine at Gaggianwallah Ferry, about twelve miles south of Khangur. 

The three formed a triangle, in which the Baoodpotras were nearer to me tlian 
to the enemy, but nearer to the enemy than I was; while a river about thi'ee 
miles wide divided the allies.” Rung Rain's plan .sliould have been to attack naiuoi.f 

Kijiejrtto. 

the Bhawulpoor army with the least possible delay, for though the numbei's 
were nearly.equal, his troo])s were far T)etter disciplined, and could hardly have 
failed to give him the victory. Instead of availing himself of this o])portunity, 
he lo.st it by waiting till the evening, and then moving eight miles lower down 
the Chenab, to the village of Bukree, within an easy march of Kineyice, Avhere 
he knew that the British force must cros.s. His object was to seize this feriy, 
and having thus prevented the passage, to deal with the Baoodpotras when left 
destitute of relief. He was fortunately anticipated by the ra[)i<l movements (jf 
the allies, the Baoodpotras having hastened down towuirds Kinc 3 'ree, Aidiile a 
strong British division, consisting of 3000 Patau irregulars under h’oujdar Khan, 
liad crossed the river and moved forward in the direction by which their allies 
were expected. Scarcely had the junction been efl’ected, on the morning of the 
18th, when Lieutenant Edwardes, who had left General Cortlandt to bring 
over the rest of the force, and was crossing the Chenab, was startled by a can¬ 
nonade, which announced that the conflict had commenced.* Rung Ram 
hunying on from Bukree before dawn to seize the ferry, and finding it occupied, 
took up a strong position on the salt-hills of Noonar, and opened his fire. 



512 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book VIII. 


A.D,1848. 


Inibuoility 
<vfthu HU.i- 
wiiljwor 
:^ouoral. 


Dufoafc 4)f 
the rubtfla. 


Lieutenant Edwardes arrived in the very nick of time. The Daoodpotras had 
rushed impetuously forward without waiting for an ordei’, and were met by a 
fire so different from that of their own border warfare, tliat they fell back in 
confusion on a village in their rear. The first salutation that met Lieutenant 
Edwardes on our arrival, was from an European, who stepped out and 
exclaimed:—“Oh, sir, our army is disorganized.” He asked for Futteli 
Mahomed Khan Ghoree, and was pointed to a laige peepul tree, round which 
a crowd was gathered. “ I galloped up,” says Edwardes, “ and looking over 
the shoulders of the people, saw a little old man in dirty clothes, and with 
nothing but a skull-cap on his head, sitting under the tree with a rosary in his 
hands, tlie beads of which he was rapidly telling, and muttering in a peevish, 
helple.ss manner, UUiumdoolillali! Ulhumdoolillah!” (God be praised! God 
be praised!) apjiarently quite abstracted from the scene around him, and utterly 
unconscious that six-pounders were going through the branches, that officers 
were imploring him for orders, and that bOOO or 9000 rebels were waiting to 
destroy an army of which he was general. He had to be shaken by his people 
before he could comprehend that I had airived; and as be rose and tottered 
forward, looking vacantly in my face, I saw that excitement had completed 
the imbecility of his years, and that I might as well talk to a post.” It only 
remained for the British officer to take the whole arrangements on himself. 
These were somewhat difficult. The Bhawulpoor artillery was overmatched by 
that of the Mooltances, and it was impossible again to assume the offensive, 
until their place was supplied by British artillery, which had yet to be brought 
from the opposite bank of the river. The difficulty was to avoid defeat 
during the interval wliich must necessarily elapse. The plan adopted was to 
continue the cannonade with the Daoodpotra artillery, imperfect as it was, 
and keep their troops within the jungle, as much under cover as possible. 
With this the Daoodpotras were not dissatisfied, but it was not all relished by 
the British force, composed chiefly of Patans, who, placed on the left and 
exposed to fire which they could not I’eturn, were continually starting up and 
demanding to be led again-st the enemy. In this unsatisfactory state six long 
hotirs had been spent, when the British guns, six in number, arrived, and with 
them two regiments of regular infantry. When the new guns opened, the 
enemy, who supposed that they had silenced all the guns which could be 
brought against them, were taken by surprise, and made a very ineffectual 
re.sistance. After a successful charge by one of the new regiments which had 
arrived, the whole allied force began to advance over the contested ground, 
and the victory was decided. The rebel camp, all their ammunition, and eight 
out of their ten guns, were taken. The loss of men was not very serious on 
either side; tliat of the victors, in killed and wounded, was about 300; that of 
the enemy in killed alone, about 500 left on the field, and many more along the 
whole line of pursuit. The fugitives never halted till they reached Mooltan. 



Chap VIII.] 


NEW SIKH WAR. 


513 


In consequence of the victory of Kineyree the killedar of Soojabad sent in A.n. isns. 
his submission, otliers followed his example, and Lieutenant Edwardes felt so 
strong, that on the 22d of June he suggested to the resident that the siege of viouiry ..r 
Mooltan should be immediately commenced. “We ai:e enough of us in all con- * 
science,” he said, “and desire nothing better than to be honoured with tlie 
commission you designed for a British army. All we require are a few heavy 
guns, a mortar-battery, as many sappers and miners as you can spare, and 
Major Napier to plan our operations. That brave ai»d able oflleer is, 1 believe, 
at Lahore; and the guns and mortars are doubtle.ss ere this at Ferozepoor, and 
only require to be put into boats and floated down to Bhawulpoor.” This was 
an over-sanguine estimate, for not only were ominous desertions constantly 
occurring among the Sikhs, but Moolraj was determined not to allow himself 
to be shut up in his fort without risking another general action. It was fought 
on the 1st of July near the village of Suddoosam, where Moolraj, commanding 
in person, had taken up a strong and advantageous position with his whole force, 
e.stimated at about 12,000 men. The allied force considerably exceeded this, 
amounting in all to about 18,000 men. Of these, however, 4000, who had 
arrived in camp only thi’ec days before, an<l formed the converging column 
under Sheikh Eraam-ud-Geen, could not be de{)cnded on, and in fact scarcely 
took any part in the action. On this occasion the enemy took the initiative', 
and about noon advancing in line were close at hand before the allies became 
convinced that they had really resolved to lisk a battle. The issue was never 
doubtful, the allies being .superior not only in numbers but in artillery, theim 
amounting to twenty two pieces, while that of the enemy did not exceed ten. 

The conflict, however, Wiis maintained with considerable obstinacy till Moolraj 
|iut spurs to his horse and fled. His example was immediately followed, while 
the victors, continued the pursuit till they were almost under the walls of 
Mooltan. This victory, which obliged Moolraj to take refuge within his foi’t, i iviiaruti..!... 
again raised the que.stion as to the practicability of immediately laying siege to it. M.-.itiin 
bicutenant Edwardes had, as we have seen, offered to undertake it, and suggested 
a plan which he thought would “obviate the neces.sity of a British army taking 
the field at all.” The resident “was disposed to think that the addition of a 
single British brigade with ten guns, and twenty mortal's and howitzers, would 
he suflicient.” Lord Gough adhered to his former opinion, and the governor- 
general in council entirely concurred with him. The letter conveying this 
decision to the resident was despatched on the 11th of July, but on the 10th of 
the same month, and of course a day before it was written, he had taken the 
decision into his own hands, and directed General M^hish, commanding the 
troops in the Punjab, to “take immediate measures for the despatch of a siege- 
train with its establishment, and a competent escort and force, for the reduction 
of tlie fort of Mooltan.” This was certainly a bold step, but as the danger of 
abandoning it after it had been publicly announced seemed to the govemor- 

VoL. III. 



A.D. 1848. 


Adviuico of 
(Joiiural 
Whiuli. . 


PeiMTiptum 
of MoolUiii. 


614 HISTORY OF INDIA. [Book VIII. 

general greater than the danger of prosecuting it, he informed the resident that 
since lie had considered it necessary, in exercise of the powers conferred upon 
him, “to assume this responsibility,” the government being anxious to maintain 
Ids authority, confirmed the orders he had is.sued, and therefore enjoined him 
“to jiroceed with vigour to carry out at all hazards the policy which he had 
now resolved upon.” 

The die being thus cast, the necessary preparations were made with all 
jiossible expedition, and on the 24th of July General Whish started for Mooltan 
w ith a force amounting to 8089 men, with thirty two pieces of siege ordnance, 
and twelve horse-artillery guns. Tt moved in two columns; the right with the 
general’s head-ipiarters marching from Lahore along the left bank of the Ravee, 



Town ani> Fort op Fkkozrpikir. - Afbur a sketch hy \l. PiUeau, Kwj. 


and the left, commanded by Brigadier Salter, marching from Ferozepoor along 
the riglit bank of the Sutlej. Tlie native force previously a.ssemblcd consisted 
of 841.0 cavalry, and 14,327 infantry, with forty-five hoi'se-artillery guns, four 
mortars, and 158 camel-swivel,a Of this force, including that of General Cort- 
landt, 7718 infantry and 4033 cavalry were commanded by Lieutenant Edwardes, 
5700 infantry and 1900 cavalry formed tlie Bhawulpoor army commanded by 
Lieutenant Lake, and 909 infantiy and 3382 cavahy formed the Sikh army 
commanded by Rajah Sherc Sing. To this besieging force of nearly 32,000 
nnm, Moolraj w)is not able to oppose more tlian a garrison of 12,000 men, with 
an artillery of fifty-four guns and five mortars. This great disparity of numbers 
was compensated by the strength of the. works. 

Mooltan, about tlireo miles from the left bank of the Chenab, but within 
reach of its inundations, is surrounded by gi’oves of date trees and beautiful 
gardens. Tliese, however, fail to make it a pleasant residence, for its scorching 
climate is proverbial even in India, sind with its usual accompaniments is not 
inaccurately described in the following doggerel couplet:— 




Chap, Vlfl.] SIEGE OF MOOLTAN. 515 

“ Churchy.ards, beggars, dust, and heat, 

Are the four best tilings at Mooltan you’ll meet." 

It was a place of great antiquity, and had undergone so many vicissitudes that 
the mound on which it stands is said to he composed of the ruins of earlier 
cities which occupied the same site. When the battle of Suddoosam Was fought 
in its vicinity Mooltan was only suiTOunded by an old brick wall; but Moolraj, 
on seeing that his whole forces were about to be shut up within this feeble 
inclosxire, had by unremitted exertion lined it with an enormous rampart of 
mud, and thus converted it into a jiowei’ful means of defence. It was not 
so much to it, however, that Moolraj trusted, as to the citadel, which ha<l long 
been renowned in Indian waidare, had stood many sieges, and was now stronger 
than ever, in consequence of the sums which MoolraJ’s father lavished upon it, 
when, with the view of asserting his independence, he withheld the revenue due 
to Lahore, and employed it in strengthening the citadel so as to make it, as ho 
thought, impregnable. It had in consequence become one of the strongest and 
most regular of the Indian fortresses consti'ucted by native engineers. Beyond 
its deep and wide ditch faced with masonry rose a rampart, externally forty feet 
in height, and surmounted by thirty towers. Within, everything had been 
done for its security, and its magazines were storetl with all the materials 
lecpiisite to enable it to stand a lengthened siege. 

On the Ith of September, as soon as the siege train arrived. General Whish 
issued Ji ])rocliimation addressed “to the inhabitants and garrison” of Mooltan, 
inviting them “to an unconditional surrender within twenty-four hours after 
the firing of a royal salute at sunrise to-morrow, in honour of her most gracious 
majesty the Queen of Great Britain, and her ally, his highness Maharajah Bhuleep 
Sing.’' In the event of non-compliance he would “ commence hostilities on a 
scale that lyust insure early destruction to the rebel traitor and his adherents, 
who having begun their resistance to lawful authority with a most cowardly 
act of treachery and minder, seek to uphold their unrighteous cause by an 
appeal to religion, which every one must know to be sheer hypocrisy.” The 
only notice taken of this proclamation was a shot from the citadel, which 
“ pitched into the earth just behind General Whish and his staff from a di.stance 
much exceeding two miles.” Moolraj, after making proposals for surrender, had 
recently received new confidence. At the very time when he was compelled to 
shut himself up in his capital, the general disaffection of the Sikhs became more 
manifest than ever, so that the resident, who in the beginning of July had been 
sanguine enough to expect “that the rebel Moolraj will either destroy himself 
nr be destroyed by his troops before the next mail goes out,” was obliged to 
confess on the last day of the same month, that “plans were forming, combina¬ 
tions were being made, and various interests were being enlisted, with a view 
to a grand struggle for our expulsion from the Punjab and all the territories 
west of Delhi.” Shere Sing, though he had been ordered to halt at Tolumba, 


A.n. 1848. 


Description 
of McK)ltaii. 


Prociaiim- 
tioii of (jcti- 
e.n (I WiiisU. 



516 


HISTOBY OF INDIA. 


[Book .VIII. 


A.i) 184 -i. had continued to advance on Mooltan. Various suspicious movements had 
taken place in other quarters, and a formidable outbreak headed by Chuttur 
siege of Sing had broken out in the Hazareh country, in the north-west of the Punjab. 

'pijjg outbreak derived additional importance from the fact that Chuttur Sing 
was the father of Shere Sing, who, though now encamped with his troops before 
Mooltan as part of the besieging force, must have previously been made 
acquainted with his father’s designs, and in all probability given his sanction 
to them. 

The siege of Mooltan was opened at daylight of the 7th of September. 
The first parallel commenced at the unusual distance of 1600 yards, said to have 



SiiEUi: .Si .'foil AND n;.-i .Scitk.- From rrinco Koltykoff’a Voyage daiia I’lndo. 


rendered neiccssary b\’ the nature of the ground. On the night of the 9th 
an attempt to dislodge the enemy from some gardens and houses in front 
of the trenches failed, owing to the darkness and confusion of a hastily planned 
night attack. This repidse so much increased Moolraj’s confidence that he began 
to strengthen the ])osition which had been atbicked, and thus besiegers and 
besieged continued for two days throwiiig up works within a few hundi'ed 
yards of each other. On the 12th the general, having deteianined to clear his 
front, caused the irregulars to create a diversion on the left, while two British 
columns advanced to do the real business of the daj''. A fierce conflict ensued, 
during which^ Moolraj s troojis, confident in the sti’ength of their entrenchment, 
and elated by their success on the 9th, fought better than they had ever done 
before. British valour, however, prevailed, and the enemy, driven back from 
his position, left 500 dead ujjon the ground. The effect of this succe^ was .to 



Chap. VIII.] 


SIEGE OF MOOLTAN. 


517 


bring the besiegers about 800 yards nearer, and consequently within l)attering a.i> i.s4s. 
distance of the walls of the city. Its speedy capture was now confidently 
jinticipated, but after the troops had nearly spent two days in securing the 
advance which tliey had gained, an event took place which disappointed all 
these expectations. 

Ever since the rebellion of his father in Hazai’eh, Shere Siriff had been loud neft* ti«ii <>f 

, , ® SIioiv Siliy. 

in professions of continued loyalty, and did not desist till the morning of the 
1 -tth September, when his camj) moved bodily off to Mooltan, he himself 
heading the movement, and ordering the tUiurum Uut dosa or- religious drum 
to be beaten in the name of the Khalsa. On receiving this intelligence the 
general summoned a council of senior officers, wdio wei e unanimously of opinion 
that “ the siege was no longer practicable.” The besieging troops were in 
(;onsequence immediately withdrawn from their advanced position within breach¬ 
ing distance of the walls of the town, to a new position at Tibbee, there to 
“await the arrival of such reinforcements as the commander-in-chief may think 
)>roper to send.” 

When Shere Sing arrived with his troo]>s at Mooltan, Moolraj, though liicevtii.n ot 
delighted with this accession of strength, w'as far from feeling perfect confidence i.r 
in his new friends, and therefore, instead of admitting tlieni into the fort, 
obliged them to remain under its guns, while he took the rajah and all his 
officers to a temple outside the city, and made them swear that tliey had no 
treacherous design. Even this oath proved insufiieient, and after serious mis¬ 
understandings, Shere Sing volunteered to join his father in Hazareh if some 
pay Avei'e advanced to his soldiei-s. Mooli-aj grasped at the projiosal, and on 
the 9th of October, Shere Sing departed to become the leader of a new Sikh war. 

Before following him, it will be necessary to tell all that remains to be told 
concerning^ Moolraj and Mooltan. 

The siege, raised on the 14th of September, was not resumed till the 17th of oiremtimiK 
December. Ihe interval, liowcver, was not one of entire inaction. The British iiiKibmu s 
troops were employed, partly in practising the erection of field-works and 
model batteries, and partly in preparing materials for siege purposes, so that 
when the time of action arrived, the enormous number of 15,000 gabions 
and 12,000 fascines had been provided. Moolraj on his part was equally ixetive 
in strengthening the fortifications of the town and suburbs, and raising recruits 
to supply the place of those who had gone ofi" with Shere Sing. Not satisfied, 
however, to remain dependent on his own resources, he looked round for allies. 

In the choice of these he displayed considerable politicsd sagacity, making his 
first offers to Dost Mahomed of Cabool, and the chiefs of Candahar, whom he 
tempted with the offei' of making the Indus theii- mutual boundary after they 
should, by their united exertions, have expelled the Feringhces! 

The plan of siege now adopted was not to take the city as a preliminary, ciuinge of 
but to make a regular attack on the north-east angle of the citadel, and occupy 



A. I). 1849 


of 

Mooltan. 


Tho <5it.y 


618 HISTORY OF INDIA. [Book VIII. 

only so much of the suburbs as were required for actual operationa The 
portions of suburbs thus required were the tomb of Sawun Mull, Moolraj’s 
father, called Wuzeerabad, and Moolraj’s own residence of Am Khus, and as 
they were naturally the first objects to which the attention of the besiegers 
was directed, not a day was lost in effecting the capture of them. At the same 
time an attack, which had been intended only as a feint, proved so successful that 
the besiegers were brought almost close to the city walla On the 80th of 
December, a considerable part of the citadel was laid in ruins by the explosion of 
the principal magazine. It was situated beneath the dome of the grand mosque, 
which was sup])o.sed to be bomb-proof till it was pierced by a shell from one of 



HTOttMiNO OK THR KiiooNCii: Hooiu lluEACH, MtK)LTAN.—Fiom Dutiloii'8 2 jketc!iti 8 duHiig the Sicgo of Mooliau. 


the British mortars The extent of tho catastrophe may be inferred from the 
fact that the magazine contained about 400,000 lbs. of gunpowder, and that 
about 500 of the gari'ison were killed by the explosion. On the 2d of Januaiy, 
one breach in the city wall was declared practicable, and another suflicient to 
allow of its being attacked as a diversion. The latter breach j)roved to be far 
more imperfect than had been imagined, for the storming party assigned to it, 
after passing under a heavy fire across a deep intervening hollow, “ found to 
their surprise the city wall in front about thirty feet in height, unbre<ached and 
totally imjmacticable, and were obliged to retire.” The other breach, however, 
as to which there had been no mistake, was carried, and with it the city itself. 
Still the citadel remained, and there was every reason to presume that it would 
not be yielded without a desperate struggle, for Moolraj retired into it with 3000 
picked men, as soon as he saw that the city was lost, and shutting the gates, 
loft the rest of his troops to escape as they best could. On the 4th of Januarj', 
a brigade of the Bombay division encamped on the north, and communicating 
with the Bengal division on the east, and the irregulars on the west, completed 
the investment of the fort. When Moolraj saw himself thus completely 



Chap. VIII.] 


SURRENDER OF MOOLTAN.' 


619 


beinmed in, bis courage gave way, and be made an overture for surrender, by 
sending a letter to Major Edwardes in tbe following terms:—'‘Having sundry 
representations to make before you, I write to say that, with your permission, 
1 will send a confidential person of my o\^n to wait on you, who will tell you 
all.” He was referred in answer to General Wbisb, who refused to receive any 
confidential person, unless be were sent simply to state, “My master wishes to 
conie in, and will do so at sucli an hour, and will come out from tbe fort at sucb 
a gate, and by sucb a rojul.” Not yet prepared for unconditional surrender, 
Moolraj allowed some days to elapse, and then as if he bad at hrst made up bis 
mind to it, intimated on the 8th of January, that he meant to avail himself of 
tlie general’s permission to send a me.ssenger. He was accordingly admitted on 
tbe following morning, but on being asked point blank whether he had anthoi'ity 
to tender his master’s submission, and replying that he had not, was at once 
dismissed. Thas repulsed in his attempts to make terras, Moolraj continued 
bis defence, and even on tlie night of tbe 12tb of January ventured to make a 
sortie on the British trenches, ’fhe end was, liowever, evidently a])proaching. 
On tbe 14th the British sap]>ers crowned the crest of the glacis at the nortli- 
oast angle of tbe citadel, with a cavalier only fifteen feet fioni the edge of tbe 
ditch, and on tbe 19tb two breaches, one on tbe north and the other on the south 
face, seemed so nearly jn'actjcable that tbe assault was fixed for tlie morning 
of tbe 22(1. 'rbeie could have been no doubt as to its success, but this was 
not put to the proof, as Moolraj at tbe last moment of re.sjiite allowed him 
came out and yielded himself a ])risoner. Tbe fort was immediately taken 
possession of without ojiposition. During the siege, which had lasted twenty- 
seven days, the British loss was 210 killed and 910 wounded. Moolraj was 
aftcrw.ards tried at Lahore, found guilty, and sentenced to be hanged, but as liis 
judges had yecommended him to mercy" as “the victim of circumstance,” tbe 
sentence was commuted into banishment beymnd seas. 

'fhe insurrection of Chuttur Sing in Hazareh, after a slight check, assumed 
larger dimensions, and threatened to Isicome still more foi-midable in conse¬ 
quence of tbe alliamje which he had foi med with the Afghans. On tbe 24th of 
October, the whole Sikh troo})s in Peshawer revolted, and Major George 
Lawrence, after endeavouring in vain to recall them to duty, was obliged to 
consult his personal safety by retiring with his assistant Lieutenant Bowie to 
Kobat, situated about thirty-six miles to the south. This place belonged to 
Sultan Mahomed Khan, tbe brother of Dost Mahomed of Cabool. His condiict 
during tbe Afghan war bad proved him to be a mere compound of hcartlesSness 
and villany; but as tbe circumstances left no room for choice, Major Lawrence, 
who had previously learned that Mrs. Lawi-ence, whom he had sent off for 
Laboi'e at the commencement of the outbreak, had been earned to Kohat under 
the pretext of giving her a moi e secure asy'lum, bad no alternative but to place 
himself and his a.ssistant also in his power. Tbe result was as might have been 


A. n. 1849. 


MooIi'oJ'k 
fiouraKo lailfi. 


Ho Rur- 
i-eTHlcrH. 


Iiovt»lt in 
Hiizareli. 



520 


HISTOEY OF INDIA. 


[Book VIIT. 


A.II. IS«t. 


tnltHH t.ln; 
tiol.i. 


of IjonI 


anticipated: Sultan Maliomed, who had promised under the most solemn oaths 
to treat them as honoured guests, sold them as prisoners to Chuttur Sing in 
part payment of a promised grant of the city and district of Peshawer. Chuttur 
Sing’s insurrection and the desertion of Shore Sing having made it impossible 
to doubt tliat the Sikhs, as a nation, had resolved on another struggle, the 
governor-general set out for the north-west provinces, after instructing the 
coniinander-in-chief to assemble an army at Ferozepoor. Lord Gough accordingly 
took the field, and marched towards the Chenab. Shere Sing had taken up his 
position in the vicinity of Rainnuggur, situated about a mile and a half from 
its left bank. Here the river in making a bend has foimed an island, which 


PLAN OF TUE 
BATTLE OF 

IIAMIS UGGUR. 


2 Tlof^ni^ere Gtn.Qaf^m AH. 



divides it into two channel.s—the one on the left bank being, except in tlie 
rainy season, little more than a dry sandbed or nullah, with a small fordable 
stream, while the main channel on the right bank was of considerable depth and 
Avidth. Though posted chiefly on this bank, the Sikhs also occupied the island, 
and weie moreover reported to have both troops and guns on the left bank. 
These Lord Gough resolved to dislodge or capture, and therefore ordered 
Brigadier Campbell (now Lord Clyde) with an infantry brigade, accompanied 
by a cavalry division and three troops of horse-artillerj^ under Brigadier 
Cui-eton, to move out from the camp for this purpose. After reaching 
Rainnuggur, from which the enemy had retired, they continued their march 
towards the river. From overaight or the impossibility of obtaining accurate 
information, the difficulty of the ground was not at all understood, and the 
artillery consulting only their courage and not their prudence, rushed impetu- 
oupiy forward till they found themselves within the range of twenty-eight guns, 
which opened upon them with deadly effect. These guns were placed in threi^ 
batteries, two of which on the right bank crossed their fire so as completel}" to 




Chap. VIII.] 


KEPULSE AT BAMNUGGI^R. 


521 


command the nullali, while the third, on the island, fired into it point blank, a.d. i 849 . 
The artillery thus suddenly checked in their career, were obliged to retire 
with the loss of one of their guns, which having tumbled over the high bank nepuise at 
of the nullah along with two ammunition waggons, could not have been 
recovered without a fearful sacrifice of life. Nor was this the woivst. When 
the enemy saw the confusion produced by their fire, they sent over fi'om 3000 
to 4000 of their cavalry under the cover of their guns. These, from some 
mistake, it is said, of an order given for a different purpose, were charged in the 
mo.st gallant st 3 ’]e by Colonel Havelock of the 14th dragoons a.nd by the 5th 
cavalry, and on their giving way by retreating across the nullah, were followed 
down the bank till close upon the batteries. The murderous fire drove them 
back, but they re-foimcd a second and a third time, and were continuing the 
attack when Brigadier Cureton arrived with orders from Lord Gough to retire. 

He had scarcely uttered the word when he fell dead, struck by two matchlock- 
balls. Colonel Havelock was also killed, and Cujitain Fitzgerald mortally 
wounded. 

Shere Sing still maintained his position on the right bank of the Chenab, fitrcuKii, of 
with a force estimated at about 35,000 men, and as the unfortunate affair iwsition. 
above relatejJ had shown how difficult it would be to dislodge him by an 
attack in front, it was resolved to .attempt to turn his left flunk. With this 
view General Sir Joseph Tliackwell, who commanded the cavalry, was sent up 
the river with a detachment, consisting of three troops of cavalry, the horse 
artillerj', and two light field batteries. He procecde<l .accordingly to Wuzeerabad, 

.and there having succeeded, on the 2d of December, in effecting a jiassage, he 
began his downvrard m.arch toward the Sikh carnji. lie was not .allowed to 
]>roceed far when he was encountes’cd by a large Sikh force, which Shere Sing 
had detached in the hope of overwhelming him. At first Sir Joseph was 
somewhat p\jzzled how to act, as his instructions were not to attack, but to 
content him,self with repelling aggression, unless he found the enemy in retreat. 

He therefore ordered a halt, which the Sikhs as usual mistook for fear. 

IJiidcr this mistake they commenced a cannonade, at the same time attempting 
to turn the British flanks by numerous bodies of cavalry. On finding th.at 
their cjinnonade was nOt returned their confidence increased, and they wer c^ 
advancing as if to certain victory, when the British artillery opened a most 
destructive fire, which silenced their cannonade and frustrated .all their opera- 

re)>uue. 

tions. Meanwhile Lord Gough, as soon as he learned that Sir Joseph had 
cro.ssed, opened a heavy cannonade on the enemy’s encampment. Shere Sing 
thus attacked in front, and threatened not only by Sir Joseph Thackwelfs 
detachment, but by .a brigade of infantiy under Brigadier Godby, who had 
also crossed only six miles above Ramnuggur, saw that his* position Wfis 
untenable, and hastened off on the night of the 3d towards the Jhelum. As 
the retreat had been made precipitately, and in the utmost disorder, it was 
VoL. TIL 262 



A.D. 1849. 


StFongth of 
tho Sikhft 
still un¬ 
broken. 


They ml- 
N CLiico anew 
to the 
attack. 


5255 HISTORY OF INDIA. [Book VIII. 

confidently predicted that the whole Sikh force would immediately disperse. 
This prediction was far too sanguine. Shere Sing's strength was still unbroken, 
and by retreating to the north, where his father was still at the head of a 
formidable insurrection, he undoubtedly took the most effectual means of pre¬ 
paring for a more decisive struggle. His troops accordingly, so far from 
dispersing, rapidly increased in numbers, and he was ere long at the head of 
40,000 men, with sixty-two guns. 

Lord Gough having crossed with the whole of his army to the right bank 
of the Chenab, continued his march northwards in the direction which Shere 
Sing had taken, and on the 12th of January, 1849, on arriving at Dingee 
found the Sikh chief with his whole force encamped in its vicinity, with his 
right on the villages of Lukneewalla and Futteh Shakechuck, the main body at 
the village of Lollianwalla, and his loft at Russool on the Jhelum. In this 
{)osition he occupied the southern extremity of a low range of hills intersected 
by ravines, and Lord Gough believing the ground “to be exce.ssively difficult, 
and ill adapted to the advance of a regular army,” determined to move on 
Russool with a view to reconnoitre. The subsequent operations on the 13th, 
we must allow Lord Gough himself to describe. After mentioning that the 
day was far advanced, the despatch continues tims:—“The engineer depart¬ 
ment had been ordered to examine tlie country before us, and the quarter¬ 
master-general was in the act of taking up ground for the encampment, when 
the enemy advanced some hoi’se-artillery, and opened a fire on the skirmishers 
in front of the village. I immediately ordered them to be silenced by a few 
rounds from our heavy guns, which advanced to an open space in front of the 
village. The fire was instantly returned by that of nearly the whole of the 
enemy’s field artillery, thus exposing the position of his guns, which the jungle 
had hitherto concealed. It was now evident that the enemy intended to fight, 
and would probably advance his guns so as to reach the encampment during 
the night. I therefore drew up in order of battle; Sir Walter Gilbert’s divi.sion 
on the right, flanked by Brigadier Pope’s biigade of cavalry, which 1 
strengthened by the 14th light dragoons, well aware that the enemy was strong 
in cavalry upon his left. To this were attached three troops of horse-artillery 
under Lieutenant-colonel Grant. The hc.avy guns were in the centre. Brigadier- 
general Camiibell’s division formed the left, flanked by Brigadier White’s 
brigade of cavalry, and three troops of horse-artillery under licutenant-coloncl 
Brind. The field batteries were with the infantry divisions.” 

Before i)roceeding to quote further from Lord Gough’s despatch, several 
reflections suggested by the portion already given will not be out of place. 
Fimt, it is clear that his lordship, if he had any intention of fighting a battle 
on the 13th, liad abandoned it. He thought the day too far advanced, and 
had therefore ordered ground to be taken up for encampment. Secondly, it is 
equally clear that the reconnoisance which had been made was understood to be 



Chap, VIII.] 


BATTLE OF CHILLIANWALLA. 


523 


imperfect. This appears both from the order given to the engineers to “ examine A.n. 1R49. 
the country,” and also from the fact that the actual position of the enemy’s field 
artillery was unknown, till they themselves, at a later period of the day, loki 

, , , Gougli's <Ie 

divulged it by opening their fire. These two considerations—the advanced tominatjon 
hour and imperfect knowledge of the ground—seem sufficient to justify the *^'**''*• 
determination to defer the battle, and the question natui'ally arises. On what 
grounds were these considerations afterwards overruled? To this Ijuestion the 
answer, in so far at least as Lord Gough has been pleased to give it, is neither 
explicit nor satisfactory. “ It was now evident,” he says, “that the enemy 
intended to fight” Does it therefore follow that his lordship was bound to 
allow the enemy to choose his own time, and force him to fight at a disadvan¬ 
tage? But then it was probiible that the enemy “would advance his guns .so 
as to reach the encampment dm-ing the night.” This undoubtedly would have 
been both annoying and insulting, but surely, assuming that there was no 
means of preventing it, the evil would have been far more than compensated 
by the advantage of allowing the troops a night’s repose after the fatiguing 
march they had already undergone, since this would not only have enabled 
them to commence the conflict with recruited strength, but given them a full 
day to decide it. On these and similar grounds it may be questioned whether 
his lordship gave sufficient reason for his change of purpose, when after narrat¬ 
ing the enemy’s movements he simply adds:—“1 therefore drew up in order of 
liattle.” 

’riie ordei- of battle having been arranged as above, the trooiw were ordered 
to lie down, while the hesivy guns opened a powerful and well-directed fire on wuiia. 
the enemy’s centre, .and the light field batteries opened theirs on the flanks. 

After an hour of this cannonade .seemed to have “sufficientl 3 '^ disabled” that of 
the enemy,, the left division, which had to move over the larger extent of 
ground, began the advance, and was shortly afterwards followed by the right 
division, protected on its flank by Brigadier Pope’s cavalry brigade. The 
advance of both divisions was ultimately successful, thoTigh not unattendcil 
with a very untoward occurrence in each. The two leading officers of the right 
brigade of the left division “waved their swords over their heads as thej' 
cheered on their gallant comrades.” Somehow this act was mi.staken for 
“ the signal to move in double time.”. The consequence is thus described in 
the despatch: “ This unh.appy mistake led to the Europeans outstripping the 
native corps, who could not keep pace, and arriving completely blown at a bolt 
of thicker jungle, where they got into some confusion, and Lieutenant-colonel 
Brookes, leading the 24th, was killed between the enemy’s guns. At this. 

Jnoment a large body of infantry, which supported these guns, opened uj)on 
them so destructive a fire that the brigade was forced to retire, having ]ost 
their gallant and lamented leader Brigadier Pennycuick, and the three other 
field officers of the 24th, and nearly half the regiment, before it gave way; the 



524 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book VIII. 


A.i). 1840. native regiment, when it came up, also suffering severely.” At this crisis 
Brigadier Penny’s brigade, left in reserve, was ordered up, but its support 
Bauionf proved unnecessary, for, adds Lord Gough, “Brigadier-general Campbell, with 

walla. that steady coolness and military decision for which he is so remarkable, 

having pushed on his left brigade and formed line to his right, carried every¬ 
thing before him, and soon overthrew that portion of the enemy which had 
obtained a temporary advantage ovei’ his right brigade.” The untoward 
occurrence in the right division was still more serious, and must like the other 
be de.scribed in the words of Lord Gough, who after saying that “the right 
attack of infantry was most jiraiseworthy and successful,” and that “this divi¬ 
sion nobly maintained the character of the Indian anny, taking and spiking 
tlie whole of the enemy’s guns in their front, and dispersing the Sikhs wherever 
they were soon,” continues thus:—“The right brigade of cavalry, under 
Brigadier Pope, was not, I rogict to say, so successful. Either by some order, 
or misajiprehension of an order, they got into much confusion, hampered the 
fine brigade of horse-artillery, wliich, while getting into action against a body 
of the enemy's cavalry that was coming down uiion them, had their horses 
seiiarjited from their guns by the false movements of our cavalry, and notwith¬ 
standing tlic heroic conduct of the gunners, four of their guns were disabled to 
)in extent which rendered their withdrawal at the moment impos.sible. The 
moment the artillery was extricated, and the cavalry re-formed, a few I’ounds 
put to fliglit the enemy that had occasioned this confusion.” Lord Gough in 
the above extract speaks only of the impo.ssibility of withdrawing the guns “at 
the moment,” and .spared himself the mortification of confessing that tlie enemy 
carried them off as trophies, and along witli them five stand of colours. It was 
not indeed a victoiy to be boasted of, for the Sikhs, though they acknowledged 
their defeat by retiring and allowing the British to encamp in advance of the 
battle-field, were so little broken and dispirited that they managed to return 
in the course of the night and cawy off unobserved {ill the guns that had been 
. ca])tnre(l from them, except twelve which had been previously secured, 
indocwivo Nothing shows more clearly how indeci.sive the above battle of Chillianwalla 

’“isaU.’ Ill * 

had been, than tlie fact that the enemy, instead of being driven across tlu; 
Jlielum, kept possession of his entrenchments, while Lord Gough considered it 
imprudent to iittempt to force them. One good reason for this delay was that 
Genenil Whish with his victorious ixmiy had started from Mooltan, and miglit 
soon be ex[)ected at head-quarters. His actual arrival was indeed most oppor¬ 
tune. The Sikh.s, pressed by the want of jirovisions, had quitted their entrench- 
jnents, and made a retrograde movement toward the Chenab by w{iy of 
Gujerat. Their intention is supposed to have been to cross over into the 
Reelina Doab, and after ravaging it advance upon Lahore. General Whish, 
who had now arrived at Wuzeei’abad, was able to defeat this intention by 
guarding the fords above and below this town, and also to effect his own 



Chap. VIII.] 


. BATTLE OF GUJERAT. 


525 


junction with the conimander-in-chief by means of a bridge of boats. The a.d. is49. 
British army now amounted to 25,000 men ; that of the enemy liad also gained ~ 

a great accession of strength, and was estimated at 60,000, of whom 1500 were strength oi 
Afghan horse, under Akram Khan, a son of Dost Mahomed, who had obtained tivV^iTOB. 
possessiori of Peshawer, and openly become a Sikh ally. The vast inferiority 
of the British in point of numbers was compensated, both by the superior 
e.vcellence of the troop.s, and by a most powerful artillery, consisting of 100 
gtms, while the Sikhs had only 59. 

On the 21st of February the enemy’s camp nearly encircled the town of 
(hijerat, lying between it and a deep watercourse, the diy bed of the Dwarra, 
which here bending very tortuously, jm.ssed nearly round two sides of the town, 
and then diverged to a considerable distance in a southerly direction, so as to 
xntei-sect the British camp. The enemy’s position on the right flank and centre 
was greatly strengthened by this nullah, and he had .skilfully availed himself of 
it by placing his gnus immediately behind it, and his infantry in front, under 
the cover of its banks; his left was in like manner covered by a deep though 
narrow stream, which running from the cast of the town, turned south and fell 
into the Cheuab, in the direction of Wuzeerabad. 'fhe interval between the '’><vnj <.f 

OujlTilt. 

twt) watercourses wivs an open space of nearly three miles, which })resented no 
natural obstacle to military mancr-uvres, and was therefore selected by Lord 
(lough as the direction of his principal attack. His plan, and the mode in 
which it was subsccjucntly canied out, are thus detailed in his loi-dship’s 
despatch; “ On the extreme left I placed the Bombay column, commanded by 
the Honourable H. Dundas, suj)j)orted by Brigadier White’s brigade of cavalry, 
and the Scinde horse, under Sir Joseph Thackwell, to })rotect the left, and 
]n event large bodies of Sikh and Afghan cavalry from turning that flank ; with 
this cavalrytT placed Captains Duncan’s and Hush’s troop of horse-artilleiy, 
whilst the infantry was covered by the Bombay troop of horse-artiUeiy, under 
Major Bloo<l. On the right of the Bombay column, and with its right resting 
on the nullah, I placed Brigadier General Cam[)beirs division of infantry, 
covered by No. 5 and No. 10 light field batteries, under Major Ludlow and 
Lieutenant Bobertson, having Brigadier Hoggan’s bi-igade of infantry in 
reserve. Upon the right of the nullah I placed the infantry division of Major- 
gcnei’al Sir W. Gilbert; the heavy guns, eighteen in number, under Majors 
Day and Horsford, with Captain Shakespeare and Brevet-major Sir Richmond 
Shakespeare commanding batteries, being disposed in two divisions on the 
flanks of his left brigade. This line was prolonged by Major-general Whish’s 
division of infantry, with one brigade of infantry under Brigadier Markham, 
in support in a second line; and the whole covered by three troops of artillery 
—Major Fordyce’s, Captains Mackenzie’s and Anderaon’s, and No. 17 light field 
battery under Captain Dawes, with Lieutenant-colonel Lane’s and Captain 
Kinleside’s troops of horse-artillery in a second line in reserve, under Lieutenant- 



526 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book YIIL 


A.P. 1849. 


Hattie of 
Oi^erat. 


CoTn))lete 
diHcnmUtiire 
of the Sikhs. 


colonel Brind. My right flank was protected by Brigadiers Hearsey's and 
Lockwood’s brigades of cavalry, with Captain Warner’s troop of horse-artillery. 
The 5th and 6th light cavalry, with the Bombay light field battery, and the 
45th and 69th regiments, under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Mercer, 
most effectually protected my rear and baggage. With my right wing 1 
proposed penetrating the centre of the enemy’s line, so as to turn the position 
of their force in rear of the nullah, and thus enable my left wing to cross it witli 
little loss, and in co-operation with the right to double upon the centre the wing 
of the enemy’s force opposed to them. At half-past seven the army advanced in 
the order described, with the precision of a parade movement. The enemy 
opened their fire at a very long distance, which exposed to my artillery both 
the position and range of their guns. I halted the infantry just out of fire, and 
advanced the whole of my artillery covered by skirmishers. The cannonade 
now opened upon the enemy was one of the most magnificent I ever witnessed, 
and as terrible in its effects. The Sikh guns were served with their ticcustomed 
i'aj)idity, and the enemy well and re.solutely maintained his jw-sition, but the 
terrific force of our fire obliged them, after an obstinate resistance, to fall back. 
J then deployed the infantry, and directed a general advance, coveiing the 
movement with my artillery as before. The village of Burra Kalra, the left 
one of tho.se of that name in which the enemy had concealed a large body of 
infantry, and which was app,ai-ently the key of their position, lay immediately 
in the line of Major-geneial Sir Walter Gilbert’s advance, arid was carried in 
the most brilliant style by a spirited attack of the 3d brigade under Brigadier 
Penny, consisting of the 2d Europeans, and the 31st and 7()th regiments of 
native infantry, which drove the enemy from their cover with gi’eat slaughter. 
A very .spirited and successful movement was also made about the same time, 
against a heavy body of the enemy’s troops, in and about the second or Ohota 
Kalra, by part of Brigadier Hai'vcy’s brigade, most gallantly led by Lieutenant- 
colonel Franks, of her majesty’s 10th foot. The heavy artillery continued to 
advance with extraordinary celerity, taking up successive forward position,s, 
driving the enemy from those they had retired to, while the rapid advance and 
beautiful fire of the horse-artillery and light field batteries, which I strengthened 
by bringing to tlie front the two re.serve troops of horse-artillery under 
Lieutenant-colonel Brind (Brigadier Brooke having the general superintendence 
of the whole horse-artillery), broke the ranks of the enemy at all pointa The 
whole infantry line now rapidly advanced, and drove the enemy before it; the 
nullah was cleared, several villages stormed, the guns that were in position 
carried, the camj) captured, and the enemy routed in every direction, the right 
wing and Brigadier-general Campbell’s division passing in pursuit to the east¬ 
ward, the Bombay column to the westward of the town. The retreat of the 
Sikh army thus hotly pressed, soon became a perfect flight, all arms dispersing 
over the country, rapidly pursued by our troops for a distance of twelve miles. 



Chap. VIII.] 


SUBMISSION OF THE SIKHg; 


527 


their track strewn with the wounded, their arms and military equipments, a d.i8«. 
which they threw away to conceal that they were soldiers." ' 

There was no room to doubt, as at Chillianwalla, whether a victory had importaut 
been gained. The enemy’s army had been annihilated, fifty-three of their guns, uuie'o? 
being, except six, the whole they brought into action, had been captured, and 
the Sikh war was in fact ended. What made tliis signal success still more 
gratifying was the comparatively small cost at which it had been purchased, 
the total British loss being only ninety-two killed and G82 wounded. Well 
might the goveraor-general say in his letter to the secret committee, “Under 
Divine Providence the British arms have signally triumphed. On the 21st of 
February an action was fought which must ever be regarded as one of the 
memorable in the annals of British warfare in India; memorable alike from the 
greatness of the occasion, and from the brilliant and decisive issue of the 
encounter. For the first time Sikh and Afghan were banded together against 
tlie British power. It was an occasion which demanded the putting forth of 
all the means at our dis]) 0 .sal, and so conspicuous a manifestation of the 
superiority of oui‘ arms as should appal each enemy, and dissolve at once their 
compact by fatal proof of its futility. The consequences of the victory which 
has been won equals the highest hopes entertained.” 

The day after the victory Major-general Gilbert, at the head of a force ol i*u™uitof 

the Afghan 

about 15,000 men, with foi’ty guns, resume<l the pursuit of the fugitives in the ansUimic:!. 
direction of the Jhelum, but on reaching Noorungabad, on the left bank, found 
tliat Shere Sing had already crossed, and was encamped on the right bank with 
the relics of his army, estimated at about 8000 men. The Sikh leader, how¬ 
ever, had 110 idea of continuing the contest, and employed the intervention of ' 

Major Lawrence, who had formerly been treacherously detained as a prisoner, 
to make his own submission together with that of the other rebel chiefs. Mean- 
time. General Gilbert having crossed the Jhelum, directed his attention chiefly 
to the Afghans, who were now in full flight toward the Indus. He so nearly 
overtook them that he reached Attock, which they had just evacuated, before 
they had time entirely to destroy the bridge of boats, with the view of preclud¬ 
ing further pursuit. He was therefore able to convey his troops aci’oss, and 
enter the territory of Afghanistan, but as there was now no hojie of reaching 
the flying Afghans before they entered the fatal Khyber Pass, he prudently 
desisted from following them, and retraced his steps. 

With regard to the future government of the Punjab, the governor-general 
had already decided, and therefore no time was lost in acquainting the Lahore domiuiou. 
council of regency that the Sikh dominion was at an end. The members, aware 
that resistance would be unavailing, contented themselves with endeavouring 
to obtain favourable terms, and on being assured that those of them who had 
not taken part in the rebellion would be liberally dealt with, gave their consent 
to a treaty, which, though made in the name of the maharajah, and signed by. 



528 


HISTOEY OF INDIA. 


[Book VIII. 


A.P. 1640. him, could not be considered as his, since he was then a boy of only eleven 
years of age. By this so- called treaty, consisting of five articles, the maharajah 
Extiiiotioii for ever renounced .all riglit of sovereignty in the Punjab, gave up all state 
dominion.* property as Confiscated to the British government; surrendered to the Queen of 
England "the gem called the Koh-i-noor, which was taken from Shah Shujah-ul- 
Moolk by Maharajah Runjeet Sing;” and agreed to reside at such place as the 
governor-general should select, only stipulating in return that he should be 
treated with re.spect and honour, retain the title of “Maharajah Dhuleep Sing 

Bahadoor," and receive a pension of not less 
than four, and not more than five lacs of 
ru])ees. It may here be mentioned as an 
interesting fact that this youthful prince 
has since erabnaced Christianity. On the 
29th of March the governor-general issued 
a proclamation in which, after narrating the 
peace and frientlship which prevailed in the 
time of Runjeet Sing, the subsequent gross 
violation of treaties by the Sikhs, the cle¬ 
mency extended to them .after their dis¬ 
comfiture, and the most ungrateful return 
which they had recently made by waging 
mxhara.iaii Dnri.F.EPSiNci. “ a fierc.e and bloody war for the proclaimed 

From llardhigc'H Rt'CollectionB of India. 

purpose of destroying the British and theii' 
power,” proceedetl .as follows:—“The goveniment of India formei'ly decl.arcd 
that it desired no fui'ther conquest, and it proved by its acts the sincerity 
of its professions. The government of India has no desire for conquest now; 
but it is bound in its duty to provide fully for its own security, and to 
guaial the interests of those committed to its cluu'ge. To th.at end, .and as the 
oidy sure mode of protecting the state from the per[)etual recuiTcncc of unpro¬ 
voked and wasting wars, the governoi’-general is compelled to resolve upon tll<^ 
entire subjection of a people whom their own government has long lieen unable 
to conti’ol, .and whom (as events have now shown) no puni,shinent can deter 
Aiinexiitioii fi-om violcncc, no acts of friendship can conciliate to peace. Wherefore the 

1 ‘uiyiii.. Governor-general of In<lia has declared, and hereby proclaims, that the 

kingdom of the Punjab is .at an end, and that all the territories of MaharaJ.ah 
Dhuleep Sing .arc now and henceforth a ]iortion of the British empire in India.” 

The action of Chillianwalla, when the new's of it reached this country, was 

generally reg.arded by the British i)ublic as e(j[uivalent to defeat and prognostic 
of future disaster, and all cyc.s were tui’ued to Sir Charles Napier as the man bc.st 
qu.alified to bring the war to a succe.ssful termination. The cry for his appoint¬ 
ment became in consequence so loud and determined that the directors, though 
he was almost at open wai- with them, were compelled to yield, and the 




Chap. VIII.] 


SIR CHARLES NAPIER. 


529 


conqueror of Scinde, who thought he liad bidden a final farewell to India, sttiled a.d. is4». 
for it again as commander-in-chief, on the 24th of February, 1849. During the 
vo 3 ’’age, when off Ceylon, he received intelligence of the victory of Gujerat. As sircwios 
the circmnstances under which his appointment had been made were thus coeds to 
entirely changed, and as he was himself by no means of a ti-actable temper, it is 
easy to understand that it was not long before he began to find himself in a false 
position. Others soon came to be of the same opinion, and not a few, who were 
smarting under his severe though probably not undeserved censures, began to 
wait for his halting. Tiie govemor-genei’al was far above entertaining any such 
feeling himself, or of countenancing it in others, but he wjis jealous of his 
authority, and is said to have hinted to the new commander-in-chief, at their 
very first interview, that ho must beware of encroaching on it. There, was thus 
from the outset no gi-eat prospect of harmonious co-operation, and before a year 
elapsed a collision took place. Believing that a mutinous spirit prevailed among 
the sepoys serving in the Punjab, and that one main cause of it was a dimin\i- 
tion of pay, produced by a government regulation afifecting their allowance for 
purchasing food. Sir Charles Napier suspended the regulation on his own 
re.sponsibility, without waiting to obtain the sanction of the governor-general, 
who was then at sea, or even consulting the su])remc council. Subsequently he 
had not only disbanded the 6Gth native infantry, on the ground of inutinj^ as 
lie was entitled to do, but also by another stretch of authority had given its 
1 ‘olours to a Ghoorka battalion, which was henceforth to rank as the GGth instead 
of the regiment disbanded. This latter proceeding the governor-general simply 
disapproved of by letter, but the former proceeding was deemed too serious an 
encroachment to lie thus quietly di.sposed of, and the decision in regard to it 
w'as communicated in a formal letter addressed by the government secretary to 
the adiutani-ceneral of the army. 1’his letter was a rcTirimand of the harshest 

Ktuildlllg 

ile.scription, both in form and in substance. I’hrough. it the commander-in-chief witiiti.o 
was told that the governor-general in council viewed the orders which he has 
issued to the officers in the Punjab “with regret and dissatisfaction”—and given 
to understand for his future guidance “that tlie governor-general in council will 
not again permit the commander-in-chief, under any circumstances, to i.ssue 
order's which shall change the pay and allowances of the troops serving in India, 
and thus practically to exercise an authority which has been r eserved, and mo,st 
]>roperly reserved, for the supreme govei'nment alone.” After such a reprimand 
nothing but resignation could have been anticipated, and accordingly on the 
22d May, it was transmitted through Lord Fitzroy Somerset to the Duke of 
VVellington, the commander-in-chief. His grace, who had always been a 
stanch friend of Sir Charles Napier, and had exerted himself in procirrang his 
appointment, was greatly displeased with the manner in which he had throVrn 
•t up, and moreover declared his conviction that his conduct had been justly 
censured. Sir Charles Napier arrived in England in March, 1851, and it is 

VoL. III. 263 



530 


IIISTOEY OF INDIA. 


[Book VIII. 


A.n. 1853 . pleasing to add, that by none was he welcomed more heartily than by the Duke 
of Wellington. The interview is thus graphically described by himself: “I never 
Renignatiou was SO kindly, so graciously received as just now by the duke; I thought he 
Sir c^iiffl would have embraced me. Will your grace let me put your name on my card 
Napier. levce on Wednesday? Oh yes! yes! and I will go there, and take care 

to tell the queen that you are there; she will be glad to see you safe back, and 
so am I, so is everybody." As an appropriate supplement to this anecdote, it 
may be mentioned that Sir Charles was one of the pall-bearers at the duke’s 
funeral, and caught a cold which accelerated his death. Disease had indeed 
long been preying upon him, but he was permitted to exceed the allotted span 
of life, and was in his seventy-second year when he expired on the morning of 
the 29th of August, 1853. 


CHAPTER IX. 


A new Burmese war - Capture of Martab.an, Rangoon, and Rronio—Annexation of Pegu—Peace witli 
Burinah—Claiins of the British government in India as the paramount power—Annexation of Oude 
- -Termination of the Marquis of Dalhousie’s government—Changes in the constitution of the East 
I ndia Company. 


Now Uur 
ineee war. 



ITE Sikh war was no sooner triumphantly terminated, than atten¬ 
tion was called to an opposite quarter. Under the treaty with 
Burrnah, British subjects trading to its ports were entitled to 
“the utmost protection and security." The governor of Rangoon 
was charged with gi'osslj’^ violating this obligation,^ and in addi¬ 
tion to individual complaints, a foimal memorial was presented to the council 
at Calcutta, by several mci’chants and commanders of trading vessels, in which 
they stated that they had “for a long time suffered from the t 3 rranny and gross 
injustice of tire Burmese authorities” at Rangoon, and that trade was “seriously 
obstructed and almost suppressed in consequence." Commodore Lambert, of 
her majesty’s ship Fox, was therefore ordered to proceed with his ship and a 
small squadron to Rangoon, to demand reparation. In doing so, he was direeted 
to use the utmost caution. He was fii-st to address a letter to the governor of 
Rangoon, briefly setting forth the facts of each case. If compensation was 
granted, the matter was not to be carried any further; but as it seemed very 
jtt'obable that this amicable settlement would not be acceded to, he was furnished 
with a letter to the King of Ava, which was to be forwarded only in the event 
of a refusal by the governor of Rangoon, and recommended the removal of this 
officer as essential to a continuance of good understanding between the two 
governments. 








Chap. IX.] 


SECOND BUEMfiSE WAR. “ 


531 


Commodore Lambert arrived at Rangoon in the endof November, 1851 ,andon a-d. jssa. 
the 28th of this month addressed a letter to the council at Calcutta, explaining his 
reasons for “deviating” from part of their instructions as to the rnodeof demanding Pnxoedinsi! 
redress. The charges made against the governor, instead of being overcharged, uore Lam- 
fell, he said, far short of the truth, and therefore, since it must be as useless as it 
was unpleasant to attempt an arrangement with an official guilty of such gro.s8 
misconduct, he had at once forwarded the letter to tlje King of Ava, and along 
with it a letter from himself to the prime-minister. In transmitting these letters 
through the governor of Rangoon, he addressed him in the following laconical 
terms: — “I shall 
expect that eveiy 
despatch will bo¬ 
used for forward¬ 
ing the same, and 
I hold you respon¬ 
sible for an answer 
being delivered in 
these waters with¬ 
in five weeks from 
this day.” The 
f^iwcrnor - general 
was of opinion that 
i Omniodore Lam- Moui-mkin - riom llm llluHtvuU-d TjOiuIoh Newa. 

bei’t had “exercised 

a sound discretion” in so far deviating from his instructions by “cutting off 
all discus.sion with the lowrl governoi,” but he at the same time cautioned 
him “not to have recourse to the terrible extremity of war except in the last 
resort, and after every other method has been tried without succe.ss.” On the 
supposition that the King of Ava might either decline to answer the letter, or 
refuse to comply with its demands, the governor-general concluded thus: “The 
only course we can pursue which would not on the one hand involve a dan¬ 
gerous submiasion to injury, or on the other hand precipitate us prematurely 
into a war which 'moderate counsels may yet enable us to avert, will be to 
e.stabli8h a blockade of the two rivers at Moulmein, by which the great ma.ss f)f 
the traffic of the Burmese empire is understood to ])ass.'’ 

On the 1st of January, 1852, the court of Ava returned an answer which uopeaofiin 

* , , luuic&ble 

seemed to leave no doubt of an amicable settlement, since it announced that the settlement, 
obnoxious governor had been recalled, and his successor instructed to make due 
compensation. The commodore, encouraged by this friendly proceeding, immedi¬ 
ately endeavoured to open a communication with the new governor, and with this 
view having addressed a letter to him, sent Commander Fishbourne and two other 
officers ashore to deliver it. Their reception was the very opposite of what had 




532 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book VIII. 


A.D. 1862. 


New Uur- 
nieHe war. 


Uisiln'tw 

ivfiiWKi by 
the Kiui4 
of Avfi. 


been anticipated. After being subjected to ignominious treatment they were 
obliged to return with the letter undelivered, and without seeing the governor, 
who, they were told, was asleep, and must not be awaked. This treatment 
was at once resented, by establishing a blockade. It would have been well if 
the commodore had stopped here, instead of taking a step which made hostilities 
all but inevitable. His own explanation is as follows:—“Having failed in 
carrying out the instructions of the government of India by the conduct of the 
governor of Rangoon, whom 1 considered as speaking the voice of the court of 
Ava, I could regard it as nothing but a national insnlt that had been offered to 
the British flag, and accordingly gave directions to Commander Fishbomme, of 
the Hermes to take possession of a ship belonging to the King of Ava by way 
of repi’isal.” Sliortly after this exploit he set sail for the mouth of the rivei-. 
Tlie Fox met with no ob.struction, but when the Hermes was seen towing behind 
lier the vessel familiarly known in the ])ort of Rangoon by the name of the 
Yelhnv Skip, and belonging to the king, the Burmese opened their fii’e upoji 
lier from a stockade> fShe of course returned it with shot and shell, and had 
little difficulty in silencing her opjaments. Actual hostilities being thus com¬ 
menced <ni the loth of January, Commodore Lambert hastened off in the 
Hermes to (Calcutta to I’cjtort.. Still anxious, if possible, to avert “the terrible 
extremity of Avar,” the governor-general in council once more addressed a 
lettei- to the King of Ava, which, after a narrative of previous proceedings, maile 
the following specific Tlemaiids:—“ 1. Your majesty, disavowing the acts of the 
[(resent governor of Rangoon, shall, by the hands of your ministers, express 
great regret that Captain Fishbourne and the British officers who accompanied 
him were exposed to insult at the hands of your servants at Rangoon on the 
Otli of January last. 2. In satisfaction of the claims of the two captains v'ho 
suffered exactions from the late governor of Rangoon, in compensation for the 
loss of property which British merchants may have suffei-ed in the burning of 
that city by the sicts of the ju-esent governor, and in consideration of the 
ex])enses of pre[)aration for war, your majesty will agree to pay, and will |)ay at 
once, ten lacs of rupees to the government of India. 8. Your majesty will direct 
that an accredited agent, to be appointed in conformity with the 7th article of 
the treaty (ff Yandaboo, and to reside at Rangoon, shall be received by your 
majesty’s .servants there, and shall at all times be treated with the respect due 
to the representative of the British government. 4. Your majesty will direct 
the removal of the [)re.sent governor of Rangoon, whose conduct I'enders it 
impossible that the government of India should consent to any official inter¬ 
course with him.” Immediate assent to these conditions, and their complete 
fulfilment on or before the 1st of Aj)ril next, or immediate war, were the only 
alternatives that could now be offered. The Burmese by non-compliance with 
the former alternative virtually accepted the latter, and both governments 
pve[>ared for war. 



Chap. IX.'] 


SECOND BURMESE WAR. 


533 


The British force consisted of two separate armaments, the one from Calcutta a.d issa 
and the other from Madras. The former, under the command of General Godwin, 
who had served in the former Burmese war, and to whom the charge of the Expaiition 
whole expedition was now intrusted, sailed from the Hooghly on the 28th of nurmaii 
March, and ari’ived on the 2d of April off the mouth of that branch of the Imwadi 
on which Rangoon stands. Here he found Admiml Austen, the naval com- 
mander-in-chief, who had come from Penang in H.M.S. linttler. The Madras 
armament had not yet arrived, but delay being deemed inexpedient, it was 
resolved forthwith to attack Martaban, situated on tlio (‘a.stooa.stneartliemoutli 
of the Salwein, oi>- 
])osite toMoulmein. 

The attack was 
made at daybreak 
of the 5th of April. 

The admiral, not- 
witlistanding the 
numerous shoals 
and currents which 
obstructed his pro¬ 
gress, move*l U]) 
witli fiv'e steamci'S, 
and placed the 
fictWZci'within 200 
yards of the city 
wall. Under cover 

of the tremendous fire whicli he tlien opened, the troops landed, and ettected 
an easy capture. 

The Madras division having arrived, the admiral again moved up the river, oponitumn 

® ® ^ ^ , at llangDoii 

and anchored close off Rangoon. On the 11 th of April the fire which the 
enemy had opened from both banks was silenced by the steam frigates, and on 
the 12th tlie troops, after landing, began to move forward. “They had not 
proceeded far,” says General Godwin in his despatch, “ when, on oj)ening some 
rising ground to our right, guns opened on us, and shortly after skirmisher.s 
showed themselves in the jungle. Tliis was a new mode of fighting with the 
Burmese, no instance having occun'ed last war of their attacking oui- flankii, or 
leaving their stockades, that I remember ever to have taken i)lace. 1 make 
this remark, as they are now not only good .shots, but bold in their operations, 
and clever in selecting their ground and covering themselves.” * Their new 
tactics, however, though they increased the number of ca.sualties, proved 
unavailing, and they were driven back to the shelter of a strong stockSide, 
from which they kept up a fire of musketry, so steady and effective, that it was 
not carried without “a very severe loss,” and such a “comjdete exhaustion of 



TEMroKAiiY Stockadb, Kartabak —From u Rkotoli by jin Officer of Mie Indian Army. 




A D. 1852. 


J’oHitioii <>t' 
Now Han- 


iiH jmgodu. 


534 HISTORY OF INDIA. [Book VIII. 

the stormiBg party,” that though it was only eleven o'clock A.M., the general 
resolved' to halt where he was, after concentrating the force “in as strong a 
position as the country admitted of.” This halt on the 12th was followed by 
another on the 13th, because the heavy guns could not be forwarded “before 
the middle of that day,” and the troops therefore did not move again till the 
morning t)f the 14tli. Before proceeding to detail the subsequent operations, it 
will be proper to mention that in 1850 the old city of Rangoon was almost 
entirely destroyed by fire, and that in consequence, instead of the old town 
which stood on the river bank, a new town had been formed about a mile and 
a quarter from it. “ It is,” says General Godwin, “nearly a square, with a bund 
or mud wall about sixteen feet high and eight broad; a ditch runs along each 
.side of the square, and on the north .side, where the pagoda stands, it has been 
very cleverly worked into the defences, to which it forms a sort of citadel. 
The distance from tlie ])agoda to the south entrance of the town is about three- 
(piarters of a mile, and it (the town) is something more than that breadth from 
l^ast to west. The old road from the river to the pagoda comes up to the south 
gate, running through the new town, and it was by this I’oad the Burmese had 
settled that we shouM attack it, and where they had made eveiy preparation 
to receive us, having armed the defences with nearly 100 pieces of cannon and 
otlKu- mi,s.sile.s, and with a garrison of at least 10,000 men.” 

An assault made in the direction where the enemy ex])ected would, in 
General Godwins opinion, have cost him half his force, and his plan therefore 
was to force his way into the.pagoda, bj’^ moving on a road which “entirely 
turned all the defences of this real stronghold.” He accordingly marched to 
the north-west through thick jungle, passed the stockaded town, and got to 
the east side of the pagoda, the capture of which, as the key of the place, was 
his main object. A battery of heavy guns was forthwith erected, and opened 
with so much effect that the assault, which had been fixed for noon, took place 
an hour sooner, and was completely successful. The city and all the country 
around fell with the pagoda. The next capture was Bassein, situated about 
sixty miles above the mouth of the river of same name, forming the most 
westerly branch of the Imwadi. This place, standing in a deep re-entering 
angle of the river, was surrounded by an irregular fortification. It was 
captured on the 17th of May after a sharp contest, and the general, contenting 
himself with leaving a small gan-ison in it, returned with the remainder of his 
force to Rangoon. 

Though the Bunnese had already lost three of their most important towns, 
and sustained defeat in every encounter, they were so far from showing signs 
of submission, that on the 26th of May they made a bold attempt to recover 
Martaban, by' suddenly attacking it with a force of about 1000 men. The 
small gariison, by signal gallantry, were able to maintain their ground, but so 
much confidence and daring were displayed by the enemy, as to show that 



Chap. IX.] 


SECOND BITBMESE WAR.‘ 


535 


still more decisive measures would be necessary in order to humble them. It a u. isss. 
was therefore resolved to threaten the Burmese capital of Ava or Umerapoora, 
by moving up the main branch of the Ira wadi, and making sin attempt upon <'.ii>ture <.f 
Prome. With this view Captain Tarleton was despatched with five steamers 
early in July, to examine its position and defences. On this occasion ho did 
much more than was expected, for he not oidy forced liis wsiy uj) the river in 
the face of all the obstructions thrown in his way, but by choosing a navigable 
channel, diiferent from that by which the Burmese, to tlie number of about 
10,000, were waiting his approach, he reached Prome on the 9th of July, and 
found it without a garrison. This was indeed a prize had he been able to take 
sidvantage of it, but as he had not been furnished with the means, he could 
only carry off a few guns, spike others, destroy the stores, and return. 

The apparent determination of the Bunne.se not to yield, having shown the 
necessity of carrying on operations on a more extensive scale than had been 
originally contemplated, the governor-general repaired in person to Bangoon, 
where he arrived on the 27th of July. During his stay, which lasted only 
about ten days, it was arranged that extensive reinforcements should be 
forwarded, so as to raise the whole force, henceforth dignified with the title of 
the army of Ava, to the number of nearly 20,000 men. Much time was spent 
in preparing reinforcements, and it was the 9th of October when the British 
army again came in sight of Prome. 

The Burmese .scarcely made a show of defence. “ Upon our advanced oenem) 
guard reaching the pagoda,” says Oeneral Godwin in his desjiatch, “it found .leBuitory 
that the enemy had abandoned that position, as well as the heiglits beyond it, 
leaving in our possession an entirely evacuated town, overgrown with thick 
and rank vegetation, and I regret to add abounding in swamps.” 3'he general 
appears to,have been somewliat puzzled at the ftmility with which a place, on 
which he had so long hesitated to advance, had been yielded, but adds, as if in 
justification of his own dilatorincss, that he had been “for a long time aware 
of the assemblage of a large force about ten miles east of Prome,” and that he 
had “ascertained, from very good authority, that they have now about 18,000 
men well posted in two or more stockades.” After this statement one naturally 
expects him to add that he was just preparing to encounter this host, and thus 
(Town his hitherto comparatively tame campaign with a signal victory. 

Nothing, however, was further from his intention; and it is therefore with a 
feeling somewhat stronger than mere surprise, that we find him in the very 
next sentence of his despatch writing as follows:—“It is not my intention to 
disturb them at present in any way, as by their concentration at that place, 
the fine force now assembling here wiU have an opportunity of striking a blow 
which may put an end to much future opposition.” From such'tactics nothing 
was to be expectecL 

Early in June a small force had been detached to Pegu, situated on the 



HISTOEY OF INDIA. 


[Book VIII. 


A.D. 1852. 


('apiiire of 
Tegu. 


It iP TO- 
HBBatllttNl 
>».V the 
linrmeso. 


53() 

river of that name, about fifty miles above the junction of the Kangoon, and 
effected its capture. Unfortunately, however, in accordance with the desultory 
mode of warfare which General Godwin was too much accustomed to pursue, 
the detachment was too small to leave a garrison in it, and as a natural conse¬ 
quence, as soon as it departed the Burmese returned and resumed possession as 
before. It thus became necessary to repeat the capture. For this purpose 
four river steamers, having on board 300 of the Bengal fusiliers, 300 of the 
Madras fusiliers, and 400 of the 5th Madras native infantry, with details of 
artillery and sappers, and two guns, sailed from Rangoon on the 19th of 
November, and having anchored on the evening of the 20th a little below 
Pegu, disembarked the troops on the following morning. General Godwin’s 
despatch contains the following description of the locality: “The site of the 
old city, wherein the enemy was posted, is formed by a square surrounded by a 
high, bund, each side of which is presumed to be about two miles in length. 
The west side faces the river, and tlie square is surrounded by a wet moat, 
between seventy and eighty paces wide. From the south-west angle there is 
a causeway over the moat, close to and parallel with the liver. This cause¬ 
way the enemy liad made exceedingly strong by traverses, and breaking it 
down at various intervals to prevent our advance. On the whole of the south 
face of the bund, fronting our position, they had bodies of troops stationed 
extending for about a mile and a quarter. As the causeway on the right of 
their position was so narrow that only a file of men could advance along it 
against their numerous musketry and local impediments, I abandoned all idea 
of attacking them there. It was therefore determined to force our way along 
the moat, and to turn the left of their position on the south face of the square.” 
In cari’ying out this plan the troops had to struggle “through the almost 
impenetrable grass and jungle along the outer moat,” exposed to a warm fire. 
At last, however, they reached a part of the moat which admitted a passage 
beyond the enemy’s left, and turned their position. Here, having gallantly 
stonued a post which was defended by two guns, they halted for some time to 
refresh themselves and collect the wounded, and then again advanced by an 
excellent path in the direction of the great pagoda, which was occupied without 
difficulty, and completed the capture of the place. After garrisoning it with 
400 men under Major Hill, General Godwin, who had personally superintended 
the capture, returned with the remainder of the force to Rangoon. In leaving 
Pegu so feebly garrisoned, he furnished another instance of that desultory and 
inefficient mode of warfare on which we have already animadverted. The 
consequence was that the Burmese immediately re-appeared, and having without 
opposition resumed possession of the town, made a daring attack on the pagoda, 
which they completely invested so as to shut up the garrison within its 
preOincts. The first attack was vigorously repulsed, but in a few days after a 
second attack of a still mOre formidable character was made, and Major Hill, 



Chap. IX.] 


SECOND BURMESE WAlt. 


537 


scarcely able to maintain his position, was obliged to make an urgent applica- a.d. issa. 
tion for speedy reinforcements. The general now did what he ought to have 
done at first, and set out for Pegu with a force of about 1350 men. During his siKwerafiii 
passage up the river he paid the penalty of his former negligence, by the state «« British 
of fearful suspense in which he was kept, while scarcely venturing to hope tliat 
his small garrison had been able to hold out against their numerous and perse¬ 
vering foea His intense anxiety was not relieved till he obtained a distant 
view of the pagoda, and ascertained by his telescope that a single individual 
observed upon it was a Madras lascar. The garrison had indeed made* a most 
gallant defence, and were justly complimented in a general order expressing 
“admiration of the noble defence of the Pegu pagoda (against a host of enemies) 
made by Major Hill and the brave handful of ofiicers and soldiers Tinder liis 
command, for so many days and anxious nights, cut olf as they were from the 
succour of their comrades by the works of the enemy in tlie river, as well as 
by the distant communication with the head-quarters of the army.” It seems 
not to have occurred to the general when penning this order, that he would be 
expected to explain why, when he had it in his power to provide an adequate 
garrison, he left only what he himself calls a “brave liandful.” 

On the 20th of December, after receiving intelligence of the capture of 
Pegu, the governor-general issued the following proclamation:—“The court 
of Ava having refused to make amends for the injuries and insults which 
British subjects had suffered at the hands of its servants, the Governor-general 
of India in council resolved to exact I'cparation by force of arms. The foi’ts 
and cities upon the coast were forthwith attacked and captured; the Burmese 
forces have been dispersed wherever they have been met; and the province of 
Pegu is now in the occupation of British troops. The just and moderate 
demands of the government of India have been rejected by the king; the 
ample opportunity that has been afibrded him for repairing the injury that was 
done has been disregarded; and the timely submission which alone could have 
been effectual to prevent the dismemberment of his kingdom has been with¬ 
held. Wherefore, in compensation for the past, and for better security in the 
future, the governor-general in council has resolved, and hereby ju’oclaims, that 
the province of Pegu is now, and shall be henceforth, a portion of the British 
territories in the East. Such Burman troops as may yet remain within the 
])rovince shall be driven out; civil government shall immediately be e.stablished; 
and officers shall be appointed to administer the affairs of the several districts. 

The governor-general in council hereby calls on the inhabitants of Pegu to 
commit themselves to the authority and to confide .securely in the protection 
of the British government, whose power they have seen to be irresistible, and 
whose rule is mai'ked by justice and beneficence. The governor-generaTl in 
council having exacted the reparation he deems sufficient, desires no further 
conquest in Burmah, and is willing to consent that hostilities should cease. 

VoL. HI. 864 



538 


HISTOEY OF INDIA. 


[Book VII I. 


A.0.1852. 


SttlnnifiBiori 
of the King 
of Avo. 


Poaoe with 
Burmnh 


But if the King of Ava shall fail to renew his former relations of friendship 
with the British government, and if he shall recklessly seek to dispute its quiet 
possession of the province it has now declared to be its own, the governor- 
general in council will again put forth the power he holds, and will visit with 
full retribution aggressions which, if they be persisted in, must of necessity 
lead to the total subversion of the Burman state, and to the ruin and exile of 
the king and his race.’' 

Owing to the strict blockade of the mouths of the Irawadi, trade with 
the interior was entirely stopped, and provisions rose to famine prices in the 
Burmese capital. The old king, to whose obstinacy the continuance of the war 
was attributable, became in consequence very unpopular, and was, after a 
struggle, ousted from the throne by his brother. Shortly afterwards overtures 
for peace were made, and on the 4th of April, 1853, British and Burmese com¬ 
missioners met at Prome to an-ange the terms. During the conference, which 
lasted nearly two hours, the Burmese commissioners seemed anxious for peace, 
and offered to sign a treaty in accordance with the proclamation annexing 
Pegu, provided the frontier was fixed not at Meeadaj^ as the British, who had 
taken possession of that place, proposed, but lower down in the vicinity of 
Prome. On application to the governor-general this point was conceded to 
them, but so far from having the desired effect, they receded from their previ¬ 
ous declarations, and on the 9th of May returned with an answer, to the effect 
that the king could not “assent to any treaty by which a ces.sion of territory 
should be made. ’ They wei-e of course immediately dismissed, and it seemed 
as if the war was about to rage more fiercely than ever. It happily proved 
otherwise. The objection, it afterwards appeared, was not so much to the 
cession of territory, as to the humiliation of doing it by formal treaty, and the 
king, who was aware of the ruin which awaited him should hostilities be 
recommenced, managed to avert them by addressing a letter to the governor- 
general, in which he virtually granted all that had been asked of him. The 
governor-generiil accepted this equivalent, and on the 30th of June, 1853, issued 
a notification, proclaiming the restoration of peace. Thus terminated a war 
which, though it proved comparatively barren of brilliant events, added to our 
empire in the East a province containing 40,000 square miles, and a population 
of at least 3,000,000. 

The policy of annexation, which had long been discountenanced by the 
home authorities, on the ground that our Indian empire was already of unwieldy 
magnitude, was once more in the ascendant. It was alleged, indeed, that in 
the cases of the Punjab and Pegu, necessity overruled all questions of policy, 
and no alternative remained but to incorporate them with the British tenitories, 
sin<fe in no other way was it possible to obtain at once compensation for the 
past and secui’ity for the future. In both wars the British government, while 
anxiously desiring peace, had been forced to take up arms in order to repel 



Chap. IX.] 


ANNEXATION POLICY. 


539 


improvoked aggression, and in inflicting punishment bad not exceeded the due A.n. issa. 
measure of retribution, by the extinction of the one kingdom and the dismem¬ 
berment of the other. But there were annexations of a different kind, in Annoxatlnn 
regard to which the above pleas of necessity and just retribution could not be 
urged—annexations made in time of peace, without provocation, and on the 
simple ground that the territories annexed had lapsed to the British govern¬ 
ment, as the paramount power, by the failure of other heirs. The first case of 
importance in which this principle of annexation was fully avowed and acted 
upon was that of Sattara. In a previous part of this work it has been told how 
the Rajahs of Sattara, who were tlie original, and continued to be recognized 
as the nominal heads of the Mahratta confederacy, had been gi'adually deprived 
of all real power by their peishwas or primc-nnni.sters, and at last reduced to 
the condition of state prisoners. When the rule of the peishwa was extin¬ 
guished in 1818, the Marquis of Hastings deemed it expedient to reinvest the 
titular rajah Pertaub Sing with a real sovereignty, and for this purpose 
entered into a treaty with him, by which he himself, his heirs and successors, 
were guaranteed in possession of a territory yielding about £200,000 of revenue. 

Pertaub Sing, for alleged violations of the treaty, was deposed by the British oimnn- 

Mlancos 

government in 1839, and succeeded by liis brother, who died in 18-18. He left ioa<iuigtoit. 
no issue, but a few hours before his death adopted a boy distantly related to 
him. This adoption having been made in regular form was recognized as 
binding, so far as to give the adopted son aU the rights which his adoj)tive 
father could convey to him, but it was denied that the succession to the raj 
was one of those rights. Sattara, it was said, was a British dependency, and 
adoption could have no validity to carry the succession, until it was sanctioned 
by the paramount power. On this ground the adoption was so fai- set aside, 
and Sattarjj, was incorporated with the British territories. The principle, to 
which effect was thus given, is laid down in the following terms in a letter of 
the home authorities, dated 24!th January, 1849:—“That by the general law 
and custom of India, a dependent principality like that of Sattara cannot 
pass to an adopted heir without the consent of the paramount power; that we 
are under no pledge direct or constructive to give such consent, and that the 
general interests committed to our charge are best consulted by withholding it.” 

In the above case of Sattara two questions were considered. Had the British 
government a legal right to seize and appropriate Sattara as a lapsed princi¬ 
pality? Was it expedient, all circumstances considered, to enforce this right? 

Both these questions were answered in the affirmative, and Sattara ceased to 
exist as a separate sovereignty. It is necessary, however, to remember that 
the questions of right and expediency are perfectly distinct, and that cases 
might occur when the one was answered in the affirmative, and the o'ther 
without any inconsistency in the negative. In fact, the very next case which 
occurred was of this description. On the 10th of July, 1852, the Rajah of 



A.D. 185JJ 


The gover¬ 
nor-general 
thwarted in 
hispntpoeed 
annexation 
of Keruwly. 


C&Hid r>f 

Jhaiiai. 


540 HISTORY OF INDIA. [Book VIII. 

Kerowly, a minor Rajpoot state, whose capital is situated about eighty miles 
south-west of Agra, died without issue, but though he was a mere youth he 
had adopted a son, without applying for the sanction of the British govern¬ 
ment. The governor-general, who appears to have adopted annexation as the 
keystone of his policy, was bent on carrying out the precedent established in the 
case of Sattara, and would have at once proceeded to extinguish th^ raj, as a 
dependency which had lapsed to the paramount power by the failure of heirs, 
tliough he at the same time freely admitted "that the continuance of the raj 
would be a measure calculated to reassure and conciliate the good-will of the 
states of Rajpootana.” Fortunately, in this instance the directors took a safer 
and we think a far more equitable course, and on the 26th of January, 1853, 
announce^ tlieir decision that the succession of the adopted son should be 
sustained. They had not, they said, abandoned the principle established in the 
case of Sattara, but they saw "a marked distinction between the cases,” Sattara 
being “a creation and gift of the British government, whilst Kerowly is one of 
the oldest of the Rajpoot states, which has been under the ride of its native 
princes from a period long anterior to the British power in India. It stands 
to us only in the relation of a protected ally, and perhaps there is no part of 
India where it is less desirable, except on the strongest grounds, to substitute 
our government for that of the native rulera” 

The next case in which the question was raised was that of Jhansi, a 
territory in the north-west of Bundelcund, with an area of about 2600 square 
miles, and a population exceeding 250,000. This small Bundela state was 
tributary to the peishwa, and of course, when all his rights were forfeited, 
became tributary to the British government. At this time it was held by 
Sheo Row Bhao, with the title of soubahdar, but as he had claims to favour 
in return for important services which he had rendered during the Mahratta 
war, the infer’ior right implied by his title was overlooked, and a treaty was 
entered into, by which at his special request the right of succession was “con¬ 
firmed in perpetuity” to Row Ram Chund his gi’andson. Accordingly, by the 
second article, the British government, with a view to confirm the fidelity and 
attachment of the government of Jhansi, “consents to acknowledge, and hereby 
constitutes Row Ram Chund, his heirs and successors, hereditary rulers of 
the territory,” &c. Row Ram Chund, who succeeded under this treaty, was 
permitted in 1832 to exchange the title of soubahdar for that of rajah, and 
held the government till 1835, when he died without issue. A competition for 
the succession then arose, and was decided by the British government in favour 
of Row Rugonath, a son of Sheo Row Bhao, and consequently uncle of the late 
rajah. Row Rugonath, who was a leper, and so incompetent to rule that the 
British agent in Bundelcund was obliged to assume the administration, died in 
1838. Like his predecessor he left no issue, and after another competition his 
brother. Baba Gunghadar Row, now the only remaining male descendant of 



Chap. IX.] 


ANNEXATION POLICY. 


541 


Sheo Row Bhao, was preferred. For a time after Ins succession the British a.d. i8S4 
agent continued to administer the government, and the revenue, which previous 
misrule had greatly diminished, began to flourish. At last, in 1843, an arrange- Annexation 
inent was made which restored the native administration, and Baba Gunghadar 
Row continued to rule till his death, on the 21st of November, 1853. As he 
too left no issue, the question of succession was once more raised, though under 
a new form. The whole male line of Sheo Row Bhao was extinct, but 
Gunghadar Row had endeavoured to secure a nominal succession to his family, 
by adopting a distant relation the very day befoi-e he died. The' principle 
jidopted in the Sattara case was obviously applicable here, and the governor- 
general lodged a minute, in which he declared his opinion tliat the territory of 
Jhansi had lapsed to the Britisli government, and “should be retained by it 
equally in accordance with right and with sound policy.” His council having 
concurred in this opinion, he proceeded to act upon it, and on the 4th of March, 

1854, announced the decision to the home authorities in the following terms;— 

“ The chief of the state of Jhansi, which was created by the British govern¬ 
ment a tributary and dependent princij)ality, adopted a son the day before his 
death. We have decided in accordance with a precedent in the case of this 
same state, that this adoption should not be recognized as conferring any right 
to succeed to the rule of the principality, and that sis the chief has left no 
descendants, and no descendants of any preceding chief of this state are in 
existence, the state has lapsed to the British government.” These views were 
not allowed to pass without contradiction, for the widow of the late chief, who 
would have been entitled to the regency during the adopted son’s minority, 
presented a khureeta or petition, in which she argued with some plausibility 
that the original Persian terms interpreted “heirs and successors,” meant not 
merely “helps of the body or collateral heirs,” but “successors in general,” and 
properly implied that “ any party whom he (the chief) sidopted as his son, to 
perform the funerabrites over his body, necessary to insure beatitude in a future 
world, would be acknowledged by the British government as his successor, 
and one through whom the name and interests of the family might be 
preserved.” This reasoning proved unavailing, and as soon as the sanction of 
the home authorities was obtained, Jhansi shared the fate of Sattara, and was 
ei’ased from the list of native states. 

The principle of annexation through failure of heirs, thus sanctioned and Nagiwor. 
practically acted upon for the second time, was now destined to be exemplified 
on a much more extensive scale, and to extinguish the largest of the then 
existing Mahratta states. Ragojee Bhonsla, the Rajah of Berar, or as he was 
frequently designated from his capital. Rajah of Nagpoor, died on the 11th of 
December, 1853. He left neither issue nor collateral heirs, and had not eVen 
attempted to supply their place by adoption, so that the question of lapsing 
was for the first time raised in its simplest and purest form. The succession 



542 


UISTOBY OF INDIA. 


[Book VIII. 


A.D. 1884. 


A miexatioii 
«»f Ka^poor. 


Oude. 


was regulated by a “treaty of perpetual friendship and alliance,” entered into in 
1826, by which the British government, after stipulating for various advan¬ 
tages, including a large tract of territory, guaranteed “the rest of the dominions 
of the Nagpoor state to Ragojee Bhonsla, his heirs and successors.” At the 
date of this treaty Ragojee Bhonsla, who had just attained majority, assumed 
tlie actual administration, but he had been the recognized ruler since 1817, 
wlien, though only maternally descended from the Ragojee who originally 
founded the state, the British government conferred the sovereignty upon him 
instead of Appa Sahib, wlio had forfeited it by treachery and rebellion. In 
this case, therefore, the claim of the Britisli government to the “paramount 
power” could not be questioned, and accordingly the governor-general, true to 
his annexation poHcy, recorded his opinion “tliat by the death of the Rajah of 
Nagpoor, without any heir whatever, the possession of his territories has reverted 
to the British government which gave them; and further, that the possessions 
thus regained sliould not again be given away, since their alienation a second 
time is called for by no obligation of justice or equity, and is forbidden by 
every consideration of sound policy.” His lordship’s language, though open to 
criticism, is moderate compared with that of a member of council, who, in his 
minute on the subject, is extravagant enough to defend the annexation policy, 
on the ground of its being divinely decreed. “ So far as we can foresee the 
ultimate destiny of this great empire,” says Mr. Dorrin, “its entire possession 
mu,st infallibly be consolidated in the hands of Great Britain. Thoroughly 
believing in this dispensation of Providence, 1 cannot coincide in any view 
which shall have for its object the maintenance of native rule against tbe 
progress of events which throws undisputed power into our possession.” 

The last and crowning act of annexation was that of the kingdom of Oude. 
As it proceeded on grounds entirely different from those which have been 
already mentioned, and divided the opinions of the highest authorities, some 
applauding it as a master-stroke of policy, wdiile others condemned it as a gross 
breach of public faith, it will be proper to consider it with some care. About 1760, 
when the Mogul empire was falling to ruins, Shujah-u-Dowlah, who was its heredi¬ 
tary vizier, and also held the soubah of Oude, seized upon the latter, and became, 
though still professing a nominal allegiance to the emperor, an independent sove¬ 
reign. He shortly afterwards made common cause with Meer Cossim, the 
deposed Nabob of Bengal, but being signally defeated by the forces of the Com¬ 
pany, was glad to submit to a treaty which only deprived him of the districts of 
Allahabad and Corah, and left him undisputed master of all his other temtories. 
In 1768, the Company having reason to believe that he was meditating the 
recovery of what he had lost, bound him by another treaty not to maintain a 
larger numbef of troops than 35,000. In 1773 he entered into the arrange¬ 
ments which have left a stain on the memory of Warren Hastings, and succeeded 
by means of British troop.s, shamefully hired for the iniquitous purpose, in crush- 



Chap. IX.] 


ANNEXATION POLICY. 


5+3 


ing the Bohillas. On his death in 1775, Shujah-u-Dowlah was succeeded by 
Asoff-u-Dowlah, and the Company, taking advantage of his position, obtained 
' the cession of several districts, and in return for these and the payment of a 
subsidiary force engaged “ to defend the soubah of Oude at all times.” By 
.subsequent arrangements the sum payable as subsidy was fixed successively at 
£500,000, £555,000, and £700,000, and at hist in 1801, Sadat Ali, then nabob, 
was induced or rather compelled to enter into a treaty by which he ceded one 
half of his whole territory in perpetuity as a substitute for the pecuniary 
subsidy, and the Company, in return for the territories thus ceded, yielding a 
revenue of more than £1,500,000, became bound to defend him from all foreign 
and domestic enemies. The ceded territories were declared to be in lieu of all 
former subsidies, and demands of every kind for the maintenance of troops in 
Oude, whether to repel foreign foes or to suppress occasional internal disturb¬ 
ances or rebellions; but in order somewhat to modify the extent of this obliga¬ 
tion, the nabob, while guaranteed in the possession and sole administration of 
his dominions, engaged to limit his own troops to a fixed number, to administer 
the government in such a manner as would be conducive to the prosperity and 
calculated to secure the lives and property of his subjects, and moreover to 
consult and act in conformity with the advice of the British government. 
Sadat Ali availed him.self to the full extent of the obligations undertaken by 
the Company, and so carefully husbanded his reveiTuc, though now reduced to 
one half of its foimer amount, that at his death in 1814 the treasury, which was 
empty on his accession, contained tlie large sum of £14,000,000. 

Though the government of Oude under Sadat Ali was ably administei’ed, 
repeated instances occurred in which the obligation to employ British troops 
in the suppression of rebellion and disorder could not be performed without 
countenancing oppression and injustice, and the re.sident had therefore been 
instructed not to afford military aid until he was satisfied that the occasion 
justified ic. The task thus thrown upon him was, however, of too vague and 
extensive a nature to be adequately performed, and mutual complaints disturbing 
the harmonious co-operation of the two governments ensued. These necessarily 
increased under Sadat Ali’s son and successor, Ghazee-u-din, a mere imbecile 
and debauchee, who left the government to an unscnipulous uiini.ster, and 
squandered its revenues among worthless favourites. For a time indeed the 
British government Wixs scarcely in a position to remonstrate with much effect. 
Its financial difficulties had made it draw largely on the accumulations of the 
late nabob, and becoming debtor to Ghazee-u-din by three successive loans »)f 
£1,000,000 each, of which only one had been repaid, not in money, but 
by the cession of a tract of countiy conquered from Nepaul, it could not well 
take high ground with its creditor. On the contrary, a new honour was con¬ 
ferred upon him in 1819, when at the stiggestion of the governor-general, and 
with the sanction of the Company, he threw aside his nominal allegiance to 


A.n. 1819. 


Barly rola- 
tions with 
Oude. 


Its nat>ob 
assuiiiestht* 
title of king. 



544 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book YIII. 


A.n 1887. Delhi, and placed himself on a footing of equality with the Mogul, by assuming 
the title of king. But while instructing the resident that the British troops 
itaiations were to be actively and energetically employed in the Oude territory in cases 
oude and of real internal commotion and disorder, the governor-general in council did 
K!"ernmeut.not lo.se sight of the reciprocal obligation on the part of the king not to 
require their interference without a just cause, and therefore, on the 22d of 
July, 1825, wrote as follows;—“This principle which has often been declared 
and acted upon during successive governments, must still be firmly asserted, and 
resolutely adhered to; and the resident must consider it to be a positive and 
indispensable obligation of his public duty to refuse the aid of British troops until 
he shall have satisfied himself on good and sufficient grounds (to be reported in 
each case as soon as practicable, and when the exigency of the case may admit 
of it, before the troops are actually employed), that they are not to be employed 
but in support of just and legitimate demanda” Ghazee-u-din and his minister, 
when thus precluded from employing British troops in the perpetration of 
injustice, took the matter into their own hands, and disregarding the obligations 
of the treaty added so largely to the native army that it amounted to 60,000 
men of all aims. 

siiBcession of Gliazee-u-din was succeeded in 1827 by his son Nuseer-u-din, who imitated 
iirincws. his reckless course, and kept up his large army, of which nearly two-thirds 
were entirely without discipline, and the remaining third, though accounted 
regulars, were so only in name, being badly trained, paid, clothed, armed, and 
accoutred, and placed for the most part under idle, incompetent, and corrupt 
commanders. Abuses thus rose to such a height that in January, 1831, Lord 
William Bcntinck, in a conference with the king, distinctly warned him of hi.s 
determination to nvakc a strong representation to the authorities in England, 
on the subject of the misrule prevailing in Oude, and solicit their sanction to 
tlie adoption of specific measures, even to the length of assuming the direct 
administration of the country, if the evils were not corrected in the • interim. 
The personal warning having passed unheeded, the governor-general renewed 
it in the following year by a letter, in which he says:—“I do not use this 
language of strong remonstrance without manifest necessity. On former occa- 
.sions the language of expostulation has been frequently used towards you witli 
reference to the abuses of your government, and as yet nothing serious ha.s 
befallen you. I beseech you however not to suffer yourself to be deceived into 
a false security. I might adduce sufficient proof that such security would be 
falhicious, but I am unwilling to wound your majesty’s feelings.” These warn¬ 
ings passed unheeded, but in 1837, when Nuseer-u-din died without issue, anil 
was .succeeded by his uncle Mahomed Ali, advantage was taken of a new reign 
to place the ridations between the two governments on a more definit^footing. 
AVith this view, a treaty was concluded, by which provision was made for an 
increased force to be placed more immediately under British control, and it was 



OlIAP. IX.] 


ANNEXATION OF OUBE. 


545 


expressly stipulated, not only that the king should exert himself in concert 
with the resident to remedy the existing defects of his government, but that in 
the event of his neglect to do so, and a consequent continuance of misrule, the 
British government would have right to appoint its own officers to the manage¬ 
ment of all portions of the Oude tenitory in which such misrule might have 
occurred, and to continue such management for so long a peiiod as it might 
deem necessary. In this case a true and faithful account of the receipts and 
(ixpenditure of the assumed territories was to be rendered to liis majesty, any 
•surplus remaining after defraying all charges was to be paid into his treasury, 
and na^iive institutions and forms of administration were to be maintained so 
far as possible, so as to facilitate the restoration of the assumed territories to 
Ids majesty when tlie proper period for such restoration should arrive. 

Owing to the Afghan war and the military operations subseqixently under¬ 
taken or contemplated by Lord Kllenborough, the increase of troops, which tlie 
Hritish government had undertaken by the above treaty to maintain in Oude 
at its own expense, to the estimated amount of sixteen lacs a year, did not take 
]»lace. To this failure on our part, the misrule which continued to prevail 
in Oude was probably in some degree attributable; but the whole blame was 
thrown on the profligate court and equally profligate ministers, who certainly 
seemed determined by their gross misconduct to justify the hai’shest measures 
that could be adopted against them. Still no decisive steps were taken, and 
though the abuses became every day more clamant, the British government 
was so much occupied otherwise, or so reluctant to act, that the throne of Oude 
was twice vacated by death and reoeexipied before the final crisis came. In 
1842 Mahomed Ali was succeedetl by his son Soorj^a Jah, and he again, in 
February, 1847, by his son Wajid Ali Shah, f'he hitter was by no means 
deficient in natural talents, but his indolence and low tastes rendered them of 
no avail, and the government fell entirely into the hands of worthless favourites. 
In the very first year of his reign, before its iniquities were fully developed, the 
govfVjior-general, Lord TIardinge, visited Lucknow, and in a conference with the 
king caused a memorandum, prepared for the occasion, to be read and carefully 
explained to him. This document, after recapitulating the treaties which had 
been made with his predecessors, and showing how the Biitish government, 
being both entitled and bound by them “to interfere if nece.ssary for the purpose 
of securing good government in Oxxde,” could not permit “the continuation of 
any flagrant system of mismanagement’' without becoming a pai'ticipator in it, 
concluded as follows :—“If his majesty cordially enters into the plan suggested 
by the governor-general for the improvement of his administration, he may have 
the sati.sfaction within the period specified of two 3 'ears of checking and eradi¬ 
cating the worst abuses, and at the same time of maintaihing his own 
sovereignty and the native institutions of his kingdom unimpaired; but if'he 
does not, if he takes a vacillating Course, and fail by refusing to act on the 
VoL. III. 266 


A.T>. 18J;2. 


Colulitioti 
of Oude. 


IncreiiHii 

(logoiier 
III tlio a 
luitUHtr} 
litiii. 



540 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book VITI. 


A.l). 1852. 


Uoraoii' 
RtraTice 
with King 
of Onde. 


Sir W. H. 
Sleoman’H 
roiwrfc. 


governor-general’s advice, he is aware of the other alternative and the conse¬ 
quences. It must then be manifest to the whole world that, whatever may 
happen, the king has received a friendly and timely warning.” 

In the above memorandum a respite of two years was allowed, and when 
these elapsed, though no symptom of improvement appeared, the governor- 
general (Lord Dalhousie) deemed it necessary, before taking the final and 
irrevocable step, that General Sir W. H. Sleeman, the resident, should make 
a tour tliroughout the country and a.scertain its actual state by personal inspec¬ 
tion. This toiir, made in 1849 50, and since published, completely established 
ti»e worst that had been alleged iigainst the King of Oude and his creatures, 
and made it clear that the Britisb government could not, without loss of character, 
refrain from interference. The substance of the resident’s report is thus given 
in a letter which he addressed to the governor-general in 1852:—“No part of 
the people of Oude are more anxious for the interposition of our government 
than tlie members of the royal family; for there is really no portion more 
hel]dess an<l oppressed; none of them can ever approach the king, who is 
surrounded exclusively by eunuchs, fiddlers, and poetasters, worse than either, 
and the minister and his creatures, who are woivse than all. They appropriate 
at least one half of tlie revenues of the country to themselves, and employ 
nothing but knaves of the very worst kind in the administration. The king is 
a crazy imbecile, who is led about by these people like a child, and made to do 
whatever they wish him to do, and to give whatever orders may best suit their 
private interests. At present the most powerfid of the favourites are Decanut- 
od-Doula and Hussein-od-Doula, two eunuchs; Anees-od-Doula, and Mbsahib- 
od-Doula, two fiddlers; two poetasters, and the minister and his creatures?. The 
minister could not .stand a moment without the eunuchs, fiddlers, and poets, 
and he is obliged to acquiesce in all the orders given by the king for their 
benefit. The fiddlers have control over the administration of civil justice; the 
eunuchs over that of criminal justice, public buildings, &c. The minister has 
the land revenue; and all are making enormous fortunes.” After adverting to 
what he conceived to be the proper remedy. Sir W. Sleeman continued thus:— 
“ What the people want, and most earnestly pray for, is that our government 
should take upon itself the responsibility of* governing them well and perman¬ 
ently. All classes, save the knaves who now surround and govern the king, 
earnestly pray for this—the educated classes, becjiuse they would then have a 
chance of respectable employment, which none of them now have; the middle 
classes, because they find no protection or encouragement, and no hope that 
their cliildren will be permitted to inherit the property they may leave, not 
invested in our government securities; and the humbler classes, because they 
are now abandoned to the merciless rapacity of the starving troops and other 
public establishments, and of the landholders driven or invited into rebellion 
by the present state of misrule. There is not, I believe, another government 




THE MEETING OF LOED CLIVE WITH MEER JAFFIEE, AFTEE THE BATTLE OF PLASSEY. 













Chap. IX.] 


ANNEXATION OF OXIDE* 


547 


in India so entirely opposed to the best interests and most earnest wishes of a.d. i8S2. 
the people as that of Oude now is; at least I have never seen or read of one. 

People of all classes have become utterly weary of it.’' 

Though the necessity of interference was allowed on all hands to be urgent, ootenuina- 
the attention of the government was so much engrossed by the protracted Hiiiiex OuUo 
hostilities in Burmah, and preparations for a new war, in which an open 
rupture with Persia, originating in a diplomatic squabble, had involved us, 
that two years more were allowed to pass away before the final step was 
taken. The governor-general, whose term of office was about to expire, was 
well aware of the difticultie.s with which the question was beset, and might 
have evaded responsibility by leaving it as a legacy to his successor. He was 
far too manly to adopt such a course, and therefore intimated to the directors 
that though the state of his health made an early departure from India 
absolutely necessary, he would remain if they desired it, and give practical 
effect to their decision in regard to Oude. This offer was gladly accepted by 
the home authorities, who having decided on assuming the government of the 
country, left him a large discretionary power as to the mode of procedure. In 
this, we cannot help thinking, he was more than unfortunate. Annexation 
involving the absolute extinction of Oude as a native government, and the 
nullification of all subsisting treaties with it, was decreed by a simple fiat, and 
then announced to the world by a public proclamation. Neither in this docu¬ 
ment nor in the instructions given to Colonel Outram, the resident, can we 
discover anything but a series of laboured attempts to disguise a gross breach 
ol national faith. According to the account given, all the relations and mutual 
obligations of the two governments were regulated by the treaties of 1801 and 
1837. By the former treaty the British government obtained the perpetual <>f 

*' ^ tlitj riuMiiixire 

cession of one half of the Oude territory, for undertaking to defend the other .n.e»tioiiod 
half from all foreign and domestic enemies, and the Oude government was 
taken bound to establish a reformed system of administration, and act in con¬ 
formity to the counsel of the Company’s officers; by the latter treaty it was 
stipulated that in the event of a reformed administration not being established, 
the British government might enter into possession of disturbed districts, and 
continue to administer them till they could be satisfactorily restored, any 
.suridus revenue arising being, in the meantime, paid into the Oude treasury. 

It is impossible to see how anything contained in either of these treaties could 
countenance annexation. The one bound the government of Oude to reform its 
administration, and the other defined and fixed the penalty to be inflicted in 
the event of its failing to do so. When the treaty of 1837 was framed, there 
was no idea of annexation, and an important point was understood to be gained 
Avhen, by the insertion of a penalty, means were provided for* giving gradual 
effect to the vague pi'omise of the treaty of 1801. Now, however, when 
annexation was to be resorted to, the treaty of 1837 was found to present a 



A. I). 1852. 


QiiOBtioii' 
able jn8t)o<) 
in annexii- 
tion of 
Oiulo. 


ViowH 4>f 
»uooo4Hivo 
govoi*ni»i*8- 
gHnenil. 


548 HISTORY OF INDIA. [Book VIII. 

serious obstacle. Its very definiteness would not allow any other penalty than 
that which it prescribed to be exacted, and therefore if annexation was to be 
persisted in, it became absolutely necessary to hold that the treaty of 1837 was 
not binding. The means employed for this purpose were certainly very Jesuitical. 
The King of Oude, on whom the treaty was in a manner forced, had subscribed 
it with great reluctance, the governor-general had ratified it, and nothing 
occurred to throw the least suspicion on its validity. On the contrary, Lord 
Auckland, under whose government it was concluded, referred to it in 1889, in 
a friendly letter addressed to the King of Oude, as “the recent treaty of 11th 
September, 1837,” and after complimenting him on having, “in comparison with 
times past, greatly improved the kingdom,” conveyed to him the gi-atifying 
intelligence that he had in consequence been authorized by the court of 
directors, if he thought it “advisable for the present,” to relieve his majesty 
“from part of the clause of the treaty alluded to, by which clause expense is 
laid upon your majesty.” This clause exacted from the king an annual 
payment of £160,000 for an additional subsidiary force, but the directors consi¬ 
dering that one half of the territory of Oude had been ceded to them under 
the express condition that such force was to be maintained at their own sole 
expense, were ashamed to enforce the payment, and therefore remitted it. In 
all other respects, however, the. treaty remained in full force, and even the 
extortionate clause demanding double payment having been remitted only 
“ for the present,” might at any future period be revived. Such was evidently 
the understanding of Lord Auckland. It was also that of his two immediate 
successors. Lord Ellenborough, when the question was put to him, declared 
that the home authorities did “not disallow the whole of the treaty of 1837, 
but only that portion of it which related to the payment, by the King of Oude 
of £160,000 for a military establishment of British ofiicers.” Lord Hardinge, 
when in 1847 he threatened the King of Oude with the penalty to which he 
should subject himself by failing to reform his administration, at once referred 
to and recognized the validity of the treaty of 1837, since in no other treaty i.s 
there any mention of the kind of penalty obviously intended. The thing is so 
clear that it is scarcely necessary to add the testimony of Lord Broughton, who 
as president of the Board of Control at the time must have known the fact. 
“ My impression,” he says, “certainly is that the treaty of 1837 was ratified by 
government at home, after the disallowance referred to; the whole treaty was 
not disallowed, but only one portion of it.” 

After reading the above cumulative evidence as to the validity of the treaty 
of 1837, one is staidiled on turning to the governor-general’s instructions to 
Colonel Outram, and finding such passages as the following:—“It is very 
probable that 'the king in the course of the discussions which will take place 
with the resident may refer to’ the treaty negotiated with his predecessor in the 
year 1837. The resident is aware that the treaty was not continued in force, 



Chap. IX.] 


ANNEXATION OF ODDE. 


549 


having been annulled by the court of directors as soon as it was received in a.o. 11 W 2 . 
England. The resident is further aware, that, although the King of Oude was ” 
informed at that time that certain provisions of the treaty of 1837 respecting ciiriow. 
an increased military force would not be canied into effect, the entire abroga- i„ 

tion of the treaty by the court of directors was never communicated to his ’ 

majesty. The effect of this reserve and want of full communication is felt to 
be embarrassing to-day. It is the more embarrassing that the cancelled instru¬ 
ment was still included in a volume of treaties which was published in 1845 
by the authority of government. There is no better way of encountering the 
difficulty than by meeting it full in the face.” And how was this to be done { 

Simply, we would say, by admitting that the government stood committed to 
the treaty, and could not recede from it without a bretujh of faith. Unfortu¬ 
nately the governor-general took a very different view, and wrote as follows: 

“If the king should allude to the treaty of 1837, and should ask why, if 
further measures are necessary in relation to the administration of Oude, the 
large powers which are given to the British government by the said treaty 
should not be put in force, his majesty must be infoi’med that the treaty has 
had no existence since it was communictited to the court of directors, by whom 
it was wholly annulled. His majesty will be reminded that the court of 
Lucknow was informed at the time that cjeitain articles of the treaty of 1837. 
by which the payment of an additional military force was imposed vij)on the 
king, were to be .set aside.” “It .must be presumed that it was not thought 
necessary at that time to make any communication to his majesty regixrding 
tho.se ax’ticles of the treaty which were not of immediate operation, and that a 
subsequent communication was inadvertently neglected. The resilient will be 
at liberty to state that the govemor-general in council regrets that any such 
neglect should have Liken |)lace even inadvertently.” Such was the mode in* 
which it was proposed to “meet the difficulty full in the face,” and we can now 
only wonder how it could have been .supposed [lossible to do so by a method so 
unworthy. 

Having managed more dexterously than honourably to escape from the siimnmiy 

^ ® ® ropwrimtion 

obligations of the treaty of 1837, it only remained to deal with that of 1801 . of 11 fonuul 
But here new difficulties arose. By that treaty the government of Oude, in 
return for the cession of half its territories, obtained a guarantee free of exjiense 
against all foreign and domestic enemies, and engaged to reform its adminis¬ 
tration in accordance with the advice of the Company’s officers. This engage¬ 
ment it certainly did not fulfil. It <lid not reform its administration, and so 
far from listening to the advice of the Company’s officers, turned a deaf ear to 
repeated and earnest remonstrances. This, as a palpable violation of the tr eaty, 
gave the British government the option of either declaring the treaty itself at 
an end, or of insisting on the faithful performance of its obligations. If the 
former alternative were adopted, matters would return to tlieir original footing. 



550 


HISTOEY OF INDIA. 


[Book VITI, 


A.D. 1852. 


AtiiiexAtioik 
of Oade. 


l^ord Dal- 
houHie’H 

prociaina 

tiuii. 


the British government simply withdrawing its guarantee and giving back the 
territories obtained in return for it; if the latter alternative were adopted, the 
King of Oude might have been compelled by force of arms, if more peaceful 
means proved unavailing, to perform to the very letter everything to which 
the treaty bound him. This, however, was the utmost extent to which British 
interference could be legitimately carried, and gives no countenance at all 
to the extreme measure of annexation. After declaring the treaty of 1801 to 
be at an end, the British government had no right whatever to interfere with 
Oude any further than might be necessary in order to preserve tranquillity 
beyond its own frontier, and therefore, when instead of contenting itself with 
such precautions, it proceeded by a kind of coup de main to seize the kingdom 
of Oude and incorjiorate it with its own territories, it pursued a policj'^ which 
wherever exemplified, whether in Europe or in Asia, cannot be too severely 
reprobated. It deserved not to prosper, and in this particular case, so far as 
subsequent events yet to be detailed entitle us to judge, it did not prosper. 
After annexation had been finally resolved, and all attempts to obtain the 
king’s consent to it liad, as must have lieen foreseen, proved unavailing, the 
deed was executed in defiance of him, and published to the world by a procla- 
clamation which, like the deed itself, wiU not bear criticism. 

The remarks already made render it unnecessary to dissect this proclamation, 
and show how, witli all its boldness of assertion and special pleading, it com¬ 
pletely failed to justify the extirpation of the kingdom of Oude. During fifty 
years its sovereigns had not only remained faithful to the British alliance, but 
had again and again come forward in periods of the greatest emergency, and 
by liberal loans replenished the exhausted treasury of the Company. To 
abandon such an ally might have been taxed as ingratitude, but to take advan¬ 
tage of his weakness to strip him of his territories was an act for wjiicb, iinle-ss 
it was dictated by stern nece-ssity, there is no excuse. Despicable as the 
govenunent of Oude undoubtedly was, its inhabitants, for whose behoof alone 
we professed to interfere, made no application to us for that purj)Ose, and so 
far from welcoming us as deliverers, united almost as one man in regarding us 
as invaders and unprincipled spoliators. All our professed anxiety for their 
prosperity and happiness they scouted as mere pretence, and ascribed the lo.ss 
of their native inde})endence to an unbounded ambition to extend our already 
overgrown empire by any means, however unscrupulous. In course of time, 
when the full benefits of our rule shall have been experienced, they may airive 
at a different conclusion, but certainly the first effects of the annexation of 
Oude was to gain us a province at a serious loss of national character. Were it 
necessary, therefore, to test the merits of Lord Dalhousie’s administration by his 
annexation policy, particularly as exemplified in its last and crowning act, it 
would be impossible to refrain from using strong terms of censure. Fortu¬ 
nately, he had merits of another kind which gave him a foremost place among 



Chap. IX.] 


LORD DALHOUSIE’S ADMINISTRATION. 


551 


Indian administrators, and entitle him to the gratitude of his country. Even a.d. isss. 
in regard to his annexations, it must be remembered that they were not all ” 

effected by questionable means. At least two of them—the Punjab and Pegu— Merit* of 
were legitimate conquests made in wars which the unprovoked aggressions iiou»ie* 
of the Sikhs and Burmese had rendered inevitable. The admirable adminis- 
tration of the former of these pi-ovinces, caiiied on under his lordship's auspices, 
is one of the gi’eatest glories of his government. His other merits cannot be 
better summed up than in the following extract from an article in the Times :— 

“ He could point to railways planned on an enormous scale, and partly com¬ 
menced: to 4000 miles of electric telegraph spread over India, at an expense of 
little more than £50 a mile; to 2000 miles of road bridged and metalled, near the 
whole distance li'om Calcutta to Peshawer; to the opening of the Ganges canal, 
the largest of the kind in the world; to the progre.ss of the Punjsib canal, and of 
many other important \vork.H of irrigation all over India; as well as to the 
re-organization of an official depai tmcnt of public works. Keeping equal pace 
with these public works, he could refer to the postal system, which he intro¬ 
duced in imitation of that of Rowland Hill, whereliy a letter from Peshawer to 
(Jape Comorin, or from Assam to Kurrachee, is conveyed for £d., or fhe 

old charge; to the improved training ordained for the civil service, covenanted 
and uncovenanted; to the improvement of education and prison discipline; tt) the 
organization of the legislative council; to the reforms which it had decreed, 
such as permitting Hindoo widows to marry again, and relieving all persons 
from the risk of forfeiting property by a change of religion." As the Marquis 
of Dalhousie was only forty-four years of age when he quitted India, on the 
Gth of March, 185G, it was hoped that he had then only performed the fimt act 
of the brilliant cai'eer for which his talents and virtues so admirably fitted him. 

He foreboded otherwise, and in replying to a parting address from the inhabi¬ 
tants of Calcutta, thus gave utterance to his feelings: “ I have played out my 
part ; and while I feel that in my case the principal act in the drama of iny 
life is ended, I shall be content if the curtain should drop now on mj’ pubbe 
career.” The words were almost prophetic, for he only returned with a broken 
constitution to linger out a few years and die. This melancholy event took 
place on the 19th of December, 18G0. 

Before closing the narrative of Lord Dalhousie’s administration, some ciiange in 
account must be given of an important change which was made in the consti- tutionofiiie 
tution of the Company. The act which regulated it being fixed to expire on 
the 30th of April, 1854, it was deemed necessary to anticipate that event by 
new legislation, and accordingly, on the 20th of August, 1853, an act (16 and 
17 Viet. c. 95) was passed, by which, until parliament should otherwise provide, 
all the territories then in the possession and under the government of the East 
India Company were to continue under such government in trust for her 
majesty. As the act Was avowedly temporary, and only remained in force for 



552 HISTORY OF INDIA. [Book: VIII. 

A,I). 1853 a very abort period, it will be sufficient, instead of giving an analysis of its 
contents, to mention its two mo.8t important provisions—the one by which the 
directors was reduced from twenty-four to eighteen, of whom 
tutionofthe twclvc Only Were to be elected by the proprietors, and six to be nominated by 
her majesty—and the other by which the appointments to the civil service, 
and those of assistant-surgeon in India, were withdrawn from the directors 
and thrown open to public competition. 



IaANTCIIa of the Strait of Malacoa. 



BOOK IX. 


FROM THE SEPOY MUTINY TO THE PRESENT TIME. 


CHAPTER I. 



Tjord Canning governor-general — Mutinous spirit prevalorjt among the Bengal sepoysObjection to 
greased cartridges—Mutiny at Berhampoor - i’rocautioiuiry measures adopted by goveminent - 
Disbandment of the 19th and 34th native regiments at Borrackpoor—Tudications of a wide¬ 
spread consj)ira(‘y -Proclamation of the governor general--Massacres at Meerut and Delhi. 

HEN Lord Cunning, on tliQ 29th of February, 18.56, 
commenced Ins administration, a period of tranquillity 
was confidently predicted. The Burmese and Sikh wars 
having been brought to a successful termination, no 
native power cither within the limits or beyond the 
frontiers of India seemed able or disposed to involve it 
nee more in open ho,stilities. There was, however, cause for 
serioxis apprehension. Mutiny had repeatedly broken out in tlie 
u itive army, and the measures of repression resorted to had rather 
'v;:'! evaded the danger than fairly met and extingnished it. During the 
< first Burmese war disaffection was general among tlie sepoys of Bengal who 
were ordered to serve in it, and was not only indicated by numerous desei'- 
tions, but openly manifested by positive and combined refusals to obey the 
order to exnbark. On this occasion one wholesoxne xneasure of severity 
overawed the disaffected, bxit the spii’it which animated the mutineers was 
by no xneans exorcised. In 1850, when Sir Charles Napier was commaxider- 
in-chief, disaffection, produced by the rejection of a claim to increa.se of pay 
during service in the Punjab, was so widely spread that that distinguished 
officer did not hesitate to denounce a large portion of the Bengal native army 
as mxxtinous, and ever after took cx-edit to himself for having, by the vigorous 
raeasux'es he adopted, prevented a sepoy revolt which might have proved fatal 
to oxir Indian empire. It is true that be was then defending himself against 
the charge of having by these veiy measures exceeded his powers,- and there 
is hence ground to suspect that his language was somewhat exaggerated. 
Still, however, there cannot be a doubt that the danger which he apprehended 
wasTby no means imaginary, and that he had even succeeded "ixi tracing dt to 
its true cause. The sepoys of Bengal, consisting in a large proportio'n of 
Brahmins and Rajpoots, whose high ca.ste enabled them to exercise a prepon- 
VoL. in, 268 


A.l) X«50. 


Mutinous 
spirit of the 
Jleiipil 
8eiK«yB. 






554 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book Ix. 


A I). 185«. 


Caufiea of 
mutinoiu 
Bpirit 
among 
tho Bengal 
•epoya. 


derating influence over their comrades, bad become convinced that their services 
could not be dispensed with, and that the fate of our Indian empire was conse¬ 
quently in their hands. They had only to combine and present a united front 
in order to intimidate the government; and, if necessary, coerce it into com¬ 
pliance with their demands. Combination had accordingly become a kind of 
watchword among them, and every subject which affected their interests was 
discussed and agitated as a common cause. Hence, when the question of 
increased pay arose, the language of some of the sepoys of the 32d native 

infantry is said to have been, “We shall 
wait till three or four regiments come up, 
and whatever they do wo will do also.’' 
In a similar spirit a Brahmin soldier, when 
his commanding officer, disgusted with 
sepoy grumblings, exclaimed, “For shame! 
you pretend to be soldiers: were I the 
general 1 would dismiss you from the 
army;" ventured to repl}'’, “If you did, 
you would get no more; we would stoj) 
them; and where would you be then?” 
Sir Charles Napier met the danger with 
characteristic deci.sion when he supplied 
the place of a sepoy regiment disbanded 
for mutiny by one of Ghoorkas, and pro¬ 
posed to give the sepoys a practical proof 
that their services wer^ not indispensable, by showing how easily their place 
could be supplied. Unfortunately he was not seconded either by the Indian 
or the home authorities, and matters remained on the same unsatisfactory 
footing as before. But though the fact of sepoy di.safiection was virtually 
ignored, its existence was not denied. Even Lord Dalhousie, while he declined 
to sanction the decisive measures which the commander-in-chief recommended, 

4 

frankly admitted that “the sepoy has been overpetted and overpaid of late; 
and has been led on by the government itself into the entertainment of expec¬ 
tations, and the manifestation of a feeling which he never held in former 
times;” and used a language of still more ominous import, when, in replying 
on the eve of his departure from India to the address of the inhabitants of 
Calcutta, he reminded them “how cruel violence, worse than all the excesses 
of war, may be suddenly committed by men who, to the very day on which 
they broke out in their frenzy of blood, have been regarded as a simple, harm¬ 
less, and timid race, not by the government alone, but even by those who 
knew them best, were dwelling among them, and were their earliest victims.” 
The danger thus pointed out, and proved to exist both by overt acts of mutiny 
and indications of wide-spread disaffection, though it must have suggested. 



Lobd Canning. —From a photograph hy MayaU. 



Chap. I.J 


CAUSES OF SEPOY REVOLT. 


555 


certainly did not produce new measures of precaution, and the Indian govern- a.d. isso. 
inent continued to slumber on, and to receive the congratulations of the 
directors on the general tranquillity which prevailed even in Oude, where, if Acoidontei 
anywhere, disturbance and revolt might have been apprehended as natural ofEnro^an 
results of the annexation policy. At the same time, from causes over wliich 
neither the directors nor the Indian authorities had any control, the number of 
European troops usually allotted to the Bengal presidency had been greatly 
diminished. Two regiments of horse, withdrawn to the Crimea during the 
Russian war, had not been replaced; four regiments of infantry, and tlie gi-eater 
part of the 14th dragoons, had been called away to serve in the war which had 
suddenly broken out in Persia; and a large proportion of the remainder weie 
stationed far in the north-west to maintain tivanquillity in the Punjab, whore 
it was not unreasonably, though, as it afterwards appeared, erroneously believed, 
that a large military force was necessary in order to curb and overawe the newly 
subjugated Sikhs. To this imaginaiy danger government had turned an anxious 
eye, and in providing against it had so bared the other stations of their proper 
complement of European troops, that Oude, swarming with discontented chiefs 
and disbanded soldiers, backed by a hostile population, was guarded only by a 
single regiment; while Dellii, notoriously the centre of Mahometan intrigue, 
was still more scantily provided, its immense magazine of military stores being 
committed entirely to the charge of native troops. Sucli a disregard of the i>>ii>ru.ioi.t 

conduct, of 

plainest dictates of i>rudence looks almost like judicial blindness. For a long ffoverrmu.ni, 
series of years almost every man who earned a name for himself in the civil or 
military service of the East India Company had lifted a warning voice, and 
called attention to the precarious tenure by which its possessions were lield; 
subsequent events had shown that such fears were not unfounded, and that 
causes were at work which threatened to realize their worst forebodings; but, 
svs if the frequency of alarm had weakened the impres,sion produced by it, the 
crisis was permitted to aiiproach, and when it actually arrived, found the gov¬ 
ernment totally unprepared to meet it. The fearful disasters which followed 
must now be naiTated. This, the latest portion of Indian history, is also in 
many respects the most eventful; and mu.st therefore be given with some 
minuteness of detail, care, however, being taken to relieve the record of sepoy 
atrocities by placing them in contrast with deeds of British heroism, at once 
more numerous and more illustrious than were ever before exhibited on so large 
a field and within so short a time. 

The British rule in India never has been, and, it is to be feared, never will 
be popular. Though far more beneficent than that of preceding conquerors and 
of the existing native princes, it is the rule of aliens in blood, in manners, and 
in religion; and is therefore submitted to as a galling yoke, to be endured so 
long as there’ is no hope of being able to shake it off", but not a day lofiger. 
Accordingly, when the native army had deluded itself into the belief that it 



A.D. 1857. 


UniMoal 
oombiiiatiou 
of Mnbonitf- 
tans and 
Hitidou3. 


The liiiifieM 
ritlc iiitro' 
duced into 
liengal , 
ui'iu.y. 


5m HISTOEY -OF INDIA. [Book IX. 

bad obtained the mastery, and was in a condition to dictate terms to the gov¬ 
ernment, revolt sooner or later became inevitable, and the only point that 
remained undetermined was the time. One of the moist formidable obstacles 
in the way was the antipathy between the Hindoos and the Mahometans, the 
former composing the great bulk of the population, and the latter, while 
numerous enough to bo formidable, deriving from their superior position as a 
once dominant class, a far greater degree of influenee than was indicated by 
their numbers. The effect of this antipathy was to keep the two clasises of 
religionists apart, and make it morally impossible for them to enter into a 
general combination for any common object. The British government, aware 
of this security against a united revolt, a))pear not to have underrated it, and 
yet from some strange fatality they, without intending it, de.stroyed this 
security, and enabled Hindoos and Mahometans to enter into a mutual league 
for the complete and final overthrow of our Indian empire. The cry raised was 
that their j’cligion was in danger, and that henceforth Christianity alone was to 
be tolerated. It is difficult to understand how such a cjy could carry any 
weight with it. I’he successive governors-general had vied with each other in 
carrying the prineijiles of religious toleration to their utmost limits, and had 
even given so much countenance to native supeivstitions as to incur the charge 
of forgetting that they were themselves Christians and the representatives of a 
Christian government. It is almost needless, therefore, to say that there was 
no intention whatever to reverse this ])olicy, and that the ciy raised was 
unfounded. Unfortunately, however, the Bengal sepoys, mnv ripe for revolt, 
were not unwilling to give credit to any accusation, however monstrous, which 
might seem to ju.stify their meditated treachery. The delusion spread like 
wildfire, and a circumstance so trivial in itself that one can hardly speak of it 
with gravity became, not perhaps the cause, but certainly the occasion, of a 
revolt not surpassed in magnitude and ferocity by any which history has yet 
recorded. 

The improved rifle, now generally substituted for the old mu.sket, is loaded 
with a greased cartridge, the end of which at the time of using it requires to 
be bitten of. In the beginning of 1857, after it had been resolved to anu the 
Bengal sepoys with this weapon, the manufacture of the necessary cartiidges 
was commenced at the military dep&t of Dumdum, situated about eight miles 
north-east of Calcutta. It had never occurred to the officials that there was any¬ 
thing in the.se cartridges by which any religious prejudice could be offended, but 
it was not long before they were undeceived. As the story goes, a sepoy (a 
Brahmin) carrying his lotah filled with water, with which he was about to 
prepare his food, was met by a classie or workman of a low caste attiiched to 
the magazine, Who asked him for a drink, and being refused on the ground'that 
the lotah would thereby be defiled, observed, “You think much of your caste, 
but wait a little; the sahib-log (literally “gentleman-strangers”) will make you 



Chap. I ] 


CAUSES OF SEFOY REVOLT. 


557 


bite cartridges soaked in cow and pork fat, and then where will your caste be?” a.d. im. 
The mention of the two kinds of fat was as artful as it was malicious, the one 
being the abomination of Hindoos and the other that of Mahometans; and it is oi.jooiion* 
hence easy to understand hoM’- the subject once mooted was not allowed to ofgmmwi 
dro]), and being generally discussed produced much real, and probably more 
pretended alarm. Major Bontein, the officer commanding at Dumdum, when 
first made aware of it, paraded all the native troops stationed there, and called 
for any complaints. At lea.st two-thirds of them, including all the native com¬ 
missioned officers, immediately stepped to the fiont, and in a manner described 
•os “perfectly respectful,” stated their objection to the present metliod of 
preparing cartridges for the new rifle-musket. “The mixture employed for 
greasing the cartridges was,” they said, “opposed to tlieii' religious feelings,” 
and “they begged to suggest the employment of wax and oil in such projjortion 
as, in their opinion, would answer the purpose required.” The spirit of mode¬ 
ration thus manifested at the outset may have blinded the authorities as to the 
extent of the danger. At all cvetits they seem not to have felt the necessity of 
instantaneous action in order to provide against it, and they contented them- 
.selves with issuing orders that the fui-ther manufacture of greased cartridgc.s 
should cease, and that in future the men might pui-chase the ingredients at the 
bazaar, and “apply them with their own hands.” Unfortunately the modera¬ 
tion exhibited at Dumdum j)roved to be the exception, and not the rule; and 
in several other quarters the excitement, instead of being allayed by the assur¬ 
ance that the cause which produced it had ceased to exist, continued to increase. 

At first f>nly the grease employed had been objected to, but it was now dis¬ 
covered that there was something wrong with the papei". Unlike that formerly 
used, it had a glazed appearance, which, in the opinion of the sepoys, indicated 
the ju’csence of gi'case, and accordingly on the 0th of February, (General ITcarsey, 
commanding the division of the Bengal troops, wrote from BaiTack[)Oor, situated 
sixteen miles noi’th from Calcutta, as follows;—“A most unreasonable and 
imfoundcd suspicion has unfortunately taken po.ssessioii of the native officers 
and sej)oys at this station, that grease or fat is used in the composition of this 
cartridge paper; and this foolish idea is now so rooted in them that it would, I 
am of opinion, be both idle and unwise to attempt its removal.” 

Hitherto the objections to the cirntridges were believed to be sincere, and They aw 
the prevailing excitement was treated as if no ulterior or criminal j)UTpose was 
in contemplation. Indications to the contrary were now manifested. On the 
5th of February, the day preceding that on which the above letter of General 
Hoarsey was written, a jemadar, or native lieutenant, waited on Lieutenant 
Allen, one of the European officem of the 84th native infantry, then stationed 
at B^rrackpoor, and informed him that the four native regiments in ,fchat 
cantonment were preparing to break out in open mutiny, and that he had been 
invited to attend a meeting which was to be held that very night for tlie 


emx)]oyed m 
a pretuxt 
for disul'tO' 
dieuoo. 



558 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book IX. 


A.U. i«5r. 


Miitinoits 
spirit ex- 
oitod among 
the se]iOys 
through 
their reli¬ 
gious pre¬ 
judices. 


Unarailiug 
attempt to 
remove their 
ohjectuuiK 
by argu 
meat. 


purpose of maturing the plot, and arranging the mode of execution. Lieutenant 
Allen, without attaching much credit to so extraordinary a statement, deemed 
it necessary to visit the lines when the alleged meeting was to be held, and felt 
reassured, on ascertaining by ocular inspection, that there was not the least 
appearance of it The jemadar, however, persisted in his statement, explaining 
that the resolution to hold the meeting had been abandoned, in consequence of 
a suspicion that it had been detected. It ultimately appealed that the jemadar’s 
information was substantially correct, for on the 11th of February a startling 
confij’mation of it was received from General Hearsey. “We have at Ban-ack- 
poor been dwelling upon a mine ready for explosion. I have been watching 
the feeling of the sepoys here for some time. Their minds have been misled by 
some designing scoundrels.” In order to counteract the impression thus 
produced, he had on the 9th paraded all the troops, and availed himself of the 
thorough knowledge which he possessed of their language, to disabuse their 
minds of the falsehoods which had been instilled into them. “ I myself,” he 
says, “ energetically and explicitly explained, in a loud voice, to the whole of 
the men, the folly of the idea that possessed them, that the government, or 
that their officers, wished to intoi-fere with their caste or religious j)rejudices, 
and impressed on them the absurdity of their for one moment believing that 
they were to be forced to become Christians. 1 told them the English were 
Christhms of the Book, i.e. Protestants; tliat we admitted no proselytes but 
those who, being adults, could read and fully understand the precepts laid 
down therein; that if they came and threw themselves down at our feet, 
imploring to be made ‘ Book ’ Christians, it could not be done; they could not 
be baptized until they had been examined in the tracts of the Book, and proved 
themselves fully conversant in them, and then they must, of their own good-will 
and accord, desii'c to become Christians of the Book ere they could become so. 
I asked them if they perfectly understood what I said, e.specially the 2d grena¬ 
diers; they nodded assent; 1 then dismissed the brigade.” Had explanation 
been all that was needed. General Hearsey’s harangue might have sufficed, and 
government rather hastily indulged the hope that the excitement was about to 
die away. The general himself must have had a very different yjresentiment 
when he wrote thus: “May I state my opinion in regard to the policy of 
having five or six regiments of native infantry assembled in brigade here, 
without any European corps of infantry, or artillery, or cavalry, as a 'point 
d'app'ni, in case of a mutiny occurring. You will perceive in all this business 
the native officers were of no use; in fact, they are afraid of their men, and 
dare not act; all they do is to hold themselves aloof, and expect by so doing 
they will escape censure, as not actively implicated. This has always occurred 
on puch occasion.s, and will continue to the end of our sovereignty in India. 
Well might Sir Charles Metcalfe say, ‘ that he expected to awake some fine 
morning, and find India had been lost to the English crown.”' 



Chap. I.] 


OUTBEEAK AT BEEHAMPOOE. 


559 


The excitement among the native troops had now passed through two a.d. isst. 
successive stages. First, its ostensible cause was the new cartridge, which " 

could not be used without incurring the loss of caste; and next, it was a belief overt act of 
that a system of compulsory conversion to Christianity was about to be miham"* 
adopted. A third stage was at hand, in which the excitement was to pass into 
open mutiny. A small guard of the 34th native infantry, one of the regiments 
which had enjoyed the benefit of General Hearsey’s harangue, having arrived 
on the 24th of February at Berhampoor, about 116 miles north from Calcutta, 
the men composing it wei'e, as usual in such cases, feasted by their countrymen 
of the 19th native infantry stationed there. The subject of the greased 
cartridges, then the engrossing toyric, was of course discussed, and probably 
along with it other grievances, real or imaginary. The result was soon disclosed. 

On the very next day, when the commanding officer. Colonel Mitchell, ordered 
blank aramirnition to be distributed, with a view to a parade on the morning • 
of the 26th, the men of the 19th refused to receive it, on the ground that 
there was some doubt as to how the cartridges were prepared. In this instance 
the refu.sal had not even a shadow of excuse, as the cartridges offered had been 
manufactured before the new rifle was thought of, and were the very same as 
those that had been used for years without objection. With some difficulty 
they were intimidated, and after receiving the ammunition in sullen silence, 
retired to thcil* lines. Their determination, however, was taken. In the 
course of the evening, after a consultation, during which they worked 
themselves into a state of uncontrollable excitement, they rushed forth, and 
having broken into the bells, or small huts, where the native arms when not in 
use were deposited, seized them, and walked off", shouting defiance. Colonel 
Mitchell had the option of two courses, either to march out against the 
mutineers in the dark, or to remain on the defensive till morning. Neither 
course was free from serious objections. There were no Euro 2 )can troops at 
the station, and no other native troops in addition to the mutinous regiment 
than a detachment of cavalry and a battery of artillery. Thus the whole work, injudicious 

ijirt . /•I/* /• • ‘t • 1 means UBed 

w nether oi coercion or of delence, was of necessity to be intrusted to troops torei.reaHit. 
who in all probability sympathized with those against whom they were to aci 
All circumstances considered, delay was undoubtedly the more prudent course, 
but immediate action, as the more spirited and decisive, was preferred. The 
night was so dark that even with the aid of torches there was no small 
difficulty in finding the way. Nor was this the worst. Tlie ground near the 
lines was interspersed with tanks, which must have greatly impeded the move¬ 
ments of cavalry, while the torchlight reflected from them, would, in the case 
of actual encounter, have enabled the mutineers, themselves unseen, to open a 
destructive fire. When fully aware of the difficulties of his position, Colonel 
Mitchell was not unwilling to avoid a bloody struggle of very doubtful issue, 
and a kind of negotiation ensued, which resulted in a compromise, he on his 



560 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book TX. 


A.n. 1857. 


A Euroixsan 
regiment 
brought 
Ran 

goun. 


Anothei 
overt lu-t 
of iinitiny. 


part agreeing as a first step to withdraw his troops, and the mutineers on theirs 
agreeing, on this stipulation being complied with, to make their submission. 

This arrangement, however necessary it may have been under the circum¬ 
stances, was not the less to be deplored. A mutiny, which was visibly assuming 
larger dimensions, had only been suppressed by allowing the mutineers to 
dictate terms. A general invitation was thus virtually given to all the 
(lisafFocted to lose no time in imitating a bad example. During these incipient 
disturbances, General Anson, the commander-in-chief, was unfortunately far 
away among the Simla Hills, to which he had gone for the benefit of his health. 
But government, previously somewhat lethargic, appeared at length to be fully 
awakened, 'fhe account of the Berhampoor mutiny reached Calcutta on the 
4th of March, and only two days later the Oriental Company's ship Bentinck 
was steaming to llangoon with ordeis to bring up her majesty’s 84th foot with 
the utmost possible desjiatch. Meanwhile the 19th had been ordered down to 
Barrackpoor. I’liither too, as a pi-cparation for the steps which it might be 
neces.sary to take, were detached a wing of her majesty’s 53d, and two troops 
of artillery. Twelve pieces of cannon were also brought into the cantonment. 
'I'he 84th regiment arrived at Cidcutta on the 20th of March, and immediately 
proceeded to Chinsurah, to await the arrival of the 19th. The object of these 
preparations was too palpable not to be well understood by the disaffected, who 
no longer hesitated to give utterance to their feelings. Tlie 34th native 
infantry in particular, throwing aside the moderation which they pi-ofossed 
when General Hearsey addressed them, were now forward in expressing their 
sympathy with the 19th, who they thought merited not punishment but 
reward, for the stand which they had made in defence of their religion. 

In India the native mind is so impulsive, that words once uttered soon pass 
into deeds. Hence the 34th, though they could not but be aware of the advan¬ 
tage of remaining quiescent till they should be reinforced by their countrymen 
from Berhampoor, were unable to refrain from previously giving an unequi¬ 
vocal manifestation of the mutinous spirit which animated them. On the 
29th of March, two days before the 19th reached Barrackpoor, it was reported 
to Lieutenant Baugh, adjutant of the 84th, that a sepoy of the name of Mungul 
Pandy, belonging to that regiment, had intoxicated himself with hang, and was 
walking in front of the lines, armed with a sword and a musket, calling upon his 
comrades to rise, and declaring that he would shoot any European who came 
in his way. The lieutenant instantly mounted his horse, and rode off to 
the parade ground. As he approached, Mungul Pandy concealed himself behind 
a gun, and teking a deliberate aim fired. The shot took effect only on the 
horse, which fell, and brought down its rider. He, however, quickly disen¬ 
tangled himse'if, and seizing one of his pistols, hastened up and fired at the 
assassin. He had the misfortune to miss, and was unable to draw his sword 
before Mungul Pandy made a rush at him and cut him down. Happily the 



CnAP. I.] 


MUTINY AT BAERACKPOOR. 


561 


blow was not mortal, and before it could be repeated, the sergeant-major of the 
regiment, who was a little behind Lieutenant Baugh, sprung forward, and by 
drawing the attack upon himself, saved the life of his STiperior officer by 
endangering his own, for he too in his attempt to seize the miscreant was 
severely wounded by him. Meanwhile a jemadar and twenty sepoys, though 
not more than thirty yards distant, refused to render any assistance, and the 
two Europeans would to a certainty have been murdered, had not a Mahometan 
orderly, who had followed Lieutenant Baugh, given a signal pi'oof of fidelity 
by seizing Mungul Pandy, in the act of again levelling his reloaded musket. 
General Hearsey, with several other officers, aroused by the firing, was quickly 
on the spot, and by his boldness arrested what was on the eve of becoming a 
general mutiny. Riding up to the jemadar and his guard with a loaded pistol 
in his hand, and threatening to shoot the first man who showed any signs of 
disobedience, he ordered them back to their posts. They were at once over¬ 
awed, and withdrew. 

On the dcay after the above outrage, the 19th native infantry, on the way 
to Barrackpoor, arrived at Baraset, which is only about eight miles distant. 
Tl)e punishment intended for them had transpired. Lord Canning, in a minute 
dated the 27th of March, had thus expressed him.self:—“The open refusal of 
the whole regiment to obey oi'ders, the seizure of arms with violence, and a 
tumultuous but combined resistance of the authority of its officers, with arms 
loaded, is an offence for which any punishment, less than dismissal from the 
service, would be inadequate; mutiny so open and defiant cannot be excused 
by any sensitiveness of religion or caste, by fear of coercion, or by the seduc¬ 
tions and deceptions of others. It must be met promptly and unhesitatingly, 
and without the delay of a day more than may be necessary.” It may be 
•piestioned whether Lord Canning acted \ip to his own ideas of the enonnity 
of the crime when he proposed simple dismissal as the severest punishment to 
be inflicted on it. At this time, however, it was almost universally believed 
that the sejjoys were so much enamoured of the service and of the emoluments, 
l)resent and prospective, derived from it, that tliey dreaded nothing so much as 
(expulsion. It would seem that the 19th still partook so much of this feeling 
that the prospect of their disbandment overwhelmed them with gi'ief, and they 
were endeavouring to avert it by expressions of repentance. This was certainly 
fortunate, for it afterwards appesvred that they had been waited upon by a 
secret deputation from the 34th, and urged without effect to concert a new and 
more formidable rising. On the 31st of March, when they eutei'ed Barrack- 
poor, they found their arrival anticipated by her majesty’s 84th, a wing of 
her majesty's 53d, two European batteries, and the governor-general’s body¬ 
guard* of whose fidelity, though composed of natives, there was no doubt. 
The disbandment was immediately carried into effect. On one side of’the 
parade ground stood the European troops and batteries, and the body-guard; 

VoL III. 287 


A,D. 1857. 


Mutiny at 
Barrack- 
poor. 


bisbaiicl' 
mont of tlitt 
inutiuouft 
I'dth native 
infantry. 



5G2 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book IX. 


A.D. 18JT. 


DUband- 
ment of the 
19th uativo 
infhutry. 


Total iuodO' 
qiiacy of tlio 
]iunisIiiuoiit. 


Mutinous 
Hpirit iu 
C)ude. 


on the other side the 34th, and other native troops previously at the station; 
and in the middle, between them, the doomed 19th, It was a moment of great 
anxiety, for it was not impossible that all the native troops would make 
common cause. The 19th, however, when ordered to lay down their arms, 
obeyed without a murmur. Their peaceful and repentant demeanour, though 
it could not reverse the sentence, procured them some indulgences which they 
could hardly have anticipated, and they received payment, not only of 
their arrears to the uttermost farthing, but of the hire of cattle and boats 
employed in bringing down their families. “ This gracious act,’' says General 
Hearsey, whose thorough knowledge of the native character did not on this 
occasion save him from being imposed upon, “ was keenly felt, and they loudly 
bewailed their fate, many men saying tlie regiment had been misled." 

Government, willing to believe that the question of the greased cartridges 
had been set at rest, and that the mere disbanding of a regiment would suffice 
to put down disaffection, began to speak of the danger «a.s already past, and 
actually engaged a vessel to carry the 84th regiment back to Rangoon. It is 
difficult to understand how the governor-general and his coimcil could have 
been betrayed into such a monstrous blunder. Not only were they aware that 
the 34th native infantry contained a number of men who had cheered on 
Mungul Pandy in his atrocious attempts at assassination; but incendiary fires, 
the invariable forerunners of general outrage, were constantly taking place in 
localities widely separated; general ferment, accomi)anied with a mysterious 
distribution, by flying messengers, of little unleavened cakes, called chupatties, 
was visible in many quaiters, even among the geneial po])ulation; and distinct 
rej)orts from various regiments proved the existence of so much bad feeling, as 
compelled General Hearsey to declare, as eaily tus the 18th of April, that “the 
Hindoos generally ai-c not at present trustworthy servants of the state.” It is 
doubtful if any measures, however severe, could have averted or even retarded 
the general revolt, for which the whole of the Bengal sepoys were now ripe; 
but it is obvious that, under the ciicumstanccs, disbandment had cctxsed to 
be a punishment, and rather provoked than siqjprcssed the crime against which 
it was directed. It in fact only anticipated tlie coui'se which the men were 
about to take of their own accord, and must have been held by them in derision, 
while govermuent were confidently trusting to it as an effcctujd means of 
Avorking upon their fears and recalling them to a sense of duty. 

On the 2d of May, the 7th Oude irregular cavalry, stationed about seven 
miles from the Lucknow cantonments, when ordered to bite the cartridge, a 
regulation winch, notwithstanding its formal repeal by the government, seems 
still, from some unexplained overnight, to have been enforced, refused. The 
regiment was dne of those which had belonged to the King of Oude, and both 
froili this circumstance, and the local influence which had [)robably been 
brought to bear upon it, there could scarcely be a doubt that the disaffection, 



Chap. I.] 


MUTINY IN OUDE. 


563 


though it took the name of a religious scruple, was of a very different and more a.d. is.5T. 
criminal nature. Accordingly, it appeared on the very next day that the 
ringleaders in the regiment, not contented with the mutinous S 2 )irit which MutinonB 
prevailed among themselve.s, were endeavouring to instil it into others, for Xde.*” 
they had sent a letter to the 48th native infantry, then stationed at Lucknow, 
in which it was said, “ Wo are ready to ohey the directions of oim brothers of 
the 48th in the matter of cartridges, and to re.sist, cither actively or j)assive]y.” 
Fortunately, the administration of Oude was at this time intm.sted to a man 
who was equal to the crisis. Sir Henry Lawrence, the moment the intelligence 
reached him, mu.stered his forces, and set out with a wing of her majesty’s 3 2d, 
a field battery, and various detachments of native infantry .and c.avalry. 
Previoiis to his an'ival, the mutiny had assumed a more aggravated form, and 
the European officers had been threatened with violence. As soon, however, 
as the ,ap 2 n' 0 .ach of the troops became known, the mutineers lowered their tone, 

.and even attempted to csc.ajic from the consequences of jtheir crime by delivering 
two of the ringleaders as prisoners, .and offering to give uj) foi’ty more. So 
completely indeed had they yielded to their fears, that every symj^toin of 
violence had dis.appeared, and the whole regiment had become ])erfect]y (juict. 

On being ordered, they at once formed into line, while Sir Henry Lawrence 
placed his guns, and disposed tlie European infantry, so as to be .able to control i.resentby 
the other native regiments till the work of disarming was quietly accom 2 )lishcd. 

The first act of overt mutiny in Oude being thus su]) 2 )rcsscd, the chief-commis- 
sioner did not delude himself into the belief that permanent tranquillity was 
secured. He knew that his decisive course liad at most j)rocured a respite, 
which ought to be employed in prcji.aring for a more formidable outbreak. 

After a court of inquiry, which led to a discovery of the princip.al offenders, 
who were consequently seized and put in irons, ho liegan to concentrate the 
troops which had hitherto bcien located in isolated positions. At the .same time 
he did not disdain to try the effect of moral sua.sion. With this view he held a 
imblic durbar at his residence in cantonments, and in jiresence of all the native 
officers, after conferring suitable rewards on several individuals who had ju’oved 
their fidelity by disclosing the attempts made to tamper with the regiments to 
which they belonged, delivered an address in Hindoostanee, pointing out the 
.advantages conferred on India by the British government, and the folly as well 
as the futility of any endeavoiir to overthrow it. The impression made is said 
to have been powerful, but of this some doubt m.a 3 '^ be entertained. The time 
for argument had passed, and there is good ground to suspect that every 
attempt at conciliation was regarded by the natives as an indication of fear. 

At first Sir Henry was di.spo.sed to disb.and the whole of the mutinous regiment, 
and thereafter allow those of the soldiers who might be founcJ guiltless tb be 
re-enlisted, but the governor-general in council, we think, acted more wisely 
when, approving generally of the prompt measures adopted, he resolved that 



A.D. 1857. 


Mutinons 
apirit iu 
Oude. 


Fonrihlahlo 
niutiiiy ut 
Moorut. 


Groan cafe- 
leasnoHCi of 
the atiituv* 
ritiua. 


5G4 HISTOKY OF INDIA. [Book IX. 

“the disbandment, to whatever length it may be carried, should be real, and 
that the men whose innocence can be shown, and whose general character is 
irreproachable, or those by whom offenders have been denounced, and mutinous 
designs disclosed, should be retained in the ranks, the others being dismissed 
absolutely and finally," because there was “ a fiction in discharging soldiers one 
day, to take them back the next, whatever may be their claims to mercy, 
which would greatly weaken the general effect of the measure of disbandment 
as an example.” The idea of a general disbandment was in consequence 
abandoned, and only the native officers, with one or two exceptions, and 
about fifteen sepoys, were dismissed. 

Almost simultaneously with the outbreak at Lucknow, another of a more 
atrocious character occurred at the important military station of Meerut, situated 
thirty-five miles N.N.E. of Delhi. Unfortunately the officer in military com¬ 
mand of the district possessed none of the abilities which characterized the chief- 
commissioner at Lucknow, and the consequences were most disastrous. In the 
first week of May, the carabineers of the 3d regiment of Bengal light cavalry, 
when ordered to parade in order to learn the new regulation, which substituted 
tearing by the hand instead of biting the cartridges, declared their determi¬ 
nation not to handle them. As the cartridges tendered were the same as those 
which they had been accustomed to use without objection, the I’efusal could 
only be regarded as mutinous, and accordingly the commandcr-in-ebief, when 
the affair Avas reported to him, ordered that the eighty-five men who had 
refused, constituting iu fact, with the exception of five, the whole men of the 
regiment armed with carabines, should be tried by a general native court- 
martial. The sentence pronounced on the 9th of May condemned the whole of 
the prisoners to ten yeai's’ confinement with hard labour, and effect was imme¬ 
diately given to it by parading the whole troops then in Meerut, consisting of 
her majesty’s GOth rifles, her majesty’s 6th dragoon guards (carabineers), and the 
Bengal artillery, all European; and the following native regiments—^the 8d light 
cavalry, the 11th native infantry, and the 20th native infantry, and in their 
imesencc fastening the chains and marching off the convicts to the common jail, 
preparatory to their removal to some of the government central prisons. The 
jail previously contained above 1200 prisoners, most of them, as may well be 
supposed, of desjierate character; but notwithstanfling the addition thus made 
to the number, under circumstances which obviously called for the utmost 
precaution, the jail remained as before under the sole charge of a company of 
native soldiers. While the authorities, civil and military (for both must bear 
the blame), were thus neglecting the plainest dictates of prudence, the native 
troops in Meerut completed their plans, and made ready to take the initiative 
in a general revolt. In the course of the day ominous warnings were given by 
placard,s, which called upon the natives to rise and slaughter the hated Ferin- 
ghees. Nothing, however, but an actual rising seemed capable of arousing the 



Chap. L] 


MUTINY AT MEEEUT. 


5G5 


authorities to a sense of their danger, and as the 9th had passed away without 
disturbance, it was hoped that the 10th, a Sunday, woiild also prove peaceful. 
At first this hope was realized, and soldiers and civilians crowded to the church, 
one of the largest in India, to take part in the morning service. There was no 
visible appearance of danger, and it was -therefore imagined that the evening 
service would be equally tianquil. Many were actually preparing for it, and 
the bell had begun to ring, when the noise of shouting and firing announced that 
the catastrophe had arrived. The day had been allowed to pass because the 
conspirators were aware how much darkness would aid them in the j)erpetration 
of their still darker deeds. Their plan was to seize the anns of the troops after 
they had marched off to church, and thus render them powerless either to 
defend themselves or afford any protection to othens. Before relief could arrive 
the work would be done, and at aU events the approach of night wmold give an 
opportunity of escape. Most providentially, cither hurried on by their thirst 
for blood and plunder, which had become too impatient to be any longer 
restrained, or deceived by the sound of the church bells into a belief that the 
service had already commenced, they broke out prematurely, and thus partially 
defeated their diabolical design. 

At the commencement a party of the 3d light cavalry galloped over to the 
jail, and, besides rescuing the eighty-five convicts, liberated all the other 
prisonciu Meanwhile the remainder of the regiment had broken out in open 
mutiny. Their European officers endeavoured to reason them into a sense of 
their duty, and, it would seem, not wholly in vain, for the 20th, the only 
regiment which had yet seized their arms, returned to their lines. Tlic impres¬ 
sion, however, was only momentaiy, for they suddenly rushed out again and 
began to fire. The 11th showed more reluctance to carry matters to extremes, 
and yielded^to their officers so far as not to touch their arms, and allow Colonel 
Finnis their commander to go out and reason with the 20th. It was a despe¬ 
rate attempt, and proved fatal to that gallant officer, who was received with 
a volley of musketry and fell riddled with balls. All restraint was now thrown 
aside, and the whole of the native regiments shouting defiance, continued their 
work of plunder, fire, and murder. “The mutineers,” says Ceneral Hewitt, in 
a report written on the following day, “then fired nearly all the bungalows in 
rear of the centre lines south of the nullah, including Mr. Gicathed’s the 
commissioner and iny own, together with the government cattle-yard and 
commissariat officer’s house and ofiice. In this they were assisted by the poj)u- 
lation of the bazaar, the city, and the neighbouring villages. Every European, 
man, woman, and child, fallen in with, was ruthlessly murdered.” On reading 
this account the question naturally arises. How could all these atrocities be 
perpelrated, while a British force sufficient to have annihilated the mutineers 
and the miscreants associated with them, was in the immediate vicinity? * To 
this question General Hewitt gives only the following unsatisfactory reply;— 


A.D. 1857. 


Mutiny nt 
Meerut. 


I'roceodiiif?* 
of tlie 
niutinecm 



566 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book IX. 


A.I>. 185T. 


Incapacity 
of General 
Hewitt. 


Dotailn of 
the niOH 
eacru ivt 
Meerut. 


“As soon as the alarm was given, the artillery, carabineers, and 60th rifles were 
got under arras, but by tlie time we re.ached the native infantry parade ground, 
it was too dark to act with efficiency in that direction; consequently the troops 
retired to the north of the nullah, so as to cover the barracks and officers’ lines 
of the artillery, carabineers, and 60tli> rifles, which were, with the exceptiolS of 
one house, preseiwed.” In other words, instead of advancing on the city he 
retired to a greater distance from it, and placing a nullah between himself and 
the insurgents, left them at full liberty to do their horrid work, and then 
escape without molestation. That there was the grossest mismanagement it is 
impossible to doubt, and we arc therefore prepared to loam that the command 
which General Hewitt at this time held ought never to liave been intrusted to 
him. Only two years before he bad commanded on the Pesbawer frontier, and, 
according to a statement of Colonel H. B. Edwardes, commissioner of the 
Pesh.awer division, had been removed because “physically unfit” for its “emer¬ 
gencies.” “During the time he coimn.anded the Peshawer division,” adds the 
colonel, “it is believed he never once visited the outposts, and he used to inspect 
his troops in a buggy.” He was in fact worn out by age and nearly half a 
century of service in India. Such was the man whom official blundering placed 
in an important command after his physical unfitness had been acknowledged, 
as if to prove the irreparable mischief of which mere imbecility is capable. 

It is unnecessary to dwell on the horrors of that Sunday night at Meerut, 
but in order to give some idea of them a few details by eye-witnesses seem 
necessary. A lady writes thus: “Bungalows began to bhazo round us nearer 
and nearer till the frenzied mob reached that next our own. We saw a poor 
lady in the verandah, a Mrs. C., lately arrived. We bade the seiwants bring 
her over the low w’all to us, but they were too confused to attend to mo at first. 
The stables of that house were first burned. We heard the shrieks o,f the horses. 
Tlicn came the mob to the house itself with awful shouts and curses. We heard 
the doors broken in, and many, many shots, and at the moment my servant 
said they had been to bring away Mrs. C., but had found her dead on the 
ground cut horribly, and she on the eve of her confinement.” Mr. Rotton the 
chaplain gives his testimony, in his work entitled The Oho,j)lain’s Narrative, 
in the following terms:—“It was not until sunrise on Monday that anyone 
knew, with anything like ceidainty, the extent of the atrocities committed by 
the savages within the cantonment of Meerut. What spectacles of terror met 
the eye almost simultaneously with the return of the day! The lifeless and 
mutilated corpses of men, women, and children, were here and there to be seen, 
some of them so frightfully disfigured, and so shamefully dishonoured in death, 
that the very recollection of such sights chills the blood.” After reading these 
accounts it is no small relief to find that in the midst of the massacre there were 
natives whose fidelity remained unshaken, and who heroically risked their own 
lives in saving othei’s. 



Chap. I.] 


ATEOCITIES AT DELHI. 


567 


General Hewitt says in his report, “I am led to think the outbreak was a.d. mr . 
not premeditated;” but this is only another of his egregious blunders. While 
he was satisfying himself with defending the barracks and taking credit for The muti 
having driven the mutineers out of the station, they were carrying out their mitunTh) 
plans and hurrying •along the highroad to Delhi, where they had by previous ' 

arrangement made sure of a welcome reception. Had General Hewitt 
despatched at least a portion of his troops in pursuit, the mutineers must to a 
certainty have been overtaken. Besides the length of the road, there were 
other obstacles that must have retarded them. Tliere was a river to jjass, and as 
it was more than half-way between the-two places, the mutinous infantiy, at 
least, could not have crossed before his dragoons came up with tliem. It is 
•said that an officer of this regiment volunteered to undertake tlie duty with a 
small detachment, and was not permitted. Thus saved from the speedy 
vengeance which might have been inflicted, the mutineers hurried on without 
interruption, and on the morning of the 11th were descried approaching Delhi. 

So cei-taiu were they that the native regiments would not oi)T)Ose them, that at Thuiranivni 

° ^ ‘ at ilolhi. 

fil-st about seven o’clock a body of troopers, numbering not more than thirty or 
foi’ty, on reaching the bridge of boats which here crosses the Jumna, galloped 
over without slacking bridle, rushed into the city, and made their apj>earance 
in front of the palace, calling clamorously for the king. On being asked what 
they wanted, they told at once that they had revolted, and come from Meerut 
resolved on fighting for their faith and killing tlio Europeans. Had there been 
no traitors in the palace this answer would have sealed their fate, but they knew 
better, and delayed not a moment to commence their murderous work. Captain 
Douglas, the commander of the pahice guards, and Mr. Simon Fraser, commis¬ 
sioner at Delhi, were among the first victims. The latter after shooting a trooper 
who had fired his pistol at him, was cut down and despatched hy a number of the 
king’s servants, who, as .soon as he fell, rushed out ui)on him, and kept cutting 
at him with their swords till he was dead. This first taste of blood having as 
it were sharpened their appetite, they forced the door of Captain Douglas’s 
apartments. He was lying on bed sufteiing from severe injuries which he had 
received by leaping from a height to escape from .some troopers who had sur¬ 
rounded him. Beside him stood the Rev. Mr. Jennings the chaplain, his 
daughter and another young lady. They were all ruthlessly murdered. After 
these horrible atrocities a general massacre of Europeans commenced. About 
thirty of them, who had barricaded themselves in the house of Mr. Aldwell, a 
government pensioner, made a resolute but unavailing defence, but the only 
persons who escaped were Mi-s. Aldwell and her three children, who, by 
assuming the native dress, succeeded after several hairbreadth escapes in 
reacliing the palace, and were there confined with about fifty otlier Europeans, 
wliose lives the king was said to have guaranteed. In what way the guarahtee 
was fulfilled will afterwards be seen. 



568 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book IX. 


A.l>. 1857. 


All tho 
native 
tri)ope at 
Dellii Join 
the mutiny. 


Attam])ts 
of the 
imitiiiooi'd 
to gain 
tho DoJhi 
moga^tiue. 


Shortly after the first troopers had crossed the bridge and rushed to tho 
palace, others took the direction of the cantonments, showing how well they 
were aware that the native troops there stationed, instead of encountering them 
as enemies, would at once fraternize with them, and take part in their atrocious 
designs. The British officers still hoped better things, and*, indeed, even those 
who saw too clearly what the inevitable result would be had no alternative. 
Tliere were no European troops, who, however outnumbered, might by deeds of 
heroism have defied the utmost fury of their assailants, and it therefore only 
remained to undertake the desperate task of attempting to put down a revolt by 
means of soldiers known to sympathize with it, and suspected of having pledged 
themselves to support it. The consequence was, that the Delhi regiments 
when brought face to face with the Meerut mutiueere, not only refused to 
oppose them, but either stood by while their officers were shot down, or, with 
ineffable basenes.s, joined in the massaore. All idea of making head again.st the 
mutineers was now necessarily abandoned, but it was thought possible that the 
Flagstaff Tower, a work of some strength, might be held till relief should arrive 
from Meerut. Here, accordingly, the surviving officers and some European 
residents escaped from the city took refuge. The defence seemed practicable, 
for Brigadier Graves had posted himself there with two guns and about 300 
sepoys, who were still apparently obeying orders. This exce,})tion to the general 
treachery was of short duration, and the handful of Europeans, almost entirely 
deserted, coidd only dispense and mn for their live.s. Meanwhile within the 
city the mutiny was assuming the form of an organized rebellion. The king 
either voluntarily in execution of a premeditated design, or, as he aftei'wards 
j)retendod, under the influence of intimidation, had assumed tlie sovereignty of 
India, and seated himself on the throne of the Mogul. 

After this extraordinaiy usui’pation, no time was lo.st in giving practical 
eftect to it. The horrible massacres which accompanied it have been already 
mentioned. The next steps were, if |)ossible, still more explicit. The magazine, 
situated only at a short <li.stance from tho palace, immediately attracted the 
attention of the mutineers, and between nine and ten on the moniinc of the 
nth it was intimated to the native officer commanding outside, that the king 
had sent a guard to take po.s.session of the. magazine, and either carry up all the 
Eviropeans within it to the palace or prevent them from leaving. At this time 
the number of these Europeans was only nine—Lieutenant Willoughby, the 
office.r in command. Lieutenants Fon-cst and Raynor, Conductors Buckley, 
Shaw, and Scully, Sub-conductor Crow, and Sergeants Edwards and Stewart. 
Had they at once on receiving the message attempted an escape it would have 
been impossible to blame them, as defence was evidently hopeless, but they 
were animated 'by a more heroic spirit, and prepared to meet death sooner than 
abandon their post. Their first measure accordingly was to close and barricade 
the gates, and to place guns double-charged with grape, so as to command the 



Chap. L] 


THE MUTINEERS AT DEL'HI. 


569 


points moat likely to be attacked. Inside the gate leading to the park stood a.d. 1857 
sub-conductor Crow and Sergeant Stewart with lighted matches in their hands, 
and with orders, if any attempt was made to force an entrance, to fire at once Attfimiit to 
the two six-pounders under their charge, and then fall back on the part of the 
magazine where Lieutenants Willoughby and Fori’est were posted; the principal 
gate was similarly defended by two guns, and at the same time within sixty 
yards of it were phiccd three six-pounder and one twenty-four pounder 
howitzci’S, which commanded two cross-roads, and could be managed so as to 
act upon any part of the magazine in the neighbourhood. The most important 
pjirt of the arrangements still remains to be mentioned. Tlie magazine was full 
of stores, and if once in possession of the mutineers would furnish them with 
almost inexliaustible resources. Lieutenant Willoughby calmly contemj)latiug 
this contingency before it became imminent, had already provided against it 
by laying a train to the magazine, and preconcerting a signal to be given for 
firing it. 

The message requiring delivery of the magazine had scarcely been received non.ic 
when a strong detachment of soldiei's wearing the king’s uniform arrived to byninu 
enforce it. They began with placing guards over each gate of the magazine, 
and superintending a number of labourers whom they had employed to carry 
off the whole of the government stores deposited on the outside. As Lieutenant 
Willoughby had disdained to return any answer to the first message, it was 
follow'ed by a second, which threatened that if the gates of the magazine wei’c 
not immediately thrown oj)en the king would send down ladders and scale the 
walls. After a short delay the ladders carrived and were placed against the 
south-easte.rji turret. The natives within the establishment had pi-eviously 
given ])roofs of insubordination, and now showed their determination to desert 
by climbing over a sloped shed inside the wall, and thus gaining the ladders, 
which enabled them to descend on the other side. The mutineers then began 
to mount, and crowded into the inside of the turret, from which they kept up 
a fire of musketry. Meanwhile the handful of beleaguered Europeans were not 
idle. As soon as their assailants began to descend into the magazine they 
opened upon them wdth grape from foxir field pieces. The only persons that 
could be spared to man these guns were Lieutenant Forrest and Conductor 
Buckley, who did not cease to ply them till their hist rounds of ammunition 
were expended. The ciisis had now arrived. The assailants had entered the 
magazine at two points, and in another moment would posse.ss themselves of 
the guns, which, indeed, even if the ammunition had not been exhausted, could 
not have been worked, as both Lieutenant Forrest and Conductor Buckley had 
been disabled, the former by two musket-balls which struck his left hand, and 
the other by a musket-ball which lodged in his arm above the eibow. At i.his 
moment, half-past three P.M., Lieutenant Willoughby gave the order, and 
Conductor Buckley repeating it by the preconcerted signal. Conductor Scully 
VoL. III. 268 



A.P. mr. 


t5igiial 
courago diiS' 
|)layed in 
blowing tip 
the inagri- 
zine at 
Delhi. 


Tlio 

rebellion 

regularly 

organized, 


570 HISTORY OF INDIA. [Book IX. 

applied the match. By the explosion which instantly followed hundreds of the 
mutineers were blown into the air, and suflfered the death they had so richly 
merited. Unfortunately none of the heroic defenders were permitted to escape 
witliout severe injury. “Conductor Scully,” says Lieutenant Forrest, “was so 
dreadfully wounded that his escape was impossible. I saw him after the 
explosion, but his face and head were so burned and contused that I don’t 
think life could have long remained in him.” Among the others who perished 
were several European women and children, who had fled to the magazine at 
the commencement of the outbreak. Lieutenants Willoughby and Foirest 
succeeded in reaching the Main Guard at the Cashmere gate. The latter even¬ 
tually escaped, but the foi-mer, probably retarded in his flight by the injuries 
he had received, fell into the hands of the mutineers on the road to Meerut and 
was barbai'ously murdered. Lieutenant Raynor and Conductor Buckley, who 
had sought the same place by a difl’erent direction, were more fortunate in 
reaching it. 

Delhi was now entirely in the hands of the mutineers, and the king, 
throwing ofl* any disguise which he had previously worn, formally accepted tin: 
sovereignty which was tendered to him. On the very evening of the outbreak, 
a royal salute of twenty-one guns announced the fact, and on the following 
day, a silver throne, which had been in disuse since 1842, having been brought 
into the hall of audience, the king took his seat upon it, received the homage 
of the chiefs, and began to issue royal orders. His eldest son, Mirza Moghul, 
became commander-in-chief, and various other sons received appointments 
accordant with their assumed dignities. During the first tumultuous proceedings, 
there was some reason to allege that the mas,sacres had received no countenance 
at court, and were entirely owing to the blood-thirsty rabble, which it was then 
impossible to restrain; but a deed of horror must now be related which 
completely destroys this excuse, and proves that the king and his sons were 
capable of repeating, in cool blood, the worst atrocities that had yet been 
perpetrated. Mention has already been made of some Euro 2 )eans who fled to 
the palace in the hoj>e of finding it an asylum. Others had been brought 
thither as ju’isoners, till the whole number exceeded fifty. The recesses of the 
palace were sufficiently large to have concealed them all, htwl they been ten 
times more numeroixs, and the king had only to give the order, which wouhl 
by this means have secured their personal safety. The suggestion was actually 
made to him, but he declined to accede to it, and shut them up in a place, 
which Mrs. Aldwell thus describes: “We were all confined in one room, verj' 
dark, with only one door, and no window or other opening. It was not fit for 
the residence of any human being, much less for the n\imbcr of us who were 
th^re. We were, verj’^ much crowded together, and in consequence of the 
sepoys, and every one who took a fancy to do so, coming and frightening the 
children, we were frequently obliged to close the one door we had, which then 



Chap. I.] THE MUTINEERS AT DELHI. 571 

left us without light or air. The sepoys used to come with their muskets 
loaded and bayonets fixed, and ask us whether we would consent to become 
Mahometans, and also slaves, if the king gmnted us our lives ; but the king’s 
special armed retainers, from which the guard over us was always furnished, 
incited the sepoys to be content with nothing short of our lives, saying we 
should be cut up in small pieces and given as food to the kites and crows.” 
The agony in wliich the prisoners were thus kept was only preliminary to a 
liorrid sacrifice. In the Court Diary, giving by authority an account of the 
daily occurrences at the palace, there is the following entry for the IGth of 
May: “The king held his court in the special hall of audience: forty-nine 
English were prisoners, and the army demanded that they should be given 
over to them for slaughter. The king delivered them uj), saying, ‘ The army 
may do as they please.’ ” Although the infamous sanction thus appears not to 
liave been formally given till the 16th, the fate destined for the piisoners was 
so well known that it was openly talked of in Delhi at least two days before. 
Accordingly, a native eye-witness of the whole proceedings bears the following 
testimony: “I heard of it two days before the occurrence; it was said the 
Europeans would be killed in two days, but I do not recollect what day it Wiis, 
On the day fixed for the slaughter arriving, great crowds of people were flocking 
to the palace about ten AM. I entered with them.” What are we to think of 
a people who could thus crowd to witness a spectacle almost too horrible for 
:h‘sei’iption, and keep the day on which it was to be pei^ietratcd as a holiday? 
Mrs. Aldwell and her three children were the only European prisoners who 
escaped. When taken, she and they were disguised as Mahometans, and she 
had afterwards managed to complete the disguise by learning and teaching 
them the Mahometan confession of faith. In this way they passed as Mussul¬ 
mans from .Cashmere, and were specially excepted, when the order arrived to 
bring out the other victims. “ The women and children,” says Mrs. Aldwell, 
“ began crying, saying they knew they were going to be murdered, but the 
Mahometans swore on the Koran, and the Hindoos on the Jumna, that such 
was not the ciuse; that they wanted to give them a better residence, and that 
the one they were in would be converted into a magazine. On this they went 
out, were counted, but I do not know the number; a rope was thrown rmind 
to encircle the whole group, the same as prisoners are usually kept together 
when on the move; and in this manner they were taken out of my sight.” All 
the victims thus marched off were, with four exceptions, women and children. 
The subsequent massacre is thus narrated by a native eye-witness:—“On 
reaching the first court-yard, I saw the prisoners all standing together, 
surrounded on all sides by the king’s special armed retainers, or what you may 
term his body-guard, and some of the infantry mutineera I <Jid not observe 
any signal orders given; but on a sudden the men just mentioned drew ^heir 
swords, and all simultaneously attacked the prisoners, and continued cutting 


A.n. 1867. 


Horrid 
ntatwacre of 
Kuro)i«iin 
woraon and 
cliildi'en 

tlio 

procinctn of 
the jwilnoe. 



572 


HISTOEY OF INDIA. 


[Book IX. 


A.D. 1857. 


MoHBacre at 


Htatu of 

in 

the rniii;il», 


at them till they had killed them all. There were at lea.st 100 or 160 men 
employed in this work of slaughter.” Shortly afterwards, “ the bodies were 
laden on two carts and thrown into the river.” Such was the nature and such 
were the first-fruits of the revolt in Delhi. Before proceeding to give an 
account of the retribution which awaited it, it will be iiecessarj' to mention 
the principal localities in which about the same time similar outbreaks occuiTed, 
and thus furnish a general idea of the extent to which rebellion was carried, 
before efiectual measures could be taken to curb or suppress it. 


CHAPTEIl II. 


Tlu: prngresa of tlio mutiny —Vigorous measures of repression in the I'niijub - -Outlireaks in other (juarters 
. Tile l)oal>—Neeniuch and NusseeralKid—.Thansi —Bareilly—Oude- Measures of govenunent to 
meet the crisis—-Eeinforcoments and proclamations—Susge of Delhi commenced. 


HE outl)reak at Meerut, and the entrance of the mutineers into 
Delhi, operated as a common signal to all the native regiments 
throughout Bimgal, and accordingly, in many localities the 
intelligence was no sooner received than a determination was 
evinced to follow the same course. The utmost, therefore, that 
could be done l»y the British authorities while preparing for the worst, was to 
inter[)Ose obstacles to immediate action, and diminish the means of mischief 
which the sepoys possessed, by depriving them of their arms. Nowhere was 
this policy more (juickly adopted and more vigorously carried out than in the 
Punjab. It must ai the same time be admitted that the authprities there 
possessed peculiar advantages. The recent annexation of the country, and the 
warlike spirit of its inhabitants, dictated the necessity of keeping a firm grasj) 
of it, and hence the troops within it amounted to 59,056. Of these 10,320 
were Eurojieans, 13,430 Punjabees, and 35,900 Hindoostanees, chiefly sepoys. 
The last, though outnumbering the other two classes, were so situated as to be 
incapable of combined action, and were moreover aware that they could not 
caiTy the sympathy of the inhabitants along with them, as they might have 
hoped to do in Bengal. They were in what they rcgai’ded as a foreign country, 
and the probability therefore was, that if they did venture on mutiny, it 
would bo not merely to encounter a European force, but to be hunted down by 
a hostile population. The advantages which government thus possessed in the 
Punjab were admirably tunied to account by the authorities, and the province 
from which a£ one time danger was most apprehended, not only remained 
com^paratively tranquil, but became mainly instrumental in the final suppression 
of the mutiny. 










tiiiAP. ir.] 


STATE OF THE PUNJAB. 


573 


Tlie Meerut outbreak and tlie possession of Delhi by the mutineers were d. issr. 
made known at Laliore by telegi-aph on the 12th of May. Sir Jolm Lawrence, 
the chief-commissioner, was then at Kawal Pindee, situated about 150 miles to ( ntiaii 
the N.N.W., and owing to a stoppage of the telegi’aph could not be instiin- the ruiijuK 
taneously communicated with. Immediate action was however felt to be 
necessary. General disafiection among the sepoys was notorious, and it could 
not be doubted that as soon as they should hear of the mutiny, they would 
seize; the first opportunity to take part in it. Mr. Montgomery, the judicial 
(;ommi.ssioner, therefore, at once assumed the nece.ssary res[)onsibility, and 
having summoned a coiincil of the leading authorities, civil and military, 
suggested the propriety of rendering the native troops comparatively innocuous 
by depriving them at least of their ammunition and peivu.ssioti cap.s, if not 
by disarming them entiiely. Tlie latter, the bolder and more clfectual course, 
was preferred, and on the following morning was can-ied into effect. The 
native rogiuumts tlieu in the large military cantonment of Mean Mecr, situated 
about six miles from Lahore, were the 16tli, 2Gth, and 40th, and the 8th light 
cavalry. To control and overawe all these regiments, the European force con¬ 
sisted only of her majesty’s 81st, mustering about 850 men, and two troops of 
Company’s honse-artilleiy. But only a iiortion of these could be emiiloyed 
in tho important operation of disarming. In ]n*ovianig for tlie security of adopt.!.! hy 
Lahore, which was itself a focus of mischief, and foi' the pi’otection of the g„iuor}. 
barracks, so many European troops were withdrawn, that the whole number 
brought to the ])arado-ground was not more than 300. Whe» brought face to 
face with this small force, and the dozm guns of lioi’se-artillery accompanying 
them, the sepoys, though mustering about 3500, did not venture to risk a 
(iombat, and at once obeyed the order to pile their ai-rn.s. The security derived 
from this deci.sive act of di.sarming extended much further than the removal 
of the immediate danger. It dealt with the Asiatic mind in the manner 
which has always proved effectual, and while it confirmed the wcll-<lisposcd, 
deterred many whose hearts were full of tremtbery from engaging in any overt 
ivet of rebellion. It Wixs aftei'wards ascertained that the disarming was not 
effected an hour too soon. A plot had been formed for seizing the fort of 
Lahore and massacring all the Europeans there and at Mean Meer, and was 
on the very eve of execution, when it was thus most providentially frustrated. 

On receiving intelligence of the mutiny, Mr. Montgomery sent off an nimiderat 

® . I’oluswiKjor. 

express to Ferozepoor to intimate the event to Brigadier innes. The intima¬ 
tion, which reached that officer on the morning of the 13th, seems not to have 
impressed him so deeply as might have been expected. The arsenal under his 
charge contained immense military stores, and be could not but feel the 
necessity of taking immediate steps for its security, but the native regiiilfents, 
the 45tb and 57th, were allowed to retain their arms, and immediately showed 
bow little they deserved the confidence reposed in them. On this subject the 



574 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book IX. 


A D. 1857. 


blunder at 
F«ro«©iK)or. 


Another 
bluixler at 
Uniluilla. 


opinion given by Sir John Lawrence, in his report on the mutiny in the Punjab, 
is decisive:—“On the British side attairs were badly managed. It was fortu¬ 
nate that the Burojiean barracks were close to the arsenal, into which building 
a company of Europeans were introduced, just before it was assailed by the 
native infantry. But after the arsenal had been secured and the mutineers 
repulsed, they were allowed to return and burn buildings in the cantonment 
at their pleasure during the whole night of the 14th May. No adequate efforts 
were made to destroy or even to punish them. Even those who, in their flight 
from the station towards Delhi, had been seized by the police and the country 

people, were not brought to trial until reiterated 
orders to that effect had been issued. But un¬ 
fortunately at Ferozepoor errors did not end 
here; for when, at a date subsequent to the 
above occuiTences, the 10th light cavalry were 
disarmed, their horses were not taken away. 
VV'Iicn, however, the taking of the horses was 
insisted on at hist, the troopers had a full oppor¬ 
tunity of concocting their plans for an outbreak; 
for the order about the horse.s, instead of being 
kept secret, w:i:! formally copied and circulated 
in the regimental order-book.” Happily, not¬ 
withstanding this tissue of blunders, no massacre 
of Europeans was perpetrated. 

At Umballa the native troops had for some time given proofs of disaffection. 
As early as the 19th of April mysterious fires began to occur, and were gene¬ 
rally believed to be the work of the sepoys. On the 8th of May a prediction 
was current in the 5th and 60th native infantry stationed there, “that in the 
following week blood would be shed at Delhi or Umballa, and that a general 
rising wmuld take place;” and only two days afterwards, the 10th, the day of 
the fatal Meerut outbreak, as if they had feared that others might anticipate 
them in fulfilling the prediction, both of the above regiments rushed simul¬ 
taneously to their bells of arms, and began loading their muskets. They were 
afterwards induced to desist, but the portion of the 60th stationed as a guard 
over the treasury persisted in retaining their arms during the whole day. 
Strange to say, this overt act of mutiny was unconditionally forgiven by the 
military authorities, and the result which might have been anticij)ated was, 
that Large portions of these regiments afterwai'ds joined the rebels at Delhi. 

The above blunders committed in the Punjab and the Cis-Sutlej states were 
fortunately only exceptions to the judicious management generally evinced in 
the same quarters. The important fort and arsenal of Philour, on the frontier 
of the Jullunder Doab, was happily saved by throwing in a company of European 
infantry and some Eui-opean artillerymen into the fort, and dispossessing 



Sir Joun Lawrsnce, G.O.B. 
I'Vom a photograi^ by Oldeil, Ulauiiford, & Co. 



Chap. II.] 


THE MUTINEERS IN THE PUNJAB. 


575 

the native troops before they had time to give effect to the treachery which a.u. isst. 
they had for some time been meditating. The same promptitude of action also 
saved the fort of Govindghur. This fort, besides being the most central and Poh of 
most important stronghold in the Punjab, completely commanded Amritsur, 
the religious caj)ital of the Sikhs, and the possession of it was hence absolutely 
indispensable to the maintenance of tranquillity in that quarter. At the time 
of tlie outbreak it was occupied by a detachment of the 59th native infantry, 
and only seventy European artillerjmien. The latter must have been over¬ 
powered had they not been reinforced by half a comj)any of her majesty’s 81st 
huiTied over in ehas or native one-home gigs fi-om Lahore. Wliat the former 
would have done may be inferred from the fact that it afterward.s became 
necessary to disarm them. 

On the 11th of May, when the telegraph announced tlje outbreak, tlie forces stutooraf- 
occupying the Peshawer valley consisted of about 2800 European and 8000 Poatiawer 
native soldiers, with 18 field guns and a mounted battery. Immediately on 
the I’eceipt of the disastrous intelligence, it was I'esolved, on the suggestion of 
Colonel John Nicholson, then deputy-commissioner at Pe,shawer, to form a move¬ 
able column of picked troops. At the same time orders were issued for the 
rigid examination of all sepoy cotTCSjiondence at the post-office:. For some time 
the disaffection of the 6 tth native infantry' forming part of the Peshawer con¬ 
tingent had been notoi’ious, and therefore one of the fimt stejis taken was to 
ci’ipple it for intrigue, by breaking it uji into detachments, and marching them 
off to isolated outposts. While thus pi'oviding for the safety of the district, the 
general interest was not forgotten; and on the 13th of May the guide co)'2)S, wliicli 
has since so greatly distinguished itself, quitted its cantonment at Murdan six 
hours after it got the order, and the next morning had accomplished the distance 
of thirty miles to Attock, while hurrying on to assist in the recovery of 
Delhi. Meantime the news of the outbreak having become known to the sepoys, 
a rapid change took place in their demeanour, and their m\itinovis intentions 
couhl no longer be disguised. Precautions were accordingly taken. The 
treasure, amounting to nearly a quarter of a million sterling, was removed 
from the centre of cantonments to the fort outside, which was at the same time 
garrisoned by Europeans. The inspection of native correspondence, at the post- m itinoim 
office, was now makinjj: ominous revelations. Letters addi’es.sed to soldiers of denw 

' o iiotccto<l 

the Glth, revelled in descriptions of the atrocities perpetrated in Hindoostan on 
the men, women, and children of the Feringhees, and contained messages frt)m 
their relatives, urging them to emulate the example. Another letter, which did 
not pijss through the post-office, but fell into the hands of Brigadier Cotton, 
commanding at Peshawer, was a formal communication from ])aii of the 51st 
native infantry stationed there to the 64th. After some preliminary saluta¬ 
tions, it proceeded thus :—” The csirtridge will have to be beaten on the 22d 
instant. Of this you are hereby informed. This is addressed to you by the 



A D. 1857. 


Matinoiis 

oorretipoii 

doUGO 


outbi'ciik ill 
AtUtck uud 
Nownlicnt. 


iHsciHivt* 
»'5t8 of 


576 HISTORY OF INDIA. [Book IX. 

whole regiment. O brothers! the religion of Hi®doos and Mahoihetans is all 
one. Therefore all you soldiers should know this. Here all the sepoys are at 
the bidding of the jemadar, soubahdar-major, and havildar-major. All are 
discontent with this business, whether small or great. What more need be 
written ? Do jus you think best. | High and low send their obeisance, benedic¬ 
tion, salutation, and service.It was added by another hand. “ The above is 
tlie state of affaire here. In whatever way you can manage it, come in to 
Peshawer o» the 21st instant. Thoroughly understand that ])oint. In fact eat 
there and drink here.” The authorities thu.s made aware of the plot, and the 
very day fixed for its execution, were able to counteiwork it, though not 
entirely to prevent overt acts of mutiny. On the 21st, the iLay jipjjointed, ii 
])art of the 55th, on duty at the Attoek ferry, suddenly quitted their post ajid 
marched away towards Nowshera. On the way they were joined by a detach¬ 
ment of the 2-tth native infantry, who were escorting coimnissariat stores to 
Peslniwcr. Mjijor Verner, commanding at Nowshera, informed by an express 
of their approach, was able to intercept and disarm them. This success, 
however, only proved the signal to a niore serious outbnsak, for the moment he 
le-entered Nowshera with his pi’isom;rs, thi-ee companies of the 55th stationed 
there came to the rescue, and having succeeded, bioke o])en tlie regimental 
magazine, sup])lied themselves with aninumition, and having succeeded in 
crossing the (Jjibool, hastened t)ff in the direction of Murdiin, where the main 
bo<ly of tlie 55tli wjis stationed. The whole iinmediiitely frateinized, and the 
mutiny of the regiment wjis complete. 

After such ovei-t acts a general disarming of the native troops could no 
longer be delayed. It began with the regiments stationed at Peshawer, 
consisting of the 5th light cavalry, and the 24th, 27th, and 51.st native infantry. 
Another regiment, the 21st native infantry, was exempted, because Jin infantry 
legiment seenusl indispensable to carry on the duties of the station, and this 
one had hitherto shown no sympathy with the mutineers. Be.sides the above 
thei'c M'eie two r egiments of irregular eavahy, the 7th and ISth. These also 
were exempted for similar reasons, though not without considerable hesitation, 
as the fidelity of the former of the two was already shaken, and that of the 
latter was at least problematical. 'The case then stood thus. Four native 
i-egiments were to Ire disarmed, and three, who were to be spectsitors of the 
openition, were hy no means free from the suspicion of being more inclineil to 
ojrpose than to assist in it. The European i-cgiments were the 70th and 87th, 
arrd these, with the artillery, on the morning of the 22d, took up positions at 
the two ends of the cantonment. 'Plje measure had been resolved, and was 
carried out with so much promptitude that the native troops, however much 
inclined to resist, were too fiiint-hearted to venture upon it, and laid down 
their arms. The next step necessary was to deal with the 55th native infantry, 
who had mutinied at Murdan. Near midnight of the 23d, a force of 300 



Chap. II.] 


SPREAD OF THE MUTINY. 


677 


European infantry, 260 iiT^gular cavalry, horse-levies and police, and eight a.d. isst. 
guns, left Peshawer under command of Colonel Chute of her majesty's 70th, 
accompanied by Colonel Nicholson as political officer. At sunrise of the 25th, Niehoismi 
this force, increased by a detachment from Nowshera under Major Vaughan, matineew. 
was descried approaching Murdan. The mutineers no sooner heard the intel¬ 
ligence than they rushed from the fort and fled tumultuously towards the 
hills of Swat. They had got so far ahead before the pursuit commenced, and 
the ground was so rugged, that the gims of their pursuers were never brought 
within range. They were not, however, pei-mitted to escape with impunity; 
for Colonel Nicholson, hurrying forward with a party of troopers, succeeded in 
overtaking them. Thus brought to bay the mutineers faced about, and a 
desperate encounter took place, but not with doubtful issue. Nicholson’s 
impetuous charge drove his enemies before him, and they fled, scattering them¬ 
selves over the country in companies and sections. The pursuit was continued, 
and with so much success, that before the day closed 120 had been slain and 
150 made prisoners. 

While the mutiny was thus either anticipated by disarming, or curbed and Mutiny in 
punished by the vigorous measures adopted in the Punjab, it made rapid and 
alarming progress in other quarters. In the beginning of May the 9th native 
infantry was distributed in the Doab in four detachments—three companies 
being stationed at Alighur, three at Mynpoorie, three at Etawah, and one 
at Boolundshuhur. Hitherto the confidence of the European officers in tlie 
fidelity of the regiment had been unbounded, and though they could not but 
feel some anxiety after they had been .startled by the disastrous intelligence 
from Meerut and Delhi, their hope still was that, however faithless others might 
be, their men would prove an honourable exception. And there certainly 
seemed to be good grounds for this charitable judgment. At Alighur, where 
the head-quarters of the regiment were established, the soldiers, so far from 
sympathizing with the mutineers, had readily assisted in hunting down some 
troopers of the 3d cavalry, who, after taking part in the atrocities at Meerut, 
had wandered into their neighbourhood, probably in search of plunder. They 
had given a still stronger proof of fidelity, by not only refusing to listen to a 
Brahmin, who had come among them as a secret agent to incite them to 
mutiny, but by taking him prisoner and handing him over to their com¬ 
mander. It is difficult to believe that in thus acting they were only seeking a 
cover to their real designs. The probability rather is that up to this time, 
though they maj’- have been shaken by the sinister influences brought to bear 
on them, they had not formed any decided resolution, but were waiting the 
course of events in that dubious vacillating state where any sudden impulse 
from* either side is sufficient to turn the scale. We accordingly learn that it 
was an impulse of this nature which actually determined them. The Brahtain, 
for his attempt to seduce them, had been condemned to die, and they had stood 
VoL. III. 269 



578 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book IX. 


A.D. 1857. 


Mutiny in 
the Doab. 


Til© mutiny 
in Hurro- 
Hiia, Nutt' 
Boerabtul. 
and Uoliit* 
ound. 


on the parade ground when the sentence was carried into execution, without 
betraying any particular emotion. Unfortunately, the lifeless body was still 
hanging on the gallows, when some soldiers who had been absent on duty 
arrived. Far from participating in the apparent apathy of their comrades, the 
sight filled them with indignation, and one of their number stepping from the 
ranks, and pointing to the gallows, exclaimed—“ That man is a martyr.” No 
sooner were the words uttered than the whole soldiers present, as if seized 
by a sudden frenzy, rushed forth shouting defiance, proceeded directly to the 
treasury, plundered it, burst open the jail, liberating all the prisoners, and then 
took the higliroad to Delhi. As there were no European troops present, no 
resistance could be offered to their proceedings, but it is only fair to mention 
that no blood-thirstiue.ss was manifested, and no lives were taken. This out¬ 
break, which took place on the 20th of May, was forthwith responded to by 
the other three detachments—^by that of Mynpooide on the 22d, of Etawah on 
the 2.8d, and of Boolund.shuhur on the 24th. It is unnecessary to give the 
detail,s of each, though honourable notice is certainly due to a young officer. 
Lieutenant de Kantzovv, who, undeterred either by threats or actual violence, 
kept his post at Mynpoorie, and actually succeeded in inducing the mutineers 
to depart without plundering the treasury. 

After these revolts in the Doab, neai’ly a week elapsed without any other 
actual rising, and many were sanguine enough to imagine that the insurrec¬ 
tionary spirit had nearly expended itself. And there is some ground to believe 
that could Delhi have been at this time wrested fronr the mutineers by a 
sudden onset, and a signal retribution inflicted for the atrocities of which they 
had been guilty, the revolt would have received its death-blow. The recapture 
of Delhi, however, by any troo 2 )S which could be hastily mustered for the 
j^urpose was imj)ossible, and the continued possession of the old Mogul capital 
by the insuigents gave a new and in-esistible stimulus to revolt. All at once, 
after a short and delusive interval, a simultaneous burst of insurrection took 
place, though in localities so widely distant that it could scarcely have been in 
consequence of jn-evious concert. On this recommencement, the first display of 
oj)en violence occurred in the towns of Hansi and Hissar, in the district of 
Hurreana, lying to the north-west of that of Delhi. There, on the 28th of 
May, the Hurreana battalion of light infantry and the 4th irregular cavalry 
breaking out into ojjcii mutiny, commenced an indiscriminate massacre of 
Europetins, and were guilty of deeds as atrocious as any that had yet been 
2 )crpotratcd. On the evening of the same day, in the remote locality of 
Nusseeiabad, situated fifteen miles south-east of Ajmere, in the very centre of 
Ilajj)ootana, two regiments of Bengal native infantry, the 15th and the 3()th, 
together with a. comi)any of Bengal native artillery, proceeded to execute the 
mutinous designs of which they had previously given many indications. One 
of their first steps was to make themselves masters of the guns. They were 



Chap. II.] 


SPKEAD OF THE MUTINY. 


579 


not, however, permitted to retain them without a struggle. The first Bombay a.d. isst. 

light cavalry (lancers), showing how little sympathy the army of that presidency 

had with that of Bengal, hastened to the rescue, and repeatedly charged the outb^k at 

mutineers. It was unhappily without success. The disparity of numbers was 

too great, and thej' were obliged to retire in the direction of Beawr, situated 

about thirty miles to the south-west. During the struggle several of the 

European officers had fallen, but the survivors, together with tlie other 

European residents, protected by the lancers, were enabled to make their 

escape. A still more formidable outbreak had, in the meantime, occurred at 

Bareilly, the capittil of Eohilcund. Having recounted the many wrongs which 

the Rohillas suffered in consequence of the iniquitous compact made between 

Warren Hastings and the Nabob of Oude, w^e can hardly deny that tlicre was 

something retributive in the vengeance which they took on this occasion, 

though the parties who suffered were certainly not tlio wrong-doei’s. The 

troops stationed here were the 18th and C8th Bengal native infantry, the 8th 

irregular cavalry, and a company of native artillery. Their disaffection was 

well known, and they had so little attempted to disguise it, that the European 

women and children had been removed for safety to the hill station of Njmee 

TaL The evil day was however postponed by dexterous management, and the 

excitement which for .some days threatened immediate violence, had so fiir 

subsided that the danger seemed, at least for the present, to be passing away. 

The sepoys themselves employed all the arts of Asiatic treacheiT in counten- Treachery of 
^ . T, ^ ‘‘‘c cepoyc. 

ancing this delusion. Professing deep contrition for having been misled by 

evil counsel, they were now only anxious that the past should be forgotten, 
and they requested, as a proof of restored confidence, that the women and 
children who had been sent off to Nynce Tal should return. With this 
request the British authorities were not so infatuated iis to comply; but 
Brigadier Sibbald was so far imposed upon that he wrote to the government, 
assuring them, in confident terms, of the fidelity of his troops, provided their 
fears were set at rest by an a.ssurance that they were not to be punished for 
any previous irregularities. The brigadier’s letter could scarcely have reached 
its destination, when the sepoys proved the hollowness of all their professions, 
and he himself became one of their first victims. Having, like their fellow- 
traitors at Meerut, fixed on a Sunday, they rose by preconcerted signal on the 
31st of May, and at once commenced the work of murder and devastation, by 
opening on their officers both with grape and musketry, firing the bungalows, 
plundering the treasury, and throwing open the jail, which contained nearly 
3000 prisoners. These mingling with a populace notoriousl}^ one of the most 
turl^ulent in India, bad full scope to commit every form of outrage. The 
insurrection being thus completely triumphant, soon found fitting representa¬ 
tives, both of the military and the civil authority—of the former, in the person 
of Ruktawar Khan, soubahdar of artillery, who, assuming the rank of general. 



580 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book IX. 


A D. 1867. 


Airocitioti 
at JJareilly 
and 81iah< 
jebanjXKir. 


Mutiny at 
Neemuch, 
ill Bciiidia’c 
dominions. 


paraded the city in the carriage of the murdered brigadier, followed by a 
numerous staff; and of the latter, in the person of Khan Bahadur Khan, a 
retired native judge, who repaid his obligation to the British government, 
which had pensioned him, by turning traitor, and employing the forms of law 
to murder its officers. In this way two of the European judges, charged with 
imaginary crimes; were subjected to the mockery of a trial, condemned to death, 
and immediately executed. The example of Bai-eilly was speedily followed at 
Moradabad and Shahjchanpoor, the other principal military stations of Rohil- 
euiid. At Moradabad the 29th native infantry, more avaricious than blood¬ 
thirsty, were so intent on plunder that they'allowed their officers to escape. 
It was otherwise at Shahjehanpoor, where the 28th native infantry, choosing 
the same Sunday as at Bareilly, shot one officer on the parade ground, and 
then sent a party of murderers into the church. Notwithstanding the sudden¬ 
ness and ferocity of this sacrilegious attack, the greater part of the European 
residents escaped into Oude. Here, however, instead of the asylum which 
they hoped to find, the whole party, men, women, and children, fell into the 
hands of savages, still worse than those from whom they had fled, and were 
barbarously massacred in the vicinity of Aurungabad. 

The mention of Oude, as well as the sequence of events, would now naturally 
lead us to trace the course of the revolt in that province, but some advantage 
in respect of arrangement will be gained by previously noticing the disastrous 
outbreaks at some other localities. We begin with Necmuch, situated in an 
isolated portion of Scindia’s dominions, near the south-east borders of Raj poo- 
tana, and, with Jhansi, long the capital of an independent native principality, 
but finally incorporated with British India, in accordance with the annexation 
policy, which refused to recognize ah adopted heir. The troops stationed at 
Neemuch belonged to what was designated the Gwalior contingent,,and there¬ 
fore did not properly form part of our Indian army, but they were virtually 
included in it, because, though nominally belonging to Scindia, they were 
provided by the British government, in accordance with treaty, and commanded 
by British officers. Still the relations which they bore to a native prince gave 
additional importance to their movements, as from these an inference might be 
drawn as to the course which the prince himself might be disposed to take in 
the fearful struggle which had commenced, and the degree of control which he 
might be able to exercise, whether for good or evil. As to Scindia personally, 
there was indeed scarcely any room for doubt. At the very commencement of 
the outbreak he had come forward of his own accord to place his body-guard 
and all his other troops at the disposal of Mr. Colvin, the lieutenant-governor 
of the North-western Provinces, and his subsequent conduct had shown that the 
fidelity of the Gwalior contingent, if any efforts on his part could secure it, 
would remain unshaken. One more ominous feature was thus added to the 
revolt, when it appeared that the sepoys of the contingent fraternized with 



Chap. II.] 


MUTINY AT NEEMUCII. 


.’581 


those of Bengal, and would in all probability follow their example. The troops a.d. 1857 . 
at Neemuch consisted of the 7th and 72d regiments of infantry, the 1st regi¬ 
ment of cavalry, and the 4th company of artillery. For some time symptoms Mutiny at 
of disaffection had been visibly manifested, and on the two last days of May, ’’ 

and the 1st of June, the whole troops were in such a state of excitement that 
an actual rising was hourly expected. From some cause, however, it suddenly 
subsided, and the 2d passed in comparative trampiillity. Oil the 3d another 
change took place, the disturbance became worse than ever, and at last, 
towards midnight, the discharge of a gun, the preconcerted signal, Jinnounced 
that the mutiny had commenced. The main body of the troops occupied the 
cantonments situated without the town, but the fort within it was gairisoned 
by the right wing of the 7th regiment, while the left wing was stationed at 
an hospital about a quarter of a mile distant. The moment the outbreak 
commenced, the whole of the troops in cantonments took part in it, but the 
7th regiment seemed not to have fully made up their minds, and the left wing 
marched off in obedience to their officers, and joined the right wing in the fort, 
both making loud protestations of unshaken fidelity. Meantime the work of 
destruction went on below, and many barbarous murders were committed. 

The officers within the fort, looking down from its ramparts, saw the air lighted 
up with the flames of their burning bungalows, but, though held in a torture of 
suspense as to the fate of their fellow-officers, and the other European residents, 
gave so much credit to the loyal professions of the ganison, that they scarcely 
doubted their own individual safety. On this point, however, they were soon 
undeceived, for when the mutineers appeared before the fort, and threatened to 
open upon it with their artillery, a soubahdar, who had seen nearly fifty years’ 
service, and to whom, from the confidence reposed in him, the command of the 
])Icket placed at the gate had been intrusted, coolly ordered it to be thrown 
open. When the ©fficers attempted to resist this treacherous order, they were 
significantly reminded that they had better look to themselves, since the 
garrison, though disposed to favour their escape, never would nor could save 
them from the mutineers outside, of whose murderous intentions they were 
well aware. This intimation left the officers no alternative but flight, which 
they accomplished with the utmost difficulty. 

The mutiny at Jhansi was of a still more atrocious character. At this Mutiny ni 
place, situated 140 miles south of Agra, near the north-west extremity of 
Bundelcund,*a strong feeling of discontent existed, partictilarly among those 
who had fonnerly been connected with the native court, and regretted the loss 
of their independence by a course of policy which seemed to them at once 
fraudylent and violent. The ranee, indeed, so far from concealing her resent¬ 
ment, had given utterance to it in the most unequivocal form, by spurnin^^the 
pension allotted to her by the British government. Under such circumstances, 
it was not to be expected that when the revolt began to spread, Jhansi wouhl 



582 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book IX. 


A D. 1857. 


Mutiny at 
Jhanai. 


IToiTible 

niassacTo, 


Mutiny at 
Agra. 


long refrain from taking a prominent part in it. The only troops in the place 
were the left wings of the 12th native and the 14th irregular infantry. From 
the first intelligence of the proceedings at Meerut and Delhi, an outbreak had 
been imminent, as the ranee and her advisers were suspected of tampering with 
the sepoys. But though the wish to break out into open violence was visibly 
manifest, the fear of being committed before success seemed certain sufficed to 
keep both the sepoys and their tempters in check, and the actual mutiny did 
not take place till the 4th of June. The Europeans, forewarned of their danger, 
had fixed upon the fort as their place of refuge. Accordingly, when the alarm 
was given, they rushed to it with one accord. I’hc prospect before them was 
fearful. Their whole number, women and children included, amounted only to 
fifty-five, and how were these to withstand the hundreds of blood-thirsty 
wretches by whom they were beset? The struggle at once commenced, and 
the heroic band, fighting for life and all that was dear to them, made good 
their defence for four days. At last, when their resources had begun to fail, 
and their position was nearly desperate, a new and more formidable enemy 
appeared. The ranee sent her artillery and elephants, and the gates, though 
strongly barricaded, were forced. By I'ctiring into some of the buildings, it 
might still have been possible to hold out a little longer, but as an unconditional 
surrender must sjieedily have been forced, we can easily understand how 
readily the tenns were li.stened to, when the mutineers offered, on the delivery 
of the fort, to save the lives of all within it. This offer, after it had been 
confirmed by the most solemn oaths, was accepted, and all who had survived 
the miseiies of the siege, having laid down their arm.s, were beginning to retire, 
when, in utter violation of all that had been stijjulatod and sworn, they were 
seized, carried off to a place of execution, and put to the sword, man, woman, 
and child, with a barbarity too horrible for description. 

At the very commencement of the revolt, some anxiety w’^as felt for Agra, 
once the capital of all India, and still the capital of the Noi-th-western Provincses, 
Fortunately, indeed, it had not, like Delhi, been left destitute of Em'opean 
troops, and it was therefore certain that, happen what might, it would not fall 
like that city without a struggle. The troops stationed in it at the time of 
the revolt were the 3d European fusiliers, a troop of European artillery, and 
two sepoy regiments, the 44th and C7th native infantry. Among the latter, 
when the fii*st intelligence of the mutiny anived, the excitement was extreme, 
and the mischief which they meditated was indicated by numeroils incendi.ary 
fires. Their object in raising them apparently was to lure the European troops 
to their lines, for the purpose of extinguishing the flames, and take advantage 
of their absence while thus employed, to make themselves masters of tli,e fort. 
If tjiis was the plan, the judicious airangeraents of the authorities defeated it. 
Knowing that everything depended on the possession of the fort, they made its 
security their first object, and never reduced the garrison so far as to give any 



Chap. II.] 


MUTINY AT ALLAHABAD. 


583 


hope of attacking it with success. The lieutenant-governor at the same time a.d. issr, 
exerted himself to the utmost to prevent or postpone the anticipated outbreak. 

As early as the 14th of May, he met the whole troops of the station on the state of 
j)arade ground, and harangued them in a manner which called forth the loudest Agra!" * 
protestations of inviolable fidelity. The sepoys in particular seemed unable to 
give sufficient utterance to their applause, and continued to make the air ring 
with their cheers long after ho had retired. At this time the depth of native 
duplicity was so little understood, that Mr. Colvin himself did not hesitate to 
speak confidently of the effect which his address had produced, and he there¬ 
fore naturally followed it up with a proclamation, in which he declared his 
belief that “ European and native portions of the military forces now rapidly 
.assembling, will honourably and eagerly vie with each other in the extirpation 
of the traitorous criminals who have cnde.avoui’ed to sow utterly groundless 
distrust between the powerful and beneficent British government and its 
attached native soldiery." The two native regiments were on bad terms, and 
Mr. Colvin, well aware of the fact, endeavoured to turn it to .account by 
employing them as a kind of mutual check upon each other. In accordance 
Avith this policy, when, in the end of May, it became desirable to bring in a 
(quantity of treasure from Muttra, about thirty miles north-west of Agra, 
instead of sending Eui-opeaus, who could ill be .spared for such a purpose, 
he selected for the .service two native companicfs, one from e.ach regiment, in 
the belief that.their hatred would not jUIow them to be guilty of a common 
act of treachery. It proved otherwise. No sooner were they in possession of 
the treasure, than they foi-got their own quarrels, broke out into open mutiny, 
and marched ofi with their ])lunder for Delhi. The incident w.as so far fortu¬ 
nate that it completely opened the eyes of the authorities, and by compelling 
them to disarm both regiments, as uttcily unworthy of confidence, undoubtedly 
prevented a more serious catastrophe. 

While Agra thus narrowly escaped, Allahabad, .situated at the junction of'I'ltiny ut. 
the Jumna with the Ganges, was suVjocted to a still more fiery ordeal. This 
city, though justly regarded as the key of the lower provinces of Bengal, and 
containing an arsenal with 40,000 stand of .arms, large numbers of cannon, and 
vast military stoi’es, had been left entirely at the mercy of native troo])S. A 
few soldiera, forming the magazine stafl", were Eurojieans, but the garrison 
within the fortress w.as composed of a regiment of Sikhs, about 400 strong, 
and a company of the Gth native infantry, while the remainder of the latter 
I’egiment occupied the cantonments. In this sbrte of matters an assault by the 
sepoys must have been successful, ami Allahabad, with its immense military 
stores, would, like Delhi, have become a stronghold of the mutineers. Fortu¬ 
nately the authorities were on the alert, and in the absence of any other means 
of reinforcement, a body of aged European invalids, about seventy in number, 
occupying the fort of Chunar, were despatched by steamer, and arrived in the 



4 0. 1857. 


Mutiny at 
AUi^tabad. 


Mutiny at 
Itennren. 


SSi HISTOEY OF INDIA. [Book IX. 

very nick of time. The company of the Cth native infantry, in charge of the 
principal gate of the fortress, had conspired to admit their comrades, when they 
found themselves suddenly displaced. They endeavoured, however, to make a 
merit of necessity, and as a cover to their treachery, the whole regiment made 
such professions of fidelity, that the thanks of the governor-general were 
publicly conveyed to them on the Cth of June. Their gi-atifioation seemed to 
know no bounds, and their cheers were still ringing in the ears of their deluded 
officers as they sat at mess, when they Were startled by the intelligence that 
the mutiny had commenced. Several of them were shot down before they 
could leave the mess-room, and othera were barbarously murdered as they 
hastened to the lines, in hope of quelling disturbance. The Europeans within 
the fort, though gallantly supported by the Sikhs, barely sufficed for its 
])rotection, and hence, both within the town and the cantonments, the work of 
plunder and devastation continued almost unchecked. Before the mutineers 
left, after plundering the treasury, throwing open the jail, which contained 
nearly 3000 prisoners, and burning down the cantonments, fifty Europeans 
had been massacred. The rest found refuge within the fort, and were obliged 
to remain tliere, as anarchy reigned within the city, and British authority had 
nearly ceased throughout the whole tract of country which skirts the Ganges 
from Allahabad up to Agra. 

About sixty miles below Allahabad, and nearly due east from it, stood 
Benares, the great stronghold of Hindooism. If religion had anything to do 
with the revolt, it might have been anticipated that this was the place of all 
others where it would burst forth with the greatest fury. Its population 
exceeding 180,000 Vas notorious for turbulence, and the only troops in whom 
full confidence could be placed were 190 of her majesty’s 10th foot, and a small 
detail of artillery, with three guns. The native troops consisted of a Sikh 
corps, the 37th native infantry, and the 13th irregular cavalry. It was hoped 
tliat both the Sikhs and the cavalry would remain faithful. The 37th, on tlie 
contrary, were known to be mutinous, and on the 1st of June it was resolved 
to deprive them of their arms. The resolution once taken ought to have been 
immediately executed, but was fixed only for the 5th. In the interval the 
sepoys, through some imknown channel became aware of what was intended; 
and to increase the difficulty intelligence airived .that at Azimghur, a place 
about fifty miles to the north of Benare.s, the 17th native infantry had mutinied 
on the 3d, and decamped after seizing treasure to the sunount of £170,000. 
Not a moment could now be lost, and on the 4th the first step in the process of 
disarming was commenced by suddenly locking the bells or huts where the arms 
were kept. By this time the sepoys were equally on the alert, and having 
burst open the doors of the bells gained possession of their arms by open force. 
The'struggle now commenced. JOn the one side stood the Europeans, mustering 
not more than 200, and on the other native troops to the number of about 2000. 



Chap. II.] 


585 


REVOLT IN OUDE; 

This immense disparity was compensated to the former by the possession of a.d. wt. 
three guns, while their opponents had none; by their indomitable courage, and 
by some reluctance on the part of many of the native troops finally to commit Mutiny at 
tiiemselves. It is even said that the’ Sikhs, when they made common cause 
with the Bengal troops, acted rather under the influence of some unaccountable 
panic than from any premeditated design. Favoured by tljis combination of 
circumstances the Europeans gained a comparatively easy victory, only four, 
one of them the commander of the irregular cavalry, being killed, and twenty- 
one wounded. This first success had an excellent cff’ect upon the populace, 
who, contrary to what had been feared, did not venture to rise. 

We now hasten towards Oude, which had become and was destined long 
to be a main centre of revolt. Its first mutiny, and the suppression of it. 



The Residency, Lucknow. —From view in Illustrated Loudon Nows, 


have alrefidy been described. As its recurrence sooner or later could hardly be Mutiny in 
doubted. Sir Heniy Lawrence made diligent use of the respite which he had 
gained, and endeavoured to prepare for the worst. His head-quarters were at the 
residency of Lucknow, situated on the north side of the rifcy, close to the right 
bank of the Goomtee. Beside it were the treasury and the hospital, and a 
number of buildings of solid masonry, occu))ied as dwelling-houses and public 
offices. About a mile and a half to the eastward was the Chowpeyrah Istubul, 
a cruciform building used as barracks by her majesty’s 32d, the only European 
infantry then in the province. At some distance to the north of the barracks 
stood another building called the Kuddum Rasool, which had been converted 
into a powder magazine. In the same vicinity were the lines of the 3d 
regiment of military ]>olice. Immediately south of the barracks was the Tara 
Kotee or observatory, where all the law courts were concentrated. About a 
mile above the residency, and on the same side of the river, were the Dowlut 
Khana and Sheesh Muhul, forming part of an old palace of the Kings of Oude. 

VoL. III. • 270 



A.D, 1867. 


Respective 
positions of 
the F!urO' 
peanaud 
native 
troops ill 
Glide. 


Position of 
Sir Hugh 
'Wiieeler at 
OHwniHM>r. 


586 HISTORY OF INDIA. fBobk IX. 

In the one were the head-quarters of the brigadier commanding the Oude 
irregular force, and in the other a magazine containing many stands of ams 
and native guna Still farther up the river, and to the westward, was the 
palace of Moosa Bagh, occupied by the commanding officers of the 4th and 7th 
regiments of Oude irregular infantry, which were cantoned in its vicinity. 
About a quarter of a mile above the residency the Goomtee was crossed by an 
iron bridge, the road from which led almost in a straight line to the Muiiaon and 
Moodkeopoor cantonments. These, situated three miles north from Lucknow, 
were at this time occupied by the 13th, 48th, and 71st native infantry, a regi¬ 
ment of regular native cavalry, and two batteries of native and one of European 
artillery. The only other military station in the vicinity of Lucknow was that 
of the 2d Oude irregular cavalry at Chukkur Kotee, on the left bank of the 
river, nearly opposite to Kuddum Rasool, and nearly as far fi’om the residency 
as the Muriaon cantonments. Sir Henry Lawrence, who obtained full military 
powers giving him the command of all the forces in Oude, at once saw the 
necessity of altering the above arrangement of the troops. Four guns were 
brought from the Muriaon cantonment to the lines of her majesty’s 32d, and 
120 men of this regiment were intrusted with the protection of the treasury 
and I’csidency, which had foimerly been entirely at the mercy of native guards. 
At the same time, while the women and the sick were lodged in the residency, 
the rest of the regiment was removed from its isolated position and moved 
down to the cantonment, and statioited close to the European battery. These 
measures, excellent so far as they went, were not deemed sufficient. A place of 
strength where the military stores might be concentrated, and an asylum might 
be found in case of attack, was still wanted. For this purpose choice was made 
of the Muchee Bhowun, situated on tlie right bank of the river, about half-way 
between the residency .and the Dowlut Khaiia. At the same time, though an 
attack on the residency was scarcely feared, some slight defensive wot'ks, chiefly 
as a precaution against any sudden insurrection of the populace, were begun. 
The treasury .also was Largely replenished, by sending out parties into the 
different districts, and bringing in the sums which had been previously collected. 

During the above preparations the progi'css of the mutiny in other quarters 
had added greatly to the difficulty of maintaining tranquillity in Oude, 
where there was reason to apprehend that any rising would, in all proba¬ 
bility, not only involve the whole province, but extend beyond its limits, 
particularly to the important town and district of Cawnpoor, only separated 
from it by the Ganges. Here General Sir Hugh Wheeler had only a mere 
handful of Europeans to oppose a large brigade of native troops, consisting 
of the 1st, 53d, and 5Gth native infantry, and the 2d light cavalry, and was 
obliged to rest satisfied with preparations which were palpably inadequate.* In 
the hope that if the sei>oy8 did rise they would march off for Delhi, he formed 
an entrenchment, which, however incapable of permanent defence, might 



REVOLT IN OUDE. 


587 


Chap. IL] 

furnish a temporary asylum. Reinforcements had been promised by the gov- a.d. isst. 
ernment and were daily expected, but the case was so urgent that Sir Henry 
Lawrence could not refuse his application for aid, and detached to him on the Positiou of 
21 st of May fifty men of the 32d, conveyed in post-carriages, and two squadrons 
of cavalry. In this emergency Sir Hugh received an o^er which was too 
tempting to be refused. It consisted of “two guns and three Imndred men, 
cavalry and infantry, furnished by the Maharajah of Bithoor,"’ the infamous 
miscreant now only too well known as Nana Sahib. He was the adopted son 
of Bajee Row, the last of the peisbwas, who, when reduced to extremity, had 
obtained by treaty a pension of £90,000 a year, aiid a residence at Bithoor, 
situated on the Ganges about twelve miles above Cawn])oor. At his death 
Nana Sahib succeeded to a large portion of his immense wealth, but his claini 
to a continuance of the pension was refused. Though he often complained of 
the refusal, and stigmatized it as a breach of public faith, it did not suit him to 
assume the airs of a malcontent, or subject himself to suspichju as an enemy to 
British interests. On the contrary he courted the society of our countrymen, 
and was regarded by them as a favourable specimen of the liberalized Hindoo. 

Sir Hugh Wheeler’s long residence in India and intimate ac(piaintance with 
native manners perhajjs only laid him more open to the influence of such a 
character, and hence, though specially warned to be on his guard against the 
Nana, ho not only accepted bis proffered aid, but .showed how unbounded his 
confidence was by employing his troops to guard the treasury. 

The Eed, a moveable Mahometan festival which fell on the 24th of May, uising ui 
was generally believed to have been fixed upon for the outbreak in Oude. 

The crisis, however, somehow postponed, did not arrive till the 80th. That day 
had passed away quietly, and the evening gun Lad been fired as usual at nine 
o'clock, when the light company of the 71 .st native infantry suddenly turned 
out and began firing at random. At the same instant two parties, the one 
belonging to the .same regiment, and the other to the 7th light cavalry, appeared 
at the opposite gates of the cantoiunent, and made directly for the mess-house, 
evidently with the diabolical design of placing the officers between two fires, 
and rendering their escape impo.s.sible. Fortunately the first shot had proved a 
sufficient warning. Sir Henry Lawrence, who was now residing in the canton¬ 
ment, hastily proceeded with his staff to that part of it where the Europeans, 
mustering 300 men, with six guns, were stationed. Two of these guns w'ere 
immediately posted on the road leading to Lucknow, so as to intercept the 
mutineers in the event of their attem})ting to reach it. Tlie other guns swept 
the native parade ground, where the three native infantry regiments stood iii 
the,following order—first, the 71st, next the 13th, and last the 48th. .The 
71st, after shooting Brigadier Handscomb, who had ventured too near •them, 
advanced boldly and fired. They were answered with grape, which sent them 
back to their lines, where they took the cowardly revenge of murdering one of 



588 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book IX. 


A.D. 1R57. 


Defeat of 
the Onde 
mutineers. 


Ilisinj? of the 
liUoknoAV 
moli. 


their European officers, who was found pierced with bayonets and musket-balls. 
The 48th, whose position on the parade ground was so distant from the guns as 
to be beyond the reach of grape, did not at first take an active part in the 
mutiny. They refused, however, to aid in suppressing it; and while pretending 
to accept the proposal of their commanding officer to march to the residency, 
desei-ted by the way in such numbers, that when he reached the iron bridge he 
could not master more than fiftj'^-seven men around the colours. In the conflict 
which had taken place, the mutineers, though they had obtained a considerable 
amount of plunder, and gratified their savage natures by burning down the 
bungalows, and laying the cantonments in ruins, had sustained a defeat; but it 
still remained for them to show whether they had so much confidence in their 



InoN Bniixis, Lucknuw.—F rom oagraviiig in IllustratfOU Loadoa Xows. 


superior numbers, as to risk an encounter with British discipline anti courage. 
At first it seemed that they liad made up their minds to this, for at daybreak 
of the 31st they were found in force occupying the lines at Moodkeepoor. 
Tlieir courage, however, w.as not proof again.st a few discharges from the guns, 
and they fled precipitately in the direction of Scetapoor. 

During the above proceedings great alarm was felt in the city. A company 
of the 71 st, who had been removed from the Muchee Bhowun for disaffection 
a few days before to another station, on being marched to the residency and 
ordered to pile their arms, refused to obey. From fear of precipitating an 
outbreak, it was deemed prudent not to coerce them. This indication of weak¬ 
ness was soon followed by its natural result. On the afternoon of the 31st tlu; 
hudmashes or mob of the city rose, and about GOOO of them, after crossing the 
Gooratce by a ford, moved towards Muriaon in order to join the mutineers, 
with‘whom they had a previotis understanding. When this scheme was fras- 
trated the budmashes returned to Lucknow, and commenced rioting in the 
quarter of Hoseynabad, near the Dowlut Khana. Fortunately the native 



CiiAr. II.] 


BEVOLT IN OUDE. 


589 


troops stationed there did not decline to act, and after an hour of heavy firing 
the insurrection was suppressed. Its occurrence, however, was a warning not 
to be neglected, and all the European women and children took refuge in the 
residency. 

The mutiny at Lucknow operated as the signal for a rising in every leading 
station throughout the province. In giving a brief account of each, we take 
them as they occurred in the four divisions into which, for administrative 
purposes, Oude, after its incorporation with British India, had been distributed. 
Beginning with Khyrabad, or the north-west division, our attention is first 
called to its principal station Seetapoor, towards which, as has been mentioned, 
the fugitive mutineers of Lucknow had proceeded. At Seetapoor, the principal 
station of the Khyrabad, or north-west division of Oude, tlie outbreak which 
had long been feared took place on the 3d of June. On the morning of that 
day, a cry having been raised that the 10th irregulars were plundering the 
treasury. Colonel Birch, of the l-lst, hastened with two companies to the rescue, 
and was shot dead. Two other officers immediately shared his fate, and the 
mutiny became general. Mr. Christian, the commissioner, anticipating tlui 
outbreak, had collected the civilians and their families at his house, and 
intrusted the defence of it to a strong guard of the military police. It was 
only to learn how utterly his confidence had been misplaced. His defenders, 
when called upon to act, only replied by firing upon him, and commenced an 
indiscriminate mas.sacre of men, women, and children. 

The European fugitives from Shahjehanpoor had an ived on the 1st of June 
at Mohumdee, another station of the Khyrabad division, then occupied by a 
company of the 9th Oude irregular infantry. By judicious management they 
were for a time restrained, but on the 4th, when fifty of their mutinous com¬ 
rades came in from Seetapoor, they .announced their determination to march to 
Seetapoor, at the same time promising that, if not opposed, they would not only 
spare the. lives of all the Europeans at the .station, hut take them under their' 
protection. With this promise, confirmed by a solemn oath, the Europeans 
were obliged to be contented, and the whole party, including eight women and 
four children, commenced the journey. The next morning, the 5th, the 
Europeans wei’e abandoned by their escort, and told to go ahe,ad wherever they 
liked. Fearing the worst they pushed on, but were overtaken within .a mile 
of Aurungabad. “ Then,” says Captain Patrick Orr, one of the only two indi¬ 
viduals who.se lives were ap,ared, “the most infernal carnage ever witnessed by 
man began.” A sepoy rushing forward seized a gun, and .shot down Lieutenant 
Sheils, an old officer on the veteran establishment. All the others collected 
undey a tree, and were there, men, women, and children, ruthlessly butchered. 

In Fyzabad, the south-ea,stem division, crimes equally hideous were jferpe- 
trated. The town, as the principal station, was occupied by a considerable, 
body of troops, all native—the 22d native infantry, the 6th Oude irregular 


A.D. jssr. 


f>ntbreak at 
Soeta)K)or. 


iVtrodons 

near A«- 
ruiiK^tbail 



590 


niSTOEY OF INDIA. 


[Book IX. 


A.D. 18S7. 


I'lYXieedings 
of the mu¬ 
tineers at 
Fyzabad. 


l^ltisaticro 
at liegum- 
gnngo. 


Perilous 
ooud]tt(»n of 
Lucknow. 


infantry, and a regular light field battery. Shabgunge, in its vicinity, belonged 
to a talookdar of the name of Bajah Mansingh, who, in consequence of informa¬ 
tion received from Calcutta, had been arrested by order of Sir Henry Lawrence, 
and was in confinement. This man, when a mutiny of the troops was hourly 
threatened, offered, if released, to shelter the Europeans in bis fort. Colonel 
Goldney, the commissioner, seeing no better alternative, accepted the offer, and 
Mansingh, set at liberty, began to prepare his fort. The mutinous troops, 
perhaps made aware of the agreement, resolved on immediate action, and began 
by demanding, on the plea of greater security, that the treasure should be 
placed under their charge. The authorities feeling themselves helpless were 
obliged to comply, and at the same time began to prepare for the worst, by 
sending their families to Shabgunge. The ladies in the cantonments, howevei’, 
declined to quit them, because they were satisfied with the assurance of full 
protection given by the native officers, and solemnly sworn to by those of the 
22d. Matters were in this precarious state on the 8th of June, when the 17th 
native infantry, who had mutinied at Azimghur, on the frontiers of Oudo, and 
carried off a large amount of treasure, arrived at Beguragunge, within a march 
of Fyzabad. On this the troops at the station threw off all disguise, and told 
their officers to shift for themselves, adding that they might take the boats 
then lying at the cantonment ghat. The civilians preferred joining their 
families at Shahgunge, but the officers embaiked in the boats and began to 
descend the stream. It was necessary to }>ass Begumgunge, and there, in 
accordance with the diabolical plan which had been concerted, the mutineers of 
the 17th were w^aiting to intercept them. Accordingly, when the officers 
approached, they were met by a volley of gra])e and musketry. Many imme¬ 
diately fell, and some who attempted to escape by swimming were either 
drowned or cut to pieces the moment they reached the bank. Colonel Goldney 
was seized in his boat and canied off to the rebel camp. “ I am an old man,” 
he said; “will you disgrace yourself by my murder?” The appeal was vain. 
The miscreants knew no pity, and shot him down. A few by almost super¬ 
human exertions distanced their pursuers and escaped. 

While mutiny tluis spread itself at all the principal stations of Oude, the 
condition of its capital became daily more alarming, and the idea of a siege, 
which before had been generally scouted, began to be entertained. In the 
prospect of such an event it became necessary to dispose of the large number 
of native tro<q)3 who, being notoriously disaffected, were more a source of 
weakness than of strength. After the suppression of the mutiny of the 30th 
and 31 st of May, out of the four native regiments the whole number of men 
that mustered amounted only to 437. In a few days, however, nearly thrice 
that* number had ranged under the native colours. The explanation was 
obvioua Many of them had come from detached posts, where their isolated 
position prevented them from taking actual part in the mutiny, though thej' 



Chap. 11.J ’ 


REVOLT IN OUDE. 


691 


had been unable to disguise their sjrmpathy with it, and several even of the a.d. isst. 
mutineers after their defeat had crept back to the lines, in the hope of being 
able either to conceal their absence or give some plausible account of it. Taking PoniouB 
these circumstances into consideration, it was strongly urged that the whole of LuckVow. 
the native troops, now amounting to 1200, or at least the most suspected portion 
of them, forming two-thirds of the whole,, should be disarmed. Sir Henry 
Lawrence, perhaps because he thought that the measure might precipitate a 
crisis, refused his consent; but about a week later, when fatigue and anxiety 
had brought on such an alarming illness that he was interdicted from business 
by his medical attendants, the provisional council appointed to act for him 
took a step which, without the name, had all the effect of disarmament. The 
troops were paraded, and told that they were to take their leave and go to 
their homes till November. They objected at first, with a great show of zeal 
for the service, but ultimately all went oft‘ except 3.50, of whom a large projjor- 
tion were Sikha Immediately after their departure the 3d regiment of military 
police, which furnished the jail guard, and took most of the civil duties at 
Lucknow, mutinied, and marched off on the road to Sultanpoor. 

By the 12th of June Sir Henry Lawrence had so far recovered as to be able POTtifloatiou 

*' ^ ami provi- 

to resume his functions. The most important object which now engaged his Biouing.if 
attention was the fortification of the residency, and the provisioning of it so as 
to stand a siege. At the same time he ordered several leading persons, suspected 
of treason, to be arrested, and confined as state prisoners. Among them were 
a brother of the ex-king, and two Dellu prince.s, who had for some time been 
resident at Lucknow. New levies of troops were also raised, particularly a 
body of volunteer cavalry, consisting partly of cavalry and infantry officers of 
disbanded regiments. A large addition was also made to the native police, no 
fewer than 2000 having been enlisted, not so much with a view to permanent 
emj)loyment,’or from much confidence in their trust-worthiness, as to relieve the 
other troops from’ routine duties, and leave them free for tho.se of more 
importance. 

Newabgunge Bara Bjinkee, eighteen miles north-east of Lucknow, had 

iuuwruiicti 

become the common rendezvous of the mutineers. On the 29th of June marcjioB 
intelligence was I'eceived that their advanced guard of 500 foot and 100 horse 
had arrived at Chinhut, only eight miles east of the capital, and were collecting 
supplies for their main body, which was expected on the following day. In 
consequence of this intelligence the troops in cantonments were brought down 
and lodged in the residency and the Muchee Bhowun. This was only prepara¬ 
tory to a stiff more important step. At sunrise of the following morning there 
had assembled at the iron bridge a force consi.sting of 520 infantry, 300 of 
them 'belonging to her majesty’s 32d, 116 cavalry, of whom tJiirty-six were 
European volunteers and the rest Sikhs, and details of artillery, with eleven 
guns, four of them European, and one an eight-inch howitzer. Sir Henry 



592 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book IX. 


A..D. 1857. 


Sir Henry 
l^awreiice 
m&rohee 

the 

mutineers 
at Chiiiliut. 


Disastrous 

result. 


Lawrence, heading this force in person, set out to attack the mutineera Some 
time was lost before the march commenced, and the heat became oppressive. 
The road, however, so far as the Kokrail, which is about half-way to Chinhut, 
was well metalled, and no difficulty was experienced. It was far otherwise 
beyond the Kokrail. After passing the bridge over it, instead of the metalled 
road, there was only a newly raised embankment of loose sandy soil, with 
occasional gaps, indicating the site of intended biidges. After a halt, during 
which apparently from some oversight no refreshment was served out, the 
force began to move sluggishly along this embankment, and the videttes had 
proceeded a mile and a half when they were fired upon from the village of 
Ismailgunge, on the left. The howitzer was ordered to the front, and was 
followed by the rest of the guna The column still plodding along the 
embankment, was exposed to a fire of round shot, which though distant did 
some execution. The enemy was now seen posted in front of Chinhut, and 
the British line deployed, the 32d taking post on the left, between Ismailgunge 
and the line of road, and the native infantry cro.ssing the road to the right, 
and drawing up in front of a small hamlet. After the distant firing had 
continued for about twenty minutes, the enemy appeared to be giving way, 
but they were only preparing to act more decidedly on the offensive, by 
advancing with their whole army, cavalry, infantry, and artillery, in two large 
separate masses, one on each of the British flank.s, evidently for the purpose of 
turning them. This attack was met by a fire of grape, which, however, had 
little effect in checking the advance, as parties of cavalry continued pushing 
forward, while the infantry made for Ismailgunge to cut off" the 32d, who were 
posted beyond it, and lying on the ground to avoid the fire. At this crisi.s, 
four guns belonging to Alexander’s Oude irregular battery were ordered from 
the right to the left in order to check the enemy’s progress. The difficulty of 
the ground, and some reluctance on the part of the drivers, deprived this 
movement of the advantage expected from it, and tlie cavalry were ordered to 
charge. The volunteers did their part admirably. Not so the Sikhs, who 
turned their horses’ heads and fled. Ismailgunge having in consequence fallen 
into the hands of the enemy, and a deadly fire been opened from it, it was abso¬ 
lutely necessary to dislodge them. The 32d advanced boldly for this purpose, 
but after losing several of their officers fell back in disorder. This repulse 
decided the battle, and a retreat was ordered. It could not but be disastrous. 
The enemy, taking advantage of every break in the ground, poured in a 
murderous fire. First the howitzer was abandoned, and then no fewer than 
six of the guns, with most of the ammunition waggons. The Europeans, who 
could least be spared, suflFered severely, 112 being killed and 44 wounded; 
the^ loss in natives was also great, though far- less by casualties tlfan by 
sha^neful desertion. It seems that when Sir Henry Lawrence resolved on 
this ill-fated attack he was not aware of the vast superiority of the force which 



Chap. II.] 


MUTINY AT CAWNPOOK 


503 


lie was about to encouritei*. It consisted, as was afterwards ascertained, of a.d. iss-. 
5550 infantry, 800 cavalry, and ICO artillery, with twelve nine-iiounder guns. 

The Chinhut disaster was, almost as a matter of course, followed by the uiookaiio of 
defection of many native soldiers, who had till then remained at least nominally ,ionc.y at 
faithful. The I'th and 7th, and four companies of the 1st in-egular infantry, 
quartered at the Dowlut Khana, under Brigadier Gray, immediately mutinied, 
and were sooti imitated by the police occupying the Imambara, a large building, 
situated on the road between the Dowlut Khana and the Muchee Bhowun. 
Meanwhile, the exulting mutineers continued their pursuit unchecked till they 
reached the Goomtee, and attempted to force the brick bridge above the Muchee 
Bhowun, and the iron bn'dge above the residency. When repulsed, they gained 



an entrance into t^ie city, and by fording the river established themselves within 
it in such numbers, that before the day closed, both the Muchee Bhowun and 
the residency were completely invested. 

Three days before the disaster at Chinhut, a horrible massacre had been Mutiny at 
perpetrated at Cawnj)oor. There the mutiny, which for some days had been 
hourly dreaded, broke out at last on the 5th of June. It began with the 
2d light cavalry, and soon extended to the three infantry regiments, the 1st, 

53d, and 5Gth. The whole, after setting fire to some bungalows, and commit¬ 
ting other outrages, set off in the direction of Newabgunge, a Aullage situated 
a little to the north-we.st. Three days before the rising, all the non-military 
Christian residents had removed into the enti’enchment. This had been 
furnished with provisions, calculated to maintain 1000 persons for thirty, days. 
Unfortunately, the entrenchment itself was totally unfitted to stand a siege of 
such a duration. It was completely commanded from different quarters, and 
Vot. HI. ■ 5J71 



594 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book IX. 


A.D. 18&7. 


Sir Hugh 

ontreiicb- 
iTioiit at 
Cawnjioor. 


Attack on ii 
liy Nana 
Sahib. 


if assailed with any degree of vigour, must at once have been forced, as the 
bank inclosing it was barely breast-high. The selection of such a place was 
certainly a fatal error, and it is difficult to explain how an officer of so much 
experience and ability as Sir Hugh Wheeler could have fallen into it. . He had a 
choice of other places. His entrenchment was at the south-east extremity of the 
cantonment, below the town of Cawnpoor, whereas, nearly at an equal distance 
above it, at the north-west extremity, stood the magazine, amply supplied with 
guns and military stores, and near it the treasury, which happened at the time 
to be well re])lenished. Nor were these the only advantages po,ssessed by this 
locality. Ravines on the one side, and the proximity of the river on the other, 
gave the magazine strong natural defences ; while a high inclosing wall of 
masonry, together with numerous substantial buildings, supplied at once the 
means of resi.stance, and, what was equally wanted, adequate shelter. The 
only plausible account of the preference given to the entrenchment is, that Sir 
Hugh, after having so long served with sepoys, and found, them faithful, still 
clung to the belief that either they would not mutiny at all, or would at the 
worst, after temporary outrage, quit the station and hasten off to Delhi. The 
latter was the course on which they had resolved, and they Avould have carried it 
into effect, had they not been diverted from it by Nana Sahib, whose treacherj'’ 
wjis now about to be consummated. Ilis troops had liecn intrusted with the 
cliarge of the treasury. I'lio result was, that when the mutiny broke out, they 
immediately plundered it. The po.ssession of the magazine was their next 
object. Sir Hugh, when he saw that he could not i)re.servc it, had given orders 
to blow it up, but the native guard interfered, .and it fell witli all its guns and 
stores into the hands of the rebels. Nana Sahib had now full scope for his 
execrable designs. When the revolted regiments were about to depart, he 
tempted them to rem.ain by taking them into his service, with the promise of 
a large incre.ase of pay, .and led them back to Cawnpoor under the Mahratta 
standard, which he had raised after proclaiming himself peishwa. 

Sir Hugh AVlieeler, as soon as he saw tlnat the entrenchment which he had 
intended only as a temporary .asylum, w.as to become the scene of a protracted 
and desperate struggle, looked about for aid, and turned once more to Lucknow. 
His application, dated the 14th June, was in the following terms:—“We have 
been besieged since the 6th by the Nana Sahib, joined by the whole of the 
native troops who broke out on the mojning of the 4th. The enemy have two 
twenty-four pounders and several other guns. We have only eight nine- 
])ounders. The whole Christian population is with us in a temporary entrench¬ 
ment, and our defence has been noble and wonderful, our loss heavy and cruel. 
We want aid, aid, aid. P.S.—If we had 200 men we could punish the scoundrels 
and aid you.” Painful though it mu.st have been to refuse such an application, 
Sir Henry Lawrence found it impossible to comply with it. On the 18th of June, 
two days after receiving Sir Henry’s answer. Captain Moore of the 32d, Vho 



Chap. II.] 


MUTINY AT CAWNPOOE. 


595 


was then at Cawnpoor, wrote thus:—“ Sir Hugh regrets you cannot send him a.d. is.ot. 
the 200 men, as he believes with their assistance we could drive the insurgents 
from Cawnpoor and capture their guns. Our troops, officers, and volunteei-s siege of 
have acted most nobly, and on several occasions a handful of men have driven hyNw 
hundreds before them. Our loss has been chiefly from the sun and their hea\y 
guns. Our rations will last a fortnight, and we are still well supplied with 
ammunition. Our guns are serviceable. Report says that troops are advancing 
from Allahabad, and any assistance might save our gan-ison. We of course are 
prepared to hold out to the last.” In other two letters received at Lucknow, 
the language was more desponding. One dated the 21st June, says:—“We 
have been cannonaded for six hours a day by twelve guns. This evening, in 
three hours, upwards of thirty shells (mortals) were thrown into the entrench¬ 
ment. This has occurred daily for the last eight days; an idea may be formed 
of our casualtie.s, and how little protection the barracks aflbrd to the women. 

Any aid to be effective must be immediate. In event of rain falling our 
position would be untenable.” The other letter, dated the 24th June, after 
mentioning that the attack had commenced on the Gth, and been continued for 
eighteen days and nights, proceeds thus; “ The condition of misery experienced 
by all is utterly beyond descri[>tion in this place. Heath and mutilation in all 
their forms of horror have been daily before us. The numerical amount of 
casualties has been frightful, cau,sed both by sickness and the implements of 
war.” In these letters the perilous condition of the garrison was not under¬ 
stated. The whole number of individuals crowded within the entrenchment 
was about 900. Of these, not more than 200 could be counted on as comba¬ 
tants, while more than a third of the whole (330) were women and children. 

In both of these classes, death was making feaiTul havoc, and the dead bodies norro™ of 

the 

could only ,bc disposed of by waiting till night, when the enemy’s fire usually 
slackened, and then throwing tliem into a well outside the entrenchment. On 
the 13th of June, the enemy’s live shells, which had previously obliged the 
officers to strike their tents, set fire to the barrack which was used as an 
hospital for the wounded, and also lodged the soldiers’ families. On seeing the 
conflagration, the rebels, endeavouring to profit by the confu.siou, so much 
increased their fire that scarcely any one could be spared from his post to give 
assistance, and the flames spread so rapidly, that about forty' of the sick and 
wounded, who could not help themselves, were literally burned to ashes. The 
barrack being thus consumed, and most of the other buildings completely 
riddled with balls, most of the women and children sought shelter duiing the 
day in holes which had been dug in the ground, and were obliged to pa.s8 the 
night in the open air, beneath the bank of the entrenchment. It was impossible 
that this state of mattera could last, and as every day, while it thiunetl the 
ranks of the garrison, was adding thousands to the number of their assailants, 
there could.be no doubt that a dreadful issue was at hand. The first thought 



596 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book IX. 


was to assume the offensive, and by a desperate effort either seize and si>ike 
the enemy’s guns, or perish in the attempt. Now that the event is known, it 
must be admitted that the boldest would have been the wisest courfse. We 
cannot wonder, however, that Sir Hugh Wheeler hesitated to incur the 
responsibility of sanctioning a stej) which nothing but absolute despair could 
justify, and chose rather to listen to the terms volunteered by Nana Sahib. 
On the 24th of June, Mrs. Greenaway, a very aged European lady, who, with 
]jer family, had been captured by the Nana, and only spared on the promise of 
]>aying a lac of rupees for their ransom, arrived at tlie entrenchment, bearing a 
note from him, the jmrport of which was, that all soldiers, and Europeans who 
had nothing to do with Lord Dalhousie’s government, and would lay down 
their anns, should be sent to Allahaba<l. Sir Hugh Wheeler authorized 
Captain Moore to act in the matter as he should consider best, and on the 
following day an agreement was entered into, by wlfich Sir Hugh, on the part 
ciii)itaiutk.n. of tlic British government, agreed to give up all the money, stores, and guns 
in tlie entrenchment, and the Nana on Ins part tindertook, and solemnly swore, 
not only to allow all the inmates of the garrison to retire unmolested, but to 
|)rovide means of conveyance for the wounded, and for the ladies and children. 
Hostilities immediately ceased, and the preparations for departure were com¬ 
menced. 'fhese having been completed, on the 2(ith, the whole gamson, men, 
women, and children, quitted the entrenchment, and proceeded towards the 
boats. These they were permitted to enter without the least molestation, but 
no sooner had they embarked, than a horrid massacre began. Two guns, which 
had been concealed, were suddenly run out, and opened their fire. At the same 
Troaciioryof time the scpoys, rushing in from all directions, began to ply their mu.skets. In 
the confusion, the men, instead of attempting to unmoor the boats, jumped into 
the water to swim for their lives. Three boats out of the whole number 
succeeded in reaching the opposite side; but it was only to encounter a new 
attack. In attempting to continue their flight, they were so closely pursued, 
that before they got a mile down the stream, two of them were swanqyed, and 
about a half of the whole party killed or wounded. The remaining boat, now 
crowded with wounded, and overloaded, was exposed during the whole day to 
a running fire of guns and mu.skctry. Night brought some respite, but next 
moraing the fugitives had again to run the gauntlet of a murderous fire from 
both banks. On the third day the boat stuck fast on a sandbank, and became 
a sure mark for the rebels, who by j)ouring in volley after volley, made it 
impossible to employ any eflPectual means of getting her off. In this extremity 
fourteen of the party undei-took the desperate task of rushing to the bank and 
charging their savage assailants. The heroic deed was so far successful that 
they ‘put the enemy to flight. Unfortunately, however, in pursuing their 
advantage, they lost their communication with the river, and only escaj)ed 
from being surrounded by retiring in a direction parallel to the stre,am. After 


A.D. 1857. 

Siogo of 



Chap. II.] 


MASSACRE AT CAWNPOOR. 


597 


proceeding in this way about a mile, they again reached the bank, but it was 
only to find their perils increased. Both banks were lined with troops, and 
escape seemed impossible. As a last resource they took refuge in a temple 
immediately in front of them. Here they defended themselves so manfully, 
that their cowardly foes, afraid to meet them in open fight, piled up wood 
ai'ound the temple and set it on tire. The smoke and hekt soon became 
intolerable, and the small band, now reduced to twelve, one having been killed 
and one wounded, threw off their clothes, and charging through the fire, made 
for the water. Only seven succeeded in reaching it. Two of them were almost 
immediately shot, and the remaining five endeavoured to save themselves by 
swimming. Though followed by the rebels, who waded into the water and 
took aim at them at oveiy available point, none of them was struck, and they 
had gone nearly three miles, when one of the party, an artilleryman, feeling 
exhausted, began to .swim on his back. He thus lost the power of directing 
his course, and unconsciously floated to the bank, wheie he wsis seized and 
murdered. The four .sur^'ivors ultimately escaped. The party left in the boat 
fell into the hands of a rebel zemindar near Futtehpoor, who sent them back 
to Nana Sahib as prisoners. Their companions left behind at Cawnpoor when 
the carnage began had already been disposed of Those shot down in the 
boats were the mo.st fortunate. Of the remainder every man was shot, while 
the women and children were cariied off to Nana Sahib’s camp. In the 
evening he celebrated what he called his victory by a series of .salute.s, one of 
twenty-one guns to himself as peishwa, i»r Mahratta sovereign, another of 
nineteen to his brother, Bala Sahib, now designated governor-general, and a 
third to Jowalla Perslnuul, a Brahmin, and rebel soxibahdar, whom he had 


Tread lery of 
the rel»ol8. 


Atmeitios of 
Nnna SSatiili. 


appointed commander-in-chief. He concluded these ceremonies with a siieech, 
in wliich he.laucled his troops for their glorious achievement at Cawnpoor, and 
pi'omised to reward it by a liberal largess. On the arrival of the fugitives from 
Futtehpoor, on the 1st of July, all the men, like those at Cawnpoor, were 
immediately put to death. The women and children were carried off to join 
the others, already imprisoned in a building called the Subada Ke Kothee, 
where they were destined to endure another fortnight of misery, and then 
become the victims of one of the most inhuman massacres ever perpetrated. 

Having taken a general survey of the progress of the sepoy revolt, and Oov«mmont 
pointed out the leading localities in which the successive mutinies occuiTed, our 
next task must be to explain the measures employed by government to meet 
tlie cri.sis. For a time, as has been seen, the danger was greatly underrated, 
and in the belief that the disaffection was limited to a few regiments, and 
would either disappear of its own accord or be suppressed without difficulty, 
the interval which elapsed after the first notes of warning was not turned to 
due account. The European regiment which had been brought firom Rangoon 
was on the point of returning, when the disastrous tidings from Meerut and 



598 


HISTOEY or INDIA. 


[Book IX. 


A.D. 1857. 


Measurea 
adopted by 
govorniueiit 


Proclaiiuv- 
tion by the 
governor- 
general. 


Delhi arrived. The authorities, now made aware that the passing cloud of 
which they were dreaming had been the gathering of a fearful storm, would 
fain have acted with vigour, but found themselves for a time almost destitute 
.of the mean.s. Large reinforcements of European troops were absolutely 
required, but though no time was lost in ui’ging their immediate despatch from 
all the difterent quarters which seemed capable of furnishing them, several 
weeks must elapse before they eould anive, and the utmost that could be done 
in the interval was to concentrate the few European troops within the districts to 
which the mutiny was as yet confined, and endeavour meanwhile, not so much 
by force as by moral suasion, to prevent it from a.ssuming more formidable 
dimensions. The orders issued on the subject of the greased cartridges, and 
tlie harangues made to different regiments when paraded for the purpose, 
have been already noticed. A wider publication of the views and intentions 
of government was now deemed expedient, and on the 16th of May the following 
proclamation was issued:— 

“ The Governor-general of India in council, has warned the ai-my of Bengal 
that the tales by which the men of certain regiments have been led to suspect 
that offence to their religion or injury to their caste is meditated by the gov¬ 
ernment of India, are malicious falsehoods. The governor-general in council 
has learned that this suspicion continues to be proi)agated by designing and 
evil-minded men, not only in the army, but among other classes of the people. 
He knows that endeavours are made to persuade Hindoos and Mussulmans, 
soldiers and civil subjects, that their religion is threatened secretly as well as 
openly by the acts of the government, and that the government is seeking in 
various ways to entrap them into a loss of caste for purposes of its own. Some 
have been already deceived and led astray by these tales. Once more then the 
goveraor-general in council warns all classes agairrst the deceptions that are 
practised on them. The government of India has invai'iably treated the reli¬ 
gious feelings of all its subjects with careful respect. The governor-general in 
council has declared that it will never cease to do so. He now repeats that 
declai’ation, and he emphatically proclaims that the government of India enter¬ 
tains no desire to interfere with their religion or caste, and that nothing has 
been, or will be done by the government to affect the free exercise of the 
observances of religion or caste by eveiy class of the people. The government 
of India has never deceived its subjects, therefore the governor-general in 
council now calls upon them to refuse their belief to seditioiis lies. This notice 
is addressed to those who hitherto by habitual loyalty and orderly conduct have 
shown their attachment to the government, and a well-founded faith in its 
protection and justice. The governor-general in council enjoins all such persons 
to pause before they listen to false guides and traitors who would lead* them 
into danger and disgraca” 

The above proclamation intimates that an unfounded alarm on the subject 



Chap. II.] 


LORD CANNING’S PROCLAMATION. 


599 


of religion was the sole cause of the disaffection which prevailed, and of the a r». 1857 . 
mutinies which had actually occurred, and yet at its date government knew of 
the atrocities which whole regiments of sepoys had perpetrated at Meerut and 
Delhi. It was surely too much to ignore these facts, instead of boldly de¬ 
nouncing them, and publishing to all the world that, come what might, they 
should certainly not go unpunished. Silence on such a .subject was as unmanly 
as impolitic, and must have been generally interpreted as a virtual confession 
that punishment was not threatened, simply because government was either 
afraid or felt itself poweile.ss to inflict it. This obvious inference received a rrooiHina- 
strong confirmation from Mr. Colvin, lieutenant-governor of the North-western e-ivii, 
Proviirces, who, at the very time when he was in communication with the 
governor-general on the subject, thought it unnecessary to wait for final instruc¬ 
tions, and on his own responsibility issued a proclamation, which, by oflering a 
general jiardon to all except the murderers of private persons, seemed to 
promise immunity to those who had murdered their officers. Tlic governor- 
general, however averse to severity, could not sanction such a pardon, find Mr. 

Colvin s proclamation was superseded by another which corrected his mistake. 
Fortunately the want of foresight which had been evinced in allowing India to 
be so much denuded of European troops was remedied to some extent by two 
most opportune contingencies. The Peisian war having been brought to a 
successful termination sooner than the most sanguine had anticijiated, the 
European regiments engaged in it were hastening back with the utmost expe¬ 
dition, while those which were prosecuting their voyage for the war in China 
liad not proceeded so fir as to be beyond reach, and in consequence of a message 
to that effect changed their dcstimition to Calcutta. The result of these 
arrangements, and of applicfitions to Rangoon, Madras, and Ceylon, was, that 
important reinforcements arrived before the end of May. At home also, 
where the astounding intelligence from India had produced an almost unpar- 
filleled amount of excitement and indignation, the general voice had proclaimed 
that, be the cost what it might, the revolt must be suppressed, and embarkations 
of troops on a scale adequate to the crisis accordingly commenced. 

While large reinforcements from other quarters were thus secured, imme- rroiwiativ>n« 

^ ^ ntcovor^ 

(bate steps were taken to collect all the available troops within reach of Delhi, <>f neiiii. 
and hurry them forward in order to attempt its recapture. As part of the force 
to be thus emjiloyed, three European regiments, her majesty’s 75th foot, and 
tlie 1st and 2d Euiopean fusiliers, who had been stationed among the hills, 
near Simla, where the Honourable George Anson, the commander-in-chief, was 
then residing, started under his immediate directions, and airived on the 23d. 
of May at XJmballa. Here at that date the troops assembled included, in 
addition to the above regiments, the 9th and a squadron of the»4th lancers, the 
COth native infantry, and two troops of horse-artillery. He had formed them 
into two small brigades, the one under Brigadier Halifax and the other under 



ooo 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book IX. 


A 1 ). 1857. Brigiwlier Jones, and was preparing to leave for Kurnaul, where he expected 
" ■would arrive on the 30th, when he was seized with cholera, and 

I’rciKinitioim died ou tliB 27th. General Reid immediately succeeded as provincial com- 
uf mander-in-chief, hut was in such wretched health as to be incapable of con¬ 

ducting the intended operations against Delhi, which were therefore intrusted 
to Sir Henry B.arnard. To co-operate with the force thus advancing, a detach¬ 
ment from Meerut, consisting of a wing of her majesty’s COth rifles, two squad¬ 
rons of Gtli dragoon guards (carabineers), 50 troopers of the 4th irregulars, two 
(companies of native sappers, and six guns, four of them belonging to Scott’s 
liattery, and two (eighteen-pounders) belonging to Tombs’ troop of horse- 
artillery, started on the 27th of May, under the command of Brigadier Wilson, 
and encamped on the 30th near Ghazee-u-din, a small but well-fortified jilace 
on the Hindon, about ten miles from Delhi. A rumour that the mutineers, 
emboldened by their recent succe.sses, meant to dispute the jiassage was gener¬ 
ally regarded as unfounded, and hence a kind of surjirise took place when, 
about four in the afternoon, a picket of iiTegulars who had been stationed 
beyond the bridge galloped into the camp to announce that the enemy was at 
band. The rifles, who had scarcely foimcd when an eightcen-poimdcr shot 
bounded into the camp, hastened forwaj’d supported by the carabineers, an<l with 
tlieir Enfields o})ened a deadly fire, which soon slackened that of the enemy’s 
guns. Meanwhile the artillery having taken up efl'ective i^ositions, two com- 
l)auies of rifles which had been the fii’st to cross the bridge made a gallant 
chaigc when not more than eighty yards from the enemy’s guns. The move¬ 
ment was decisive, and the rebels, outnumbering tlieir assailants at least seven¬ 
fold, were soon .seen in disgraceful flight. Five guns, two of heavy calibre, wei c 
the trophies of the victory. The struggle, however, was not yet terminated. 
Trusting to the strength of the village in which they had entrenched them¬ 
selves, the mutineers mustered courage for a second encounter, and the next 
morning, Sunday the 31st, once more made their appearance and commenced a 
shai’p caimonfwle. The experience of the previous day had taught them a lesson 
by which they did not fiiil to jirofit, and they kept their guns at such a distance 
• that no new captures could be made. This cowardly precaution, and tlie intense 
heat, which .made pursuit all but impossible, favoured their escape, and enabled 
tiiem to bear the tidings of their own defeat to their comrades at Delhi. 

JOuooniiter of The Meerut brigade did not again start till the 4th of Juno, and proceeded 
•ibrigaiiewith lu tho uivectioii oi JSagput, wheve it arrivea on the 6th; on the 7th it reached 
th«rei*is. joined ihe two brigades from’ the north. The united force on 

quitting Alipoor on the Bth had the prospect of an immediate engagement, and 
therefore set out in three columns formed in order of battle. The enemy had 
stropgly entrenched themselves at Badulee Ke Serai, so as to intercept the 
approach of the British troops to the cantonments, situated to the north-west 
pf Delhi. ’ It was here therefore that the encounter was about to take place. 



Chap. II.] 


BRITISH FORCE ARRIVES AT DELHI. 


001 


Sir Henry’s despatch gives the following account of it: “As soon as oiur 
advanced picket met the enemy, these brigades deployed leaving the main road 
clear. The enemy soon opened a very heavy fire upon us, and finding that our 
light field pieces did not silence their battery, and that we were losing men 
fast, I called upon idle 75th regiment to make a dashing charge, and take the 
place at the point of the bayonet; this service was done with the most heroic 
gallantry, and to Lieutenant-colonel Herbert, and every officer, non-commis¬ 
sioned officer, and men of the 75th regiment, my thanks are most especially due; 

, the 1st Europeans supported the attack, and on the second brigade coming up 
and threiitening their right, and Brigadier-general Grant showing the head of 
his column and guns on their left rear, the enemy abandoned the jiosition 
entirely, leaving his guns on the ground. ” 

After all this success, the work of the day was not yet finished Badulee 
K.e Serai is about five miles distant from Delhi, and Sir Henry Barnard was 
afraid that if he halted before reaching the position which he wished to occupy 
at the cantonments, the enemy might take advantage of the delay, and inter¬ 
pose more formidable obstacles than those he had jast overcome. Ho re.solved 
therefore, though awai-e that his men were much exhausted, to push on, and at 
once reap the full fi uits of his victory. Accordingly, having divided his force 
into two columns, the one intrusted to Brigadier Wilson supjiorted by Briga¬ 
dier Shower’s brigade, while he liimself supported by Brigadier Grave’s brigade, 
led the other, he sent the former along the main trunk road, wheic it had to 
fight the whole way through gardens with higli walLs and other obstacles, whih; 
the latter diverging to the left proceeded stiaight through the cantonments. 
Both columns successfully accomplished the tasks assigned to them, though 
not till their skill and prowess had again been put fully to the test. The rebels 
were .strongly plisted on the ridge which oveilooks the cantonments from the 
east, and stretclies southwards till within a short distance of the north-west 
extremity of the city. The second column, as soon as it came within range of 
the guns in position on this ridge, was exposed to .so destructive a fire that the 
design of forcing it by a direct attack in front was abandoned for a movement 
which would take it in flank. This movement, combined with that of the first 
column, which was now thi'eatening the other flank, happily siicceeded. The 
rebels abandoned their guns and retreated into the city, while the columns 
advancing from opposite directions swfept the ridge, and finally' met upon it at 
Hindoo Row’s house, which thenceforward became the key of the British position. 

On the 9th of June, the very day after the ridge was carried, the British 
force received a most valuable addition by the arrival of the guides, forming the 
first instalment of reinforcements from the Punjab. On the 12th of May, when 
they received orders to march, they %ere at Hoteo Murdan ih the vicinity of 
Peshawer. By the following morning they had made a march of thirty iuiles 
and arrived at Attock. Here they were still 580 miles from Delhi, and at the 
VoL. III. 272 


A n. 18 ST. 


Victory of 
Badulee K« 
Idcrai. 


British force 
arrives on 
the heights 
hImivc Delhi. 


Arrival of 
'the guidee 
from the 
Punjab. 



602 


HISTOEY OF INDIA. 


[Book IX 


'A D. 18S7. 


Vurioiis 
at>t<miptAi of 
tho robolK 
to turn the 
jtritisli 
position. 



1. Orriorn or the Guide Coiii’a.-^Proin IlluHtmtod London Kowh. 

S, IIavimiar 4KP Soi.Puut or TH> Sin^iooH GmonKAA*—From Ihu^trattHl Timeit 


ordinary rate of naarcLing must have been two months in reaching it, hut 
forward had always been their watchword, and by one of the most rapid 
marches on record, they accomplished the whole distance in twenty-four days. 

Deducting three of these, 
duiing which they halted 
by special order, they had 
pushed on continuously for 
three weeks, at the daily 
average rate of twenty-eight ■ 
miles. It is needless to say 
that the acclamations of the 
British camp were long and 
loud when Captain H. Daly 
marched into it, at the head 
of his three troops of cav¬ 
alry, and six companies of 
infantry. After their long 
march thej'^ were certaiidy 
entitled to repose, but it was 
not asked, and could not 
have been gi’anted, as a can¬ 
nonade which had continued aU morning was followed in the afternoon 
by a desperate attack on the British right flank. The guides, called out 
to aid in repelling it, displayed a gallantry amounting to rashness, and fol¬ 
lowed the fleeing rebels uj) to the walls of Delhi. Having thus exposed them¬ 
selves to a muz’derous fire they suffered severel 3 \ Captains Daly and Hawes 
were wounded, and Quiutin Battye, a young officer of remaikable promise, who 
commanded the cavalry, received his death-blow, ^nd only survived till the 
following day. This attack of the rebels was only the fimt of a scries in which 
the enemy persisted for several successive days. On the 9th, 10th, and 11th, 
their endeavour was to turn our right flank by gaining possession of Hindoo 
Row’s house, where our heaviest guns had been placed in batteiy. Foiled in 
this they turned to the left flank, and on the 12th assailed it with the utmost 
fury. At this time the Bi-itish left extended no farther north along the ridge 
than the Flagstaff tower, immediately beyond which was a deep cut, through 
which a steei^ road, leading from the city to the cantonments, had been carried. 
A battery erected at the tower commanded this road, and made it impossible 
for the rebels to a})proach by it; but to the north of the tower the ridge sloped 
rapidly down toward the sandy bank of the Jumna, while another compara¬ 
tively level road led circuitously round tl!e extremity of the ridge towards the 
cantonments. In order to avail themselves of the facilities of attack in this 
direction^ the I'ebels, after plundering the house of Sir Theophilus Metcalfe, situ- 




60 S 


CJhap. II.] OPERATIONS BEFORE DELHI. 

ated close to the river, about a mile and a half north of the city, and laying it A.n. mr. 
in ruins, had placed a battery in the grounds, and made their position so strong, 
that a military council, held in the British camp on the 11th, had decided Attampuof 
against any present attempt to dislodge them. The danger of allowing them to ttiru tliti 
to occupy it was fully manifested on the 12th. Early in the morning of that 
day, they had managed to bring a formidable array of guns, and a strong body 
of troops, within 400 yards of the Flagstaff, while another body was stealing 
round by the extremity of the ridge to gain the cantonments, and thus place 
themselves in the British rear. This alarming attack was only discovered when 
the day broke, and created so much confusion, that the Flagstaff battery was 
for a short time in imminent danger, and a lodgment was nearly effected in 
the cantonment itself It was not long, however, before sufficient means of 
resistance were mustered, and the rebels, repulsed at every point, endeavoured 
to regain their original position. Even in this they failed, for in the pursuit 
which followed, they were completely driven from the Metcalfe grounds, which 
thereafter remained in British possession. 

It was hoped that the 12th of June, which had opened thus axispiciously, 
would not close before a still more brilliant success had been achieved. The 



Hindoo Row’tj HonaE, before Delhi. --From Tllustratetl London Nows. 


impossibility of wresting Dellii from the rebels by the weak force which had 
boldly taken up a position before it, had already become aj)parent. The 
magazine blown up by Lieutenant Willoughby was only that which contained, 
the small arms, and the rebels consequently possessed an almost inexhaustible 
supj^dy of guns and military stoi’es. Tlie short trial which had been made 
sufficed to show that with an artillery far inferior both in number and Calibre 
to that of the enemy, and troops barely sufficient to maintain the position, and 
consequently incapable of furnishing working parties, the regular siege of Delhi 


604 


HISTOEY OF INDIA. 


[Book IX. 


A.n. 1857. 


Propoeal to 
take DoUii 
by surprise. 


)t is almn 
duiiod. 


■DoHmptioii 
of Delhi. 


was impossible; and lienee, as the importance of recovering it, in order to crush 
the mutiny before it had assumed still larger dimensions, had been strongly 
urged by government, it became a question whether it might not be practicable 
to carry it at once by a sudden assault. This question, without undergoing a 
thorough discussion, had been an.swered in the afiBrmative, and it had been 
re.solved tliat at the dead of night, while the cavalry remained in charge of the 
camp, the whole of the infantry should move out, and after blowing in two of 
tlie gates by powder bags, rush in and seize possession of that part of the city 
where the palace stood. The execution of this plan had been actually com¬ 
menced, when it was suddenly countermanded. Sir Henry Bamiu’d had 
changed his mind, because it had been forcibly represented to liim that he was 
endangering the safety of the camp by denuding it of European infantry, and 
M’ould be unable to hold the city, even if he should succeed in surprising it. 
On this subject opinions arc still conflicting, and we thei’cfore content ourselves 
witli simply remarking how unfortunate it was that the objections which 
ultimately prevailed had not been previously con.sidered. The trooiJ.s, it is 
true, retired without sustaining hann, but the alai’m which had been given 
put the enemy upon their guard, and thus precluded any similar attempt at 
.surprise, when it might have been made under more hopeful circumstances. 
Nothing therefore now remained but to strengthen the position on the ridge, 
and wait the arrival of a siege train with adequate reinforcements, in the. 
meantime submitting to exchange conditions with the rebels, and become the 
be.sieged instead of the besiegers. This was indeed a great disappointment to 
the government, who had not only calculated on the early recapture of Delhi, 
liut in the eagerness of their wi.shes allowed themselves to be imposed upon by 
unfounded rumours, which announced that it had actually fallen. As a regular 
siege was now inevitable, and would neces.sarily require months*‘of preparation, 
this seems tlie proper place to give a more detailed account of Delhi and its 
vicinity, in order that the subsequent operations before it may be more easily 
understood. 

Delhi, which in 1658 superseded Agra as the capital of the Mogul empire, 
stands on the right bank of a branch of the Jumna, W’hich leaves the main 
stream about five miles above the city, and joins it ten miles below. Its site, 
about 800 feet above the level of the sea, is a comparatively ban-en tract, much 
broken by rocks, and made still more rugged in appejirance by heaps of ruins, 
which, by the large space they cover, indicate the magnitude and importance 
which the city must have attained in very early times. The modern city, 
founded by the emperor Shah Jehan in 1631, is above seven miles in circuit, 
and contains, exclusive of the suburbs, a population of about 140,000, in which 
the number of M.ahometans far exceeds the usual proportion found in the cities 
of India, being only a few thousands less than that of Hindoos. The wall on the 
east, facing the river, is nearly straight, but on the other three sides forms a 



Chap. II-l 


DESCBIPTION OF DELHI. 


G05 


very irregular curve. As originally built, it had only a few weak towers, but a.d. isst. 
since its possession by the British, its defences have been greatly strengthened 
by the excavation of a ditch, and the erection of large bastions, each mounting neiwripMon 
nine guns of large calibre. Of these bastions it is necessary to give the names 
only of those on the north and north-west sides, because, from fronting tlie British 
camp, mention will often be made of them as the siege proceeds. Beginning 
at the north-east extremity, and proceeding westward, they succeed each other 
in the following order—the Moira or Water, the Cashmere, the Shah or Moree, 
and the Burun bastion.s. The main g.ates are the Calcutta on the east, approached 
by the bridge of boats acro,ss the Jumna, the Cashmere on the north-east, the 
Moree and Cabool on the north-west, the Lahore on the west, the Ajmere on 
the south-west, and the Delhi on the south. The houses arc in general 
substantially built, but almost all the streets are narrow; the only two which 



Moree Gate. Delhi.—F rom a jihotograph. 


can be described as spacious and handsome arc the principal one, called tlu; 
Cliandei Chauk^ running eastward from the palace to the Lahore gate, and 
another, leading also from the palace southward to the Delhi gate. The edifice tih- pniai*. 
surpassing all others, both in extent and structure, is the palace, situated on 
the east side, inclosed by a lofty turreted wall of red granite, a mile in circuit, 
and communicating at its north-east extremity with the old fort of Selimghur. 

The access to it is by two lofty and richly sculptured gateways, the one in its 
south, and the other in its west side. The principal one, called the Lahore 
gate, because leading to the city gate of the same name, conbiins the rooms in 
which the first murders, on the arrival of the mutineers from Meerut, were 
perpetrated, and is succeeded first by a noble arch, supporting^ the great tower, 
and then by a vaulted aisle, not unlike that of a Gothic cathedral. Heyond 
this aisle is the Dewani Khas, or council chamber, a splendid pavilion of white 
marble, and near it the open court, where, with the sanction, if not by the 






GOO 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book IX. 


A.D. 1857. 


pMoriptiou 
of Delhi. 


Strong 
dofoiisive 
lM>sition of 
tUo UritisU. 


express order of the king, a large number of unoffending women and children 
were cut to pieces by soldiers in his pay, while his sons and grandsons looked 
on and enjoyed the horrid spectacle. The only other edifice which need here 
be particularized, is the Jumma Masjid, or principal mosque, situated to the 
west of the palace, in a street leading from it to the Ajmere gate, and forming 
from its elevated Site, and the marble domes and minarets which surmount k, 
the most conspicuous object which is seen when the city is approached. In 
addition to the city proper within the walls, Delhi has extensive suburbs, two 
of wliich, from the cover and means of annoyance which they gave to the rebels, 
became the scenes of frequent and sanguinary contesta The one, called Kissen- 
gunge, situated to the west of the Cabool gate, was skiited on the north, where 
it fronted the British position, by the Delhi canal; the other, called the Subzee 
Mundee, was situated considerably farther to the north-west, on the trunk 
road leading to Kurnaul, and in some degree enveloped the British position, 
as it extended beyond the southern extremity of the ridge, and to the rear of 
Hindoo Row’s house. 

The British position was certainly the most favourable which could have 
been selected for defensive purposes. The main body of the troops was 
encamped on the parade gi-ound of the cantonments, which, having been burned 
by the mutineers, now existed only in name. On the west side it was 
protected by a canal, or rather outlet, from a large jheel or lake at Nujufghur, 
and on the east by the ridge, which in the course of a few days was rendered 
unassailable by any force which the rebels could bring against it. Besides the 
batteries at the Flagstaff tower and Hindoo Row’s house, others were erected 
at severfil intermediate points, as the oRservatory and the mosque, while two, 
placed more in front, bore directly on the suburbs already mentioned. But 
though the strength of this position secured it against being forced, there were 
various circumstances which increased the difficulty of holding,, it. Cholera had 
made its appearance, and though not yet adding largely to the mortality, was 
creei>ing on insidiously, and might ere long rage like a pestilence. The rebels 
too, fully alive to the kind of tactics which their native cowardice as well as 
superiority of numbers suggested, seemed determined to give no respite from 
attack, thus occasioning losses which the British could ill spare, and threatening 
to overcome their means of resistance by mere exhaustion. It must also be 
remembered that the authority of the government had ceased in all the distiicts 
to the south and east, and that only from the north-west could supplies and 
reinforcemente be obtained. The latter, collected chiefly in the Punjab, had a 
long march to accomplish, but by the aid of the Rajah of Pattiala and other 
friendly chiefs of the Cis-Sutlej protected states, were able to surmount all 
opposing obstacle. There was more doubt as to the suppliea Being required 
for daily use, and too bulky and perishable to admit of ^distant conveyance, 
they had to be drawn chiefly from the neighbouring distnets, and .the danger 



Chap. IT.] OPERATIONS BEFORE DELHI, ' G07 

was that the rebels, by scouring the country and besetting all the routes leading a.d. isst. 
to the cantonments, might to their other means of aggi’ession add that of~ 
starvation. Happily this, the greatest danger of all, was not realized. To cut 
off the supplies either did not occur to the rebellious sepoys, or required more 
enterprise than tliey possessed, and from first to last, however great the priva¬ 
tions endured in the British camp, a deficiency of provisions was not one of them. 

The mutineers, notwithstanding successive repulses, did not abandon the attack 
hope of forcing the British lines, and on the 17th of June commenced a work tiiieers. 
which, if they had been i)crmitted to complete it, would have enfiladed the 
position and seriously affected its security. This was the erection of a battery 
in the immediate vicinity of Kissengunge. To conceal their design and with- 
draAV attention from the locality, they opened early in the day with a heavy 
cannonade, and continued it for some time without iuterrui)tion, till tlio 
approach of a British detachment told them that they must cither abandon 
tlie work, or contend manfully for the possession of it. The attacking party 
advanced in two columns, the one under Major Tombs, consisting of two 
companies of rifles, four comj)anics of 1st fusiliers, thirty cavalry of the guides, 
twenty sappers and miners, and four guns; and the other under Major Reid, 
consisting of his own Sirmoor battalion of Ghoorkas, four com])anies of rifles, 
and four companies of 1st fusiliers. Tlie rebels, expecting attack in front, were 
not a little disconcerted when the columns, by separate flank movements to 
the right and left, placed them between two fires. Their resistance, though by 
no means obstinate, cost them dear. Not oidy was the battery ca])tured and 
the magazine established in its neighbourhood blown up, but a number of 
sepoys cut ofir from retreat paid the penalty of their crimes. 

The 18th of June, a day memorable in British annals, passed quietly, 
perhaps becausS the enemy were engaged in extensive preparations, which were to Main the 
fully developed op the 19th, when about mid-day they were seen issuing in * 
great numbers from the Lahore gate. An attack in the direction of Hindoo 
Row’s house was expected, but it .soon appeared that something tliflerent 
was intended, as they wore observed passing through Kissengunge, and dis¬ 
appeared among the ruins and gardens beyond. After waiting for some liours, 
the British troops were recalled, in the belief that the attack had been aban¬ 
doned. This proved to be a hasty conclusion. The rebels, after proceeding 
westward by a circuitous route, had turned round, and wens within a, mile and 
a half of the British rear. As soon as the alarm wiis given. Brigadier Hope 
Grant, commanding the cavalry, hastened out with all the cavalrj'^ he could 
muster, and twelve guns. This force, however, was very inadequate. It 
consisted of only 250 sabres, while the enemy were found strongly posted, to 
the number of about 3000. Against such odds little could .'be effected, and 
the British cavahy towards dusk were retiring in some degree of confusion, 
when the ^ival of'about 300 of the rifles and fusiliers, gave the rebels a 



608 


HISTORY or INDIA. 


[Book IX. 


A.D. 1857. 


iiwforelMhi. 


Miitnal roiii' 
furcoiuuiits. 


Capture of 
tile Subzoo 
M uiiitoo. 


sudden check, recaptured two guns which had fallen into their hands, and 
compelled them to retreat. Either unconscious of defeat, or determined not to 
acknowledge it, the rebels again made their appearance on the following day, 
and advanced so boldly and rapidly, that they were pitching their round shot 
into the British camp before they could be effectually met. At last, by bringing 
into action every' man that could possibly be spared from the British camp, the 
enemy wore driven across the canal, and compelled once more to seek the 
shelter of the city. 

These defeats, however much they must have damped the spirits of the 
rebels, had not the effect of diminishing their real foi’ce, which was on the contrary 
daily augmented by reinforcements of revolted regiments. The Nusseerabad 
mutineers, comprising the 15th and 30th native infantry, had already arrived, 
and on the 21st, no less than four legiments—the 6th light cavalry, and the 
3d, 3Gth, and (!lst native infiintry—were seen pouring into the city. Elated by 
these new arrivals, and rendered still more confident of success by a piophecy 
whicli foretold the downfall of British rule in India exactly a hundred years 
after it was founded, they had fixed on the 23d of June, the centenary of the 
victory of Blassey, for a great effort. The But Juttra, a high Hindoo festival, 
which happened to fall on the same day, added to the general enthusia.sm, 
while iM'tKj wiis liberally supplied in order to inspire an artificial courage. On 
tlie other hand the admirable amingements of Sir John Lawrence in the Punjab 
were now beginning to tell, and important additions were made to the British 
force before Delhi at the very moment when they were most w.anted. On the 
morning of the 23d, 100 men of her majesty’s 75th, 100 of the 1st fusiliers, 
three companies of the 2d fusiliers, and the -ith Sikhs, 400 strong, marched into 
the camp. The struggle had already commenced. Under cover of a furious 
cannonsvdo from all the bastions, and from the advanced batteiiet/ in the suburbs, 
large bodies were advanced thi-o\igh the Subzee Mundee, to assail Hindoo Bow’s 
house from the rear, and at the same time a battery which had been erected 
at the Eedgah, situated t(.) the west of the Lahore gate, opened a destructive 
enhladiiig fire. Bepulse after repulse seemed unavailing. The enemy refused 
to retire, and kept up such a deadly fire of mu.sketry from the Subzee Mundee, 
that the Hindoo Bow battery could hardly be worked. It thus became 
necessjiry to obtain possession of the suburb by assuming the offensive, and 
attacking it at the point of the bayonet. The column formed for this purpose, 
consisting of the 1st and 2d fusilici-s, supported by the 4th Sikhs, who had that 
very morning made a march of twenty-two miles, advanced through a shower 
of shot and shell, and pushed on for a small temple called the Sammy house, 
from which, under cover of its high inclosure, the enemy’s fire of musketry was 
most ‘destructive. This hand-to-hand fight issued as it always does vrhen 
Asiatics are brought into contact with British bayonets. After a short resistance 
and a fearful carnage, the rebels fled and the whole suburb was cleared out. 



Chap. 11.] 


OPERATIONS BEFORE DELHI. 


609 


Tlie advantage thus gained would have been lost had the enemy been allowed a d. issr. 
to return, and therefore permanent possession of the Subzee Mundee was 
.secured, by establishing a strong European picket at the Sammy house, and at a cuptui-e ..f 
serai opposite to it on the Kurnaid road. The British loss was less than might 
be inferred from the nature of the struggle. Only 39 wei’e killed and 114 
wounded. This however does not contain the whole list of ctxsualties. So 
intense was the heat that, out of ten officers of the 2d fusiliers, five were 
struck down, and in the 1st fusiliers one was struck down and six were 
disabled by sun-stroke. 

The centenary of Plassey, which, according to native prophecy, was to have 
witnessed the destruction of British rule in India, only witnessed the discomfi¬ 
ture of those who had treaeherously rebolle<l against it—a discomfiture with 



Tqe Serai Pioket the Subzeb Mundee, before Delhi.—From engraving in lllustraled Lunduu Nuwe. 


which the only hope which the rebels had of forcing the British position at Delhi nritisli roin 
may be said to have expired. By the end of June the effective force of the 
British had been increased to GOOD men, and though much was still wanting to 
enable it to assume the offensive and prepai’e for the final assault, there was no 
longer any danger of being compelled to raise the siege, nor any reason to 
doubt that sooner or later the recapture would be effected. For this brightening 
prospect a large share of credit is undoubtedly due to Sir John Lawrence as chief 
commissioner, and the able men associated with,him in the civil and military 
administration of the Punjab; and it is therefore not less due to them than 
e.ssential to a full narrative of the mutiny, that before proceeding fui’ther some 
account should be given of their exertions. 

In the beginning of June, when there was still some ground to hope ihat 
many of the .sepoy regiments would pause before finally committing themselves 

VoL. III. 27 a 



A.D. 1857. 


Siege of 
Delhi. 


l!n]M>rtaut 
aid from 
the Punjab. 


610 HISTORY OF INDIA. [Book IX. 

to mutiny, Sir John Lawrence issued an address to them, in which the following 
passage occurs; “ Those regiments which now remain faitliful will receive the 
rewards due to their constancy; those soldiers who fall away now, will lose their 
service for ever. It will be too late to lament hereafter when the time has 
passed by—now is the opportunity of proving your loyalty and good faith. The 
British government will never want for native soldiers. In a month it might 
raise 50,000 in the Punjab alone. If the ‘ Poorbeah’ sepoy neglects the present 
day, it will never return. There is ample force in the Punjab to crush all 
mutineers. The chiefs and people are loyal and obedient, and the latter long 
to take your place in the army. All will unite to crush you.” These words, 
which were doubtless regarded by the sepoys as a vain-glorious boast, contained 
the simjile statement of a fact of which it became the business of the chief 
commissioner, as soon as unlimited authority to levy troops was given him, to 
furnish ocular demonstration. The first object was to confirm the fidelity of 
the Sikh chiefs whose territories intervened between the Punjab and Delhi, 
and whose friendly aid was hence necessary in order to keep open the com¬ 
munications between them. Here happily no difficulty was experienced. The 
Rajah of Jheend, instead of waiting to be urged, had organized a force of 800 
men, and was pressing forward with it to join the force about to be collected 
for the recovery of Delhi. Still farther north, and consequently nearer the 
Punjab, a still more valuable auxiliary was found in the Maharajah of Pattiala, 
who, resisting all the native influences brought to bear upon him, at once declared 
liis determination to stand or fall with the Di’itish government. The loyalty 
thus evinced he maintained unshaken to the last, and jendered services of whicli 
it is not too much to say that they contributed essentially to the suppression of 
the mutiny in the north-west of India. His example was followed by other 
chiefs, among whom those of Nabha .and Kooperthalla deserve honourable 
mention. Some notice has already been taken of the vigorous measures adopted 
when intelligence of the first outbreak was received. Of these measure.s, one; 
of the most important was the formation of a column which should be ready to 
move on every point where mutiny required to be put down. The command of 
this column was conferred on Brigadier Neville Chamberlain, who previously 
held that of the Punjab irregular force, and was acknowledged on all hands to 
be an officer of distinguished talents. The guides, which formed an importsmt 
part of the original column, have ah*eady been seen pushing forward to Delhi, 
and performing excellent service on the very day of their arrival there, after 
completing a march of about 600 miles with almost unexampled rapidity. The 
rest of the column, after performing good service, was also moving southward 
to join the Delhi foi-ce, and on the 3d of June entered Lahore. After halting 
for a week it started again, intending to continue its progress southward,'when 
intelligence arrived which obliged it to change its destination, and proceed 
eastward to Amritser. That important place was stiU imdisturbed, but it M^as 



ChaK ril:] OPEBATIONS BEFOEE DELHI. 611 

feared that a mutiny which had broken out at Julendur might prove infectious, a. a issr. 
more especially as the mutineers had been permitted through some mismanage¬ 
ment to escape and were roaming the country. The moveable column after 

. ° . . . I'mijab. 

this delay, which was employed in checking or suppressing distm'bance, 
again started for Delhi, commanded no longer by Brigadier Chamberlain, who 
had been appointed adjutsint-genei-al of the anny, but by Brigadier Nicholson, 
who after rendering essential aid on the western frontier in raising new levies, 
and in maintaining tranquillity while surrounded by all the elements of disturb¬ 
ance, was destined to a more brilliant but unhappily a too short career. The 
formation of the moveable column was only one of the many means employed 
by the authorities of the Punjab to curb the mutiny and provide for its final 
suppres-sion. In the months of May and June, five new regiments had been 
completed, and by the beginning of October the number had been augmented 
to eighteen. At the same time irregular levies of 7000 horse and as many foot 
had been raised, so that ultimately the total new force amounted to 34,000. It 
is not too much to my that, but for these exertions in the Punjab, the siege of 
Delhi must have been abandoned. 


CHAPTER III. 


Siege of Delhi eontimied—Eepeated attempts on the Britwli jioBitiori by the rclieln—RepulHCS—Deatli of 
Sir Henry Barnard, and appointment of Brigadier-general Wilson to the command—Itcinforcements 
on both sides — Ihifeat of the reliels at Nujufghiir—^Preparations for the assault—Recapture of 
Delhi. 



HEN the mouth of June closed, the British force before nitncaitmi 

4>f the Bio^e 

^ Delhi had improved its position by the expulsion of the ofooiiu. 


g rebels from the Subzee Mundee, and tlie permanent occupa- 
' tion of that important suburb. Still, however, there was 
no immediate pro.spect of an assault which would seal the 
fate of the city at once, and no prospect at all of establishing a blockade, which 
could either exhaust its means of resistance or starve it into surrender. The 
British batteries, placed nearly 1500 yards from the walls, were too distant to 
make any serious impression on them; and moreover commanded only two gates, 
those of Cashmere and Cabool, while all the othera lemained as free as ever to 
send forth troops for attack, or to bring in reinforcements and 8upplie.s. These 
considerations, which it was impossible to overlook, produced 'some degi'qe of 
despondency, and more tlian once the abandonment of the siege was gravely 
mooted. The arrivals from the Punjab did little more than supply the waste 



612 


HISTOBY OF INDIA. 


[Book IX. 


A.D. 1857. 


BJego of 
Delhi. 


An assault 
iiigitiii ])ro 


It is again 
abandoned. 


by casualty and disease, so that the effective force of all arms did not exceed 
5800, while every successive mutiny was adding whole regiments to the rebels, 
and increasing the alreadj’^ too great disproportion between them and their 
assailants. There is reason to believe that Sir Henry Barnard was not indisposed 
to follow the advice of those who woiild bave withdrawn from Delhi. Having 
no experience of Indian warfare, he had little expectation of bringing the siege 
to a triumphant termination, and agi’eed with those who saw a more hopeful field 
of action if the British army were moved more to the eastward, and concentrated 
so as-to secure the safety of Agra, and the important districts connected with 
it. Though opinions were divided on this subject at the time, only one now 
('xists, and it is admitted that a withdrawal from Delhi would have given such 
a triumph to the mutiny as to have made its final suppression all but imjjos- 
sible. While the question of abandoning or prosecuting the siege was under 
discussion, the idea of a sudden assault was revived. Sir Henry Barnard, it 
will be remembered, had sanctioned it when formerly proi)osed, and counter¬ 
manded it when on the point of execution. T'he same iiresolution was again 
to be repeated The whole jdan was arranged. One column was to effect an 
entrance by blowing in the iron grating of the cjinal near the C'abool gate; an<l 
another was to blow in the Cashmere gate, and have the double chance of 
entering by it and by an escsilade of the adjoining bastion, while a party moving 
stealthily round to the river side was to endeavour to find an entrance from 
the east. The plan, in order to insure secresy, was never whispered in the 
camp, and it was hence taken for granted that the enemy had not the least 
idea of it. This was a complete mistake. Not only were they on the ahu-t, 
but they had formed a counter-plan, which if they had been permitted to cany 
it out, would in all probability have annihilated the British force. A lai’ge 
party, sent out by a circuitous route, had been posted aliout 'two,miles in oxir 
rear, and there only waited the departure of the storming party to hasten 
forward and seize the camp while denuded of its usual defenders. Providen¬ 
tially this fact became known in the very nick of time, and the idea of a sudden 
assault was once more abandoned. Shortly afterwards the British aimy was 
for the second time deprived of its general. On the 5th of July, Sir Henry 
Barnard was seized with chdlera, and died in the course of a few hours. The 
event produced a feeling of deep and universal regret, a regi’et rendered all the 
more poignant by the fact that he had been brought by no choice of his own 
into a position in which the excellent qualities which he undoubtedly po-ssessed, 
both as a man and a commander, wei’e not displayed to advantage. The 
command of the Delhi force now devolved on General Reid, the provisional 
commander-in-chief, and was formally assumed by him. It was however more 
in pame than reality. The state of his health, which previously unfitted him 
for active duty, obliged him before a fortnight elapsed to decline the responsi¬ 
bilities of office, and the appointment was conferred on Brigadier Wilson. 



Chap. ITI.] 


OPEEATIONS BEFORE DELHI. 


613 


In the beginning of July, a seasonable addition was made to the British a.d. issr. 
force, by the arrival of about 450 men of her majesty’s 5l8t foot, but as had 
almost invariably happened, the rebels could boast of having on the very same Rcinforce- 
day been far more largely augmented. The Bareilly brigade, consisting of three iwth sides, 
whole regiments of infantiy and some irre¬ 


gular cavalry, after mutinying, as hiis al¬ 
ready been described, had arrived on the 
opposite bank of the Jumna. No attempt 
could be made to dispute their passage, and 
they entered the city, where their reception 
was all the more cordial from its being 
known that they were possessed of a con¬ 
siderable amount of treasure. In conse¬ 


quence of the new arrival, it was generally 
expected that a formidable attack would be 
made by the rebels to force our position, or 
at least to regain a footing in the Subzee 
Mundee. But it would seem that the pun¬ 
ishment which had there been inflicted upon 


TlaiGADIKR-OKKKRAL Bill AtlCUI>ALB WiLHON, (i.d.U. 
From A bj' Maynll. 



them induced them to turn their views in a 


difierent direction. The village of Alipoor, forming the first station to the west- u®*"' «*■ 

® ^ ® _ iwililioli 

ward on the Kurnaul road, was known to have furnished large sujqdies to the asaiiiKt 
British camp, and had therefore been marked out by the rebels for vengeance. 
Accordingly, on the 3d of July, a considerable force moved out from the Lahore 
gate, and proceeded westward. Their destination being at the time unknown, 
the British could only send out a force on their track, and it was not known till 
the following*morning that they had been wr eaking their fury oir the inhabitants 
of Alipoor. It.was sad enough that the aid which they had given to us should 
have brought such a disaster upon them; brrt though orr this grortnd alone it 
was most desirable that the rebels should irot bo allowed to return with im¬ 


punity, there was another reasorr why a blow should bo strrrck which might 
deter them from attempting to gain a footing iir that part of the country. ItT 
lay in the direct line of communication between the ftarnp and the Punjab. 
Only the day before the village was destroyed, a large nrtniber of sick sent 
from the camp had passed through it, and but for a most providential delay 
the plunder would have included, in addition to that obtained from the village, 
a valuable convoy of treasure and ammunition. The force sent out from the 
camp had the good fortune to accomplish both objects. By intercepting the 
rebels before they could regain the city, it took summary vengeance for the 
atrocities which had been perpetrated at Alipoor, while by clearing the road it 
secured the safety of the convoy. 

Thopgh the mutineers had as yet been foiled in all their attempts to estab- 




614 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book IX. 


A.n.i857. lish themselves in the British rear, they had by no means abandoned that 
mode of attack. Of this, after several days of comparative quiescence, striking 
Renewed proof was givctt ou the 9th of July, when a body of cavalry suddenly emerging 
the Hriiish from cover, charged right into the camp, and were within it almost as soon as 
the alarm could be given. A picket of carabineers, most of them young, 
untrained soldiers,’ instead of opposing the enemy, lost all presence of mind, and 
fled. Still dashing on, the rebel troopers made for the guns of the native troop 
of horse-artillery, and called aloud on the men in charge of them to join them. 
The men remained stanch, and the troopers, without accomplishing their 
object, were obliged to decamp. The boldness of this attempt, and the little 
re.sistanco offered to it, gave rise to grave suspicions of treachery. A short 
time previously, the few Bengal sepoys mingled with the irregulars had been 
turned out of the camp, because they were believed to be in communication 
with their comrades within the city. It now appeared that they were not the 
only traitors, and recourse was had to the somewhat extreme remedy of sending 
off the whole three corps of irregular cavalry, one of them to Umballa, and the 
other two to the Punjab. While the sowars were assailing the camp, a furious 
cannonade was kept up from the city, and volleys of musketry were directed 
against the British station from every available point in tlie suburbs. After 
the expulsion of the sowars, it becfime necessary to dislodge those who, with 
the view of supporting them, had taken post in the gardens and other inclosures 
of the vicinitj'. This task, after a sanguinary contest, was successfully accom¬ 
plished. One result of the affair of the 9th was to make the rebels more chary 
of exposing themselves to similar repulses, and they allowed nearly a week to 
elapse before they again ventured out. 

On the IGth, the mutineers from Jhansi, stained with the blood of an 
atrocious massacre, an-ived at Delhi. On this occasion,* the usukl cry^tom was 
not forgotten, and after a day’s rest, they were sent out to take the lead in a 
new attack, in order at once to signalize their zeal and display their prowess. 
As usual, the attack ended in a repulse. After desultory discharges of guns and 
musketry, which, as both parties were under cover, produced few casualties, the 
British became the assailants, and drove the rebels before them. On more 
than one occasion the British, after repulsing the enemy, had in the ardour of 
pursuit exposed themselves to a deadly fire froqi the city walls. The repetition 
of such fatal mistakes was at length corrected by a distinct order that they 
should in future act strictly on the defensive, and rest satisfied with repelling 
an attack, without following it up with any pursuit of the fugitives. This 
order, besides preventing an unnecessary waste of human life, had another bene¬ 
ficial effect, which could hardly have been anticipated. It changed the tactics 
of the labels, who,‘'on finding that they could no longer lure the British within 
range of their fire, had less inducement to persist in their incessant attacks, and 
allowed days to pass without renewing them. The respite was partly .employed 


New atta(;k 
by the rcbelH. 



Chap. Ill.j OPERATIONS BEFORE DELHI. 015 

in completing the breastwork on the ridge, so as to form an almost unbroken line 
from left to right, and enable the men to move from point to point as safely as 
under a regular covered way. Other changes, partly of a sanitary nature, were 
introduced, and the health, spirit, and discipline of the force visibly improved. 
Meanwhile the large increase of numbers obtained by the rebels had not added 
to their real strength. Mahometans and Hindoos, though tliey had combined, 
were by no means united, and intrigues, factions, and dissensions prevailed to such 
an extent that the king would gladly have saved himself by the sacrifice of his 
nominal supporters. “Only recognize him as titular king, and secure him in 
the enjoyment of his pension, and he will open the gate of the fort of Sclimghm-, 
and through it admit the British troops into the palace.” Such were the terms. 
Inadmissible as they were, he could not have j)erformed his part in them, and it 
is almost unnecessary to add that though Sir John Lawrence, when consulted on 
the subject, had replied, “Treat, but beware of treachery,” the negotiation came 
to nothing. The position and pro.spects of the British force before Delhi at this 
time cannot bo more briefly stated than in the following letter of General 
Wilson, dated 31st Julj'^:—“It is my firm determination to hold my })reseut 
position, and to resist any attack to the last. The enemy are very numerous, 
and may possibly break through our entrenchments and overwhelm us, but the 
force will die at their po.st. Luckily, the enemy have no head and no method, 
and wo hear dissensions Jire breaking out among them. Reinforcements are 
coming up under Nicholson. If we can hold on till tliey arrive, we shall be 
secure. I am making every possible arrangement to secure the safe defence 
of our position.” 

The moveable column under Nicholson, to which, as appears from the above 
letter of General Wilson, so much importance was .attached, arrived on the 14th 
of August. Jilt first some di,sappointment was felt when its strength was ascer¬ 
tained to be far less than rumour had assigned to it, but the impoitanco of the 
addition which it made to the British force before Delhi will at once be seen 
when it is mentioned that it nearly doubled it. The previous force, though 
nomin.ally about 5000 of all arms, had about a fifth of the whole in hospital, 
and could therefore muster for duty not more than 2700 Europeans and 1SOO 
natives; the moveable column amounted to about 4200. One essential want, 
however, stiU remained to be supplied. The siege train brought to Delhi had been 
pronounced totally inadequate to make the necessary breaches for assault, and 
another of much weightier metal, and more complete equipment, had been pro¬ 
cured from the arsenals of Philour and Ferozepoor. It was already on the way, 
but moving very slowly, as its line of gun carriages, tumbrils, and carts, 
extended over thirteen miles of road. Meanwhile the rebels lost much of their 
confidence. To violent dissensions, sometimes terminating iji bloodshed, were 
added wholesale desertions by sepoys who, when denied permission to visit their 
homes, took the remedy into their own hands; and even the Delhi princes, some 


A.D. 1857. 


Disuuion 
among tlio 
rebels. 


Arrival of 
inoTt^able 
column 
under 
Nicliolsuu. 



A.f). 1857. 


Biego of 
Dolhi. 


Ksploit of 

IltxiBoii al 
Rolit'ik 


GIG HISTORY OF INDIA. [Book IX. 

of them the very miscreants who had ordered and exulted in the massacre of 
European women and children, had the effrontery tp send letters into the 
British camp, in which they sought to escape the retribution about to overtake 
them, by declaring that “they have been all along fondly attached to us, and 
only want to know what they can do for us.” 

As everything depended on the safe arrival of the siege train, it was neces¬ 
sary to clear the route along which it was to pass of all mutineers and marauding 
I)arties. In this respect the districts of Paniput and Rohtuk required special 
attention. The Raughurs, a turbulent and predatory horde located there, 
taking advantage of the revolt, withheld their revenue, and when threatened 
answered with defiance. An attempt to coerce them had not been completely 
successful, and in the beginning of August intelligence was received that they 
were again collecting in force, and liad been or were about to be joined by a 
considerable body of Delhi rebels. The safety of the train being thus endan¬ 
gered, Captain Hodson, whose services during the mutiny, both in the intelli¬ 
gence department in the camp at Delhi and as the chivalric leader of a body of 
irregular horse, invest his brilliant but brief career with peculiar interest, set 
out on the IGth of August at the head of a small ft)rce, and pushed on for 
Rohtuk, which had become a rallying point for the rebels. The tjisk assigned 
him seemed beyond the means at his disposal. His detachment consisted 
almost entirely of cavalry, and how could he hoj)e with them to overcome 
an enemy shut up within a walled town, and apparently resolved to make 
a vigorous defence? Too clear-sighted not to perceive the hopelessness of 
attempting an assault, and too resolute to despair of success without making 
an efibrt to secure it, he withdrew in the meantime to bivouac in an 
inclosure in the vicinity. In the course of the evening he was waited upon 
by a deputation from the city, “having grass in theiivmouths,*’ in, token of 
8ubmis.sion. It was merely a trick to throw him off his gufjrd, for on going 
out on the following morning to reconnoitre, he saw the enemy hurrying 
forward at full tilt, and had barely time to form his men before they were upon 
him. After a short encounter, the rebels were driven back, but it was only to 
keep uj) a galling fire under cover of the trees and gardens surrounding the 
city. It was now Hodson’s turn to try .stratagem, and lure the enemy into the 
open ground by commencing a feigned retreat. Nothing more was required. 
The rebels, yelling and shouting as if secure of victory, followed close upon his 
track, and were nearly a mile beyond their inclosure, when he gave the order 
to face about. The fancied pursuit was at once converted into a disorderly 
flight, and on the following morning Rohtuk itself was found to be evacuated. 

While Hodson was thus clearing the way in the direction of Rohtuk, 
another and larger detachment, having the same object in view, had proceeded 
from ihe camp. Mahomed Bukht Khan, an old sepoy soubahdar, who had 
become commander-in-chief of the rebels, in order to wipe off the disgrace of 



Chap III.] 


SIEGE OF DELHI. 


G17 


several recent repulses, set out from the city, swearing that he would either a d. isst. 
capture the siege train or die in the attempt. His force, amounting, according ” 
to the report of the spies, to GOOD men of all arms, with sixteen guns, started Defeat of tii* 
on the 24th. By an early hour of the following day, a British column N„j„fgimr, 
commanded by Nicholson was marching in pursuit. Its progress was much 
letarded by torrents of rain, which liad so flooded the roads and fields, that in 
seven hours the advance had only accomplished ten miles, and the main body 
was so far behind that a halt was necessary. That the time thus occiqtied 
might not be lost. Sir Thcophilus Metcalfe, who was with the column as a 
volunteer, and had a good knowledge of the country, pushed on with two 
ofiicers in search of the enemy. After proceeding about five milcs.and ascending 
a rising ground they found them encamped beyond a nullah, which here crosses 
the road, and was running deep and strong. A fatiguing march of two hours 
brought the column to the rising ground, from which the enemy wei’e seen occu¬ 
pying a position well chosen both for defence and for retreat. It was situated 
in the vicinity of the village of Nujufghur, about fifteen miles south-west of 
Delhi, and formed a rectangular space open to the rear, but bounded on two adja¬ 
cent sides by the nullah already mentioned, and the canal or outlet from the 
Nujufghur Jhecl, meeting it at right angles. Within the area the rebels fronted 
the nullah, having on their right a village, where nine of their guns were 
placed, on their left a rising ground, and in the centre an old serai, which was 
defended by four guns, and formed the key of their position. Nicholson at 
once formed his plan of attack, but owing to detention in fording tlje nullah, it 
was five o'clock before he could put it in execution. His object was to force 
the enemy’s left centre, and then changing front to the left, to sweep down 
tlieir line of guns towards the bridge. The enemy made little resistance, all 
their guns .wei’e captured, and the conflict seemed to be at an end, when it was 
reported that a willage a few hundred yards in the real’ was still occupied. 

Strange to say, it was here only that any serious resistance was experienced. 

The rebels, seeing their retreat cut off, and knowing the fate which awaited 
them, fought with extreme desperation, and were with difficulty ovei’powered. 

So many of the cavalry were employed in protecting the baggage which had 
been left on the other .side of the nullah, and in escorting the guns, that pursuit 
was impracticable. The enemy’s lo.ss was however severe, amounting, according 
to their own confession, to above 800. 

On the 3d of Seritember, before the rebels had recovered from the conster- Ay*™' 

^ the siege 

nation produced by their defeat at Nujufghur, the siege train an’ived, and the nain. 
erection of heavy batteries within breaching distance was immediately com¬ 
menced. At the same time a seasonable addition was made to the force by the 
arrival of reinforcements, including a contingent from Cashmere. The* crisis 
being now at hand, General Wilson issued an address to the troops. It com¬ 
menced thus:—“ The force assembled before Delhi has had much hardship and 
VoL III. JJ74 



618 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book IX. 


A.D. 1857. 


Arrival of 
the Biege 
train. 


llaltenes 

erecttxl. 


fatigue to undergo since its arrival in this camp, all of which has been most 
cheerfully borne by officers and men. The time is now drawing near when the 
major-general commanding the force trusts that their labours will be over, and 
they will be rewarded by the capture of the city for all their past exertions, and 
for a cheerful endurance of still greater fatigue and exposure.” It concluded 
with the expression of a confident trust “ that all will exhibit a healthy and 
hearty spirit of emulation and zeal,” and thereby secure “ the brilliant termi¬ 
nation of all their labours.” 

In regard to the direction from which the assault .should be made, there was 
no room for choice. The north wall fronting the British position could alone 
be selected for that purpose, but the particular part of it to be selected for 
breaching was not so obvious, and some degree of stratagem was used to conceal 
it. Considerably in advance of Hindoo Row’s house the ridge terminates in a 
kind of plateau. Here, nearly on a line with the Sammy house, the fii-st 
battery was run out on the 6th of September. It consisted of six nine-pounders 



and two twenty-four poxinders, and was commanded by Captain Remington. 
Near this battery a dry nullah descends the ridge towards the left, and forms 
a natural parallel. Advantage was accordingly taken of it, and on the night 
of the 7th, another battery (No. 1), mounting six guns on the right and four on 
the left, was erected within 700 yards of the walls, and placed under the 
command of Major Brind. Tliese two batteries placed on the right flank, where 
mo.st of the fighting had hitherto taken place, convinced the rebels that the 
assault would certainly be made from this quarter. Hence the next advance fook 
them, somewhat by surprise. It was made considerably to the east at Ludlow 
Castle, which, though they had a strong picket stationed at it, was wrested 
from them almost without a struggle, and became the site of battery No. 2, 



Chap. III.] 


SIEGE OF DELHI. 


C19 


mounting on its right division seven eight-inch howitzere and two eighteen- a.d. isst. 
pounders, and on its left nine twenty-four pounders. It was commanded by 
Majors Kaye and Campbell, till the latter, disabled by a wound, resigned his nroaoMng 
part of the charge to Captain Johnson. Tlie number and large calibre of the 
guns in this battery indicated that the reaj attack would be from the left, 
where two other batteries were forthwith planted, the one mounting ten 
mortars under Major Tombs, at the Koodsia Bagh, near the banks of the Jumna, 
and the otlier in fiont of it, at a building which had once been the custom¬ 
house. This building, though within IGO yards of the Water bastion, had, 
from oversight or overweening confidence in the rebels, been left unoccupied, 
and the battery was so nearly completed when they discovered their mistake, 
that they were unable to make any impi'e.s8i()n upon it. All these batterie.s 
had been erected in the course of a single week, and before the end of it had 
successively opened fire—Remington’s, on the 6th, Brind’s on the cSth, that at 
Ludlow Castle on the 10th, and those of the Koodsia Bagh and old custom¬ 
house on the 11th. The effect was soon apparent. Tlie Moree or north-west 
bastion, against which tlie fire fi’om the right flank was chiefly directe<l, wa.s 
easily silenced, and the Cashmere bastion towards the north-east, though it had 
been recently restored and strengthened at the expense of the British govern¬ 
ment, began to ciaimble away within an hour after the twenty-four pounders of 
Ludlow Castle began to yday upon it. Nowhere however was the fire .so 
destructive as at the Water or north-east bastion, where, from the proximity of 
the battery, almost every shot told, and a large breach was speedily effected. 
Meantime the rebels were not idle. Besides maintaining a heavy fire from the 
bastions not silenced, and from every spot in the vicinity within range of gi-ajie 
and musketry, they succeeded in placing two batteries, one at Kissengungc, 
which enfiladed those on the ridge, and another on the opyiosite. side of the 
Jumna, which enfiladed those of the Koodsia Bagh and custom-house. These, 
though they could not postpone the day of retribution, produced many casualties. 

The plan of attack as previously arranged, and the assault, fixed for three ti'u asBauit. 
o’clock in the morning of the 14th, are thus succinctly described in General 
Wilson’s official report:—“ After six days of oyien trenches, during which 
the artillciy and engineer’s, under their respective commanding officers Major 
GaitskeU and Lieutenant-colonel Baird Smith, vied with each other in j)res.sing 
forward the work, two excellent and most practicable breaches were formed in 
the walls of the place, one in the cui’tain to the right of the Oa.shmere bastion, 
the other to the left of the Water bastion, the defences of tho.se bjistions, and 
the parapets giving musketry cover to the enemy commanding the breaches, 
having also been destroyed by the artillery. The assault was delivered on four 
pdirits. The 1 st column under Brigadier J. Nicholson, consisting of her majesty’s 
75th regiment (300 men), the 1st European Bengal fusiliers (200 men), and 
the 2d Punjab infantry (450 men), assaulted the main breach, their advance 



G20 


HISTORY or INDIA. 


[Book IX. 


A.D. 1857. 


of 

DoUii. 


TIjo Cosli 
mwG gate 
forctMl. 


being admirably covered by the Ist battalion of her majesty’s jJOth rifles, under 
Colonel J. Jones. The operation was crowned with brilliant success, the enemy 
after severe re.sistance being driven from the Cashmere bastion, the Main 
Guard, and its vicinity, in complete rout. The 2d column under Brigadier 
Jones of hei' majesty’s 61st regiment, consisting of her majesty’s 8th regiment 
(250 men), the 2d' European Bengal fusiliers (250 men), and the 4th regiment 
of Sikhs (350 men), similarly covered by the 60th rifles, advanced on the 
Water bastion, carried the breach, and drove the enemy from his guns and 
position, with a determination and spirit which gave me the highest satis¬ 
faction. Tlie 3d column under Colonel Campbell of her majesty’s 52d light 
infantry, consisting of 250 of his own regiment, the Kumaon battalion (250 
men), and the 1st Punjab infantry (500 men), was directed against the Cashmere 
gateway. This column was preceded by an explosion party under Lieutenants 
Home and Salkeld of the engineers, covered by the 60th rifles. The demolition 
of the gate having been accomplished, the column forced an entrance, over¬ 
coming a strenuous opposition from the enemy’s infantry and heavy artillerj’, 
which had been brought to bear on the position. I cannot express too waimly 
my admiration of the gallantry of all concerned in this difficult operation. The 
re!3erve under Brigadier Longfield of her majesty’s 8th regiment, composed of 
her majesty’s 61st regiment (250 men), the 4th regiment rifles (450 men), the 
Belooch battalion (300 men), and 200 of her majesty’s 60th rifles, who joined 
after the assault had been made, awaited the result of the attack, and on the 
columns entei'ing the place, took possession of the posts I had previously assigned 
t<^ it. Tliis duty wiis ultimately performed to my entii’e satisfaction. The firm 
establishment of the reserve rendering the assaulting columns free to act in 
advance. Brigadier-general Nicholson, supported by Brigadier Jones, swept 
the rampai’ts of the place, from the Cjishmere to the Cabool gate^ occupying the 
ba.stions and defences, capturing the guns and driving the epemy before him. 
During the advance. Brigadier Nicholson was, to the gnef of myself and the 
whole army, dangerously wounded; the command consequently devolved on 
Brigadier Jones, who finding the enemy in great force, occupying and pouring 
a destructive fire from the roofs of strong and commanding houses in the city 
on all sides, the ramparts themselves being enfiladed by guns, prudently resolved 
on retaining possession of the Cabool gate, which his troops had so gallantly 
won, in which he firmly established himself, awaiting the result of the opera¬ 
tion of the other columns of occupation. Colonel Campbell, with the column 
under his command, advanced successfully from the Cashmere gate, by one of 
the main streets beyond the Chandei Chauk, the central and principal street 
of the city, towards the Jumma Musjid, with the intention of occupying that 
important post ’'The opposition, however, which he met from the gieat con¬ 
centration of the enemy at the Jumma Musjid and the houses in the neighbour¬ 
hood—^lie him,self, I regret to state, being wounded—satisfied him that his most 



Chap. 111.] 


BIEGE OF DELHI. 


621 


prudent course was not to maintain so advanced a position with the compara- a.d. iss;. 
tively limited force at his disposal, and he accordingly withdrew the head of 
his column, and placed himself in communication with the reserve, a measure Advance ..r 
which had my entire approval; I having previously determined that, in the trcoiw into 
event of serious opposition being encountered in the town itself, it would bo *■''* 
most inexpedient to commit my small force to a succession of street fightfs, in 
which their gallantry, discipline, and organization could avail them so little.” 

After describing the position which had thus been gained, and mentioning 
liis intention to use it us the base of “systematic operations for the complete 
})OSsession of the city,” General Wilson thus continues: “Simultaneously with 
the opei’ations above detailed, an attack was made on the enemy’s strong position 
outside the city, in the suburbs of Kisscnguuge and Pahareepoor, with a view 
of driving in the rebels and supporting the main attack by cflecting an entrance 
at the Cabool gate after it should be taken. The force employed in this dilhcult raHiai 
duty 1 intrusted to Major C. Reid, commanding the Sinnoor battalion, whose 
distinguished conduct I have already had occasion to bring prominently to the 
notice of superior authority, and who was, I much regret, severely wounded on 
this occasion. His column consisted of his own battalion, the guides, and the 
men on duty at Hindoo Row’s (the main picket), numbering in all about 1000, 
supported by the auxiliary troops of his highness the Maharajah Rumbeer Sing, 
xinder Captain R. Lawrence. The strength of the positions, however, and the 
desperate resistiince offered by the enemy, withstood for a time the efforts of 
our troops, gallant though they were, and the combination was unable to be 
effected. The delay, I am happy to say, has been only temporary, for the 
enemy have subsequently abandoned their positions, leaving their guns in our 
hands. In this attack, 1 found it necessaiy to support Major Reid with cavalry 
and horse-artilfery, both of which arms were admirably handled, respectively 
by Brigadier Hope Grant of her majesty’s 9th lancers, commanding the cavalry 
brigade, and Major H. Tombs of the horse-artillery, who inflicted scveie punish¬ 
ment on the enemy, though I regret their own loss was very heavy.” 

The above account, admirably clear so far as it goes, is too brief to enter mowing 
into detail, and hence neces.sarily omits several points of interest which must not Smu™'” 
pass unnoticed. The rendezvous of the three a8.saulting columns was at Ludlow 
Castle. Shortly after three o’clock A.M., the 1st column moved into the Koodsia 
Bagh, ready to rush on the main breach immediately to the left of the Cashmere 
bastion; while the 2d column took up a still more advanced position at the old 
custom-house, in the immediate vicinity of the breach adjoining the Water 
bastion. The 3d column moved along the main road, having at its head the 
“ exploding p<‘irty,” by whom at daybreak the signal for the as.sault was to be 
given. This party consisted of Lieutenants Salkeld and Homtf of the engineers. 
Sergeants Smith and Carmichael, Corporals Burgess and Smith of the Bengal 
sappers and miners, and Bugler Hawthorne of her maje.sty’s 52d, to sound the 



622 


HISTOEY OF INDIA. 


[Book IX. 


A I) ISW, 


lilowilkg 
01)011 of tlie 
Ciuihnioru 


o\' 

iho tt( iiick. 


advance. The signal was to be the explosion produced by blowing in the 
Cashmere gate. For this purpose the party were accompanied by twenty-four 
native sfippcrs and miners, carrying bags of gunpowder. The subsequent 
operation is tlius described by Colonel Baird Smith:—“The party advanced 
at tlie double towards tlie Cashmere gate. Lieutenant Home, witlj Sergeants 
Smith and CarniLchael, and Havildar Mahore with all the sappers, leading and 
carrying the powder bags, followed by Lieutenant Salkeld and a portion of tlie 
remainder of the party. The advanced [larty reached the gateway unhurt, and 
found that part of the drawbridge had been destroyed, but passing along the 
jirecarious footway sujiplied by the remaining beam.s, they proceeded to lodge 
their powder bags against the gate. The wicket was open, and through it the 
enemy ke])t up a heavy lire upon them. Sergeant Carmichael was killed while 
laying his ptiwder bag, Havildar Mahore being at the same time wounded. 
The powder being laid, the advanced party slipped down into the ditch to allow 
tlie firing [larty under Lieutenant Salkeld to perform its duty. While endea¬ 
vouring to fire the charge, Lieutenant Salkeld was shot through the arm and leg, 
and handed over the slow match to Corporal Burgess, who fell mortally wounded 
just as he had accomplished the onerous duty. Havildar TeUah Sing of the 
Sikhs was wounded, and Ilainloll, sepoy of the .same corjis, was killed during 
this pait of the ojieration. The demolition being most successful, Lieutenant 
Home, hap])ily not wounded, caused the bugler to sound the regimental call of 
the 52d as the signal for the advancing columns. Fearing that amid the noise 
of the assault the sounds might not be heard, he had the call repeated three 
times, when the troojis advanced and canied the gateway with comiilete 
success. J feel certain that a simple statement of this devoted and glorious 
deed will suffice to stamp it as ono of the noblest on record in military histoi’y.” 
Lieutenant Home, Sergeant Smith, and Bugler Hawthorne escaped unhurt, 
and wei’e duly I’ewardcd for their heroism, but Salkeld died of his wounds after 
lingering only a few days. 

'i'he rush of the column after the exjdosion V'as irresistible, and in a few 
minutes the Cashmere gate and the Main Guard adjoining it were carried. 
The 1st and 2d columns had been equally successful, though the rebels some¬ 
what recovered from the eonsteniatiou into which the explosion had thrown 
them, and beginning to have the advantage of day-light opened a deadly fire 
from every avaihdile 2 >oint. Brigadier Nicholson, who had been the firet to 
mount the breach assigned to his column, taking the right of the Cashmere 
gate led it along the Rampait road, clearing the ramjiarts without meeting 
much re.sistance, till the whole of them as far west as the Moree bastion, and 
then southward to the Cabool gate, were gained. Here, had the attack on the 
suburbs of Kissevgunge succeeded, he would have been joined by the force 
there ‘employed, but that attack having failed. Brigadier Nicholson was left 
entirely to his own resources. Unfortunately he attempted more than his 



Chap. Iir.] 


SIEGE OF DELHI. 


623 


column, now tliiuncd in nuinliers and fatigued by previous exei-tion, could 
.accomplish, and was in the act of urging hi.s men foi'ward to seize the Lahore 
gate after a rather serious check had been received, when he was shot through 
the chest from an adjoining window, and fell back mortally wounded. After 
this lamentable event no further progress was made, and the Cabool gate 
became for the time the limit of advance in th.at direction. ' Tiie same cause 
arrested the progress of the other columns. When General Nicholson on leaving 
the Main Guard turned to the right, Colonel Campbell took the left, and having 
cleared the Cutcheny, the English church, and Skinner's house, all in tlio 
immediate vicinity, forced his w.ay first into the C'handei C’hauk, and then 
into a n.arrow street le.ading to the Jnmma Musjid. His object was to caj)turo 
this celebrated mosqm^, but liis means were totally inadc(piate. Its side ai'ches 
had been bricked up, its massive gate closed and barricaded, and he had neither 
guns nor bags of gunpowder to attempt to force them. His only alternative 
was to retire under cover from the deadlj'^ fire which the rebels had opened, 
and rest satisfied with what had been already gaine<l. Enough had been 
achieved for one day; enough too h.ad been sacrificed, since the killed and 
wounded .amounted to OG officers and 1101 men, or nearly <a third of the whole 
number engaged. 

The next day passed without any new efibi-t to advance. The reason, 
though discreditable, must be .stated. During the assault, though no nu'rcy 
was .shown to the mutineers, whose atrocious barbarities could not be forgiven, 
the as.sailants did not forget their humanity, and gavefidl effect to the general’s 
call to .sp.are .all women and children. Their natural love of justice and abhor¬ 
rence of cruelty sufficed for this purpose, Avithont recpiiring any great exercise 
of self-restraint, but there was another temptation which tiny Avere unable to 
resist, and. in yielding to which they became st) completely di.soiganizcul .as to 
imperil their previous success The rebels, well aware of Avhat must still be 
regarded as the besetting sin of Briti.sh soldiei's, particularly Avhen thejir passions 
have been rou.5ed, and (heir bodies exhausted by almost superhuman exertions 
under a burning sim, had taken care to place the means of unlimited indulgence 
within their reach, by piling up beer, wine, and brandy within the .shop.s, and 
even outside along the pavement. The bait proved irresistible, and for a time 
discipline Av<as lost in brutish intoxication. To such .a height was it carried, 
that the necessitj’^ of vacating the city was forced on the general’s consideration, 
and only avoided by ordering that all intoxicating liquors .should be destroyed. 
The remedy thus applied allowed the advance to be re.sumed on the Ifith, when 
the magazine was canned, and the position at Kissengunge .so far turned that 
theyebels voluntarily abandoned it. Every successive day was now signalized 
by some new success. The nature and extent of it is thus described by General 
Wilson:—“During the 17th and 18th, we continued to take up advanced posts 
in the face, of considerable opposition on the part of the rebels, and not without 


A I). 18ST. 


Ooiieml 

KiclioJaoi) 

nioilally 

^^'Ounded. 


Kttbrt id if) • 
toxii'alioi) 
in ri'tardin^ 
Dll' final 
cajituro 



A.D. 1867. 


Capture of 
Delhi. 


Fllt;ht. of 
the king. 


024- lilSTORY OF INDIA. [Book IX. 

loss to ourselves, three officer’s being killed, and a nuit^ber of men killed and 
wounded. On the evening of the 1.9th, the Burun bastion, which had given us 
considerable annoyance, was surprised and captured. . On the morning of the 
2()th, our troops pushed on and occupied the Lahore gate, from whidi an 
unopposed advance was made on the other bastions and gateways, until the 
whole of the defences of the city were in our hands. From the time of orir 
entering the city, an uninterrupted and vigorous fire from our guns and mortars 
was ke])t up on the palace, Jumma Musjid, and other important posts in 
po.sse.ssion of tire rebels; Jind as we took up our various positions in advance, 
our light guns and mortars were brought forward, and used with effect in the 
streets and houses in their neighbourhood. The result of this heavy and 
unceasing bombardment, and of the steady and persevering advance of our 
troops, has been the evacuation of the palace by the king, the entire desertion 



The Tomu or Hituavoon, near Delhi.- From an oriental drawing in the East India Huugo. 


of the cit 3 ’ by the inhabitants, and the precipitite flight of the rebel ti’oops— 
wlio abandoning their camp property, many of their sick and wounded, and 
tlie greater part of their field artillery, have fled in utter disorganization— 
some 4000 or 5000 across the bridge of boats into the Doab, the remainder 
down the right bank of the Jumna. The gates of the palace having been blown 
in, it wjis occupied by our troops about noon on the 20th, and my head-quarters 
established in it the same day.” 

The king appears to have at first accompanied the rebels in their flight, 
and it was feared that the influence of his name might still suffice to rally the 
fugitives, and keep alive the rebellion. Whatever his intentions may have 
been, lie soon ablindoned the idea of resistance, and took refuge in the tomb of 
Humayoon, situated a few miles to the south. As soon as the fact became 
known, Hodson, who was ever on the alert and ready for any. enterprise. 



Chap. III.] 


CA.FrUEE OF DELHI. 


t525 


obtained permission to profceed with a party of his irregular horse to the tomb, a.d. isat. 
and endelavour to obtain possession of the king’s person. On liis arrival, a 
negotiation commenced, and was protracted for above two hours, the king <'ai>tun>of 
gradually lowering his terms, till he at last offered to surrender, if his own life o "al"'* "* 
and the lives of his favourite wife Zeenat Makal and their son Jumma Bukht 
were guaranteed. Hudson having previously obtained the general’s sanction 
gave the guarantee, and the king returned once more to Dellii, but only to 
occupy it as a prisoner till he should be transported beyond seiia as a convict. 

Justice would have been defrauded had the members of his family, who were 
notoriously guilty of having sanctioned and witnessed the horrid massacre of 
women and children, been permitted to escape on the same terms. It is not 
improbable that, on the following day, when Hodson searched them out and 
obtained the unconditional suri'ender of two sons and a grandson of the king, 
tliey too hoped that tlieir lives would be saved. It is certain, however, that sniamiuv 
no promise to this effect had been given, and Hodson only antici}>ated the 
doom which awaited them, and which they certainly deserved, when, (.)U finding 
that an attempt at rescue was about to be made while he was conveying his 
prisoners to Dellii, he shot them dead on the spot with his own hand. 

While vengeance was thus taking its course, an event of a very different 
description was visibly approaching. John Nicholson was on his deatlibed. noiitiiof 
From the course which the ball had taken, thei'e could scarcely be a doubt tliat 
vital parts had been injured, and therefore skill and friendship could at the 
utmost do nothing more than alleviate his sufferings, and minister comfort, till 
the fatal hour should arrive. His death took place on the 23d of Sejitember, 
and filled the British camp witli mourning. He was only in his thirty-fifth 
year, but had already given proof of such talents, both as a diplomatist and a 
soldiei', that all with whom he came in contact, whether countrymen or natives, 
looked up to him Vith admiration. Brief as his career was, it did not termin¬ 
ate till he had achieved a deathless fame. 

The capture of Delhi, which government, from underrating the difficulties, 
had been expecting with some degree of impatience, was all the more welcome 
when it was officially announced, and the governor-general issued a notification, 
in which the language of exultation was freely used. “ Delhi, the focus of the 
treason and revolt which for four months have haimsed Hindoo.stan, and the iiii.tuio..f 
stronghold in which the mutinous army of Bengal has sought to concentrate 
its power, has been wrested from the rebels. The king is a jirisoner in the 
palace. The head-quarters of Major-general Wilson are established in the 
Dewani Khas. A strong column is in pursuit of the fugitives Whatever may 
be. tlie motives and passions by which the mutinous soldiery, and tho.se who 
are leagued with them, have been instigated to faithlessness, rebellion, and 
crimes at which the heait sicken.s, it is certain that they have found encourage¬ 
ment in the delusive belief that India was weakly guarded by England, and 
VOL. III. ■ 875 



A,D. m7. 


J/nrd Cjin» 
fling onthci 
(aptim of 
Uolhi. 


G2G HISTORY OF INDli. [Book IX. 

that before the govemuiMit could gather its strength against them, their ends 
would be gained. They ore now undeceived. Before a single soldier of the 
many thousands who are Jjastening from England to uphold the supremacy 
of the British power lias set foot on these shores, the rebel force where it was 
strongest and most united, and where it had tlie command of unbounded military 
appliances, has been destroyed or scattered, by an army collected within the 
limits of the North-western Provinces and the Punjab alone. The work has 
been done before the support of those battalions which liave been collected in 
Bengal, from the forces of the queen in China, and in her majesty's eastern 
colonies, could reach Major-general Wilson’s anny, and it is by the courage and 
endurance of that gallant army alone—by the skill, sound j udgment, and steady 
resolution of its brave commander—and by the aid of some native cliiefa, 
true to their allegiance, that, under the blessing of God, tlie head of rebellion 
has been crusliwl, and the cause of loyalty, humanity, anil rightful authority 
vindicated." 

Lord Canning, when he said in the above notification that “the head of 
rebellion has been crushed,” gave utterance as much to his wishes and hopes 
as to his convictions. Though cheeked and virtually crushed in the north¬ 
west, it was maintaining a bold front in oilier (juarters, and even threatening, 
particularly in Oude, to celebrate its triumjili by the perpetration of another 
horrid inaasacre. To this part of the narrative, which was necessarily left 
untold, in order to give a continuous account of the siege of Delhi, we must 
now tiim. 



CIIAPTER IV. 


SiK'Reflnpfi of Cii'Ticrril NciTI at Jlcnarcfi and Allalial^ad—The Sritieh bewegti<l in Lucknow—Death of Sir 
Henry Lawrence—Arrival of tToti])A from Perwa—General Havelock aiipointcil to the command 
of a ruUuving furcxj—Hiw Iwilliant vict<»rics—Third Cawnpor niasBacre—Cam^aipi in Oude-'-Ncw 
vicUn'ioB — Tlw Gangeti recroBkied—-Battle of BitlhH>r. 


I IN Eiiiswer to pressing <ip]jliciitions from vjirioua places where mutiny 
I had occurred, or was hourly threatened, government, though sadly 
I liamj^re<l by a deficiency in the means of transport, had begun to 
I ftErwjuxl detachments of lier majesty's 84th, In this way sonte 
% feeble relief had been given to Sir Hugh Wheeler, who had under 
nBitiSww liim, when Nana^Salilb perpetrated his horrid massacres, fifty men belonging.to 
wimliMl Uy tins regiment. JSJleanwhile another European regiment, the 1st Madras fusiliers, 
commanded by Colonel Neill, had arrived. At tlm moment of landing, the 
railway train from Calcutta to Raneegunge was on the point of starting, and 








Chap. IV.] 


G27 


DEFENCE OF'LUCKNOW. 

though it was now well known that not an hour wjfs to be lost in pushing on a.d. issr. 
troops, the railway officials would have stai'ted without them, because the time 
was up. Colonel Neill in this emergency gave proof of the energy and decision Hoinf.>rce. 
which characterized his subsequent proceedings, and by seizing the engine- waniudby 
driver and stoker, prevented the departure of the train till as many of his 
soldiers as it could cairy had taken their seats. Tliis decisive step is said to 
have saved Benares. On the 3d of June, when he reached it with only forty 
of his men, mutiny had already broken out. Feeble as the relief was in 
numbers, it sufficed under the conduct of its able commander to turn the scale, 
and before evening closed, the insurgents had paid tlie }>enalty of their crime 
^in the loss of a hundred killed and twice as many wounded. This success, 
followed up vigorously by other measures of i-epre.ssion, so coinjdcrtely intimi¬ 
dated the mutineers, and the populace, who would willingly have made common 
cause with them, that Colonel Neill was able to leave Benares in tramiuillity, 
and hasten westward to Allahabad, where his presence was still im>re urgently 
required. It has been told how its fort, and the immeu.se military stores of its 
arsenal, were saved by the op])ortune arrival of seventy European invalids from 
Cliunar. The rest of the city, however, was left at the me”cy of the mutiueei's, 
whose unrestrained license had continued for five daj's, when CV)lonel Neill 
appeared with a wing of his fusiliers. Here as at Benares he ])ut down the 
mutiny with a strong hand, and even pacified the surrounding countiy by the 
mere terror of his name. On reading the narrative of his doings, one cannot 
help wishing that he had been permitted to retain the command, in order to 
finish the work which he had so well begun; but all i cgi et 021 this head must 
be suppressed on learniiig that the person about to sui)ei sedc him was not only 
his suj)erior office 2 -, but one who in the course of a few months was to gain 
victory after vlctoiy, and be hailed with universal acchuiiation as one of the 
greatest heroes yf modern times. But it will be uecc.s.s[uy before bringing 
Havelock on the scene, to return to Oude, and take a survey of the British 
])osition at Lucknow after the dis 2 istrous affiur of Chinhut. 

Sir Henry LaAvrcnce, though hopeful that the mutiny might be kept in 
check till the promised I’cinforcements should aiaave, W2is too j)rudcnt to triist Luckuow. 
to a peradventure, and had been diligently ])reparing for the. worst, by foi'ti- 
fying and provisioning both the Muchee Bhowun and the residency, so as to 
have the option, if driven to it, of standing a siege. These labours were con¬ 
siderably advanced, but by no means completed, when the i-cimlse at Chinhut 
left him no alternative but to retire within his defences. H(i was at first 
disposed to hold both the residency and the Muchee Bhowun; or if this were 
deemed impracticable, to give the preference to the Litter. O 12 further con- 
sideration he took a different view, and the Muchee Bhowufi was abandoned. 

The necessity of this step was only too appai-ent. The enemy had already 
isolated it, so completely from the residency, that there could be no direct . 




G28 


ITISTOEY OF INDIA.r 


[Book IX. 


A I). 1H57. 


Tlio Mtiolioe 
liUowmi 
blown up. 


Position of 
the UvitiHli 
At Luukiiow. 


communication between them, and the order to evacuate could not be given 
till an old telegraph on the top of the residency was repaired, and made fit to 
transmit the following brief message: “Spike the guns well, blow up the fort, 
and retire at midnight.’' Colonel Palmer executed this order with perfect 
success. TJie little garrison moved out with their treasure and two or three 
of their guns, and reached the residency without being discovered. About half 
an hour afterwards, the slow match which had been left burning took effect on 
the magazine, containing 250 barrels of gunpowder, and blew the place into 
the air. 

The position occupied by the British force, and the large number of women 
and children under their charge, consi.sted of a kind of plateau, which attained^ 



1, Tlio l»roa<l blank Iin« 1, 1, 1, nbows the ground tKJCupiod by tbo garrison previous lo the ai^.ival of Generals 

Outraiu 1111(1 lla\eloek on Septiiiiiliui' 2r>. 

2, The s))su;e marked *2, "2, *2, indiuutes the position occupied by the relieving force Hulwequent to their arrival. 

U, Kesulonc)-. 8, Native UoMpital. 13, Bheep-house. 

4, lIosi>ital. 9, lirigado Sipioro. 14 Church. 

6, Treasury. 10, Hikhs’ 8(piaro. 1.' Kcilau battoiy. 

(), Post-oiUco. 11, Racket Court. 36, Ommnnoy’s liouse. 

V, llarracks. 12, Cutcherry. , Cawinwor battery. 

IS, JohanneK’s liouso, from which the ononiy kept up a moat destructivo fire on the Cawnjioor battery. 

t t t Shows the position of the enemy's gnus, wliich woe constantly changed during tlio siege. 

its gi-eatest heiglit at the re.sidency, and sunk down rapidly from it to the low 
grounds on the right bank of the Goomtee. Towards the north, Avbere it was 
comparatively narrow, and terminated in a projection of very iiTegular shape, 
it was iuclo.sed by a ditch and bank of earth not above breast-high, but 
heightened where most exposed by sandbags, with openings between them for 
musketry; the other sides were bounded for the most part by the walls of 
various buildings’ and inclosures, wliich, notwithstanding numerous zigzags, 
gave to the remaining space somewhat of a square form. The access to the 
inclosure was bj'^ two gates, the one the Water gate, immediately north of 




Chap. IV.] 


DEFENCE OF LUCKNOW. 


629 


the residency, and the other the Bailey Guard gate, formiug the principal 
entrance to it from the east. These gates -were defended by barricades, as 
Avell as by guns jdaced on the streets which they terminated. The other 
defences consisted of a series of batteries, thrown up on all the most com¬ 
manding points. On the north-east, to the left of the Water gate, and above 
the residency, were two batteries, called re.spectively Evans' and the Redan, 
with a mortar battery between them; at the .south extremity, the Cawnpoor 
battery, and at the south-west Gubbiu’s battery. Owing to tlie .suddenness 
of the siege, two batteries which liad been commenced on the Avest side could 
not be finished, and Avere consequently left outside the inclosure. 

The residency, an irapo.sing pile of building of three storicis, AV'as \'ery little 
adapted for defence. Its nAimerou.s lofty windoAvs gaA'c fiee entrance to the 
missiles of the enemy, and its roof, Avhich Avas only edged round by an orna¬ 
mental balustrade, was wholly exposed. The up))er stories Averc iieccsfiKirily 
abandoned at the A^ery commencement of the siege by all the ladies and 
children ; the ground floor was occupied by the soldiens, Avhile their families 
found good shelter in the tylchcmas, or underground j’cx)m.s. A little to the 
east of the re.sidcncy stood the banqueting hall, a building of tAvo stories. 
Having A’^ery large lofty rooms, it Avas coiiA'erted into an hos2)ital, for Avhich it 
woidd have been well adapted, had it not, like the re.sidency, been too much 
cx 2 )osed. The defect Avas hoAve\'er 2)artially remedied by closing the doors 
and AvindoAA's of the most ex2)osecl .sides with any available materials. Still 
farther east stood the trea.sury, close to the Bailey Guard gate. Immediately 
on the 02 q 30 site .side of the street leading from this gate, Avas the house of 
Dr. Fayrer, a large but not lofty building, with a flat roof, which, being well 
protected by sandbags, aflbrded a good cover for musketiy, and with a tykhana, 
to Avhicli,^wheJi the firing became heavy, the female inmates Avefe able to retire. 
Being thus used^ for defence, the house and its inclosure or compound wei e 
called Dr. Fayrer’s garrison, a name Avhich Avas for the .same reason a2q)lied to 
various other com2>ounds. Thus 2>roceeding south from Di‘. Fayrer’s, occuiTcd 
in succession the Financial garrison. Sagos, and the Judicial, overlooked from 
the west by the Post-ofiice garrison, Anderson’s, and Du2)rat',s, the latter 
adjoining the Cawnpoor battery. On the Avest, Avith the battery at its 
extremity already mentioned, was Gubbin’s garrison, to Avhich the judicial 
commis.sioner of Oude has, both by his services during the siege and his work 
on the subject, given some degree of celebrity. The above enumeration makes 
the defences more formidable in name than they Avere in reality. The two 
strongest batteries—the Redan and the Cawn2)oor—mounted only three guns 
each, and in many places the obstacles were .so fcAv and feeble, that nothing 
but the necessary courage was Avanting to have enabled the enemy to force 
their way into the interior. One of the greatest disadA’antages of the feritish 
position Avas the number and 2 >roximity of the native buildings by which it 


A.D. 1857. 


DritiMi] 
]K>Aitioi) At 
Lucknow. 


I)uRcri|»tton 
of tli« reni ■ 
dency and 
itK 

tiona. 



leso';- 


.msTOKV-or :iifDiA. 


{Book .IX. 


’a.D. r867.- 


Dttftth of 
Blr Hynry 
Lawretu‘.e. 


IIU iioh]o 
clmnu;tor. 


was on all sides sjiirrouaded. When, a siege; was not believed, to be imminent, 
a proposal to clear away these buildings to a sufficient'<Sstance had been 
rejected from motives, of humanity, and when the mistake became palpable, it 
was too late to- remedy it. effectua.lly. In the vicinity of the Redan and 
of Mr. Gubbin’s ■ garrison some clearances had been made, but the ground 
remained covered with liou.sefl, from whicli tbe enemy’s sharp-shooters kept up 
a ceaseless and destructive Are. 

The siege had a vei’y lamentable and ominous commencement. On the Ist 
of July an eight-inch shell entered the room occupied by Sir Henry Lawrence, 
in the first story of the north-east angle of tlie residency. It burst without 

injuring any one, but as the repeJ.ition 
of such a providential escape \vas not to 
be })resumed, he was strongly urged, 
though unfortunately without ettect, 
either to remove to a less exposed 
apartment, oi- to quit the residency al¬ 
together for safer quarters. The very 
next day a second shell entered the 
room and wounded him severely. Hud 
his constitution been le.ss impaired, it 
might have been po.ssible to save his 
life by having recourse to am])utation, 
but with his attenuated frame, the 
utmost that could be done was to apply 
the tourniquet in order to stoj) bleeding. 
The i-espite thus procured lasted onlj”^ for 
two days, duihig which, though writhing with agony, he remained perfectly 
collected, and dictated a series of instructions, appointing Major Banks to the 
civil office of chief commissioner. Colonel Inglis to the command of the garrison, 
and Major Anderson to the .subordinate command of the artillery and engineers. 
Alternately his thoughts tui-ncd to the perilous condition of the garrison and to 
■ the solemn change he was himself about to undergo. He often repeated, “ Save 
the ladies; ” at other times, addressing the sorrowing group around his bed, 
and referring to his own success in life, he asked, “What is it worth nowl” 
The thought was not new to him. He had long acted upon it, and when he 
called ujion all present to fix their afiections on a better world, he only advised 
what he hatl steadily but unostentatiously practised. Never indeed was 
there a nobler spirit- Possessed of talents of the highest order, he was .simple- 
hearted as a child, liberal almost beyond his means, and of so tender and 
affectiiKiate a nat\ire that it Wiis impossible not to love him. His character 
may still be read in the modest epitaph which he ordered to be inscribed on 
his tomb: “Here lies Sir Henry Lawrence, who tried to do his duty. May 









God have roercj on him.”- Hia aervices; particnlarly in-the Punjab, of which a.d.iss:.’ 
lie was one of tlie earliest most successful adroinistratora, entitle him to a ~ 

foremost place among Indian statesrnen; but even eoiild these bo forgotten, 
the noble institution which bears his name as its fbunder, and ,by which the 
children of European soldiers serving in Indian instead of being left to ^ow 
up as outcasts, are duly oared for, would sufTice to keep his memory in perpetual 
and honoured remembrance. The siege of the British garrison at Lucknow, 
and its gallant defence, furnish perhaps the most interesting episode in the 
liistory of the mutiny, but before proceeding further with the details, it will 
be necessary to give an account of the exertions wdiicli were bfcing made by 
government to effect its relief. 

A diviMon of the troops employed in the Persian war was commanded by o®"*™' 
General Henry Havelock, who had thus for the first time, after a long jieriod an-irai in 
of service in subordinate positions, some adequate scope for his great talents, romia. 
Something however was still wanting, and be naturally longed for an appoint¬ 
ment which, giving him undivided responsibility, would enable him to form 
his own plans and execute them in his own way. Such an appointment, when 
be had little reason tf> expect it, was actually awaiting him. The lia.sty return 
of the European regiments from Persia having broken up the division under 
bis command, he hastened back to India, intending to lose no time in joining 
General An.son, the commander-in-chief, his proper place as adjutant-general of 
the army being at head-quartera On arriving at Bombay on the 29th of May, 
and there receiving the astounding intelligence of the events at Meerut and Delhi, 
his first impulse was to pTish on to the north-we.st by the nearest route across the 
country. On further inquiry this was found impracticable, and he therefore 
embarked, on the 1st of June, in i\\eErin steamer, for Point de Gallo, where be 
hoped to meet '^he steamer proceeding from Suez to Calcuttii. On the night of 
the 5th, when ne^iring the coast of Ceylon, in clear moonlight, the vessel struck "■••n-ow 
upon a reef, and as the forepart immediately filled, seemed about to go down coyimi. 
head-foremo.st, but as he himself afterwards expressed it: '• The, madness of 
man threw us on shore; the mercy of God foutid us a .soft jilace at Caltura,” 
and though the vessel was lost, all the persons on board escaped. Proceeding 
by land to Galle, he found .a ve.ssel about to return to Calcutta, and immediately 
re-embarked. He reached Madras on the 13th of June, and was surprised and 
grieved to learn that General Anson was death He had been hastening to 
join him—what should he now do? Expecting that Sir Henry Somerset, then 
at Bombay, would now, by virtue of his rank, become provisional commander- 
in-chief, he was thinking of returning thither to join him. Fortunately, a 
different arrangement took place. Sir Patrick Grant, ctimmanding at Madras, 
became provisional successor to General Anson, and took lum with liim to 
Calcutta, where they arrived on the 17th of June. It had been resolved tr> 
organize a moveable column for Bengal, similar to that which had rendered 



632 


histohy of iNbiA. 


[Book. IX. 


A n. msr. 


(Jonom 
llavol 
app< tiiiKl 
(ioinniiuader 
of th« fon'^e 
for relief of 
LuokiU'W, 


Tlio nrnnbor 
of hia trooi)s. 


such essential service in the Punjab. The troops composing it were to include 
among others the 64th and 78th Highlanders. These distinguished regiments 
had formed pa*-t of Havelock's division in Persia, and it was with no ordinary 

feelings of gratification that the command 
of the column, confeiTcd upon him thret' 
days after his arrival, again placed him at 
their head. The instructions given him 
by go'vernment on his appointment were, 
that “after (jnelling all disturbances at 
Allahabad, he should not lose a moment 
in supporting Sir Henry I^wrence at 
Lucknow, and Sir Hugh Wheeler at Cawii- 
poor; and that he should take prompt 
measures for dispersing and utterly de¬ 
stroying all mutineers and insurgents." 

Havelock’s first object was to i)rovidc 
against any delay in the progress of the 
column from want »)f carriage. He knew 
that during the outbreak at Allahabad 
1600 bullocks collected by the commis¬ 
sariat liad disappeared, and he there¬ 
fore proposed that the carts and bullocks on the gi-and trunk road should 
be employed in transporting ammunition and stores, while the troops, with 
their baggage and tents, should be conveyed by water. Having obtained the 
necessary sanction to these arrangements, and also to a liberal use of secret 
service-money, for the purpose of making tlitj intelligence department as 
complete as possible, he started from Calcutta on the 25th of June, an<l reached 
Benares on the 28th. By this time, one of the most important objects which 
he had in view had been frustrated by the perpetration of the fli’st Cawnpoor 
massacre, though the fact was not made known to him till the 8d of July, 
three days after his arrival at .Allahabad. Here another disa]>pointmeut 
awaited him. The European column was to have included four European 
regiments, but on the 7th of July, when he marched out to the re-capt\ire of 
Cawnpoor, he could not muster mon^ than 1400 European bayonets. The 
day before he reached Allahabad, the Cawnpoor massacre not being yet known, 
Colon(^^s5J%ill had detached for its relief, under Major Renaud .of the Madras 
fusiliers, 400 Europeans, 300 Ferozepoor Sikhs, 120 native irregular cavahy, 
and two nine-poundei-s. This movement, though made with caution, was 
perilous, for should the enemy bear down upon him, they would be able t® 
overwdielm him b^ mere numbers, even if the whole'of his detachment should 
prove faithful. Should part pro|fe othenvi.se, as was strongly suspected, his 
destruction would be all but inevitable. In this emergency General'Havelock 



Majok-qgnebal Sir Henry IIaveliiok. 

Front the bu«t by VV. Uehtiut* 




('HAP. IV.1 


GENERAL HAVELOCK. 


G33 


liastened forward by forced itiarclies. The rebels on their part were equally 
active, and in the hope of having only the detachment to cncounbir, had 
pushed on to Futtohpoor, near the right bank of the Ganges, ala^ut forty-five 
mile.s below Cawnpoor. On the same day he effected a junction with Major 
Renaud, and hence on the 12th of July, when the rebels, who had mistaken 
a reconnoitring l)arty for the detachment, rushed on without any regular 
formation, in the full confidence of an easy victor 3 ^ they found themselve.s 
brought suddenly in jiresence of the whole British force. Tlie j)o.sition and 
subsequent operations are thus described in the general’s des]>atch:—“ Futtch- 
])oor constitutes a position of no small strength. The haid and dry trunk 
road subdivides it, and is the onlj' means of convenient access, for the ]>lains 
on both sides arc covered at this season ly heavy lodgments of water, to the 
depth of two, three, and four feet. It is sunounded by garden inclosures of 
great strength, with high walls, and has within it many houses of good masonrj*. 
In front of the swamps arc hillocks, villages, and mango groves, which tlie 
enemy alreadj'^ occiqiicd in force. I estimate his number at 3500, with twelve 
brass and iron gun.s. I made rny disposition.s. I’lie guns, now eight in 
nnmbei', were formed on and close to the chausde, in the centie, under Captain 



FuTTr.iirooR.— From oiigravin;; in Illustrated Loiidiui News. 


Maude, R A., protected and aided by one hundred Enfitdd l illemen of the C4th. 
The detachments of iufantrj'^ were at the same monnuit thrown into line of 
qiiarter distance columns, at deploying distance, and thus advanced ift support, 
covered at discretion by Enfield skirmishera. The small force of volunteers and 
irregular cavalry moved forward on the flanks on harder gj'ound. I might say 
that in ten minutes the action was decided, for in that shoi t space of time the 
spirit of the enemj'^ was entirely subdued. The l ifle fiie reaching them at 
an unexpected distance, filled them with dismay; and when Captain Maude 
was enabled to push his guns through flanking swamps to point-blank range, 
Voi,. HI. 270 


A.n. 1857. 


r«eiHTnl 
Havelock’iS 
tirKi. on 
oouiifcr 
M idi tliO 
iiiutiui'or.4 

at Futtch 
11 «.>»■. 



G34 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book IX. 


A.D. 1857. 


OnnerAl 
order issiiod 
by Ifiivo- 
lock after 
victory of 
Kuttoh]ir><ir 


Two vioto- 
rioii in one 
d-My. 


liis surprisingly accurate fire demolished their little remaining confidence. In 
a moment tliree guns were abandoned to us on the chaus^e, and the force 
advanced steadily, driving the enemy before it at every point." 

The merit of this victory was greatly enhanced by the circumstances under 
which it was fought. The British troops had previously marched twenty-four 
hours, and from the preceding afternoon had not tasted food. No wonder 
tliat after the battle, wliich, though decided as the despatch says in ten minutes, 
really lasted four hours, the men sank down exhausted on the ground about a 
mile beyond the spot where tlio enemy made their last stand, and did not 
attempt pursuit. On the 13th of July, the day following the battle, while 
the troops were en joying a necessary and well-merited repose, the general issued 
tlie first of his orders of the day. It deserves quotation; “General Havelock 
thanks his soldiers for their arduous exertions of yesterday, which produced in 
four hours the strange result of a rebel army driven from a strong position, 
eleven guns captured and their whole force scattered to the winds, without the 
loss of a single British soldier. To what is this astounding effect to be attri¬ 
buted? To the fii-e of British artillery, exceeding in rapidity and precision all 
that the brigadier has ever witnessed in his not short career; to the power of 
the Enfield rifle in Briti.sh hands; to British pluck, that great qualit}’' which 
lias survived the vicissitudes of the hour, and gained intensity from the crisis; 
and to the blessing of Almighty God on a most righteous cause, the cause of 
justice, humanity, truth, and good government in India.” 

General Havelock resumed his march on the 14th, and next day, on ari'iving 
a little after daybreak in front of the village of Aong, nearly half-way between 
Futtehpoor and Cawnpoor, ascertained that the enemy were encamped at a 
short distance beyond it, behind an entrenchment which they had thrown up 
across the road. Colonel Fraser Tytler, sent forward with about a third of the 
force, found the enemy strongly posted in gardens and inelosures. A short 
delay on the part of the British while their line was being fonned, being 
niistakeu by the enemy for hesitation, they advanced to the attack instead of 
waiting foi- it, and occupied a village about 200 yards in front of their entrench¬ 
ment. The Madras fusiliers, ordered to dislodge them, effected it with the 
utmost gallantly, though unfortunately with the loss of Major Renaud, their 
intrepid commander, who was mortally wounded. After clearing the village. 
Colonel Tytler gave the enemy no respite, and continued to advance till they 
fled with precipitation. While the detachment was thus employed, the main 
body was assailed by large bodies of cavalry, who made repeated attempts to 
plunder the baggage, but in this they were completely foiled. The work of 
the day, however, was not yet over. As soon as the troops had breakfasted, 
the order to move was again given, and they pushed on for two hours under a 
vertical .sun along the main road to Cawnpoor. The object of this extra- 
ordinaiy exertion was to gain the bridge which spans the Pandoo Nuddee, 



Chap. IV.] 


ADVANOE ON CAWNPOOR. 


635 


before the enemy could destroy it. The stream, though usually fordable, was ad. kwt. 
now flooded, and might have proved a serious obstacle to the advance, if the 
bridge had been removed. Fortunately the enemy were surprised in the very AiImhiw i.i. 
act 01 mining, and after a short but sharp contest, were compelled to retreat on 
Cawnpoor. This place was now only twenty-three miles distant, and every 
man was anxious to push on for it without the loss of a single hour. Abf)vi* 

200 European women and children, reserved by Nana Sahib when he jierpe- 
trated his two previous massacres, were reported to be still alive. What a 
glorious enterprise to rescue them, and at the same time take suminary 
vengeance on their inhuman jailer! 

Notwithstanding the universal e.agerness to advance, some diday was 
unavoidable. Night had set in before the commissariat cattle had roaclaid the 
encamping ground, and many of the men, before animal food could bo ]n epaved, 
had sunk down exhausted, after contenting themselves with ])orter and biscuit. 

In the morning when the men again started, a march of sixteen miles brought '’..situ.ii <.t 
them to the village of Maharajjjoor. Here during a halt and a hasty meal, 
which like that of the previous night was more stimulating than nutritive, the ' ' 
force and position of the rebels were ascertained. Nana Sahib in ])erson had 
come out from Cawnp<ioi- with 5000 men and eight guns, and was (iucampod 
about seven miles on this side of it, near the village of Aheerwa. (.'ould any- 
thing have given genuine courage and confidence to this execrable miscreant, he 
might have found it in the strength of his position. Ilis left, restiiig on the 
high ground which sloped to the Ganges about a mile btdow, was defended by 
lour twenty-four pounders, his centre, posted in a hamlet where a horse six- 
pounder and a twenty-four pounder howitzer stood entrenched, was intersected 
by two roads—the one the grand trunk road passing immediately on the light, 
and the ol^her, Vhich branched ofi‘ from it about half a mile in Iront iuid led 
directly to the Cawnpoor cantonments, jiassing at some distance to the left; the 
right, posted behind a village embosomed among mango groves, and inclosed by 
a mud wall, had the additional defence of two nine-pounders and the railway 
embankment at some distance beyond. I'he whole line was in the form of a 
crescent, with its concavity fronting- the trunk load, by which it was assumed 
that the attack would be made. General Havelock resolved to make it from a 
different direction. Any attemjit to carry the entrenchments in front would, even 
if successful, entail a loss of life which might be almost as fatal as defeat; and 
his determination therefore was to turn the left flank, where the dryne,ss 
of the ground and the gradual ascent fully compen.sated for its greater 
elevation. 

The British force began to advance along the trunk road in a column of 
sub-divisions—the volunteer cavalry taking the lead in frofit. A march of 
three miles having brought them to the point where the two roads diverged, 
the column, wheeled to the right, and under cover of a line of thick groves. 



03G 


IIISTOKY OF INDIA. 


[Book IX. 


A.T), issT. advanced 1000 yards in Uiat direction unseen by the enemy, who, when they 
saw the volunteer cavalry pursuing the direct road, naturally supposed that 
8igniii<iof«it they were followed closely by the main body. At length an opening in the 
at Maiiamj- trccs having made the rebels aware that their loft was the real object of attack, 
they opened all their available guns on the flank of the advancing column, and 
at the same time iittempted to meet it by a change of front. It was too late. 
Bi'fore they could recover from their surprise and consternation, the column 
had emerged from the grove, and the companies wheeling into line were 
advancing rajtidly under cover of an effective fire from the artillery. To this 
fire the rebels could not rej)ly from their centre and right, without mowing 
down their own left, and thus one of their most powerful arms was in some 
measure pai'alyzed. Still, however, their twenty-four jjounders on their left did 
so much (execution, that a speedy resort to the bayonet became necessary. The 
mode in which this wiis done is thus described in the despatch; “ The opportu¬ 
nity had arrived for which 1 have long anxiously waited of developing the 
prowess of the 78th Highlanders. Three guns of the enemy were strongly 
[losted behind a lofty hamlet well entrenched. 1 directed this regiment to 
advance, and never have I witnessed conduct more admirable. They were led 
by Colonel Hamilton, and followed him with surpassing steadiness and gallantry 
under a heavy fire. As they approached the village, they cheered and charged 
with the bayonet, tlu; pipes sounding the j'ibroch. Need I add that the enemy 
fled, and the village was taken, and the guns were captured?” When the 
enemy’s left was tli\is crushed, their infantry rushing to the rear, ap])eared to 
bi’eak into two bodies, the one retiring a few hundred yards on the road to the 
Cawnpoor cantonments, and the other rallying near the howitzer which 
defended theii'centre. (.)n this, the general calling again upon the 78th, exclaimeil, 
“Now, Highlanders, another charge like that W'ius the day.” 'They answered 
with a cheer and a rush, and aided by the 61-th, who emulated their courage, 
captured the howitzer, scattering the masses who had made it their rallying 
]K)int. During these operations the enemy’s right had been driven in headlong 
flight. Though victory had now declared itself, the fighting had not ceased. 
From one of the villages where the fugitives had rallied, a heavy fire was kept 
u}), and not .silenced till the general, who well knew how to excite and main¬ 
tain a spirit of honourable rivalship among his troops, called aloud, “Come, 
who’ll take that village, the Highlanders or the U4th?” The a]>peal was 
instautaueously answered, and the village effectually cleared. 
catHo One other effeu’t Avas reepured. When the enemy seemed in full reti’eat, 

a destructive fire was suddenly opened from two light guns and a twenty-four 
pounder, which had been planted in reserve upon the road. The troops around 
these guns consisted partly of reinforcements whom Nana Sahib had called to 
his assistance from Cawnpoor, and who were conseijuently fresh, while our men 
were exhausted. As our guns were a mile in the rear, the British troops while 



Ciia:'. IV.] 


CAWNPOOR RETAKEN. 


637 


waiting for them lay down for shelter from the fire wliieh was oarrying death a i>. i.s.',7. 
into their ranks. This halt gave new courage to the enem 3 ^ Nana Saliih wa.s 
seen riding among them, while the miise of their drums and trumpets indicated ‘lof'-ja 
that another grand effort Avas about to he made. They accordingly pi'cpared 
to advance, while their cavalry .spreading out in the form of a crescent, threatened 
to envelope the British force, which did not now exceed 800 men. Matters 
once more looked seri<.ms. “ My artillery cattle,” sa^ s the gtmeral, “ wearied 
hy the length of the march, could not bring U}> the guns to my as.si,stiince, aJid 
the Madras fusiliers, the Glth, 8fth, and 78tli detachments foinied in line, were 
exposed to a heavy fire from the twenty-four })ounder on the road. 1 vuis resolved 
this state of tilings .should not last; so calling upon my men who Avere lying 
doAvn in line, to leap on their feet, 1 directed another steady advance, it Avas 
irresistible, 'fhe enemy sent round shot into our I'anks until Ave Avere Avithin 
300 yards, and then poured in gra.]»e with such precision ami determination as 
I have seldom svitne.ssed. But the (itth, led by Major Stirling, and by my 
aide-de-cami> (the general’s own son, noAV Sir llemy Havi'loek), who had placed 
him.self in their front, Avere not to be denied. Their rear shoAved the ground 
strevv'ed with wouiuled, but on they steadily and silently came, then Avith a 
cheer charged and captured the uiiAviehly trojihy of their valour. 'I'he eiu'my 
lost all heart, and after a hurried fire of mu.sketry, guAC Avay in total rout. 

Four of my guns came up, and completed their discomfiture liy a heavy 
cannonade; and as it greAV dark, the roofless barracks of our artillery Acei'e dimly 
descried in advance, and it was evident that CaAvnjioor Avas once more in our 
])os.ses.sion.” 

I'empting as the immediate occujiation of tVAVUpoor mu.st have bei'U to 
(leneral Hav'elock, it would have been hazardous to enter it in the <lark, and the 
exhaustec^ trodjis biA ouacked for the night on the bare ground. Next morning 
before starting, ^spies returned with the dreadful intelligenei! that the fiendish 
Nana, to compen.sate for the successive defeats tif his adherents, had on the 15th 
taken the revenge of which only such a natAire as his was cajiable, by massacring 
the 210 helple.s,s women and children, whom a previous act of gross treachery 
had })laced in his poAver. When the troops entered the toAvn, Sir Hugh' 
Wheeler’s encampment, and the prison-house where the I'ccent butchery had 
been perpetrated, were naturally the llnst objects of interest. The .scene which n"m,i ..i«)<- 
presented it,self is too hoirible to be dAA'elt upon, and Ave therefore simply 
boiTOW the brief description of it by Mr. Mar.shman in his Me'imilrs. “The 
pavement was SAvimming in blood, and fragments of ladies’ and childr’en’s 
dresses were floating on it. They entered thi! apartments and found them 
empty and silent, but there also the blood lay deep on the floor, covered with 
bonnets, collars, combs, and children’s frocks and frills. 'I’lift Avails werf^ dotted 
with the marks of bullets, and on the wooden pillars were <lecp sword-cuts, 
from somp of which hung tresses of hair. But neither the .sabre-cuts nor the 



038 


HISTOEY OF INDIA. 


[Book IX. 


A.I» IB-W. 

Horrible 
t(i*erie pre- 
oa 

filtering 
i ’awn|K)or 


hWmler iti 
thu Itritinh 
4am|i 


bullets were sufficiently high above the floor to indicate that the weapons had 
been aimed at men defending their lives; they appear rather to have been 
levelled at crouching women and children begging for mercy. Tlie soldiers 
I)roceede(l in tlieir search, when in crossing the court-yard they perceived 

human limbs bris¬ 
tling from a well, 
and on further ex¬ 
amination found it 
to be choked up 
with the bodies of 
the victims, whicli 
ap]>eared to have 
been thrown in 
promiscuously, the 
dead with the 
Avounded, till it 
was full to the 
brim. The feel¬ 
ings of those who 
witnessed the spec¬ 
tacle it is ea.sy to com^eive, but impossible to describe. Men of iron neiwe 
who, during the inarch from Allahabad, had rushed to the cannon's mouth with¬ 
out flinching, and had seen unajiptilled their comrades mowed down around 
(hem, now lifted u]) their voices ami wept.” 

'J'he exultation i>roduced by the victory at Cawnpooi- was followed by a 
certain degree of de.spoudeney. 1’he British ranks had been thinned not only 
in tight, but by cholera, which carrying on its insidious ravages, schrcely allowed 
a. day to j>a.ss without cutting short some valuable life 'which coyld ill be spared. 
While thus wt'akened, the magnitude (jf the bisk assigned to the force became 
iu(»re pal])able, and it was impossible not to feel anxious when the question was 
asked. How Avill it be po.ssible with a handful of men to clear the road of the 
myriads of r«'bels, and force the way to Lucknow^ In answer to urgent appli¬ 
cations for reinforcements, General Neill (.such was now his rank) entered 
Cawnpoor on the 20th of Jul}', bringing with him only 227 men. More than 
these wi're neces.sary to garris(jn the town, and thus the force which remained 
available for action in the field was less than before. To aggravate the difficulty, 
disoipline had begun to yield to the love of plunder, and the general was obliged 
to exchange, huulatory terms in addressing his troops for such language as the 
iollowing: “'J'he marauding in this camp exceeds the disorder which super¬ 
vened (Ai the shor't-lived triumph of the miscreant Nana Sahib.. A provost- 
marshal has been appointed with special instructions to hang up, in their 
nn i/orm, all British soldiers that plunder. This shall not be an idle threat.” 



'liir •* Sl-A!Mi!iTKH-HoDflK.” (!a\vni*oge. wlicrt* thc MaHHaorc ttwik place. 

Froiu lb H Uredk’e Bkrtolu-h in India the Mutiny. 


Chap. IV.] ENTRENCHMENT AT CAWNPOOE. 639 

While pondering the difficulties which lay before him, Havelock had been 
heard to exclaim, “ Jf the worst comes to the worat, we can but die with 
swords in our hands.” But this resource, which the brave man can always 
count upon, would be a very soriy excuse for the general who should bring 
matters to that desperate pass without absolute necessity. His very fiist step, 
therefore, after entering Cawnpoor, was to select a spot which he could fortify, 
so as at once to command the pfissage of the river and secure the safety of the 
garrison. Fortunately such a si)ot was easily found. It was situated on the 
bank of the river, and formed an elevated flat, about 200 yards in length and 
100 in breadth. On this spot necessary operations for a field-work, capable of 
accommodating and of being defended by SOO men, were immediately com¬ 
menced and carried on with the utmost vigoui'. Nearly 1000 native labourers 
from the town were set to work, an^^ encoui’aged to punctuality by regular pay¬ 
ment every evening, 'fhe irregular cavalry, who had been disarmed on the 
march for disaffection, were also made to labour, while British siddiers po.s- 
sessing mechanical skill were induced to exert it by a gratuity of sixpence a 
day. The work made so much progress, that it promised to be able to protect 
itself by the time the passage of the Ganges could be effected. This last was a 
work of no small difficulty. The Ganges, nearly a mile wide, was swollen to an 
impetuous torrent; the bridge of boats had been broken by the mutineers; and 



Well at Cawnpoor. —From sketch by Lieutciiaiit Pcarco, engraved in Illustmted Times. 


there were neither boats nor boatmen to supply its place. After considerable 
difficulty, on the morning of 21st July, by the aid of a small steamer, a detach¬ 
ment of Highlanders was sent across amid torrents of rain. They landed in a 
swamp, and had the enemy been on the alert, must have be^n in the ^eatest 
peril. Fortunately no opposition was offered. A second detachment followed 
in the evening, and at the end of a week the whole force had safely crossed. 


A.n. 1857. 


Difnciilty 
and danger 
of lulvunc* 
iiig into 
Oudu. 


llavolriok’s 

etitri'iicli- 

niont. 



A I>. 1857. 


I'ij'Ml en 
counter 
with tho 
rnutinoet 
in Od'lv 


Viflory of 


Virlorj of 

gutig.*. 


G40 HISTORY OF INDIA. [Book IX. 

On the 28th of July tlie whole British force, coasistirig of 1500 men, of 
whom 1200 wore Britisli, and ten guns, was assembled at Mimgulwar, about 
five miles from tho river, on the road to Lncknow, situated fort 3 r-five miles to 
tlie north-east. On the following morning a march of three miles was made 
to Omm. Here the enem^' were hmiid strongly posted. “ His right,” saj's 
tho geiKU-al, “ Avjrs protected bj”^ a swamy) which could neither be forced nor 
turned; his adv'anco was drawn up in an inclosure, which in this Avarlihe 
district had purposely or accidentallj' as.sumed tho form of a bastion. The 
rest of his (advance) f<.)rce was y)osted in and behind a village, the houses of 
which were looy)holed. The j>as.sagc between the village and the town of Onao 
is nari’ow. The towui itself extended three quaiters of a mile to our right. 
The flooded .state of the counti^y ynccluded the jmssibility of ttirning in this 
direction. Tho swarny) shut us in on the lc£t. 'J’hus an attack in front became 
unavoidable.” It Avas commenced bj’^ the 78th Highlanders and Madras 
fu.siliius, who suecc^eded in carrjdng the bastioned inclo.sure, but AAm-o met by 
such a destructives fire on ay)y)roaching the A'illagc, that they could not carry it 
till reinforced by the 0 Ith. After it Avas forced, and the guns defending it 
wtae c,ay>tuvcd, the Avhole force debouched l)etAA cen the village and tho toAvn of 
Onao. Here, hoAvewer, it Avas im])o,s,sible to halt. The main l»ody of the 
enemy avoix; seen ha.stening down to the town Avith a numerous aitillery, and 
if y)ermitteil to establish themselves Avithin it, Avould eftectuallj'- bar all fai-ther 
jArogress. 'J’herc Avas no alternative therefore bvit to endeavoAir to outstriy> 
them, and gain a y)osition bej'ond the town before they could reach it. In 
this, b_y pushing ray)idly forAvard, the column casilj’^ .succeeded, and stood 
posted on the Lucknow side, on a yiiece of diy ground about half a mile in 
('.xtent, commanding the highroad, along Avdiich the enemy, still in hojie of 
gaining the race, Avere huriying in great confusion. It \A ould irnA^e, been ea.sy 
ti> arrest tln'ir yirogress, but the gcmeral knew better, 'fhe^^ Avere ru.shing to 
their owm destruction. He allowed them therefore to come on till they A^'ore in 
IVont of his lino, and then, before they eoidd remedy their jnistake, or recover 
from the con.sternation producetl ly it, oy>ened with such a fire both of guns and 
musketiy, that victory sooi\ declared in his favour, with a lo.ss to the enemy of 
800 men and fifteen gun.s. 

The troojis at the end of thi'ce houi’S again started, and marched to Busserut- 
gunge, a Availed town, intersected ly the highroad to LucknoAV. The gate in 
front was defended ly an eartliAVork, a trench, and fom‘ guns, and the AA'alls, as 
Avell as tAvo turrets flanking the gate, A\mre looyJmled. The road leading out from 
the farther gate was continued by a causeway across a sheet of AA’^ater about 
150 3 m-ds Avide and 0 feet deeyA. Taking adA^antage of this circumstance, 
ordera were given' to the Glth to march round the town to the left, and inter- 
y)ose betAveen the farther gate and the causeway, while the 78th Highlanders 
and the Madras fusiliers should storm in front. These combined movements 



Chap. IV.] 


ADVANCE FROM CAWNPOOR. 


G41 


so alarmed the enemy, that after a short defence they abandoned the town and a.d. ibst. 
fled across the causeway. The flank movement ought to have cut off their 
retreat, but owing to an unfortunate delay, the opportunity of inflicting a 
more signal defeat was lost. 

Once more two victories had been gained on a single day, but still the n.iveiock 
prospect was by no means cheering. During the action, a large body of troops, 
supposed to be those of Nana Sahib, had been seen hovering on the left, and 
new mutinies, particularly one at Dinapoor, had given new strength and 
courage to the mutineers. Meanwhile the sick and wounded had become so 
numerous, that the whole carriage available for their use was already required. 

Strong reinforcements had been promised, and in particular the arrival of two 
regiments, the 5th fusiliers from the Mauritius, and the 90th foot, forming 
part of the troops originally destined for China, had been confidently e.xpected, 
t)ut it now appeared that these regiments had been diverted to another quarter, 
and that some weeks must elapse before the real strength of the column could 
be increased. Under these circumstances a retrograde movement had become 
imperative, in order to keep open the communication with Cawupoor, and 
deposit the sick and wounded in its hospital The order, equally painful to 
the general and odious to the troops, was accordingly given, and the column 
returned to Mungulwar. This 2 )lace had the double advantage of being within 
an easy distance of Cawnpoor, and furnishing a site for the canij) on an 
elevated ridge which, held by a British force, was impregnable. 

Shortly after reaching Mungulwar, General Neill pushed forward from 
Cawnpoor 257 bayonets, and five guns belonging to Cajitain 01[)hert’s 
battery. The column, thus imperfectly reinforced, was in fact no stronger 
than when it first crossed the Ganges, but it was now the month of August, 
and Havelock felt that another advance for the relief of Lucknow must be 
attempted at all" hazards. He therefore moved out of Mungulwar on the 
evening of the 4th, and next morning, on approaching Busserutgunge, came in 
sight of the enemy. His plan of attack, nearly similar to that formerly adopted, 
was happily carried out with more success. While the C4th and 84th advanced 
in front, under cover of a thundering cannonade, the 78th Highlanders, the 
1st fusiliers, and the Sikhs, with Captain Maude’s battery, moved round by 
the right, which had been discovered to give easier access than by the left. 

The enemy, as before, rushed out from the farther gate, and made for the 
causeway, where they suffered severely from Captain Maude’s guns, which were 
already in full play upon it. So complete was the rout, that they never 
halted till they reached Newabgunge, five miles beyond the battle-field. 
Notwithstanding this success, Havelock was obliged once,more to j>auso. 

With the force at his command, was he not attempting an impo.ssibility? , The 
Gwalior contingent had recently mutinied, and the report was, that while the 
mutineers of Dinapoor were advancing into Oude from the east, those of the 
VoL. III. * 277 



642 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book IX. 


A.l). 186T. 


Diffitiult 
jiosition of 
llayelock. 


llo 

a second 
time to 
rofcim. 


Alarming 
nows from 
C-aAvn|)Oor. 


contingent, forniing in itself a little army, complete in all its parts and well- 
disciplined, had an-ived in the vicinity of Caipee, situated on the Jumna, only 
forty-five miles south-west of Cawnpoor. The question raised was much more 
serious than before. Then it was simply a question of delay, and was decided 
under the conviction that the advance might still be resumed in time to effect 
the relief at Luctnow. Now, on the contrary, if another retrograde movement 
took place, the hapless garrison would be left to its fate—a fate which could be 
nothing but tlie repetition of the Cawnpoor massacre in an aggi’avated form. 
No wonder that “ the mind of the general was," as Mr. Marshman says, “ a 
prey to conflicting anxieties.” Many commanders would in such a dilemma 
have had recourse to a council of war, but, “ independently of his own spirit of 
self-reliance, liis experience of the mischief which had attended these councils 
in Afghanistan was sufficient to deter him from any such attempt to divide 
the responsibilities of his post," and after consulting with the officers of liis 
staff, who unanimously concun-ed with him in the opinion that to advance to 
Lucknow under present circumstances would be only the uncompensated loss of 
his own force, he gave the order to return to Mungulwar. That he was fully 
alive to the momentous consequences involved in this step appears from his 
letters relating to it. In one addressed to Colonel Inglis, now commanding at 
Lucknow, after stating that stem necessity had left him no option but to retire, 
he continued thus: “When further defence becomes impossible, do not nego¬ 
tiate or capitulate. Cut your way out to Cawnpoor. You will save the colours 
of the 32d and two-thirds of your British troops.” In a letter to Sir Patrick 
Grant, he said: “ It was with the deepest reluctance that I was compelled to 
relinquish as impracticable and hopeless the enterprise of the relief of Lucknow, 
but my force, diminished to 900 infantry, was daily lessened by the inroads of 
cholera. I should have had at least two battles to fight before !• could have 
approached the Dilkoosha park, which is the direction in which I would have 
endeavoured to penetrate; and to win my way up to the residency through a 
fortified suburb w'ould have been an effort beyond my strength. The issue 
would have, been the destruction of this force, as well as of the gallant garrison ; 
a second loss of Cawnpoor, and the abandonment of all this portion of the 
Doab to the insurgents.” 

Wliile the column remained at Mungulw'ar, the communication across the 
Ganges was rendered complete by taking advantage of three islands in its 
channel, opposite to the entrenchment, and connecting them by boats or rafts, 
so as to form a continuous line of road. The value of this road was soon put 
to the test. On the 11th of August General Neill forwarded the following 
startling communication: “One of the Sikh scouts I can depend upon, lias 
just come in, and reports that 4000 men and five guns have assembled to-day 
at Bithoor, and threaten Cawnpoor. I cannot stand this; they will enter the 
town and our communications are gone; if I am not supported I can only hold 




Chap. IV.] 


VICTORY OF BITHOOE. 


643 


out here; I can do nothing beyond our entrenchments. All the country a.d. 18 .W. 
between this and Allahabad will be up, and our powder and ammunition on 
tlie way, if the steamer, as I feel assured, does not start, will fall into the haDd.s Alarming 
of the enemy, and we will be in a bad way.’' In consequence of this commu- cawniioor! 
nication, Havelock was about to recross the Ganges, when ho learned that the 
enemy, mustering about 4000 men, with some guns, had arrived at Busserut- 
gunge. To have effected the passage with such a force in his rear would have 
been difficult. The moral effect also would have been pernicious, as the rebels 
might have boasted with some plausibility that they had chased the Bntish 
out of Oude. He therefore at once took the initiative, and marching to 
Boorhiya, about a mile and a half on this side of' Busserutgunge, found the 
enemy strongly entrenched, their right resting on the village on the main road, 
and their left on a mound about 400 yards distant, both defended by artillery. 

In their front was a flat eovered with green vegetation, which gave it the 
appearance of dry ground. It Wiis in fact a morass, but was not di.scovered to 
be so till the right wing of the column, after a steady advance, amved at its 
edge. The halt produced by this mistake was only of short duration. The 
78th Highlanders, moving on to the main road, marched up to the enemy’s 
guns, notwithstanding their well-served fire, and aided by a flank movement 
of the fusiliers, captured them at the point of the bayonet. No further 
resistance was offered, and the flight became general, the fugitives suffering 
severely, particularly from the captured guns, which the Highlanders had lost 
no time in turning upon them. After this exploit tlie column retunied to 
Muiigulwar, and the following day made an easj’’ passage across the Ganges. 

Though thus precluded for the present from further operations in Oude, 
the column, was not permitted to indulge in repo.se, for 4000 rebels were posted 
in a menacing attitude at Bithoor, scarcely ten miles distant. To encounter 
this new foe the column set out on the morning of the 16th of August, and, 
after a most fatiguing m<arch under a vertical sun, which burned with unwonted 
fierGcne.ss, found the enemy in one of the strongest positions they had yet taken 
up. The plain in ft'ont, covered with villages and dense plantations of sugar¬ 
cane and castor-oil plants, was watered by a stream which pursued its course 
towards the Ganges, and was at this season too deep to be fol dable. The only 
access to the town across it was by a uaiTow stone bridge, defended by a 
breastwork on its flank, and commanded by some high ground and strong 
buildings. Foi-tunately, either from ignorance or excessive confidence, the 
enemy had failed to profit by this position, and instead of remaining behind 
the nullah, had placed themselves among the villages and plantations in its 
front, and thus left no escape in the event of discomfiture, except the narrow 
bridge. The attack was made by advancing in direct echeloh from the’right, 
the 78th Highlanders, the Madras fusiliers, and Maude’s battery forming the 
right wing, and the 04th, the 84th, the Sikhs, and Olphert’s battery the 



644 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book IX. 


A.D. 18.17 


Victory of 
Bitlinor. 


Mutiny nl 
]>itia)H>or. 


left. Considering the superiority of the British artillery, an easy victoiy might 
have been anticipated, but the enemy, sheltered behind their entrenchments, 
stuck to their guns, and continued to pour forth volleys of musketry, which 
were only silenced at the point of the bayonet. When the flight became 
general, the want of cavalry was again grievously felt, and Havelock scarcely 
overstated the matter when he said that if he had pos.ses.sed cavalry not a rebel 
would have es(!aped. 

Active operations for the relief of Lucknow being suspended until adequate 
reinforcements should arrive, the campaign was virtually at an end, and we 
may therefore take advantage of the interval to give some account of important 
events which had occurred in other quarters, but have not yet been noticed. 


CIlAPTEll V. 


Mutiny at Dina))Oor — .\rraU l>eKioj!;o<l am] relieved—Amval of Sir Colin Campbell as commandcr-in- 
chief—lleinforcemi'nt.s from Europe—Havelock superseded in his command - Continued siege of 
tlie Eritish garrison at Lucknow—Relief and sulisnqucnt IJockade — Second relief—Sir Colin 
Camjdieirs cainji.aign ■ -Havelock’s death. 


NE main cause of General Havelock’s detemiination to desist for 
a time from attem[)ting the relief of Lucknow was the detention 
of roiiiforccraents, on whose ariival he had confidently calculated. 
While on the way to join him, their further progress was 
arrested by a mutiny at Dinapoor. This place,^ situated on the 
Ganges a little above Patna, near the junction of the Soane, was*one of the 
great military divisions, and was occupied by her majesty'fe 10th, a wing of 
her majesty’s 37th, a field battery, and three native regiments, the 7th, 8th, and 
4()th native infantry. The disaffection of these last could scarcely be doubted, 
and the prudent course would have been to deprive them of the power of 
mischief by disarming them. Unfortunately the division was commanded by 
General Lloyd, an aged officer, who owed his appointment more to the length 
than to the merit of his services, and who had persuaded himself that whatever 
other sepoys might do, those whom he commanded were proof against seduction. 
Government, naturally anxious to take the most favourable view, lent a too 
willing ear to his flattering reports, and did not awake from the delusion till 
they were shaken out of it by the intelligence that, on the 25th of July, the 
three ,nati\*e regiments had not only mutinied, but been permitted to raai:ch 
off' in the direction of the Soane. The general, as slow to act as he had been 
to believe that there could be any necessity for it, gave the mutineers a respite 
of four hours, in the absurd expectation that they might yet be ‘induced to 





Chap. V.] 


DEFENCE OF AREAlf. 


645 


return to their duty, and then retired to a steamer to take lunch and a a.d.isst. 
siesta. Meanwhile the mutineers were filling their pouches with ammunition, 
and preparing for their departure. At the last hour the European troops were 
called out, but it was only to find that they were too late. 

The mutineers having crossed the Soane unchecked, proceeded westward Hcr..ii-de 
to Arrah, situated only eight miles beyond it, and after plundering the treasury »innl) parly 
and throwing open the jail, beset a house in which tlio Europeans, only .sixteen 'u,d ImOvo" 
in number and all civilians, and fifty of Rattray’s Sikh police, had taken refuge. 

The house in which this party took refuge was ojily a bungalow, but one of 
them was fortunately an engineer, who turned his professional skill to good 
account, and strengthened the post by all tlio means at his command. At best 
however the defence was 
desperate, and to all human 
appearance could not be 
successful, as the original 
mutineers had been aug¬ 
mented by the retainei*s ol‘ 
an insurgent chief, of tin; 
name of Koer Sing. Mean¬ 
while a detachment of about 
400 men, drawn chiefly from 
her majesty’s 10th and 37th, 
had left Dinapoor by steam, 
to rescue the beleaguered 
garrison. Part of the route I'ortifiki> house *t akkau. 

^ From tketch by Lieutenant V Kyrv, engraved in llluatiatrd London Nrns. 

was necessarily to be per¬ 
formed by laud, and the troops having disembarked, proceeded till they 
reached a bridge about a mile and a half from Arrah. As the day was about 
to close, a halt till next moi’ning was suggested, but the oflicor in command, in 
his eagerness to accompli.sh the task committed to him, pu.shedon without even 
stopping to reconnoitre. This rash proceeding wiis severely punished. On the 
outskirts of the town, while the trot)ps were passing along the edge of a mango 
gi’ove, they were suddenly assailed by volleys of mmsketry by an unseen eueiiiy, 
and were ultimately obliged to make the be.st of their way bacik to the steamer, 
with the lo.ss of half of their original number in killed and wounded. The fate Tiioirdesjwr 

^ , ate position. 

of the civilians in Arrah now seemed sealed. Still however their courage 
never failed them; some of them were excellent rifle .shots, and struck terror 
into their cowardly assailants by their deadly aim. At the same time they 
wgre admirably supj)orted by their native comiades, who, though heavy 
bribes were offered to them, treated every offer with defision. They must 
however have been overpowered, had not a British officer, animated by a spirit 
like theip'own, flown to their relief. Major Vincent Eyre, already known to 




A.D. 1857. 


The besieged 
at Armb 
relieved by 
Major Vin- 
oorit £yre. 


Arrivid of 
Sir Coltii 
Ontnpbell 
ut ('aloutUi. 


646 HISTORY OF INDIA. [Book IX. 

the reader by hie services in the Afghan war, and his work on the subject, was 
proceeding to the common rendezvous at Allahabad with his horse field-battery, 
and providentially arrived at Dinapoor on the very day when tlie mutiny 
occurred. As both Buxar, where the Company had a valuable stud, and 
Ghazeepoor, a place of still gi-eater impoi-tance, were reported to be in danger, 
he continued his voyage, and reached the one on the 28th and the other on 
the 29th of July. Finding no cause for immediate alarm at either, he returned 
to Buxar, with the intention of advancing to the relief of Arrah, with the aid 
of such infantry as he could pick up from the detachments proceeding by tl)e 
river. Happily 160 men of her majesty’s 6th fusiliers had just arrived. 
Having thus quickly organized a field force with three guns, he started from 
Buxar, and on the morning of the 2d of August had, on advancing about half 
a mile beyond Gujragunge, found the enemy in force occupying a wood in front, 
and moving large bodies to other woods on his flanks. The evident intention 
being to surround him, he at once offered battle, and opened fire with his guns. 
Tlie enemy, screening thcm.selves behind some broken ground, replied with 
volleys of musketry, but ho succeeded notwithstanding in obtaining a clear 
passage for the baggage and tlie guns beyond the wood.s, the advance now 
becoming comparatively easy, as the road was formed by a causeway, witli 
inundated rice-fields on either side, which kept the enemy at such a distance 
that their musketry could not tell. Having come to a stream which he could 
not cross. Major Eyre made a flank movejnent towards the line of railway, 
along which there was a direct road tf» Arrah. This movement, concealed for 
a time by a brisk cannonade, was no sooner discovered by the enemy than they 
hastened to defeat it, the raw levies of Koer Sing following close on his rear, 
while the disciplined mutineers of Dinapoor moved parallel to him on the 
Opposite side of the stream, and took post in a wood which abutted on the 
railway. This post having been caiTied after a fierce struggle, no further 
resistance was offered, and eai'ly on the morning of the 3d of August, the 
gallant band at Arrah, after a defence which Eyre does not hesitate to char¬ 
acterize as “ one of the most remarkable feats in Indian history',” had the happi¬ 
ness to welcome their deliverers. 

Gn the 13th of August Sir Colin Crtmpbell amved in Calcutta. As soon 
as the death of Gcnei’al Anson was known in England, he was appointed to 
succeed him: twenty-four hours after, he had,embarked. There could not have 
been a imne judicious appointment. His distinguished services in the Crimea 
had jtointed him out as the man in whom, in the event of any great emergency, 
liis country might repose the utmost confidence; and if there was any quarter 
of the globe for which he was more e.specially qualified, it was India, where he 
had spent many y4xrs of his life, and had thus the double advantage of being 
at once*inured to its climate, and thoroughly acquainted with all that is peculiar 
in its mode of warfare. By taking the overland route he had outstripped most 



Chap. V.] 


HAVELOCK SUPEESEDED. 


6+7 


of tlie reinforcements of which his army of deliverance was to be composed, A.n. issr. 
but there was no reason to fear that the means placed at his disposal would 
prove inadequate^ since the national spirit, completely roused, was no longer to sirJameg 
be satisfied with desultory efforts, and troops to the number of 30,000 had 
already left, or were preparing to leave the British shores for India. Sir Colin’s 
arrival at Calcuttsi had been recently preceded 
b}'’ that of another officer of a similar stamp. 

Tliis was Sir James Outram, who had held 
the chief command in the Persian war, and 
was now, in consequence of its early and suc¬ 
cessful termination, without any fixed ap¬ 
pointment. He could not be left unemployed, 
and it was nothing more than might have 
been expected,, and was generally approved, 
when he was gazetted to the military com¬ 
mand of the united Dinaj)oor and Cawnpoor 
divisions. The command of the former had 
been rendered vacant by the incompetency of 
General Lloyd; that of the latter, which had 
been held by the lamented Sir Hugh Wheeler, 
had not been formally filled up, but it would have been incongruous to confer 
it on any other than Sir James Outram, who having foimerly been chief com¬ 
missioner in Glide, had a natural claim to be reinstated in it with the full mili¬ 
tary powers which had been conferred on his distinguished predecessor. But 
while both professional routine and individual merit concurred in entitling him 
to the above command, the appointment had an effect which wsis probably over¬ 
looked at‘the time, or if perceived was considered unavoidable. It placed a 
superior officer in the district in which Havelock had achieved his glorious vic¬ 
tories, and thus by reducing him to a subordinate position, really superseded 
him. The same thing took place, it will be remembered, in respect to General 
Neill, when Havelock himself was appointed, and if regi’et was then felt, it is , 
impossible not to feel it still more when, returning with Havelock from his 
victory at Bithoor, we see him take up the Calcutta Gazette, and receive from 
it his first intelligence of the fact that the command which had already given 
and still promised to give him so many laurels, had passed into other hands. 

Havelock’s mortification at being superseded could not have been lessened Hnvaioek 
by the increasing difficulties of his position. So much indeed had his force 
been weakened, while the rebels were gathering strength in the suiTOunding 
districts, that he seriously meditated a retreat upon Allahaba,}!. In a despatch, 
dated 21st August, he thus explained his position:—“I will frankly, make 
known to your excellency my prospects for the future. If I can receive prompt 
reinforcements, so as to make up my force to 2000 or 2500 men, I can hold 



OlilNGllAL STR JaMF» OuTRAM, Ci.C.B. 
From A photograph by Kllbum 



HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book IX. 


A.D. 1857. 


ljicreaiiiN}{ 
diffloultleti 
of Have- 
lock’a post* 
tioii. 


Hir Janiea 
Outranfa 
arrival at 
DitiaxKior. 


G+8 

this place with a high hand, protect my communication with Allahabad, beat 
everything that comes against me, and be ready to take part in active opera¬ 
tions on the cessation of the rains. I may be attacked from Gwalior by the 
mutinous contingent with 5000 men and thirty guns, or by the large forces 
whicli are assembling at Fuiruckabad, under its rebellious nawab, which has 
also a formidable artillery. But as they can hardly unite, I can defeat either 
or both in successive fights. But if reinforcements cannot be sent me, I see no 
alternative but abandoning for a time the advantages I have gained in this 
part of India, and retiring upon Allahabad, where everything can be organized 
for a triumphant advance in the cold season. It is painful to reflect that in 
this latter event, Cawnpoor and the surrounding country, in fact the whole 
Doab, would be abandoned to rapine and misrule, and Agra will feel unsup¬ 
ported.” The answer to this representation not only promised reinforcements, 
but communicated tlie pleasing intelligence that part of them were already far 
on their way. About seven companies of her majesty’s 90th had left Dinapoor 
on the lith, and were to reach Allahabad on the 21st or 22d; a considerable 
portion of the 5th fusiliers, detained at Miizapoor, had been telegraphed to push 
forward for the same place; and a battalion of Madras infantry, with six guns, 
had proceeded by rail to Raneegunge, and was to push on by land to Benares. 
After this assurance of reinforcements, Havelock laid aside all thoughts of 
retiring to Allahabad. 

Sir James Outram arrived at Dinapoor on the 17th of August, and two 
daj?s afterwards wrote to the governor-general, suggesting a new line of opera¬ 
tions for the relief of Lucknow, It was to organize a column to proceed west¬ 
ward from Benares through Juanpoor, between the Sye and the Goomtee, 
An alternative plan was to stait from Dinapoor and proceed by^ water, first by 
the Ganges, and then by the Gogra as far as Fyzabfid. By either j)lan the 
passage of the Sye, which w’as assumed to have been the main obstacle to 
Havelock’s advance, would be rendered unnecessary. On further consideration 
both plans were abandoned, and on the 28th of August, Sir Jfirnes Outram, in 
his first communication to General Havelock, informing him of his intention to 
join him forthwith with adequate reinforcements, generously added; “But to 
you shall be left the glory of relieving Lucknow, for which you have already 
struggled so much. I shall accompany you only in my civil capacity as 
commissioner, placing my military service at your disposal should you please, 
serving under you as volunteer.” The reftiforcements promise?' suffered 
considerable deductions in their progress, particularly at Allahabad, which was 
threatened by Koer Sing, who had assumed the title of King of Shahabad, and 
began at the age, of eighty to give proof of military talents, which it could 
hardly, have been supposed that he posse.ssed, after his disgaceful’discomfiture 
at Arrah by Major Eyre. In consequence of the danger which thus threatened 
Allahabad, the effective force under Sir James Outram was reduced to 1449 




Chap. V.] 


REINFOECEMENTS BEACH CAVNPOOR. 


64.9 


men. Its comparative weakness tempted the enemy to endeavour to intercept a d. isst. 
it. With this view their advanced guard had actually crossed the Ganges ^ 
from Oude at Dalamow, nearly opposite to Futtehpoor, and were about to have 
been followed by the main body, when Major Eyre, now in command of the 
artillery, was pushed forward, and by a sudden attack nearly annihilated the 
whole of the rebels who had already crossed, and rendered the crossing of 
others impossible by seizing the boats collected for transpoi-t. The importance 
of this service may be gathered from the statement of Sir James Outram to 
the commander-in-chief, that had the main body of rebels succeeded in crossing, 
a general insun'ection throughout the Doab would have ensued. 

The last of the reinforcements reached Cawnpoor on the 1 5th of September, sir James 
and next morning appeai'ed a division order, in which Sir James carried out goneroas 
the generous intention he had already intimated. After a just eulogy on the 
brave troops and their distinguislied commander, and the expression of a 
confident hope tliat the great end for which they “ have so long and so glori- 
ou.sly fought, will now, under the blessing of Providence, be accomplished,” it 
concluded thus:—“The major-general, therefore, in gratitude for and admira¬ 
tion of the brilliant deeds in arms achieved by General Havelock and his 
gallant troops, will cheerfully waive his rank on the occasion; and will 
accompany the force to Lucknow in his civil capacity as chief commissioner of 
Glide, tendering his military services to General Havelock as volunteer. On 
the relief of Lucknow, the major-general will resume his position at the heiul 
of the force.” No time was lost in preparing for the advance upon Lucknow, 
but it will be proper, before giving the details, to return to the beleaguered 
garrison there, and ascertain the condition to wliich a siege of more than two 
months by an overrwhelming force had reduced them. 

On the.23d*of August, Havelock had received a letter from Colonel Inglis, stiitoonim 

^ ^ garniMiii in 

in which, after rq|erriiig to one received from Colonel Tytler, and containing Luuknow. 
the following passage—“ You must aid us in every way, even to cutting your 
way out, if we cannot force our way in,” he continued thus:—“ If you hope to 
save this force, no time must be lost in pushing forward. We are daily being 
attacked by the enemy, who are within a few yards of our defences. Their 
mines have already weakened our post, and I have every reason to believe 
they are carrying on others. Their eighteen-pounders are within 1 50 yards of 
some of our batteries, and from their position, and our inability to form 
working parties, we cannot reply to them, and consequently the damage done 
hourly is very great. My strength now in Europeans is 350, and about 300 
natives, and the men ai-o dreadfully harassed, and owing to part of the i-esi- 
deney having been brought down by round shot, many are without shelter. 

Our native force having been assured on Colonel Tytler’s Authority of your 
near approach some twenty-four days ago, are naturally losing confidence, and 
if they leay.p us, I do not see how the defences are to be manned.” In another 
VoL. HI. JJ78 



650 


HISTOEY OF INDIA. 


[Book IX. 


A.D. 1857. 


Ilwoic do- 
feiKio of tlio 
garrison at 
Lucknow. 


letter, dated 1st September, Colonel Inglis explained that his position was 
daily, becoming more hopeless, but added that from the reduction of rations 
and the diminution of numbers, he hoped to be able to hold on to-the 21st 
instant. There was thus still time to effect the relief, and certainly never did 
a garrison better deserve it. In proof of this we cannot do better than quote 
at length, from the brief but admirable account of the siege contained in 
t'olonel Inglis’s despatch. After •describing the imperfect means of defence, 
and the incessant fire of the rebels, it continues thus:— 

“ The enemy contented themselves with keeping up this incessant fire of 
cannon and musketry until the 20th of July, on which day at ten A.M. they 

a.ssembled in very gi-eat force all around 
our position, and exploded a heavy mine 
inside our outer line of defences at the 
Water gate; the mine however, which was 
close to the Redan, and apparently sjirung 
with the intention of destroying that bat¬ 
tery, did no harm. But as soon as tlie 
smoke had cleared away, the enemy boldly 
advanced under cover of a tremendous fire 
of cannon and jnusketry, with the object of 
.storming tlie Redan. But they were re¬ 
ceived with such a heavy fire, that after a 
short struggle they fell back with much 
loss. A .strong column advanced at the 
same time to attack Innes’s j)ost, and 
came on within ten yards of the palisades, affording to Lieutenant Loughnan, 
13th native infantry, who commanded ■the po.sition, and his biavp garrison, 
comj)Osed of gentlemen of the uncovenanted service, a. few of Jier majesty’s 32d 
foot, and of the 13th native infantiy, an 02 )portunity of distinguishing them¬ 
selves, which they were not slow to avail themselves of, and the enemy were 
driven back with great slaughter. The insurgents made minor attacks at almost 
every outpost, but were invariably defeated, and at two P.M. they ceased their 
attempts to storm the place, although their musketry fire and cannonading con¬ 
tinued to harass us unceasingly as usual. Matters pi’oceeded in this manner 
until the 10th of August, when the enemy made another assault, having pre- 
vioirsly .sprung a mine close to the brigade mess, which entirely destroyed our 
defences for the space of twenty feet, and blew in a gi-eat portion of the outside 
wall of the house occu})ied by Mr. Schillig’s garrison. On the dust clearing 
away, a breach appeared through which a regiment could have advanced in 
perfect' order, amJ" a few of the enemy came on with the utmost determination, 
but were met with such a withering flank fire of musketry from the officers and 
men holding the top of the brigade mess, that they beat a speedy retreat. 



's 

OENKItiL 8m .JOHK iNGUa, G.C.li. 

From A photograpb by Mity&ll. 



CUAP V.] 


HEEOIC DEFENCE OF LUCKNOW. 


651 


leaving the more adventurous of their number Ij'ing in the breach. While this a.d. imt. 
operation was going on, another large body advanced on the Cawnpoor battery, 
and succeeded in locating themselves for a few minutes in the ditch. They The defence 
were however dislodged by hand-grenadea At Captain Anderson’s post they deucy.”*' 
also came boldly forward with scaling-ladders, which they planted against the 
wall; but here as elsewhere they wei-e met with the most indomitable resolution, 
and the leaders being slain, the rest fled, leaving the ladders, and retreated to 
their batteries and loopholed defences, from whence they kept up for the rest of 
tlie day an unu.sually heavy cannonade and musketry fire. On the 18th of 
August the enemy sprung another mine in front of the Sikh lines, with very 
fatal effect. Captain Orr (unattached). Lieutenants Mecliam and Soppitt, who 
commanded the small body of drummers composing the garrison, were blown 
into-the air; but providentially returned to eartli with no further injuiy than 
a severe shaking. The garri.son, however, were not so fortunate. No less than 
eleven men were buried under the ruins, from wlience it was im]>o.s.sible to 
exti-icate them, owing to the tremendous fire kept up by the enemy from liouses 
situated not ten yards in front of the breach. The explosion was followed by 
a general assault of a less determined nature than the two former efforts, and 
the enemy were consequently repulsed without much difficulty; but they 
succeeded under cover of the breach in establishing themselves in one of the 
houses of our position, from which they were driven in the evening by the 
bayonets of her maiesty’s 32d and 84th foot. On the 5th of September the "oriciui 
enemy made their last serious assault. Having exploded a large mine a few the enemy, 
feet short of the bastion of the eighteen-pounder gun, in Major Apthorp’s post, 
they advanced with large, heavy scaling-ladders, which they planted against 
the wall, and mounted, thereby gaining for an instant the embrasure of a gun. 

They were, hoVever, speedily driven back with loss by hand-gi’enades and 
musketry. A fev minutes subsequently, they sprung another mine close to the 
brigade mess, and advanced boldly; but soon the coipscs strewed in the garden 
in front of the post bore testimony to the fatal accuracy of the rifle and 
musketry fire of the gallant members of that garrison, and the enemy fled 
ignominiously, leaving their leader—a fine looking old native officer—among 
the slain. At other posts they made similar attacks, but with less resolution, 
and everywhere with the same want of success. Their loss ui)on this day must 
have been very heavy, as they came on with much determination, and at night 
they were seen bearing large numbers of their killed and wounded over the 
bridges, in the direction of the cantonments.” 

Such was the series of assaults made by the rebels, and such the heroic spirit ^ 
in which the garrison repulsed them. At length, however, the day of deliver- approachea. 
ance was approaching. Leaving about 400 men under Colonel Wilson to 
garrison the entrenchment at Cawnpoor, the whole of the other troops began 
to cross the Ganges on the 19th. The force, mustering in all 3179 men, of 



652 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book IX. 


A.D. 1857. 


Advanoa of 
tbe roliov- 
ing forces. 


Capture of 
till! Aluni- 
bagh. 


whom 2388 were European infantry, 109 European volunteer cavalry, and 282 
European artillery, and 341 Sikh infantry, and 59 native irregular cavahy, 
was formed into two brigades, the 1st under General Neill, and the 2d under 
Colonel Hamilton of the 78th Highlanders. On the 21st, the enemy, found in 
position with six guns at Mungulwar, were instantly attacked and put to flight. 
Tliis first disconiforture cleared the road as far as Busserutgunge, where the 
force bivouacked amid torrents of rain. Next morning an advance was made 
to Bunnee on the Sye. The passage of this river was expected to prove a most 
formidable difficulty, but the rebels, pursued only by their fears, continued their 
headlong flight without even stopping to destroy the bridge, and were not again 
seen till the morning of the 23d, when they were found in force in the vicinity 
of the Alumbagli, a large palace belonging to one of the princes of Oude, about 



Intsrioh of tjie Alumbaou, near Lucknow.-^-Froxn Lieuteuant Mecham's Siege of Lnoknow. 


four miles south or Lucknow. It stood in a beautiful park, inclosed by a lofty 
wall, with turrets at each angle, and in addition to the main building had an 
extensive range of offices for the accommodation of a numerous body of retainers. 
The enemy, evi<lently determined to lisk a battle, stood drawn up in a line 
A\'hich extended nearly two miles, with their light and centre posted on some 
mounds, and their loft resting on the Alumbagh. Their strength was estimated 
at 10,000 infantry, 1500 cavalry, and six guns. The plan of attack was to turn 
their right flank, but as a morass intervened, it was necessary that the attacking 
force should make a con.siderable circuit. During this operation it was exposed 
to a withering fire, till the guns from which it proceeded were silenced by Ej'^re’s 
heavy battery of, four twenty-four pounders. At the same time the cavalry 
massed on the right were driven back, and the whole of the enemy’s line was 
thrown into disorder. The only resistance worthy of the natne was made at the 
Alumbagh, in the wall of which two embrasures had been hastily struck out after 






Chap. V.] 


RELIEF OF LUCZNOW.‘ 


653 


the action commenced, and mounted with guns which immediately opened fire a.d. issr. 
with some effect. The field artillery and the bayonets of the 5th fusiliers soon ~ 
succeeded in disposing of this obstacle, and possession was obtained of the 
Alumbagh without further opposition. Five guns were the trophies of this 
victory, but neither these nor the victory itself produced such cheers as echoed 
through the camp when, as the troops were about to bivouac for the night, 
they learned through a message ju.st received that Delhi had fallen. Another Anxiety 
fact scarcely less gratifying had reached their ears during tlie battle. For some the garriMMi* 
time there had been no communication with the beleaguered ganrison, and their 
fixte was doubtful. Now, however, all anxiety on this subject was happily 
relieved, for the guns of the residency answering those of its besiegers were 
distinctly heard, and made it certain that the approacliiiig lelief was still 
in time. 


While halting on the 24th in the Alumbagh, the generals consulted as to “f 
the direction in which the attack should be made. Pickets had been pushed JjuokJiow, 
out towards the Charbagh bridge, spanning a canal about a mile and a half 
north of the Alumbagh. From this point the Cawiipoor road led directly 
through the heart of the city to the residency. The rebels, anticipating that 
this route, being the shortest, would be selected, had dug <lee]> trenches across 
it, loopholed the houses lining it, and filled them with ninsketcers. The 
apj^roach by it was therefore at once abandoned, and it became a (juestion 
whether it would not be advisable to make a long detour in an easteily diixiction, 
and thus avoid the most dangerous localities. To this course there was however 
one formidable objection. Three days of incessant rain had made the ground 
so swampy that even the light pieces could hardly have been conveyed across 
it. The resolution ultimately adopted was to proceed first across the Charbagh 
bridge, then eastward along a lane skirting the canal, and finally northwards 
to a cluster of strong buildings situated to the east of the residency. 

Leaving the baggage and the sick and wounded in the Alumbagh, under a stmegio m 
strong guard, the force started for Lucknow at eight a.m. of the 25th, tl Igigh hridgt). 
first and leading brigade headed by Sir James Outram, while General Havelock 
followed with the second. At the very outset the struggle commenced, and 
some loss was sustained before the Chai'bagh bridge was reached, from the 
enemy’s sharjishooters, and from three guns which raked the I’oad. At the 
bridge the resistance was still more formidable. It was defended by six guns, 
one of them a twenty-four pounder, and all-the adjoining houses carefully loop- 
holed were crowded with marksmen. The fire, as soon as the men became 
fully exposed to it, was so destructive that they were ordered to lie down 
unijer such cover as they could find, while Maude came forward with two guns, 
to reply to the enemy’s six, his placed in the open road without covei* theim 
showering grape from behind a breastwork. To terminate this unequa\ con¬ 
test, it was necessary to use the bayonet, and the 1 st Madras fusiliers were 



654 


HISTOEY OF INDIA. 


[Book IX. 


A.D. 1857. 


Fiirthor a<l- 
vanoo and 
captui'o of 
the Beciiti- 
tier nagh. 


The garrison 
relieved. 


ordered to advance. The moment the order was given, Lieutenant Arnold and 
ten of his men rushed forward without waiting for the rest, and received a dis¬ 
charge of grape, which struck down the lieutenant, shot through both legs, 
and swept off his followers almost to a man. This perilous rush had been 
shared by two mounted staff officers, Colonel Tytler and Lieutenant Havelock. 
The former had his horse shot under him, the latter reached the bridge, where 
he stood unscathed waving his sword till the fusiliers came up and drove the 
enemy before them. 

After cros,sing the bridge, the main body of the relieving force followed the 
lane skirting the canal, and then proceeded in a northern direction as far as 
the Seconder Bagh, where they made a sharp turn west towards the residency, 
and arrived without much opposition within a short distance of the Motee 
Munzil, situated on the right bank of the Goomtee. At this spot, still three- 
quarters of a mile east from the residency, the enemy had concentrated their 
strength, and a new struggle, in difficulty and fiercene.ss resembling that of the 
Charbagh bridge, began. A battery, which the rebels had erected at the 
Kaiser Bagh or king’s palace, opened a fire which, with that of the musketry 
from the adjoining streets and inclosures, was so destructive as to make further 
advance all but impossible. Two of Major Eyre’s heavy guns succeeded twice 
in silencing the battery for a time, but the resistance was still formidable, when 
relief came from an unexpected quarter. A body of Highlanders who had 
been left at the Chaibagh bridge, had been following in the track of the main 
body till they came to a point where all trace of it was lost, and providentially 
turned off to the left by a street which brought them to the gate of the Kaiser 
Bagh, and gave them an opportunity of capturing its battery. This accom¬ 
plished, they succeeded in forming a junction with the rest of the force. The 
distance from the residency was still about 500 yards, and as nfght was setting 
in after a whole day spent in fighting, a halt was proposed. , The troops how¬ 
ever were too impatient to rest till the grand achievement was accomplished. 
The Highlanders and Sikhs having been called to the front for the purpose, 
pushed on through an incessant storm of shot. General Neill, after leading the 
Madras fusiliers as they followed in their wake, was unfortunately struck in 
the head by a musket-ball, and died almost instantaneously. The troops mean¬ 
while continued their advance in the face of obstacles which, but for the noble 
spirit which animated them, must have proved insurmountable, and at last 
founcTtheir full reward when the gates of the residency were opened to receive 
them. 

The scene within is thus described by a staff officer:—“Once iairly seen, all 
our doubts and fears regarding them were ended, and then the garrison’s l 9 ng 
pent-up feelings of anxiety and suspense burst forth in a succession of deafening 
cheers. From every pit, trench, and battery—from behind the sandbags 
piled on shattered houses—from every post held by a few gallant spirits, rose 



Chap. V.] 


RELIEF OF THE RESIDEHtSY. 


655 


cheer on cheer—even from the hospital many of the wounded crawled forth to a.d. isst. 
join in that glad shout of welcome, to those who had so bravely come to our 
assistance. It was a moment never to be forgotten. The delight of the GV6r Thegarriaou 
gallant Highlanders, who had fought twelve battles to enjoy that moment of 
ecstasy, and in the last four days had lost a third of their number, seemed to 
know no bounds. The general and Sir James Outram had entered Dr. Fayrer’s 
liouse, and the ladies in the garrison and their children crowded with intense 
excitement into the porch to see their deliverers. The Highlanders rushed 
forward, the rough, bearded warriors, and shook the ladies by the hand with 
loud and repeated gratulations. They took the children up in their arms, and 
fondly caressing them, passed them from one to another in turn. Then when 
the first burst of enthusiasm was over, they mournfully turned to speak among 
thenaselves of the heav^’’ losses they had sustained, and to iiiq^uire the names of 
the numerous comrades who had fallen in the way.” 

After the Highlanders and Sikhs h«ad forced the way, the portion of the CMuaitii*. 
troops left at the Fureid Buksh, about 500 yards distant, began to follow, and 
under the guidance of Lieutenant Moorsoo:n, who was thoroughly acquainted 
witli the localities, reached the residency without further loss. The lear-guard, 
(consisting of the 90th under Colonel Campbell, W'ere not so fortunate. They 
had been left at the Motee Munzil, to aid the advance of the 78th Higldanders, 
who were not known at the time to have taken a more direct route than that 
of the main body. They had with them two of the heavy guns, the sjtare 
ammunition wfiggons, and the wounded. They remained at their post during 
the night, but in the morning Mr. Bewslcy Thornhill of the civil service volun¬ 
teered to go out and bring in the wounded. His knowledge of tlie locality 
unhappily proved insufficient, and he inadvertently entered a square where the 
convoy of dhoolics was at once enveloped in the enemy’s fire. The escort, 
seized with panic,4brsook their charge, the dhoolie-bearers followed the (jxamjde, 
and nearly forty of the wounded were immediately butchered by the insurgents. 

Two of the leading dhoolies by pushing on got out of reach of tlie fii’e. The 
other dhoolies which had not entered the square stopped short when the firing 
commenced, and by taking a different route were brought into tlie residency 
in safety. The task assigned to the relieving force is well described in General 
Havelock’s despatch, who sums up thus:—“To form an adequate idea of the naveiocks 
obstacles overcome, reference must be made to tbe events that are known to 
have occurred at Buenos Ayres and Saragossa. Our advance wsis through 
streets of houses which I have described, and thus each forming a separate 
fortress. I am filled with surprise at the success of the operation, which 
demanded the efforts of 10,000 good troops. The advantage gained has cost 
us dear. The killed, wounded, and missing, the latter being wounded sbldiers, 
who, I much fear—^some or all—have fallen into the hands of a merciless foe, 
amounted,..Jip to the evening of the 26th, to 535 officers and men.” 



A.D. 1857. 


Colonel 
luglie's de> 
sjifttch. 


Adiairablo 
eoiiduut of 
the iiitnuteB 
of tho rtwi- 
dotiuy dur¬ 
ing tho Biege. 


656 HISTORY OF INDIA. [Book IX. 

An account has already been given of the repeated assaults made by the 
rebels, and the manner in which they were repulsed by the heroic garrison; but 
in order to make the account complete, we must again borrow from Colonel 
Inglis’s despatch;—“If further proof be wanting of the desperate nature of the 
struggle which we have, under God’s blessing, so long and so successfully waged, 
I would point to the roofless and ruined houses, to the crumbled walls, to the 
exploded mihes, to the open breaches, to the shattered and disabled guns and 
defences, and lastly, to the long and melancholy list of the brave and devoted 
officers and men who^have falleiL These silent witnesses bear sad and solemn 
testimony to the way in which this feeble position has been defended.” 

In another part of the despatch, Colonel Inglis says:—“I cannot refrain 
from bringing to the prominent notice of his lordship in council, the patient 
endurance and the Christian resignation which have been evinced by„ the 
women of this garrison. They have animated us by their example. Many, 
alas! have been made widows, and their children fatherless, in this cruel 
struggle. But all such seem resigned to the will of Providence, and many, 
among whom may be mentioned the honoured names of Birch, of Polehampton, 
of Barbor, and of Gall, have, after the example of Miss Nightingale, constituted 
themselves the tender and solicitous nurses of the wounded and dying soldiers 
in the hospital.” Lest it should be supposed that the whole merit of the 
defence belonged to the British alone, Colonel Inglis has added a passage, 
which it would be ungenerous and unjust to withhold: “With respect to the 
native troops, I am of opinion that their loyalty has never been surpaased. 
They were indifferently fed, and worse housed. They were exposed, especially 
the 13th regiment, under the gallant Lieutenant Aitken, to a most galling fire 
of round shot and musketry, which most materially decreased their numbers. 
They were so near the enemy that conversation could be carried on between 
them; and every effort, persuasion, promise, and thi-eat was alternately resorted 
to in vain, to seduce,them from the handful of Europeans who, in all proba¬ 
bility, would have been sacrificed by their desertion.” This praise must of 
course bo confined to those native troops who fell at their post during the 
siege, or were found at it when relief arrived, for it is an indubitable fact that 
nearly a third of the native troops shut up within the residency when it was 
first invested, were unable to resist the temptations which Colonel Inglis 
describes. The garrison, as it stood at the beginning and at the termination of 
the sifege, is thus stated by Mr. Gubbin:—“The garrison of Lucknow originally 
was 1692 strong. Of these 927 were Europeans and 765 nativea We lost in 
killed, of Europeans 350 and 133 natives, and of the latter 230 deserted, making 
a total loss of 713. There remained of the original garrison, when relieved 
on the‘25th of September by General Havelock, a total number of 97^, i« 
winch' both sick and wounded are included, of whom 577 were Europeans, and 
402 nativea ” 



Chap. V.] 


BELIEF OF THE RESIDE'NCY. 


657 


It had been intended that the garrison and its deliverers shotild forthwith 
quit Lucknow for Cawnpoor, and accordingly, while the baggage and military 
stores were left in the Alumbagh, the relieving column took with them only 
three days' food, and no change of clothing. The course of a few days sufficed 
to throw doubts on the expediency and even practicability of an early depar¬ 
ture. The provisions of the garrison, so far from being exhau.sted, as had been 
supposed in consequence of some miscalculation, were found sufficient to ft'ed 
the whole force for upwards of two months, and while the most urgent reason 
for retiring was thus unfounded, the impossibility of finding the necessary 
means of conveyance had become apparent. The determination tlierefore was 
to remain at the residency, and wait for reinforcements. The detachment left 
at the Alumbagh now (paused much anxiety, and an attempt was made to open 
a communication with it by the Cawnj)oor road. Tlie opei'ation wa.s com¬ 
menced on the 3d of October, with crowbar and pickaxe, but was relinquished 
on the 6th, “it being found,” says Sir James Outram in his de.s])atch, “ that a 
large mosque, strongly occupied by the enemy, required more extensive opera¬ 
tions for its capture than were expedient.” The enemy in fact,^recovering from 
their first surprise, had again assumed the offensive, and placed the whole force 
in a state of blockade. Fortunately the detachment in the Alumbagh proved 
able to repel any hostile attempt, and by means of forays in the neighbourhood, 
and supplies brought under escort from Cawnpoor, was freed from all risk of 
starvation. The area occupied by the garrison being barely sufficient for its 
own accommodation, a large addition was made to it on the north and east, 
lly this means, while the mutineers were thrown back about 1000 yards, the 
defences were greatly strengthened, and all the points formerly most vulnerable 
were effectually secured. On the south and west sides also, though little addi¬ 
tional space w*& inclosed, the damages were repaired and new works erected. 
The following qqotation from a despatch by Sir James Outram, gives a suffi¬ 
cient idea of the nature and extent of the operations carried on on both sides;— 
“I am aware of no parallel to our series of mines in modern war; twenty-one 
shafts, aggregating 200 feet in depth, and 3291 feet of gallery, have been 
executed. The enemy advanced twenty mines against the palaces and out¬ 
posts; of these they exploded three which caused us loss of life, and three 
which did no injury; seven had been blown in; and out of seven others the 
enemy have been driven, and their galleries taken possession of by our miners— 
results of which the engineer department may well be proud.” 

Sir Colin Campbell, on learning that the intended retirement of the original 
ganison of Lucknow, and of the relieving column, was abandoned as imprac¬ 
ticable, hastened to place himself at the head of a l<)rce more adequate than 
that which had previously been sent. Nor were the means wanting.* Rein¬ 
forcements had begun to pour in from Europe, and in juldition to the usual 
land forces, another of a peculiar character, destined to render excellent 
VoL. HI. 279 


A.n J857. 


(Garrison and ’ 
relieving . 
fi.>Tce unabU 
t(i quit 
Idickuow. 


Sir Colin 
Campbell's 
advaiK^ 
and Peel'ip; 
brigade. 



658 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book IX. 


A.n. 1867. 


ProoeuiUTigH 
of tho col- 
unitt from 
JHOlti. 


AffAir at 
Agra. 



Gbnejud Sir Colin OAMpBEUi 

From A photograph hy Herbert Watkins. 


service, had been organized, under the name of the naval brigade, commanded 
by Captain Peel, a son of the late Sir Robert Peel, who promised to be no less 
distincuished as a naval officer than his father had been as a statesman. Tho 
brigade, consisting chiefly of the crew of the captain’s own ship, the Shannon. 
with a sprinkling of seamen from Calcutta, 
carried with them eight guns of the largest 
calibre, and before reaching Cawnpoor had 
given proof of what might be expected from 
them by encountering, in concert with a 
military force of about 700 men, a body 
of rebel.s, estimated at 4000, and utterly 
routing them. Among the other troops 
which had arrived at Cawnpoor, and passed 
over into Oude to form part of the new 
relieving force, was a moveable column 
which had been formed at Delhi immedi¬ 
ately after its recapture, and sent in pur¬ 
suit of the rebels who had escaped from, 
it. This column, commanded by Colonel 
Creathed, consisting of her majesty’s 8th 
and 75th, the 2d and 4th Punjab in¬ 
fantry, the 9th lancers, 200 of Hodson’s horse, with some Punjab cavahy 
and horse-artillery, had marched south-east, and inflicted successive defeats 
on the rebels at Boolundshuhur and Alighur. A more important encoun¬ 
ter still awaited it. Agra, the capital of the North-western Provinces, had 
already had its full share of disaster. On the 2d of August, a body of 
rebels, composed chiefly of the regiments which had mutinied at Nusseer- 
abad and Neemuch, and estimated at 10,000, encamped within four miles 
of Agra. The authorities there preferring a bold to a timid course, resolveil 
to take the initiative, and sent out all the troops which they could muster 
to offer battle. Unfortunately, a largo portion of them belonging to what 
was called the Kotah contingent went over in a body to the enemy. This 
untoward event was followed by another of a. still more fatal character. 
After a long and obstinate struggle, the British ammunition failed, and it 
became necessary to retreat. As has almost invariably been the case in India, 
the rebels, who had pi'eviously been kept at bay, pressed on in the full confi¬ 
dence of victory, and with so much rapidity that the retreat became disastrous. 
In the course of the evening the British troops found themselves shut up within 
the fort with a crowd of fugitive non-combatants, amounting to several thousands, 
and had the moHification of beholding from the ramparts tho devastation 
of the rebels flushed with victory, and undisputed masters of the city. This 
calamity, aggravated by previous anxiety and mortification, broke the heart of 



Chap. V.] 


THE DELHI COLUMN.’ 


659 


Mr. Colvin, and thus deprived the Indian government of one of its best a.d, issr. 
servants, at a time when, as the governor-general in council justly expressed 
it, “his ripe experience, his high ability, and his untiring energy would have DmthofMr. 
been more than usually valuable to the state.” The rebels, after wreaking 
their vengeance and satiating themselves with plunder, had retired, but in the 
beginning of October the defenceless state of the city and weakness of the 
garrison tempted another body of them, amounting to about 7000, to repeat 
the visit. Providentially their arrival had been jjreceded a few hours by that 
of Greatlied’s column. Neither party, however, being aware of the proximity 
of the other, the result was a mutual surprise. At first the rebels had the 
advantage, but it did not long avail them. On finding that instead of the 
ea.sy victory which they had antieij)ated, they were confronted by the whole 
Dellu column, they endeavmured to make off, and were closely pursued for 
nearly ten miles, with great slaughter. Immediately after this exploit the 
column crossed the. Jumna and proceeded eastward. On the 14th of October 



iNTERion OF Fort of Agra.—F rom engraving in Illustrated Times. 


Colonel Greathed resigned the command to Brigadier Hope Grant, who, after 
new successes at Mynpoorie and Canojije, entered Cawnpoor on the 28th of 
October, and two days after crossed the Ganges into Oude. 

The commander-in-chief left Cawnpoor on the 9th of November, and after coUn 

* ^ Campbell 

halting three days at Buntara to allow the detachments still on the road to iu oude. 
come up, started on the 12th at the head of a force composed iis follows:— 

Naval brigade, eight heavy guns; Bengal horse-artillery, ten guns; Bengal 
horse field battery, six guns; heavy field battery, royal artilleiy; detachments ■ 
Bengal and Punjab sappers and miners; her majesty’s 9th* lancers; detach¬ 
ments 1st, 2d, and 5th Punjab cavalry, and Hodson’s horse; her majesty’s 8th, 

53d, 75th,.-and 93d I’egiments of infantry; 2d and 4th Punjab infantry. This 




660 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book IX. 


A.D. 1857. 


Sir Colin 
Caini>l>6] L'h 
advance 
uiK>n Luck 
now. 


DePi>orate 

street 

ing. 


force, amounting to about 700 cavalry and 2700 foot, received reinforcementa 
on the 14th, which made the whole number of men of all arms nearly 5000. 
On the 9th of November, after the approaching relief had become .known to 
the garrison, Mr. T. H. Kavanagh of the uncovenanted service volunteered to 
go out and make his way to the British camp. It was a most perilous enter¬ 
prise, as every outlet was strictly guarded by the enemy’s posts and pickets, and 
the way lay through the very heart of the city. Mr. Kavanagh’s task was 
not only to convey information as to the state of the garrison, but to make 
liim.self useful as a guide. Both objects he happily accomplished, and was 
rewarded by government with £2000 and admission to the regular civil service. 

On the 14th of November the commander-in-chief began his advance on 
the city. On approaching the Dilkoosha park, the advance guard was met by 
a long line of musketry fire. Beinforcements were immediately pushed* on, 
and after a running fight of about two hours, the rebels were driven across 
tlie grounds of the Martiniere, and beyond the canal to the north of them. 
The rear-guard, hung upon by the enemy, was unable to close up to the 
(jolunin till late on the 15th. On that day, therefore, no further progi-ess 
was made, but early on the 16tli, leaving every description of baggage at Dil¬ 
koosha, under charge of her majesty’s 8th, the column began to advance 
direct on the Secunder Bagh. “ This place,” says Sir Colin Campbell in his 
despatch, “ is a high-walled inclosure of strong Inason^^^ of 120 yai ds square, 
and was carefully loojfiioled all round. Opposite to fit was a village, at a 
distance of 100 yards, which was also loopholed, and filled with men. On the 
head of the column advancing up the lane to the left of the Secunder Bagh, 
fire was opened on \is. The infantry of the advanced guard was quiclcly 
tlirown in skirmishing order to lino a bank to the right. The guns were 
pushed rapidly onwards, viz.: Captain Blunt’s troop, Bengal‘hor^e-artillery, 
and Captain Travers’ royal artillery heavy field batteiy. The troop passed 
at a gallop through a cross fire from the village and Secunder Bagh, and 
opened fire within easy musketry range in a most daring manner. As soon 
as they could be pitched up a stiflT bank, two eighteen-pounder guns under 
Captain Travers were also brought to bear on the building. While this was 
being effected, the leading brigade of infantry, under Brigadier the Honourable 
Adrian Hope, coming rapidly into action, caused the loopholed village to be 
abandoned, the whole fire of the brigade being directed on the Secunder Bagh. 
After a time a large body of the enemy who were holding ground to the left 
of our advance were driven by parties of the 53d and 93d, two of Captain 
Blunt’s guns aiding the movement. The Highlanders pursued their advantage, 
and seized the barracks, and immediately converted it into a military post, the 
53d stretching in*a long line of skirmishers in the open plain, and driving the 
enemy before them. The attack on the Secunder Bagh had now been proceedii^g 
for about an hour and a half, when it was determined to take th«! place by 



Chap. V.] 


CAPTUEE OF THE SECTJNDER BAGH. 


661 


storm through a small opening which had been made. This was done in the a d. ibst. 
most brilliant manner by the remainder of the Highlanders, and the 53d, and ~ 
the 4th Punjab infantry, supported by a battalion of detachments under 
Major Barnston. There never was a bolder feat of arms, and the loss inflicted 
on the enemy, after tlie entrance of the Seconder Bagh was effected, was 
immense—more than 2000 of the enemy were afterwards carried out.” 

The next capture was the Shah Nujeef It is thus described in the capture of 
despatch:—“The Shah Nujeef is a domed mosque with a garden, of which xiueef. 
the most had been made by the enemy. Tlie wall of the inclosure of the 
mosque was loopholed with great care. Tlie entrance to it had been covered 
by a regular work in masonry, and the top of the building was crowned with 
a jiarajiet From this and from the defences in the garden, an unceasing fire 
of npisketry was kept up from the coniinencement of tlie attac^, Tlie position 
was defended with great resolution against a heavy cannonade of three hours. 

It was then stormed in the boldest manner by the 93d Highlandeis, under 
Brigadier Hope, supported by a battalion of detachments under Major 
Barnston, who was, I regret to say, severely wounded. Captain Peel leading up 
his heavy guns with extraordinary gallantry within a few yards of the building, 
to batter the massive stone walls. The withering fii’e of the Highlanders 
covered the naval brigade from great loss, but it was an action almost unex- 
.anipled in war. Captain Peel behaved very much as if he had been laying the 
Shannon alongside an enemy’s frigate.” 

'J'he oarrison were not idle while the relieving column was eneraifcd with c<..oporation 

I T. . •• •• .“-.I , oftlier«»i- 

the Shah Nujeef. This building was within a few hundred yards of a garden, .lencygur- 
iri which a battery had been established to co-operate in the relief This battery 
was screened from the view of the enemy on two sides by a high wall, and the 
intention was to throw down the wall by exploding a mine under it, as .soon 
as the moment for opening the battery ari-ived. Orders to this effect wei e 
accordingly given during the fierce struggle at the Shah Nujeef, but the explo¬ 
sion in a great measure failed, because the powder with which the mine had 
been charged three days before had in the interval become damp. Some time 
was thus lost in battering down the wall with the guns, which, after this • 
preliminary obstacle was removed, opened with good effect on the H ureen Khana 
and the steam-engine house, the two strongest buildings, immediately in front. 

After practicable breaches had been effected, a storming party from the garrison . 
rushed out and carried the buildings by assault. 

On the morning of the 17th the struggle was resumed, and proved so obsti- 
natc, that it cost six hours to carry the mess-house. The operations are thus «>n. 
described in the comraander-in-chiefs despatch:—“Captain Peel kept up a 
steady cannonade on the building called the mess-house. .‘This building, of 
considerable size, was defended by a ditch about 12 feet broad, and dcarped 
with maspnry, and beyond that a loo])holed mud wall. I determined to use 



662 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book IX. 


A.D.1857. 


Final relief 
of the garri' 
soil. 


Tlomoval of 
the non- 
c-4>ni>>at>utits 


the guns as much as possible in taking it. About three P.M., when it was con¬ 
sidered that men might be sent to storm it without much risk .... (it) was 
carried immediately with a rush. The troops then pressed forward with great 
vigour, and lined tlie wall separating the mess-house from the Motee Munzil, 
which consists of a wide inclosurc and many buildings. The enemy here made 
a last stand, which was overcome after an hour, openings having been broken 
in tlie wall, through which the troops poured with a body of sappers, and 
accomplished our communication with the residency.” The contest was not yet 
over. The enemy kept up such .a galling fire of musketry from the Tehru Kotee 
or observatory, and of artillery from the battery of the Kaiser Bagh, that much 
street fighting, as well as some skilful strategy, was still required. The plan of 



Bailkv Cuard Gateway.—F rom Mecham's Siege of Lucknow. 


the commander-in-chief was not to retain present possession of Lucknow, hut 
, rest contented in the meantime with effecting the deliverance of the garrison, 
and conducting the women and children, together with the sick and wounded, 
• in safety to Cawnpoor. The delicate operation of removing the women and chil¬ 
dren, and the careful manner in which it was conducted on the 19th, is thus 
described by Mr. Gubbin:—“ Most of tliern were conveyed in carriages closely 
packed, every description of vehicle being pressed into service on tlie occasion. 
Many were seated on native carts, and not a few walked. They were 
conducted through the Bailey Guard gate, the Furhut Buksh and Chuttur Muuzi 1 
palaces, and emerging near our advanced battery, crossed the line of fire from 
the Kaiser Bagh to Martin’s house. Thence they entered and passed through 
the court of the IJ^otee Munzil, on the further side of which they gained £he 
highroad leading to the Secunder Bagh. Here, and near Martin’s house, they 
were exposed to the fire of the enemy’s guns placed on the farther side of the 





CllAP. V.] 


EVACUATION OF THE EESIUENCY. 


663 


river. Screens formed of the canvas walls of tents, or doors placed on each a.d. isst. 
side of the way they traversed, as far as the Motee Munzil, concealed the marcli 
of the fugitives from the enemy, and on one side of this a ditch or traveise 
liad been dug, Jilong which, dismounting from their carriages, tliey walked 
past all the exposed places. All most fortunately reached the Secundcr Bagh 
in safety.” 

The giirrison was yet to he extricated, and the eommander-in-cliief having acmovniof 

, . . ” the garrisiin 

resolved to effect this “ without exposing it to tlie chance of even a .stray amt reiiev- 
musket-shot,” thus explains his mode of procedure:—“ Upon the 20t1), fire was 
opened on the Kaiser Bagh, wliich gradually increased in importance, till it 
assumed the character of a regular breaching and bombardment. The Kaiser 
B.agh was breached in three places by Captain Peel, and 1 have been told that 
t,he .pnerny suffered much within its precincts. Havitig thus led the enemy to 
believe that immediate as.sault was contemplated, orders were issued for the 
retreat of the garrison through the lines of our pickets at midnight on the 22d. 

The ladies and families, the wounded, the treasure, the guns it was thought 
necessary to keep, the ordnance stores, the grain still possessed by the commissariat 
of the garrison, and the state prisoners, had all been previously removed (two 
Delhi princes, and some other leading natives arrested on suspicion). Sii- James 
Outram had received orders to burst the guns which it was thought undesirable 
to take away; and he was finally directed silentty to evacuate the residency at 
the hour indicated. The dispositions to cover the retreat and resist the enemy 
should he pursue were ably carried out by Brigadier the Honourable Adrian 
Hope; but I am happy to say the enemy was completely deceived, and he 
<lid not attempt to follow. On the contrary he began firing on our old positions 
many hours after we had left them. The movement of retreat was admirably 
executed, and »vas a perfect lesson in such combinations.” 

The whole ft)rce rejiched Dilkoosha at four in the morning of the 23d. 'J'he naveiock's 

• ^ deaiii. 

sick and wounded had left the residency on the 19th, and Lieutenant Havelock, 
who was included among the latter, in calling to take leave of his father, now 
Sir Henry Havelock, found him seated alone by his lamp, reading Macaulay’s 
History of England. The very next morning the general was seized with* 
diaiThoea. His constitution, shattered by past and recent exertions, was little 
able to contend with the formidable disease which, during the 21st, assumed so 
serious a form that it was deemed necessary to convey him at nightfall to the 
Dilkoosha. His own conviction, calmly conveyed to those around him, was that 
he should not recover. In the course of the 23d, when a fatal issue became only 
too probable, he met it not only without fear, but cheerfully. “ I die happy and 
contented.” “ I have for forty years so rided my life, that when death came I 
might face it without fear.” On the morning of the 24tK, after sonic slight 
Revival, there was a sudden change, and at half-past nine, he breathed his last, 
dying as,.he had lived, a Christian hero of the highest stamp. Immediately 



664 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book IX. 


A.D. issr. after his death, the troops who had been selected as a moveable column 
to be left in Oude under the command of Sir James Outram, set out, bearing 

with them the mor¬ 
tal remains of their 
departed general, 
which on aniving 
at the Alumbagh, 
they laid in a 
humble grave. Sir 
Henry Havelock 
had attained the 
age of sixty-three, 
and can hardlj' be 
said to have died 
too soon. After 
long and patient 
waiting, full scope 
had been given him 

for the display of his extraordinary talents, and his country, which reaped the 
benefit of them in one of the most eventful periods of her history, has not 
been ungrateful. 



ilAVEi/)CK’a Ora VIS ani> Alumbagh Pickjst House.— l^rom Mocham’B Riege of Lucknow. 


CHAPTER YT. 


Cawnpoor attacked by tbe rebels —Victoty of Oawnpoor—Other successes in tlio Doab— The auxiliary 
force from Nepaiil —Oenoral Outram in Oude—Final march upon Lucknow—Its capture—Subse- 
tjuent operations in Jiohar, Oude, and Kohilcund—The campaign in-Central India. 


CawniKior 

attoukud. 



[HOUGH tbe defences of Lucknow had been forced for a second 
time, the place remained in the possession of the rebels, and the 
commander-in-chief commenced his return to Cawnpoor. Mean¬ 
while General Outram remained at the Alumbagh with a force 
of 4000 men, at once to keep open the communication across 
the Ganges and to keep the enemy irt check should tliey attempt any hostile 
movement. On reaching Bunnee, encumbered with an immense train of 
waggons and other carriages employed in the conveyance of baggage, ammu¬ 
nition, 'commissafiat stores, and nearly 2000 helpless non-combatants, the 
returning force was startled at the sound of a cannonade in the direction af 
Cawnpoor. There could be little doubt as to the nature of it. That .place had 







Chap. VI.] 


REBELS ATTACK CAWNPOOE. 


6()5 

long been threatened by the rebels, and they had at length actually attacked a.d. isst. 
it. The commander-in-chief when he crossed the Ganges believed ho had 
provided sufficiently for its safety by intrusting the command of it to General 
Windham, with a force of above 2000 men. All previous reports seemed to 
indicate that there was but little chance of an immediate attack, and hence 
the continued silence of General Windham for several days was naturally 
accounted for by assuming that he had nothing of importance to communicate. 

It was far otherwise. He had sent urgent messages which had not been stai-tiii.g 
delivered, and it was only next morning, when luistening on as rapidly as frum cn»ii. 
possible, that Sir Colin Campbell “ received two or three notes in succession— 
first, announcing that Cawnpoor had been attacked; secondly, that General 
Windham was hard pressed; thirdly, that he had been obliged to fiill back 
from outside the city into his entrenchment.” 

At Calpee, situated forty miles .south-west of Cawnpoor, the mutineers Advniiooof 
of the Gwalior contingent had for some time fixed their head-(;[uarters, and contingBut 
obtained complete command of the surrounding districts. Nana Sahib was 
•also hovering about in the neighbourhood at the head of a considerable force. 

Tlio whole had united, and on the morning of the 2Gth of November were in 
full march on Cawnpoor. General Windham, on being made aware of their 
approach, sent to the commander-in-chief for instructions, but, in conse(|uence 
of the mi.scaiTiage of his mc,ssage, not having received any answer, felt obliged 
to act for himself Had ho remained on the defen.3ive he could not have been 
.sncce.ssfully a,ssailed, but he determined, Avith more .spirit than prudence, to 
])m’sue a bolder course; and leaving part of his force to guard the entrenchment, 
hastened out to meet the coming foe with the remainder, consisting of about 
1200 bayonets, 8 gnus, and 100 mounted sowars. His object was to strike a 
blow at tlv5 erfemy’s advance, and thereby perhaps induce the whole body to 
retire. He did strike the blow, and with no small degree of success. “ The conomi 

‘ ° .,,.,1 Wiiidlmiu 

enemy,” he says m his despatch, “ strongly posted on the other side of the dry iittacka it. 
bed of the Pandoo Nuddee, opened a heavy fire of artillery from siege and 
field guns; but such was the eagerness and courage of the troops, and so well 
were they led by their officers, that we carried the position with a rush, the 
men cheering as they went; and the village more than a mile and a half in its 
rear was raphlly cleared. The mutineers hastily took to flight, leaving in our 
possession tAVo eight-inch iron howitzers and one six-pounder gun.” General 
Windham must have made this advance under the impression that the main 
body of the enemy was .still so distant as to leaA^e him time to Avithdraw his 
small force to a safer position before it could be overpowered by overwhelming 
numbers. This miscalculation was productive of disaster. Observing from a Uu'iaiw 

. • . « ^ • results. 

height on the other side of thp village that the enemy’s ftiain body was at 
Ijand, “ I at once decided,” says the general, “ on retiring to protect Cawnpoor, 
my entreijchments, and the bridge over the Ganges.” This retreat, made in 
VoL. III. 280 



A.D. 1S67. 


Arrival of 
the c(»in' 
numder-iii- 
chiof at 
OawiiiKwr. 


tliA oniiy 
cnuMf'i* the 
Gaiigea. 


606 ' HISTORY OF INDIA. [Book IX. 

the face of an enemy estimated at 20,000 men, with forty guns, was not effected 
without considerable difficulty. Next morning, the 27th, the contest was 
renewed, and General Windham was obliged, at the end of five hours, on 
finding himself “threatened on all sides,” and “very seriously attacked” on 
his front and left flank, to make the best of his way to the entrenchments. It 
was high time, for they were already beset. Had they fallen, the safety ot 
the force in Oude would have been seriously compromised. 

The commander-in-chief, pushing on in advance of the column, reached the 
entrenchment on the evening of the 28th. During this day the fighting was 
very severe, and it had “ become necessary to proceed with the utmost caution 
to secure the bridge” over the Ganges. This operation and its success are 
thus described in a despatch:—“All the heavy guns attached to General 
Grant’s division, under Captain Peel, II.N., and Captain Travers, E.A., 



(jAWNrooR. — From a ilrawuig by W. Cari»enter, jiinr , engraved in Illustrated Lordou News. 


were placed in position on the left bank of the Ganges, and directed to open fire 
and keep down the fire of the enemy on the bridge. This was done ver\' 
effectually, while Brigadier Hope’s brigade, with some field artillery and cavalry, 
was ordered to cross the bridge and take position near the old dragoon 
lines. A cross fire was at the same time kept up from the entrenchment to 
cover the march of the troojjs. When darkness began to draw on, the artillery- 
parks, the wounded, and the families were ordered to file over the bridge, 
and it was not till six P.M., the day of the 30th, that the last cart had cleared 
the bridge.” The passage of the force with its encumbrances over the Gange.s 
had occupied thirty horn’s. As soon as the pa,ssage was effected, an earnest 
wish was felt to drive out the enemy, and make them pay dearly for their 
temporary triumph. By none could this wish be felt more strongly than by 
the commander-in-chiei‘, but he justly felt that his first duty was to. place the 



Chap. VL] 


CAWNPOOE RELIEVED.. 


6G7 


helpless intrusted to his care beyond the reach of danger, and therefore was a.d isst. 
obliged, as he himself expresses it, “ to submit to the hostUe occupation of 
Cawnpoor, until the actual despatch of all my encumbrances towards Allahabad 
has been elfected.” 

The safe removal of the families and the wounded having been completed Prei«initionB 
on the 5th of December, the respite which had been given to the rebels in ingtiiu 
Cawnpoor, and which had greatly increased their confidence, immediately 
ceased, and the very next day was fixed for the attack. The position of the 
enemy and the plan of attack ai-e thus described by Sir Colin Campbell’s 
despatch:—“His left occupied the old cantontnent, from which General Wind¬ 
ham’s post had been principally assailed. Ilis centre was in the city of Cawn¬ 
poor, and lined the houses and bazaars overhanging the canal which separated 
it fipm Brigadier Greathed’s position, the principal streets having been after¬ 
wards discovered to be baVricaded. Ilis right stretclied some way beyond the 
angle formed by the grand trunk road and the canal, two miles in rear of 
which the camp of the Gwalior contingent was pitched, and so covered the 
Calpee road. This was the line of retreat of that body. In short, the canal, 
along which were ydaced his centre and right, was the main feature of his posi¬ 
tion, and could only be passed in the latter direction by two bridges. It tiio attack, 
appeared to me, if his right were vigorously attacked, that it would be driven 
from its position without assistance coming from other parts of his line, tlie 
wall of the town which gave cover to our attacking columns on our right being 
an effectual obstacle to the movement of any portion of his troops from his left 
to right. Thus the {possibility became apparent of attacking his division in 
detail ” After mentioning that the enemy mustered about 25,000 men, with 
thirty-six guns, the despatch continues thus;—“Orders were given to General 
Windham on ^le morning of the Gth to open a heavy bombardment at nine A. M. 
from the entrenchment of the old cantonment, and so induce the belief in the 
enemy that the attack was coming from the general’s position. The carai) was 
struck early, and all the baggage di’iven to the river side under a guaid, to 
avoid the slightest risk of accident. Brigadier Greathed, reinforced bj^ the Gith 
regiment, was desired to hold the same ground opposite the enemy which he* 
had been occupying for some days past . . . and at eleven a.m., the rest of the 
force . . . was drawn up in contiguous columns in rear of some old cavalry lines, 
and efiectually masked from observation of the enemy. The cannonade from 
the entrenchment having become shick at this time, tlie moment had arrived 
for the attack to commence. The cavalry and horse-artillery having been sent itBcompiete 
to make a detour on the left and across the Ctanal by a bridge a mile and a half 
farther up, and threaten the enemy’s rear, the infantry deployed in parallel 
lines fronting the canal. Brigadier Hope’s brigade was in gdvance in pne line. 

Brigadier Inglis’s brigade being in rear of Brigadier Hope. At tlxj same 
time Brigadier Walpole, assisted by Captain Smith’s ‘field battery, 11.A, was 



668 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book IX. 


A.l). 1857. 


^ncccas of 
tU« attiick. 


I'lirsuit- of 
the* nO)cls. 


Coiiotiutru • 
tiou of the 
British 
fitrca*) at 
Krtrnicka- 
ha<l. 


ordered to pass the bridge immediately to the left of Brigadier Greathed’s 
position, and to drive the enemy from the brick-kilns, keeping the city wall 

for his guide.The advance then continued with rapidity along the whole 

line, and I had the satisfaction of observing in the distance that Brigadier 
Walpole was making equal progress on the right. The canal bridge was quickly 
passed, Captain Peel leading over it with a heavy gun, accompanied by a soldier 
of her majesty’s 5Sd, named Hannaford. The troops which had gathered 
together resumed their line of formation with great rapidity on either side, us 
soon as it was crossed, and continued to drive the enemy at all points, his camp 
being reached and taken at one p.m., and his rout being complete along the 
Calpee road. 1 must here draw attention to the manner in which the heavy 
twenty-four pounder guns were impelled and managed by Captain Peel and his 
gallant sailora. Through the extraordinary energy with which the latter l^ave 
worked, their guns have been constantly in advance throughout our late oi)era- 
tioiis, fi-oin the relief of Lucknow till now, as if they were light field pieces, aud 
the service rendered by them in clearing our front has been incalculable. On 
this occjxsion there was the sight beheld of twenty-four pounder guns advancing 
with the first line of skirmish era. Without losing any time, the pursuit with 
cavaliy, infantry, and light artillery was pressed with the greatest eagerness to 
the fourteenth milestone on tlie Caljiee road, aud 1 have reason to believe that 
every gun and cart of ammunition which had been in that j)art of the enemy’s 
])()sition which had been attacked, now fell into our possession.” Duririg these 
oj)eration,s, General Mansfield was equally successful in gaining the rear of the 
enemy’s left, and comjdetely routing the troops of Nana Sahib, who were there 
]n)sted. After a successful pursuit, the troops returned at midnight of the Gth. 
T’he following day the troops reposed, waiting for the arrival of the baggage, 
but early next morning Brigadier Grant started again in pursuit with the 
cavahy, some light artillery, and a brigade of infantiy. • After reaching the 
Nana’s residence at Bithoor, and discovering a large quantity of treasure which 
had been concealed in a well, he hastened on to the Serai Ghaut, where he had 
the good fortune to overtake the fugitives in the very act of crossing over into 
•Oude, and capturing fifteen guns. These, added to those previously taken, 
miulc the whole number thirty-two, thus nearly annihilating the whole artillery 
which the contingent possessed, and depriving them of the arm in which they 
had been most powerful. The whole British loss in this important victory was 
f)nly ninety-nine in killed and wounded. 

After the victory of Cawnpoor, the troops were compelled to remain inactive 
for several days, waiting the return of the means of conveyance from Allaha¬ 
bad. At length on the 2-ith of December, when they v’ere prepared to start, 
the plan of the campaign wa,s more fully developed. The more immediate 
object'was to clear the Doab of rebels, and i-etain command of it, so as to keep 
open the line of communication by the great trunk road from Alhdiabad to 



Chap. VI.] 


CONCENTRATION AT FURRUCKABAU. 


669 


Delhi. The northern portion of tliis line had already been to some extent a d. isr.7. 
secured by Colonel Seton, who having set out from Delhi at the head of a 
column consisting of^he carabineers, Hodson’s horse, the 1st Bengal fusiliers, 
and a Sikh regiment, mustering in all about 1900 sabres and bayonets, was 
proceeding southwards Avith an immense convoy of tents, ammunition, carts, 
camels, and in short everything most wanted at hcad-quartei-s. Ho was now 
advancing towards Mynpoorie, and in order to co-operate with him, and finally 
join him at that place. Brigadier Walpole was detached with the lifles, and a 
strong body of cavalry and artillery, mustering about 2000 men of all arms, 
to sweep across the Lower Doab by proceeding westward in the direction of 
Etawah, and then turn northwards so as to be able, after the junction with 
Colonel Seton, to reach Funnickabad, situated on the Ganges about eighty 
inile^ N.N.W. of Cawnpoor. This place, the onlj' one of which the rebeds still 
had undisputed possession, it was of the utmost importance to wrest from them, 
as the fort of Futtehghur in its vicinity gave it the command f)f the eastern por¬ 
tion of the Doab, while its bridge of boats, forming the leading communication 
with both Oude and Rohilcund, furnished the mvxtineers with which they 
swarmed with full opportunity whether of annoyance or of retreat. The 
capture of this place, which the commandcr-in-chief had resex ved for himself, 
was easy, for the enemy, instead of making the l)old stand which bad been 
anticipated, evacuated both the fort and town with such headlong baste, that 
a large amount of goveiiunent property, which they iloubtless xncantto dcsti'oy, 
wjis found uninjured. The whole British army encamped at Furruckabad fell 
little short of 10,000 men. 

While the commander in-chief had thus the happiness of seeing him.solf at a (n.oorkii 
the head of a foice more adecpiate to the ta.sk still before him than he had ,\o|mni. 
hitherto been »ible to muster, an important diversion in his favour was being 
made towards the eastern frontiers of Oude, by an auxiliary force of 10,000 
Ghoorkas, who had descended from Nepaul under the personal command of 
Jung Bahadoor, in name only the prime minister, but to all intents the actual 
sovereign of that country. These troops, possessing a high reputation for 
courage, fuid animated by an intense hatred of the sepoys, having cro.ssed the ' 

Nepaul frontier, leached Segowlee on the 21,st of December, and then marched 
westward to Gorruckpoor, clearing the country of mutineers as they pa.ssed, and 
preparing to enter Oude from the east, with the view of cutting off the retresit 
of the rebels in that direction, and then advancing to Lucknow, to take part 
in its final capture. 

The commander-in-chief, though anxious for immediate action, remained for riaxof 

^ ^ campaign. 

some time encamped at Futtehghm’. The plan of campaign which he pi'efeired 
was to cross the Ganges into Rohilcxmd, which was almost entirely in the 
hands of the rebels, and re-establish the authority of government, so as to* make 
it impossijjle for. the insurgents to find an asylum in it after they should be 



A.D. 1857. 


Plan of 
cumi)a{g:n. 


Oiulo agiviti 
entered and 
Lucknow 
attacked. 


670 HISTOEY OF INDIA. [Book IX. 

driven out of Lucknow. The governor-general’s plan was different. He 
thought that the time which would necessarily be occupied in the subjugation 
of Rohilcund would be more advantageously employeePin Oude^ where the 
rebellion still counted the largest number of adherents, and possessed its most 
important stronghold. Tliis was the plan ultimately adopted, and Sir Colin 
Campbell, leaving a sufficient garrison in the fort of Futtehghur, broke up hi.s 
camp on the 1st of February, and set out for Cawnpoor. At this time the 
whole force under his personal command amounted to 18,277, composed as 
follows: infantry 12,498, cavalr}”^ 3169, artillery 1745, and engineers 865. These 
included the strong detachment under General Outram, who, besides gallantly 
holding his post at the Alumbagh, 
had on two different occasions put to 
rout largo bodies of the enemy who 
had ventured to assail it. Another 
British force under General Franks, 
which liad been organized at Benares, 
after defeating a lx>dy of rebels esti¬ 
mated at 2.5,000, was hastening for¬ 
ward to take ])art in the operations 
before Lucknow. 

'I’he first portion of the anny 
crossed the Ganges on the 4th of Feb¬ 
ruary, but tlie wliole did not cross 
till the 28th, on which day head-quar¬ 
ters were transferred to Buntai-a. On 
the 2d of March the Dilkoosha palace 
was seized, and occupied as an ad¬ 
vanced picket, though not without 
opposition from the enemy, who 
o]iened a heavy fire from a series of strong entrenchments in the line of the 
canal, and kept it up with so much effect as to make it necessary to retire 
from the spot which had at first been selected for the camp, and carry it 
back as far as the nature of the ground would permit. On the 3d and 4th. 
after the. last of the siege train was brought up, the right of the position rested 
on the Goomtee and Bibrapoor, situated within an angle formed by that river, 
while the left stretched in the direction of Alumbagh, which was about two 
miles distant. Hudson’s horse, stationed in the interval between the two posi¬ 
tions, kept the communication open. After these preliminary steps, the plan 
of attack began to be developed. The nature of it will be understood from the 
following explanktion given in the coraraander-in-chief’s despatch :—“ Having 
received tolerably correct infonnation with respect to the lines of works which 
had been constructed" by the enemy for the defence of Lucknow, j^t .appeared 



Juno Bahadoor. 

Froln » painting in the Muiieuni, Knit India House. 




CUAP. VI.] 


SECOND ADVANCE ON LUCKNOW. 


671 


evident to me that the necessity would arise - for operating from both sides of a.d. issr. 
the Goomtee, when the capture of the city should be seriously entertained. 

Two very important reasons concun-ed to show the expediency of such a course, 
the one that it would become possible to enfilade many of the enemy’s new 
works; tlie other, that great avenues of supply would be closed against the 
town, though I could not hope to invest a city having a circumference of 
twenty miles.” 

In accordance with this plan, a bridge formed of casks which had been pro- F.irniiiUj>io 

, _ _ - •! 1 Uifflcult.ies 

viously provided was hastily tlirowa across the river, and on the 6th a com- 
plete corps of infantry, cavalry, and guns, under Sir James Outram, who 
had been withdrawn from the Alumbagh to assume the command, passed 
over, with instructions to proceed northward in a line nearly parallel to the 
oourae of the liver, and then endeavour to penetrate westward, so as to obtain 
command of the two bridges, the one of iron and the other of stone, giving 
acce.ss to the city fi orn the north. The woiks which the first part of this 
movement was designed to turn are thus described in the despatch;—“The 
series of courts and buildings called the Kaiser Bagh, considered as a citadel by 
the rebels, was shut in by three lines of defence towards the Goomtee, of which 
the line of the canal w'as the outer one. The second line circled roimd the 
large building called the mess-house, and the Motce Mahul, and the first, or 
interior one, was the pi-incipal rampart of the Kaiser Bagh, the rear of the 
inclosures of the latter being closed in by the city, through which approach 
would have been dangerous to an a.s,sailaut. These lines Avere flanked by 
numerous bastions, aiid rested at one end on the Goomtee, and the other on the 
great buildings of the street called the Huzratgungo, all of which w’cre strongly 
fortified, and flanked the .street in every direction. Extraordinary care had 
been expended 6n the defence of the houses and ba.stious to enfilade the streets.” 

As soon as it became apparent that Sir James Outram had turned the first Caiimitrv 
line of defence*by pusliing forward to the vicinity of the Chnkkur Walla Ivotee, thoyaroKur 
all tlio batteries at the Dilkoosha opened their fire on the Martiniere, and 
with so much- effect, that on the 9th it was successfully stormed by the 42d, 

53d, and 90th regiments, under the direction of Brigadier Sir Edwai-d Lugard 
and the Hon. Adrian Hope. This first success was immediately followed by 
one of still more consequence, when the 4tli Punjab i-illes, .supported by the 
•i2d Highlanders?, climbed up the entrenchment abutting on the Goomtee, and 
swept down the whole line of works forming the outer defence as far as the 
building known as Banks’s house, which 'was carried next day at sunrise, and 
secured as a strong military post. Sir James Outram had in the meantime 
been making rapid progress, having not only captured the Badshah Bagh, one of 
the finest of the King of Oude’s summer palaces, but establisheJtl himself strongly 
at the north extremity of the iron bridge. The continuance of the attack is 
thus described in the despatch:—“The second part of the plan of attack against 



HISTOEY OF INDIA. 


[Book IX. 


072 


A.D. 1857. 


Snccoflflive 
c.ij»tnreft of 
onouiy’s 
etroiiKcnt 
wtirks. 


Arrivjil of 
the Nopau- 
leeo force 
at Lucknow. 


the Kaiser Bagh now came into ojieration, viz., to use the great blocks of houses 
and palaces extending from Banks's house to the Kaiser Bagh as our approach, 
instead of sapping up towards the front of the second line of works. By these 
means I was enabled to turn towards our own left, at the same time that they 
were enfiladed on the right by Sir James Outram’s advance. The latter had 
already received 'orders to plant his guns with a view to raking the enemy’s 
position, to annoy the Kaiser Bagh with a vertical and direct fire, also to 
attack tlie suburbs in the vicinity of the iron and stone bridges shortly after 
daybreak, and to command the iron bridge from the left bank. All this was 
carried out by Sir James Outram with the most marked success. The enemy, 
however, still held pertinaciously to his own end of the iron bridge on the 
right bank, and there was heavy cannonading from both side.s, till the bridge 
was afterwards taken in reverse.” • 

The front attack as continued from the 11th is thus described:—“The 
operation had now become one of an engineering character, and the mo.st 
earnest endeavours were made to save the infantry from being hazarded 
before due preparation had been made. Tlic chief engineer. Brigadier Napier, 
placed the batteries with a view to breaching and .shelling a large block of the 
palaces called the Begum Kotee. The latter was stormed with great gallantjy 
by the 0.‘?d Highlanders, supported by the 4th Punjab rifle.s, and 1000 CJhoorkas, 
led by Brigadier the Hoji. Adrian Hojie, under the direction of Biigadiei- 
general Sir Edward Lugard, at four a.m. The troops secured the whole block 
of buildings, and inflicted a very heavy lo.ss on the enemy, the attack having- 
been one of a very desperate character. This was the sternest struggle 
which occuri’ed during the siege. From thenceforward the chief engineer 
pu.shcd his approach with the greatest judgment through the inclosures by 
the aid of the sappers and of heavy gn7i.s, the troojis immediately occupying 
the ground as he advanced, and the mortars being moved frojn one position to 
another, as the ground was won on which they could be placed. ' The building.s 
to the right and the Secunder B<agh were taken in the early morning of the 
same day Avithout opjwsition. During the night of the 12th, Sir James Outram 
was reinforced with a number of heavy guns and mortars, and directed to 
increase his fire on the Kaiser Bagh, while at the same time mortars placed in 
a position at the Begum’s house never ceased to play on the Imambara, the 
next large palace it was necessary to storm, between the Begum Kotee and 
the Kaiser Bagh.” 

On the 11th, Jung Bahadoor, after long delays, arrived Avith a force of about 
9000 men and twenty-four field guns, with which he took up a position clo.so 
to the canal, where he was advantageously employed for several days„ in 
covering the left df the British fofee, whose whole available strength was then 
massed towards the nght, in the joint attack carried along both banks of tl»e 
Goomtee. The attack of the Imambsira, under the direction of General Franks, 



Chap. VI. ] 


THE ATTACK CONTINUED. 


G73 


who had relieved Sir Edward Lugard, took place on the 14th, and not only a.d. 1857 . 
succeeded, hut was followed up in a manner which none had been sanguine 
enough to. anticipate. After the Imambara had been forced by the column of conUnuwi 
attack led by Brigadier D. Russell, Braj'ser’s Sikhs pressing forward in pursuit tlio llritiali 
entered the Kaiser Bagh, and made good their footing within it. The third 
line of defences having thus been turned without a single gun being fired 
from them, “suppoi'ts,” continiies the despatch, “were {puckl 3 ^ thrown in, and 
all the well-known ground of former defence and attack, tlio mess-house, the 
Tara Kotee, the Motee Mahul, and the Chuttur Munzil, were rapidly occupied 
by the troop.s, while the engineers devoted their attention to securing the 
position towards the south and west. The day was one of continued exertion, 
and every one felt that although much remained to be done before the final 
expulsion of the rebels, the most difficult part of the work had been overcome.” 

How much had been achieved may be learned from the following brief descrip- 



CiiUTTVit Munzil Palace, Lucknow.—F rom a photogmili (‘iigravcd in tlio IJluBtrcitisil 'Jiim-h. 


tion which the despatch gives of the various buildings successively sapi)ed into or 
stormed:—“They formed a range of massive palaces and walled courts of vast 
extent, equalled perhaps, but certainly not surpassed, in any capital in Europe. 

Every outlet had been covered by a work, and on every side were prepared 
barricades and loopholed parapets. The extraordinary industiy evinced by 
the enemy in this respect has been really unexampled. Hence the absolute 
necessity for holding the troops in hand, till at each successive move forward 
the engineers reported to me that all which could be effected by artillery and 
the sappers had been done before the troops were led to the ttssault.” • 

, The 15th having been employed in securing what had been gained, and rinai cap¬ 
fixing moptaiB for the bombardment of all the positions ^ill held by the enemy, 

VoL. III. 281 



674 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book IX. 


A.D. 1857. 


Defeat of tlif* 
liogiim of 
< )utle an<l 
the Moulvie 
of Fyzubail 


Death of 
>io(l 60 u and 
Peel. 


active operations were resumed on the following day, when Sir James Outram, 
with the 5th brigade under Brigadier Douglas, supported by two other regi¬ 
ments, crossed the Goomtee by a bridge of casks, a little above the iron bridge, 
and was able not only to take the latter bridge in reverse, which was the chief 
object in view, but to advance more than a mile up the right bank of the river, 
and take possession both of the Muchee Bhowun and another building consider¬ 
ably beyond it, called the Great Iraambara. At the same time, a portion of 
his force having turned eastward, passed through the Chuttur Munzil into the 
residency. The city was now won, but the far greater part of the rebels had 
made their escape. This was perhaps unavoidable, as the extent of the city 
made it impossible effectually to guard the loading outlets from it. 

Two considerable bodies of rebels still remained to be disposed of One of 
these, estimated at about 7000, occupied the Moosa Bagh, a large palace .with 
gardens and inclosures, situated at some distance to the west, near the right bank 
of the Goomtee. It was under the immediate direction of the Begum Huzrat- 
Mahul, the ex-queen of Oude, who had throughout been the very soul of the 
insurrection in that kingdom. She had with her her son Brijeis Kuddr, of 
whom, in the absence of her husband, then a prisoner at Calcutta, she had 
made a puppet king, and also her notorious paramour, Mumoo Khan, who had 
so long been permitted to usurp her husband’s place, as to make the real 
paternitj’’ of Brijeis Kuddr more than doubtful. ’J'he other body of rebels 
occupied a stronghold in the heart of the city, and was headed by the Moulvie 
of Fyzabad, whose combined ability and fanaticism made him one of the most 
influential of the insurgent leaders. On the 19th Sir James Outram moved 
directly on the Moosa Bagh, by the right bank of the Goomtee, while Brigadier 
Hojic Grant cannonaded it from the left bank, and Bi-igadier Campbell moved 
round from the Alumbagh to the west, for the purpose of preventing retreat in 
that direction. The result was a complete rout. The moulvie, after a stout 
resistance, was driven out on the 21st by Sir Edward Lugar(i, and pursued by 
the cavalry under Brigadier Campbell for six miles. Resistance being now at 
an end, the commander-in-chief deemed it “possible to invito the return of the 
inhabitants, and to rescue the city from the horrors of this pi’olonged contest ” 
Notwithstanding the desperate fighting which had taken place, so much care 
had been taken not to expose the troops unnecessarily, that the capture was 
eff’ected with a comparatively trifling numerical loss. In another respect the 
loss was serious, as it included two of the most promising officers in the service, 
Hodson and Peel. The former fell mortally wounded during the assault, and 
died almost immediately after; the latter, now become Sir William Peel, in 
just 1 ‘ecompense for his distinguished services, was also severely wounded, but 
had given good hopes of an early and complete recovery, when an attack of 
small-pox, aggravated by his previous suffering, carried him off", after be had 
been removed to Cawnpoor. 



Chap. VI.] 


OUDE STILL INSECURE. 


675 


When Lucknow was captured, it must have become apparent to the rebels a.u. jsst. 
that ail hope of successful resistance was at an end. But tliey did not therefore ~ 
at once abandon the struggle. On the contrary, with the exception of the capitid The atnigsie 
and the small portion of country adjoining tlie road leading from it to Cawn- 
poor, the whole of Oude was still in their possession; wJiile they mustered 
strong in Behar on the east, where Koer Sing still headed the-revolt; in Ilohil- 
cund on the north-west, where Khan Bahadur, reinforced by insurgent fugitives 
from other quarters, had become so strong, as to make it a question whether a 
campaign against him ought not to have preceded that undertaken against 
Tjucknow; and in the south and south-west, where, throughout the greater 
j)art of Central India, the authority not only of the British governmimt, but of 
the two leading native princes, Scindia and HoJkar, who remained in alliance 
with., it, had for the time been completely extinguished. Mucli important 
work thus remained to be done, and though ultimate success could no longer 
be considered doubtful, there was little prospect of being able to achieve it 
before the rains would set in, and render campaigning all but impossible. 

Under these circumstances, all that the commander-in-chief could do wjis to 
provide for the security of Lucknow by intrusting the command of it to Sir 
Hope Grant, with a force adequate not only to garrison it, but to overawe the 
disturbed districts.in its vicinity, to send out moveable columns to cles-r the 
way in those directions where his communications were endangered, and then 
I)repare for the final suppression of the mutiny by moving against Kohilcund, 
effecting a junction with Sir Hugh Rose, who had been leading a laige and 
victorious force northwards through Central India, and lastly return with 
augmented force into Oude, and drive the rebels before him into the pestilential 
morasses of the Terai of Nepaul. 

The Ghoorkas, impatient to return to their homes laden with plunder, rro<««iiiiKi. 
(juitted the vicinity of Lucknow shortly after its capture, and proceeded east- direction of 
ward by way of Fyzabad. They were followed shortly afterwards by Sir 
Edward Lugard, at the head of a strong column, consisting of three regiments 
of infantry, three of Sikh horse, the military train, and three batteries, which 
started from Lucknow on the 29th of March, and proceeded south-east to* 
Sultanpoor. The immediate destination of the column was Azimghur, which 
had for some time been held in a state of siege by Koer Sing, with the greater 
part of the Dinapoor mutineers, about 3000 levies, and three or four guns. On 
the 2d of April an attempt had been made by the rebels to intercept a large 
convoy of ammunition and supplies, sent out to the beleaguered garrison from 
Benares, with an escort of 4G0 men under Lord Mark Kerr. I'his attempt was 
successfully repulsed, but the garrison, though relieved and strengthened by 
the convoy and escort, was still in danger, and the column was tlierefore 
anxious‘to push forward. Unfortunately there were obstacles in the way. A 
temporary bridge which the Ghoorkas had thrown over‘the Goom tee at Sultan- 



UISTOEY OF INDIA. 


[Book IX. 


I )tifeat and 
(loath of 
Koer iSiiig. 


()iihap]).v 
aflair at 
lUiouduuiuw. 


Death of the 
lion.Adrian 


Buttle of 
Bareilly and 
fli;;ht of the 
rubelB. 


poor had been broken down, and the column being in consequence obliged to 
take a somewhat circuitous route, did not reach Juanpoor till the 9th of April. 
Another detention, caused by the defeat and pursuit of a body of rebels, who 
threw themselves jujross its path, prevented it from reaching Azimghur before 
tlie 15th. Here the final encounter took place, and terminated as usual in the 
di.scomfiture of tJie rebels, who broke up into three different parties, one of 
which fled northward on the road to Gorruckpoor, and another back towards 
Oude, while the third and main body, under Koer Sing himself, moved east¬ 
ward towards his own zemiiidaree, in the vicinity of Arrah, where the wounds 
which he had received in the action shortly afterwards terminated his career. 

On the 10th of April another strong column, mustering nearly 0000 men of 
all arms, and fully provided with light and heavy artillery, under Genera] 
Walpole, set out from Lucknow with the intention of clearing that part of the 
country, and moving upward along the left bank of the Ganges toward 
Rohilcund. No opposition was experienced till the 15th, when, on arriving at 
llhoodmnow, fifty miles west of Lucknow, its fort was found in possession of a 
body of rebels. Their number did not exceed 400, and the defences of the fort 
consisted only of a high loopholed wall and a ditch. An easy capture was 
consequently anticipated; and with strange disregard both of ordinary caution, 
and o:^ the special instructions of tlie commander-in-chief ^o risk no assault 
until due preparation had been made for it by the use of artillery, an attacking 
jtarty, consisting of the 42d Highlanders, sujiported by the 4th Punjab rifles, 
was ordered to advance to the attack. This was a serious and costly blunder. 
The rebels, completely sheltered, kept up such a deadly fire, that the assailants, 
after an unavailing display of gallantry, were obliged to retire with a loss of 
nearly 100 in killed and wounded, including among the former four officers, 
one of them Brigadier the Hon. Adrian Hope, almost adored by his own 
legimcnt, the 93d, and described, with little exaggeration, as “ the most gallant 
and the best beloved soldier in the array.” The foil}' of having risked this 
repulse was demonstrated next morning, when it Avas found that the place had 
been evacuated during the night. 

' The commander-in-chief having opened the campaign in Roiiilcund by the 
capture of Shajehanpoor, .started again on the 2d of May, and began to advance 
northwards on Bareilly, on which, at the same time, in consequence of a well- 
managed combination, two other columns were moving—one under General 
Jones from the north-west, by way of Moradabad, and the other under General 
Penney from the south-west, by way of Budaon. This concentration of force, 
jirovided for the suppression of the mutiny in Rohilcund, shows that a very 
formidable resistance was anticipated. Khan Bahadur Khan, while allowed 
to remain in undinsturbed possession of his usurped authority, carried matters 
with so high a hand, that the whole of the Rohillas, who had grievous wrongs 
of their own to avenge, seemed to have mllied round his standard. The 



Chap. VI.) 


BATTLE OF BAREILTA'. 


G77 


result, however, showed that he was formidable only so long as lie was a d. isst. 
unopposed. When the encounter took place he made little more than a show 
of resistance, and seeking safety in a precipitate flight, left the British to FUghtofthe 
resume almost undisputed possession of Bareilly. More boldness and dexterity ™ 
were displayed by the Ikloulvie of L\icknow, who, taking advantage of the 
departure of the British army for Bareilly, mustered a large-promiscuous force, 
and by making a dash at Shajehanpoor, actually succeeded in seizing and 
plundering it. Some mistake must have been committed in intrusting it to a 
gairison so feeble that they were obliged to take refuge in the jail, and remain 
entirely on the defensive till they were again set free by General Jones, who 
had been detached from Bareilly for that purpose. With the cajiture of 
Bareilly the Rohilcund campaign virtually terminated. The rebels, unable to 
keep the field, only attempted a desultory warfare, while the a])proaching rains 
made the continuance of active operations on the part of the British in great 
measure impossible. In contemplation of this period of comparative quiescence, 
the commander-in-chief fixed his head-quarters at Futtehghur, there to wait 
till the return of the cold season should allow the campaign to be resumed. 
Meanwhile it will be necessary to turn to another (juarter, to wliieh due 
attention has not yet been paid, and give a brief account of the progress of 
events in Central India. 

In the earlier stage of the mutiny no eflbrt could be made to check its '’«nii«ign 

In (lentrai 

jirogress in Central India, and the mutineers, headed in some instances by JikIhi. 
native princes, were allowed to indulge a tenqiorary triumph. It was not of 
long duration, 'fhe presidencies both of Bombay and Madras, after a shoi t 
period of anxious suspense, gave satisfactory proof that they were not inqilicated 
in the treachery which prevailed in Bengal, and it in consetpience became 
pi’acticablp to organize columns from their respective annies, which, entering 
Centxal India from the south-east and south-west, might afford effectual aid in 
restoring the* authority of govex’nment. The former column, under General 
Whitlock, after quitting Nagpoor, proceedeil northwards towards Jubbulpoor; 
the latte]’, under General Roberts, coming frojn Rajjiootana, proceeded in the 
direction of Kotah; both were intended to co-operate, and ultimately form a 
junction with a more central column, wheii the whole, under the command of 
•Sir Hugh Rose, was to assume the name of the Centi’al India field force. 

At the outset the central column, consisting of about (iOOO men, of whom iv«Brcw<if 
2500 were British, was formed into two brigades. One of them, commanded f..rce». 
by Brigadier Stuart of the 14th light dragoon.s, having mi the 2d of August, 

1857, effected the relief of Mhow, which since the commencement of the 
mutiny had been kept in a state of siege, spent the remainder of the rainy 
season in repjiiring and strengthening the fort, erecting/new batteries, and 
.throwing up entrenchments,*with the view of making the locality a basis foi’ 
subsequent operationa On the 19th of October the bi’igade was again in 



C78 


HISTORY OF INDIA, 


[Book IX. 


A.D. 18.57. 


Dliar 

btisiegtwl. 


of 

Dhar and 
M nndisorc. 


motion, and proceeded west to Dliar, the capital of a small principality, where 
a body of mutineers, collected from various quarters, had, contrary it was said 
to the wish of the native authorities, taken forcible possession. The actual 
rajah was a mere boy, and the probability is that his guardians were playing 
a double game, conciliating the rebels by complying with their demands, and 
at the same time professing to the British government that they did so not 
voluntarily, but under compulsion. As the bi'igade approached the town, the 
rebels, quitting the fort, advanced to the attack, and opened a brisk fire from 
three brass guns which they had planted on an adjoining height. After a short 
encounter their courage failed, and they took refuge within the fort, leaving their 
guns behind them. A siege in consequence became necessary, and after the 
arrival of the .siege train on the 24th of October, operations were immediately 
commenced. While from a position at some distance to the south shells 
continued to be thrown into the fort with little intermission, advantage was 
taken of the cover afibrded by the huts and mud walls of the town to place 
a breaching battery, which began to play at the distance of 300 yards on the 
curtains and bastions of the fort, which were all substantially built of stone. 
Means were at the same time taken to invest the place so closely as to prevent 
the escape of the garrison, which was supposed to fall little short of 4000 men. 
By the 29th, after a considerable breach had been made, the garrison began to 
talk of terms, but on being told that nothing but an unconditional surrender 
would be accepted, declared their determination to hold out to the last. This 
Avas only a feint. They were already preparing their escaj»e, and notwith¬ 
standing all the ])recautions which had been used, acconqdished it with so 
much dexterity, that their flight was not known till the .stoi ming party entered 
the breach and found the place deserted. 

After laj'ing the fort in ruins so as to prevent the rebels froln again using 
it as a stronghold, and receiving a considerable reinforcement by the arrival 
of the Hydembad contingent under Major Orr, the column resunled its march 
in two divisions—the contingent starting on the 7th of November for Mahid- 
poor, where the Dhar rebels, greatly augmented by others from the neighbour¬ 
hood, were reported to have committed great outrages; while the rest of the 
force did not .set out till the following day. The contingent pushing forward, 
came up with the enemy at the village of Rawul, and by a gallant charge drove 
them from their guns, which were captured, together with laige quantities of 
ammunition, and of bullocks and carts loaded with plunder. This success 
having cleared the road, no further encounter took place till Mundisore was 
reached on the morning of the 21st of No\'ember. Here the rebels had fixed 
their head-quarters, and felt so confident in their superior numbers, that instead 
of waiting to be attacked, they first attempted a surprise, and when it failed, 
advance'd steadily with banners flying, threatening at once both British flanks, 
and centre. After a .short encounter they turned their backs, and were, pursued 



Chap. VI.) 


NEEMITCII RELIEVED. 


679 


almost to the walls of the town. Meanwhile intelligence was received that a a d. isss. 
body of rebels, estimated at 5000, who had been laying siege to Neemuch, had ’ 

set out to form a junction with those at Mundisore. As this junction would MunUisora 
have given the enemy an overwhelming preponderance. Brigadier Stuart 
determined to frustrate it, by throwing himself between the two bodies, 
though at the risk of opposing himself to an attack both -in front and rear. 

He accordingly set out on the morning of the 22d, and had an encounter with 
the enemy’s advance-guard without any very decisive result. On the following 
day, after advancing a short way along the road between Mundisore .and 
Neemuch, he found the enemy in gi'e.at force, strongly posted in and beyond 
the village of Goraria. This position wtrs too strong to be forced, and when 
night closed, after <a fierce struggle, still remained in i)OSsession of the enemy. 

Wlylc the battle was raging in front, a party of rebels from Mundisore had 
made an attack on the British rear, and attempted, though without success, 
to cjiiry off the baggage. On the 24th the battle was renewed and m<aintained 
by the rebels with great obstinacy, till they were driven from the village at 
the point of the bayonet, and fled, scattering themselves over the country. 

Their loss was estimated at not less than 1.500. The result was the relief of 
Neemuch, where a considerable number of Europeans, shut up within the fort, 
had for some time been maintaining a gallant but almost dc.spei’atc defence, 
and the capture of Mundisore which, when the column returned to it the day 
after the battle, was found evacuated. Leaving Major Orr with the contingent 
in occupation of Mumlisore, Brigadier Stuart reti’aced his stejis, and on the 
15th of December arrived at Indore, where Sir Hugh Rose assumed th<i 
command in person of the two brigades, composing what was henceforth 
dcsign<ated the Central India field force. 

ITom Ind»re, the cai)ital of Holkar’s dominions. Sir Hugh Rose, in the Soiio™ ana 
beginning of January, 1858, marched north-east in the direction of Sehore, a novaa. 
town in the principality of Bhop.al, ruled at this time by a princess or begum, 
who had remained faithful to the British alliance during the general disaffec¬ 
tion, though most of the troops belonging to her contingent h.ad joined the 
mutineers. After re.aching Sehore, and executing summary vengeance on a 
number of mutineers, the force continued its march through Bho})al and Bhilsa 
.to the fort of Rhatghur,* situated about twenty-five miles W.S.W. of Saugor. 

This fort was one of the largest and stronge.st in Central India, and was then 
garrisoned by a large body of rebels, who had retired to it as a stronghold 
which could not be wrested from them. It stood on the S 2 mr of a lofty ridge, 
isolated on the east and south sides by scarped i)recipice.s, while the noiih side 
was inclosed by a deep ditch, and the west side, in wliich the gateway was placed, 

■•v^as flanked by several square and round bastions. With much labour and 
^difficulty, a morkar and a breaching battery having been comjdeted, •fire was 
opened from them on the 27th January, at the distance of about 300 yai'ds. 



A.D. 1858. 


Coiitjnuo<l 
prc^oMi of 
thu UriiiBli 
arms. 


Maltlioor 

tliroateiiod. 


680 - HISTORY OF INDIA. [Book IX. 

and kept np with so much vigour, that on the evening of the 28th the breach 
was pronounced practicable. It was however unnecessary to storm. The 
garrison, descending by a precipice which,*as it seemed to bar the possibility 
of egress, was carelessly guarded by a body of Bhopal troops, had made their 
escape. The next advance was to Saugor, where Sir Hugh Rose had the 
happiness of relieving a body of Europeans who had been cooped up for eight 
months within the fort. A few days afterwards, the Madras column, under 
General Whitlock, which had been advancing by way of Jubbulpoor, made 
its appearance, after having successfully cleared the districts through which it 
passed. 

At some distance to the east of Saugor stood the fort of Gurrukotta. It 
was occupied by a body of rebels, and Avas expected to give some trouble, but 
the garrison only made a show of resistance while pre])aring for flight, valid 



J^ORT or Saugor.—F rom lUufitrated LoikIoh New.?. 


then moved off, leaving a large quantity of accumulated plund/^r behind them. 
Sir Hugh Rose now prepared for a long march to the north. His destination 
was Jhansi, where a hideous mas.sacre had been perpetrated, and where the 
begum, resenting the questionable act which had incorjiorated the territory 
with British India, had headed the revolt, and given' proof of talents wdiich, 
but for her shai'e in the Jhansi massacre, might have extorted admiration. 
The road led over some of the ridges of the Vindhya Mountains, and through’ 
several passes which, if properly defended, could not have been forced without 
great difficulty and sacrifice of life. Maltlioor, the most difficult of these, was 
in the direct line, and the rebels, a.ssuming that the British force would jirocced 
by it, had blocked it up with boulders and bamcades, and occupied it with a 
large body of troops, under the personal command of the rebel Rajah of Banpoqr. 
Sir Hugh Rose having taken up a po.sition from which he might move on any 
one of £he passes which might eventually be selected, took means to confirm the 
enemy in the belief that he had fixed upon Maltlioor, and then made-a sudden 



Chap. VI.] 


JHANSI BESIEGED. 


681 


flank movement, which brought him to the pass of Mudanpoor. The resistance a.d. ism. 
offered by the rebels only showed how much more effective it would have been 7 ~ 
if they had not been taken by surprise, and after a short struggle the pass was 
cleared. The level country having thus been gained, several j^laces of some 
strength were captured, and the wliole force continued its advance on Jliansi, 
where it anived on the 21st of March. 

The town of Jhansi, situated in the midst of extensive woods, covers an rii* fort of 
area of about four miles and a half in circuit, and is suirounded by a wall of 
.solid masonry from six to twelve feet thick, and eighteen to thirty feet higli, 
flanked with bastions for ordnance, and loojiholed for musketry. Within the 
town, and inclosed by it on all sides except the west, where the rock on which 
it stands terminates in an abrupt and lofty precipice, i-i-ses tlie citadel, com- 
plet^y commanding both the town and the roads lea<ling to it, and strongly 
fortified both by nature and art. Its walla, constructed of solid granite from 
sixteen to twenty feet thick, were flanked by elaborate outworks of the same 
solid construction; while the interior, partly occupied by the massive buildings of 
the palace, contained several lofty towers mounting heavy ordnance, and in 
some places pierced with five tiers of loopholes. I’lie south side appearing to 
be the only one from which the fort could be siiccessfully assailed, batteries were 
so placed as to bring a concentrated fire upon it, and immediately opened with 
great effect. Several of the enemy’s guns were silenced, and the battlements gave 
evident signs of crumbling away. The besiegers were in consequence indulging 
the hope of a speedy and successful assault when this cheering prospect became 
suddenly clouded. On the evening of the 31st March, a telegraph which Sir 
Hugh Rose had tiiken the precaution to establish on a commanding hill in the 
vicinity, signalled that “the enemy were coming in great force from tlie noi-th.” 

There. could bo no doubt as to the enemy thus announced. 'I’he very day Attemptod 

» . roliufufit 

when the siege commenced it was rumoured that a whole army of rebels, bytiierebuia. 
composed chiisfly of the gathered remnants of the Gwalior contingent, under a 
distinguished leader of the name of Tantia Topee, was about to advance to 
the ranee’s relief from Calpee, situated on the Chumbul, about ninety miles 
to the north-east. This, then, was the enemy; and the British force, which' 
barely sufficed to carry on the siege, was suddenly called upon, while continuing 
to man its batteries and keep in check a garrison of 12,000 men, to encounter 
an army of nearly double that number in the open field. The odds were 
fearful, for aU the troops that could be spared from the siege did not exceed 
1200, and of these only 500 were British infantry. With these Sir Hugh Rose 
moyed out with as little delay as possible, and found the enemy matching in 
masses, and taking up a position in front of the British camp, near the banks 
bfthe Betwa. The battle was deferred till tlie following irforning (1st April), 
and furnished another signal example of the utter inability of a native to 
cope with a British force properly handled. After a Cannonade which made 

Vot. III. 28SS 



A.T>. 1868. 


Jltanai taken 
by aMaiilt. 


VictOTlon!! 
career of 
two Britisli 
auxiliary 
coliuntis. 


682 HISTORY OF INDIA. [Book IX. 

havoc among the dense masses of the enemy, a charge of cavalry, directed 
simultaneously against both vrings, increased the confusion, and made it 
comparatively easy for the infantry to push forward and complete the victory 
at the point of the bayonet. All the guns brought by the enemy from Calpee 
were captured, and nearly 1000 of their number lay dead upon the field. After 
this victory the siege was prosecuted with so much vigour, that an assault took 
place on the 3d of April. It was made in two columns—the one on the right, 
composed of the Madras and Bombay sappers, the 3d Europeans, and Hyderabad 
infantry, effecting an entrance by escalade, while that on the left, composed 
of the royal engineers and the 86th and 25th Bombay native infantry, stormed 
the breach. Both attacks succeeded, and the two columns, after clearing the 
way before them, met, and were concentrated at the palace. The fighting, 
however, was still continued in different parts both of the city and the.fort, 
and did not finally cease till the 6th, when the capture was completed. Large 
numbers of the rebels were slain, but still larger numbers escaped, and among 
them the ranee, who, though seen in full flight, mounted on a gray horse, 
and attended only by a few followers, could not be overtaken. 

While Sir Hugh Rose was pursuing his victorious career, the other two 
columns under Clenerals Roberts and Whitlock were also making a successful 
advance. The Bombay column under the former general, advancing througli 
Rajpootana by way of Nusseerabad, reached Kotali on the right bank of the 
Chumbul on the 22d of March. Here the position of affairs was somewhat 
singular. Immediately on the arrival of the British on the left, bank of the 
Chumbul, the rajah crossed over by one of the fords and entered the camp. He 
had all along been a faithful ally, and at the head of a body of troops, whose fide¬ 
lity remained unshaken, was still in posse.ssion of the citadel and palace, situated 
in the southern division of the town. The northern division, however, was 

t 

wholly in the power of the rebels, and thus Kotah was truly a city divided 
•against itself. Tlie .arrival of General Roberts threw the balance* so completely 
in tlie rajah’s favour, that little difficulty was found in expelling the rebels, 
though tlicy m,anaged as usual to distance their pursuers and escape. The 
Madras column, under General Whitlock, had been equally successful. After 
traversing a large extent of country, and clearing it of rebels, it arrived on the 
19th of April in the vicinity of Banda, about ninety miles west of Allahabad- 
Here the native ruler or nabob was in open arms against the government, and 
advanced at the head of about 7000 men, of whom about 1000 were sepoys of 
the Bengal army, to offer battle. General Whitlock, though outnumbered 
nearly sevenfold, gladly accepted the challenge, and after a contest, which was 
obstinately maintained for four hours, gained a decisive victory. 

After remainifig some time in Jhansi to prepare for a movement on Calpee, 
where' it was understood that the rebels, again augmented by fugitives from 
various quarters, had resolved to make a final stand. Sir Hugh Rose, somewhat 



Chap. VI.] 


SIR HUGH ROSE’S GENERAL ORDER. 


683 


weakened in consequence of being obliged to deprive himself of a considerable a.d. ms. 
portion of his troops who were to remain in garrison, started again on the 29th 
of April, and made several midnight marches, which were daily becoming more Advance of 
difficult from the oppressive heat. The first serious opposition was encountered UMfon*' 
in the vicinity of Koonch, where a body of rebels, headed by the Ranee of 
Jhansi, the Rajah of Baunpoor, the Nabob of Banda, Tantia Topee, and others, 
and estimated at 20,000, had as.sembled. It would seem however that the 
succession of disasters Avhich had befallen the rebels had deteired them from 
risking a fair encounter, and after a distant cannonade, and some volleys from 
musketeers who remained under cover, the British advance became the signal 
for general flight. Calpee was now only forty miles distant, and was gradually 
approached by slow marches, the heat rendering rapid movement ahsolutely 
impossible, and daily producing heavier loss than the enemy were able to inflict. 

On the 22d of May, after Golowlee, within six miles of Calpee, had been 
reached, and several days had been spent in a kind of desultory and harassing luui mptu™ 
warfare, the enemy were seen advancing in force along the Calpee road, in order 
of battle. An immediate encounter took place, and was for some time main¬ 
tained by the enemy with so much deteimination, and in such overwhelming 
numbers, that the issue looked doubtful, till the bayonet was resorted to, and 
I)roved as usual decisive. The enemy’s masses of infantry driven headlong, 
broke up in confusion, and fled panic-struck in all directions. The result of 
this victory was the capture of Calpee, with large quantities of ammunition, 
military stores, and the plunder of the different stations from which the muti¬ 
neers had come. Assuming that the campaign was now virtually ended. Sir n«sonorai 
Hugh Rose, who was about to depart on sick certificate, issued the following 
order:—“Camp, Calpee, 1st June, 1858. The Central India field force being 
about to be dissolved, the major-general cannot allow the troops to leave his 
immediate command without expressing to them the gratification he has 
invariably experienced at their good conduct and discipline, and he requests that 
the following general order may be read at the head of every corps and detach¬ 
ment of the force: Soldiers: you have marched more than a thousand miles, 
smd taken more than a hundred guns; you have forced your way through* 
mountain passes, and intricate jungles, and over rivers; you have captured the 
strongest forts, and beat the enemy, no matter what the odds, wherever yon 
met him; jmu have restored extensive districts to the government, and peace 
and order now reign where before, for twelve months, were tyranny and 
rebellion; you have done all this and you have never had a check. I thank 
you with all my sincerity for your bravery, jmur devotion, and your discipline. 

When you first marched I told you that you as< British soldiers had more than 
Enough of courage for the work which was before you, but tliat courage *without 
discipline was of no avail, and I exhorted you to let discipline be your Vatch- 
word; you have attended to my orders. In hardships* in temptations, and in 



G84 


HISTOKY OF INDIA. 


[Bot>K IX. 


A V. ma. 


Tlie rebeia 
capturo 
Gwalior. 


A now vic¬ 
tory over 
thorn. 


dangers, you have obeyed your general, and you have never left your i-anks. 
You have fought against the strong, and you have protected the rights of the 
weak and defenceless, of foes as well as friends; 1 have seen you in the ardour 
of the combat preserve and place children out of harm’s way. This is the 
discipline of Christian soldiers, and this it is which has brought you triumphant 
from the sliores of Western India to the waters of the Jumna, and establishes, 
without doubt, that you will find.no place to equal the glory of your arms." 

The above excellent order, considered as a parting address, was rather ]>re- 
mature. The rebels rallying after their defeat, had carried their arms into 
another district, and achieved a success to which they had for some time been 
strangers. Most of them in their flight from Calpee had taken the direction of 
Gwalior, situated about 100 miles due west, and wreaked their vengeance on 
Scindia, for his refusal to share in their revolt. This native prince, who ..had 
hitliorto offered only a passive resistance to their measures, was emboldened, on 
hearing of their approach toward his capital, to take more active steps, and 
mustering the troops still in his service, sent them out to ofier battle. When 
the decisive moment arrived, a large proportion of them deseited, and return¬ 
ing with the other mutineers to Gwalior took forcible possession of it, while 
Scindia himself, unable to offer any effectual resistance, fled northward and 
took refuge in Agra. His place was immediately supplied by Row Sahib, a 
nephew of Nana Sahib, who was placed upon the musnud, and received the 
homage of the rebels as the new sovereign. Sir Hugh Rose, on hearing of these 
events, once more buckled on his armour and set out for Gwalior, after sending 
instructions to different detachments to join him by the way. ’ The rebels 
during the short respite which had been given them, had exerted themselves to 
strengthen their position, and conscious that they were playing their last stake, 
prepared for a determined re.sistance, by carefully occupying all the roads by 
which it was supposed that the British force might approach. In the absence 
of Tantia Topee and other leaders, who after their defeat at Ctilpee were proba¬ 
bly convinced that they would be more safely, if not more usefully employed 
elsewhere, the command of the rebels was undertaken by the Ranee of Jhansi, 
•who clad, it is said, in male attire, mounted on a noble steed, and attended b}^ 
a picked and well-armed staff, kept moving about wherever her presence was 
required, superintending all arrangements, and displaying a skill, energy, and 
courage worthy of a better cause. The first struggle was for the possession of 
the cantonment, out of which the rebels were driven with heavy lo.ss. On the 
following day the battle was resumed, and raged with great fierceness, invariably 
to the disadvantage of the rebels. At last, on the afternoon of the 19th, after 
the greater part of the town had been occupied, aU their courage failed them, 
and they thought ‘only of saving themselves by flight, leaving the battle-field 
and thfe street covered with their dead. Among these the Ranee of Jhknsi was 
known to be included,'but her body, probably because it had been carried off 



CuAr. VIL] 


A NEW INDIA BILL: 


685 


and burned by her attendants, was never discovered. Meanwhile Scindia, in the a.d. isss. 

prospect of being reinstated in liis sovereignty, had set out from Agra and was .. 

approaching his capital. He re-entered it on the 20th, and thus obtained 
the reward of a fidelity which, though it must have been sorely tried, seems owanor.^ 
never to have been shaken. The campaign being now virtually ended, the 
Central India field force was broken up, and Sir Hugh Rose, left at liberty to 
carry out Lis oi’iginal intention, started for Bombay. 


CIIArTEU VIT. 


rn)posed csliange in t)ie government of India—Oliange of ministry—C/anningV Oude pniclaiiiation 
—Lord EUenborough's despatcli—Extinctiim of the East India Company—The QwHm’s proclama¬ 
tion—Suppression of tlie mutiny—Conclusion. 



|NDIA, in consequeiico of the mutiny, had attracted, both fioiu the rnKotamga 
country at large and from tlie legislature, a degree of attention which men”*"" 
it had never been able to command before, and the result was a 
general conviction that a radical change in the mode of governing it 
was imperatively required. The subject bad on several occfusions been 
incidentally discussed in both Houses of Parliament, and the Company, made 
aware by communications with government, that their very existence as the 
rulers of India was seriously threatened, had presented a long and elaborate 
petition, in which, pleading the merits of their past services, and denying that 
the mutiny wae owing to their mismanagement, they deprecated legislation of 
the kind which they understood to be in contemplation, as at once pernicious 
and unseasonable; pernicious, because it would substitute a bad form of govern¬ 
ment for one which had on the whole worked admirably; and unseasonable, 
because, proposed at a time when mutiny was raging, its natural efiect would 
be to unsettle the native mind still more, and inci'ease the existing confusion# 

This petition was presented to the House of Lords on the 11th of February, 

J858. Next day Lord Palmerston introduced into the House of Common.s a a new iiiuia 

“ BUI for the better government of India.” Leaving arrangements in India 

unchanged, it was intended to apply only to home management, and proposed 

that the functions of tlie Courts of Directors and Proprietors should cease; that 

for these bodies there should be substituted a president assisted by a council for 

the affairs of India; that the president should be a member of the government, 

and the organ of the cabinet in everything relating to Indifin affairs; and that ' 

^he council, named, like the president, by the crown, but restricted to individuals 
who had either been directors of the Company or bad* resided in India for a 










68G 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book IX. 


A.D. 1SS3. 


A new 
luOia biU 


Huddoii 
ciiaiige of 
tho BritiHl) 
juiaintry. 


certain period, with or without employment, should consist of eight members, 
elected for eight ye.ars, two retiring by rotation every second year, in order 
that successive administrations might have an opportunity of renewing the 
council from time to time, by the introduction of persons returning from India 
with fresh knowledge and ideas. The final decision was in all cases to remain 
with the president, because the cabinet of which he was the organ was hence¬ 
forth to be solely responsible for his measures; but in the event of a difierence 
of opinion, the members of council should have the power of recording that 
difference, together with the reasons of it, in the minutes. In regard to patron¬ 
age, all the appointments hitherto made in India were to be made there as 
before; and at home, while the writerships remained as at present open to 
public competition, the appointments of cadets should be shared by the president 
and the council, in the same manner as they were previously shared by^ the 
president of the Board of. Control and the Court of Directors. When the 
usual motion for leave wtis made, Mr. Thomas Baring, who had presented the 
petition from the Company, moved as an amendment, “That it is not at present 
expedient to legislate for the government of India;" but after a debate con¬ 
tinued during several successive nights, the amendment was negatived by 318 
to 173. In this first trial of strength, the supporters of the bill so far outnum¬ 
bered its opponents, that it was considered beyond the reach of danger, and 
yet, owing to a contingency whicli suddenly arose, and was not at all connected 
with Indian affairs, the bill was not destined to become law. 

An attempt had recently been made to assassinate the French emperor, and 
as the as.sassins, though foreigner.s, were known to have come from England, 
violent tirades were made against this country for having afforded them an 
asylum. These might have been overlooked had they been confined to ordin¬ 
ary newspapers, or even to congratulatory addresses which were 4 )rinted in the 
Moniteur, and in which blustering soldiers asked permission to cross the Chan¬ 
nel, to root out tho nest of hornets and those who fostered them; but the 
matter assumed a graver form when tirades were followed, not only by a speech 
in a somewhat similar spirit by M. Morny in the legislative body, but by an 
official despatch from Count Walewski, in which, after saying, at least by im¬ 
plication, that assassination was here “elevated to doctrine,” and “preached 
openly,” he indignantly asked, “ Ought then tho right of asylum to protect, 
such a state of things? Is hospitality due to assassins? Ought the English 
legislature to contribute to favour their designs and their plans?” &c., and called 
upon her Britannic majesty’s government for “aguarantee of security, which no 
state can refuse to a neighbouring state, and which we are authorized to expect 
from an ally.” The only answer given by government to this despatch was 
the introduction of,, what was called a conspiracy bill, the object of which wrfs,- 
without trenching on the right of asylum given to foreigners, to amend the 
English law by making conspiracy to murder, instead of a misdemeanour 



Chap. VII.] 


THE DERBY CABINET., 


687 


punishable only by fine and imprisonment, a felony punishable by p^nal servi- a.d. isss. 
tude, wherever the murder was intended to be committed, whether in this or ~~ 
in a foreign country. After a debate continued for two successive nights, leave 
was given to introduce the bill by a majority of 299 against 99. The conserva¬ 
tives had voted generally in the majority, but on the 19th of February, when 
the second reading was moved, a combination, encouraged by the general 
unpopularity of the measure, had taken place, and the conservatives, now in 
league with its opponents, succeeded in placing government in a minority of 
nineteen, by supporting an amendment expressive of “regret that her majesty’s 
government, previously to inviting the house to amend the law of conspiracy 
at the present time, had not felt it to be their duty to reply to the important 
despatch received from the French government.'’ In consequence of this vote 
the Palmerston ministry resigned. 

The new ministry fonned by Lord Derby could hardly fail, both from its Policy of tiw 
general character atid the particular appointment of Lord Ellenborough as 
prefsident of the Board of Conti’ol, to have a marked effect on Indian politics. 

Not only had the conservatives supported Mr. Baring’s amendment, declaring 
that “it is not at present expedient to legislate for the government of India,’’ 
but their leaders in both houses, when votes of thanks were moved to the 
Indian officials civil and military, “for the eminent skill, courage, and perse¬ 
verance displayed by them" in the suppression of the mutin 3 ', took special 
exception to the name of Lord Canning, on the ground that the merits of his 
administration during the crisis were very questionable, and at lca.st ought not 
to be recognized till they’^ were better ascertaine<l. There were tlms two points 
to which the new ministry stood committed, as for as previous expressions of 
opinion could bind them—the one, the impolicy of introducing an India bill at 
present, and the other, a determination not to recognize the merits of Lord 
Canning’s administration without further inquir 3 ^ The latter point, though 
insignificant cibmpared with the other, wasperhaps felt to be the more pressing, 
as it was of a party character, and we cannot therefore wonder that in the 
vigorous hands of Lord Ellenborough, to whose department it officially belonged, 
it soon crave rise to discussions which for a time absorbed all the intei’est which* 
was felt in the other. 

• With regard to the impolicy of introducing a bill for the government of Their <iim 
India, the new ministry could not but feel that they stood m a false position. m^Kieoftiur- 
The vote in favour of a bill was overwhelming, and it was not to be suppo.sed 
that the very same house which carried that vote, would reverse it merely at 
the bidding of a new cabinet. Under these circumstances, the ministrj’- took 
the only course which was open to them if they were to retain their places, by 
bringing their opinions into harmony with those of the majority, and armounc- 
yig their intention to lose no time in introducing an India bill, which’ would 
secure mqst of the objects of the bill of their predecessot^, and at the fsame time 



688 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book TX. 


A.D. 1858. 


IndiA bill 
No. a. 


ItA princiixil 


be free frcJm the objections to which it was liable. The change of opinion thus 
implied was accounted for with some degree of plausibility, by adverting to 
the effect which the previous vote must have had in weakening the. authority 
of the Com])any, and thereby rendering the transfer of it to the crown, which 
might otherwise have been inexpodient, absolutely necessary. Accordingly on 
the 26th of March, Mr. Disraeli, now chancellor of the exchequer, and leader of 
the House of Commons, introduced what was called “ India bill No. 2," to dis- 
tinguLsh it from the previous bill, which not having been abandoned, retained 
its precedence, and was called “India bill No. 1. ” The main object, the trans¬ 
fer of the government of India to the erown, was the same in both bills; but 
the mode of effecting it was very different, and in the case of “No. 2,’' called 
into existence a very novel and curious piece of political machinery. There 
was to be, as in No. 1, a president and a council, but the latter, instead of being 
limited to eight members all nominated by the crown, was to consist of eighteen, 
of whom half were to be nominated and half elected. In regard to the lattei-, 
the power of the crown would of coui’se be entirely excluded; but in regiird 
even to the former, though they were to be named by crown warrant, the 
qualifications nccessarj’’ to eligibility wo\ild bo such as to make them truly 
representatives not of the crown, biit of distinct Indian interests. Four, repre¬ 
senting the civil service, must have served in it ten years—one in Upper India, 
one in Bengal proper, one in the presidency of’Madras, and one in that of 
Bombay. Of the four representing the military service, one a queen’s officei-, 
must have served five years in India, and each of the other three ten years in 
their respective prcsidcncie.s. Tlie remaining nominee was to be an individual 
whose employment in India as resident, or political agent at a native court, 
must be presumed to have made him well acquainted with native charac¬ 
ter. Of the elected half of the council, four were to be eligible only after teii 
years’ employment, or fifteen j'^ears’ residence without employment, in India. 
The electors, estimated at .5000, were to consist of all civil and rfiilitary officers 
who had resided ten years in India, and of all persons still resident tlierc 
pos.se8aed of shares in an Indian railway, or other public work, to the value of 
.£2000, and of all proprietors of £1000 of India stock. -The other five elected 
members must have resided ten years in India, or must have been engaged for 
five years in tniding or exporting manufactures to India, and were to be electc*! 
respectively by the parliamentary constituencies of the five following towns— 
London, Manchester, Liverpool, Glasgow, and Belfast. This bill, though 
denounced by one member as “a sham,'’ and by another as “clap-trap,’' was 
allowed to be introduced without a vote; but when during the Easter recess, 
which took place immediately afterward, its provisions had been fully canvassed, 
it begafi to appear in so ridiculous a light as to threaten the very existence of tlie 
ministry who had been so ill advised as to introduce it. In this emergency Locd 
John Russell, who had" not formed part of the last ministry, came unexpectedly 



Chap. Vlt] 


PROPOSED PROCLAMATION IN OUDE. 


680 


to the^ rescue, by suggesting that the house should not proceed by bill, but by a d. ibm. 
a series of resolutions on which a bill more acceptable than either of those yet 
proposed .might afterwards be founded. Mr. Disraeli at once closed with the AJmndon- 
suggestion, and so heartily, that he was even willing to allow the resolutions aiTilwu 
to be proposed by Lord John Russell himself. This mode of resigning tlie " 
proper business of government to a private member being however disaj)proved, 

Mr. Disraeli undertook the task, and proposed a series of fourteen propositions, 
to be discussed separately, in order that those rejected might be thrown aside, 
and those approved might form the gi’oundwork of a third bill, combining all 
that was unobjectionable in the other two. After considerable debate, the two 
first resolutions, the one declaring the exi^ediency of an immediate transfer of 
the government of India to the crown, and the otlier empowering her majesty 
to commit the home administration to one of her responsible ministers, were 
adopted without a division. Here however the discussion was arrested, and 
the whole attention both of parliament and the country was turned aside from 
the general question to a very subordinate one, to which Lord Ellenborough 
had, by an act of singular indiscretion, given an adventitious importance. 

Lord Canning, in contemplation of the capture of Lucknow by the i ..rd cm- 
commander-in-chief, had prepared a proclamation, which he meant to issue as 
.soon as that achievement should be effected. It was in the following terms:— ^“oude!" 

“ The army of his excellency the coniinander-iii-chief is in possession of Luck¬ 
now, and the city lies at the mercy of the British government, whose Jiuthority 
it has for nine months rebelliously defied and resisted. This resistance, begun 
by a mutinous soldiery, has found support from the inhabitants of the city and 
of the province of Oude at large. Many who owed their prosperity to the 
British government, as well as those who believed themselves aggrieved by it, 
have joinejl in^this ba<l cause, and have ranged themselves with the enemies of 
the state. They have been guilty of a great crime, and have siibjected them¬ 
selves to a just retribution. Tlie capital of their country is now once more in 
the hands of the British troops. From this day it will be held by a force 
which nothing can withstand, and the authority of the government will be 
carried into eveiy corner of the pi’ovince. The time then has come at which 
the Right Honourable the (lovernor-general of India deems it right to make 
known the mode in which the British government will deal with the talookdars, 
chief land-owners of Oude, and their followers. The fii’st cai-e of the governor- 
general will be to reward those who have been steadfast in their allegiance, at 
a time when the authority of the government was j)artially overborne, and who 
have proved this by the support and assistance which they have given to 
British officers. Therefore, tlie Right Honourable the Governor-general hereby 
•leclares that Drigbiggei Sing, Rajah of Butrampoor; Koolurunt Sing, Rajah of 
Pudnaha; Row Hordea Buksh Sing, of Kutiaree; Kashee Pershad, Taiookdar 
of Sissaipdie; Zabr Sing, Zemindar of Gopal Ghair; andfChundee LaJ, Zemindar 
VoL. ni, 283 



600 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


.{Book IX. 


A.i). 1858. of Morson,(Baiswarah)—are henceforward the sole hereditary proprietors of the 
land which they held when Oude came under British rule, subject only to such 
i>mi,o«oa moderate assessment as may be imposed upon them; and that these loyal men 
tionukOuU«. will be further rewarded in such manner and to such extent as upon considera¬ 
tion of their merits luid their position the governor-general shall determine. 
A proportionate ■ measure of reward and honour, according to their deserts, 
will be confeiTed upon others in whose favour like claims may be established 
to the satisfaction of the government. The governor-general further proclaims 
to the people of Oude, that with the above-mentioned exceptions the proprietary 
right in the soil of the province is confiscated to the British government, which 
will dispose of that right in such manner as it may seem fitting. To those 
talookdars, chiefs, and landowners, with their followers, who shall make 
immediate submis.sion to the chief commissioner of Oude, surrendering their 
arms and obeying his ordem, the Right Honourable the Governor-general 
])romiae3 that their lives and honour shall be safe, provided that their hands 
are not stained with Engli,sh blood, murderously shed. But as regards any 
further indulgence which may be extended to them, and the condition in 
which they ]nay hereafter be placed, they nmst throw themselves upon the 
justice and mercy of the British government. jVs participation in the murder 
of English women will exclude those who are guilty of it from all mercy, so 
will those wiio have j)rotected English lives be entitled to consideration and 
leniency.” 

unimit. When Lord Canning drew up this proclamation he was ignorant of the 

I^?hy' change of ministry, and had not received a despatch which had been transmitted 
iimii* IS. through the secret committee of the Court of Directors, and in which 

the views of the new government as to any amnesty which might be granted 
to those w ho had taken part in the i-evolt were fully explained. »This despatch, 
dated 24th March, 18.^8, after expre.ssing a hope that Lucknow had been 
captured, and that the Indian government might in oonse«iuenct deem them¬ 
selves “ sufiiciently strong to be enabled to act tow'ards the people with the 
genero.sity as well as the justice which are congenial to the British character,’ 
•proceeded as follows:—“ Crimes have been committed agaiirst us wliich it would 
be a crime to forgive ; and some large exceptions there Tiiust be of the persons 
guilty of such crimes from any act of amnesty which could be granted, but it 
must be as im])os.sible as it would be abhorrent from our feelings to inflict 
the extreme penalty which the law might strictly award upon all who have 
swerved fiom their allegiance. To us it appears that whenever open resistance 
shall have ceased, it would be prnident, in awarding punishment, rather to 
follow the practice which prevails after the con(piest of a country which has 
defended itself to the last by desperate war, than that which may perhaps be 
lawfully adopted after the suppression of mutiny and rebellion, such acts always 
being excepted from forgiveness or mitigation of punishment as have.yxceeded 



CiiAP. TII.] 


LORD ELLENBOEOUGH’S PROCEEDINGS. 


091 


the license of legitimate hostilities.” After several other passages eounselling .v.d.ism. 
leniency, the despatch concluded in the following terms:—“In canying these 
views into execution you may meet with obstructions from those who, maddened 
by the scenes they have witnessed, may desire to substitute their own ]>olicy 
for that of the government; but persevere firmly in doing what you may think 
right; make those who would counteract you feel that you are resolved to rule, 
and that you will be served by none who will not obey. Acting in tiiis spirit 
you may rely upon an unqualified support.” 

The account given in a previous part of our hi.story certainly does not '-""i kiibh- 
exhibit Lord Ellenborough during his brief tenure of the office of governor- ropiytutiie 
general in the light of an indulgent ruler, disposed to humour the 2 »'ciudicos 
and deal lightly with the delinquencies of the natives of India. On the 
contrary, we have seen him hunting out treason in the Ameers of Seinde, in 
order that he might have a plausible pretext for confiscating their territories 
and treating Gwalior as imjjeriously .os if he had coiKjuered it, because its rulers 
had i)resumed to thwart his wd-shes. His lord.ship’s moderation and leniency 
being thus new-born, he naturally fostered them with all the zeal of a young 
convert, and hence must have been in some degree shocked Avhen, only a few 
weeks after sending off his despatch, he was furnished with a cojiy of Lord 
Canning's intended proclamation, accomi)anied with a letter of instructions 
addressed to Sir James Outram, as the chief commissioner of Oude, Avhich 
plainly showed the confiscation of pro 2 )rietary rights in that country was to be 
not an idle threat, bvrt an actually inflicted 2 >enalty. There were some consi¬ 
derations which might have induced Lord Ellenborough to 2 >ause before sitting 
down to write a letter to Lord Canning animadverting on his proclamation in 
the severe.st terms. As yet, the fact of its having been issued was not known, 
and circumstarjces might occur to ind\ice a change in its terms, or even 2 >revent 
it from being issued at all. It was moreover obvious from the instractions 
that a large discretionary power was to be vested in the chief commissioner; 
and it might have been charitably inferred, that a governor-geneial Avhose 
chief error hitherto was alleged to be undue lenity, would be able to give some 
satisfactory reason for having ap 2 )arently rushed into the op 2 AOsitc extreme,* 

Either overlooking such considerations, or deeming them beneath his notice, 
the president of the Board of Control penned a new despatch, in which he not 
only denounced the 2 >roclamation in language so bitter and sarcastic as to be 
almost insulting, but S 2 >oke of the talookdars and other 2 )roprietors of Oude as 
if they were more sinned against than sinning, and were entitled to be treated 
1 ‘ather as patriots than as rebels. This singular dos 2 )atch, after bi iefly describing iuh ii,jn.ji 
the contents of the imoclamation, contains such 2 'i>'Ssages as the following • ]tD»tion of 
“ We cannot but express to you our apprehension that this decree pronouncing 
the disinherison of a 2>eople» will throw difficulties almost unsurmoilntable 
in the way of the re-establishment of peace. We are under the impression 



A.D. 1868. 


Ixird Ellen- 
borough’* 
doftpatch. 


Consaqiient 
prooeodiiiga 
in iHU-litt- 
nionti* 


692 UISTOEY OF INDIA. [Book IX. 

that the war in Oude has derived much of its popular character from the 
rigorous manner in which, without regard to what the landowners had become 
accustomed to consider as their rights, the summary settlement had in a large 
portion of the province been carried out by your officers. ... We cannot 
but in justice consider that those who resist our authority in Oude are under 
very different circumstances from those who have acted against us in provinces 
which have been long under our government. We dethroned the King of 
Oude, and took possession of liis kingdom, by virtue of a treaty which had 
been subsequently modified by another treaty, under which, had it been 
held to be in force, the course we adoj)ted could not have been lawfully pursued ; 
but we held that it was not in force, altliough the fact of its not having been 
ratified in England, as regarded the provision on which we rely for our justifi¬ 
cation, had not been previously made known to the King of Oude. yiiat 
sovereign and his ancestor's had been uniformly faithful to their treaty engage¬ 
ments witli us, however ill they may have governed their subjects. They had 
more than once assisted us in our difficulties, and not a suspicion Imd ever 
been entertained of any hostile disposition on their part towards our govern¬ 
ment. Suddenly the people saw their king taken from amongst them, and our 
administration substituted for his, which, however bad, was at least native. . . . 
We must admit that under tire circumstances, the ho.stilities which have been 
earned on in Oude have rather the character of legitimate war, than that of 
rebellion, and that the people of Oude should rather be regarded with indulgent 
consideration than made the objects of a penalty exceeding in extent and in 
severity almost any which has been recorded in history as inflicted upon a 
subdued nation. Other conquerors, w'hen they have succeeded in overcoming 
resistance, have excepted a few persons as still deserving of punishment, but 
have, with a generous policy, extended their clemency to the great body of the 
people. You have acted upon a different principle; you have reserved a few as 
deserving of special favour, and you have struck with what'they feel as the 
severe.st punishment the mass of the inhabitants of the country. We cannot 
but think that the precedents from which you have departed will appear to 
bave been conceived in a spirit of wisdom superior to that which appears in 
the precedent you have made. We desire that you will mitigate in practice 
the stringent severity of the decree of confiscation you have issued against the 
landowners of Oude. We desire to sec British autliority in India rest xipon the 
willing«obedience of a contented peojde. There cannot be contentment when 
there is general confiscation.” 

From the account formerly given of the annexation of Oude, it will be seen 
that Lord Ellenborough is in the main correct in what he says on the subject, 
but even those whp agree with him in opinion may be permitted to question 
the necessity or propriety of giving so much prominence to it after the act 
which it condemns was done beyond recall. In his description of the nature 



Chap. VII.] 


LORD ELLENBOEOUGH RESIGNS. 


693 


and probable effects of the proclamation, there is some truth with m\i£^ a.d. isss. 
exaggeration. Fact is sacrificed to antithesis, and the confiscation directed 
against refractory talookdars, most of whom had acquired their lands by 
intrigue or violence, is converted into a blow struck at “ the mass of the inha¬ 
bitants of the country.” But waiving all question as to the merit or demerit of 
this despatch, all must admit that nothing was more to be deprecated than its 
premature publication, inasmuch as its natural tendency was to weaketi the 
hands of the governor-general at a most critical period, and encourage rebellion 
by the hope of impunity. At all events, as the despatch was transmitted i-oni Eiion- 
through the secret committee, and was consequently known only to a few mvoiScoi- 
individuals, who had been sworn to secrecy, nothing can be conceived more 
preposterous than to place it in the hands of the public weeks before it 
could reach those of the governor-general himself. Yet this preposterous thing 
had taken place with the knowledge, and directly through the instrumentality 
of Lord Ellcnborough. Great was the indignation felt by Lord Canning's 
friends, and strong the disapprobation expressed by men of all parties at 
this most discourteous and unstatesmanlike proceeding. The first effect was 
to put the ministry on their defence. Lord Ellenborougli, as the member of 
the cabinet more immediately responsible, had nothing more to offer than 
the very lame excuse that, having sent a copy of the despatch to Lord 
Granville, as a friend of Lord Canning, and a leading member of the former 
ministry, he deemed it only fair to send another copy at the same time to 
Mr. Bright, as the leader of another political party. This explanation, which 
certainly justified the suspicion that the ministry, under a consciousness of 
numerical weakness in the House of Commons, had been endeavouring to make 
political capital out of their despatch, had to a certain extent been forestalled 
by Mr. Disraeli, who, when consenting to lay the despatch on the table, volun¬ 
teered the stjitcment that her majesty’s government “disapproved of the 
policy of the proclamation in every sense.” Notice was immediately given by 
Lord Shaftesbury .and Mr. Cardwell of their intention to bring the subject 
before both Houses of Parliament, by motions which, amounting to a direct 
censure of ministers, would, if carried, compel them to resign. In this’ 
emergency. Lord Ellenboi’ough endeavoured to save his colleagues by making 
a victim of himself, and retired fi-om office, his official connection with the 
government of India thus coming a second time to an abrupt termination. 

The Whig party, anxious to regain the places from which they thought AminwtBriai 
th,at a political combination more skilful than honourable had driven them, 
refused to be satisfied with Lord Ellenborough’s retirement, and the motions of 
which notice had been given were persi.stcd in. It was a mere j)arty struggle, 
and ended in a ministerial triumph, obtained principally**by the opportune 
m-ival 'of despatches from India at the very time when the debabe was 
proceeding. From these despatches it appeared that l^ie proclamation, before 



694 


HISTOEY OF INDIA. 


[Book TX. 


A.D. 18S8. 


Afodificatiou 
of tlio Oiifio 
I>roolan>a- 
tioii. 


New act for 
the bettor 
govormnoiit 
of hiilia. 


Its priuo)|ml 
provisiuiiH. 


being issued, had been modified in substance, and would be still more modified 
in practice, in consequence of a remonstrance by Sir James Outram, who, on 
acknowledging receipt of the proclamation, declared his “ firm conviction that 
as soon as the chiefs and talookdars become acquainted with the determination 
of the government to confiscate their rights, they will betake themselves at 
once to their domains, and prepare for a desperate and pi’olongcd resistance,” 
and the result would be “the commencement of a guerilla war for the extirpa¬ 
tion, root and branch, of this class of men, which will involve the loss <^f 
thousands of Europeans by battle, disease, and exposure.” To this opinion the 
governor-general yielded so far as to introduce the following additional para¬ 
graph relative to the landowners:—“To tho.se of them who shall promptly 
come forward, and give to the chief commissioner their support in the I’estora- 
tion of order, this indulgence will be large, and the governor-general will be 
ready to view liberally the claims which they may thus acquire to a restitution 
of their former rights.” In consequence of the new information furnished by 
the despatches, the motions foi- censure could not be maintained, at least in the 
terms in which they were expressed. Lord Shaftesbuiy’s motion in the House 
of Lords had indeed been already defeated by a majoi-ity of nine, and that of 
Mr. Cardwell, which was still under discussion, was ultimately, at rhe earnest 
request of many of its pledged supporters, withdrawn. Ministers were thu.s 
at liberty once more to proceed with the India resolutions, which, after they 
had been thoroughly discussed and modified, were embodied in a bill, which 
became law on the 2d of August, 1858, and ranks in the statute book under 
the title of “ An act for the better government of India ” (21st and 22d Viet. c. 106). 

This act consists of eighty-five sections. Its main object is to tran.sfer the 
government of India from the Company to the crown. For this purpose it 
enacts that India shall be governed by and in name of her majesty, through 
one of her principal secretaries of state, assisted by a council, to consist of 
fifteen members, and to be styled the Council of India. Of thestf fifteen coun¬ 
cillors, who are all to hold their ofiicc “ duiing good behaviour,” eight are to be 
nominated by her majesty, and seven to be elected, on the first election only, 
l>y the existing court of directors, and over after, on the occasion of any vacancy, 
by the council, subject always to this proviso, that the major part of the council, 
whether nominated or elected, shall always, with the exception of those elected- 
by the directors, be persons “ who shall have served or resided in India for ten 
years at least,” and “shall not have left India more than ten years next pre¬ 
ceding the date of their appointment.” The secretary of state for India, should 
he be a fifth one appointed by her majesty, in addition to the present four, shall 
have the same salary as they, and each member of council a salary of £1200, 
or in thfi event of resignation from infirmity after ten years’ service, a retiring 
pension of £500; all such salaries to be paid out of the revenues of India. Every 
order or comraunicatiorf sent to India shall be signed by one of the..principal 



Chap. 'VII.J 


THE QUEEN’sS PROCLAMATION. 


G95 


secretaries of state, but the council shall, under the direction of tlfe secretary a.d. isss 
of state acting for India, conduct the biisiness transacted in the United 
Kingdom in relation to the government of India and the correspondence with J’jimijmi 
India. In all cases where a difference of opinion may arise, the determination 
of the secretary of state shall be final, but*each member may require that “his 
opinion, and the reasons for the same, be entered in the minutes of the j>ro- 
ceedings.” Wherever the secretjiry shall act in opposition to the opinions of 
the majority, he shall record his reasons. Communications with India, or 
despatches from it, Avhich would formerly have been addressed to the secret 
committee, may still be marked “ secret,'’ and “ not be communicated to the 
members of the council, unless the secretary of state shall so think fit and 
direct, ” but all other communications and despatches shall be submitted to 
then). In I’cgard to patronage, all appointments hitherto made by the 
directors with the ap])robation of her majesty, shall henceforth be made by her 
majesty, by warrant, under her royal sign-manual. 'I'lie ai>polutments made 
in India continue as before. Appointments to the civil service, as well as 
cadetships in the engineers and artillery, shall be thrown open to public compe¬ 
tition, and conferred oti the successful candidates in the order of ])roficiency. 

“ Except as aforesaid, all persons to be notninated for military cadetshijjs shall 
be nominated by the secretary of .state and members of council, .so that out 
of seventeen nomination.s, the secretary of state shall have two, at)d each 
member of council shall have one," but each nomination .shall take effect only 
if ap])roved by the sec.retary of state, and “ not le.ss than one-tenth of the whole 
number of j>ersons to be recommended in any year for militaiy cadetships 
(other than cadetships in the engineers and artillery), shall be selected, accoi'ding 
to such regiilations as the secretary of state in council may from time to time ■ 
make in this bshalf, from among the sons of j)ersons who have served in India 
in the military or civil services of her maje.sty or of the East India Comjtany." 

The remaining sections, relating to transfer of ]:)ro])erty, revenues, existing 
establishments, &c., need not be s})ecially noticed. 

Shortly after the pa.ssing of tin; a,bovc act, her majesty in ct)uncil caused a tii« 
j)roclamation to be issued, for the purpose of notifying the impoitant changp.s’ 
introduced by it, and the cour.se of policy which it was her desire and intention 
to pursue. It was addre.ssed to the ])rinces, chiefs, and people of India, and 
was publi.shed with some degi'ee of ceremony by the governor-general in pei’son 
at Allahabad, on the 1st of November, 18.58. Con.sidercd as the first act of 
government exercised directly by the crown in the British Indian empire, it 
forms, we trust, the commencement of a hap]>ier era than any yet recorded in 
Indian annals. For this rea.son, as well as on account of the soutuI and liberal 
Views which the document promulgates, it will be necessary'to quote from it at 
some lehgth. After intimating that her majesty had, with the advice and 
consent of parliament, resolved “ to take upon ourselves the government of the 


]>rOV1910TIR 

of ttie new 
net for the 
hotter Ro- 
vorrinjeiit 
of India. 



696 


HISTOEY OF INDIA, 


[Book IX. 


A.D. 1858. territories *of India, heretofore administered in trust for us by the Honourable 
East India Company," calling upon all subjects within said territories to bear 
The queen's true allegiance, constituting Viscount Canning “first viceroy and governor- 
tion. general,’’ to administer the goverament “in our name and on our behalf," and 
confirming all persons now employed in the Company’s service in several offices, 
civil and military, the proclamation proceeds in the following terms: “ We hereby 
announce to the native princes of India that all treaties and engagements made 
with them, by or under the authority of the Honourable East India Company, 
are by us accepted, and will be scrupulously maintained, and we look for the 
like observance on their part. We desire no extension of our present territorial 
jtossessions; and while we will permit no aggression upon our dominions or our 
rights to be attempted with impunity, we shall sanction no encroachment on those 
■Rights of of others. We shall respect the rights, dignity, and honour of native princes as 
iirincestohe our owii; and we desire that they, as well as our own subjects, should enjoy that 
TBiqiectod. pj.o8j)erity and that social advancement which can only be secured by internal 
peace and good government. We hold ourselves bound to the natives of our 
Indian territories by the same obligations of duty which bind us to all our 
other subjects, and tliose obligations, bj'^ the blessing of God, we shall faithfully 
and coihscientiously fulfil. Firmly relying ourselves on the truth of Chris¬ 
tianity, and ficknowledging with gratitude the solace of religion, we disclaim 
alike the right and the desire to impose our convictions on any of our subjects. 
We declare it to be our royal will and pleasure tliat none be in any wise 
favoured, none molested or disiiuieted by reason of their religious faith or 
observances, but that all shall alike enjoy the equal and impartial protection of 
the law; and we do strictly charge at\d enjoin all those who may be in authority 
under us, that they ab.stain from all interference with the religious belief or 
yuiiiifluii worship of any of our subjecis, on pain of our highest displeasure. ^ And it is 
fwrfher will that, so fiir as may be, our subjects, of whatever race or erced, 
iiiuigovorn- fi’eelv and impartially admitted to offices in our service, the duties of which 
they may be qualified by their education, ability and integrity, duly to dis¬ 
charge. We know, and re.spect the feelings of attachment with which the 
natives of India regard the lands inherited by them from their ancestors, an<l 
we desire to protect them in all rights connected therewith, subject to the 
equitable demands of the .state, and we will that generally in framing and 
administering the law, due regard be ]>aid to the ancient lights, usages, and 
customs of India. We deeply lament the evils and misery which have been 
brought upon India by the acts of ambitious men, who have deceived their 
countrymen by false reports, and led them into open rebellion. Our power 
has been shown by the suppression of that rebellion in the field; we desire to 
show oilr mercy by pardoning the offences of tho.se who have been thus misled, 
but who desire to return to the path of duty.” , 

On the subject of aii amnest 3 % after approving and confirming all, that Lord 



Chap. VII.] 


THE QUEEN’S PROCLAMATION. 


697 


Canning had promised in his Oude proclamation, her majesty declares as a.d. wss' 
follows:—“ Our clemency will be extended to all offenders, save and except 
those who have'ljeen or shall be convicted of having directly taken part in the 
murder of British subjects. With regard to such, the demands of jastice forbid 
the exercise of mei’cy. To tlu)ae who have willingly given an asylum to 
mui-derer.s, knowing them to be such, their lives alone can l)e guaranteed; but 
in apportioning tlie penalty due to such i)evsons, full consideration will be 
given to any circumstances under whicli they have been induced to tln-ow off 
their allegiance; and large indulgence will be shown to those whose crimes may 
appear to have originated in too credulous aocepttince of the false reports 
circulated by designing men. To all others in arms against the go\ ernmeut 
we hereby promise unconditional pardon, amnesty and oblivion of all offence 
agaipst ourselves, our crown, and dignity, on their return to their homes and 
peaceful pureuits. It is our royal pleasure that these terms of grace and 
amnesty should be extended to all tho.se who comply with the.se conditions 
before the 1st day of January next. When, by the blessing of Providence, 
internal tranquillity shall be restored, it is our earnest desire to stimulate the 
])eaceful industry of India, to promote works of public utility and improve¬ 
ment, and to administer its government for the benefit of all our subjects 
therein. In their prosperity will be our .strength, in their contentment our 
security, and ^n their gratitude our be.st reward. And may the God of all 
jiower grant to us, and to those in authority under us, strength to carry out 
these our wishes for the good of our ))eople.” 

This excellent proclamation could liardly fail to producii a strong impression, 
])articularly on those who, having taken part in the mutiny merely because 
they imagined that it was destined to tiiumph, must have been anxious, now 
when they saw it doomed to failure, to e.scape from the consecpiences. t)n the 
other hand, those of the leaders who still held out, either because they coidd 
not stoop to .thb humiliation of accepting i)ardon, or because they had been 
guilty of atrocities which placed them l>eyond the reach of mercy, naturally 
employed every means in their power to throw discredit on the proclamation, 
and thus check the threatened desertion of their followers. The most singular TiioneRum 

• • 1 Oinlo’s 

attempt of this kind was ma<le by the Begum of.Oude, who, acting in the name vepiytoOw 
.of her son, whom she had induced the rebels of that pi’ovince to recognize as {ioiT,*””" 
their sovereign, i.ssued a formal answer to the proclamation, and dissecting it 
paragraph by paragraph, laboui’ed to .show that no dependence could be placed 
on any of the promises contained in it. As a specimen of the kind of reasoning 
employed, and of the delusions and grievances which probably originated and 
certainly fostered the mutiny, the following criticism on the portion of the 
■ i?roclamation which refers to religion, is not unworthy of quotationIn the 
j)roclamation,” says the begum, a bigoted Mahometan, “ it is written that the 
Christian religion is true, but no other creed will suffer oppression, and that 

VoL. ill. 284 



698 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book IX. 


AT). 1853. 


).or(l OlyUti'H 
jmtoltuiin- 
tiofi. 


ITis niilitary 
HiOTementM. 


tlie laws .will be observed towards all. What has the administration of 
justice to do with the truth or falsehood of a religion? That religion is true 
which acknowledges one God and know.s no other. Where there, are three 
gods in a religion, neither Mussulmans nor Hindoos—nay, not even Jews, 
sun-worshippers or fire-worsliippers—can believe it to be true. To eat pigs and 
drink wine, to bite greased cartridges, and to mix pigs’ fat with flour and 
sweetmeats, to destroy Hindoo and Mussulman temples on pretence of making 
I’oads, to build churches, to send Clergymen into the sti’eets and alleys to preach 
the Christian religion, to institute English schools, and pay ])eople a monthly 
stijiend for learning the English sciences, wliile the places of worahip of Hindoos 
and Mussidmans are to this day entirely neglected, with all this, how can the 
peoi>le believe that religion will not he interfered with? The rebellion began 
with religion, and for it millions of men have been killed. Let not our subjects 
be deceived ; thousands were deprived of their religion in the north-west, and 
thousand.s were hangi’d rather than abandon their religion.” 

The (;ommander-in-chief, now raised to the peerage with the title of Loi-d 
Clyde, after taking part in the ceremon 3 ' of i-eading the (pioen’s proclamation, 
crossed the Ganges at Allahabad on the 2d of November, 18.58, and proceeded 
northward to join his head-quarters at Pertabghur, a town of Glide, about 
twent 3 "-five miles distant. It would be a misnomer to speak of his sub.sequent 
operations as a camjiaign, for the rebels no longer kept the field, iiuid were able 
to do no more than ktuip u]) a desultory warfare, confined mosth' to the distiict.s 
where refractoiy chiefs, trusting to the strength of their forts or the number of 
their retiiinera, still kept up a show of resistance. The nature of the task still 
to be performed may bo infeired from a proclamation which had been issued on 
the 2(>th of October, in which the commander-in-chief announced to the iidia- 
bitants of Oude that he was coming “ to enforce the law.” “ Inoorder to effect 
this without danger to life and jirojierty, re.sistanco must cease on the part ol' 
the pi'ople. The most exact discipline will be preserved in the Camps and on 
the march, and where there is no resistance, houses and crojis will be spared, 
and no plundering allowed in the towns ami villages. But wherever there is 
lesistanoe, or even a single shot fired again.st the troops, the inhabitants must 
expect to incur the fate the}' have brought on themselves. I'heir houses will 
be plundered and their vill.ages burned. This proclamation includes all ranks' 
of the. pcoj)le, from the talookdai’S to the poorest ryots. The commander-in- 
chief invites all the well-disposed to remain in their towns and villages, where 
they will be sure of his protection against all violence.” 

Preceded by this jiroclamation, and the far more important one issued by 
the queen. Lord Clyde commenced his first direct attempt at jiacification with 
the Bajah of Amethie, who possessed, like most of the Oude chiefs, a mud fort 
in the midst of jungle, and was reported to be at the head of a force, 
estimated at 20,000 men-; with a large number of guns. There would not have 



Chap. VII.] 


LORD CLYDE’S MOVEMENTS. 


Cfl9 

teen much difficulty in knocking the place ateut his ears and putting his a.d. 
rabble force to flight, but as this might have cost many British lives, and 
pacification was' now the order of the daj', communication.s had been opened 
with the rajah, and a day had been fixed on which he was to tleclai IVlV 1H‘ !^urrcii(U*rof 
against surrender. On the 9th of November, when the force Avas within tl Aiuolhk*. 
miles of Amethie, the outj)Osts considerably in advance Ave;v fired u{)on, and 
the grass-cutters rushed back, shouting “The enemy!” it was a false alarm, 
for in the evening a messenger arrived from the rajah to express regret 
for the filing, and account for it by repre.senting that it had bca^n done 
without his orders by the sepoys, whom he was unable to control. lie would 
willingly, he said, make his submission, and surrender all hi.s guns, but his 
])Owcr over the troojis wjis limited to his own infantry. Lord Clyde, not 
satined with the explanation, left the rajah the alternative <tf sui’iemler or 
bombardment on the following day. This alternative at once ilecided the 
wily chief, who stole out of his foi t during the night, and .sent woid that he 
w'ould next morning cuter the camp. He did so, and thus secured the safety 
of his person and his property, though there could be no doubt that he had 
]ilayed a trick. After his departure, doulitless by previous concert, tbe sepoys 
had marched off, and when the fort wiis entered, it was found to contain only 
about 3000 matchlock-men, the rajah's own retainers, and a few old guns, 
in.stead of tl^e thirty which he was known to j>osse.ss, and wjis bound to 
surrender. Several of those missing w'ere afterwards found hidden in tiie 
jungle. 

Having dismantled the fort and cleared the jungle Jis far as possible. Lord ‘.aiituro.if 
Clyde proceeded in the direction of Slmukerpoor, another mud fort of vaunted iio.ir. 
strength, belonging to a powerful chief of the name of Bene Madhoo, who was 
reported to hijive added to his troops by receiving the fugitive .se])oys from 
Amethie. During the march a vakeel arrived from tlic chief, a.sking what 
terms would* bS given. The answer Avas, that his excellency would not treat 
with a rebel, but that clemency might be expected on surrender. Shortly aftcr- 
Avards a characteristic letter was received, not from Bene Madhoo himself, but 
his son, who wrote as follows;—“If the government Avill continue the settkv 
ment with me, I will turn out my fiither. He is on the part of Bjijeis Kuddr 
.(the puppet-king), but 1 am loyal to the British government, and 1 do not 
wish to be ruined for my father’s sake.” The obvious de.sign of this proposal, 
probably concocted between the father and the sou, was to allow the former to 
continue in his rebellion, and at the same time elude the forfeiture, A\hich 
would deprive the latter of the succession to his estates. No notice therefore 
was taken of it, and the march upon Shunkerpoor w'as continued. On the 
■ T5th the force with Lord Clyde arrived at Pechwarra, thivee miles sputh-east 
^of Berte Madhoo’s stronghold, while a separate debichment under Sir Hope 
Grant moved upon it from the north-west by the Roy Rai eilly road. The wily 



A.D. 1858, 


PllTBUit of 
lieiie Mml- 
]) 0 o, cliief 
of Shiitiker* 
ixjor. 


IFis versatile 
inovomei]t>s 
and hair- 
hreadt}i 


700 HISTOKY OF INDIA. [Book IX. 

rebel cliie£ thus in danger of being hemmed in, outwitted his assailants, and 
moved off in the dark with all his troops, guns, treasure, and baggage. In the 
morning, when the fort and entrenched camp were entered, only a few old 
men, priests, and fakirs, some gun bullocks, and a mad elephant were found. 
Bene Madhoo, when next heard of, was at a place called Poorwa, from whicli, 
with strange effrentery, he sent a vakeel to ask what terms he might now 
expect. 

After the evacuation of Shunkerj)Oor, the force which had been combined 
for the purpose of moving upon it was broken up. Sir Hope Grant proceeded 
northwards across the Gogi'a into the Gomickpoor district, and a detachment 
from Lucknow moved eastward in tlie direction of Fyzabad, while Colonel Eve- 
lagh, at the head of another detachment, was instructed to follow Bene Madlioo, 
and not lose sight of him for a moment. Lord Clyde, keeping the same object 
in view, readied Roy Bareilly on the 20th of November, and starting again on 
the following day, crossed the Sye at Keenpoor. On the 22d Bene Madlioo 
was reported to be at Doundeakira, a jilace situated on the left bank of the 
Ganges, about twenty-eight miles S.S.E. of Cawnpoor, and belonging to a 
zemindiU' of the name ofRamBux, who had acquired an infamous notoriety 
by the murder of several of the Cawnpoor fugitives. Here it was hojied that 
the arrangements for the attack were so complete as to bring the rebels to baj^ 
and make their escape impossible, but though an encounter did take place, and 
Ram Bux’s stronghold was captured, it proved a bairen conquest, as Bene 
Madhoo had again disappeared with most of his troojis and all his treasure. 
For some days nothing was lieai-d of his movements, and Lord Clyde made 
several marches which brought him to the vicinity of Lucknow. Here 
Mr. Montgomery, whom we formei'ly saw doing good service in the Punjab, 
had become chief commissioner in the room of Sir James Ouk'am, who had 
been called to a seat in the governor-general’s co\mcil. Under him the 
pacification of the country was making satisfactory progi’ess, numerous chiefs 
daily coming in to take advantage of the amnesty ofiered by the cpieeii’s 
proclamation. 

‘ After a halt of several days, during which the force had encaiiqied at Bunm-e, 
on the Cawnpoor road, Lord Clyde again took the field, and marched north-east 
about twenty miles to Ne\vabgunge, on the road to Fyzirbad. Here on the 0th of* 
December tidings weie obtained of Bene Madhoo, who was reported by the 
spies to be not more than twenty miles off, at a jilace on the Gogra, called 
Beyram Ghat. Thither accordingly a forced march was made, while Lord 
Clyde himself, leaving the infantry in charge of Brigadier Horseford, pushed on 
for the ghat at full gallop with a body of cavalry and four horse-artillery guns. 
It was only to exp^ience the old disappointment. Bene Madhoo with his rebels 
had just-crossed and taken all the boats along with him. After halting'on the. 
7th for the infantry, and.leaving a detachment at Beyram Ghat to protect the 



CllAP. Vll.] 


riTRSUIT OF BENE MADHOO. 


701 


engineers under Colonel Harnes while forming a bridge of boats, the ccfmmander- a.d, isss. 
in-chief again took tlie road to Fyzabad, and readied it on the 10th. His object 
was to avoid tlie delay Avhich would have been neces.sary in waiting till a 
bridge was thrown over the Gogra. He accordingly crossed by the bridge at 
Fyzabad, and immediately jiroceeded to carry out the plan of a combined 
movement which had been previouslj’^ arranged. Sir Hope Grant had crossed 
the Gogi’a on the 2.5th of November, and after encountering and defeating a 
large body of insurgents under the Eajah of Gonda, and occupying that place, 
had advanced to Secrora, which is only fifteen miles east of Bej’ram Ghat. 

He was thus in the rear of Bene Madhoo, and in co-ojieration with Lord Clyde, nene wmi- 
would have placed him between two fires, had not the wily chief scented out 
the dangei" and fled before he was entangled. An important object however 
had MOW been gained. The frontier of Bohilcund, from Avhich the rebels bail 
been driven into Oude, was carefully guarded, the most practicable jiassages of 
the Gogra Avere. secured, and thus the Avest, south, and east lieing barred 
against the rebels, now massed together within a comparatively narrow space, 
nothing remained for them but to fight or retu’e by their only l emaining outlet 
into the marshes of Nepaul. In either case their destruction seemed inevitable— 
in the former by the SAAmrd, in the latter by the malaria of the Terai, which at 
certain seasons rages like a pestilence. The subsequent moveriiente, and the 
result, cannot be better described than in Lord Clyde’s des])atch:— 

“On the 23x1 (December) I left Bareytch, passed Nanpai’a on the 2()th, and Thcrei.ei8 
after marching twenty miles on that day, attackexl a (axiisiderabh; body of rebels the frontier 
at Burgidia. Their left flank Avas turned. They fled xifter making a slight 
resistance, and Avere ])ursued until nightfall, leaving their guns in our hands, 

On the 27th the force inarched on the fort of Musjidia. This jxlaee Avas taken 
after three .honfs of vertical fire from two mortars, and a cannonade from an 
eighteen-pounder and an eight-inch howitzer, tlu* infiintry being carefully laid 
out to commafld the enemy's embrasures and parapets. I have much sati.sfac- 
tion in dwelling on the manner in which the fort Avas captured, Avith a A ery 
trifling amount of loss to the troxxps engaged. The diief engineer, Cohiiiel 
Harnes, R.E, has reported it to be one of the strongo.st as respects artificial 
defences that he has .seen in India, But, like all the others, it Avas Avithoiit 
bomb-proof cover, and consequently fell easily into xxur hands after a few hours 
of well-directed fire. On the 29th the troops returned to Nanpara, made n 
forced march on the night of the 3()th to the A'icinity of Bankee, Avherc the 
enemy had loitered under the Nana. He Avas surprised and attacked Avith 
great vigour, drivmn through a jungle which he attempted to defend, and 
finally into and across the Raptee, the 7th hussars entering that river with the 
fugitives. The next day it was retiorted that all the bodfes of rebels which 
lyid been retreating before us from the day of our arrival at Beyram Ghat, had 
either surrendered or passed the Nepaul frontier. In these various affairs 



702 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Bo'ok IX. 


A.D. 1868 . eighteen guns fell into our hands. In the meantime, Brigadier Rowcroft 
attacked Toolosepoor on the 23d December, driving Bala Row from that point 
itoToit in to the foot of the mountains, and taking two guns. Sir Hope Qrant was 
gui«ii«d. alarmed about his flank being turned to the eastward, and to tlie noilih of 
Gorruckpoor. Acting according to his instructions, and with great judgment, 
lie made that point absolutely safe before renewing his attack on Bala Row. 
That being done, he advanced through the jungles on that leader, and took 
flfteen guns from him, almost without the show of resistance on the part of the 
rebels, the-latter disjiersing and seeking refuge in the adjacent hills, and Bala 
Row fleeing into the interior, as the Nana his brother had done before him. 
^riius has the contest in Oude been brought to an end, and the resistance of 
150,000 armed men been subdued with a very moderate loss to her majesty’s 
troops, and the most merciful forbearance towards the misguided enemy.”* 

The rebels of Oude having thus been forced to (juit the field and hide them¬ 
selves in the po.stilential morasses of Nepaul, where a vengeance not less certain 
nor less fatal than that of the sword would inevitably overtake them, the 
mutiny was virtually at an end. It is true, indeed, that perfect trampiillity 
had not been restored. In several districts bands of l ebeis kept up at least a 
show of resistance, and by the rapidity and dexterity of their movements 
gave infinite trouble to the viurious detachments sent out against them. Theie 
could be no doubt, however, that the task of dispersing them, tltough difficult, 
would ere long be effectually accomplished, and it was therefore resolved by 
the authorities, both at home and in India, to assume the complete suppression 
of the mutiny as an accomplished fiict, and attest it by some I'orm of public 
Pitbiiiirc- acknowledgment. At home this acknowledgment was made in a maimer 

oc^iiition of , ,, •It • rtf *111 

theenppres- oocoiniiig ii (yliristiiUi Tiation, by the appointment of a day of special “thanks- 
giving to Almighty God for the constant and signal successes ftbtajued by the 
troops of her majesty, and by the whole of the force serving in India, whereby 
the late ssinguinary mutiny and rebellion which had broken out ift that country 
hath been effectually suppressed, and the blessings of tranquillity, ordei’, and 
peace are restored to her majesty’s subjects in the East.’’ In India, where tbe 
difference of circumstances mad(‘ a similar mode of national acknowled<rmcnt 


impracticable, it was deemed expedient to adopt a less solemn and moi’e osten¬ 
tatious proceduie, which, while it proclaimed leniency toward those who had 
incurred the guilt of rebellion, provided thej'^returned forthwith to their alb'gi- 
ance, gcave due honour and reward to those who.se fidelity had remained 
un.shaken. The King of Delhi, though he had, in consequence of the promise 
given, escaped the capital punishment which he deserved, was expiating his 
crimes as a transported convict j the Ranee of Jhansi, after the perpetration of 
a hori’id massacre/had perished in battle; Tantia Topee, who had acted as the 
right-hand man of Nana Sahib, had paid the penalty of his treachery on the 
gidlows, and a similar fate was awaiting Khan Bahadur Khan of Bfut;eilly, the 



Chap. VII.] 


OONCLUDINQ REMARKS. 


703 


wretch who, with a horrid mimicry of tlie forms of justice, had in -cold blood a d. im. 
put two European judges to death. Not only might justice now be tempered ^ 
with mercy, but the time had arrived when those who had under trying ciicnm- 
stances proved their fidelity might fairly expect a reward. Accordingly the orand 
governor-general, starting from (Calcutta on the 12th of October, 185S), com- cu«'n'^w 
menced a tour through the provinces, very much in the style of a roj-al pr<)gi-es.s, 
holding durbars or levees at the ])rincij)al .stations through whi(;h Ik^ passe<l. 
assembling the chiefs, and with a <li.splay of luagniticcuce well fitted to captivate 
the oiiental mind, bestowing di’c.sses of lionour and other ornaments on tho.se 
whose services during the mutiny were deemed wortliy of su(;Ii an ac.knowhjdg- 
ment. Jt would seaicely accord witli the dignity of liistory to follow Lord 
Canning throughout this tour, and detail the proceedings at tlie ditferent places 
wheje Ids levees were held. It will sutlice to call attention to the .splendid 
scene exhibited at Cawnpoor on 3d November, ISaU', where his lordship, when 
he had with his own hands hung a chain round the neck of the Rewah rajah, 

' Extract from Ictfcor of correspondent, 200. Ver}* shortly after two o’clock the wordn 

<latcd Cawnpoor, 4th Noveui her, —“Thednr- ‘ A ttcuti«>n,’ * KlioiiUler arin»,’ aiul then * I’recent 

bar yeatorday was a siglit worth seeiujj. The arms/aiinouiicedthatUioviceroywaspaKHingtliroui'li 

effect of tlie great variety of costunioa and the bril- the entrance tent, ainl presently', preceded )»y his 

liant colours ranged round the tent was very striking. cliief secretaries of state and aide-s-de-caiup, ho en- 

T’iie swell rajah of the day was ho of llewah. He hail tereil, the round of guns outside announoing it. l’l»e 

a chair on the right hand of the viceroy, and he fully asaeuihly rose on his entrance, and remained stand- 

caino up iuappeara^fcotoone^Hidoa of anativorajali. ing till he sat down. Then came the proHOutationH 

He is a big, hurly inau, of tall stature, with a iicavj’^, <»f the rajahs. Mr. llcadou took the big ones, and 

grossly .sensual face and yellow coHiple-\i«m. His Mr. Simpson the small fry. Each r^ijah had ovid- 

liands, fat and shajicless, Mere covered with dazzling ently been thoroughly drilled how }i4‘ was to make 

rings. He wore a light yellow tunic, with a black an obeisance, which act was accoiiipaniod in every 

and white Hcarf, tliat looked at a <listancc like a boa* case with a nuzzur, and which was also in each case, 

constrictor’s skin. On his head was a liaiidsonie after being touched hy the vioo-rcgal band, taken 

towering cap,coinposo<l entirely ofgold ami diamonds, from the otilcer by the peo[)le of the Toslia K liana 

which evidently made an inclination of the head department. 

dillicult. On his riglit eat Mr. (’ceil iloadon, the “ Then came the presentation of khclals. Theprin- 
home and foreign seAetary, wlio at a distance is very cipnl r.ijahs had chains fastened on their necks, but 

like Mr. Kdinondstone. On his right sat the Ilenares only to one, the If owah rajah, was this done hy Jionl 

rajah, who was very (ijiietly drossod, having merely Canning personally. To give him Iiis chain his lord- 

a neat white shad^ turbnn; he is a very* ordinary- ship rose*aiid passed it round his neck. The others 

looking buuialidikc man. On his right sat tlie Ciiik- had their collars of honour )mt on by the .socretaries, 

aree rajah, an ehlerly, hut rather striking looking Lord (Jauiiing merely' touching each cliain when pre- 

nmn, with a goo<l face, and dressed generally' in red soiiiod to him for that pur))Ose. 1'hc llewah rajah, 

garments. ITiero w ere besides from eighty to a bun- the Henarcs rajah, ami llic Chikaree rajah were each 

dred rajahs, great and .small, and tlicir brothers or addressed by Lord Canning in Eiiglbh <m their khe- 

ininisters, not two of whom v*ero. Rimilarly dressed. lats being given them, hut to the Chikaree rajah a 

“Tlie hourfixedforthe durbar wastwo o’clock, and great lionour was paid, for, after saying a few words 

^ly that time all were in their seals; a passage tout, to liirn. Lord Canning, turning to the comiiiander- 

lined with the grenadier company of the 35th regi- iu-chief, who on being addresscl immetliately stood 

nieut as a guard of honour, led to the dm bar tent, up, the whi»lo of the English ofliccrs present siamling 

which is simply a very fine doubb'-poled tent lined also, said, * J.<ord Clyde, I wish to bring to your iio- 

with yellow. In the centre of the farther side from tice the conduct of this brave man, xvho showed 

the entrance was Lord (Manning’s chair, and on his marked devotion to the Ilritish cause by acting on 

right were all the rajahs; on his left was the chair of the offensive against the rebels of iiis own accord, 

the comiuauder-in'chief; on his left flir Richmond and when besieged in a fort, refused to give up a 

♦Shake8j>ear; then came Generals Birch and Mansfield, British olHccr, offering his own son as a hostage in* 

L'olonels Becher and Stuart, and behind them the stead; and I trust,’ said Iibrd Canning, *tliat every 

governor-gjsneral and ebiers staff; tliezi farther to oliicer of the queen now present will reineviber this, 

tjie left w'as a flock of black coats, and on their left and should they ever come in contact with this rajah, 

the military, of whom there must have been about act accordingly.’ * 



704 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Book IX. 


A.D. — 


Wonilorfiil 
rise and 
jirogme of 
the British 
Indian em¬ 
pire. 


AixpiUition 
of Bombay 
and ohango 
of j[)olicy. 


specially eulogized the Chikaree rajah for his marked devotion to the Britisli 
cause, ill having not only borne arms against the rebels, but offered his son as 
a hostage in order to save the life of a British officer. 

In looking back upon the whole course of events recorded • in these volumes, 
it is impossible not to be struck with wonder and admimtion. At first a small 
body of merchant adventurers, with no higher ambition than to obtain a shai e 
in what was known to be a lucrative trade, contribute their capital and send 
out a few ships of moderate burden to the eastern seas by way of experiment. 
)Some of the ships are wrecked, an<l • others fall into the hands of enemies who 
plunder bi‘ destroy them. A few are more fortunate, and return laden with 
cargoes so valuable as to coinpensiite for other losses and stimulate to new 
exertions. For a time the continent of India is in a great measure overlooked, 
and the main exertions are directed to the Persian Gulf and the spice islai^ls of 
the Indian Archipelago. In the former direction the returns, though increased 
by the very discreditable practice of seizing and pillaging native ships, prove 
unsatisfactory; in the latter direction Dutch jealousy presents insuperable 
obstacles, and the long-chei'ished idea of a spice trade is all but abandoned. 
Inilia now begins to attract more attention, and in addition to a few places on 
the Malabar coast, where pepper forme<l the staple ai’ticle of export, other 
localities are selected, particularly on the Coromandel coast, and noiiliwards 
towards the Bay of Bengal. 

Hitherto all the factories established in India were held by the most 
precarious tenure. 'I’he property in the soil remained with the native jjrinces, 
whoso protecti()n, though purchased by much fawning and many costly 
j)re.sent.s, was not unfre(piently withdrawn, as often as the pillage of a factory 
promised to be moi’o [)rofitable than its tribute. In one (quarter, however, the 
tenure was of a different and more satisfactory natui’e. The i.sla,nd of Bombay, 
possessing the best harbour in India, had passed to the British crown as ]>art 
of the dowry of the Portuguese princess who became the wbe vjf Charles 11. 
At first there was rtxnn to doubt whether this ac<]uisition was to promote or 
to <lamage the interests of the East India Company. Prerogative pushed to 
its utmost limits wiis then the favourite policy of government, which accord¬ 
ingly began to exercise its new .sovereignty in the East in a manner which 
seemed to set the Company's chartered ])rivileges at nought. Complaint and 
recT’iraination of course ensued, and the results threatened to be disastrous, 
when government made the happy discovery that the possession of Bombay, 
instead of being a gain, was annually entailing a heavy loss. This was one of 
the last evils which a court so needy and avaricious as that of Charles II. could 
endure, and little difficulty therefore was felt in concluding an arrangement by 
which tJie Compavy entered into posse.ssion of Bombay with all its burden's. 
This w'ds a new and important step in advance. Previously they .were onl^ 
traders exi.sting by the .sufferance of the native powers; now they too were 




Chap. VII.] 


CONCLUDING EEMARKS. 


705 


sovereigns, and laying aside the abject forms of address with which they had 
been accustomed to approach native princes, began to use a more dignified 
language,, and act in a bolder spirit. The profits of trade had hitherto satisfied 
them, but they now talked of revenue from territory, and gave their servants 
to undei-stand that they expected it to form an important item in their future 
returns. The idea was never after lost sight of, and the aims of tlie C(unpany 
became visibly enlarged. They would no longer exist by stiiferanee, and began 
to familiarize their minds with the idea of conriuest. It was not long bef<»ro 
full scope was found for this warlike temperament. Not merely had they to 
repel aggression on the part of native, riilers; but a groat Euroj)ean power, 
which had settled on the east coast, ha<l engaged in a vast .scheme of ambition, 
which, if realized, would almost as a noce.ssary conse<]uence .annihilate British 
iutencsts in India. The collision with France thus nndered inevitable, le<l to 
a desperate struggle, in which, afti'r various alternations of success, France was 
obliged to succumb. Me.anwhile a war fraught with still more important 
consequences had commenced in another quarter. The atrocity of the Black 
Hole of Calcutta had been perpetrated, and Clive, who niarched to avcuigo it, 
had, in return for dethroning one ruler an<l jJacing another upon the throne, 
obtaineil for the Company an absolute control over the levenues of the 
inimen.se and populous pi-ovinces of Bengal, Behar, and ()ri,s.sa, wdth full right 
to appropiiate* them to their own use, subject only to certain stijuilateil 
payments. This grant of the dewannee was properly, as its name implies, only 
one of revenue, but revenue generally suffices to make its possessor masti'r of 
all the other rights of property, and a(au)rdingly the Company acte<l from the 
date of the grant as if the three provinces belonged to them in ab.solute 
.sovereignty. The British Indian empire having been thus foumhsl, efuitinued 
to advance in the face of hostile combin.ations which interrupted its progre.ss, 
and at times even threatened its existence, till every power hostile to it was 
overthrown, and its supremacy was conqiletely established. 

While pursuing the remarkable career which h.as ju.st been slightly .sketched, 
the con.stitution of the Company had been radically changed. Its connection 
with trade had been entirely dis.solved, an<l its directors had been cmivia ted 
into a kind of middle men, through whom, but in immediate subservience to 
blie British ministiy, the government of the country uais conducted. This 
anomalous foian of administration, which was rather <lictated by cii'i-um.stan(a.‘s 
than delibei'ately adopted, was not entitled, and was indeed never meant to be 
pennanent. The right of sovereignty lia<l been declared by repeated acts of 
the legislature to be vested exelusivelv in the Briti.sh crown, and it .seemed 
necessarily to follow that the crown would .sooner or later exercise this right 
in India' in the ssime way as in its other dependencies. *it was necessary, 
hgwever* owing to the magnitude of the interests involved, to proceed with 
the utmost caution, and though the obvi<ius ten<lency of .all recent legislation 
VoL. Ili. 285 


A.D. 


fur 

KUpivinai^j 

with Fmiu v. 


in 

the coimiitii 
tinu of Die 

» 

Cotnj any. 



706 


HISTORY OF INDIA. 


[Boo^ IX. 


AD. — on the subject had been to increase the direct authority of the British govern- 
nicnt and diminish that of the directors, the final step of annexation had not 
been taken, and was to all appearance at some distance, when it was precipitated 
by the Sepoy Mutiny. 

Theseixiy It would be Unfair to lay the whole blame of this fearful catastrophe on 
iowB .1 by the Indian governiUent, as then actually administered. The causes which led 
nuw it had long been in o])eration, and were so deeply seated, that even some of 

the ablest Indian statesmen, though they saw and lamented them, failed to 
discover or. suggest any effectual remedy. Still it must be cfmfessed that a 
government, which was not ignorant of the danger, but allowed itself to 
slumber over it till the crisis actually airived, must have laboured under 
grave defects both in substance and foim, and we therefore cannot wonder, 
that as soon as the horror and indignation produced by the atrocities of,the 
mutineers had subsided so far as to leave room for reflection, a general 
desire was felt to rid the Indian government of its most striking anomalies, 
and assimilate its machinery as much as ])ossiblc to that Avhich has so long 
stood the test of expei'iment at home. TIic desire<l changes have accordingly 
intinctimi been made. Tlie <pieen now rules Indi.a in her own name, like all her other 
laiiiy. dejicndencies. Mini.stei’.s, one of whom now bears the name and ofliee of 

secretary of state for India, are strictly responsilde for the mode in which it is 
administered. The jealousies and heartbui nirigs produced by the»maintonance 
of two Eurojieaii armies, have been .set at I'est by their amalgamation. The 
best talents of tliis country have been employe<l in refonning the Indian 
financial system, and the question of jiatronage has been happily .solved, b\ 
substituting (jualifleation for family oi- political influence, in aj)j)ointing to 
the mon; im])ortant branches of the ])ublic service,. The strange policy of 
discouraging Eurf)pean settlers has been completely i-ever.sed, and liberal 
m(!a.sures liave been dcvi.sed for the ])urpo.se of attracting Euroj)ean capital to 
the. country, as one of the most obvio\is and eflectual means ol (teveloping its 
vast resources. Nor is it out of place to mention that under the new anunge- 
rnents India Avill never again be placed at tlie mercy f>f pamj»ered sepoy regi- 
inents. A mitive army cannot be dispensed with, but it will henceforth he 
kept in its proper place as an auxiliary force, capable of doing good .service in 
snbonlinate departments, but too few in numbers, and cora{)oscd of elements » 
too heterogeneous, to admit of s\ich formidable combinations as were witnessed 
(luring the late mutiny. 

Such arc a few of the im])ortaut improvements which have been, or are in 
course of being introduced into the administration of our Indian empire, but 
it ought to be remembered, that in regard to .still more important improvements, 
governmhnt is alim)st powerless. In the matter of education it i.s mue!i 
doubtless to be. able, to open schools and to provide them with well-(|ualified, 
teachers, but in selecting the subjects to be taught, government njust stop 



Chap.' VII.] 


CONCLUDING REMARKS. 


707 


sliort and exclude the only topics by wliich the Hindoo mind and heaib can be ad. — 
effectually reached. It may be fairly calculated that the teaching of the 
government schools is in a great measure lost upon three-fourths of those who Measures uf 
attend them. The knowledge communicated cannot find a resting-place in the moiit iu 
minds of persons whose previous beliefs consist of such monstrous dogmas as 
Hindooism inculcates, and whose religious observance.s, entwined with the 
ordinary business of life, have become to them a second nature. Tlie case of 
the remaining fourth of the scholars is somewhat different Tlieii- object 
probably is to obtain .some of the government appointments foi; whicdi the 
knowledge acquired in schools and colleges is an essential (pialification. They 
accordingly pass through the whole curriculum, and will iu due time be 
found seated at the desks of government ofticea They ])ave succeeded in 
thewr object, and arc become public servants. So far so good. They have 
procured a livelihood, and owe it to the education provided for them at tlie 
public expense. But there is unfortunately another side to the ])icture, and 
when inquiry is made into the j)rivate character of those men, it is too often 
found that they have paid dear for their knowledg*?. They have cast away 
their early beliefs without substituting anything better, and belong to the class 
of liberalized Hindoos, who ape the manners and practise the worst vices, 
but are utter strangers to the virtues of European society. To this class, but 
with all its«Avorst qualities exaggerated, the infamous miscreant Nana Sahib 
belonged. 

When the question is asked. In what way can the affections of the Hindoo Religion 

iustntctioii. 

be gained, and his fidelity to British rule placed beyond jeopardy? the answer 
is. By making him a Christian. A common faith will give him a common 
interest, and form a bond of union which not even violence will be able to 
sever. During the late mutiny, those of the natives who had embraced Chris¬ 
tianity arc understood to have remained true to their allegiance, and it may 
reasonably be (?xpccted that in aU similar cases the same course will be pursued. 

Here, however, the interference of government is precluded, simply because 
the suspicion which it would produce, would in all probability' more than 
counterbalance any benefit that could be derived from it, and hence, a work 6n 
which, more than any other, the prosperity and happiness of India depend, must 
be carried on by private benevolence. It is pleasing to know that Christian 
missionaries, distinguished alike for talents and piety, have long been devoting 
them to this sacred task, and that the mutiny itself, by awakening attention to 
the real wants of India, has given a new impulse to efforts for christianizing it. 

The time is in some respects singularly propitious. Under a native dynasty, 
the suppression of the mutiny would have been followed by general massacre 
and devastation, and every province in which the mutineers had mastered in 
.strength would have been converted into a desert W® our*triumph 

with nwderation, and tlie punishments have been few compared with the number 



708 


HISTOEY OF INDIA. 


[Book IX. 


A o. — 


XleligiouB 
iiu»ti*uctio!i 
of tho Hin¬ 
doos. 


Duties i>f tho 
Ui-iiisii 
t>tioplc‘ ill 
rogard to 


and enonwity of the crimes. The natives ctinnot fail to ha,ve perceived this, 
and are acute enough to have inferred that the Christian religion, which teaches 
those who ]nofess it to act thus generously, must be infinitely suiierior to their 
own barbarous and cruel supei’stitions. If such was the impression produced by 
our leniency in the hour of victory, how greatly must it have been deepened 
by the liberality displayed during the late famine, when, forgetting all theii- 
wrongs, and listening only to the cry of suffering humanity, the inhabitants of 
the United Kingdom were seen contributing their thousands and tens of thou- 
•sands, in order to save millions of Hindoos from starvation. If the heart of 
that people be not incurably hardened, this noble return of good for evil must 
surely have softened it, and now therefore is the time to win them over, and 
induce them to exchange theii- monstrou.s and cruel superstitions, for the pure 
faith, which, while it j)reparcs man for his final destuij', tames his si^vage 
nature, and effectually civilizes him. The task of conversion from heathenism 
is indeed the most difticxdt and delicate in which human agents are permitted 
to co-o])erato, and if we may judge by the j»ast, nowheie encounters such 
formidable obstacles as in India. Hindooisin has bound its votaries as witli 
adamantine fetters, and it would almost seem as ii' every attempt made to break 
them only rivets them more firmly. Men eminent for piety and talents, aftci- 
wearing out their lives in missionai-y labours, are obliged to confess that theii- 
converts are few and not always of a satisfactory description. However sanguine 
therefore, we may be, and hovv'cver confident that the task will be ultimately 
accomplished, a long period may be expected to elapse before any visible 
impression will be made on the gieat bulk of the Hindoo pfipulation. Mean- 
wliile the path of duty is [ilain, and no degree of difficulty can afford any valid 
excuse for not attempting to walk in it. A good cause must never be abandoned 
in desjiair ; and though some may seek a pretext for indolence, by representing 
the conversion of the Hindoo as a work which the Almighty has reserved to 
himself, and will accomplish in his own time without human ifitetvention; anil 
othei-s, disdaining even to use a cloak for their infidelity, may ridicule the very 
attempt as ipiixotic, or stigmatize it as intolerant—the Christian who is true to 
Ids vocation, and grateful for the many blessings which he derives from it, will 
be more stimulated than dispinted by the obstacles thrown in his way, and 
console himself with the assurance that his work of faith and labour of love,- 
however limited the measure of success gnuited to it, will not be forgotten. 

To the attempts made to christianize India, it has been objected that the 
inevitable result of their success would be to destroy the British rule. The 
iidiabitants made aware of their natutal rights, and become capable of self- 
government, would throw off our yoke, and declare their independence. Un¬ 
questionably they Would. But what then? Is it meant that for the purpose’ 
of perpetuating our empire in the East, we must endeavour to keep our subject^ 
there in a state of semi-barbarism, and discountenance all endeavoui;8 to raise 



Chap. VII.] CONCLUDING EEMAEKS. 709 

them to our level in respect of intelligence, religion, and general (Hvilization? 
The time has been when such selfish and heartle.ss policy would have been 
looked upon with favour, but a better spirit now jjrevails; and the determina¬ 
tion, as announced in the queen’s proclamation, and cordially acquiesced in by 
all classes of society, is to do justice to India, and more than compensate her for 
all the wealth she has bestowed upon us, by funiishing lier'with the means of 
rising above her present degraded state, and attaining to the highest form of 
European civilization. Should the effect be to enalde hei’ to dis{)ense with our 
tutelage, we shall have the satisfaction of* feeling that we ourselves, have been 
the willing instruments of her emancipation; while .she, even in .severing the poli¬ 
tical ties by which she is now bound to as, will not forget how much she shall 
then owe to us for the enlightened and generous policy which gradually ])re- 
j)ar»d her for freedom. Should the day evej' come that India, in conscrpionce 
of the development of her resources by British ca])ital, and the enlightenment 
of her people by Briti.sh philanthropy, shall again take rank among the nations 
as an independent state, then it will not be too much to say, that the extinction 
of our Indian empire by such peaceful means .sheds more lastre on the British 
name than all the other events recorded in its histoi-^'. 



A.D. — 


Future 
doBthi^ uf 
India. 


Arms of the Eamt India Company. 





INDEX 


COMPREHENSIVE HISTORY OF INDIA. 


A. 

tlie, i. 402- 

Ai.<t>MYl K}mKt. ail An^i) chief, capitulates at 
Maliigauui. {ii. lOU. 

Alxloulah Khan, Major Bunnss’ treatinent 
«>f: t)»kc8 a leading part in tlic CuImk> 1 in- 
surructiim, iii. 392; tlin munler of, 408 

Aljcrcroiniy, Geueral. hia (xmiiucst of Ma¬ 
labar, ii. 295; or»l«rt?il to return from 
(lainatiiliaihly to Malaliar.fiOS; returns to 
Telliclierry, Cll; at BcriuKapataTU, 61K; 
Tiiudo conuiiaiiilcr-in><ihiot, 650; defeats 
< iiiolani Mahomed Khan, 070. 

Abinaton. Captain; his brave attempt on 
MuilaiiKhur, ii. 400. 

AIhio, Mount, the «1aiii teni]»les on, ii. 148. 

AbuUW.I, Aklter'B minister, the assassination 
of. i. 139. 

Acheen, the reception of tho first cxiiciUtion 
of the llfist Tiidia Coiiiiiany at. i. 239. 

Adam, Hir FrctloricU, aovonior of Madras, 
iii. 247. 

Ailani, Mr, John, the oflicc of governor- 
general d<JVi>lvcH on, pr<> Inn., iii. 129; his 
relation witii the firm of W illtam l*almer 
A Co., 130; RistrictioiiH imposed by him on 
the iiroRR, 132. 

Adam Klian, a singular tTagc4ly occasioncxl 
by. i. 12ri; assassinates IVlalioined Khan 
Atka, 126; ills pnnislimont. 120. 

Adams, </olonel. his oiK'nitions against tlie 
Hindarces, iii. 79; aids in routing tho isiish- I 
wa'Hurmy, 91; takes tho fort id Chanda, 93. ! 

Aden, Albuipioniue’s oxjHxlition against, [ 

i. 1^; Allniiiiiet‘<iuc*s ineffeid.nul attempt i 

ufKni, 187. • 

Adlorcrou, (Jolou^l, sot aside by the presi- 
dency of Madivia lis ooinmaiider of tho 
oxiieditlon to ikuigal, i. 549. 

Adultery, tho Hindoo lav' in relation to, i 

ii. 105. • * I 

Afgliau ilynasly, the, founded by Ifhcilole 

Lody, i. bK>. j 

Afghaiiistmi. Kunjeet ^4ing's de.Hign.s on. iii. { 
277; a liarrier to hidia, 285; internal state i 
of, 286; comuintioaflui, 286; troubled state ' 
of, 289; British objections to an aUianiHi ' 
of, with Persia. 301; Kussian intrigues in, 
301; Bord J'alnicratoifs note respeeting 
IluBsuin intrigues in, 306; Ivitssian expla¬ 
nations and ilisclaimers, 308; negotiations 
with the chiefs of, ;M)9; Lord Auckland’.s 
haughty troatiueiit of Dost Mahomed of 

• f'alKXil, 311; fresh negotiations witli Dost 
Mahomed, 314; Dost Mahomed’s letter to 
tho governor-general, 315; departure of 
tlie Brltisli mission from CalxMl. 316; 
delllierations of the British govemmont 
reKjMictitig. 317; new l*ei-sian expo<lltiou 
against lierat, 317 (see Hfrat ); Lord Auck- 
huid’s warlike iHtlicy respecting, 326; the 
tripartite treaty relating to. 328: tlie small 
proportion of the natives of, in Bliah 8hu- 
jah s army desigiiMl to ro-cstablish his au¬ 
thority ill, 328; British preparations for a 
war in, 330; the Simla manifesto resiioct- 
hig, 330; appointments of Mocnaghten and 

* Bitmos to offices in, 333; character of I^ord 
Auckland's policy respecting, 337; tho ex- 
peilitiou to, persisted in aft^ the raising 
of tho siegfe of ^orat, ^0; tho force to Ixi 

•employed in the expedition to, dltninishod; 
troops selected, 341; limt march of the 
exp^tion ta and ite arrival at Bahawnl- 
Sk>or, 343; the ciiiedition to, enters the tor- 


Afglianistan, - 

ritortcs of tlie Ameers of Bcinde; ditilcul- I 
tics with the Ameers, iii. 342; ditUcultittS of • 
tlie Bombay division of the exiH'dition to, i 
345; threiitoncd attack of thccxiHidition to. | 
on Hydcralnvd, tho capital of the Ameers, 
345; injustice done the Ameers: money i 
extorted from them, 346; treaty with the ; 
Aniocrs, 349: ailvanci; of the British army 
to; ilitticulticB exiH‘rienced. 350; the British ; 
army march through the Bolan l^ass, tiio i 
only ontranc.e to, 351; halt of the Britisli ' 
anny at Dadur ; its tlireatemoil starvation. I 
3.52; mutual dislike of Khah Hhujaii and ' 
tho Afghans, 353; ipiestioii of priiixidcncy 
in tlie. Afghan expoilition. 351; halt of thi- 
Afghan extieditiou at t^iiettah. and occu¬ 
pation of Cani^tvr. 354: HUali Sliujah’s : 
reception at Candahar, 355; pursuit of 
Uarukzye. chiefs, and lawless state of tho 
o.omitry, 355; departure of the Afghan ex¬ 
tieditiou fr< nil t^uulahar, am I arrival lioh >re 
Gluiznee. 356; the Afghan exiiedilion as¬ 
sault and capture GhiiTuec. 358; flight of ’ 
]>ost Malioiiuxl, 361; Hhah Shujuh’s entry i 
into Calxiol, and letter to Queen V'ictoria, ; 
*ki2; iiartial withdrawal of British troojis ' 
from Cabool. 3(^4expedition against, and ; 
capture of Khclat. 3(>4; army of occui>atioii 
in Afghanistan, 3G6; Bhah Hlmjah rt'movi^ 
to Jelakdiod, 3^; congratulations on the . 
sueexiSH of the Afghan war. 3G7; w.w alarms 
and pezplexitics resiiocting the affairs of ! 
AfgUaniaton. 3(>7; unsatisfactory stiite of. 
368; disturliauces of various kinds in. and j 
operations to suppress them, 3(59; suri*(‘n- i 
der of Dost MahonuMl, who is ciuiveyed to i 
British India, 380; fancied tmmiulllity of ' 
Afghanistan. 382; new insniTectioii in, , 
and efforts to supprcBS it, 382; delusive . 
views of the tnvuquilllty of, 386; (.^abool, 
fearful occurrences in. 392 (see ('nhoof); ' 
ojierations of the British in different iHirts i 
of, 430; Hale's march to Jelalalioil, 4^k>; i 
.S:i1i>’s di‘f<‘inx'of .Telalabiel, '(32; defeat of | 
tlie Briti.-)h reiieiing toree mtlie KIijIh'I | 
434, an eartiiMuake iK .-.iro^^ the de- I 
fence.*: of .leliiluliad. ulijeh are forthwitli . 
rcsioiiNl, 435; deleat ef .\k!iar Khun U* ' 
foiM ilet.UalKiti. 43i5, ^late ol I'ediuu^r; 
General pollock’s advanci^ from, towards ; 
Jelalaliad, 436; the KhylKjr Paiw forced 1 
and Jelolabad relieved, 437; Ghuznei* cap- | 
tured by the Afghans, 437: state of affairs : 
atOondahar, 438; an Afghan force defeat- ! 
ed near r^audaliar, 438; order to deliver , 
up (Kandahar to the Afglians disregimled | 
by Colonel Kawlinsmi ami General Nott, i 
439; preparations for tin* defence of Can- j 
rlahar, 439; au Afglian stratageui to take , 
Oaiidahar defeated, 440; views of the go- , 
venimeut on luamiug the Afghan disiiste'r, 
441; first prochimation of tiio govcnior- 
gcneral promising vigorous meitsures, and 
his subsequent ilespoiiilciicy, 442; policy 
of the new govertior-gciiend, lionl Kllcn- 
Ixirougli, in regard to Afghuiiistau; its 
first promise lielieil, 443; defeat of (*enoral 
Eugland in the Kojuk Bass. 444; fc'cling of 
iiiortiiication prcKluccd in tho minds of 
Generals Nott and Pollock by the gover- 
tior-generars order to witlnlraw from Af¬ 
ghanistan, 445; the governor-general’s 
misgivings as to the policy of withilrawing 
from, 446; fate of Hhah Shujah in. 447: tlie 
order to withdntw from, virtually comiter- 
manded, 448; tho governor-general’s in-* 
structions respecting the gates of the tern- [ 


Afghanislan,- - 

pI«‘of SomnauthaiCjShuxnue, iii. 465; Gene¬ 
ral Nott's tnaich from Candahar to (Bin/.* 
mxi and limit encouiiten* with tlie enemy, 
4,50; defeat of the Afghans. 451; nH.*apture 
of Ghnziioe, 451; Nott’s victory at Maidan. 
452; victorious niarch of General INilIock 
on CulsHil, 452; the Afghan chiefs resolve 
t(i offer submission, 453 ; defeat of the Af¬ 
ghans and capture of GuImwiI. 453; ailvcn- 
turcs of tho Bnglish captivi'S in Afghan¬ 
istan ; their rt^lcose, 454; evacuation of 
Afghanistan by thi* British anny, 458; 
tiuTsuit of the Afglian auxiliaricH of tho 
Sikiis. 527. 

Afglians, the, \. KXi; offended by Hikundur; 
theymise fsu*tinns against him. 193; trdiea 
of; Aklier's war on them. 130; war with the 
HikliR. iii. 270; British treaty with. 285; 
negotiations with the chiefsof. 318; deteat 
of, at .lelalalxul, 43»}; (ihuxnot* captim-d 
by, 437: defeat of, at Oamiahar, 43tk ileteat 
of, lit (•hoaine. 151: defr.it of. at .Maid/uj, 
■152: dri'iMt Ilf. n> :ir ('aliool, 453. 

Af/ul Khi'ii, ‘on of l»o*f M.’ihoined. iii. 361. 
Aga Mir, miiiiRter of tho NaUih of (hnU*. 
ili. 214. 

Aghorls, the, it. 76. 

AgnoM', Mr. II. A. Vans, iimrdereil by the 
soldicrB of Moolnij at Mooltan, iii. 597. 
Agni, a Hindoo deity, ii. 34. 

Agra, captured by lialHT, i. Ill; th<* Tuj« 
Mahal at, 289, and note; ailvanco of (ten- 
eral Luke upon, and catitnre of, ii. 7(53; tlie 
great (pm of. 764; the sepoy mutiny at, iii. 
582: disastrous enmuiiter with the rclielH 
at. (’>68; (•eneral ({reiithed’s defeat of the 
relKils at, 65!i; the new iirositlcncy of. left 
in alx'yance. iii. 249. 

Agriculturi*. of the Hindoos, slow progress 
of, ii. 151; peculiar fcaturi'S and antiquity 
of,l52; implcniciitftof plough,harrow, rol¬ 
ler, 152; mode of sowing; drilling-machine, 
154; exees.sivc cropping; waste striiW'; and 
manure, 155; varieties of vegetable pro- 
diic<»; rici>, niotle of cultivating it, 156; 
wheat. iMirley, and ragee. 157: legnininoiis 
I'lsuiis, (■••itoii. ir>8, -ug.ir. I.V.i, ind:p>. 161; 
opium, 1>52. 

Ahiiiya Baev, ii 742. 

Ahmed All Khan, infiuit son of A^diomed 
Ali Kliaii; rest^mvtion of tho jiiglmc to, 
by Hit Kolkirt Alicrcromby, ii. 670. 

Ahmed liuksU Khan, iii. 187, 212. 

Ahmeil Shah, a celi-brateil Afghan inon- 
an;h, chiistiHes the Sikhs, lii. 270. 

A hnied Shah Aislalee, tlie riw of. i. 402. 
AJinied Shah Doorance, makes tho I'unjab 
trilmtarj’, L 403: a new invasion by, ^; 
liis struggle with the Muhraitas and de¬ 
feat of thcin, 405. 

AhmednliOil, the capture of, ii. 456. 
Ahineiliiuggur, tho fortn-ss :if, attacked and 
captured by Geiieml WellcBlcy, ii. 749, 
Ahmuty. (’olonel, ii. 435. 

Aix-la-(.iiajM‘lIe, theiieace of, 1. 428. 

Ajagerh, reduction of the fort of, ii. 821. 
Ajmeer, i. 59, note; capture of, byKhahalMi- 
dill, who vaiiciuishcs the Indian anny, ,59. 
Akliar Khan, conference with him and othor 
Afii^un chiefs in ('ubooi. lii. 417; lieconieg 
guteic to the British Yrom the Hissar 
in GidMi.ll to the eantoniimiit.-*. 419: liis 
evrr;e>rdiiiur.v |iro)iO':ii| to the llritisli en- 
v.»y, 421; cotifereiic** of ilie envoy willi, 422; 
iiiunUT of the envoy in his presence, 42^1; 
is unable to grant the promised protec¬ 
tion to the British on tlieir departure from 




n2 


INDEX. 


AKBEIt 


AKCHITECTURE 


Aktioj- Khan, -- « 

Oabool. iii. 425; the married oflScera and 
their families delivered to him on the do- 
paiture of the Brltiidi from Cabool. 42%; 
profewieBto be uimble to protect the IhItiBh 
from the mimleroua attackit made on 
them. 427; bis treachcrouA conduct on set- 
tlug Lord Elpliinfltone and other British 
offlcera into his power 428; niakett his ai>- 
pearance before Jehuabod, 435; defeated 
ny Bale at JelalaiKid, 436; desiros to come 
to temia 453: hia defeat and 453; 

adveiiturcB of hla captivea • 455; 

the release of bis Kngluih ci^Wea 455. 

Akber. hisearly history, i. 121; BehramKhan, 
his tutor, reigns in his name, 122; his 
tlu^tne endangered by various enemies, 
1^; his victory over his enemies at i^i* 
put, 122; he ro-entere Delhi, 123; he dis¬ 
misses Behrain for his arropince; who re- 
bt^Is, 123; bis vigorous and successful rei^, 
124; marries a Htudod, 125; rivalship 
among his i»ffloerB. 126; escapes aasawina- 
tion, 127; the Uslwks nd)ol a^inst him, 
127; his campaign imainst the ITsbeks, 
1:1%; proceedings in Oabool and Tjohore 
aiivcrse to him, 128; lie suppresses the 
ITsbek revolt, ; his siege of ilhittoor; 
shoots Jogmiu the governor. 130; revolt in 
fhijerat against him, 131; his mipiirossioii 
of the revolt in the l^unjal^ 131: new 
troubles arise to him In Gujerat. 132; re- 
V(dt against him in Bengal, 132; he sup¬ 
presses the revolt in Reiigiil, 133; advance's 
into the Punjab, 134; nis campaign in 
t'^bool and < Cashmere, 134; his camjiaign 
aeainat the Vr>osf>ofsQres and Koshnyes, 
l3s ; makes himself master of C7andaliar 
and claims the supreniacy in the T>ecoau. 
137; his camiiatra in the Deccan, 138; his 
succem in the Deccan, 130; his domestic 
sorrows au<l death, 139; his tomb. 140, and 
n^ttei his jmrKon, talents, and characit^r, 
140; his internal administration, 141; the 
liberal spirit of his nde, 142; his public 
worka 142; bis onler fur the cxecutimi ot 
a Persian translation of the giispels, 143. 

Akram Khan, iii. 525. 

Aktur Khan, heiuhithe insurgents in ^tnin- 
dawor; is defeated and sumuits. iii. 382. 

Ala-u-din. suoccteds Mahomed on tlie throni* 
of Dcllii ;his foeblo reign, i. 99; liis resi- 
ilenco at BiKlatNin, 99. 

Ala-u-din, ue}>hrw of ,TcIal-u-din, inv;u1os ) 
the Deccan; bis success, i. 76; murders bis 
uncle, 77: usurps the throne of Delhi. 78; 
courts popularity; his cruelty; defeats a 
Mogul invasion, 78; retluoes Oujerat. 78; 
n^pels another Mogul iuvaKion, 79; hispriv 
jecta. 80: attempts on his life, 80; his cap¬ 
ture of Rintimliore. 81: administrative re¬ 
forms. 81; hiatyrauny.82: attacks Oliittoor. 

82; his capital blocKa<led by the Moguls, 

82; his minute and vexatious regulations, 
83; imprisons the Hajab of Chittoor, who 
escapes, 83; defeats a mnv Mogul invasion; 
his conquest of tlie Deccan, 84; docliniiig I 
fortmies and death, 85. > 

AlH-u-din. of Ghtif, brother of the munleri'^l 1 
Kutb-u-dln Sur, defeats the inurclorer Boh- J 
ram,i.66;destroysCthuzuce,56: hisiloatli.ST. 

Ala-u-diu Musaooil, Sultan of llellii, i. 

Albuquerque, Alfonso de, and Fraiudsco, 
stmt to Tiulia by the Portuguese govom- 
meut: return to Burope, i. 172; Alfonso 
returns to India., 178; his cx|MMlition to 
the Persian tlulf. 178; attacks Ormuz; the 
Persiana sulmiit, 179; his attack on Cali¬ 
cut, and narrow escape, 181; re]tairs to 
Uoa, and captures it, ifiz; his expetUtion 
against Malacca, and capture of it. 183; his 
heroism aud humanity, 184; his expedition < 
against Kden, and capture <»f Ormm^ 184; 
he witiely extemls Portuguese power iu the 
East, 185; his illness and deata 186. | 

Aidwell, Mrs., history of her escajic from the i 
Delhi mGM(sacn«. iii. ^7, 570. 

Alexander the Oniat, his <‘xpeditioD to 
India, i. 1; Itesieges Tyre. 25; coiuiucrs 
Darius at Arliela, and pursues Bessus, 26; 
crosses the Indus, 26; pamesthe Hydu^tes 
and is emposed by Purus, 27; fights the 
liattle of the Hyilaspes, 28; Porus sur- 
veiulers to,'29; his furtnor pi^ress, 30; 
iwsses the Acesin€» nr.dheuab; Porus (& 
secsnid of the name) flees before him; 
crosses the Ilydraotes, and besides Ban- 
gala, 30; arrives at the Hyuhasis, wlytre 
his troops refuse to proceeiz farther, 30; 
returns, ami is wounnt^ among the MalU, 
31; descends the Iirfius, 31; taxes leave of 
Tudia: the effects of his expe<iitIon, 32. 

Alexandrl^intluenoe of its foundation upon 
Tyre, i. 25; Ptolemy Lagus makes it his 
capital, 36. 


Algebra, Hindoo, ii. 125. 

All Hussein, claimant of the throne of the 
Carnatic, ii. 7^. 

AU Moor^, ill. 464. 

AH Mortis: sends a present to Coote after the 
capture of Arcot, 1. 630. 

AU ^za. ii. 580. 

Ali Kexa Khan. ii. 717. 

Ali Verdy Khan, made governor of Behar; 
his treasonable designa 1. 520; becomes 
nabob, 522; his government. 523; revolt of 
the governor of Orissa ag^nst him, 523; 
his dominions are invaded tlie Msh- 
rattas. 524; his victory over the Mahrattas, 
526; his ilomininns are again invade<l by 
the Mahrattae, 627; his murder of Bosker 
Pmit, and exasperathm of the Mahrattas. 
527; tra^cal death (»f his brother and 
nephew, >J7; hfs own death, 5^; his suc¬ 
cessor, 529: the state of Bengal uiuler him, 
529. 

Alighur, the fort of. captured, ii. 759; the 
sei>oy mutiny In, iU. 577. 

AHpoor, the rebel expedition against, from 
Delhi intercepted and punished, iii. 613. 

Aliwal, the little of. W. 4^. 

Allaliaitad, the pavilion of the Chaloes Bi¬ 
toon at, i. 143, note palace of, 792, vote ; 
cession of, and of Ooi^ to the Mahrattas, 
ii. 320; sepoy mutiny at, ill. 583. 

Allen, Lieutenant, at fiarrackpoor, informed 
by a jemadar of the lntcnae<l mutiny of 
ff)ur r>r five native sepoy regiments, iii. 557. 

Ally Adil Bhah, fonuhlable attack of, on the 
Portuguest' at Goa; its repulse, i. 194. 

Almas Beg, his treachery towards Ala-u-^lin, 
i. 77. 

Almeida. D<m Fraiioiaeo, sent by the Portu¬ 
guese in command of an expedition tr> 
India, i. 174; is exposed t«> danger, 176; 
lierolsiu and death of his sou Ijorenzo, 177; 
sets out bi avenge his son, 179; destroys 
Ihiltul, and tlefeats the Turkish aTi<1 Gu- 
jerat fleets, 180; though sui)erBe<lo«l, lo- 
tains his viccroyship, 180; his death. 181. 

Alonso V. and John JI. of Portiupil; their 
xeal for maritime discovery, i. loO. 

Alptegiii, founder of the hfuise i>f iihuxiu^ts 
i. 42. 

Altamsh. successor to Ki)>uk, i. 63; sovc- 
ndgii of I>elhi. 64. 

Aliif Khan, Itcsieges Wiinmgole, i. 87; siin- 
eeeds his father on the throne of l>elhi. 
luider the title of Mahomed Toglak; his 
character. 88; his gi-inding taxation. 88; 
his projet.’t of conquering China, 8i»: at¬ 
tempts to remove the seat of empire to 
]>owletai)nii. 90; insurrection against, and 
ilcath of, 91. 

AhimlKigh, the. iii. 652; the mutineers firmly 

K isted at, but defeate<l by Havelock, 652; 

avelock’s trootis halt at, 653; the sick 
and wounded of Havelock's army left at, 
6.53; anxiety felt aliout those left at. 657. 
Alumgecr. the reign of, i. 4'k3. 

Aliimp^va. takfm by Migor Monson. ii. C31. 
Aluptujecn, defeated I>y Tognil Khan, i. 69. 
Alves, Major, the Hiitish political ag^nt at 
JcypfK>r, woimdcd i»y amaHsassin, iii. 226. 
Amar Sing, a Ghoorka chief, defends Ram- 
ghur against the British, iiL 15. 

Amliajee luglia, a treaty made with, ii. 


Amboor, besiege<l by Hydcr Ali, Ii. 257: fail¬ 
ure of the siege of, 257. 

Amltoyna, atrocious proceedings of tlie 
Dutoh at, i. 261. 

Ameen Khan, ii. 404. 

Ameer DawisMl Khan, of Transoxoniana. 
invades Delhi, i. 78. 

Ameer Khan, league of .Teswunt Row Hoi 
kar witli, ii. 743; comes to the relief of 
Bliurtp<»or when lieslcged by the Ihritish, 
792; hiB unsuceesHrnl attack on the British 
convoys, 792; departs for Rohilcun<l, 793; 
pursued and overtaken 1:^the British cav¬ 
alry, 793; defeated by the British, 794; 
rf'tunis to Bhurtuoor, 794; inva^los Berar, 
825; txird Minto s interference with, 826; 
fliH.'S to Indore, 827; Is at the heail of mar- 
amlers, iii. 63; his exactions on the Rana 
of <'ldeypoor, 55; his horrible siuigostion 
to the mna, 56; a treaty mode \nth him 
by the British, 65. 

AmecrBing. claims the rajahsliipof Tanjore; 
his claims set aside, ii. il4. 

Ameers of Hcinde, the, relations of the Bri- 
tisli with, iii. 115; hostile iiroceedings of, 
116; a treaty condudod with. Ity the Bri¬ 
tish, 227, 281; a new treaty with, 21^; 
difticultics of the Afghan cixpedition with, 
34^ Lord Auckland^ mode of settling the 
dimculties witii. 343; are forced to code 
*Bukkur, 344; intimidated, 346; injustice 
done them. 346; money extorted from 


Ameen of Scinde,— 

them. iii. M7; a treate maile with them, 
349, 460; Lord Auckland’s unjust ti^t- 
ment of, 461; oppressive proceedings 
against, 463. 

Amethie, the fort of, demolished; the rajah 
of, sulraits, iii. 69A 

Amhert^ Lord, M^inted Oovemor-genenU 
of India, iii. 129; his declaration of war 
against the Burmese, 141; disturbances in 
India during his administration, 176; his 
conversion from non-interferonce brlii- 
ciples. ; his visit to Lucknow, 18^ bis 
visit to Agra, 188; his interview with the 
King of 188; his visit to Simla, ; 

close of his administration, 189, 

Ammmiee Khan, considrea against Meer 
Jaffler, i. 647. 

Anand Row, iii. 35, 116. 

Anangpal, opposes and is defeated by Sul¬ 
tan Mahomed, i. 44. 

Anantpoor, taken by the British, iJ. 517. 

Anderson, (Captain, attacks and routs tho 
Ghiljies, til. 369. 

Anderson, Mr. David, sent by Hastings to 
conclude a treaty of peace with Bcindia, 

ii. 466. 

Anderson, Lieutenant, murdered at Mool- 
tan, iii. 507. 

Anrierson, Major, appointed by Sir Henry 
Lawrcnc.e to the command of the oi^iliery 
and engineers at Lucknow, iii. 630. 

Angria pirates, the, i. 509; negotiations wit! i, 
and cxi>editii)D scut against. 511; success 
of Oommodorc James’ expeditirm against, 
512; their capital taken, 512; Oeriah, tiic 
stronghold of, 513; an expe^tion se.nt 
against their stronghold, which is attacked 
an<l taken, 514. 

AiiimalB of India, i. 11. 

Anjedivah, temporarily posmssed by the 
Kngliid). i. 315. 

Annexation, of the Punjab, iii. 528; of Ke- 
rt)wly thwarted, 540; of Jhansl, 540; of 
Namtoor. 541; of iHide, 542; quoAiou as 
to the justice of the, of Oude, 547; jesulti- 
c-al reasoning iu defence of the, of Oude, 
549; lx)rd Dalhousio’s proclamation re- 
B|iectii^ the, of Oude, 550. 

Anson, General, is awuy among the Bimla 
hills when the grea1tiHefK>y mutiny breaks 
out. iii. 5f«0; dies of chr»lera on his W'ay t<» 
Delhi. 599. 

Aiimidemuz, st^izes ution Vizigapatam, and 
offers it b> the British, i. 611; tiie British 
make a treaty witli, 613; endeavours to 
evade stipulatod payments, 613. 

Anwar-u-din, Nabob of Arcot; his crimes, 
i. 434; his vaeillating conduct, 434; liis 
prooee<1ings in Kistna,'435; defeat and 
death of, 443- 

Aiia Hahib (Modajee Blionsla), made rcgc’iit 
of Nagpoor: the British make a treaty 
with, iii. 44; uni>opularity of the tn^aty, 
and bis critical imrition, 45; on the mur¬ 
der of the rajah he^iecomcs rajah himself, 
68; his hostility to BritieCi interest 69; 
his profession of aUt^ance to the peisbwa, 
69; preparations for hostilities with, 70; 
his diuirile game: terms <lictated to, 72; 
tn-tachcry of bis Atu.h mercenaries, 73; 
treaty with, 75; his trcaclierous pnicecxl- 
ings, 89; sent prisoner to Allaliabad, but 
OBcape^i by the way, 101. 

Aptijee Ram. a skilful <liidomatist of Tippr>o 
Bultazi, ii. 523. 

Ai»thorp. Major, at Lucknow, iii. 651. 

Arabs, tne, invade India, i. 39; their con¬ 
quests iu India, 40; Arab mercenaries of 
Apa Bahib; their treachery, iii. 73; at 
Talncer, 96; capitulation of, at Malligaum; 
curious mistake in the terms of capitula¬ 
tion, 100. 

Aracan, conquered hy tlie King of Burmuh, 

iii. I^; invatltsl by Khycndimn, 135; a 
force sent against. )w the Brftisli, 162; tlie 
physical features of, 162; procoedlt^s of 
the force sent a^inst, 163: ca^mo of. 164. 

Aracanese fugitives, the, iii. 1 m; claimed 
by the Burmese, 134; the Burmese make 
the case of, an excuse for war with the 
British. 135. 

Architectui*e, Hindoo, ii. 140; treatises on; 
the Mauasai'a; its analysis, 141; pyramidal 
temples, 142; x^rta of temiiles, 142; ap- 
pfmtlages of templca 143; rock-temples 
and monasteries, 143; cave-temples 
Karli, 144; the seven pagodas, 145: com- 
})arative cost of rock-cut temple and built 
tompleal46; rogularly constrncj^temidcs 
of Tanjora Gombaoonuio, Gbilliaroiia- 
ram, and Madura, 147; temples of OrisiHi. 
148; Jain temples on Mount Aboo, 148: 
other Hindoo structures, 140; sunmiury 
view of Hindoo architecture, 



INDEX, 


713 


ABCOT 


BANTAM 


Arcot. tho nabob of» lays claim tn Iklatlraa, 

i. 413; the nabob of, is repulsed from 
Madras, 419; HachituUa is nabob of, 430; 
the nabob of, seuds aid to tho Kanou of 
TricULnopoly, 431; Suhlcr Ali, ualuib of; 
Lis league with tho Mahmttas, 432; Aii' 
war-UMiui is lusMle iial>ob of, 434; attackiHl 
anvl captured by Olivo, 460; Olive puraiioa 
the garrison of, 461; Olive is Imsicged in, 
4)il; proceeilnigs during the siege of, 462; 
Btiiito of the fortifications of, 463; small 
numbers of the defenders of, 464; activity 
and stratagem of the defondors, 464; a 
practicable breach made in the wall of, 461; 
an eimrnions gnu in. 465; an atUmipt to 
relieve, 465; thi assault on; its faiiuF(\ 
465; the siege of, rai«,Hl, 467; on attempt 
to BUrjirise, 469; Diipleix disno.-tes of tho 
iiabobsliip of, 4S1; state of affairs in, 595; 
the French gut possiMsion of, 604; Oi>otu 
prepares to take it, 623; taken by Ooobe, 
629; the nabob of, opp.ises Die restoration 
of the Naliol)of Tanjoro, iscapturecl 

by llyder AU, 485; agreumont entered into 
by till} naboii of, witli tiio government of 
ifcngal, 02S; thcdtibtsof the iiabobof, 534; 
enactments reganling the debts of the 
iialHib of, 535: classification of the debts 
of tho nabob of, 566; dilfercnco of opinion 
between the iloanl of tJontrol and th ) 
direct-ors as to the debts of tJie nabob of, 
discussion in the Hribisb jiarUament 
rt‘S(>ectiiig Die debts of tho nalKdi of, 568; 
llurke's celebrated speocli on the debts of 
the nabob of. 568; the nabob of, accused 
of treachery. 717; incousistenny of tiie 
course a'lopted in regard to. 718; Ibe sutfi' 
ciency of Die charges against Die naliob 
of, (picstionaiile, 719; the mt‘asuros of the 
giiveiiior-geiieral towards the nabob of, 
approved by the home authorities, 719. 

Argaon, Die battle of, ii. 770. 

Argosy, a Venetian, lost on tho Clooilwiu 
Sands. 4. 211. 

Aviau'C.Mipau, delay of the Britisli b.'foro, 

i. 426. 

Arithmetic, Hindo>, ii. 124. 

Army, a Hindoo, on the march described, il. 

111 . 

Arneo, Clive’s victopr at. i. 4 *8; encminh'r 
at, between the British and llydcr’s troi ips, 

ii. 503. « 

Arnold, CmImucI. a‘K im^hur. ii) 16 

Arnold, .M.ij.ii', ;:l. Ih.' < ii ii'iMgli iirnigc, iii. 
651. 

ArraJi, heroic defence of, by a handful of 
civilians au<l native police, iii. 644; relief 
«.»f, by Major lOyrc, 643. 

Arnau’s Alcxaiidri, referred to, 

i. 25. 

Arslan, son of Mu-saond, usuriis the throne 
of Gliii/.iiee, i. 55. 

Arwaz, Maliomed, mufti, iii. 31. 

Aryaverta, ii. 1. 

Ase.irgiiur. preparations of tlio British 
against, iii. 109; ilcseriptiou of, 103; cap- 
turoil. 110. ^ 

Asia. Central, r«great game in, proposetl by 
the British envoy in Afghanistan, iii. 3 >7. 

Asiidic Socielj/, Jourual oj the, tpioicd, i. 51, 
nofr. 

Asoll'ul-Bowlah, lu« BuJbessioti to tho iia- 
bobship of Cudo, ii. 386; mutiny in liis 
Ciunp and strife among bis ministers, 388; 
the treaty of Fyzoba l exaetjd from, 532. 

As.<iaiii, the ooiKiuest of, by Die Hurnii'se, iii. 
J39; operations of the British in, 150; die* 
turbanues in, 2ii6. 

Assaye, tiattle of, ii. 782. 

Astabgeer, ill. 86. 

Astronomy, Hindoo, i. 17; copL*s of the 
rules of the Biahmius for the (uiloulatton 
of eclipses obtained by tho Froucli, x>ub* 
lishedby Bailly, ii. 121; not sciontitio, but 
empiricid, 122; the Surya SklhanDi, 123. 

Asuf Khan, his unprincipled attack on 
tiueen Doorgawutty, i. 127, 

Asylum, tho iiuestion as to tho right of, 
originatcil by the attempt to assassinate 
the Emperor of the French; leai.ls to Die 
overthrow of the I'alnierston ministry, and 
thereliy delays the considoratiun of the 
bill for tho better government of India, 

iii. 686. 

Ataida. Luis <lc, combination of native 
princes against the l*urtuguese during his 
viooroyshli), i. 193. 

ADieistic and thoistic schools of philosophy 
. ^anioug tile Hindoos, il. 118. 

Attock, tho se{>oy outbreak at, iii. 57C. 

Aubur’a ItUm and Pi'ogreHa of Britiah Power 
in /udiaf Quoted, ii. 244. 

■•Auchniutty, Sir Samuel, commands the cx- 

I toditlon against the Moluccas and Java, 

i. 847. 

VOL. II'I. 


A uckland, Lard, appointed Governor-general 
of India, iU. 257; his judicial reforms, 258; 
his pacific jiolicy; Dost Mahomed's letWr 
D>, 295; dilHculties exiieriencod in carrying 
out his pacific policy, 296; makes light of 
the apiiearance of a Itussian agent in 
IJaboul, 305; intimates his dlsjileasure at 
tho proteiitiou otteroil by Mr. Bumes to 
the Afghan chiefs, 310; scikIh an exxiedb 
tiou to the IVrsiaii Gulf, 324; his warlike 
IHiliey, 326 ; explains Ids policy in ndatioii 
to tho war with Afghanistan, 330; issm-s 
Die Himla manifeiit<i, 331 ; true character 
of his Afghan |M>licy, 337 : his interview 
with Runjeet Sing, 338; Jiis counter visit 
to Runject Sing, 310; his in«Mle of settling 
the <lillieiiltic.H of the Afghan exxKHliDun 
with the Ameers of Sciiide. 343; disui>- 
proves of (lenoral Nott’.s treatment of 
Sh ill Sliiijab‘f cppreS'^iiig•dTi.'i.iN, 373. In', 

Ml'ilhiiiiig i; iiidiO'r ilii> Xi'i'li.iii 

II <r ‘r.4 II. -eik'd by Lord r.lli ni>o!-.,:i^li, 
4 1,3; his iiiiju.'!. m ,it ae uLof t h,* Aiti.-vi.'of 
Kcinde, 461. 

Amiol. Mr., ii. 434. 

Aurungai>a<l. atrocious sei>oy massacre of 
Europeans near, iii. 589. 

AiJTungzoiH5, contests tho sncecnsion to Ins 
faUier. i. 287; dothronos his futlier, 288; 
game of enift between him and Sevajci*. 
298; in Dio Deccan, 303; subjeelion of 
eonila atut Bojai>oor to, 304; Dikes Samlta- 
jee prisoner, 305; lays siiJgc to and cn))- 
tures Giiigec. 306; captures Satlarab. 307; 
hi.s illness and death. 3o8. 

Ava, the king <»f, iii. 132, 135; the king f»f, 
abiriii'*'! f‘*r Ins eapihil. 1-H: f'-minKidore 
i..L;nl»>. t'sileiirr l<* in,' ot, iM-mand'ng 
‘TI-mi f>ir injnrii'',; In*, roplv. .'hll ; 
the king of, i'ei'u.ses ludress, 632; subiuis* 
Sion of tlui king of, to the British, 533. 

Avatars, Die. of Visbuu. first, seciUKl, and 
thinl. ii. 25;* fourth, llfth, and sixth, 27; 
Hevonth, 29; eighth and niiiili, 30. 

Ayaz. Sheik. Burnuide.rs Ih-dnore t<» the Bri¬ 
tish, ii. 517 : Tipjioo’s secret onlers to put 
him to death, 517. 

Ayoot, Prince, made nominal sovenugn of 
t.'jiliool, iii. 288; set aside, 289. 

Azeem-u-l.)<nvlab, made Nabob of the C'ar- 
natie, ii. 722. 

A/.im, son of AururigzelxJ, i. 335. 

Azim Khaii, iii. 287. 

Aziin-u-SlKin, i. 516. 


B. 


Ikib^r, Rejah of CaiiooJ, invited by tho 
governor of Lahore to help him against 
Ibrahim of JXdhi, i. 104; his birt>h ainl 
early hiHtrf>ry, 105; his message tolnsuu<5l<5, 
AhnwHl Mirza, on his father’s death, l(*r); 
his dilllenlt ]>ositioii; altcmativo sutxjesses 
and defeats, 106; illness and misfoi'tuiuis, 
106*: his ilrcain, 107; captim^s Hamarcand, 
107; is defeated by tin* UaWks, 108; iie- 
comes muster of ('alKHil imd Gandahar, 
108; forms an alliance M’ith the Bhali of 
l’«T.sia, 10".); preimrcs U* invade India, 109; 
his first caiuiiaigu in India, 110; his siu:- 
cesses. 111; captures Agra ami Delhi, Hi; 
niakc.s India hisiK*rinancntrc-.sidejice, 112; 
his ditticiilties, dangers, and death, 112; 
his auDibiography, 113; ids sons, 113. 

Bactria, the Greek kings of. i. 33. 

Bidiadur KJian, sou of the governor of 
Behar, duclareBhimself iu<lei>endent, i. J0.3, 

Baliadur Khan Seestuny, opposeH Akiter, i. 
128; Ids dcatli, 129. 

Bahadur Shah, otherwise called Mouzziiu, 
a Mogul ruler ; liis deaDi. i 38.5. 

Daiuidur Shah, Regent of Nepaul, Hi. 8; is 
]>ut death by his nephew, liana Balia¬ 
dur, 9. 

Bahawulpoor, tho arrival of the British 
Afghan expedition at, id. 342; tiie khan of, 
342. 

Bahoor, the l» ittle of, i. 483. 

Baillic, Colonel, his detachment intercepted 
by Tipp(»o Balilb, ii. 481; tho (mportunlty 
of saving it east away. 482; reinforced, 48*3; 
attacked by Hydcr witli his whole force, 
483; entire destruction of Id:: detachment, 
484. 

Baillle, Major, British rcfliilent in Oude, iii. 
118; the govemor-goueral's opinion of Dio 
proceeding of, 119. 

Bailly’s Aeti’ouoniie Tndiennf ft OiHentalf, II. 

121 . 

Baird, Colonel, at Seringapatam, ii. C14. * 


f tidndia; ht‘r 


Baird, GenorabBir David, heads the aBsault 
on seriuffapatam, ii. 701; buoccbs of his 
assault, 702; placi^s a guaixl ixnuid tho 
zenaua. 703; timls 'rijipou among the slain 
in one of the gates of tlic city, 703; sur¬ 
renders Dio charge of t^eringupatam to 
('olonol Wellesley, 706; sent in counnaiid 
of on exiH^dition to Eg}’] ft, 734. 

BaizaBai, the favourite wuc of tidi 
procooduiifs, Iii. 221. 

Bajiis Kao, i. 394; subjugates Guji'rut, 3J».5: 
his sucix'ssos in Malwah, 3%; Nizam-ul- 
Mciolk endeavours to arrest his jirogn ss, 
397. 

Bajee Row, father-in-law of Lakdniiini 
^awa : the tragedy iierpetrate’d by him, ii. 

Bajei} Row. son of the late Rtig<iba1i, mndcf 
peisliwu. ii. 669: ooiulitionul oiwsiou of ; 

i sirtion of the Mysoix; e<uiiilry (o, 713; 
Lept a virtiuil prisoner by KeiiuUa, 740 ; 
cruel executign of Jeswunt Row’s brother 
by, 744; his night liefore Jeswunt llow, 
745; makes Die treaty of Bassidn will) 
<’<*U)tii*l Oh»8i}, 746; bis relations with the 
gidc«»war, in. 35; ins favourite, Triinlnik- 
jee Dainglia, 36; Gnngadhnr Kastrce’.s 
entuiigloments with, 37; Du* mmder of 
tiungadlnn Sastree iit his couH by Trim- 
bukjee, 39; Mr. Kljihiiistune demands of 
him Du‘ arrest of lh« murdoror, 40; he is 
couiiH'lled deliver up tho munlfror, 
41; liis iKiliey. 58; his dni>licity, 59; prs- 
parations for a war with. .59; hi.n alarm, 
6<L rigorous terms otTered D*. whieh be 
nc<M‘ptH miller prohst, 60; final mpture 
witli, 65; dtiiiiQiidsof, on Mr. Elphinstoiie, 
66; (light from Vooniili, (>8; Apa Salilb’s 
professions of ollegianee to, 69; ]>urHiiitof, 
by the British. 84; engngemint wiDi his 
army ut Korfgaoii, 85; liig conduct at tint 
battle of IvorigHon. Kt*; continued flight 
au<l pursuit or. 87; Kul'jirisc of liiseainu 
atul defeat of, 88; bis attempt to retuTi 
Nagpoor defeated, ‘.'(J; ^u*oposes D> sur- 
i*ender, 102; ni^gotiates with a view to sur¬ 
render, 102; terms ottered Jntn, 103; inti¬ 
midated, he accci'ts the tt‘mis ottered bhn, 
105; his )K}Tidex(.vi situation. 105; dissatis- 
faelioii of Die governor general with the 
D'rnis granteil D>, 105; Die tiirms granted 
him ajiproved by tin* Court of Dii’cctor.s, 
lo5; proceedings of his followt'rs, 105. 
Baklitiar Kbilji, governor of Berur, com- 
fKitiPir of Albimsh. i. 64. 

Bakt Sing, liajali, i>uL in po.sHcssfon of Kt>- 
tra, ii. 827. 

Bala ilissar, thi*. of Cabool, iii. 387; Shah 
Hlinjah refuses it for the British tro<ips. 
389: Shall Shujah, during Die insurrection, 
urges Die Kritish to (x^enpy it, 415; the 
e'uvoy urges its oecui>ation, 417; evacuated 
by the troops that were in it, 418. 

Bata Ivtiw, defeated and dinveii into Nejiaul, 
iii 792 

Balajvi* Khoonjur, ii. 751. 

Baiul Sen, il. 9. 

Balaram Kelt. ii. 825. 

BiUason}, Die East India Company erects a 
factory at. i. 272. 

Bnlbliailra Sing, a famous Ghoorka leader, 
roinilHes the British ut Kalungu, iii. 11. 
Balbiin. He-e Bvlbitu. 

Baldeo Sing, Rajah of Bhiirljioor, iii. 179. 
Babhilee K o Serai, defeat of the i*el)el si-poys 
at, ill. GOO. 

Balijioor, Great, llyder All’s iiroceixllngs at, 
il. 234. 

Balipoor, LitUi*. liesieged by H^ler Ali, ii. 
235. 

Ikiiiiian, Dost Mabomeirs utb’r defeat by 
Brigiulier iKuiiiie near, iii. 378. 

Banda, General WiiiDock defeats Die muti¬ 
neers in Die vicinity <»f, iii, 682, 

Baudoolu Matia. engages toomniuer Bengal 
for the King of Hurmuh. iii. 140; apiieais 
on the Ixirdersof (fiiittagong with astrong 
force, 147; armour worn by, 154, note; Ids 
great uxextiouK; ids army disiicrsed, 155; 
at Donabew, 166; slain, 168. 

Bandn, Die Sikhs under the leadership of, 1. 
389. 

Bangalore, Lonl fkimw'allls advances on, ii. 

596; desciipDon of, 597; taken by sDirm, 599.' 
Banket^ Nana Sahib attacked near, itiid 
driven Dirough a jungle, iii. 701. 
l^nks. Major, appointed, along with Cdloncl 
inglia to tho eoinman<l of the garriBon of 
Lucknow by Sir lienry Lawrence on his 
heathhftl. iii, 63Q. 

Bantam, Die arrival of tho Dutch trading ex¬ 
pedition at, i. 219: anivat of the first East 
India Oomitany exixxliDun at. 240; tho 
East India Company’s trade with, 334; the 
king of, sends an embassy to England, 333. 

286 



INDEX, 


n 4 

BANYAN 


BEYRAM OHAtPr 


U.tnifan, a. ii. 313, noff.. 

Hai>Do {^obowlca, a llwalioi* chief, quits the 
Hritinli cunip, iii. 4^. 

Tlarabuttco, tne furt uf, ii. 757. 

Jlamniahul, the subjectiou of, by Tlyclor All, 
it. 227. 

prr>cecrUi)jm of a fauatical Ma}iom> 
utiUi soot at, iii. 205. 

Itarttilly, the open reflistaiico of the inhabi- 
ta-iits of, to taxation, iii. 30; insurroction 
at. 31: the Bonoy mutiny and atnwitieH in, 
579; tlio iimtfnejr brigaido fram, arrives in 
l>elhi, C13. 

Tiaring. Mr. Thonias. ItiB motion in pn&'lia* 
ineiit against. Lonl i*aJiiicrstou’H bill for 
the better govemnient of India, iii. 660. 

Ilarkor, 8ir IloiKjrt, ii. 297. 

i ai‘l<m', Sir iltKirge, bu<««,hh1s Lord Corn¬ 
wallis as Goveruor-gcincral of India, ii. 806; 
Ids system of neutrality, 807; concluiles a 
trt^aty witli Bulndia, 808; declamtory art.i- 
clos api>cii<led to his treaty with Sciiidia, 
806: the mean spirit of his policy, IMhi; 
Lord Lake checks his retrognide policy, 
£10; cluiractter of his a<lministration, 817; 
bo is su]>ci Bided, 818; succeeds Sir William 
Jientinck a.s governor of Madras, 831; re- 
fuso-^ c Mice.Hsion to the mutineers at Masn- 
|i|siiaui, 843; liis conduct in reliction to 
tho Madras mutiny for the most )>arb 
appwweil, 845; his prohibition of public 
missionary operations, 851. 

Barnard, Genei'til, oporatitms against l>(dbi 
intrusted to, iii. COO; liis desitatch nuotc<l, 
describing tbo affair witii tlie rernds at 
BaldukeKclScrai. GOi; su'^co-eifully reaches 
Delhi. 601; countennand.s tlie order to 
iissauit Delhi, 604: his irresolutiou; his 
death by cholera, 012. 

Barustone, MaJ<»r, iii. 661. 

Baroach, procco.Ungsof tlu; Bombay goveru- 
mtuit at. ii. 35.5; cxi»edibion ag.iin.d., 356. 

Boroda, the state of iMirties at tiio court of, 
Hi. 35. 

BiiirrackiK>or. mutineer sjilrit among the 
sepoys at, ill. 557 ; mutiny tit., 561. 

Bartow's L!fco/ Lot-d Mi.tcariw'ii^ <ltioted, ii. 
564. 

Bartolommeo Dia?., i. 151. 

Barukzycs, tlie, tlieir buccossch against Shall 
Mahmoud, ill. 2H7; dissensions among. 
288; lio8tlUth*a with the Ktklis, 288; pur¬ 
suit of tlie chiefsof, by HrigaiUcr Sale, 356. 

Harwell, Mr, a 8t<‘a<ly :ullu»r»nt of Mr. 
Hastiuss, ii. 365; tlie <lircctors of tlio Bast 
India Ooinpany resolve to |>otit.it>u for his 
rcuiioval from tiie coimcil of Bengal. 422, 
424. 

Bibsultic tnip, in tlie Wcetcni Ghauts, i. 7. 

Basalut Jung, governor of Adoni, his nego¬ 
tiations with tiie l«'ronc:ii under Bussy, i. 
620; coufers the naliobship of Sera on 
Hydor All, ii. 233; negotiations of tbo 
Madras presideni-.y witii, 471; the Mailras 
council semis aid to, 476; his dread of 
llyder AH, 477. 

Basin liow, i. 497. 

Jtasket-boats, ii. 522, iiotr. 

Bassein, the siege of, ii. 461; tho treaty of, 
746: Scindla refuses to accede to tlie treaty 
of, Ul. 

Bates, his deposition on the clroigc of brii>- 
ery against thoE.isb liidiatkiinpany, i. 363. 

liaUa, douldi*. ulN>Jis)M^l. i 693; lii'- iir.ii;n> 
(»f the ollirerniii (‘«in''i*i|u*.‘iiC'‘ ol t he aUMii 
tion of, TiH); on of tie* 

mutinyo.'ciisioiu-d by t}i>‘a oi.ison of.7*"*, 
Sir Wilha'ii Ik'iit !ii< k s erger res|N elni,;. 
iii. 193. q'ie.-<ti<>n or* the i \i e lien *.v of Ins 
«>nler r.--i e *1 in r. 191: the el.-iio'-ui'r li-i* I 
by its alH>Hti<>ii, i’.M; ulMli;ion an injii- 
dieliius aiul iKiltTy Tiroccciiiug, 195. 

Battle.s, liattlo uf tno llydasiies, i. 28; of 
Peshawer, 44; of Delhi, 79; of I'aniput, 
122: of Garuoul, 399; uf Panlput. l)etw<;eii 
the DooromMis and the Maimrttns. 405; of 
Gingeo, 446; of Coveryiiauk, 469; of Saini- 
avoram, 475; of Bahoor, 48^1; of Sc'ringliam, 
487: of tlie Golden llock, 490; of tlie Sugar- 
loaf Hock, 491; of Tundeinim’s Woods, 495; 
<>f PlasHoy, 578; near Kaiahnmtidr.v. 613; of 
Wondiwusli, 627; near Triva-ii.634; lietween 
the Dutch and ISuglish In the Hoogbly. 
601; of Augadeep and Oudauulla, 676; of 
Biixur, 679; near Trincomalo *, between 
the Britisli and Hydor, 11. 254; of Ooscote, 
267; of Doogaur, 461; of Porto Novo. 491; 
<if Pollllore, 494; of Sholingur, 495; of 
Amoo, 603; of <7udduloro. 512; of (3arigat. 
602: of Malavilly, 695; of Assay©. 751^of 
Delhi, between the UrlHidi and Malirattas. 
761; of Lanviir 'e, 165: of Argaon, 7^; of 
I^irrueknb^ 781; of Deeg, 782; of Kinkei^ 
iii. 67; of the t^etabaluee Hills. 72; of 
Koilgi^n, 65; of iaholapour, 93; ox Jel^- 


Battles, - 

bad, iii. 436; with the Afghans In Ghoaine. 
451; of Maidan, 452; of Mcanoe, 467; of 
Dubba, 469; of Maliaraj|K>ur. 482; of 
Mood^c, 488; of Ferozeshah, 490: of All- 
wal, 493: of Hobraon, 495; of Kineyree, 
611; of owldoosam, 513; of the Ohcual^ 
521: of (^hilliauwalla, 523: of Giderat, 525; 
of Balduleo Ke Serai, COO; of Nujufghur, 
616; of FuttohiKior, ^: of Aong and tlie 
l^andoo Nuddy, 634; of Mabarajiioor, 635; 
of t>nao, 640; of Bithoor, 643; of the 
<!haraliagh, 653; of Agra, 658; of the 
Sucuiuler ftogh, 660; of tlio Pandoo N udily, 
tini seooud, 665; of tJawnjioor, 667; of Gor- 
nriu, 679; of Betwa, near Jhansi, 681; of 
Gwalior, 684. 

Battye, t^uintain. Captain of tho Guides, 
killed before Jkdhi, iii. <>02. 

Baugh, liioutenaiit, attempt on his life liy a 
mutinous stiiHiy. iii. 561. 

Baugbloor, disaster sufctaiucd by tho British 
at. ii. 274. 

Buz Bahailoor. i. 135. 

Bay^iar, a. in Sciiulia’s camp, described, ii. 
748, nutr. 

Beard, AkbePs dislike to the, i. 443. 

Beatson, Colonel, his oj thr Origin and 
Ctmdact o/ the IPor irith Tippoo Snltaa, 
quoted on tho doftcicncy of supplies at tiro 
Ktego of i^cringapatam, ii. 699. 

Ik*chor, Mr. Richanl, ii. 423. 

Ih^dinghehl, Lieutouant, munleretl by tho 
Kasyas, iii. 207. 

Bednore, Hydor*s expedition to, ii. 235; con- 
querwl by Hydor, who llnUrtgreafc treasure 
tliero, 236. 

Becjy itay, defeated by Hultan Malimoud, 
i. 44. 

Becrbul, Ilajali. i. 136. 

Bega Khan, a marauder of Scindia, iii. 503; 
defoutod and slain, 503. 

Btigum Kotee, the, ut tuicknow, shelled, iii. 
672. 

Bcgumgun:;c, a sciioy mussacTC at, iii. 690 . 

Begum.s of Gude, Uio, s)H>liati<>n of, ii. 541; 
thoir cLaiins on Britiali pnitection, 542; 
their clainm disallowed on frivolous 
grounds, 613; Sir Klijali Iiupey volunttHira 
to obtain oilldavits for Mr. Hostings 
against, 513; Hastings attempts to ju-sti- 
fy tlie plunder of, 544 ; iiuprisonment and 
inbiiman treatment of, 545; their final ro- 
leaso. 54.5. 

Behar and Bengal, incorporated with the 
Mogul empire, i. 134. 

LN-A/riu/rr, the title granted to Hydor Ali by 
tixe Ibajaii of Mjrsoro, ii. 225. 

or water-touTUT, tlie, i. 115, note. 

Bi'iiram, of (diuznee, liis reign, i. 55; his 
tri'iiehery tri the house of Ghor, 56; his ex¬ 
pulsion and dchiat, 56. 

liehram, a 'riMirkoiuaii, reigns in AklK*r’s 
name, i. 122; his itirogance. and dismissal, 
123; relKils and is )iardoned, 124. 

Bejaiioor, assassination of tlio general of tlie 
king of, liy Hcvaji-c. i. 295; siege of tlio 
cajiital of, by a Mogul cliiof, 301; its sub¬ 
jugation by Aurungzelw, 304. 

BelwimlKi, .M., surrenders Pondiclionytotho 
British, ii. 4i)8. 

Beluos*, Mrs., Manners of quoted, 

ii 50. note. 

Beloocliecs. the, cut off a British detach- 
iiu'iit, iii. 374; defeat Major Olibborn at 
tho NulItKisk |-*ass, 374. 

Benares, British relations with the ni^ah 
of, ii. 531; detiiands nuulo on the rajah 
of, liy Mr. Hastings, 533; a new demand 
on the rajah of, 5^ ; Hastings’ dctormiii- 
ation to exact severo revenge from the 
rajah of, 536; pruceedingH of'Hastings at, 
536; iligiit of the ntjiili of, and iiorilous 
position of llastinmat, 537: insurrection 
at, iirovokeil by Ilastiiigs, 538; sliamoful 
treatment of tlie mother of tlie rajali of, 
538: passive resistance of the inhabitants 
of, to tvxalion, iii, 30; seiKiy mutiny at. 
58-1; suppression of the mutiny at, 585; 
saved by the resohition andsiiead of Gene¬ 
ral Neill, 62C. 

Bciic Bing, Bajah of Dlwar, iii. 187, 

Bene MatUicKi, a powerful chief, driven from 
his fort by Lord (’lyde, iii. 699; piu'suit of, 
by Jiord f'lydc, 70U. 

BcnflcUl, Paul, his claims on Tuujore, ii. 
3S.Z; Ill's claims on the NaTiob of Arcot, 
564: exposed by Burke, 568. 

Bengal, the preHidem^ of, 1. 23; revolt in, 
a>saiiuit Aklier, and its suppression, 132; 
incorporated with the Mo^l empire, 134; 
foun<lation of the East India Oompunv's 
trade with. 266; privilege obtained by the 
(jornpanyin, 277; theComiMuiythreatem'd 
«with hostilities in, 313; t£« Company not 


Bengal,— 

alive to the importance of, i. 316; progrera 
<»f tho Company in, 338; extent of trade 
in, 339; (Captain Heath’s proceedings in 
tlie liay of, 345; state of, 516; imder Ali 
Vordv Klian, 529; two rival claimants for 
the throne of. 532: origin of the qiuuvel 
lietween Burajah Dowl^i s^d the presi¬ 
dency of, 532; treatment of Bamrauisinc’s 
hrotnor by the presidency of, 533; dila¬ 
tory proceedings of tho presidency of, 
against BurajiUi Dowlah, 536; application 
of tlie presidency of, to the French and 
Dutch for miited effort to avert a fximmon 
danger, 537; prod^odings of Bura^h Dow- 
law in, 637 (see Calcutta); a new form of 
govertmieiit for, ii52; a new revolution in, 
t»roject<xl in tlie comuill of Calcutta, 666; 
disBeusioiiH in the council of, 670; sellisit 
and im|iolitic views of the council of, 674; 
oiieii miiture of the presidency of, witii 
Meer (k)ssim, 076: Meer Cossim is defeat- 
e<l and dciiosed liy the presiilency of, 676; 
tiie iialNib o^ converted into a mere iien- 
sioiior by Olive, 6511; Clive’s double 
goveriiinent of, ii. 283; abuses conseriueiit 
on tills double government of, 284: adWiad- 
ful famine in, 284; reiluction of tho pen¬ 
sion of the nalKib of, 285; Ilastlugs 
appointed prcBidcnt of, 306; revolution 
piHMlucdl in, by changes in the adminis¬ 
tration of, 312: defects of tlic judlcjal dt;- 
partmoiits hi, 312; a new financial scucuie 
for, 312; judicial arrangements, 315: new 
members of the council of, arrive from 
Kiiglaml, 363; early diHsensions in tlio 
council of, 363; the discussion of tlie 
Kohilhi war in iJio council of, 364; frivnl- 
OU.S complaints of the new memliers of the 
council of, 364: nidmcss and inconsistency 
of the new nieirilM^rs of the council of, 365; 
the dinduct of the new memliers of the 
council of, in regard to relathiiis wltit 
Gude. 306; tiic council of, divnled inh) 
two liostile camps, 3(!ti; harmony vainly 
ri'comiiiondcd to the menibcrs of ilie 
council of, hy tho directors, 367; charges 
ill tho eomicil of. against Hastings, 3(>7 
(see Haniings, irto'rrw); tli« government 
of, doeLire their approbation of tlie Mu- 
<1rtts cxnincil. 399; msapproviil and severe 
censure of tlie IkunlMy council on account 
of tiuiir trt'uty with^tagobah, 404; a new 
scliisTn in the council of, 406; extraordi¬ 
nary iiroceeilingH in the council of, wiio 
now resolve to supj^Hirt Kagobuh, 408; tho 
government, of, ratify the treaty of Poor- 
imdliur, 409; affairs in, 410; dissensioiiH 
in tile supremo council of, alxiut the <ivor- 
lettiiig of land, 411; extraorOimiry pro- 
cocdiiigs In tlie council of—two governors- 
generiu. 424; separate agreement of tlio 
goveniment of, with tlic Nnl>ob of Ari-ot, 
528: tho govemiiieiit of, exiust tlic treaty 
of Fyzaiiad from Asoff-ul-DowlaJi, .532; 
the government <»f, endeavour to increase 
the revenue of. Iw a house-tax, iii. 29; 
mutiny among the scpoyij, of, 157 : hri'ak- 
ing out of the great mutiny among tbo 
seiKiys of, 553 {sco Sepoga, Mnihig). 

Beutiiick, Lord William, governor of Bfad- 
ras, ii. 813; rocaLe<l,4834j jiut forward as 
candidate for the offico of Governor-general 
of India, iii. 129; uppoinkxl governor- 
general. 190; his ]>o1icy of rctrenehmeni, 
192; iiis onler on the subject of Ixittsi., 
193; otlier financial arrangements of liis, 
195: his judicial reforms, 199; abolishes 
suttee, 199; new regulations of his to se¬ 
cure the rights of ccmvei'ts from Brah- 
minism to Christianity, 2(H): steam commu¬ 
nication with Imiia first tried during his 
administration, 200; liis administration in 
relation to allied states, 210; his dissatis¬ 
faction with the Riijah of DcUii, 212; his 
policy reganling Oude, 214; hisjKilicyin re¬ 
gard to the Maiiratta states, 219; his policy 
in regard to the RaJiKiot states, 222; ids 
troatii's with liHlejiendont states, 227; his 
interview with Runjeot Sing, 228; hisiv- 
sigfiation of the govenior-geueralsbip, an<l 
iiieritsof his administration, 249; question 
as to his succ^sor, 253. 

Berar, negotiations with tho rajah of, ii. 
445; British relations wjtli. 826. 

Berhampoor, mutiny of the sepoys at. 
Injudicious means used to suppress it, iii. 
659. 

Beniodottc, interesting anecdote of, ii. 51b 

Bossus, the pursuit of^ liy Alexander, i. 26. 

Busk (^ptam, his voyage to tho East, and 
spirited procoroings Against the Portu¬ 
guese, i. 254; treaty with the Mogul, 255. • 

Boyram Ghaut» 2x>m Clyde marches to. 
ogolost tbo maUoeers, iii 700. ‘ 




INDEX, 


715 


BHAGEERtrr ROW 

Bhagoonit Row, succeeds to the throne of 
(Iwalior, ill. 473. 

Bhamaalii How, Rajah of Cutch, ili. 27,114. 
llhawulpoor, iii. 280. 

Jiheeiii Sing, Rana of Odeypoor, the contest 
for, and fate of, hin heautifiU <langhtcr, 
iii. 54. 

Bhellolo Lody, aims at tt)o throne of Delhi, 

i. 08; founits the Lody-Afghan dynasty, 
100; opposed by Mahniood Shah Shurky, 
Kin|;of J(»unpoor, 101; imiK>Utic partition 
of his territories, 101. 

Dh(K>j, the capture of, HI. 11.5. 
liliopaul and ^ugor, proposed alliance with 
the nabolis of. iii. 41; terms offered to tlio 
nalKilM of, 42; protest of Scindia against 
those alliances. 43; Sciudbv claims Biio- 
pauI, 43; tlie alliance witli Blionaul frus¬ 
trated by the duplicity of the iiaixil) of, 4-1. 
Dhurtpoor, the rajah of, in league with 
llolkar, ii. 784; the Jat capittvl, 785; Lonl 
Dake's description of, 786; siege of; preiniv- j 
ture and disastrous assault on, 787; secoml | 
aa^ault on, and failure, 788; change of the ' 
mode of attiick on, 780; a third disa.s* I 
irons assault on. 790; a last desiioratrf; ; 
assault on; its failure, 791; the siege of, ' 
enuTortod into a blockade, 792; Ameer ‘ 
Khan comes to the relief of. 792; contln* { 
ued blockade of. 795; peace made with tite 
rajah of, 796; (listuibailees in; the rajsdi 
of^tipplantod by his nephew, iii. 179; in- 
torfereiKH! of tlie British in the affairs of, 
181; views of Sir Charles Metcalhi and the 
governor-general respecting the necessity 
of intorfereuce in the affairs of, 182; n;- 
Bolution of the suiiruiiie council rcispccting, 
183; a British force appears bufoie, 183; 

' defence of. 184; siege and (uipturo of, 184; 
the rajah of, restored, 185; the fortifloa- 
tions of, disnianlled, 186. 

Bilaspoor, the mjah of, ii. 16. 

Jiitu Ball, a Choorka chief, iii. 9. 

Birch, Colonel, shot by the Seebapoor inuti- 
noors, ill. 589. ! 

Bird. Ijieuteuaut, his heroic conduct at | 
Cabool, iii. 411. 

Binls of India, i 11. 

Bithoor, Havelock’s victory at. iii. 613. 

Black Hole, th(i, of (.'alcutta, the British 
soldiers immured in, i. 543; horriblcBUf* 
ferings in, 514. • 

Black Town of Madras, i. 607. 

Blake. Mr., assistant of Major Alves at,Try- 
poor, inurdorod, iii. 226. 

Blowing from a. gun, instance of, i. 497. 

Jiliint, Captain, at Lucknow, iii. 660. 

Bokhara. St<»d<lart ami Oouolly prisoners in; 
Dost Mahomed take.s refugii in, but is soon 
glad to escape from, iii. 368. 

Bolau l*asH, th<}, described, iii. 351; success¬ 
fully throailed by the British army on its 
Mi'ay to Cabool, 354. 

Boles, Major, ii. 810. 

Boinliay, area and form of the presidency of, 

i. 14; aiMiuisition of, l»y th-j crown; ditti- 
culties ill obtainiugi|>assea4inn of, 314; Sir 
(it^rvaso Lijba.s u))p<)intod governor of, 
320; granted to the East India Company; 
terms (»f tlie gniiit, 323; pnijectud inijirove- 
ments at, 324; tlirejvtf ued by the Dutch, 
336; A Mi)gul tleo4 in The harbour of. 327; 
progress of, 338; mutiny among the snl- 
Oioiw in, 329; rival attempts on, by the 
Siddee and Sovajeo, 330; Ketgwin’s mutiny 
at; its alarming progress and suppression, 
332; formed iiitfi a rogciioy, 343; trcsity 
between llyder Ali and the presidency of. 

ii. 244; vie\^ of ilyder entertained by the 

f ovonimeiit of, 244; letter to Madhoo Row 
rom the governor of, 245; propimud treaty 
lH)twooii Hyder Ali and the govoriimuut of, 
246; proceedings of the government of, at 
Surat an<I Haroach, 355; negotiations of the 
govommeiibof, with Bagobah, 360; dishon¬ 
ourable conduct of the government of. 361; 
the government of, send au ex|)e<lition 
against Taunab, 361; state of affairs at, 39U; 

S rocoedings at, in regaril to Halsette, &c , 
19; treaty lK*twecn Ragobah and tlie coun* 
cil of, 4<M); trooi>s are furnished to Ragoliali 
bythognveriiiiientof, 401; the government 
of, in a dilemma, 401; the proceedings at,dis' 
approved by the Bengal government, 404; 
severe censure passed the Bengal gov- 
eruineiit on the procoedmga of the couiu;!! 
of, 405; resolution of the government of, 

. to assist Ragoliah, 442; an overland expe¬ 
dition to, suggested by Hastiiij^, 442; con¬ 
temptible coniluct of the government of, 
446; the expediUou seo^ by the government 
of, to'Poonah, 447; dilatory proooedinjpj 
and appointment of ileld-deputies, 448; 
bluiiilers and disaster of the expedition 
seutfon^ by the government of, 449; the 


Bombay, 

govorninent of. attempts to negotiate, 11. 
450; the du^racoful eouvenbioii of tlic gov- 
emmentof, with Scindia, 451; thenioi'tiflca- 
tioii of the government of, 452; iiiisimder- 
standiug between tlie government of, and 
that of Bengal, 453; the government of, 
pr«>poso an alliance with Scindia, 453; the 
goveiiiment of, satishcil with the results 
of the campaign, 460; code of laws lielong- 
ing to. iii. 202; collision between the go¬ 
vernment Olid supreme court of, 202; ap¬ 
peal to the privy council and its decision, , 
204; the government of, organizeacolumii , 
to suppre8.H the sepoy mutiny in Central 
India, 677. 

Bonaparte, Kaiiolcou, his letter to Tippoo 
Haliih, ii. 692. 

Bouteiii, Major, calls for any complaints of 
the Ropoy.s as to tiio new liartridi^es, ili. 5.57. 

Boodhuu, a Brahmin, (mrious religions dis- 
cuHSion between, and nine Mahometan 
d<Kitors, i. 101. 

B« oj, the capital of Cutch. iii. 27. 

Booudoo, tile rajali of, iii. 57; disturbances 
in, 222. 

Boura (<ohain, iii. 139. 

Boorhanpour, u IMndarco outbreak in, iii. 
177. 

Busker l^int, invades Jhmgal with his Mali- 
rattas, i. 524; treacherous niimler of, by 
AU Verdy Khan, 527. 

Ikmrlxiu, Lord Miuto’s expedition against, 
and ca)>ture of, H. 846. 

Boyd, CaptiLin. and CJaptain Johnstone urge 
Ceneml Klphlustone to defeiMl the coui- 
niissariat fort at (Cabool Hi. 403; are dis- 
ai>pojnte<l, 404; succeed in making up for 
the loss of the commissariat stores, 407. 

BnMlshaw. Major, iii. 17. 

iiRihina, ii. 22. 

Brolimanalsul, heroic defence of, against the 
Aml«. i. 41. 

nrabiuavertii. and Bruhniarshi, H. 1. 

Hraiuuius, the. supremacy of, ii. 4; com- 
})arativu impunity for crimtj ensoyecl by, 

5; penalties for insulting one, 5; sbuges 
of the life of a Braliiiiin, 5; iii^t und 
sectrtid stages, 6; third and fourth stages. 
6; change in the diseiplitiu of; lU'cline of 
the influence of, 8; extravagant <lef«in‘ncc 
paid to the Brahininical caste. 8; original 
4Minalityof,andpreBoutdistln(TionH among' 
9; the Kulinas or imblcs, 10; lM^^n^cions 
regulation rcsi>ecting the daughters of, 11; 
oliservanccs of a Brahmin, 42; morning 
worsliip of, 43; sacraments of, 44. 

Braithwaitc, his liravff conduct in Tnnjoro, 

ii. 498; destruction of a British dctacliinent 
under his command, 499; capture of IVni- 
ilk^berry by, 63‘.l 

Braysor’s Hikhs at Lucknow, iii. 673. 

Breda, the treaty of, i. 321. 

Bi'eretoii, Major, his reverse bof<»re Waiuli- 
waah, i. 619; his death. 628. 

Briliery and corruption practised by the East 
India Coinjiany; itivcstigabiuu und dis- 
Olosui-es respecting, i. 358. 

Brigg's Ferishta, i|U.>to<l, i. 43, 48, 156. 

Briggs, Captain, iii. 100. 

Brij itaj, eldest son of the Rajah of Jumoo, 
ms quarrel with his father, Hi. 270. 

Brljeis Kniblr, sou of the cx-(,^ueeu of Oudo, 
puppet-king, ili. 674. 

Briinl, Major, iii. 618. 

Bristow, Mr., resident in Oude. H. 420; his 
removal from Oude censured l>y the Ui- 
rtictors of the Ooinpany, 429. 

Britain, Great. Bee Knohonl. 

British resources, Hyder All’s 'opinion of 
them, ii. .500; ascendency establislied in 
India, ill 112. 

Broodfoot, killed in the Caliool insturreotion. 
Hi. 393. 

Brook. Captain, liis bravery at Gooriim- 
couihv, ii. 271. A 

Brook’s Lienti'nant-coloncir kUled in the 
liatile of ChiilianM'allu. iii. 523. 

Broughton’s LeUrrs v'rilten in a Muhratla 
Camp, quoted, ii. 748, untt'. 

Br<iwn, Captain, Ai»a Sahib’s escape from. 

iii. 101; uts gallant defimco of the fort of 
Kahun, 374; at Omurkote, 470. 

Brown, C^olonel, attempts t(j snn’riso Scin- 
dia’s camp, ii. 457; with Goddard on his 
iiioroli towards Poonah, 464. 

Brown, Qoncral, conimamlcr of the second 
division of the army of lliudoostan, iii. 62; 
storms Jawud, 83. 

Bruce, Major, leads tho escalade at Gwalior, 
ii. 460. 

Bryden, Dr., the solo survivor of the force | 
which retreated from CaImkiI, lit. 430. i 

Bucliauan’a Narrative of a Journey,tn>m Ma- j 
drasthn)wjhMyso‘i$. quoted,!. i56;ii478. j 


BURMESE 

Buchanan, Captain, roftises an enormous 
brllie, and i8«rewarrled by the Bombay 
govermnent, i. 515. 

Bucke, Major, his disoKtrons march, tlirougU 
ignorance of geogiupliy. Hi. 165. 

Buckiugliam, Mr. James Bilk, editor and 
l»ropriotor of the CaUuiita Journal, shipjosl 
off to England for using the frcctlum of 
the press, Hi. 131. 

Buckley, Conductor, his bravery in defence 
of Uie Delhi ma:.^i/ine. iii. 569. 

Btidanon, the rcsidouco of Mahomed of 
Dollii at. i. lOU. 

BiiiVlha, il. 31. 

Budge Budge, Clive arrives at. tho fort of, 
i. 651; captured >>y Clive, 663; results of 
the capture of, 55;i 

Bukht Khan, a rebel soulmhdar, dcfeatctl 
atKujufghur, iii. 617. 

Bukkur. the forccil cession of, by the Ameers, 
HI. 344. 

Bulhuii, Vi/ior of Delhi, snhducs Ibe Raj¬ 
poot s, i.Oii; succeeds to tiie throne oflXdm; 
his early caicer and ]iatroiiage of litera¬ 
ture, 67; his love of pomp, zeal for tem- 
l>cranc(\ and iits of oconomy. 68; roltollion 
of Toghriil Khan against; his campaign in 
lU'iigul, 69; his death, 71. 

Bulwant Bing, Zeiuiudar of llnarcs, ii. 
.531. 

Bulwiuit .Sing, a]»pointed Rajah of Bhurt- 
ptior us sueceasor Ut his father, iii. 179; 
supplanted by liis nephew, 180; restored by 
the British, 185. 

Bulwant Bing, Jtajah of Ulwar, set aside by ’ 
his nephew itenee Bing. Hi. 186; Benee 
Bing, intimidate<l l>y the British, restores 
him one Imlf of the territory, 387. 

Biiixlelu chiefs, the l ehelHon of the, ii. 768. 

Biuidulciind, proceediiigs in, ii. 767; disturb- 
uiices in, 821. 

Burgess, Cori>orul, forms one of tho explosion 
party at IhdlH; killed, iii. 621. 

Burgldia, a rebel force defeated at, l>y Lord 
Clyde, iii. 701. 

Buricigli, recommends Sir 1'klward Mitchcl- 
iKime to tile directoi-g of the East lislia 
Comiuiiiy; the (-oiiiiiuny rofuses iiim, i. 
229. 

Burke’s, .K<lmund,4l<;scription of the devasta¬ 
tions of llyder Ali in the Carnatic, ii. 479; 
description of the famine in the south of 
India, 510; speech on the Naliohof Arcot's 
debts, 568; Hrst step tow-ar<ls the iinpcncli- 
uient of nastingH, 641; character of liis 
opposition to Hastings, 648. 

Burmese, tlie. niisiinderstaiKling with, HI. 
132; send a force across the Britisli fixm- 
tier in pursuit of niaruiulers, 13;i: the 
luisillannuoiis itonduct of tlic ludo-Britisli 
g4»vcriimcnt in ix'gartl to, 134; emigrants 
froui Arucan cJaiuieil by, 134; temporary 
urraiigcineut with. 135; they again elaim 
the eTnigrants fiMin Araciui, 135; com- 
lilaint'S of, against the British, 135; lay an 
endtargo on Hritish vessids at Raiigoim, 
136; invarle tlie British tx^rritories, 136; 
their ii)sidiou.s dt^sigim, 137; policy of the 
home authorities resiHicting, 138; ]iOTtioim 
of the British territories claimed by, 138; 
are iK'iit on war with tlie Britisb, 140; 
coiiiiiieiicemeut of hostilities with, 149; 
the govemor-generars dcclamtion of war 
against, 141; plan of military otierations 
ayainst, 142; their niudo of warmrt!, 142; 
lilan of their euiiipaign, 143; Britisli force 
eiiiployeil u/minst, 143; urrival of the Bri¬ 
tisli licet at Kungooii, 144; attack on Ran¬ 
goon and c»]>ture of it, 144; nrror in the 
plan of the caiiiiKiign iigtiinst, 145; success 
of the British against, 146; invasion of 
<'liittagong by, 147; tlie British nquilse^l 
by, at Ramoo, 148; oiierations in tbc vici¬ 
nity of Rangoon against, 149; affair at 
Koniendino W'itli, 149; heavy rains sus- 
)>ciid oi>e^ioiiK A^iust, 149; extJiisivo 
)>reparations made by. 150: capture of the 
stockades at Kuinaroot, 150; captme of 
Byriam und oiicratiuiis in IVgu gainst, 
151; subjugation of liieir Teims-ioriin pro¬ 
vinces, 152; they make an attack on the 
British iKist at the tlolden Bagoda, 162; 
serious repulse sustained from, at Kaikhxi; 
their exultation, 153; ilefeaiof their lea<lcr 
Kye Wungyoe. 154; position of tlie British 
army and of theirs, 154; great exertions 
iiiatle by, 155; British successes at Kokein 
against, 1^; operations in Assam against; 
subjugation of Assam, 156; two forces sent 

• overland to Ava against, 157; mutiny in 
the Aracan armament, 158; dBiiarturc of • 
tlie Arucan force sent against, 162; opera-* 
tions of the Aracan forot: against, 163; 
capture of Aracan, 164; disasters occa¬ 
sioned to the British tiirough ignorance of 



71G 


BURMESE 


INDEX. 


CAMFBEEU 


iJurmcfl©,— 

geogtuphy, iii. : overtureft of indopond- 
once made to Pegu by the Biitioh, 165; new 
plan of operations agaliutt, suggested by Hir 
Archibald Oamptiml, 165; ofMjrations of 
Major Sole and Oeneral Cotton against; 
165; stockades at DonaYiew, 166; failure of 
the attack iif the British on the stockades of 
llonabew, 167; sulisequont proceciUngB 
against, 167: Huccesses against, 168: ad¬ 
vance of the British luriny int.o tlio interii tv 
of their (Miuiitry and capture of l*rouie, 168; 
negotiations wiili, proposed, 169: fallun; 
of negotiations with, I/O; resumption of 
hoatil?ti<!s witli, 171: affair with, at Wati- 
gaon. 171: u new lea<ler of, his defeat and 
death, iT2 ; renewal of negotii^tioiis witli, 
173; a<l(5fiiiitivc tifaty with, cxecutetl, )>ut 
not ratified, 173; hostilities with, resumed; 
Printxe of Sunset, 173; new tactics of the 
Ih'inco of Sunset, Ins defeat, 174; negotia¬ 
tions with, renewed; iK^aoe concluded, 
review of the war with, K5; a new war 
with the; its causes. 530; expedition 
against the, 533; oiH^rations at Itangoon, 
533; the jMisitiou of new Hangoon, 534; 
e.a]ituro of Proine, 534; Ceneral Cod- 
win’s desultory proceedings, 535; cajiture 
of Pegu. 530; Pegu assaulteil by the Ihir- 
luese, Imt successtully defeivdtKl by the 
garrison, 536; annexation of Pegu, 537: 
subuiiasi(»iiof the King of Ava. 538; peace 
Goncliidcd with Bnriiiuh, 539. 

Burn, Colonel, ii. 781. 

ItiimeB, Lieutenant Alexander, his cxpe<li* 
tion up the Indus, iii. 262; tiio olsttuidcs 
he m(!t with, 2H3; his travels in Central 
Asia 296; Ins Tnission to Caliool, 297; the 
ostensible object of bis mission to tlabool, 
2117 ; his intssioii to Caliool a political one, 
297; his reception by Dost Mahomed, 298; 
Ills first int«*rview wiUi Dost M:ilionjod, 
299: bis conference with Dost Mahomed 
on tlie subject of Pesbawor, 299; T)fist 
Mabomed comes to him for counsel in 
reference to the Russian agent in CalMiol. 
303: he promises Dtmt Mahoineil British 
jirutoction, 310; his views us to the results 
of ]./)nl Auckland's supercilious letter to 
Dost Maliomed. 313; the high groumlbikcn 
by him towards Dost Maliomed, 314; Dost 
Mahomed’s statement to, 310; his deitiir- 
ture from CalxMil. 316; his appointment 
as envoy to the eliii'f of KheJat, 333; his 
dealings with the Ameers of Sciiide, 343; 
Ills treaty with tlie Khan of Klielat, 
353; iiis (Ircam of security; informed by 
Molnui lisil of a cons^tiracy among tlie 
Afghan (’hiefs, 391; injudicious proceed¬ 
ings of, 392; cons)>iracy against, 392; his 
house attackorl, and liiniself and inmates 
munleretl, 393. , 

Burr, Ooloiiul, at the battle of Kinkce, iii. G7. 

Burt, Colonel, iii. 84. 

Busserutgunge, Havelock’s victory over tlie 
seiioys at, iii. 640. 

I-ussy, M., captures fort Gingoe, i. 449; his 
iufluenco at the wiurt of Halabut Jung. 
501: leaves sick, while his enemies are 
plotting against liiui, 501; his return. 502; 
forsakes Salahnt Jung, 610: bis negotia- 
tiouB with Basaliit Jung. 620; arrives in 
time to succour Arcot, t>23: joins Ailmiral 
HiifTrein with reinforcements, ii. 511; at 
fhiddalore, .512. 

Jhixar, Major Hector Monro's victory at, i. 
679. 


a 


C'aliool, proceedings in, hc^tile to Akiicr 
Khan, i. 129; is taken possession of hy 
Akbor. 134; Lord Miuto sends an cmliassy 
to, ii. 833; Bliab Bhujali floes from, 833; 
Khali Bhujah attempts to recover the tlirone 
of; his utter discomfiture, iii. 228; Lieu¬ 
tenant Bumes’mission to, 297; Lieutenant 
Burnes’ departure fmra, 316; Dost Mabo- 
inod’s flight from, 362; Hbah Khujah’s 
entrance into, 362; description of the city 
of. 387; the Bala Hissar. 388; Hhah Shu- 
jah’s refusal to accommodate the British 
troorw in the Bala Hissar; erection of 
Britiid) cautunments near, 389: British 
sports of tlie army at, 390; lioontiouaneM 
of the British troops ix., 391; dreams ob 

• tranquillity as to, 391; sustiicions of a plot, 

• 392; injudicious ^roeeediugs of Bir A. 
Bumes, and conspiracy against him, 392; 
Bir A. Bumes* house attaokeil. and hiw- 
Hcir and other inmates xnurderedt 393; 


Cubool,— 

feasibility of Bupprosslug the insurrection 
In, at flmt; failure of first efforts, ill. 394; 
ouliialde delays of Geiiend Elplilnstone 
and the envoys in dealing with the insur¬ 
rection, 395; singular indecision of General 
Khihinstoue, 396; fatal conseiiuences of 
tills indecision, 396; pioiier means not 
employed to quell the insurrection in, 398; 
iucomiiefcency of tlie military and civil au¬ 
thorities in, 399; im^tfevtual application 
for aid to Qeueiid Nott, 399; failure of 
application for aid to General Hale, 400; 
General Klphinstone conjures tip difli- 
eultie8,401; miserable ini^cisiou of General 
Klphiiistone, and enipUiyment of inade¬ 
quate means to quell the iiisuirectiou, 402; 
progress of the insurrection, 403; tiie Bri- 
tisli commissariat fort captured, 404; Gene¬ 
ral EUphinstonc begins tritalk of terms with 
tile iiifliirgents, 40.5; Captains Boyd and 
Johnstone nobly labour to conijicnsato for 
the loss of the coinmissariat stores, 405; Hir 
'William Macuaghton. tiio envoy, resorts 
to brilierjr to procure the assnssination of 
tlie principal reiicl cliicfs, 407; spread of 
the iiiKiirrecbion, and disasters of the Bri¬ 
tish army, 409; infirmities of General Ki- 
phinstoiie, 410; an attack on the enemy 
pro}Kiscil; dittiisuitlcs and disasters, 411; 
a new position taken ui) l>y the enemy on 
the Behmaitio HUIk, 412; attempt to dis¬ 
lodge the enemy, 412; resolution to hold 
the cantonments, 413; new attempt to 
dislislge the enemy, 413; failure or the 
attack on tlie Afghans, 414; the British 
routed by the Afghans, 415; all extorior 
exertions almiidoned; resolution to come 
to tonus, 415; arrogant demands of tlie 
enemy, 416; riiinouH delay, and new pro- 
lioRal for negotiations, 416; conference 
witli tlie Afglian chiefs, 417; draft of a 
treaty submitted by the l^ritisli. and osten¬ 
sibly ocixiptod liy the Afghans, 417; evacua¬ 
tion of the Bala Hissirr by the few British 
soldiers who were in it, 418; forts com¬ 
manding the cantonments surrenderetl to 
the enemy, 419: intrigues of tlie envoy, 
and<M>unter-ixitrigucBo£ tlic AfghniiK. 420; 
cxtraonlinary projiostils miido l»y Akbar 
Kiian to the envoy, 421; infatuation of the 
envoy, 421; eonfcmiee of tlio envoy with 
Akbar Khan ; niunler of the envoy, 421; 
negotiations renewed with the enemy aftor 
tlic muriler of the envoy, 423; evacuation 
of the cantonments by tiie British soldiers, 
424; horrors of tlie retreat of tlie British 
army; its annihilation, 425; Dr. Bryden 
tile sole survivor of the British who re- 
treaUwl from, 430; the govenior-gciierars 
virtual iiermission to<Tenerals I’ollock and 
Nott to advance on. 448; responsibility of 
advancing on, tbroa ti on (.Teucrai Nott by 
the governor - general, 441); triumiiliant 
inarch of General Bollock on, 452; the 
defeat of tiie Afghans and recapture of. 
453: wanderings and ultimate rtdease of 
the. English captives belonging to the army 
of. 454; tlH! British army finally quits, 458. 

Cabot, Heliastiaii, discovers Newfoundland, 
i. 196. 

Cabral, sent out to the East with a seixuid 
Portuguese expedition, i. 163: arrives at 
(’alicut, 164; bis interview w'ith tlie Zo- 
iiiorin of Cidicut; their mutual distrust, 
164; proceedings ailverso to, at Calient,165; 
is invited to Cochin, 166; friendly over¬ 
tures of the Rajah of Cochin to, 167; ]iur- 
sned by tlic zamurin’s fleet, 167. 

Calcutta, ac<iuired by the East India Com¬ 
pany. i. 383; the permission of Kissendoss 
to take refuge in, tlie origin of the quarrel 
with Hurajali Dowlah, 532; peremptory 
order from Surajah Dowlah to desist from 
fortifying, and the govomor’s explanation, 
534; Burajah^owlah compels Mr. Watts 
t<i sign a pajVr liindii^ him to level the 
new works at, 536; Surajali Dowlah ad¬ 
vances against, 537; state of Fort William 
at, 538: the enemy’s jirogrcss against, 540 
general consternation at, and flight of the 
governor of, 540: Mr. Holwell elected 
governor; the garrison shamefully left to 
its fate, 541; attempts to negotiate; the 
fort taken, 542; Hurajah Dowlah in the 
fort, 542; the Bl^k Mole, 543; the horrible 
Buffering of the British immured in the 
Black Hole, 544; Burajah Dowlah is dls- 
apiiointed at the emallness of the plunder, 
545; an expedition to, resoled on, M7; 
choice of a commander of the expedition 
to; Clive apjKiintcd; his feelings and views, 
549; operations fur Its recapture, 551; re¬ 
covered by Clive, 554; Su^a^ Dowlah 
advances oU| but is attacked and iutimi- 


Calcutta, — 

ilated Clive, i. 557; complaints against 
Clive for not securing from the ualnib com- 
I^BatiOJi for private sufferers tl^ nluii- 
derof; Clive’s defence, 560; general diffu¬ 
sion of wealth at, occasioned tor tlie ar¬ 
rival of the conquered nabqb’s treasureB, 
59]: Clive applies to the presidency of 
Madras tixe the sniqtly of vacancies in the 
council of, 698; members of the council of, 
arrive from England, ii. 363; xUsseneions 
and discussions in tlie council of, 363; tho 
council of, divuled into two hostile factions, 
366: dissensions in the council of, on tho 
land 411; collision lietweeu the 

council of, and the government, 433; arbi- 
trapr i>rr>cce<liiigs of the council of. 435; 
action brought against the council of, and 
the governor-general; abrupt wlthilrawal 
of the same, 436; jurisdiction of the su¬ 
preme court of, deflneil by a new statute, 
438: disturlsince occasioned in the vicinity 
of, a fanatical Muhoinetan, iii. 205. 

Coli iiuya, the, of Hindoo chronology, ii. 2. 

Gulicut, DeGama arrives at, 1. the za- 
niorin of, 157; De Gama lands at, 157: Dc 
Gama's visit to tlio zamoriu of, 157; ])<^ 
<lama'B second visit to the zamorin of, 1^); 
Do Gama forcibly detaiueil on shore at, 
160; trafllc of the Portuguese at, 161; lum- 
tllity of tiie zamorin of, to Dc Gama, and 
his retaliation, 162; the fleet of the zhruo- 
rin of, attacks De tlanixi, 163; Galiral ar¬ 
rives at, and hits an interview witli tho 
zamorin of, 164; mnttial distrust of Cabtui 
and the xaniorin of. 164; Moorish iutrigii<>s 
ag.tinst the IVirtugiiese at. 165; the Poriu- 
guesti factory stormed ak 165; lioml'arded 
by C^brak 166; Oalu-al is pmsued by the 
fl<«?t of the z/iinoriti of, 16?. 

Calleiidar, (’aptuin, his cowardice and dcalli 
at Masuliputum, i. 616. 

C'alllaud, his bravery in the action near tJio 
Sugar-loaf Rock, i. 497; saves Trichmoiiolv. 
595; ap)H>inted commandiT f>f tbe army in 
Bengal. 666; frustrates Hhali Alum’s jmr- 
imst s, 667; marches to give Hhah Alum 
battle, 668; Ids mission to Hyderabail, ii, 
216. 

GhIjk’C, captiiretl by (he British, ii. 768; out¬ 
breaks in. iii. 177; Hir Hugh Rose iiiovok 
against, and caiitures^t from tlio rebels, 
682. 

(.'uinat^ Major, now Ookmol. invades Mai- 
wall, ii. 464; suriirises Heindia’s camp. 4C5. 

Camel Corps, formed by Sir Cliarlcs Napier 
to onerato against the trilies of Cutch 
Gumlava. iii. 502. 

Camp, a IlindtHi. descrilietl. ii. 112. 

(.'ampbcll. an liido-Britain, sent out of tlie 
Bala Misstir to quell the iusurreuiioii in 
t’ahool, iii. 394. 

Campliell, Sir Archiliald. governor of Ma¬ 
dras, ii. 683; (vinimander in tho Burmese 
war, ill. 143; his oiieratious in the vicinity 
of Rangoon, 148; carries the stockailes 
near Kai^oon, 150; |i now plan of opera- 
(imis ogaiiiKt the Burmesevsuggestod l»y, 
105; fui'ther operations of, 167; captures 
tho stockades of Donaliew, 168; udvaneos 
into the interior of Jhtniiah, 168; captures 
Proine, 169; prupor&s nagotiatinus witli the 
Bunneso, 169; n'snnics hostilities, 171; 
proceeds against Maha Ni^niyo and Kyi; 
Wungyee, and defeats them, 172; defeats 
the IMnce of Sunset, and concludes ilxe 
war, 174. 

Campbell, Brigadier, at Bamiinggur, iii. 520; 
ills biavery at CUilliunwalla, ^; at Luck¬ 
now, 674. 

Cumpltell, Sir Colin (Txird Clyde), arrives in 
India as comninnder-in-chief. lit. 646; 
places himself at tiie hetnl of an OAlequato 
force for the relwif of Lucknow, 657; leaves 
Cawu}M>or for Lucknow • the numlier and 
composition of the forces under his com¬ 
mand, 659: begins his advance on Luck¬ 
now; capture of the DUkoiisha park, an<l 
Secunder B^U, (>60; capture of the Shall 
Nujoef, 661; effects the rmnoval of tlie 
women an<l children from the residency, 
662; secures the removal of the garrison 
from the residency; skilful mode of pro¬ 
ceeding in doing so, 663; leaving General 
Gutram with a sufficient force in the 
Alumhagh, he proceeds to the relief of 
Cawnpoor. where General Windhani is 
liesicgcd by the rebels, 664; ivaohes the 
entrenchments at CawiiiKNir. 666; having 
effected the safe reinoxiil of tbe families 
and wounded in his care, he attacks and 
defeats the rebels at Cawnpopr, €G7; hav¬ 
ing conquered tlie rebels at Cawnpoor, he 
encamiw at Futtefaghur, 669; he ^vancis 
finally on Lucknow; hia plan«of attack. 



INDEX, 


717 


CAMPBELt, 

Oampbel]. Sir Colin,— 
iii. 670: hia oporationa against Lnckuow, 
671; opcnatbo ciunpaign against the rebels 
in RohilcuiKl, 076; now Lord Clyde, he re> 
news operations in Oudo against the 
rebels, his proclamation. 608; attacks aiul 
disinantles l>ho fort of the Kajah of Arne- 
tlile, 693; dtuitroys the fort of Shuukerpoor 
bolou^ng to llene Matlboo. 699; bisimr- 
BUit of Bene Madhoo, 700; bis subsequent 
operations against the rebels described in 
his despatch, 701. 

OaiuplicU, (k>lon«l Donald, his operations 
against Kyder All. ii. ; at Mangalore, 
520; in Cuthwk, 757; at Delhi, 620, 623. 
Caiuwle, his atomic theory and physics, U. 117. 
< Janal. the, constructed by Jj'erozo, i. 
Candabar, arrival of a Persian aml>as8a<h>r 
at, iii. 300; occupation of, by the Britisli 
oxpe<lltion to Afghanistan. 351; 8hal» 
Hhujah’s reccpti*m at, 305; conspiracy in, 
against the lives of Kuro;>eauH. 370; state 
of allairs at, after the Cahoot <U8astcr, 438; 
defeat of Afghans at, 4^; Cencrsil 
mphiustontVs ortler to deliver it up dis- 
reganled by (General Nott aiul Major 
ItiiwlinHon, 439; prtiuarations for the de¬ 
fence of, by (leueral Nott, 439; an Afghan 
attempt to take it by stratagem frustrate*!, 
441. 

Oandeish. operations of the British in, iii. 99. 
CaniainiMiddy, Major Dixon’s d<*scription of 
the ground around the British camp at, 
ii. 603. 

Canning. T/f»r«l. Governor-general of India, 
ill. 5.53; orders thu <lislKiU(Uiig of the 
mutineer mqxiys at Barra<;ki>oor, 561; his 
piHtclaniatiou respecting the sepoy mutiny, 
698; disavows Mr. Ciilvin’s prtic^mation, 
599; his proclamation on the capture of 
Delhi, 625; his pr(N;]aniatinu iiitoiided to 
bo usefl on the capture of Lucknow, 689; 
his proclamation denounced by Lortl 
Klicnlstfuiigh iu his despatch. 691; indig> 
nation of him and his friends on the re¬ 
ception of Lord Blhmborongh’s despatch. 
093; bis proclamation moiUlied before 
published, 093. 

Canning, Mr., appointed Oovcmor-geiieral 
of India, and resigns, iii. 128. 

(’uiiTiing, Captain, sunt on a iin.ssiou to 
Kaiigoon. iii. 135. • 

(’aiiougo, the ruins of, i. 47. 

Cantou, tlio cose of, in relation to Mr. Host* 
ings. ii. 38-1. 

Capo of Go<sl Hope, «Ioublud by Diaz, i. 
152; proccodji'gK at, between the French 
and Knglish, ii. ,501. 

Capila, the founder i>f the atheistic branch 
of the Hjuikhya school of pliilobophy, ii. 118. 
</ap]>ur, Oulonul, his sus|KUision, ii. 840. 
(Jarangoly, capture of, by Canton Davis, ii. 
486 

f’arigat. the buttle of, ii. 602. 

CarmichaeL Serjeant, r)nu of the explosion 
party at Delhi, kilhxl, iii. 621. 

(’aruac. Sir James, rwvcnjor of Bombay, 
deposes tho J^jali of Bomliay. iii. 268. 
Carnac, Major, assumes the <M>tnmand of Uie 
British army hi India, i. 761; his troops 
become mutinous, 678^ receives presents 
contrary to coveiufut., *90; in the wimcil 
of Bomliay, ii. 447: (juarrels with Colonel 
Bgertoii on a jM»int of etiqueth', 448; his 
cowardly conduct in the expedition to 
Pooiiah. 449; dismissed tho service, 451. 
Carnatic, tho, Vsiundaries and physical fea¬ 
tures of. j. 42i); the Mabrattas brought 
into, 432; state of affairs in. 594; lliml 
arrjmgement respecting, by Lord Morn- 
ingWn. ii. 721 ; claimants to the throne 
of; Azoem-n-Dowlah made nalK>b of, 722. 
C^tjor, capitulation of, to tho Company, ii. 

Carpenter, Colonel, iii. 13. 

Ciurrical. tho naval engagement at. between 
Admiral lN>of)cke and (7mnb d'Achil, i. 
602; capture of, by Captain Monson, 632. 
Cartikeia, the Hindoo god of war, ii. 38. 
Cartridges, tho greu-sed, usoil by tlie seiioys 
as a pretext for disobedience, iii. 556. 
Cartwright, I'olonel, attempts to restore 
disciprino among tlio Bengal mutineers; 
appointed to Burmali. iii. 158. 

Cashmere, AkbcFs campaign in, and con¬ 
quest of, i. 135; failure of Knnjeet Sing’s 
expedition against, iii. 278. 

Cashmere Gate, the, of lleUii, blown open, 
• iii. 620. 

Casim, Mahomed, invades India, i. 40; his 
conquests, 40; slugulax revenge taken on 
him by fC daughter of the Bajah of Brail- 
* inanabad. 41, 

Caspian Bea, errouTOus notions of the Per¬ 
sians respecting, i. 37. 


Caste, among tho Hindoos, ii. 3; tho Brah¬ 
mins, 4'11; tile Cshatriyasand VaisyoB. 11: 
tho Bndras, 12; now, 13; now identified 
with proft^ons and trailus, 13; effects of 
caste, 14; loss of caste. 15; caste an obstacle 
to tho spread of Cliristianity, 16. 

Costlereagh, Iiord, proposes tiiirtoon resolu¬ 
tions containing tho loa<ling provisions of 
the new charter of the Iflast India Com- 
l>any. iii. 3. 

(ktulfitdd. Captain, sent to Jawud, iii. 83. 

fiJavendiah, Sir Thomas, his voyage to tho 
Htraits of Magalimcntt, and tho l^tcific, i. 
209; his letter t(> Ltml lludson, 209. 

Cawni)o»>r, tlie iiosition of 8ir Henry Wlieel- 
er at, iii. 586; mutiny at, 593; attack on 
Sir Henry Wlioelcr’a i>os»tion by Kana 
Saidb, 594; siege of, by Nana Habib. 595; 
capitulation of, 59*»; treachery i»f tbo 
rebels, SiMi; atrocities committed by Nana 
Sahib, 697; Imrrid.sixjotaclo presenttyl 
Havelock’s trotips on their entering, 637; 
Havelock at Muiigulwar receives alarming 
news from, 642; General Windliam tlireat- 
ciMwl in, by the relwls; attacks them au«l 
is <h*fcat«tl; Sir Colin i’ampbell marches 
to liis aid, 664; Hir Colin < 'ainpbeil attacks 
anil routs the relKtIs at. 667. 

Cay, Captain, loses his life at Karh^^, ii. 449. 

(Censorship of the press hi India, iii. 130. 

Cei*emonies of the Hindoos, ohmwvaiua^s of 
u Brahmin, ii. 42; tho live sacraments, 
44; o)i«t‘.rvanccs of the vulgar, 44; multi- 
l>licity of forms, 45; solf-intltcted tortures, 
4;;. 

(’haiuHah, iii. 1()8. 

Chalmers. Ckdonel, ins operations against 
VailfKi Tambi, ii. 835; suspended, 811. 

(.Uiamlterhiin. BrigivUer Neville, iii. 610. 

Cliaiuliers, Hir CliarJea Harcourt., jutlge of 
tlic supreme csmrt '’f Btnigal. iii. 203. 

Champion, Colonel, defeats the Itohillas, ii. 
327; appointeil toOmlein Mr. Middleton’s 
pluGO. 365. 

Chund Jkseby, her Iioroism, i. 138. 

Chanda, tiiefortof, taken by Colonel Adams, 
iii. 93. 

CJiandemagore, (’live prepares tf> attack, 
but is prevented by th<! Nalsib of Bengal, 

i. 561; the dtjfcnces of, SKi; Clive advances 
against, and captures, 564. 

(’bandra Kauta, iii. 139. 

(.’handu T,nl, minister of the Nizam, ii. 823; 
iii. 28; his iiiiluenw iu the Nizam’s court, 
121; Ins dealings with William I’almer & 
(*o., 122. 

(3iantraBam Hak, Hajab. iii. 19, 22. 

Chariuigh Bridge, tlie, Havelock’s c.onflict 
with the mutineers at. iii. 653. 

C2iarikur, bravely tlcfeiidcd by (’ajitain 
(’mlringtoii; evacuatcil, iii. 409; burned 
down, 457. 

(Charles 1., Xing, grants a crown Hconse to 
rival traders to the Juist India ('omimny, 
1 .267; buys the Comiiany’s i)opiK*rou credit 
and soUs it for reoilv money, 272. 

Charter of tlie Bast India Company, i. 231: 
a new. granted by Cliarles 11., 3iJ; anew, 
granted by William HI., 355; renewed l*y 
George HI., ii. 1. 

CHicetoo, a adelirated Pindaree letwlcr, bis 
«;urly fortunes, iii. 47; acts In tuiion with 
Kureem Khan, 49; his durra, 50; his in- 
roa«ls on Surat, 50; enmity between him 
and Kureem K ban proventH united action, 
79; pursuit of him by Sir Johu Malcohn, 
and dlsi>ersion of his duna, 81. 

Ohelos, ii. 616. 

Chemistry, Hindoo, ii. 126. 

Chen Busveia, stninge sto^ of, it. 235. 

Cheyte Sing, British relations with, ii. 531; 
exactions from, 532; made a prisoner in 
his palace Hastings, 536; reseno and 
escape of. 537; carries with him oU his trea¬ 
sures, 539. 

Chilambrum, failure of Coot^ attempt on, 

ii. 489. 

Child. Sir John, appointed captain-geueml 
of the India Comi>any. i. 341; his mi- 
scrupulous eoiidiict, 345; his powerh^ssness. 
347; his de]K)sition liofore jiarHauieut as 
to the alleged bribery of the East India 
Company. 362- 

Childron, Hindoo, tho unfavourable influ¬ 
ence to which they are subjecU'd, ii. 200. 

(’hiliionwnila, the battle of, iii. 523. 

Cliina, Mahomed Toghlak’s projetd, of 8ul>- 
duing, i. 89; the attc^m)>t of the Kast> India 
Comity to form a trade with, 334. 

Chinglei«it and (’ovelong, preparations of 
the Britisli for the siege of, 1. 483; capture 
of, by Clive, 4^; importance of; French 
attempts on, 605. 

Chiriaghati Pass, the. Iii, 24. « 

ChiBhoiin, Lieutenant, his death, Ui. 85. 


CLIVK 

Cliitbagong, fujdtives from Anu»n settle In, 

iii. 132; marauders, followeti by the Bur¬ 
mese, enter, 133; the Burmese claim tiie 
emigrants who have settled hi, 134; invotled 
by the Burmese, 147. 

Chittanyus, the, tiieir tenets, jl 72. 

Chittapet, Cooto captures, i. 629. 

Ohittoor. attacked 1^ Aio-u-din, i. $2: tho 
fortunes of. 82, note ; tho rajali of, in prison 
atllellii; proiiosal made to him as the con¬ 
dition of his release, 83; his i‘scaiK% 83. 

ChoMtn', a, ii. 478, note. 

Cbplora, Its ravages in the Brilisli cumi> in 
tne year 1817, iii. 78. 

Choorainan, a Jat leiulor, ii. 7S4. 

('hota NagiHior. disturlMincos in, ill. 218. 

Chtmk, tho, of Dactm., i. 647. 

(.’lioul, a naval fight off, lietwecn the l*ortu- 
guese and Gujerat fleets, i. 188. 

Cho\tHr\i, a. i. ‘fl>3. 

Cliristian, Mr., wmimiK-sioner at Hcctaixior, 
his misplaceit coiitidence in the niiut^ury 
police, iii. 589. 

Cliristianity, not cliargealilowith tlie Vellore 
mutiny, ii. 815; uiifavouralde isisition of 
couvertB to, in India, Hi. 20»»; new regula¬ 
tion in favoiu* of converts to, introiluccd 
by Hir WilUutn BentHick, 200; its iuflueiicu 
on Iixlia. 705. 

(’hromdogy of the Hindoos, the. ii. 2. 

Cluiuar, the siege tif, by Shci:r Khan Rur. i. 
114; failure of tlie attempt oi the Britisii 
on, (»81; tho tn'aty of, ii. 539. 

Chund Koonwur. iii. 486. 

Chiiiida Saiiib, his tr<‘acherj'. i. 431: hiscon- 
nectwni with Ptuwlii-herry, 433; a prisoner 
with the Mabrattas, 434; ransomed by 
1 iuploix, 435; bis procecdiiigH at Kistua, 
435: his cx|>e.dlti<iti against Tuniore. 444; 
at V<jlcon<ln, 4,5"; beleaguers Trichlii<»- 
poly, 471; Major Lawnuice attempte to 
KUriirise Ids camp, 474; his instps desert 
him. 477; tries to effect las c8C‘;v)>e, 477; his 
cruel fate, 479. 

Chuprnni, a, iii. 22.5. 

CJiunit Htng. a Sikh chief, his ri.so oiitl suc¬ 
cess, iii. 270; hisdeatli, 270. 

(’hute, ('olouel, at Mimlan. iii. .577. 

Chuttiir Hing, cauMcs an insurriiction i: 
Hazartdi, in. 519. 

(‘ireors, the Northern, the Fn-msb get posaes- 
sioii of, i. 503; stale of uiVuirs in, 610; ii. 
213; grant of, to the Kust Jmliu (k)iii|mny, 
31.3; urrangoiiients of the (’ompany as to, 
214; vacillating cotuliict of the Moilras 
presidency as tio, 215; Air. Hastings’ pro- 
IxjHuI to cede thu, to thu Nizam Ali, 528. 

Clarke, Major, iii. 82. 

(lavcriiig, General, sent out from Kiigland 
as a iiu iubi'r of the council of Bengal, ii. 
363: optMisdl to liastingH, 364, 411, 418; 
assumes the office of guvemor-gcnerul, 424; 
bis death, 428. 

ChblKim. Major, his disaster at NufTnoak 
Pass, iii. 374. 

Climate of JiidiiL, i. 7; niodirying causes of, 
8; iieat and humidity of. 8. 

Clive, ItolHTt, ids brave conduct and narrow 
est^IKi at tlio siege of Devieotta, i. 438; hts 
early life. 439; his apitoiiitmeiit as writer. 
440; his constitutional melancholy, 441; 
his escai>e after the siege of Madras. 441; 
singular anccilott; of him. 442; oldains an 
ensign’s ctoiiuinssion, 442; charge of <M>war- 
dice against him; its refutation, 442; lus 
prcdoniiiiatiiig «Muilitics. 442; at the siego 
of Voleiaida. 457; accoiiipaineK Pigot to 
relieve VerdatJicbiin, 4.59; hismarmw es- 
cajie on his return f mm Verdotmelum, 459; 
bisextieditiontoTriciiinopoly, 460; attat^ks 
and captures Arcot. 460; pursues the garri¬ 
son of Arcot, 4rd; isliesiegeii in Arcot, 461; 
capturesTiiiiary, 467; hisvictory at Amecii 
468; captures Conjeveram, 4>>8; his victory* 
at (.%ivcTyi>auk, 469; st^conds Mirior Law- 
r<mcc in command of a force to Trlchino- 
]N>ly, 473; has the coiutnand <if a division, 
475: is in danger at Hamiavoram. 475: ex¬ 
posed to new dangers, 476; captures (kivo- 
h>nu. 484; captun's ('hingiCput, 485; arrives 
at Boniln^ with the rank of (’olou^. 509; 
ex|ieditiow to, and capture of Geriah, 513; 
appointed by tlie Company ctimmaiidcr of 
tlie exiieditiou to Bengal, 549; Ills letters 
to tho (’ourt of Directors. 549; the squa¬ 
dron and land-fon'.e umler his command; 
voyt^;!'! to Bengtil, 550; bo cnmmenceH 
operations, 551; blunders e<»miuitted, 552; 
|ihptures Uie fort of Budge; results of the 
cajiture. 553; recovers Calcutta, 554; bis 
misimderstaudings lyith Admiral Watson. 
554; Ids attack on tlie Nabob <ff Bengal’s 
camp, 559; makes a treaty with Uie nabob; 
bis uefence of it. 1^9: prepares to idiiack 
Chandemagore, but is prevouted by Uui 



718 


INDEX 


CLIVE 


Clive. Tlol)ort,— « 

nabob, i.5()l:adTanceftagaitist and captures 
ChaiKicmasuro, 565; the title of Sabut 
Jung bestowed on him by the naliob, 567; 
his participation in the coiiHpimuy agaiUKt 
the na1>ol), SC9: his diasimulution towards 
the naiiob, 670; sets out to perform his 
part of the conspiracy, 574; Iiih Htatement 
of grievances, and march from Ohamlor- 
nagore, 575; hoMs a council of war. 576; 
his march to Plassey, 677; his victory at 
Plaswy, 578; salutes Moer JaiHeros Naliob 
of Bengal, 581; seats Mcer Jattler on Uio 
muBuud, 582; the <leception jirtictiHud >)y 
him on OmichuTKl, and its melancholy 
offocts, 583; his futile attempt to justify 
his deception. 585; his disputes a>K>ut the 
spoils, 5'}l; insists on Meer Jattler paying 
treatv money, 645; his interference on 
behalf of itaiuimriun, (>49; obtains from 
Meer JafHor for the Oompanjr a monoisdy 
of all the salt])otru mado within Ids do¬ 
minions, 650; ids opinion of Meer Jaftier, 
651; lie returns to Moorshcdaba<l. 651; his 
complaint to the nabob of the conduct of 
Ids son Moerun, 651; he is net included 
in the new council of Bengal 652; ho is 
invited by the council to become president; 
liis refusal, but siiluicqucnt acceptance of 
the offer. 653; his letter to Mcer Jollier 
in respect to tlie shaxada. 056; the sha- 
Eada's letter to him, 656; his reply to tlie 
sliazada. 057; hastens to Patna, which is 
Itesieged by the sbazada. and reheve.H it. 
657; his jughiro, 658; objections to his 
jaghire, 659; pre}>areH to oiijiosethe Butch 
armament sent to Bengal, 660; his reply 
to tin: Dutch manifesto. GCl; resolves to 
depart for Kiigland, 663; att(impt>s to dis¬ 
suade him from returning to England, 664; 
his letter to the Karl of Ohatham, 8Ct.tiug 
forth his views as to tiie future goverii- 
luent of Bengal. 664; his estimate ami 
proi>osod emidoyment of its revenues, 665; 
Lord Oliatham’s reply to Ids letter. 66<»; ho 
uiuts India, 6i>6; his reception in England, 
683; his dissatisfaction, 084; his anxiety 
about his jaghire, 084; lie and his party in 
a minority in the East IniUa House, 685; 
his right to the jaghire is disputed, 685; 
discussion as to his reappointincut to 
India, 685; want of cordiality between j 
him aud the directors, 686; urmngeimmt | 
as bo his jaghire, 686; powers conferred i 
cn him on his reapiM>intnieiit to India, 
687; his outward voyage, 688; his first 
proceeiliiigs at C'alcutta, 688; he makes an 
arrangement with the Nalnibof Bengal. l>y 
which tlie latter becomes a pensionary nf 
tlie <.'oin]>any, 691; his visit to Allahiahad, 
and auiiouncement to Hliah Alum. 692; 
irksome duties assigned to him, 695; he 
applies to the Miulras presiilency for the 
supply of vacancies in the council of Cal¬ 
cutta, and the disccniteiit resulting there¬ 
upon, 698; carries into effect the orders of 
the directors for abolishing double batta, 
699; bis firmness in suppressing the mu¬ 
tiny occasioned by the aljolitiun of double' 
Itatta, 70U; his lenient treatment of the 
mutineers, 701; estaldlsliment of a fund 
called “Clive’s Fund,” 7U3; his health ! 
seriously affected, 704; he nssolves to quit 
India; diqiartnrc.and reception in England, 
705; his tenure of tiie jaghire extended, 
7UJ; power and activity of his enemios, 
70G; important results of his achievements, 
706; letter to Bord Bute in relation to tlio 
treaty with France, ii. 207; liis double 
government of Bengal, aud abuses conse¬ 
quent thereon, 283; lie gets Hastiiii^ up- 
pointed a member of the council of 
Madras, 303; liis opinion of Uastln^ 307; 
charges against him in the India House, 
334; his defence, 3^; his account of the 
Coiii})any's embarrassment, 336; impru¬ 
dence of i>art of his defence, 336; honours 
ahowered on him. 337; supiiorts tlie aboli¬ 
tion of supervisors, 339; pitiful charges 
against, 339; laM'suit commenced by the 
Company against, 340; Burgoyne’s resolu¬ 
tions {gainst, 340; his ilefence, 341; <lis- 
cussiou of Biirgoyno’s adverse motion, 341; 
motion in favour of him carried, 342; un- 
aatisfactory result of the vote iii favour of 
him, and uufavoumlile influence of the 
adverse proceedings on his luliid, 342; his 
(loath, 343. 

Clive’s Fund, the establichinent and amohiit 
of. i. 703. ^ 

Clive, Lord, govengir of Madras, his 
opinion of the Nabob of the CaniHtic. ii. 
719; li^ a personal interview with tiie 
Nabob of the Oaniatio. 722; places Azeem* 
U-Dowluh on tiie musnud, 7^, 


{ Close, Colonel, bis visit to Jeswunt Bow 
{ Holkar in ills camp, ii. 745; forms tlie 
treaty of Basaoin with the pcisbwa, 746; 
sent against Ameer Khan, 826; sent to Hy- 
derail to suppr^is the mutiny there, 8H. 

Olyile, Lord. Bee C<imp\tell, Sit' Colin. 

Coriiin, the Portuguese invited to, i. 166; 
the Portuguese remove from (.-aiicut to, 
166; De Nueva arrives at, 168; theZamu- 
rin of Calicut proposes an attack on, 171; 
arrival of the expedition under Albu- 
quenpie at, ciianges the aspect of affairs, 
172; tiie Zamoriii of Calicut forms a coali¬ 
tion against, but is defeated and humbled, 
172^^1accd under British mouagomeut, 

Cockbum, Colonel, ii. 449. 

('odrington, (’aptain, liis bravery at Chari- 
kur; is mortally wounded, iii. 409. 

Coins. K^contly (iiscovci'od, throwing light 
on Indian history, i..33; of Bultan Mali- 
mood, 52. 

ColebrtMjke’s TirelwVicn'ninMymre, quoted, 
ii. 604, noti'. 

Coluiiilms, (3)ristophcr, his enlightened geo¬ 
graphical views and discoveries, i. 149; 
jiohits out the direction in whicii tlie route 
tolndia lay, 150; h isarrival in the Tagus, 152. 

Colvin, Mr., lieutenant-governor of Agra, 
deceived by native duplicity, lit. 583; his 
proclamation disapiiroved by Lord Can¬ 
ning, 599; his death, 658. 

CoiiilKirmerc, Lord. Boo C<ttton, Bngadier- 
yetifral. 

Commissariat, the Hindoo, dcBcril)ed, it. 112. 

Com|>any, the. JCaat JnfiUi ConijHiny. 

Compass, tlie mariner’s, influence of the 
invention of, on navigation, i. 149. 

Comyn, Major, at the attack on the stockade 
of JetiMMir, iii. 17. 

Confodeiucy, a general, to expel the BritLsh 
from India, ii. 471; llyder’sshareiiiit. 472. 

Conflaus, M., left by Buasy in tlie Northern 
Circars, i. 610; dniws up his forces to rciiel 
C5olouel I’orde, 612; defeated by Colonel 
Fordo, 613; urges Saiabut Jung to send 
bis forces to Masulipatam, 614; besicgiMl 
by Colonel Fonle in Mosuliputum, 615; 
surrenders, 617. 

Conjeveruiii, cajiturod by Clive, i. 4C8; sur¬ 
prised by LalJy, 624. 

ConoUy and Btudilart, jirisoncrs in Bokham; 
Bir william Macnaghten’s plan for their 
lilieration, iii. 368. 

Couolly, liieutciiont John, his letter to 
Mohun Lai to further the a^^sassination 
policy of his uncle, Bir William Mhc- 
uagliUm, iii. 407, 412. 

Constantinople, the Uenoeae and Venetians 
strive for the ascendency at, i. 116. 

Contract, a singular, entered into by the East 
India Company, i. 361. 

(Contrasts in Hindoo character. 11. 204. 

Converts to Christianity from llindooiBiii, 
tlicir unfavourable position; new regula¬ 
tion to improve it,,iii. 201. 

Cooktf. Bir Thomas, called before parliament 
to give an account of monej^ given to mem¬ 
bers of |>arliunieiit for services done in tlie 
house fur the Compiuiy, i. 360; bill for his 
iiiclemiiity, 3G1; his disclosures. 361. 

Cooiier, Colonel, at Kumghur. iii. 16. 

C(H)rg. the rajali of, his ill-treatment by 
llydcr aud Ti])|M)o, ii. 611; tho fidelity end 
giuierosity of the rajah of, 612; tlie rage 
nf I'ipixK) when he understood that ho wiui 
to lie deprived of. 620; the rajah’s account 
of the battle of i^laseer, 694; tho cruelty 
and limtality of the new rajah of. Vira 
Itajeudra; a revolution in, iii. 209; an¬ 
nexation of, to the British territories, 210. 

Cooto, Captain Eyre, amMiintcMl governor of 
Calcutta by Admiral Watson, 1. 554; cap¬ 
tures Hooghly, 555; captures (/Utwali, 575; 
his vote in the council of war before the 
battle of Plassey, .577; his expedition 
aguin.Ht the French near l^tna, 588; u<l- 
vances to Moiigliir, 589: his bold march 
with inutiiiouR troops, 589; his firmness in 
dealing with mutineers, 590; his recall, 590; 
lie pnifits by Lally's blunder in dividing 
liisforcos, 622; captures Wandiwash, 622; 
captures Canvngoly, and makes an at¬ 
tempt on Arcot, ; liis tnoveinonts and 
those of Lully, 623; his advance to relieve 
Wandiwash, 625; defeats Lally. 627; he 
ca]>tures<7hittivpet,629; lays siege to Aient, 
which surrenders, 629* rejects a present 
from Mortiss AU of Vellore, 630; captures 
Fermacoil, 6^; captures various j^aoes 
around Pondicherry, 631; captures Ville- 
uore, 634; prepares to besiege Pondicherry, 
635; is superseded in command by Colo- 
jpel Monson, 636; Colonel Monson btdrig 
wounded, Coote resumes the command. 


CORNWALLIS 

Coota, Captain Eyre,— 

1.63/; Pondicherry surrenders to him, 639; 
dispute between liim mid the Madras pre¬ 
sidency, 641; appointed (as Bir ^re 
to succeed General Cluvering, both a.s 
member of council and commander-in- 
chief, ii. 429; sent to preiumi military re¬ 
sources on tiin north-west frontier, 452; 
arrives from Bengal to sutiersede Bir Hec¬ 
tor Monro in the war o^nst Ilyder, 485; 
takes the field against Hyder, 465; relieves 
Wandiwash, 487; desultory oi>erati(iiis near 
Cuddalore, 488: the council of Madras give 
him military instructions; his reply. 489; 
failure of his attempt on Chilambruni. 489; 
his victory over Hyder All at Porto Novo, 
491; frustrates an attempt of Tippoo Baliib 
to cut off a detachment froui Bengal, 493; 
captures Tripassore, 494; conquers llyder 
Ali at I’olliloro, 494; his troops are in want 
of provisions, 495; c^onqncrs Hyder at Sho- 
linghur, 495; mi attack ou a dotaclmient 
of his repulsed, 496; secures a supply of 
provisions from Vellore, and takes i/tiit- 
toor; starvation in his army, 497; isdan- 
m>rouBly ill, yet hastens to relieve Velloix^, 
49Ji; his qtiarrel with Lord Macartney, 5(J1; 
offers the Flinch tiattle, wiiich tliiiv <1ocline, 
563; successful encounter with Hyder at 
Amoc, 563; resigns hiscomni.'uul to Major- 
general Stuart, 605; his death, .511; on the 
extraordinary powers bestowed on hka by 
tlie Bengal govemnient. 529. 

Cope, Captain, sent in coiinnand of an ex])C'- 
(lition to Taiijnre, i. 436; liis unsuccessful 
attempt on Mudura, 455. 

Comwiulis, Lord, his (qiinion of Bir Juiin 
Msicpherson, ii. 561; made (.Jovernor-geiu- 
ral of India, 568; his appointment gcnc- 
rally approved. 570; first imfiortant acts of 
his adininistmtion; cunccds MaephorRon’s 
treaty with the Mahrattiis, 570; his view 
of tii<^ financial difficulties of tlie (.'om- 
pany, 571; liis dealings with tiie Nalxib of 
Ou<le, and final arrangement witli linu, 571; 
the shozada's offered visit declined, 573; 
his HulMSiquent interview with the shiv- 
Ziula at Benares, 574; Nizam All’s treaty 
with. 580; questionable policy of his in 
reviving on old treaty with Nizam AU, so 
os to give it the effect of a new, ^1; 
his motives for tlie #iourse udopteit 582; 
forms a trii>le leagtie against Tii>poo t^hlb, 
585; ills lett(‘r to Governor Holland, 587; 
resolves to command in person against 
Tippoo, 593; letter to hfs brother, the 
Bishop of Lichfield and Coventry, 594; he 
oiiens the campaign, 596; his narrow cscaiKS 
from a dash made at him by throe of Tip- 
jHio’s horsemen, 597; takes Bangalore, 597; 
pursues Tippoo, 599; resolves to advance 
on Beringapataui, 600; prei>arcs for a gene¬ 
ral engagement with Tippoo, 601; gains 
the battle of Carigut, 602; is compelled by 
want of provisions to retreat, 603; is suc¬ 
coured and relieved by the Malirattos, 603; 
proceeds with the Manrattos to Bongahm': 
arrangements and oiicratiotis of the tin itei I 
army, 605; his reply to Tippoo’s expres¬ 
sion of his desire to negotiate, 606; m< 
from Bangalore,(iP7; capturesNimdidroog, 
607; lays mege to and siaiitureK Bavandroog, 
1)08; makes anight attack on Seringuiiat am, 
612; ro.siilts of liis night attack on Beringa- 
patam,6]3: is wounded inhcadingacharge. 
1)15; treacherous attempt planned against 
his life ^ Ti]>iNH>, 617; his ultimatum of¬ 
fered to Tippoo, 618; Tippoo's sons are <U')i- 
vered to him as liostagcs, 620; his views of 
the iieace made witli TiptK)o,6^;hiH^}isive 
poli(^ in reference to the Mahrattdg 624; 
his views regarding Itidian governor^ 624; 
his arrangements with Mnlioined AH, 625; 
financial reforms introduced hy him, 627; 
his view's as to land tenure, 629; adopts a 
permanent seiiiindary settlement, 631; his 
views sanctioncxl by tho British ministry, 
632; the soundness of his settlement ques- 
tionable, 632; judicial reforms introdia^cd 
by him, 633; his views os to the constitu¬ 
tion of the (kmipany, 637; his arrival in 
England; his reception (xintrasted with 
that of Hasthigs, 640; the contrast whicli 
his character and administration pi'csciib 
to those of Hasting 651; his profsised rc- 
appoiiitmeut as Governor-general of India, 
075; Mr. Dundos’ letter to him on the au]>- 
ject Of his reappointment, and his repl>% 
676; is sworn into office, but home occun 
rencos induoe him to draw back, 676; 1>c- 
comes again Governor-general of India, 
^3; tho course marked out fof him, 604; 
his pusillanimous r>roceediugs, 804; shame- •> 
ful concessions to Bcindia, b 05; his death, 
and character of his administrations, 800. 



INDEX. 


719 


CORNWALLIB 


RKLIir 


ComwallU, Arlmiral, ii. 639. 

C!ortereal, Ganpur anti Miguel. Portuguese 
iiavigatora, i. 197. 

Cortland, General Van, Hi. 509, 

M.. aaaiHta TipiKw at Mangalore, 

Coaslniba^nr, attacked and iiIllugedbyHura- 
jah Dowlau, i. 533. 

Co^Biiiaiit Jiaboo, tlie case of, ugaiust the 
Rajali of (^OHsIjiiraii, iU 435; nis actirei 
against '^the co\irt of Ctdi'.utta, and the 
abrupt withdrawal of it, 430; his caseex- 
plainetV 437. 

C^ottfin. iiuluccTncnts and olxttauhm to the 
cultivation off extent of tlio cultivation 
of, in India, ii. 15S; the manufacture of, 
in India, lt>4. 

<*ottou, lirigarlier-general (George Kta- 

i doton Cotton. Viscoiiut Ooinl)erineri'i, 
iiH o)>eratiouH in liunnab. in. 165. 172; 
moves against Bhurt|H>or, and cimtures 
it. 183. 

4V)ttoii, Miijor-gcneral Sir Willoughby, sent 
on the Afghan cxfieditiou, til. 341; halts 
at Dadur, 352; the Bengal army placed 
miiler liis cumtnand, 354: appoints Gene¬ 
ral Nott to trainiuillba^ the flhiljtc coun¬ 
try, 309; approves of tlie conduct of Gcni- 
eral Nott ti>warUs tlie othcials of Bhuii 
Shujab, 373; resigns his command in Af¬ 
ghanistan, and returns to India, 382. 
CMivteu's Association, i. 269; renionstranfXf 
of the Bust India Company against, 2«>9; 
its decline, 273; its union with the Kast 
India CotniMwiy, 273. 

Covcioug, propiiratl<»nB by th<^ British fur 
the siege of, i. 482; how tlic l‘'reiic:h first 
gai^eil possession of. 484: Clive's diili- 
cnlnes licforc, an<l capture of, 484. 
Cnvorjiiauk, aitair of. i. 4 W. 

< !ox’s licsidenct' ia the liuvnum Enii>ire, re¬ 
ferred to, iii. 109. 

< h*a<ldock, Bir John, Jiis crxlc of n^gnlations 
occasions the Vellore mutiny, ii. 813; liis 
rerxdl, 837: tlie retrenchments nnule by 
him occasion the Madras mutiny, 838. 
(.'reation, the, iiitidoo doctrimt of. of the nni- 
verse, ii. 17; of inferior <leities, 18; of 
men. 19; Itmdciicyof till iKuiigs to decay, 
19; Innuan and divine imriods of, 20. 
lYeed of the Hindoos; fundaiiieiitsil prin¬ 
ciples of rcligioiu liolicf. ii. 57; <logniaof 
trausmigration, oS; views of licavuu, 00; 
viitws of hell, 61; monU sysiciu, 02. 
I'rlmiuiil law aunmg the ilindoos, ii. ]i>3. 
CnunwoU, Oliver, his ilecisiou respecting the 
lOiist India C-oinpany, i. 278; liis death. 280. 
<Vc>w, Sub-conductor, Ills brave conduct in 
defence of the I>clhi luogsixiiio, Ui. 508. 
fVusadcs. tlie effects of tlie, on commeras 
&c.. i. 145. 

C^siiatriya and Vaisya castes, the. i. 11. 
Cuihlalorc, the attempts of the Fivueh on, 
ropulled, i. 422; iu‘W attempts of the 
French on, 424; Coote’s desulton' openi- 
tiouB near, il. 488; taken by IJy^ler Ali, 
502; <*eueral Stuart's oi>erations near, 
512; the liattlo of. 513; dangerous }H>8i- 
tion of the British in. 515. 

Cuppage. (’oloucb proceetls against Vailoo 
Tainbi, it 836; is suspuiiiled from coni- 
maud, 841. t ^ 

Cureton, Brigtulicr, killed at Ramiiuggur, 
iii. 521. 

Currie, Sir Kix^derick. resident at Laliore, 
contemplates advancing a British force 
on Mooltau, iii. 508: hU .successes. 510. 
Oiitch, tlie state of affairs iu. in 1818. lit 
27 ; Britiftli iiiterfcivtice in the all'airs of. 
27; military oiieratioiiR of the British iu, 
28; the rajult of, 114; a dreaAlful eurth- 
qnuke in, 115; disturliivnccs in. 179. 

Cutch Gnndava, the physical foatnms of, 
lit 501; tiiu inhabitants of; Bir ('iiarlcs 
Napier's oiieratioti.s in. 502. 

Cuttack. General Wellesley’s operations iu, 
ii. 757; iuBurrection iu, iii. 125. 

('iitwah, on the Ganges, taken by Oooto, t 
575, 

Ouvera, the Uindoo god of wealth, ii. 33. 


D. 


B'Achd. Count, bis arrival in India, i. 596; 
liis naval engageiuent with Admiral Ho- 
cocke, 597; lands his troops to liesiegeFtirt 
ttt. David. 597; his cowanily conduct, 598; 
defeated by Admiral Pococke at Oairical, 
€02; his ilastardly conduct. 603; lias aii' 
other engagement with AdxuimI Pococke, 
618; bu^ timidity, 619. 


Dacoitoe an<l Dacoits, the suppression of, 
it 194. 

Dada Khasloe Walla, an intriguer in tho 
court of (iwolior, iii. 475; meditates the 
seizure of Mama Saliili, but Is intimidated, 
475; his intrigues, 470; Is mailc prisoner 
by his opponents. 476; the delivery up of 
his jK^rson d6inando<l by the governor- 
general. 477. 

Dailur, Sir Willoughby Gottoii'a lialtnt. on 
tho cxiiedition to Afghanistan, lit 332. 

Dahir, Itajuh of Bciiidt», defenils his king¬ 
dom uguinst the Aral»s, i. 40; his defeat, 
41; singular revenge taker, by one of Jiis 
daughters on ('asiiu Mahomed, her 
father’s coiupieror, 41. 

Dalhousit!, Lord, made Governor-gonend of 
India, iii. 505; his proelamalion respect¬ 
ing th<! annexation of Oude ; choractcTof 
his odministmtiou. 550. 

Dolla. Bheikh, iii. 177. 

Dalton, t'aptaiu, hifvvigilanett snves Triclii- 
iiotHily, i. 480 ; detects a French spy, 489. 

Daly, < ^iptain II., c.ominaud(!rof the guides, 
reaches Delhi; his gallaulry there, lit 
602. 

Dafzcll, <h*neral, attempts to bring the Ik n- 
gal inutiueers to a sense of duty, iii. 150. 

J>andis, the, ii. 74. 

Dara, son of Shall Jehan, c<uib‘Kts tJic siic- 
ceft.'^ion to hi.'j falhctr. i. 287; hi.s adver¬ 
saries, 290. 

Dariiu) Sing, a Buiidela chief, comiielletl to 
Riureiidcr his fort. ii. 828. 

D’AuteuU, <lefeatH Anwar-u-din, I. 44-3; ai4ls 
Muyjcnffer Jung, 447 ; snjH.TM'dciftM. l^jvw, 
475; retreats to Volcoiida, 477 ; cimiicm to 
terms with Glivo, and buneiiders Vol- 
comla, 477. 

DavM, l*\)rt St., 5. 351; the I'rencli expedi¬ 
tion against; theirrepnlse. 420 ; elation of 
the Fuglishat, 42.5. ticneriil Bally prepares 
to lay siege to, 590 ; the siege uiul capture 
<if, by the Fnaich, 597 ; Bally’s exultation 
at tho capture of, 599. 

Davis, <!JaptaLii, takes ('arang<»ly, ii. 48G. 

Dawar, captured by Captain Little, ii. 006. 

Dawood Khan, lakes np arms against Ak- 
IxT, and is defeated, i. 132. 

I>ay, Sir J<i)in, Ins opinion in tho case of 
Oossinaut Bahoo, ii. 4.35. 

Do Castro, niliovcs Din, i. 192; hf.s ostenta¬ 
tions celehiution of the victory; characU:r 
and death, 193. 

Do Cattan.s, a Frt'nch ollicer, acting as a 
spy at Trichinoimly, is deloirtcd, i. 489; 
is hung, 49.5. 

XK'ccaii, the, table land i. 0: invaded by 
Ala-n-4lin, 70 ; coiKpiest of, hy Ala-u-tliii. 
84; Akber claims the suprcniacy In, 137; 
Aklier's campaign in, J38 ; Aklier’s suc¬ 
cesses in, 139; Insurrection in, against 
Shall Jcliaii, 2^: tlic kings of. made, tribu¬ 
tary, 283; cani]»aignHin, 285; AnnmgzelHi 
arrives in, 294; proi*ecdings of tbo Moguls 
in, 339; arrival of Sufiler Ali in, 433 ; Ni- 
zaui ul-Moolk in, ; General Wullosloy 
cninmand.s in, 749. 

Dccg, the vict<>ryof, ii. 782; General Lake 
advances on, 785; its noted stnuigth, 785; 
tlie siege and capture of. 785. 

Deeps, taie seven, of ancient Indian geo- 
grapliy. i. 1. 

Ih^famation, tbo law’s relating to, among 
tlie IJindoos, ii. 103. 

Defer, slays DuIkus, the Fnaich king's com- 
niissioucr, inn duel. i. 641. 

Dc (hima, Vasco, his inaritimc distuivories, 
i. 153; his course along tho African coast, 
1.54 : at Mozambjiue, 154; ut Mombae 
and Melinda, 155; engages aGuje.rat iiilot, 
155 ; an’ival of. at Calicut, 155; bis landing 
at Calicut, 157; bis visit lo thi^ 2^niorin 
of ('tUicut, 157; his reception at the Zitmo- 
riu's jialuce, 15S; his pr<»iK)S' d present to 
tho zamoriii, 159; his soconcl visit to the 
Kumorin. 160: Mooiish intrigues against, 
ICO; is fonsihly detained aslioro ; his r<j- 
Icase, 101 ; tho zatnorin becomes hostile 
lo, and ho retahatew, 1C2; is attacked by 
the zamoriii's fic’ct, 163; his arrival iu 
Portugal, and return to the East with a 
now cxiiedition. 163; sent, out on a fresh 
expedition. 169; his new title ; capture of 
au Egyptian ship by. 160; his barljarlty, 
170; atflanore aiidt'alicnt, 170; treachery 
of tho Zatnorin of (.Jalkuit hi; his return 
to Europe, 171. 

Dcranin, tho treaty of, ii. 771. 

DcUii, the rajah of. opposc.s and defeats 
Bhahnh-u-«llu, i. 58; tlie riijah of. is du- 
fonted hy Shahab-u-dlii and put to death, 
60; is made the capital of a Midiometan 
dynasty, 64; Rukn-u-din reigns at, 64; 
the sister of Ruku-u-diu, Sultana Ksgia, 


I Delhi,- 

I governs, i. C5;JS1(iiz-u-diii Bchram succeeds 
to the tlirone of, i’>6; Na-sir-u-iUii Mah- 
mo(Ml reigns at, 66; emliossy from tho 
King of Persia arrives at. Ou; hatiits of 
Nasir-u-ilin. king of, 67 ; Biilbun succeeds 
Nosir-ti-din at. 67; Keikuluul succeeds 
Bulbuii at, 72; Jelul-u-Klin succeeds Kei- 
kobad at, 74; the throiu» of, usunied 
hy Ala-u-din, 78; is bJockoiled by tlio 
Moguls, 82-; reign of Mooluirik in, 86; 
Glio/y Beg Toghlak monnts the throne 
of. 87; the son of <iha/y Beg Toghlak suc¬ 
ceeds liirn in. 88; athmipt of tlu* king 
of, to remove his capital to Dowletabad, 
96; Fertizc ascends the throne of, 91; 
Ghoios-u-din reigns aloite at, 92; Tamer¬ 
lane iH'sicges and sacks. 95; dismomlier- 
inont of the kingdom of, 96; Mnlloo Yek- 
lial endeavours to restore. 97 ; the ex-king, 
MahnuKid Toghlak. invited to. 97; Kliizr 
Klian, Tanierlaiie’H ilenuty, at. 97: Moo- 
liarik KUocec«ls KliizrKhon at, 98; Prince 
Malimood, Moolmrik’s son, dhecceds him 
ut. 98; BIumIoIc Issly aims at the tlirono 
of. 98; Ala-u din, son of Mahinood, as- 
eendH thutliroiic of. W; Ala-u-iiii) removes 
in's rosiihuici’from, to Biidaoon, 99; Bhci- 
lolo fotiiuU the J.i(Hly Afgliun dynasty ut, 
109: opiMisition <if the Hliurky family to 
Blieilole at. 101; Kikundur I’eignsat, JOl ; 
Ibrahim siuxa'cds Bhcilole at, 103; cap¬ 
tured by Buber, 111; IhilKT rtdgns at, 112; 
BiilH'r’s son. lltHiuiaytKin. succectls him 
ut. 114; Hhecr Khiui seizes the thniiie 
of, 310: HiMunayoon again mukes hiiiistdf 
master of, 119; is taken and sackcHl by 
Nadii’Shah. 3‘.)9 ; Nadir Sliah’s departure 
irom, and rival factions ut. 4<X); reign of 
Ahincd Shah ut, 402; reign of Alnxngecr 
11. at. 493; victory of Gcax'rul Lake at, ii. 
701; llolkar’s on. 789; gallant de- 

fcticti of, agaiiiHt llolkar, 780; dislurbanct s 
at, 832 ; l^ord Amherst's interference with 
the king of. iii. 18b; the king of, dissatis- 
iicMl, sends ItanuiKihiui Boy its his age... 
to England, 211; the imiiieiiKo military 
magaziiicH of, K'ft in cluirgc to native 
troops, .5.55: arrival of the Meerut nmti- 
iieers in, 507 ; tho atrocities of the Mei 
inutineers in, 367; the native troo]iH in, 
join the mutiny, 508; utteiniitof the mu- 
tims'rs to get iKisses.‘<ioii of the nhagazine 
of, 568; heroic defence of the niagazine 
of, by nine British soldiers, 569; eouruge 
displayed by the British sohliers in blow¬ 
ing up the magazine of, 509; tlio rebellkiii 
regularly organized in, 570; horrible mas¬ 
sacre of wonioii and children within the 
precine-tH of the palace of, 571 ; projianv- 
tioijs lor the recovery of it from the mu¬ 
tineers, 599; a British force arrives on the 
heiglits iilwivc, 601 ; arrival of the guides 
fiom the Punjab at, 601: various attempts 
of the relssls to turn the iKmltion of tho 
Ihitisli, 602; oiiorationH of tlie Britisii lie- 
fore, 603; proiMinal to take it hy surprise 
ubandotuMl, 694; deKcri]i<ion of. 604; tho 
jialucc of, 605 ; strong <iefeiisivc iiositioii 
oi tlie British lehire, 606; new attack ou 
the British liythe niutiiu’ors in. 607; at¬ 
tempt of the uiuiineersto gain the Britisii 
rear. 697; reinfoi’ceineiits arrive to tho 
British, and to the ri-lHlr, in, €08 ; capture 
of Sid»zco Mmidee; Hindisi Bow’s hoiiso 
asruiled, 608; t>i<i British forc-e increased 
iK’fore, 609; iinporimit aid arrives from 
the J'unjah to the British force liefoi-e, 
CIO; (liltKiilties of the siegn of, 631; an 
assault Ofruin iiroposed, aiaf nlmndoncA 
()12; rtMiiforconicnta received by the Bri- 
li.-h uimI i’( N'l:.. <>13: lels'] cxiieuition sent 
n- ill. iiguiiiM Alipi i-r, €13; renewed ut- 
teiiipts oi the fcIicIb on the British rear, 
634; lU'W attacks on tho Britiih by tho 
rclsds, G14; disunion among the reliels in, 
615; arrival <if Kiciiolson’s moveable e<i- 
Imiin bcfoie, 615; exploit of Captain Hod- 
son ut Itolitiik. 616: defeat of tlie rebels 
under Mahomed Buklit Khan at Nujuf- 
gliur, hear Delhi, 616; arrival of the siege 
tiaiti, 617; erection of liatterics, 618; the 
breach itig liattcrics liegiu to play, 619; tho 
iissaiilt, 619; the Cashmere gateforce<l; 
Brigudier-gnieral Nicholson dangerously 
woiindetl. 620; advance of tho British 
troops into the city; tMtrtiiU failure. 621; 
iilowing oxion tlie Cashmere ga te; heroism 
. of Licuteiiuuts Rolkckl oiul Home, and 

•* otheni, (i21; lieutenant Salkeld killed, 
622 ; progress of the attack. €22 ; General* 
Nicholron mortally wounded, 620, 623 f 
the British soldiers liecome intoxicated, 
and retaixl the taking of the city, 623 ; the 
hombatdment of the Jiunnia Musjid and 



720 


INDEX, 




EAST INDIA CO. 


Dclhf.— 

night of the king, iii. 624; the king captnrcd 
and brought back ; execution or hie eouH, 
625; death of Cieneral Nicholson, 625; 
Lord Canning on the capture of j>elhi, 
625. 

Deuuie, Licutenant-colotml, at tiie Btonii> 
iiig of Ohuxnoe, iii. 35'J; uh brigadier, 
utterly defeats the anny of Dost Maho¬ 
met, near liainian, 378; predicts that 
only one man sliaU ettcatHi to tidl of the 
slaughter of the <;aboo] army, 436; ilefc.itfl 
the enemy who were Hurro\tudiiig Sale's 
brigatlo, 431; liis death, in an cngageinout 
with the Afghans, at «ielalat»ad, 436. 

Dennis. Major-general, iii. 482. 

Deothul, iitta('Ke<l end ta.ken by the Eng¬ 
lish, iii. 21; au attack on, by the Glioor.va'^ 
rcpulsetl. 22. 

Deru Uliosce Khan, captured by Hyder 
Khaii. iii. 510. 

Derby tninistry, the, introduce a n<‘w hill 
for the better goveruiiieat of India, iii. 
687. • 

Desertion of a Uritish oilltJer, ii. 252. 

l>ova Krishan Itow, the Boondcu minister, 
as.sas8lnat4Hl, iii. 223. 

l>evicotta, tJie siege of, i. 433; the capture of, 
439. 

Devotion, Hindoo, ii. 63; itscxcluflivfntwiH,64; 
its true charaeh^r. 64; its irrational charac¬ 
ter, 65; deep iiiit iK*rverte(l feeling in, 65- 

Dewal) Anuijee, iii. 203. 

Dhor, captured from the mutineer sepoys, 
iii. 678. 

Dkrrmt., a curious custom among the Hin¬ 
doos, ii. 20J ; a reiiuirKable instance of, a.4 
practised by liyder AH, 225. 

Dnondoo Punt tiokla. attacks Dhoondia. ii. 
714; pursues liim with his Maliratta.H, but 
is defeated an<l slain, 738. 

Dhoondia Waugh.his origin, history, ravages, 
and defeat hy (’olonel JJalr>'inp]e and 
tiolfind Kteveusoii, ii. 713 ; pursued by the 
Mahrattas, whom lie defeats, 733; pur¬ 
sued and ami Hiilutcd 1 ly Colonel W elleslcy, 
738. 

Dhuleop Sing. iii. 487, 528. 

Dh>an Sing. iii. 480. 

'Dias, Jhirtolommco, his iHscovertcs, i. 151. 

Dick, Colonel, his braver}’among the (ihoor- 
kas, iii. 19. 

Itilkonsiia pjirk. the. ciptiiri'd fr<un the 
ndh'I.H. 111. 0 ■(!; the l>dHo.Mlia ■•.(lai'e scs/. vl, 

Dinaiioor, the sepoy mutiny at, iii. 644. 

I>inar, the golden, vahui of. i. 46, vote. 

DiiKliguI, occu)>ie<l by Jlyiler AH. ii. 2J0. 

Diixlorus Siculus, (|uotcd as to Semiramis, 
i. 21, 

Dirnm, Major, his NnratU'eo/the (Jumpaitjv 
ialndhi, ciuoh'd, li. 603. 608. 

Disraeli's lull for the lietter government of 
liuiia. iii. C88. 

Dill. aPortupieseGXpeditionsentag.ainst; its 
failure, i. 188; the Ptirtuguese liesiegod in, 
190; siegeof. raisisl; attempt to poison the 
garrison; the siege of. renewed, 191; re¬ 
lieved by l>e <’astro, 11^. 

Divuloiid. the, of th<? ICast India Comi),any 
increased, ii.286; regulated by parliament, 
287. 

Dual), disturhantjca in the, iii, 32; sepoy 
mutiny in, f»77. 

Doast Ali, I. 430. 

JtokuiiH, the. ii. 748. 

Don. Colonel, captures Tonk Dampoora. ii. 
770. 

Dfinabcw, tj^e stockades of, iii. 166; failure 
of an attivck of the Hritisli on the uLoekat Ics 
of, 167; the stockades of, taken by tiie 
'Hritish. 168. 

Donkin, CeiK'ral. notices of. iii. 62. 79. 

J>iK>gaur, tiie battle of, ii. 461. 

Dooraiiees, the, i. 403; their struggles w'ith 
the Mahrattas. 405; defeat tiie Mahratt-as, 
406; revolt against Shah Shujah, Hi. 382. 

Doorgawutty, Queen of (hirrali, an unprinci¬ 
pled attack on. by Asuf Klian Hcroy, au 
Ushek leiwlor; her death, i. 127. 

Dost Mabotued. <if CabiHil, defeats Shah 
Shnjah, iii. 229; las treacherous attack on 
Herat, 286; csc^ies to Cashmere, 287; 
captures i ’alK>ol, 287; is threatened by two 
armies in Calsx)!. 288; com]>cls llabiboolali 
Khan to shut himself up in the Bala 
IliHsar, 289; hollow truce betw'cen him 
and Sultan Mahomod. 289; renews his 
claim on (’abool, 290; attempts t<» reixivcr 
I'eshuwcr from Rtiiiject Sing. 291; victo» 
I of his sons overaSikh army, 292; hisdubi- 
« ouB tiolicy. 293; his letter to Lord Auckland, 
395; his reception of Lieutenant Alexan¬ 
der Bumes, 2w; his interview with Lieu¬ 
tenant Jiurnos, 299; his statement rusiiect- 


Dost Mahomod, — 

ingthe propoMid olHance between Persia 
and the Afghans, iii. 300; secmid interview 
with Lieutenant Bumes, 303; letter of, to 
the (!!zar of Russia, 304; Lord Auckland’s 
luiughty treatment of, 311; Lord Auck- 
lami’s supureilious letter to, 312; unto¬ 
ward rosiuts of Lord Auckland's letter to, 
313; new jiroposals of, to the Biitish, 314; 
fruitless negotiations with, 314; his letter 
to the governor-general, 315; his state- 
inonts to Captain Burnes, 315; hi.Hconstcr- 
natUm at the fall of fxliuznee, and attempt 
to negotiate, 361; his flight, 362; takes 
refuge with tho Kiiaii of Bokhara, and 
afb^rwonls in tlie territories of thoWullco 
of Khooloom, 368; acts in concert with tho 
WuUeeof Khooloom, 377; routed by Briga¬ 
dier Deiinio, 378; mice more a wanderer, 
379; Hir 'William Macnaghten’s bloo<ly 
thoughts rcsiKf.tiug, 380; his encounter 
with British native troojjs, 380; his surren¬ 
der to Sir William MiMUiaghtep, 380; his 
treatment by Sir William Macnaghten, 
381; is sent prisoner into Britisli India, 381. 

Dotiglas, Captain, among the first munlered 
by the mutineer seiioys at ]>e]hi, iii. 567. 

Douglas, B]'iga<Hor, at Lucknow, iii. 674. 

Doiiiuleakii’H, Lielonging to Rum Bux, eap- 
ttireil, iii. 7(KK 

T>ovoton, (;oloncl. iii. 62; intimidates tho 
Rajah f>f Nagjsior, 73; routs the peishwu's 
army, 91. 

l>owlct Row H<4ndia. S<h* Srindvi. 

Dowletaliad, Mahomed Toghlak attempts to 
make it his capital, i. 90. 

Ihiwlut KhanLody, governor of Lahore, rv.- 
volts against Ibraliim of liclht. i. lU-1. 

IVDyley’s o/ Jtacca, quoted, i. 

647, vote. 

Drake, Sir Francis, his cruises against 
Kisinianls, i. 208; his li-strolalje, 208; his 
proe<*ediiigB de<!lared piratical by Sjiain, 
but hononnsl by England. 209; visitetl by 
tpieen Kli/abeth on hoanl his ship, 209. 

Draki*, governor Bengal, liia dimtui'dly 
fiiglit mmi Calcutta, i. MU. 

Ilrania, tlu^ }iind(M>, ii. 137; its defects. 138 

Draper, Colonel, makes a Sidly against the 
Frtuich Ix^sieging MailraR, li. 607. . 

l)rai»er, Mr. Daniel, member of the Botnliuy 
council, ii. 2(»1. 

Drilling machine, the, of the lliruluos, ii. 
154. 

Dublia, Sir CHiarlcs Naiticr's victory at, iii. 
469. 

Diibhoy, tlie fort' of, !i. 455. 

DulMiis, imu’ilen^d on coming out of tlie 
gates of l\>ndicht!rry, i. 641; his Muuurm 
riT. of iii. 14. 

Dtidcrnaigue, M., surrenders to the British, 
il. 764. 

Duff R Imlia ovd Indian JUlUsious, referred 
to. ii. 49. 

Duff’s, Captain, Hii*torn of the Mahrattas, 
quoted. 1 . 511. .515; ii. 3»52. 444.663; iii. 85. t>2. 

Duke of 'Vork, Lord (Virnwallis’liflibor to. on 
the nuat\cial dithcultius of tlic East India 
Company, ii. 571. 

Dumdum, theuianufacbure of cartridges for 
tile KnficM rille at, iii. 556; complaints 
mode about the cartridges at, 557. 

Duncan. Mr. Jonathan, his exertions t>o put 
down infaiitioUlc in India, ii 180. 

Duiidas, Mr., his hill of pains .and penalties 
against Indian ofiiclals, ii. 548; LordtNirn- 
w’allis* letter 57J; liis letbT to J^onl 
(kirn wal}isa.H to thedeclaratory hill, 578; his 
declaration of iuahiUtyto fasten any eriiu- 
iiial iiituntion on Warren iiastings. 642; 
his claim to faimeas in liis dealings with 
the COHO of Hastings, <;44; disisised to l>e- 
oome (jtovernor-geiieral of India. 655; Ins 
letter to T,or(l Cornwallis on tho reappoint¬ 
ment of tlie latter to India, 675; reply of 
Lord (kmiwallis to. 676; his part in the 
discussions respecting the renewal of the 
charter of the Kast India Company. Hi. 1. 

Dupleix, appointisl ^vemor of tlie French 
settlements in India, and his ambitious 
designs, i. 408; coolness between, and 
I,abourdonnals, 413; his interference in 
the capitulation of Ma4lnis, 416; fits out an 
exi>edition against Fort St. I>avid, 420; his 
attempt on Cuddalore, 421; his second 
attempt on Cuddalore. 422; his thinl at- 
tomiit on Ciuldolore, 424; his ambitious 
thoughts, 428; itas recourse to diplomacy, 
447; extensive powers conferred on.'l^ 
Muxxuffer, 4.52; insulting procecslings of, 
towar<ls the KngHslu 456; memorial of his 
vanity, 470; liia capture of Swiss mercen¬ 
aries employed hy the English, 482; at 8i>r- 
ingapatani, 487; superseded by M. Gud- 
elieu, 506. 


Durjan Sal, supplants hisuephow, the Rajah 
of Bhurtpoor, iii. 179; put down Iv the 
British and made misouer, 181. 

Dutch, the, exiKHlitibnB of, to India, under 
Houtmami, L 218; progress of the East 
India trade of, 223; their jealousy of 
English trade with the luands, 245; 
tiieir opposition to the Engli^ Kast India 
Comiiany, 259; tlicir formal arrangement 
with tim l^^t lu(ba Oomt>any, 260: new 
quarrels of tiie Knglisli with, 26F; their ini- 
<iuitous and liarharous proceedings at 
Amlioyna, 2Gl; indignation in England at 
their hariiarous proceedings in Amboyna, 
363; protracted discussions with, 264; iwti- 
tion presentod to |»arliamcnt hy tho East 
India Comiiany against, 274; war of .Kng- 
laud witli, 275; their ascendcin^ in Gic 
Ikist, 275; treaty with. 276; the Flast India 
(’oinpany’s war with, 326; |)eace lx».twecn 
Knglaiul and, on the accession of William 
111. and Mary, 327; their progress 

in India, 350; an armament sent to Bengal 
by, 66i); Olive’s preimratious to opiMiso 
their aiunameut, 660; Mcer Jufiiers in¬ 
trigues with, 601; a imuiifesto pulillKhcd 
by, ami Clive’s rt?ply, 661; JioRtilitics com- 
mence^l with; their defeat, 662; oouditioiis 
dictatml by ClivtJ, 663; Hyder Ali con- 
elndes a treaty w’ith, ii. 497; attack of the 
English on their Bettlements; its suocess,848. 

DwelHugs of the Hindoos, ii. 168. a 

Dyaiam of Hatras, iii. 33. 


E. 


EarllKpinkc. a dre^idfiil. at Outch, iii. 115; a 
ti'cmeudous, at J elalabail. 435. 

l^t. the, overlatul journey to, i. 151; first 
EugllHh voyage dirt^ctly to, 212; association 
of English im^rcliant a^lvcnturers for a 
voyage to; their jiutition to the queen. 224; 
apiiroval of tlie voyage to, granted and 
witiidrawn, 224. 

East, Coloue), Ills military oi>cration8 in 
Cuteh, lit. 28. 

JCsiHt India t’ompany, the, petition of mer¬ 
chant adventurers ti>|jQneen KHr-abetb, i. 
224; aiiproval of govornmentgnintod to.uiul 
Mdtlufrawn from, 224; meiiiorial of KiigUsh 
mcrdiantH to tlie privy <xmncil, 225; Fulke 
Ivrcvillb’s n^poi-t on tho memorial, 227; 
prtqiarations for a voyage to the East, 228; 
Rpiritoil conduct of tlie directors in rela¬ 
tion to government. 229; qualification 
for employment under the directors, 229; 
arrangements fur the first voyage, 229; 
mooting of the adveniurers and imymcnt 
of siihscriptlons, 230; ainKiintmeiit of 
officers to the exiiedition, 231; u charter 
gnuitcd to the Company: its form and 
objects, 231; tlic cliarter or, preHcriliCB tlie 
inode of niaiiageinenjv, 232; the charter of, 
imlicatos the <inaHucatiou for member- 
siiip, 233; tho cliarti^r of. prescri1>OR Uie 
geographical limits over wliich the Com¬ 
pany inigiit trade, 233; the diartcr of, si^ts 
forth the exclusivi, iirigilcges of the Com- 
jMiny, 234; Hulmci’i)>tioiis and payment of 
stock, 235; the queen’s letter to eastern 
prim es on behalf of. 236; the first voyage 
of, 238; voym^e home, 240; success of tlie 
voyage, 241: second voyage of, 241: attempt 
tti traile with the Spice 1 shuids, 242; rcRults 
of tlie second voyi^c, 243; Hiieiise m-tuiteti 
hy King .lames 1. to Sir Edward Micliel- 
bome, ^3; the third voyage, 244; first visit 
of the (’onqiany’s sliiiw to the continent of 
India, 245; Dutch jealousy and hostility 
towards, 245; sulHX'qucnt voyages of, 246; 
now charter granted hy King James I. 
to. 246; increased suliscriptiona under 
tliHir new' charter, 247; proceedings of Sir 
Henry Midilleton, one of tho Oomiiany's 
cninmandcrs, 247: arT<.igaiit claims of tho 
Portuguese, and reply, 248; ('a-ptain Haw¬ 
kins visits the cotirt of the Great Mogul, 
248; Hir Henry Middleton leaves Surat 
and returns to tlie Red Sea, 250; a Ihirk- 
ish firman olvtaineil in favour of theGom- 
IMUiy, 251, Captain Saris sent to Japan, 
252; voyage of Captain Hippon, 252; 
limited success of the (’ompany. 253; voy¬ 
age of Captain Best; his spii'iterl deedings 
the Portumiese, 254; Best’s treaty ^ 
with the Mogul, 255; resolve to iiude only 
on a Joint-strx;k, 255; send Sh- Thomas Roe 
on an embassy to the court of the Mogtd, 
2^; extension of theirtrado;‘dcaHngswith • 
Persia. 256; collision with tlio Fortuouese, 
258; encounter opposition froii\tbe Dutch) 



INDEX. 


721 


EAST IN'EIA CO. 

ISast Xndia CotnpaAy,— 

1.259: formal arraugemeut with the l>utcb, 
and institution of the council of defence, 
260; now quarrel with the Dutch, 261; 
iniquitous ana cruel treatmont of tlic ser- 
Tants of the Ooinpaujsr mid otbora at Am^ 
Itoraa, 261«; diiiicultios of the Oomiimiy, 
263; discusmons with the Dutch, 264; ap> 
plication to parliament, 264: mlverse pro¬ 
clamation by the crown, 264; apparent 
helplesshoaa and continued dtihoiiitieH of. 
265; perseverance in obviating diffloultleR, 
266: foundation of the trade with J^ugal, 
266; truce with the Portuguese, 267; licetiso 
granted tqr the crown to rival traders, ^7; 
charge against the Ooniiiany, ^6; Cuur- 
ten’s counter aa^^iatloii and remonstrance 
against it, 269; ^pressed state of, 270; 
attempt to form a new joint-stock, 270; 
drst settleinoiit at Madras, 271; purohivfc 
on credit of all the Company’s pepper by 
tiie king, to lie sol<l for ready money. 272; 
erection of a factory at Balasore, 27^; pro¬ 
posal to amalgamate with Oourten’s asso¬ 
ciation carried into effect, 272; petition 
presented to iiarliainent against the Dutdi, 
274; comi>ennation awarded to the Com¬ 
pany in the treaty of tiie English goveni- 
uient with the Dutch, 276 ; privileges oIh 
tained in Bengal, 277; arrangements in 
favour of tiio Company, 277; a new joint- 
stock company formed, 279; new arrange¬ 
ments abroad, 280; effects of domestic 
IioUticB on the proceedin^^ of the (Join- 
pauy, 309; a now charter granted by 
Charles 11.. 311; leading provisions of the 
new charter, judicial, militivry, and re¬ 
strictive, 311; conduct of thoir agent in 
Bengal, 313; affected by the proceedings 
«)f government reqjecting Bomltay, 315; 
are not ytrt alive to the init>ortunco of 
iiengal, 316: alarmed, but ftiially bene- 
ilted by the iuenrsion of the Mahrattas 
into Surat, 316; alarme<l by a Dutch war 
and a French East India Company, 317; 
troubles caused by Sir Edward Winter, 318; 
convention with the Portuguese restiectlng 
Bombay, 319; are involvtMl in a lawsuit 
on a constitutional (luestioti, 320: tea 
Imginsto form an investment of, 322; Bom¬ 
bay granted to them by goverumeut, 322; 
war with the Di^ch and alliance with 
Frainx;, 326; treaty witii Sevajee, theMah- 
ratta chieftain, 328; priiici}>lo of seniority 
established in the Company’s service, 330; 
injudicious retvcnclimcuts made by, 330; 
(Captain Kichard KcU^wlu’s mutiny, 332; 
atteiimts tofonna i^miatrade, 334; trade 
with Bantam, 334; thoir trade in tiie Per¬ 
sian (Inlf, and uncertain position there, 
336; HiiiguJur remonstrance with the King 
of Persia, 337; progress in Madras, 337; 
progress in l^iigal, 338; cliangeof their 
policy on the accession of James II., 340; 
claim indeiwudent iK>wor, 340; their war¬ 
like schemes, 341; extravagance and failure 
of thoir warlike scln'mes, 342; form Bom¬ 
bay and Madyae into regencies 343; con¬ 
tinual war with the Mogul, 344; their tor¬ 
tuous trolicy, 345; game of deceit with the 
Mogul. 346; capture of the Momil ships, 
346; Uioir disanimiutflients and humili¬ 
ating position, 347; effects of therovidti- 
tiou of 1688 u|M)n the Comitaiiy, 348; their 
aspirations after revenue, 348; jietition pre¬ 
sented to Uie House of Commons furanew, 
^9; state of their tratlo, 3^; the French 
and Dutch take advanti^ of thoir blun¬ 
ders, 351; acquirement of Fort Bt. David, 
351; parliamentary rcsolntions resiiecting, 
351; Intention of parliament to continue 
the mouoj>oly of the East India trade, 352; 
address to the crown to dissolve the Cr>m- 
pony, 352; new regulations proiiosod by the 
privy council; ohjoctions of the Company, 
353; answer of the king to the aildresspray- 
itis for tho dissolution of the Company, 
354; forfeit their charter. 355; a new 
charter grante^l, 355; special proviso in the 
new charter, and effect given to the pro¬ 
viso, 356; dissatisfaction with the new 
charter. 357; endeavours of the Company 
to obtain an act of parliament, 358; bob- 
pected of bribery'and corruption, 358; sin¬ 
gular contract into whicli the Couipoi^ 
had entered, 360; parliamentary proceed¬ 
ings respecting, 360; disclosures of Hir 
Thomas Cooke respecting, 361; deposltirnis 

• of persons euimlued. 362 ; impeachment of 
the Duke of Eeeds for taking bribes from 
the Company, 364; suspicious disappear¬ 
ance of an Important witness, 365; the 
• king’s athlress, mssolving parliament, and 
quashing inquiry, 365 ; a Scotch opposition 
company, its jpopulaiity for a time, and 
Vot. JTI. 


East India Company,— 
ffnal extinction. I. 366; inducements to 
form a new company, 372; disouasions on 
the subject of a new company, 372: report 
on the wairs of thd old Company, 373; act 
of tiarlloment forming a new oompany, 
373; notice given to the old Oompany, 374; 
a new joint-stock formerl, 375; impolitic 
arrac^mente, 375; tiie old Company still 
conffuent; greundsof this coiiild^ce, 376; 
two independent companies, 377: the 
amaigmuation of the old Company with 
tho ntfw, 378; position of the old at tlic 
time of the ama^amatlon; cnuiner^ion 
of their factories 379; obstacles to tiie 
union, 380; capital and name of the united 
(v'omiiany, 381; acquisitions of the united 
Oompany in Bengiu, 382; its constitution, 
383; its early history, 384 - imfiortaiit grants 
made by Farokshir to, 3e6; involved iu the 
affairs of Tatijore,.435: negotiations with 
the French uomi»any, 504; failure of the ne¬ 
gotiations with the French company^ 5(^; 
agreement entered into with the Frencli 
oomiMUiy, 506; aiubiguitios and other do- 
focts of the treaty with tiie French com¬ 
pany, 507; hostilities resumed, 508; negotia¬ 
tions witli thu Anglia pirates, 510; donuta- 
tiou to Delhi to complain of Jaflicr Kliau, 
519; implicated in the coiwplracy against 
BurajahDowlah, 569; their i^oenumtwith 
Meer JafHor, 573; advantages gained by the 
revolution in Bengal, 594; neutrality l>e- 
tween the English and French companies 
after the revolution in Bengal, 595; quarrel 
witi) Meer Cossim; monstrous pretensions 
of the Company's servants, 673; mutinous 
spirit of tile Coumany’s army, 678; sordid 
conduct of tlio Corapany’s servants, 6^; 
private trading forbidden to their servunts, 
687; corruptions of their servants, 680; 
attempts of their servants to evade the 
covenants against tuvkiug presents, 689; 
treaty with BuraJah Dowlali, 695; tiio 
directors abolisli <fouble liattu, 609; Clive 
carries the orders of the directors as to 
doulilc batta Into effect, 699; their Madras 
joghire, ii. 210; the Northern Circars 
granted to the Comiiany, 213; treaty with 
Ki^am Alt, 216; first contact with Hyder 
Ali, 243; views of the tlirectors as to Hyder 
AJj, 245; grant of Mysore to the Company 
by Nizam Ali, 260; forei^i policy of the 
directors, 261; newac<iuisition of territory 
deprof^ted, 262; danger apprehended by 
the directors from tiie Malirattas, 263; 
increase of <lividoii<l of the < lomiHUiy, 286; 
amount of tho Company's dividend re¬ 
stricted by parliament. 28?; opiiosiiion to 
the claim f>f govtiruuient to a share in 
Tiidlaii politics, 288; indignation of the i 
directors at the apnointinciit of a crown 
plenipotentiary to India. 291); Hyder Ali : 
claims assistance fn>m, 292; resolve to act 
ostensibly os dewau of Bengal and liehar, 
304; liastings’ letter to the directors amt 
their reply, 315; unworthy designs of Uie 
(^ompony, 320; involved in war with tbu 
Rohillas, 327; pecuniary ^ins the Ito- 
hilla war, 333: iiecuniary difficulties, 334; i 
forced by tho legiHla.ture to acce)it a loan, I 
343; a new constitution thrust on thoui, ' 
344; the regulating act, 344; oi>vet Hul- ! 
sette, 356; capture Balsette. 362; renewal | 
of tho cliarter, 547; Lord ComwaHis’ , 
opinion of the ffnanclol difftcultios of the , 
Oompany, 571; abuses in provhling for I 
the iuveatmeutsof tiie Oompany, 575; state i 
of the Company’s army, 676; atmscs in ' 
the army of Wie Oompany, 677; proposal ti> ! 
amalgamate tho king's troops and those I 
of tliH Company, 577; obstacles iu the way ; 
of the amal^mation proftosed, 578; col- 
lision between tho Boartl of Control and , 
the directors of tiie Oomiiany. 578; claims 
of tho ^impany to Ountoor enforced, 579; 
approaching expiry of tiie charter; Lord 
Oumwallis consulted as to future arrauge- 
inentB, 636; scheme proposed by govern¬ 
ment as to its ooiistitution: Lord Coni- 
wallis’ vievre, 637; the now cluirter, 638; 
territorial cessions to the Oompany iu 
Mysore, 709; raieunderstondiug iietween 
Lord Momington ami the direotora 735; 
quarrel Iietween the tUrectors and the go¬ 
vernment as to the appointment of a 
govemor-genoral, 818; rtnal decision of 
the quarrel, 819; dliqmtos with the Kajah 
of Travancore. 834; proposeil renowsJ of 
the chiuter of, and optioeitlon to their 
monopoly, iU. 1; oppowng views of tiie 
government, and the directors of, 2; neg^ 
tiations on the subject of the monopoly of, 

2: failure of tiiese negotiations, 3; renewal 
Of the discusaion in parliament respecting 


ELLENBOEOUGH 

East India Coihnany,- 
the charter ol.ni.3; terms of the new charter 
of, 4; leading provisions of tho new charter 
of. as to European residents, education, 
patronage, religion &c., 5; their pacific 
iuteroonree with Nepaul, 9; the policy of 
nondnterferenco adopted by, and the neces¬ 
sity of abandoning it. 34: tho ilirootois of. 
approve of the terms man ted to tho puishwa 
by Sir John Malcolm, 105; loan of the 
Nabob of Oudo to, 119; tiie directiirs of. 
disapprove of the proceedings of Willium 
Balnier & Co., 123; o^iosiiig views of tho 
directors of, and the Board of Control, 
recocting the affairs of William Palmer 
& Oo., 217; proceedings of tiie Boanl of 
Control in rcgaid to the claims of William 
l^oluior & Co. against the iiJzam, 218; a 
writ of niandamuH issued against the di¬ 
rectors of, ill tiie cose of William Palmer 
& Co., 219; approactiing expiry of tiio 
charter of, 280; arguments against the 
monopoly possessed by, 230; the (luestion 
as to hoir, for tiie future, the mrectnrs 
of, are to govern India, 231; nogotisi- 
tions liotwoeh the govorument and, 231; 
FcsolutioiiH oilnptiMl by iiarliament iu ro- 
S|»cct ti*, 233; bill emlHMlylug tlio resolu¬ 
tions adopteil by tho House of (lommtvus 
roB))octing, 235; progress of tho bill, 236; 
diasontient resolutions of tiie Coiirt of 
IMrectora of. 236; the hill rospodhig. 

I iassod, 237; loading sections of the now 
lill resiMicting. 238; sections rctsiHictiiig tliu 
iuid fia.Miifiii. of di\{deiid. 238; S(‘c- 
tioiis nv^pecliiig tlio isiavr of (be JliNinl of 
239; si-clions regarding the Ibni 
ie»l |Kiwer of the diivot»»rr* in nfs|H'Cl to 
adnnui.srmtion, 249; .seirtioiiH rcsjiecting 
p:itrotiiige. 241; HtM-tiotis relative to tho 
gov4>rniii<‘iii of India, 241; Sfetioiis n>- 
siK«cting the resldonoc of l^lurmiuaiis. and 
religiouH cstablishmouts, in India. 244; 
curious dUemma oocasioneil by tlio bill, 
245; objections to tho ap)>t>iiitment of any 
servant of, to b» governor-general, 254; 
chajigo in the constitution of, 551; petition 
of. to Wrliamont against Xsird I’almm'ston's 
bill n>r tho bettor government of Imlia; 
Mr. T. Baring's motion. 685; by an act 
emlxHlieil in a bill for tJie iM'tter govern- 
inont of Indio, the government of India 
is transferred to tiu^ crown, aiul the East 
India Company is alxilishoct 694. 

I'last India Conqiany, tlie Dutch, i. 223. 

KAHt India f’omiHuiy, the Frcncli, i. 317. 

East India nompatiy, tho Scotch, 1. 366. 

East India Houho, tlie old. i. 352, uotr. 
I'^lucation. among Uie Hindoos, ii. 199; liro- 
vision mode in tiio charter of the East 
India Ctiinpany for. Hi. 5. 

Kdwardos. Ijioiitenant. his military oj>ora- 
tions iu tho Punjab, iii. 509; his suuitosses, 
610; Ids F«ar«n thf Punjfth, quoted as hi 
the rulative strength of the Britisli anil 
8ikh armies, 511; defeats the Bikhs iu thu 
iNittie of Kinuyroo, -511; his victory over 
thu Biklis at Buddoosam, 513. 

Edwards. Bcrjeant, otic of tiie nine defenders 
of tho l>clhi magazine, iii. 568. 

Eedgali, tlio, in Moultan, iii. 507; desortioii 
of tho garrison and murder of the British 
officers in. .'iOS. 

Egerton, Colonel Charles, appointed to nom- 
maud the cxiHidiiion against Pooiiab, ii. 
447; quarrels with Mr. t’amac on a )ioiut 
of otiqibette. 448; cowariUy conduct of, 
449; his dismissal, 4.51. 

Egjlit, tho sultan of. Joins the crXubfnation 
of native IniHan states against tlio Portu¬ 
guese, i. 175; the sultan of, fihi out a ffuet 
wlUeb arrives in India, 176; Iionl Morn- 
• ingtou smuls an exiiodition to, ii. 734. 
Eiiiuk, an officer of ohahab-u-<tin’B, his ex¬ 
ploits. i. tk): his early history. 62; his affi¬ 
nity with Eldoz of Ghuznee, 64. 

Eibuk Khan, n Mogul chief, invades India 
and is defeated, i. 84. 

Eldoz of Ghuznoo, i. 62. 

Elephant, tiio singular feat of Morori How's, 
ii. 268. • 

Elik Khan, a Tartar prince, Invaitos Kho- 
rasau and is driven bock l>y Mahmootl 
Bultan. i. 45. 

Elizabeth, Qnoon, visits Bir Francis Drake 
on boartl his ship, i. 209; her enlightened 
views os to the ri^it of all nations to the 
sea. 212; petition of English merchants to, 
216; her letter to the commander of the 
first voyage uniler tiie charter of the East 
India Company, 236. 

Ellunboroimh, Lord, hie letter of protest to 
Eunjeot Sing. iii. 228; moves the appoint- 
• mont of a si^ct committee to inquire Into 
theoffalrsof tiio East India Company, 230; 

287 



722 


INDEX, 


ELLEITBOEOTTGH. 

Blleuborough. Lord.— * 
siicceedH Loixl Auokltuid as govemor- 

§ enora],iii. 442:hiflpoli(^indicate<t yotitH 
rst proiiibte Tjolied, 443; his iQisgivings us 
to his retrogrado policy. 446;viitually conn- 
tormatidH his onicr to the amiy to retire 
from AfghaniKtan. 448; throws Hie ro- 
Bponsihility of not retiring from Afgiiaiils- 
tan on Oeneral Nott. 449; hiu instructions 
respecting tiio gat^ of the teniiile of 
Bonii^utii, 450; liis ])rocIauxation n^pcct- 
ing the triumphant march of the Jj^nglisli 
on Cabo »1, 458; his i>n>clamation nwpept- 
liig the gates of Komnauth. 459; his 
iastructionsto Blr <Jharles Napier respect¬ 
ing tlio Ameers of Bcindo, 4*i2; his rclo- 
tioiiH with Sciiidia. 473; instnx^tionsto thi« 
British resident at Gwalior, 473; liis olTi'r 
of military ai<l iloclined hy Kdiitlia, 474; 
his policy towards Gwalior, 477; moves 
British trooiis towanis the frontiers of 
Heiudia, 477; his ulterior views resiH^cting 
Kcindia, 478; negotiations for an intorviow 
with the Maharajah of Gwalior, 479; ilie 
ri|;urous terms he dictates to Gwalior, 482; 
hiH recall, 483; character of his adtiiinis- 
tration, 4S4; liecoiiurs president of the 
Board of C^mtrol, 687 ; his ilespateh to 
Lord (banning, 690; his despatch con- 
<lemniiig lA>rd Canning’s iiroclamation. 
691; indignation of Lord Canning and his 
friends at the despatch of. 693; compelled 
to rest^ hispliMie in.the ministry, 693. 
Elliot, Mr., Ills death when sont an embassy 
tr) Borar, ii. 445. i 

]-lUis, Mr., his rashness in precipitating a > 
rupture with Moor Oussiin, i. 675; is mur- i 
dered along with others at l*atiia by Mure 
Cfjssim, 677. I 

EUora, tlio rock temples of, ii. 17. ! 

3'llphinstone, tlio Honourable Moimtstuart, j 

sent by Lon I Mhito on an embassy to I 
Cabool, ii. 833; becomes the resident at I 
l*oouah, hi, 36; protests against the recep¬ 
tion of the agents of Bituram, 3/; accusoK , 
Trimbukjee of the murder of Gungiulhur 
Bastree, and demands his apprehension, 
40; insists on the delivering up of Triiii- 
imkjee to the British government. 41; 
prepares for war with the peJsliwa, 59; llie 
Tkdshwa is alarmed at his preparations and 
lirmuesH, <«); the rigorous terms he offers 
the }>eishwa, 60 ; demands from tiie 
peishwa an explanation of his proc^uHl- 
mgs, 6.5; ilumonds of the peisbwa on, 66; 
Heats the Kajah of Battorah on the throne, 
92; the oflii^i of governor-general offorecl 
to, an<l declincfl by, 256; quoted as to the 
policy of restoring BhaU Hhujali to tln< 
throne of (’abool. 337: the command in 
Afghanistan conferred on, 382; his fatal 
delays and indecision in the insurrection 
at CalxKtl, 395; conjures up difficulties, 
hU miserable indecision, 401; employment 
of inad£f<iuat(! means to BUjipress the 
insurrection, 402; his miamani^pemcnt dur¬ 
ing the iTiHurrociiou, 404; begins to talk of 
terms with the insurgents, 405; hisground- 
lessfears, 406;hisinflrmiticK, 409; shares his 
command with Bri^dier Shelton, 410; 
is willing to come to terms with the in¬ 
surgents, 415; consents to deliver up the 
married olllcci's and their fumilies ts> 
Akbar Khan, 426; <lemanils of Akbar 
Kflan to make goo<l his promise of protoe- 
tion, 427; invited to a conforeuco with 
AklKU* Khan, anrl dotaiuod as a prisoner, 
428; his recovery from c:iptivity and death, 
455. « 

Kliihinstoiic's JThtory of /ndm, qtiotwl as j 
to tile incarnations of Buddha, ii. 32; as to j 
the Hiinloo idea of transmigration, 59; as 
to Hindoo sourci^ of revenue, 89; giving 
a description of an Indian townsbi}) pro- 
village, 92: as to Hindoo law of debtorand I 
creditor. 96; describing a Hindoo anuy on j 
march, 111; on Hindoo {lainting, 140; on ' 
Hindoo rural life. 173; on Hindoo fesll- i 
vities. 198. 

Klphinstoue's Cuhool, quoted, in relation to 
the Gukkurs, i. 45, 46, note. 

Eiunianuel of Portugal, hia zeal for mari¬ 
time discovery, i. 152. 

Kmmaumghur, Bir Charles Napier's expedi¬ 
tion against, iii. 465. 

Bmporor of the French, the discussion of 
the attempt to assa.<»tinate, originat-(’S the 
right-of-iMylum question in Bugiaml, iii. 
686 . 

BnfieM rifle, the, inlroducod into the 
Bengal army, lit 556. 

England, General, hitf defeat in the Kojuk 
Pass, iii. 444; is constrained by General 
Nott to advance through the Kojuk I*as.s, 
445. 


England, and India, compa^^ as to tho 
average fall of rain, i. 8; the flret J^uro- 
poan state that cntcrod into competition 
witli Hie Portuguese in their tmde with Hic 
East, 215; indignation in, at the atrocious 
conduct of tho Portuguese at AmlKiyna, 
263; war lietween, and Franco, 349, 409; ii. 
639. 

English, maritime enterprise, i. 195; e^iedi- 
tum to the East, 212; Hecoml ex|ieditiou to 
the East, 216; association of merchant ad¬ 
venturers for a voyage to tho East. 224, 

Erode, BurrcTMlorod to Hydcr AU, l»y Captain 
Grton. ii. 277. 

EucratideK, King of Bactria, i. 34, notr. 

]<lvims. Colonel, quells an insurrection in 
Mysore, iii. 209. 

Evolagh. Colonel, pursues Bene Madhoo, 

iiiTToo. 

Evidence, taking of, among tlie liindtxiH, ii. 
95. 

lOxpedittons to tho East, Portuguese, i. 155. 
163, 167, 169; English, 212-218; Hutdi. 218. 

Eyre, Major Vincent, relieves tho liesieged 
Englisli civilians in Arrah, iii. 645; defeats 
Koer King's iwlvmice guard at Ualamow, 
649; siluiioi'S Hic Kaiser Bogh battery in 
Lucknow, 651. 


F. 


Factories of the East India Couniany, i. 
379. 

Family life among the Hindoos, ii. 199. 
Famine, a droadful. in Bengal, ii. 2S5; 
Burke's description of a, in the south of 
India, 510 

Faiicourt, (kilonol, wounded in tho Vidlore 
mutiny, ii. 811. 

Fan<\ Kir lleiiry, commandcr-in-chicf of 
the army for the Ai'glian war, iii. 329; liis 
interview with Huiijeet King, 338; returns 
to linglaiid, 311 , hi': cisrious plan i f 
iroopH for the .ViViian eaiiiim:gii, 
311; aci'-tinpani*'• ila* .\f/'iun oxjudiTirn 
IHLiib of tlie way, 3-1.5. 

Fjtnner, Mr., sent to negotiatts with tlio 
Mahrattas. ii. 450; left as a ht>stag>; witli 
tlio Mahrattas, 451; released. 456. 
Farokshir, his reign, i. 387; iniiKirtant grants 
made to the East India (knnjHiny by, 388; 
the affairs of, hasteiiing to a crisis; 389; 
defeat and luunlcrof, by the Heyeds, 391; 
ileputation sent to, by Uie East India 
Ouniiany, 519. 

Ifiirrington, ('aptalii, defeats Akbar Khan, 
ill. 382. 

Fawc<!tt, Colonel, ii. 776. 

('harra, i. 6,54, anti }toic. 

Female sex, degradation of the, in India, 

ii. 176. 

Fenton, Mr. Edward, his i oyago to the l^t, 
i. 212; instructions for his vttyage, mer¬ 
cantile and inilitiiry, 212; interest ,i,ttaeh- 
Ing to his voyage, 214; failure of his cx- 
Iiedition, 215. 

Fordusi, the poot, his treatment by Sultan 
Mahmmxk i. 52. 

Ferguson, (kilonel. ii. 757. 
i’orgusrtou’s HundlMHtk of Arrhitectnrr, 
quoted respecting the gates of Konmauth, 

i. 50. votv\ respecting Ak1x>r*s tomb at 
Becundra, 140; respecting the Chalees 
Bitoon, ] 13; lespocting the Tajo Malial at 
Agr»^ 289. nntv\ resiiectiiig tlio iialaoe of 
AllahalKid, 692; on the constmetiou of the 
rock temples of India, it. 143; on tiio 
cave temple of Karll, 144. 

Forishta, ipiuted, i. 58. vote, 65; his curious 
aeeouut of Nasir-u-dlu. C7; on Bulbim’s 
love of pomp, and zeal for tcnqierancc, 68; 
on the miserable state of iXdhi under 
Jolal-u-<\in, 74. 

FerozoToglilak, tuscends tho Hirone of Delhi; 

his reign, i. 91; his works, 92. 

FerozetMior, held l>y General Kir John Little, 

iii. 4w: rmitiny at, 533. 

Ferozoslioli, the liattio of, iii. 490. 

Festivals, Hindoo, of Kali, it 47; of 

Juggernaut, 51. 

I’estivities of tlie Hindoos, il. 198. 

Field deiiutics, apiKiinted liy the Modms 
council to assist Colonel Kmilh, ii. 266; 
letter of tho Madras council to, 272; return 
of the, to Madras, 2^. 

Fine arta, thg» among tho Hindoos—-music, 

ii. 139; iiMnting and sculpture, 140; 
archite^ure, 140. 

Firebracc, Blr Basil, his depositions rea^ct- 
«iug the charge of bribery against the East 


FRENCH 

India Company, i 3^; hia aid again asked 
by the Coiiqiany, 360. 

Finnan, a Turkish, obtained in favour of 
Hie E^t India Company, L 251. 

Fisbbcmnie. Commander, ignomlniounly 
touted by tho governor of Rangoon, iii. 

Fit^erald, Oaiitain, his bravery in the 
liattle of Hie Beetalialdeo HiUs, iii. 72. 

Fitzgerah], Lieutenant, fails in his attempt 
on Poolojee, iii. 503. 

Five Roc^h, tlio affair of Hie, i. 500. 

Fletcher, Kir Roliert. ilisniiHseil the service 
for mutiny, i. 701; nistoration of, to 
tho Oonimny’s service, ii. 351; dissension 
between him and tlie council of Madras, 
352. 

Flint, iJiTUtonant, his gallant exploit at 
WandiwaHi, ii. 486; Ids defence of Wandi- 
wash, 487. 

Florentines, tho, in relation to tho Indimi 
tnnle, i. 148. 

Floyd, Oolonr'l, drives Keyed Kahib across 
the Bliowaiii. ii. 589; eiicomiters Tip]>oo’s 
anny, 590; retreats before Tippoo, 592; 
wounded and nearly killed In a skirmish, 
597; at Pondicherry, 639; defeats Tippoo at 
Maiavilly, 696; arrives wlHi (General 
Ktuart Ixifore KcringaTMitam. 698. 

FckmI and clothing of the Hinilorm, ii. 168. 

Forbiger’s Handbveh der altea Oeoijrophle, 
referred t(», i. 3. • 

Fordo, Colonel, sent with an exiioditlon to 
(»)-o)>erate with Atiumlerauz In tlio 
Northern Circars, i. 612; defeats tlie 
French under Conflans, 613; deft'ats the 
Dutcli on the i>laiu of Bedarrti., 6i»2. 

Fonic, Major, at tho liattle of Kirkco, iii. 
67. 

Foreign policy of the Hindoo guveniment, 
ii. 107. 

Fori'est, Lieutenant, one of the nine gallant 
dol'euders of the Delhi m^;aziiie. iii. 568. 

Fowke, Mr., son of Mr. Joseph Fowke, re- 
oalleil from Beiiari'S. ii. 421; his recall 
from Tkiiiares censured by tlie directors of 
tlie (.Company, 429. 

Franco, war between, and Britain, i. 3-19, 
409; peace between, and Britain, ii. 207 ; 
treaty lH*twi*en. and Britain ; clause re- 
livtliigto India, 208; Tippoo sends an envoy 
Ui, 595; war between, and Britiun, 639, 
846. 

Francis, Mr., sent out from England ns n 
memlter of the Bengal eonncil, iT. 363; pre- 
stmts Nuiicomar’s lettt'r against Mr. Hast¬ 
ings to the council, 370; his plan for Si‘t- 
ting lands in opposition to Hiat of Mr. 
llastingB, 415 ■; his objections to lluel- 
ings’ views, 418; desires to act ns metlia- 
tor Ixitween Mr. Hastings and General 
Clavering, 425; putched-up arraiigemoitt 
liutweon liim and Mr. Hastings, 432; 
fights a duel with Mr. ilastings, 433; 
his views of land Uuiure in Indio, 628; 
rtijectetl from the coiinnittwi apiioiiited 
to draw up artides of impeachment 
against Hastings. d45. t 

FmnkH, LU'tiUuiant-colonel, at the liattlo of 
Gujerat, iU. 526. 

Franks, (»eueral, directs the attack on the 
Imamliara at LiAknoiw, iii. 672. 

Fraser, lietieral, killed in the liattleof Deegi 
ii. 783. 

li’rostir, Mr., tho British commissioner at 
DcUii, assassinated, iii. 212. 

Fraser, Mr. H., murdered by tho mutineto* 
BC'poys at Delhi, iii. 567. 

Fraudulent }»ractices, the law relating to, 
among the Hindoos, ii. 106. 

French, the. settlements and progress of. in 
IiKlia, i. 350, 407; apiKiintmcnt of iKipleix 
as governor of their setUetnents in India, 
408; jirojectof, to annihilate English in¬ 
teroats in India, 409; Labourdoimi^B sent 
out by, to the Isle, of France, 410; efforts 
of Labourdounais to establish tho as- . 
cendeney of, 411; liabounlonnais sent 
by. in command of an expedition, t^i 
the East, 411; relative strength of the 
British wiuadrou and theirs in the East, 
412; encounter between the British Miuu^l- 
ruu and ihoirs, 413; besiege and take 
Madras, 415; proceedings of, at Madra-n. 
418; tho Nabob of Arcot repulsed from 
Madras Iw, 419; viobition ef the capitula¬ 
tion of Mailras by, 420; extiedition of. 
against I'^ort St. David, 420; ropulstd 
from Fort St. David, 42^ attempts o4 
on f.’uddalore, and retreaf; 421; new at¬ 
tempts of, on Ouddalore, 423; the Eng* 
litdi strike at Hie centre ox thetr l>ower at 
Pondicherry, but fail, 425; the exultation^ 
'of, at the failure of the English, 428; it'* 
store Madras 428; warlike toudeucies of 



INDEX, 


V23 


FRENCH 

Frencl^ the,— 

the KngliMh Company and thoint com- 
]>ar(xl, 1.428; deftsat Auwar-u*diii, Nabobof 
Aroot, 443 } the BritUh take opiHiaite 9id«’S 
to, in natives miarrelB, 445; Huccea^t^s of, 
againat Nazir Jm^, 447; MuzzufferJung 
Xiroclalmod aonliandar hy, 451; insulting 
• conduct «>f their governor Diiplcix, 456; 
DkiroiiNh between a reinforcement under 
Clive and a pjirty of, sent to intercept 
them, 460; defeated by Clive at Arcot, 
401: Cilve-’s victory over, at Arnoc, 468; 
aifair with, at Cov<^rypauk. 4c*9; further 
engagements of Clive with, 474; aifair 
with, at Samiaveram, 475; reverses of, 
477; surrender of their forcso at Si-i*- 
ingh^^/ influence of, with Bolabut 
*Tung, 481; Major Kinncir defeatetl by, 
482; a company of Swiss uicrcenanoa caii- 
turetl by, 482; def<5ate<l by Major Law¬ 
rence at Bahoor, 483; I}OBieg<xl in Ohin- 
gleput and Oovelong, whidi arc capture<l, 
483; strongly rciurorotMl at Sttringbam, 
487; a brilliant affair with, 487; stratii- 
gems of, out-stratagemed at TricliiimiJoly, 
488: battle of the Golden Kock with, 490; 
battle of tlie Sugiur-loaf liock with, 491; 
a^mault made by, on Tric>iino]>oly 
pulse^l, 493; a brilliant auhieveineiit 
against, 497; barbarous ]trocee<lings of, 
in the Tajijorc countrj*. 499; def<‘at <»f, 
tlie plains of Trichitin}x>Iy, 5(X); in- 
linonce of, in the Deccan, 501; great ac¬ 
cession of territory to, in tlie shape of the 
Northern Clrcars, 503; negotiations Imi- 
tween the Knglisli CnniiNuiy an<l that of, 
504: arraugeincnts between tlxnr com- 
liany and tbc English, 506; war beWoou 
Great Britain ami, 556; Olive’s gn*at 
aim to destroy tlie Interest of. in Bengal, 
561; futile attempts to negotiate with, 
661; attacked in (,;handeniagoro, whicli 
is caittiLTcd, 564; the Nalioh of Bengal 
pretends to dismiss them, 568; arrival of 
their force'- under l^ally, and preparations 
for tlie siege of Fort Ht. Daviil, 596; iude- 
fdsive naval engagement with, 597; cap¬ 
ture of Fort Ht. David by, 597; expedition 
against Tan jore, 600: tlie KingofTaiijore 
oiHiiis ncgciUatious with. 601; resxunptloii 
of hostilities by, GOl; failure of tlicir at¬ 
tempt on Tauj<UN3. 602; naval eouhicts 
with, 602; dastanlly c.Hmduct of the ail- 
miral of, 663; resolve to lay siege to 
Madras. 603; subonlluate oissratloiis of, 
(i04: their iireparatiuns for the siege of 
Madras. 605; failure of their attempts on 
Madras, G06: capture of Knglish factories 
by, 610; defeated i>y (-olouel Forde, 612; 
Ijesieged by Colonel Fordo in Masuliim- 
tain, whicl) is ca)>tuTed, 614; active hosti¬ 
lities with, interrupted, 617; naval opera¬ 
tions against, 618; defeat Colonel Brenv 
ton Ixiforo Waixliwash, 620; negotiations 
of. witli Basalut Jung, €20; their forc<ts 
injudiciously dlvidetl liy Lally, of whicii 
blunder Cooto 621; wandiwnsh 

ca])tured fyom, u22; other successes 
against, 623; (Foote's oticrations against, 
under Lally,623; Conjeveram siiritriscd by. 
624; attempt of, to capture Wandiwash, 
G25; approach oLthef two armies; Lally 
out-raai>ceuvre«l by 0<«)tc, 626; amount of 
their force, 627; defeat of, by tJooto, at 
Wandiwash, 627; Chittapot taken from, 
629; gloomy prosiiects of, C;t6; CiKitc’s 
coiitiuueil successes against. 630; moke a 
treaty with Hyder Ali, 632; Villenore 
taken from, by Coote, 634; are besieged 
in Fondiclierry, which siirrcndorH, 6^; 
annihilation of their ascendency in India, 
642: fate of their general Lally, 643; 
Hyder Ali in communication with, ii. 
279; intrigue at Foouali, 441; naval ac¬ 
tions of the British with, 408; Nizam Ali 
hires troo|>s of, 471; Hyder Ali in league 
with, 474; liuinane inteiposition of some 
oflioers of. to ailve Kngliw prisoners from 
tlie cruelty of Hyder’s soldiers, 484; a 
force of, l^docl at Porto Novo, to aid 
Hyder, 500; their fleet defeated by Sir Plii- 
ward Hughes, 500; a convoy of troops sent 
out by, capturad l>y Admiral Kempeiifelt, 
501; naval engagement with, 502; decline a 
battle offered by Bir Kyro Coote, 503; an¬ 
other naval cmi&t^ment witli, 504; naval 
movements oL 511; engagement witli, at 
Ouddalore, 512; naval ongagoment with, 
514; Tippoo’s intrigues with, 583; absurd 
conduct of their governor Malartio, 681; 
Tippoo made Oitii^n Tippoo Ity; Jaoobin 
club oi^ganizod by, 681; the luzain com¬ 
pelled by treaty to disliand the troo]>a be¬ 
longing to, in his service, 685; Tippoo not 
forgotten by; Napoleon’s letter to him, 


French, the,— 

ii. ^1; attnek on the setttcmentsof; their 
caiituro, 847; attempt to usBassinato tlie 
emperor of, Jii. 686. 

French Fl^ast India (/ompauy, the. i. 317,407. 

Fullartoii, (kilonel, it. 517; contrary onlcrs 
given to, 521: captures Palghautcherry, 
•522; his victorious ('.arccr arrest-ed, 523; or- 
dertMl hy the Madras government to ev:i- 
cuate all his coiKiuests; .Swartz's surprise, 

Furruckaba<l. the arbitrar>’ tniatment of the 
ualnib of, ii. 732 ; precipitately evacuated 
Tiy the relnjls, ili. 669. 

Pnttcli All, iii- 281. 

Futteh Juug, the ]>up])eL king of GaUioI, iii. 
457. 

Futteh Klian, iii. 2SG; his treachoroim jil- 
tttck on Herat, 280; the liorri«i barliaritivs 
inflictcHl on, by l*rinne Kanirau, 287. 

Futteh Mahomed of f'utch, iii. 27. 

Futteli Muhonied Ivhau Glioree, iii. 511. 

Futteh Bliig, ii. 403,454; iii. 35; his 
tionswith RuujectHIng, 277. 

FuttcliiMKir, founded by AkiitT, i. 143; Have¬ 
lock’s victory over the relicl sepoys ut, iii. 
634. 

Fuzziil Oolab Kliaii, curious arrangement 
of Hyder All with, ii. 22*9; his negotin- 
tioiiH with Basalut Jung on bedudf of 
Hyder Ali, 233; rtsluceH Havanoor, 238. 

FyzalwMl, the treaty of, ii. 532; the sepoy 
mutiny in, iii. 5:i6. 

Pyz(K>la Khan, unjust treatment of, by the 
Company, ii. DIU. 


a 


Gaitskcll, Major, iii. 619, 

Gaj llaj Misr, iii. 22. 

Gulfii'ats and Orabn, 1. fdO. 

Galloway, (’olonel, iii. IIW. 

Gauesii, ii. 36; the living incarnation of. 37. 

Ganges, the., the Isisiu of, i. 4. 

Gatica^ i. 600. 

tlaw’ilghur, the ca.pture of, by the British, 
ii. 770. 

Genoese, ascendency of, ut Coustautiuople, 

i. 140.; iliKustei*H US. 

GoograiAy, the, of India, i)hysic;il, i. 4; 
)K)1iiichl, 12. 

Geoltigy of India, i. 6, 

Geriah, astronghokl of the Atigria pirates; 
expedition against, and captiu'c of, i. 514. 

Ghauis, the, i. 5, 430. 

Ghazee.s, conflict of the Britisli with, at 
fJabool, iii. 414. 

Giiazee-ud-iliu, the Nabob of Oude, ill. 213, 
543. 

Giiaz(^-U'(lin, defeat of the r(‘bcl sepoys ut, 
by Brigaiiicr Wilson, iii. 600. 

Ghazy Beg Toglilak, defeats tlio Moguls 
under Kibuk Klian, i. 84; defeats tlie 
usurer Khtisrow: liis reign in Dellii and i 
aeeifiental dt'ath, 87. j 

Ghcias-u-ilin and Shaha1>-u-<lin, nephews of , 
Alu-u-diu, tlieir reign, i. 57. i 

Glioias-U'din, grandson of Ferozo, succta^ds ' 
him on the throne of DcUii, i. 92. 

Ghengis IClian, his appcaramxt iu India, i. 63. 

tlhe^jcety Begum, daughter of Ali Verdy, 
claims the tliroue'of l^ugal for tlie infant 
son of a deceased brothcr'in-biw, i. 532. 

Ghiljics, the. an exiHulitlon sent against, and 
cngogtmieut with, iii. 369; a new iuKurroc- 
tion among, 383; defeat of. 384; a new in¬ 
surrection among: Brigoilicr Hale sent to 
Rupjiress it, 3K); loss sustained by Ih.j Brh 
iiiui in an engagement with, 386. 

Oholab Hiiig, ili. 487; proceeds t.o the British 
camp os mcdiahir for the Sikhs, 498; ar¬ 
rangements of tlie JhdtiHh ivitii, 5(K). 

Gholani Mahomixl Khan, inimlers his bro¬ 
ther; is iiefeated in Imttlc by Hir Itoljert 
Abercrombie, ii. 670. 

Gholam All. ii. 620, 717. 

Ohoorkas, the, who so calleil, iii. 7; their 
osnundency in Nepuul, 8 ; British <*xpodi- 
tion against, 8; their cncroac'hnieiits, 9; 
failure of negotiations with; hostilities 
against, declat^, 10; the 1<kLrl of Moira’s 
plan of campaign against, 11; serious re¬ 
pulses sustained from, by the British at 
kaluuga, 11; fresh repulse at Kalunga; its 
capture, 12; ominouB coniinoncenient of 
the war with, 13; progress of the war witli, 
13; General Martindale repulsed by, at 
Jytak, 14; operations of General Gchter* 
lony against. 14; repulse sustaineil by the 
British from, atFortBamghur, 15; arrival 


GflLDEN ROCK 

Ohoork^ the.— 

of Teinforcemeuts against; capture of 
Ifamgbur, Hi. 16; investUKUit of Malaun, 
16; General Wo<Kisoi)eratjons against; liis 
retreat, 17; (ienenU Marley's oiierations 
against, 17; injudicious tmiunr of Marley’s 
oiieratious acoinst, 18; retn'at of Marley 
and Ktiddou disapitcanuioo of. 18; affair of 
C'olonel Dick and Colonel Fickers^l witli, 
19; General Wood’s infatuation in ubaii' 
dolling tlio advance on Kliatmandoo, 19; 
opcniftious against, by Captain Latter in 
Kumaoii, 19; Hubjngatioiiof Kunmon and 
Ghurwal, 20; success of General Gchtev- 
Imiy'H operations against, 20; disaster stis- 
hiiiied by a British detachment from, 21; 
attack on Dcothiil by, rt'pulsed, 21; cap¬ 
ture of Malaun from, 22; lugoilations for 
]K.>iU'e with. 22; trtxity eonoluflcil with, but 
not ratified liytheNepaulcKO, 23; hostilities 
willi, resumed, 23; Gtmoral Cichterlotiy 
leaving tlie Whiriaghati I’ass unattemi>tod. 
])i'i)COi'dH against tlieiii by a different pass^ 
2,3; further succcsst's of tleneral Gchter- 
loiiy ugaiiist. 25; treaty of ikuco with, ruti- 
licd b^ the Nepaulese, 2.5; results of the 
war with, 26; tliey send inissiunB to foi'eign 
Cfiirts, 26. 

(Jbor, Bebrain of Ghuznee’s treachery to the 

I houKo of, i. .55. 

Giiiiffoor K ban,(leneral Elpbhistono’s ordeJ s 
to deliver delalabad to, lii. 4121. 

Ghurw'aland Kuiiiaon, the subjugation of, 
iii. 20. • 

Ghuznavides, the extinction of the, i. 67. 

Cdiuznix;. tlie house of, j. 42, 57; the new 
palace of, huilt liy Musaood, 54; arrival of 
the Afghan exi>caition before the walls of, 
iii. 357; its formidable appcarull<x^ 357; re¬ 
solution to assault, 358; stormed, 359; per- 
Houal eucoiuiter of Brigadier Halo at, ^1; 
cfiptiire of, 360; humane conduct of the 
captors of, .361; constcniation of Dost Ma- 
lioinod at the capture of, 361; captured by 
tbe Afulians, 437; recapture of, hy General 
Nott, 451. 

Glblis, (k)loiicl. Sent to Hcringa]>atam to sup¬ 
press a mutiny there, ii. 843. 

(JillH-rt, Major-general, pm'sucs the routed 
Afglaui auxiliaries of the HiklisfroiuCliil- 
Ihuiwallo, iii. 527. 

Gillespie, Gohuiel, supjircsRcs the mutiny at 
Vellore, ii. 811; his rc'pulKe and death at 
Kahuigo, iii. 11. 

Giiigce, the siege and capture of, i. 306; tlie 
fort- of, 44(); eapturcul by Bubs^’, 449; a rash 
attempt to retiapture, 482; finally rcciiii- 
tureil by the Knglish, 642. 

Giugi'ii, (Japtain, sent in crmimand of an ex- 
Iiitilition against Volcuuda, i. 456: hisde- 

I feat. 457. 

! Gladwin’s A yrrw jllhny, cited, 1. 1, no/r. 

Gleig’s A/i Utoirao/ H'<tiTCu//<isCiit(/n, quoteil, 

ii. 303. 

Goa, mpturtsl by Albuf|ucr«fUo, i. 182; taken 
and reiakt'ii, 183; formhlablo attack on, by 
Ally Add Hhah, 194. 

rpKlajee Daiuglia, iii. 59. 

Goilby, Brigadier, threatened 1>y Itunject 
Hiiig in LoiKliuna, lii. 493. 

Gfxldard, Colonel, succei'ds Colonel Isislic, 

ii. 444; dticidcB between coiitrniUctory 
orders, 446; arrivisatHurat, 452; demands 
exiilicit answers from ^nna Funuivcse, 
454; xiroceedsto Bombay, 454; proc'cinlings 
of. in Gujeiat, 455; captim-s AliinedatUifi, 
4.56; attempts to nc'gotiate with Scindia, 

' 450; sur)>rises Heimha's camp, 457; oisms 

a new cauipuigu, 460; Itessfres liuMseiii, 
461; lights and wins the Ixittle of Doogaur, 
431; his tJireatc-ning advance to wants 
I’oonah, 462; is surrounded with dillicul- 
th’s, 463; his jieritlcxities and disastrous 
retreat, 464. 

t;odeheu,M., Kupereedes Dupleix a.s governor 
of the French Bettlcmeuts iu India, i. 566. 

Godolphin, th« earl (*f, lieconics referee for 
tlie old au<l new East India Companies, i. 
380. 

Gtslwin, GeueriU, sent against the Burmese, 

iii. 533 f CM pturea Martaban, 533: his opera¬ 
tions at UangiKin and capture of its pagoda, 
533; desultory iirocecdings of, 535; cax>tures 
Pegu, 5^. 

(7ohn77Ui. the, iii. 139. 

Gohud, alliauco of the British with tlie rana 
of. il. 468. 

Gokla, a general of the pcisbwa, iii. 87; an 

• Jionourable circumstance respecting, 92. 

^daiti Kodir Kh^, ii. 573, ^2. 

Golcomla and Bujapoor. proceeding of Dilir • 
Khan in, i. 301; Rubjugation of, by Au-* 
rungzebe, 304. 

Golden PagcKla, the, of Rangoon, iii. 140. 

Golden Rock, tlie battle of we, L 490. 



724 


INDEX. 


OOLDNEY 


HASTINGS 


Goldn^, Colooe), murdered by the muti'* 
ueers at Fymbad, iU. 590. 

Clonda, tiie rajah of, defeated by Sir Hope 
Grant, iU. 701. 

(.■onda the, lii. 107; Apa 8al^ among. 107; 
campaign of the British aumug, 108. 

<.2oodwin Bands, the, loss of a Venetian ar> 
gosy on, i. 210. 

i'luor, tlie ruins of, i. 133, note. 

Goor Buhsh, eon of Maiia Bing, iii. 272; his 
child, 273; Ills widow, 274. 

Gooruinconda. siege of. by Nlauuu Alt. ii. 610. 

Ciopal Bing, his proceedings, and proceedings 
against, ii. 8^. 

(iopas and Gopis, ii. 72. 

Gordon, Cajitain, if. 450. 

(4or(^n, Mtuor ICobert, i. 637; killed at Tal- 
ueer, iii. 90. 

Gosaina the. ii. 71, 708. 

Gospels, Aklier orders a Persian translation 
of the. i. 143. 

(■otama, his logic, if. 116. 

Croiigh, Hir Hugh, Lord, defeats the Mali* 
rattas in the battle of Maliarajpoor, iii. 
481; his descri^ion of the battle of Mood- 
kee. 489; dccitfes against moving a force on 
Mooltan, 50^ takes the field in the second 
8ikh war, 520; repulses the Sikhs on the 
banks of the Ohenab. 521; crosses the 
Ohenab aiminst the Bikhs; his tlespatch 
quotetl. 522; commands in the l»attlo of 
('hillianwalla, 522; gains tlio victory at 
Gujora^ 

Gough, Bir Thomas, tlm$atened at XTmlialla 
by the Uiklis, iiblSS. 

Govomment of tlie Hiudocw, monarchical, 
ii. 84; no constitutional clitH'.k on. 85; 
moral restraints on tlie king, 86: tho king's 
uonneiUors and other chief fiuictlonaries, 
86; the king’s residence, 87; the king's 
daily life, 87; <livisiou of tiic kingdom into 
civlland military districts, 88; civil admlii' 
isiautinn, 89; sinirco of revenue, 89; pro- 
])erty in lanil, 90; royal mines, 91; the 
townsliip, 91; authiulty and irarmanency 
of the village system, 92; administration 
of justice, %; judicial procedure, 93; non¬ 
suit casoB, 93; competency of witu^ses, 94; 

S roooeilinira in court; taking evidence, 
I: oath of parties. 95; trial by ordeal, 96; 
written ciKiea; kinds of action; leading 
axiom, 9t); amount of interest exigible; 
prescription; obllgatlouH, 97; sale ana pur¬ 
chase; hiring; master and servant, 98; 
boundaries, 98; husitand and wife, 99; 
form of marriage, 100; inferior position of 
the wife, 101; law of succession, 101; cri¬ 
minal law; defamation, 103; theft and 
violation, 104; adultery, 105; ^lice and 
espionage, 106; prisons, 106: fraudulent 
.rracticea 106; foreign policy. J07; war, 108; 
military tactics and laws of war, 109; mo¬ 
dem changes in Hindoo government, 109; 

, changes in law, 110: changes in the mcxle of 
' carrying on war, 111; army on tho march, 
111; camp, 112; commissariat, 112; mode 
of paying soldiers, 113. 

G(»viiid Binh, successor of Kanak, founder 
of tho Bikh sect, ii. 80. 

Goviuil How. ii. 403. 

Govindghur, the fort of, saved from the 
mutineer sepoys, iii. 574. 

(jrovlndpoor, pusiltauiinity of the British 
aliiiMi at. i. 5^,. 

Gowdio, Major, ii. 607; captures Nundidroog, 
608. 

Grafnt and GalJivat^i, i. 510, and 
Granitic formation of the mountain ranges 
of Indio, /. C. 

Grant, Brigadier Sir Hope, sent against the 
rebels who attempt to gain the British rc^ar 
at Delhi, lii. €07, 621; Cnloncl GroaUicd 
resigns his command to. €59; Ids success- 
ful pursuit of tho relicls defeated at (Jawn- 
tKK>r. 668; at Lucknow. 675; defeats a 
body of insurgents under tho Hajah of 
i^nda, 701; defeats Bala SUm and drives 
iiim into Nepaub 702. 

Gnmt. Captain, at tho battle of Maharajah, 
iii. 482. 

Grant, Mr. Charles, nl>jocta to the aiipoint- 
nientof a>ny servant of tiie Cou)|>anyto bo 
govomor-geuerat. Hi. 254. 

Grant, Dr., his death, iii. 409. 

Grant, Bir John Peter, judge of the supreme 
court of Bombay, his extzaordmary pn>- 
oeedinga, iii. 203. 

Grant, mr Patrick successor of General 
Anson, iii. 631. 

Gray, Mr., senton aprlvate mission to Hydfir 
AJi: his impacious reception, 11. 477. 
Greathed, Colonel, defiats Ihe rebel sepoys 
at Agra, lii. 659; rerigns his oommatul to 
Brigadier Hope Gzan^ 669: at Cawnpoor, 
667. 


Greek notions respecting Indian geography, 
i. 1. 

Greek writers, their statements respecting 
India, i. 20. 

Greenway, Mrs., at Cawnpoor, li. 696. 
GrevUle, Fulke, his report upon the memo¬ 
rial to the privy council rospectiug a voy¬ 
age to tho £Mt, i. ^27. 

Grey, Bir John, iii. 493. 

Grinen, Admiral, 1. 423. 

Grifitths, Major, the murder of, and of his 
comtMuiy, un their retreat from Uabool, 
iii. 429. 

Oruelier, Oolouol, ii. 793. 

Gubhina Mr., his statement of the force of 
tho Lucknow garrison, iii. 566; his account 
of the removal of the women and children 
and tlie wmuided from the n^ideucy of 
Lucknow, 662. 

Guicowar, the, British interference hi his 
liehalf, iii. 27; relations between, anil tho 

S cisliwa 35; state of parties at his court, 
7; negotiations of his minister with the 
peisbwa, 37; murder of bis minister, 38; 
new arra^igement of the British with, IIG; 
refuses to discbai^ his Afghans, 219. 
Guides, tlie, arrival of, at Delhi from tlie 
Xhmjab, iii. 601; their surprisingly rapid 
march, and ga1huit» Imfure Delhi. 602. 
Gujerat, reduction of, by Ala-u-clin's com¬ 
mand, i. 78; riwolt of, against Akber, 131; 
new troubles in, 133; subjugation of, by 
Bajee Kao, 395; proceedings of General 
Goddard in, ii. 455; General Wellesley's 
operations in, 755; state of affairs in, lii. 
316; expedition against ttie pirates of, 117; 
victory over the Biklis in, 625. 

Gukkurs, the, 1 45, and votr ; ravaged liy 
Bhahab; they emlirace Mahometanism, (il. 
Gun, an enormous, at Arcot, i. 465; the 
great, of Agra, ii. 7114. 

Gunga, a Hindoo personification of the 
Ganges, ii. 41. 

Gungmlhur Bastroe, iii. 35. 
iTiinnah Pimt Beoray, ii. 403. 

<4unne8li l^uut, a Mahratta officer, ii. 457. 
GunputHow, iii. 76, 89. 

Guns, pimisliment of blowing from, in¬ 
stances of, i. 497, 679. 

GuntTKir, tlio Company’s claims to, enforccrl, 
i. 579. 

Gurrukotta, the fort of, iii. 680. 

Gwalior, captured by Captain W. Ptmham, 
desert^ i. 459; captureil by Colonel White, 
769; consternation caused at, by the arl- 
vauce of the British troops, iii. 478; rigor¬ 
ous terms dictated to, 482; the mutineers 
driven out of, by Sir Hugh Kosc, 604. 


II. 


Corjrtttt, the question respecting, be¬ 
tween the government and the suprutue 
ci>nrt of Bombay, iii. 203. 

Babiboolali Klmn. iii. 2^. 

Hnckcry, tho. i. 518. 

Hockluyt, instructions for Fenton's voyage 
<luoted from, i. 212. 

Haflii Jee, his rushucss at Goorumconda, ii. 
610. 

Hafir. Itahmct, a Itohilla chief, defeated by 
Colonel Champion, ii. 327. 

Ilajl, brother of AU Verdy Khan, ids tragi¬ 
cal death, i. £27. 

HaJi Khan Kakkur, iii. 362. 

Hakim Mehili All Khan, minister ofr tho 
Nabol> of Oude, iii. 214. 

Harcourt, CVilon^, in Cuttack, ii. 757. 

Hunlinim, Bir Henry, Viscount, succeeds 
Lord JbUleuliorough as Govemor-gencrai of 
India, iii. 485; liis tiolicy, 485; pniceods to 
visit tho Hikli protected stati^ 487; his 
proclamation respecting the Bikbs, 488: 
volunteers to act as second in command 
in the battle of Ferozeshah, 4^; dictates 
terms to the Blkhs in their own capltaJ;, 
498; his internal reforms in India, 504; is 
created a viscount, 505; his memorandum 
to the Rajah of Oude, 545. 

Hardyman, Colonel, defeate the Malirattas 
atJubbulpoor, lii. 76. 

Hariana, Lord Minto's interforanoe in the 
district of; militoiy adventurers in, ii. 829. 

Harland, Sir Robert, sent as crown plenipo¬ 
tentiary to India, nis instructions, ii. 291; 
his views, 292; letters of tlie Madras 
coundl to, 292; his blustering reply, 293. 

Hames, Colonel, iii. 701. 

UaiT>er, Colonet sent to tho assistance of 
^iUalttt Jung, ii. 476. 


Harris, General, ii. 663; berins the campaign 
against Tippoo, 692; defeats Tlppoo at 
Malavilly, 695; reoolvesa oommimfcatiou 
from Tlppoo; his reply, 698; receives 
another communication from Tippoo; his 
reply, 700; receives a third cominunlca- 
tion from Tip]>oo; his reply, 700. 

Harrow and roller, the, of Iliudoo husban-* 
dry. ii. 163. 

Hartley, Captain, his Inrave conduct in the 
retreat from Penmah, ii. 450; his reward, 
451; relieves Captain Abington in Mul- 
langurh, and expels the enemy from tho 
Ooucan. 461: his bravery in the battle of 
Dmigaur, 463; attacks and defeats Tippoo, 

Hast^ Dal Obautra, lii. 20. 

Hostings, tlie marquis of, takes the field to 
suppress the predatory system, iii. (>3; im¬ 
poses u new treaty on Bclndia, 64; his 
resignation, 124; Ills internal administra¬ 
tion, 124; his lawrefoniis, 124; his finan¬ 
cial reforms in the Bengal presidency, 125; 
his financial reforms In the Madras pi'csi- 
dency, 126; increase of the Indian revenue 
during Ids ailministration. 127; question 
of recompense to, 127; motion for granting 
a jiecuniury recompense to, lost, 128; his 
regulations regarding the press, 131. 

Hastings, Warren, liis early life. ii. 299; his 
education, 300; obtains awritership in tlie 
service of the Kast India Coiu)>aiiyta300; 
mmle a prisoner at (kissimliozar, 300; 
escajies and serves as a volimtisir; his 
marriage, 301; liecomcs a member of tlio 
council of Bengal, 302; his return to Eng¬ 
land, and back again to India, 302: on tiis 
outward voyage buys a wife and cmildreii 
of Boron Inihoff, 303; appointed iiresident 
of Bengal, 306; Clive's letter to him on 
the difficulties tf> be encountered, 306; 
(Hive's opinion of him, 307; curious a<l- 
vice of the secret council to him, 310; ho 
appnivesof tho appointinent of Xnneomar 
to the office of dewan, 310; his account of 
his proceedings to the dllrctorB, 315; reply 
of the directors, 316; his letter on tho 
charges brought against tlic two dewauK, 
318; his comiiact with the NalN>1> of Oude; 
its disgraiMtful eJiuracUT, 322; delegation 
of power to him ; objections to it>, 324; 
his defence of the tr^ty of Benares, 325; 
dissensions with the new members of the 
council, 3(>3; tho correspondence of his 
agent in Gude demanded, 364; his agent 
in Oude recallod. 365; charges itfainst him 
encouraged by the majority of the council, 
367; accusations brought against him by 
the Ranee of Burdwan, 368; alsnird charge 
preferred against him. 368; charged with 
receiving pn*sents. 369; his defence, 370; 
accused by Nuiicomar, 370; indecent pro¬ 
cedure of the majority of tho coun<'il 
against him, and his remarks on it, 370; 
Colonel Monson closeted with his acemu'r 
Nuncomar, and apiteorauce before tlic 
council against him, 372; apTiarentgroiuid- 
lessnesK of Xiincoffiar's charge, yet the 
majority holds it proved, o73; Nuncomnr 
and othera charged with oonsplnuy a^nst, 
373; letter of the three new coimcillors, and 
his reply, 374; tbf, m^ority of the council 
take port with Nunc^iar and encourage 
informers against him. 375; his acceptance 
of the challenge of appeal to the publii*. 
and statement to the directors, 375; sus¬ 
pected of being the real prosecutor of Eun- 
cr>mar on the charge oi forgery, 370; sets 
Nmicomar at lilierty, 377; arrament to 

} >rove that tho char^ against Nuiicomar 
lod no connection witli the charges against 
him, 379; his rcsiionsibllity In regard to 
Nuncomar, 382; tlie execution of Kun- 
comar a stain on his memory, 383; be was 
no gainer by Nimcomar's execution, 3R4; 
his relations with (^autoo Baboo, 384; his 
approliation of the proceedings of the 
Madras council, 388; Ids connection witli 
the ovcrlotting of land, 410; his new plan 
for the management of lands, 412; his 
plan rejected, 414; he propels to institute 
an office for ascertaining the valueof land, 
418; objections to his plan. 418; tho office 
lustitutml by his casting vote, 420; he re¬ 
verses the acts of the majority, 420: his 
resolution not to resign, 421; KobiUa 
war ccKits him the favour of the directors, 
who tidaolw to petition the crown for his 
removal. ^1; his cause espoused Iw thg 
oo\irtofpro{Mri«tors,^^; (Colonel Maclean's 
letter to the directors, and intrigues with 
the treasury In favour of, 422; procoedings 
of the directora, and report of the com¬ 
mittee appointed by them respecting him. 
423; the direotonr hold that he has re- 



INDEX. 


HmDOOS 


725 


HATBAS 

HantlngB, Warren,-~- 

Biguod; extraonlinary pToceecUngs in Ben- 
sH in conai3(iueuce,li.^4; Mr.Fiaucis offers 
Limself as mediator between him and the 
council, 425;* his letter of explanation to 
tbo directors; its unsatisfactoiy chara<rtor, 
426; festivities on his second mari^sre, 
427; is cetiKured by the directors, 428; uis- 
regartlM their peremptory onlezs, 429; his 
obioctioiis to the rostoration of Mirza 
Kbun oTomilecl, 430; yet he gains his end 
by other moans. 431; is again ceiisur^i by 
the directors; their peremptory orders, 
431; is continued iii oitice liy act of parliitr 
meut, 432; his 4liiei with Mr. Francis, 433; 
his explanation of the sud«len torminivtion 
of tlie action of Oossinaut l{alK)u against 
tlie governor-general and a>micil, 437; his 
luisuudorstanding with Lord Macartney, 
527; his wild projKinal ti) cede the N'orttiern 
Oircars to Nmun All, ^8; his letter to tli^ 
Madias council, 529; his visit to Benares, 
531; his declaration in regard to tlie Aajah 
of Benares, 533; his altered views in regard 
to the RjiJah of Benaros, 533; receives a 
bril)e from the Rajah of Benares, 534; his 
<letenninivtion to exact severe vengeance 
on the Rajah of Benares. 535; his doings 
at Benares, 536; his arrest of the rajah, 
and the iK'rilous -^itlou ho placed him¬ 
self in thereby, 537; bU conduct towards 
the Ranee of jBcnares, 539; his di8apiH>int- 
meut as to prizii-money, 5|^; his rolation 
to the treaty of Ohiinar, 53^* treatment of 
Fyzoola Klian, 5^; spoliation of tbo 
Begums of 4>ude, Ml; his attempt to 
justify the plunder of the begums, 544; 
accepts a large i»rosent from tlie Nabob of 
Oudo, 547; nxiuests the directors to bo 
permitted to kt^p the money as his own; 
the directors remove him from ofiice, 547; 
opposito views of tlie diretitors and pro- 
pnotors as to ills removal from oliice, 549; 
resuU of the dis<riissioii rcg.’inling hint, rhi"; 
Jiiinounc Ills inanition to r«‘*iigii; Ills 
reuH>i]i<4 for so doing 506: ins vinil to buck- 
now, :V)1; tiniLlIv finits India, 552; his n*- 
ceptioii in Kuglaiid contrasted with that 
of l^ml Oomwallis, G40; discussions in 
parliament respecting him, 641: ili*st steps 
in the impeachmout of him, M2; twouty- 
two articles of charge against him, M2; 
the first charge4tgainst iiim rojcctetl by a 
majority, 643; sees his way to a fieeragc, 
643; strange conduct of PiU towanls him 
in tlie house on the third charge. 643; the 
articles of dukrge against him voted, 615; 
preparations for liis trial, 645; the coiii- 
incncement of his trial; Macaulay's dts 
RcriptU >11 of the scene, M6; slow progn^ of 
his trial, 647; his ac(|uittal, 648; general 
approval of hla actiuittal; ito accordance 
with eriuity, 648; the reparation made him, 
649: sultsoqueut events of his life, 649; 
honours paid him; fulsome eulogies on 
him, 650; tho character of hisadininistn^- 
tion revicweil, 650; his laxity of principle, 
651; his imlitary«Mlministration. 652; his 
merits tes^^d by what ho di<l and what lie 
wished to do, 652; his extravagant esti¬ 
mate of himself. 653; character of his ud- 
ininiatration contrasted with that of Lor<l 
ComwuUls, 654* 

ITatras, in the Doab, captured, ill. 33. 

Havelock, Henry, afterwards Sir Henry 
Havelock, quoted relucting tho 

interview lietweou Hunjeot Sing and the 
governur-gcnenil, iiL 338; his account of 
tho counter-visit of tho governor-general 
to Runjeet Sing, at FerozejMor, 340; liis 
remarks on the plan of selecting troops for 
the Afghan war adopted by Sir Henry 
Fane, 341; his acoomit of Smib Shujah’s 
reception In Cauduhar. 355; his account of 
Brif^licr tSole's encounter with a iKtwerf al 
Afghan, 360; on tlio capture of GhuTiioc, 
361; on tbo importanc-e of bolding tho Bala 
Hissar in CailN>ol. 388; at tho uefenoo of 
Jelalabad, 436: having l>eon sent with tlie 
exiiedition to Persia, at the close of the 
Persian war he returns to India, and is 
wrecked off C'cylou, 631; appoints com¬ 
mander of the force for tlie relief of Luck¬ 
now, number of his troo^, 632; his first 
encounter with the mutineer sepoys at 
Fatteh]KK>r, 633: his onler after the victory 
of Futtohpotfr, 634; two victories gained by 
liim in one day; his advance on Cawnpoor, 
634; defeats ttie reliels at Maharajpoor 
turner Nana Bahib, 635; enters Oawnpoor; 
horrid speotaelo jiresented there, 637; dis¬ 
order in his camp, 638; his entrenchment 
at Oawnpoor, 639; his first enonunter wiUi 
the mutineers of Dude; victory of Onao, 
640; hia victory at Basseru^runge, 640; re- 


Havelook, Henry,-^ 

tires to Mimgmwar.iii.Ml; ntlvanoesagain, 
Ml; his difficult position; obliged again to 
retire, 642; receives alarming news from 
Oawnpoor. 642; his victory at Bitboor, 
643; Hir James Outram appointed to su- 
Tierseiio him, M7; increasing tlifficulties of 
his position, M7; Sir James Ou^mn waives 
his zuiik in favour of, 649; receives a letter 
from Colonel Inglls at Lucknow urging 
him to advance, 649: proceeds for tho 
relief of Lucknow, and reaches the Alum- 
bagh. 651; reaches tho Charbagli brhlgc, 
653; reaches Seciuidor Bagb. 654; enters 
tho residency; scene within, 654; his sick¬ 
ness and death, 663. 

Havelock, Lieutenant Sir Henry Havelock, 
iii, 637; at the Chorliagh briilgu, 

Havelock, Colonel William, killed at Kam- 
uiifigur, ii. 521. 

Hawkins, Ca])tuitif commandor of tho Hr&. 
tor, i. 245; procee<lH to Surat, 246; visits 
the Mogul court of Surat, an<l hecumes a 
resident there, 248; roevivoH u W'ife from 
the Mogul, 249; ultimate treatment of, and 
return homo with Sir Henry Middleton, 
250. 

Hawthorne, Bugler, forms one of tlio explo¬ 
sion party at Lcliii, iii. 621. 

Hazoreh, a revolt in, iii. 519. 

Hearsay, Captain, ill. 20. 

iiearaey, Gteueial, endeavours to reason the 
mutineer sepoys out of tiieir foolish im¬ 
pression of ades^i to force them tol>ecome 
Christians, iii. 5OT: quoted on the imtiolicy 
of having a numltor of native regiments 
togetiier witlumt any Kuroi^cans, 558; his 
coinage in repressing the mutineers at 
Ikurackpoor, 561. 

Heath, Captain, sent out by the East liulia 
ConiT»any in command of the Drfenci, i. 
344; proceedings of, in tlie Bay of Beugu), 
345. 

Heath, Major, disperses a Phidarce camp, 
iii. 81. 

Heaven, tho, of Vishnu, ii. 25; of Hindoo 
theolo^, 60. 

Hobor'e, Bisliop, Indian Joui'nal, quoted, ii. 
188. 

Heeroo and Burmi, brothers, Pindaree 
loadem, iii. 46. 

Helena, St., a principal intermediate station 
of the East India Company, i. 309. 

IleilH, the, of Hindoo theohigy, ii. 61. 

Hcmmat Baliadur, ii. 768. 

liemoo, a Uiniloo, his iieroism, i. 122. 

Henry VII. of England, Columbus seeks to 
find a patron in, i. 195; charter granted 
by, to Oabi>t, 19i*. 

Henry, Prince, of Portugal, his zeal for 
maritime disciovery, i. 141). 

Hera Sing, iii. 487. 

Herat, tlie designs of Persia on, iii. 295; a 
now Persian ex]>e<lition against, 317; tho 
iKisitioii of, 317: defences of, 318; tyranni¬ 
cal character of the government of, 318; 
difficulties of the Persian ox])edition 
against, 319; tho siege of, commenoHl by 
the Persians, 319; servicat of Eldrtxl 
Pottiuger in dofoiioe of, during tho siege, 
320; negotiation attcmi^d; British tne- 
<liation, 321; failure of Ihritisli mediation, 
322; the siege of, resumed under Russiau 
auspicies, w2; a grand assunlt on, re- 
pulfAid, 323; tacit armistice. 324; a British 
expedition to the Persian Gulf comiiels 
the Persians to raise the siege of, 324; tho 
siege of, by the l*ersians not unjustifiable, 
336. 

Herodotus referred to in relation to India, 
i. 1. 21. 23; ii. 158. 

Horri Sing, Hyder All’s rival; Hyder pro¬ 
cures his murder, ii. 223. 

Hewitt, General, his report on tho Meerut 
mutiny, and his incapacity to deal witii 
tlio mutiny, iii. 565. 

Ueytesbury, Lord, appointc<l Governor- 
general of India: the appointment con- 
ceUed. iU. 256. 

Hill, Major, his gallant defence of Pogu, iii. 
536. 

Hindoo Row’s house in Delhi, iii. COC. 

Hindoor. the rajah of, iii. 16. 

Hindoos, the, do not represent a single race, 
i. 12; the fabuluiu nature of their history 
and chronology, ii. 2; their early histoi-y, 

2; best pliysical tyj>e of, 167; their opiKisi- 
tion to a new taxation imposetl by Lord 
MInto, iii. 29. !• 

Hindo^ the, division of, into Castes, ii. 3; 
superiority of the Brahmiuical caste, 3: 
oomporatfvo impunity for crime enjoyed 
^ Brahmins, 5; penalties for Insulung a 
Brahmin, 5; ste^i^'of a Brahmin’s life, 5; 


Hindoos, tho,—■ 

first and second stages of a Br^min’s life, 
il.6; third st^ot aBrshmin's life,6; fourth 
stage of a Bralimin’s life, 7; cli^iges of 
Brahminical ilisoipliue, 8; i>artial decline 
of Brahminical inilueuco. o: extravagant 
deference to the BruhmiuioU caste. 9; ori¬ 
ginal equality of. and present diatmotlons. 
aniong BraXimius, 9; the Kulinas or 
nobles, their degeneracy in modem time^ 
10; pernicious regulations it.‘S)>ecting tho 
dai^hters of KiiQuas, 11; Oiwatriya and 
Vaisya classes, 11; cl^m of the Rajpoots 
,to be Cshatriyas, 12; the Hudra doss, 12; 
improvement of the Budras in nuKlem 
times, 12; introduction of new castes, 13: 
castes now iduntifiod witli professions ajul 
trades, 13; effects of caste. 14; alien'd 
favourable results of caste; denied, 15; 
loss of cash'. 15; ciwtto on obstacle to tho 
spread of C^irlstiunity, 16. 

Hindoos, the, Xteligtou of; original soumes 
of ilie Jliudno creed, ii. 16; tlie Vedas, 17; 
the Institutes of Menu, 17; creation; crea¬ 
tion of hiferior divinities, 18; creation of 
man, 19; tendency of all beings to decay* 
19; transmigration of the soul, 20; human 
and divine jicrioilR, 20; the Hupremo Being 
of Hiiidooisui, 20; Mouotlicism, the creed 
of iliislcoism, 21; dufectji in the concep¬ 
tion of the attributes of the Deity, 21; 
monstrous idolatries of Hiiidooism, 21; 
tlie Hindoo triad, 22; liralmia, 22; the 
Hoktis of each of the gods In the triad, 23; 
V isliuu, 23; supremacy claimed for Vishnu* 
and legend in suiiport of his supreniat^, 
24; Vishnu's heaven. 25; avatars of Vish¬ 
nu, 25: first, second, and third avatars 
of Vistmu, 26 ; fourth avatar of Vishnu, 
27; fifth and sixth avatars of Vishnu, 28; 
seventh avatar of Vishnu, 29; eightli ava¬ 
tar of Vishnu, 30; birth aud exploits of 
Krishna, 30; ninth avatar of Vishnu, 31; 
Buddha, 31; Siva, tlio third member of tbe 
triad, 32; supremacy claiiiieil for Siva, 32; 
emblems of the woi^ip of Siva, 33; other 
Hindoo deities, 33; Agui, 34; Indra and 
bis wife Indrani, 35; l*avaiia and Vuruna, 
35; Burya. 35; Homau or Chandra, 36; 
Gauesu, 36; living incarnation of Ganesa, 
37; Cuvera aial iJurtikoio, 38; Kama or 
Kauiadeva.39: Yoma, 4U; hiferior suid local 
deities, 40; (hinga, 41; Hiiidooism in prac¬ 
tice, 42; observances of a Brahmin, 42; 
morning worship of a Brahmin, 43; five 
sacraments, 44; observances of the vulgar. 
44; multiiilicity of forms, 45; Hindoo ideas 
OK to the attainment of spiritual perfec¬ 
tion. 46: self-inflicted tortures practised, 
46; llinuoo festivals: fcsLivol of Kali, 47; 
hook-swinging and otlier liurbarlties prac- 
tisotl at the festival of Kali, 48; origin of 
the festival of Kali, 49: apiieorance of the 
festival of Kali described, 49; festival of 
J uggemaut, 51; temple of Juggernaut, 52; 
legend respecting .Tiiggcniaut, 52; Broh- 
riutilcal explanation of the worship offered 
to Juggernaut, 53; his annual festivals, 53; 
tile festival of Rath Jatra, 53; interest of 
the BrahniiuH in the festival of Jugger¬ 
naut, 55; connection of tho British govern- 
metit witii the festival of Juggernaut, 55: 
fiiiKlamental principles of regions belief 
among the Hindoos, 57; dogma of trans¬ 
migration ; its peniicioiis influence on so¬ 
ciety aiid on individuals. 57; true nature 
of transmigration; mode in which its 
changes are mgulateil, 59; qualities of 
darkiu^ and passion, ; quality of good¬ 
ness, 60; Hindoo heaven; it!b limited dura¬ 
tion, 60; Hindoo hells. 61; HiudtK) moral 
system; its comparative fulness and accur¬ 
acy, 62: inculcation of Internal purity and 
tbe i>assive virtues, 63; Hindoo devotion, 
63; exclusiveness and true character of 
Hindoo devotion, 64; irrational character 
of Hindooilovotion. deep but perverted 
religiousfwling of the Himloos, 65; alleged 
tolerant spirit of Hiiidooism, 66; division 
of Hindoo votaries into orlliodox and 
betovKlox, 66; leading sects, and modes of 
distinguishing them, 67; monastic institu¬ 
tions among the Hindoos, 68; Valshnava 
and Ramanuiyias sects, 69; tho Ramawats 
and KabirPonthiis 70; tbe worshippers of 
Krishna, 71; tho Valshnavas of Bengal, 
or Chitanyas, 72; the tenets of tbe Ohl- 
tanyas. 73; the sects of the Halvas, 74; tho 
Dandis, 74; tlie Yogis, 75; tho 14ngaye<«, 
75; the I*arai|iahanBaB and the Aghoris, 
76; the ^ktas andtiie leading bran^es oL 
77; the orgies of Bakti wondiip, 78; tge 
Kcraris, 78: the Bikhs, and their founder 
Nanak Bhah, 78; different branches of tho 
Sikhs, 80; the Jains, 80; nature of tho wor- 



72G 


INDEX 


HINDOOS 

Hindoos, Roligion of tiie, ••• 
sbipof ttieJains, if.81; practfceofthe Jains 
af to caste, an<i tlieir partial respect for 
the Vodns, 82; the moral fvsteui of the 
Jains, 83; HiudiKtlsin not nxod but vari* 
able: its numerous changes, 83; hope of 
the final overthrow of llhuloomm, 85. 

Hindoos, the, <«ovcnimcnt of; tUo Kiitijcct 
still imiK)rtunt, ii. 84; their govoniiucnt 
monarchical, 85; no constitutional check, 
85; moral restraints on the king, 8t>; king’s 
counciUoi's and other chief functiouarieH, 
8>j: the king's residence;, 87; tiie king’s 
daily life, 87; elivision of the kingdom iuto 
civil and nitlitHary districts. 88; civil atl- 
mlnistration, 8P; sources of revenue, 89; 
property in lami, 90; royal mines, 91; 
township or village, description of a, 91; 
antiquity aud )ieniiancncy of the village 
system, 92; atlmiiUstratiou of ju.sti<xs. 92; 
judiciiil procedim;, 93; uon-siiit cases, 93; 
competency of witnesses, 94; proceedings 
in court; taking evideuco,*94; the oath, 
95; trial by ordeal, 96; writte.n codes; 
kinds of action: loading aniom of Hindoo 
law, 96; amount of interest exigible; 
prescription; obligation. 97; sale, purchase, 
aud hiring, 98; nonniLaries, 98; law of 
IjiirImiicI and wife, 99; forms of iiiarriagc, 
JOO; inferior position of the wife, lOl ; law 
<*f succession, loi; criminal law; defama¬ 
tion, 193; theft and violence, 104; adul¬ 
tery, 105; policc’and espionagti, lOG; pri- 

: sons, 106: fraudulent practifsis, 106; fondgn 
iiulicy, 107; war, 108; military tactics, and 
laws of war, 109; modern changes in gov- 
('rinnent, 109 ; cUange.Rin law, 110 ; changes 
in the mode of carrying on war. 111; a 
llimloo army on the march. 111; a i lindoo 
camp, 112; commissariat, 112; mode of 
paying soliliers, 113. 

Hindoos, the, PhUosojiby and Science of; 
chief subjects of the philosopliy of. ii. 113; 
the Vtslanta school, 114; nature of the soul 
ucconling to the VtMlauta system, 115; 
views of the Veilanta school In regard to 
matter, 115; tins Niyaya school. 116; (io- 
tama’s logic. 116; ('amide, his atomic 
theory and physics, 117; the Sankliya 
Hchool; IJapila. his dogmas. 118; nature of 
creatum, anti throe essential tjualities of 
nature, a-ctrording to the. Sankliya stdinol, 
119: tlie soul’s liburatioii, according to the 
Hankliyaschooh 120; atheistic autHhoistic 
HcliotuB: pratrticcof tlie yoga, 129; resem- 
blauce itotwoen Hindoo ami Grook ]>hi- 
h)eonhers and philosopliy, 121; astronomy 
of, 121; the astronomy of, not scientitic 
but empirical, 122; the Siirya Hidhauta. 
123; mathematics, .'123; arithmetic autl 
algebra, 124; other branches of scitince, 
eshemistry, surgery, and medicine. 125. 

Hindoo Litorature and Art; Sanscrit, ii. 126; 
Sanscrit now only a dead language, 127; 
poetry, 127; earliest pcHsms of the vedas; 
the icamayaua, its snbject, 138; exile of 
Itama andSita, 129: the resitleucc of Jiauia 
and Sitaiuthe l>eccait. 129; Ravana King 
of Ceylon carries off Hita, 130; exploits of 
lianuman. a monkoy-geueral.130; recovery 
of Sita. aud ascent of llama to heaven, 
131: merits of tlu; Ilaiiiayana. and exinicts 
from. 131; the Mahabharata, its subject, 
tlie Pandusand Curus. 133; aswavainliora, 
held by tb<‘- King of Pancliala, 13;); claim¬ 
ants for the liniid of the daughter of the 
King of T'anchala, 134; hiicikiss of Arjiina, 
134: arrogance of Yudistiiira, 135; groat 
battle l>otwc<!ii the Pamlusaud (hirus, 135; 
Yiulislhira’6 journey t(» Mount Mern, 135; 
merits of the Maliabharata, and extract 
from, 136; more UKslem poets; Kalklasa, 
•laya l>eva, tlio ilitopadesa, 137; the 
drama, 137; di'.fccts of tlu*. ilrama, 138; 
music, 139: painting and sculpture. 140; 
urchitecturc, 14U; the Manasara. a treatise 
on architecture, 141 ; aiialysiiyif the Matia- 
SiU'a, 141; pyramidal temples, or rimonaj*, 
142; parts aud appendages of temples, 143; 
rock-cut temples and monasteries, 143; tlic 
cavc-tempJe of Karli, 144: tlm Ht*ven Pago¬ 
das, 145 ; the Kylas, 146: com|>arative cost 
of rock-cut ami regularly Imilt temides, 
146; regularly constructed temples; the 
pimmla of Tunjoro: temple of (kimlia- 
coiium, iiagodosof ChiUamtvu'am and Ma¬ 
dura, 147; temples of Orisf^, 148; Jain 
Wmples of Mount Al>oo, 148; other struc¬ 
tures, olisorv'atorics. ghauts, 149; summary 
view of Hindoo archTti!clJirc. 150. *• 

^indnoR. the, Agricnlturo.Matiufact>ures, and 

» Oommercc of; slow nmgress of agricul¬ 
ture, ii. 151; peculiar matures of Hin<hK> 
agriculture. Its antiquity, 152; Implements 
of asriculture; the plough; substitute for 


Hindoos. Agriculture, &c., of the,— 
tlio roller, ii. 152; chunsmessof their agricul¬ 
ture, 154; moiles of sowiTig;<lrUling machine; 
excessive cropiiing, 154; thrashing, waste 
straw, aud manure, 155; great variety of ve- 
getahlc jirodiico in ludia,155; rice; modes of 
cultivating it, 156; wheat. 1 Kirlcy, ragee, 157; 
Icguritinous atidotlier croiis. 158; evitton; 
Induceineuts ami olistacles to its cultiva¬ 
tion; extent of eultun*, 158; sugar; extent 
of cultivation. 159; silk; extent of cx{H>rt, 
imiirovemcnls in the inauagomeiit of, 160; 
culture of indigo, 161; cultun^ of opium, 162; 
rotation of crops, 163; iinproveimmts re- 
fpitred in llimbn) agriculture, 164; maim- 
facturus; nott^m. skill in spinning and 
weaving it, 164 ; silk and other manufac¬ 
tures, 165; foreign trade, 166. 

Hindoos, the. Manners aud Customs of, ii. 
167; physical typeof, 167; food.clothing.oud 
dwellings of, lt»3: prevalence of villages 
among, 169; village .system; principal 
olbcersunderit; heiultnan au<l sulKinlinatc 
ottictsTS, 170; viihfcgc aristocracy. 172: cou- 
ilition of tiie villagers; rural life, 172; 
towns, tlioir inhabitants, lower classes of, 
173; marriage custom^ 174; condition of 
Hindoo wives; domestic life, 175; degrailii- 
tiou of tlic female sox, 176; <liHgusting 
haliits of the Nairs; onler of single succes¬ 
sion among; true character of. 177; female 
ipfanticide, and caiisos of its former pre¬ 
valence, 178; bigend in snpjwirt of female 
infanticide, 179; first onicial notice of 
fermilo infanticide by Mr. Jonathan J>iin- 
can. and tlic exertions of him aud (kdonol 
Walker to suppress it, 180; diftioultios in 
dealing with the crime of feinalo infanti¬ 
cide, 181; exertions of Mr. Willoughliy to 
suppress female infanticide, and satisfac¬ 
tory Tiwilts, 182; sutt.ee, or burning of 
widows, 183; funerals, 18*1; Holwell’s ac¬ 
count of a satt«*K, 185; suttee of a Mah- 
ratta iiriiux^ss. 187 ; alMunl eulogies of sut¬ 
tee. 187; suttee often compulsory, 188; 
Muliometan restrictions on suttiM*, 188; 
views of brahininized KuroiH^anson suttee, 
189; cautious iuterfonmcc of the (?omi>any 
with suttee, 189; successful alwilition of 
suttee, 190; thuggi^e, 190; prcKsnluro of 
the Tlmgs, 191: regular training of eliil- 
dreii to thuggee, 192; Rrahmins and otti- 
cials interested in thuggee, 11*3; probable 
numlior of thuggee victims, 194 ; duooitee; 
proceilurt* of the Jhuioits, and suppression 
of the system. 194; atrocities indicative of 
natural charai^ler; iiidilfcronce of Hindoos 
to hmnan life, 195; occasional outbreaks 
of national charactcir. 196; indolence an<l 
frugality of tht* Himbxis, 196; conviviali- 
tics, 197; festivities; tlie Hoolcc, and orgies 
emnected with it, 198; family life, 199; 
education, 199; children, uufavouraiile iii- 
fiuences to which they ore subjected, 200; 
practicti of dhema, 201; the juiuchfifft/jt, 
202; Bottlcmeiit of ipiarrcls. 202 ; lawsuits, 
203 ; disregard of truth, 203; singular con¬ 
trasts of Hindoo character, 204; estimate 
of Hindoo character, 2<*5. 

Hipiialus, tht' navigator, his bold plan of 
sailing to India, i. 3”. 

Ilippou, ('aptain, i. 252. 

t!irraiTtOui, ii 691, and tio/c. 

Hisloj), Sir Thomas, iii. (>3; at the liaitlc of 

• Mahidpoor, 77; his rt^trog'nnle movement 
towanU l*o<iuah, 79; his explanation of 
thoexecution of the killcilar of Talneer,97. 

Hitchcock, Lieutenant, deserts, ii. 252. 

Hobart, Lord, governor of Miulrus, his pro¬ 
posal to the new Nabob of Arcot, ii. 673 ; 
luoilc jirovisionally (iovernor-geueral of 
Indio, 675 ; iii. 3. 

H<Mls^>n. Miijor, si'iit from Dtdhi against the 
rol>ellious llaughurs ; hiscle.vcr stratagem 
and brilliant success, iii. 616 ; capturesand 
shoots the two sous of the King of Delhi, 
625; killtnl at Lucknow, 674. 

llolkar, rise of the family of. U. 741; Mulhar 
How Holkar, 741; Afialya Bacn;. aud Tooka- 
jets Holkar, dissensions in the family of, 
742 ; Jeswmit How Holkar; his league 
with Ameer Kluiii, 743; .Feswuut R^iw’s 
victory at Oojeiu, and snliseiiueTit re¬ 
verse, 744; Jeswunt How's iireilatory 
warfare, 744; the cruel execution of Jes- 
wunt Kow Holkar’s brother by the 
lieishwa. 744; Jeswrunt 11 <»w'k hostilities 
w'itli the i*4^hwa and I8cindia, 745; his 
victory at Poouah, 745; Colonel (^lose visits 
him in his camp, 745; his views, 773; his 
arro^nt proposal to Lord Xiako, 773; his 
<luplicity aud vain boasting, 774; prciiaro- 
tions of the British for a war with. 775; 
Colonel Monsori apriointod to keep him in 
ch^ck, 776; dofoatu Ueutenant Lucan, 777; 


HtTMBERSTONE 

Holkar,— 

disaatroutf retreat of fkdonol Monson 
lioforo, ii. 777; Lord Ijake takes the field 
against, 779; gallant defetice of Delhi 
against, 780: repulsed and tiurmied by 
Lonl Lake, ySl, overtakeu, surprised, oial 
<lefeatod, 782; the llajali of Hhurtpoor in 
league with, 784; is again silriirised and# 
defoatsHl, 795; Bcindia's leanings in favour 
of, 798: Bcindiu'fl connections with, 660; 
sends envoys to Lonl Lake to sue for peaise, 
809; treaty with, 809; liis eriines and 
insanity, 825; the state of affairs at Ins 
court during liis insanity and afh^r liis 
death, iii. 76: young Holkar, Mulhar Row, 
defeatefl at Maliidimor. 77; a new treaty 
with, 78: indirect advantiigc's secured to, 
from British interference in Oimtral India, 
114; improvement of his territories luidec 
British management, 188; relations W'ith, 
during Lord Bentinck’s ailministiation, 
220; favourable tei-ms otfcretl to Jesw’unt 
Row Holkar by Hir George Barlow, 275, 

Holkar, Haree, Iii. 220. 

Holkar, Mahipat Row, combines against hia 
cousin, ii. 825. 

Holland, jieace made with, on t.lie niaiTiago 
of Rrincess Mary with the J'*riiiC!e of 
Orange, i. 327. 

Holland, Mr., noticeil, Ii. 471; governor of 
Mmlras, 584; misconiluct of, 586; is dis¬ 
placed. 587. . 

Holmes, MrASent to negotiate with tlie 
MahrattaSiTi. 450. 

Holwell, amiointed governor of Galciitla 
on the flight of Governor Drake, i. 541; 
attcmiit to negotiate with Surajah 
Dowbili, 542; immured in the Black Hole, 
543; fuHlicr tUivatenctl and ill-nscxl by 
the nulKib, 544; sent prisoner by the 
nalHib to' Moorshedabad, 54.5; further 
notice of, 545, nob*; Meer Cossim’s iietm- 
tintbius with^ to supplant Mecr Jafficr 
and U> take his iilace, (>69. 

Home, Lloiitenant, along with Lieutumnfc 
Salkeht heiuls theexpJosion party at 9el]ii 
to blow open the t^asbini're gate, iii. 620. 

Homo’s.S'rh-ri Viru »la J///j<oiY,<iuoteil, ii. 598, 
•iiotf, 609. 

li^ioghly, a l*ort-ugue.sc factory at, captured, 
ii. 28-1; attacknl by the (Vniqiiiny, 342; 
atta<ike<l and captured by Kilpatrick and 
(.’-ootc, 555. • 

Hoolak<H», King of Persia, Rondsou cinbuBsy 
toDtilhi; its iqilended reception, i. 6'!. 

Hoolee, a Hindoo festival, ii. 198. 

IJootrmyoou, mounts the throne of Dtdhi, i. 
114; opposed and defeated by Slieer Khan, 
114; his nori-ow t'sciipo, 115; defeated a 
Bccond time and escapes, 115; subsequent 
fortunes of. 116 ; his reception by Shah 
'J'amasp of Persia, 317; recovers portions 
of his ti'iritorics and his capital, 118; liis 
death. 120. 

Hoossein Kwilly Khan, i. 133. 

Jioossein Shah Shurky opisnses Bhoilole, i. 

101 . 

Hi*pe, Brigadier, thellifeinuralJeAdri'in, his 
attiM'.k on the SecuiKlor isugh, iii. 
storms the Ih^^ini Kotee, 072: killed at 
llhotslamow, 6/6. 

TTomby, Mr^ govemey of Ihimliay, ii. 4(d,4G2. 

llorscfield, Lieutenant, in. 760. 

llosen All, supmuts Farokshir, i, 387; 
scheme of ParoKsbir to rid himself of the 
prewnce of, 387: and bis brother a)- 
solutc masters of the government, 391; 
stabbed 392. 

Iloiise-tax, tlic, imposed by tlic goveniim iit 
of Bengal, receiver opposition, iii. 29; pro¬ 
duces an insinreetion at Bareilly, 31. 

Iloulmunii. sent in command of a Dutch ox- 
IK'dition to tlie i. 218; roachesMadagas- 
vivT, 219 ; arrives at Bantem, 219; bis 
injudicious conduct; is imule jiriiwmer. 
220; threatens retaliation; his surmoipient 
procfHidings, 220; return of the expedition, 
and its results, 221. 

How'dah, the silver, of Durjaii, iii. 186. 

Hughes. Admiral, demands of the Madras 
coimcil the release of Ixird l*igot, ii. 396; 
Ids intended ojwrations against thelluteh. 
491; brings equipments for the siege of 
Negapatam to Nagore, *498; defeats a 
Frcncli fieet. WK); him another engage¬ 
ment with the French, .502: has furthi'r 
engagements with the French under 
Suifrein, 504: lias another naval engage¬ 
ment with the French, 514. ' « 

Huinayoon, the tomb of, near Delhi; the 
King of Delhi takes refuge there, but is 
brought Ixtck, iii. 624. 

Humberstonc, Colonel, defeats Mukhdom 
Ali; Ii. 505; attempts to toko l^algbaut- 
dierry, 506. 



INDEX, 


7?7 


HUME 

Ilumc, Surgcrtn, ii. 83<». 

Humidity of the* ejimat.; of IiulUi, i. 8. 

Utiofl and Beythiaus iuvade aiul Bctilo in 
Indiii, i. 3i. 

Iluutor, I'apbaki, at Beringapiiiiiiu, ii. 014. 

Hvintur, Brigmlicr. qitoIlH tliu mutiny among 
the tiepr>ys, at Hhikan>oor, iii. 503. 

Hunter, Lieutenant, hixI Lieutenant IMor- 
rifioinlelivered from nristm, on tUooanture 
of Wuftota, iii. 91. 

Ilurreaiu)., the MtJtwy mutiny in, iii. 573. 

Hurricaue, a terrildc, at I'orto Novo, i. 43»; 
a disastrous, ut I'oudiehcrry, 638. 

Hurry Hunt, a Malimttu goncrul, ii. 401, 
HYi, 604. C33, 

llnslKuid and wife, tlie reLition of, among 
the HindiH>s. ii. 09. , 

Uuzral Maliul, liogutu, ox-cinoen of Ou<te, 
iii. 674. 

llydjwiHiS, Al<‘Xaniler crosses the, i. 27; the 
battle of tlui. 29. 

Hyder Ali, Ijally the Fnsnch general inaUi’s 
a treaty with, i. 632; his )»areutage, ii. 217; 
his youth, 218; his ilrst miiihiry service, 
218; plunder ohtaiumi from Nazir Jung’s 
camp lays the foiimlation of his fortunes. 
219; the regular sysbmu of plunder 
or^mized hy, 219; becoiui'S foujedar tjf 
Hindigul, 219; soheiue to enrich iiims(4f. 
220; his visit to the Mysore <*ajHtaI, Kl; 
wii'ls troops W tlie aid of tJie Sfair llajah 
otPalgliaiit in MalalMir, 222; iijak(« an in- 
cursitni into Mmlura nml is defeatml, 222; 
is iutruste4 l»y Nunjeraj to settle the 
diaputi's with the Mysore army, 223; pro¬ 
cures the death of his nval, Herri Sing, 
224; liis arranireiueiit with tlie Mahrattas. 
225; i'-. sa!id'*d i»y tin* r!i.jah vvi'h tin* tit!' 
of r. 2:':>. siud ««'■••• In', iii'.ngite a* 

the rajan' • isU um -. -.u « ni . o-i a* .\nn 
jeraj’s gate, 22.5;ohtains nowai'raugements 
in his favour, 226; intrigue carrieil ou 
against him in the palaci;, 237; is sutl- 
denly attackt*«l by Knndoe Row; ills escape 
and flight, 238: his curious arrangement 
with li'uzznl (.lollii Khan, 221h is tlefeatc**! 
by Knndoe Itow, 231; Ids visit to Nunjeruj, 
by whom he is mmle coniniauder-in-cliief, 
231; his oixiratioiis at Scrlngapabam, 232; 
gets possession of Kiindee How; his treat- 
imnit of him, 233; liocomesNalKib of Sera; 
his con.seiiuent cliange of title, 233; Jiis 
]>roct:edings at areat Jla1ij>orir, 234; his 
Biege and tJapture f)f Little Jlalipoor, 233; 
his eX| olilion to Jle<lnox*e, 233; his con¬ 
quest of JJe,dnoif, andthevivsttreasim^ob- 
taine<l hy him tiiere, 236 ; Jiis proctiedings 
at Heduore, which lie tr(!ats u.s a separ¬ 
ate kiugiloru, 2.37; u (ujnsiiiracy against, 

.*..-1 ..i..’... v.r v’..e c»>nspiratorH. 237; 

organization of his army, 237; progress of 
his coiKiuesta, 238; jx-dnccs Kjivanoor, 23-!; 
his war with the Mahtattas, 2.39; ilisas- 
trouH t^nnpaign agahi.st tlie Mahrathis, 
239; d(!feateii by Madhoo flow, 240; Ins 
designs on Malaiwir, 24l»; his eouijiiest of 
T.Ialabar, 241; bis iiroccislings to secure 
his ctuuuiest, 241 ;‘€iis cruel treatment of 
tJio Nairn, ^42; ]»roelaims an amnesty, 
243; a confederacy fonucsl iigainst, 243; 
Ids hr-st eontuet ivith tins Company, 243; 
liis treaty with thoJlomlniy presidency, 
244; view of tlio'*lJonibay govenimcnt m- 
Hpeoting, 244; views of the East Jmlia 
directors ivgjirdhig, 245; treaty of peace 
between him and tiie Mahralta.s, 246; 
tile HomlKiy pri'siilency transmit him a 
treaty compostsl of fourteen articles; Ids 
reply, 246 ; vacillatir^ wmilmd of llio 
Aladrai^ govenuneut in respect U>, 247; 
inrgotiations of the Mmlras pr(!.si.lency 
W'ith, 247; ix'solutioiis of the Almiras coun¬ 
cil rcganling him, 248; is at war with 
tlie Alahmtlas. 248; his successful nego¬ 
tiations with Madhoo How, 249; Ni/uiii 
Ali ]m)feK.ses hy lye an ally of the (loin- 
puny aguimst, 250; Nimjeraj is entrapi>i‘d 
by, 250; Nizam Ali leagues with him 
against tlio Oomi>any, 2.51; nuTnlH.Tof his 
forces, 251; Ids attempt to intercept a 
liritish detachment, 252: ho miscalciilatcH, 
253; Nizam All’s iinpat encc precipitates 
an ongagumeiit, 254; his defeat, 254; his 
retinue asdesd-UMid by IJoIonel 'Wilks, 255; 
ravages of his son Tippoo in the country 
round Madras, 25(>: nicoiieiliatiou between 
Inm and the Nizam, 2.56; Ids siege of 
Ainhoor; its failui-e, 2.57; new cami>aigii 

• against, 2.58; his narrovv encai>e at the 
pass of Hingari>etta. 259; parting Isdwoon 
luiu and Nizam All. 259; his operations 
in Malalsvr, 264; bis mtslc of levying 
contributions, 264: his encounter with 
Morari R^iw, 267; his attempt to intercept 
Culuucl \Vuud, his retreat, 269; re- 


Hydor Ali, — 

solves to sue forpcacc, li. 269; his overtures 
for t»eacc i^jechsl, 270; narrow escaiie of 
Colonel Wood’s division from, 270; (.■oioiiel 
Hmitli's views rcs]XH:tii)g tile aecosslty of 
forcing liim into aid^lon, 271; at(>o8WH>r. 
273; Colcyncl W4K«l intrustdl witli tlie chief 
(xiiumuud uguinst, 273: plju*-c« Colonel 
Wood ill a iHjriJ<»usi>osition, 274; enteix on 
a new camiuiigii. 27.5; his sncci.‘s.scs, 276; 
armildlabcs a liritish detaehniont, 276 ; 
treacherous retaliation i»f a breach t)f 
parole. 277; bis ailvauce tc'wards Mailrus, 
278; his overtures of ticiu-e, 278; in 
«-omiiiMnii‘.'ii ion with the Ereiicli, 279; tlu: 
<‘omii‘d of .M..dr:i< lymiioHe a triici' witli, 
V*' 0 ; li;-. su«!*li*u :i}*i>eariMico lunir Mmlrus ; 
lelUT to Mie gin« •inucnt of Aladras, 2S0; 
peace concluded with: its temiH, 281; )u; 
takes part in a conspiracy h* e.xpci tbo 
Hiitishfroui liuliit, 472; i.s in league with 
tlie P’rtnich, 474; thmaleiUHl rupture of tlie 
Mailras government W'ith, 474; Swart<z re- 
(luosted to undertake a mission to Idm; bis 
reasons fora(M;eptiiig it, 475; Swartz’ inhu-- 
view witli, 476; ap)iroaciiiiig ruiitui'c of the 
Madras government with, 477; Mr. (iray 
seutouaseoondndHSiontohiiii.478; iii.s])rL'- 
liamtions for wav. 479; oi»enst.hc eainpaigii, 
479: liis devastations iiitliet’aniatic as d(‘- 
scrilieil )iy Eiliniind Ihirko, 479; liis rapid 
jirogruBB and inunerous eai)tnre.H,480: slow 
movements to oiifioso liiin, and gross blun¬ 
ders;, 481; attacksOyl.TJaillieW'ithIdswholo 
army, 483; entlndy destroys (Adonel Itsnl- 
lio’s detaisbiiieiit, 484; ca|»tim*8 Arcot, 485; 
Sir Kyiv Coote taki'S the tield agaiiiKt, 485; 
he iKisiegcs Wandiwasli W’itliout effect, 486; 
desuihyry o^x-'rations in (Jnddalore against. 
488; failure of an att4wk on a foriiiieil 
pagoibi Ix'loiigiiig to, 489; Sir ICyre (’note’s 
vich iry over hi m at 1 *ortoN (ivo, 491; liis rage 
and <.liHap)M>intiiu:<it, 492; Trijmssoi'e taken 
from. 494; he selects his own Iwittle-tield, 
494; is defeated in the luittle of Sholiiigur, 
496; repnlstsl in an attack ou a liritish 
dotachniisit, 496; rc'sults of tlie eamiiaign 
against, 49il: his opinion of liritish resour¬ 
ces, and resolution thereon, 51)0; his death; 
singular mode of concoaliug it, 567. 

Hyder Hcg Khan, minister of the NulKibof 
Oude, Jiis negotiatioUB with Lord Corn- 
wallis, ii. 571. 

Hyiler Khan ( Jliolaru, brother of Dost Ma- 
liomed, taken ]>riHoner. iii. 361. 

llyde.r Khan, son of Kliowrah Khmi, cap¬ 
tures Hera CJliazce Khan. iii. CdO. 

IlyderalMid. Air. .Sotori W’lit on an eiriliiissy 
to, ii. 634;. 4lisaffection at. 8H; di.stuib- 
litices at, ciutsod by iiie nabob’s sons. iii. 
28; tbreatcneil attack on, liy tlie force 
of the Afghan exiieditioii. .346; proceed¬ 
ings of the liritish at. 466; Sir (9iarl«'S 
JVapioradvaucesagaiiiHt, 46>(;; surrendered 
to Uie liritish after the victory of Alemiee, 
468. 

IlydriMitcs, or Kavee, Uio passage, of, by 
Alexander, i. 36. 

H 3 'nthnan, Colonel, ii. 686. 

Hyplmsis. Uic mutiny of Alexamler’a finuy 
at. i. 36. 


I. 


Ibrahim, of .lounpoor, i. 103. 

Ihrahlm lloossetn Alirza, raisc'.s an insurrec¬ 
tion ill the I'uijjab against Aklter. i. 131. 

Idolatry, the monslrous, of the iiitidoo 
religion, ii. 22. 

linhoff. Baron, sells his wif«< and ;:liildren 
to Warren Hastings, ii. 3u3. 

JwjK'rial Utr.rttirr, quoted, i. 29, 

Imix'y, Sir Elijah, application to, in fav<*ur 
of Niuiconiar; his itqily, ii. 377; unlHicom- 
hig ixiiiduct of, 381; partizanslifp of, 382 ; 
Ills iMshavioiir in the of Air. Naylor, 
436; brilsid to lowxir his elaimsto jurisilic- 
tioii, 437: his new appointment and in- 
creaswl Balary. 438; view of lawyers, an«l 
of tho e^muuithv of tlie Ihiuse of C^uii* 
iiioiis rusiKicting his new appointment, 
439, 

India, ancient Hindoo andCreelc idtas of, 
i.i; ,\le\;iiidi*r.-i« iito.l.. ii.cie.i 
higly, lli'uigh inifH'i leeilv mi'ler'%iiio.|. 
through regular intercourse witli, 2; 
I^toleiny’a map of, 3; l*ortugueso dlseovo- 
riosof, 3; extent and Isuintlaries of, 4; di- 
V’tsioiin of, 4; liasiiis of tlie Indus and the 
Canges, 4; w-utral, the Deccan, au»l Wes¬ 
tern Ghauts, 5; the Eastern (Jhauts, 6. 


INFANTICIDE 

India,— 

the T>eccau■•table-land, i. 6; gcohigy of; 
IxisaJtic trap, 6; climate of, 7; heat and 
humidity of. 8; monsooiis. 8; seasons of, 
9; vegetation of, 16; birds, iKiasts, &o.. of. 
11; political geography of. 12; native 
states, 12; th<i three pr<‘sideiicies of, 13; 
divisions of the history of, 14; prehistoric 
)H!ri<xl of. 15; sources of iiifonnation re- 
siiccting it in ancient limes. l.S; rock tem¬ 
ples of, 17; astroiioin)', 17; U'stimonies of 
Greek wriiom coiiceiniitg. 20; exiH'ditimi 
of Scsostris to, 26; expedition tif Bcmi- 
raiuts to, 21; expedition of Daiins to, 23; 
traile of the 1 Phoenicians witii, 24; Ah‘.x- 
andor’s e\|xuUtion to, 27; Alexaiuler's 

I return from, 31; effetits of his ex|Mslitiou 
to. 32; Scleiicus Ni<‘ator in. 32; coins, re- 
i'cntly discovcrtsl, throwing light ou thu 
history of, 33; Homan iiihwcoursc witli, 
34; routes leiuling to, inland, maritime, 
Kc., 3.5; iPliny's uceoimt of Uie usiuil voy- 
iige to, 38; trade with, by means of tlio 
Pei-skiu (hilf, 39; nu.Hliioval ix'viod, 39; 
Jiistapih.‘urai)ce<if the Andsiin; ejuiquestK 
of Alahoiiietanisin, 40; first iHTiiianeut 
Alaliojiietaii garrison in, 48; struggle for 
iiidei»cndencc, 58; invasion of, iiy tlio 
Aloguls, 76; mrcoiid invasion of, by tho 
Moguls, i<4; fmtIuT iiicursioim of the 
Aloguls into. 88; inviuled by Tamerlane, 
94; the Ahfgul ilyiiasty eKtablislied in, 105; 
political state of, in the 14th century, 119; 
a new era iM'gins in. 120; nnslem peruKl 
of tiu! history of, 144; first voytigi'H of tho 
English to, 212; t'nxt Dutch cxpiulition te>, 
218; firstvisibof tlitiKastliidiaC'ouipuiiy’B 
ships to the conthumt of, 245; invatlcd by 
Nadir Bliali, 398; state of, wibldii the Bri¬ 
tish territories and the lU'iglilKUU'ing slate's 
on the arrival of Lord Mornhigton in, ii. 
677 ; barbarous races of, iii. 166 ; tlie ncce.s- 
sityof tile Ihitisli maintaining a Tsiwerfiil 
army in. ill ; Uritisli useendeiicy in. 112; 
exteuision of British te'iritfwy in, Mot<irigi- 
luUly (smtoniplutev.1. 113; rtwiaiue of, dur¬ 
ing the Marquis of Hustings’ iidmiiiistrii^ 
tion, 127; various Boureos of distnrliaiax'.s 
in. flnvjn;r K;^rl .Andiei'^t’’*- admini^tratie.u, 
],'6. Iii-'ii -iSt iim (••n.iiiiiineai ii>ii w.i li. ‘Jol ; 
<(•^^;l•■n i.iiM'd III p.iiii.iu.i lit as to tho 
lutiii'e government oi, .31; i.Jie lull re- 
S]iecting the govornnieiit of, 235; tho 
great sejioy mutiny break.-? out in, 553; 
ucciihnital di-ticieiiey of Kuro]iean troojia 
in, at the jicriod of the sepoy mutiny, 
5.55; proposed change in the covermuent 
of, 685; Loivl J’uiiiierston'H bill for tho 
liettor governuieiit of, t>Kf); tiie discuKsion 
of Lord I’uliiiersloirs bill intcmiptesl by 
tiie rlglit-of-asylnm tinesi.ifui, whicli led 
to the ilefeat of tho ministry, 686; anew 
bill intvodiieiHl by tho Derliy ministry, 
687; the di.seu.MHi<iU of bniil llerby’s biU 
inlerrnpteil hy tJie commotion produci'd 
by Lonl Kllenborongli’s despatch, 689; a 
new lu^t passed f<*r this Is-tter govemnietit 
of fiulia. 694; licr majesty’s Indian pro- 
<-.lamatioi), and its effects, 6!>,'i; review of 
till! {i.ist liist'ory of liulia, 762; iinprove- 
meiits introdiK-ed into tlic government 
of, 764; education in; its effects, 765; tho 
jMiwer of ('hri.stiunUy uhuic snflicieut tei 
make India loyal and liappy, 765. 

India, (’eidral. Ihe presidencies of |>omh.ny 
and .Madi.i:* oiyam/i- ci'hin.iis to r>iippsi- i 
the mutiny in, in. i;77; relief of Alnow, 
677; capture of Dhar, 678; defeat of tho 
rohcls at Riiwid and Alundisore, and ro- 
lii'f of N(-eiiin<*h, 678; oiK-riffions against 
Selion- and the ha t of Hiiatglmr, 679; at- 
teick on .Jiiansi, <i80 ; defeat iff* 'I'antia To- 
pei'. and canturu of Jhansi, 681; oixnu- 
tionsi'f the i>oiiib»y and Madras generals, 
682; Sir Hugh Hose moves on (.'ali>ce; 
di-foat of tlie ivlxils and capture, of (.'alpist, 
682; tlu! relMds hoeing te>(i«alioraix! pur¬ 
sued and tlmeate-dby Sir Hugh Hose, 684 ; 
(k-ntral India cleared of the i-ebeln, 685. 

Indian satrapy of tJic J’ersian em.»ire, tho, 
i. 23. . 

Indian trade, under Justinian, i. l-H ; 
ehanges of the route of, 144; coinimslitica 
of; Enrojx'ati deuuind for. 118. 

Indigo, the culture of. ii. 161. 

indolence of the Hindoos, ii. Kf6, 

Jiido-Sr^hi.'iu proviiwx; of Scinde, the, i. 34. 

Indra, ii. 35. 

liulus, tho basin of tUo, i. 4; iii. 280 ; croase.d 

» hy A l<!xandcr, i. 27. 

•infanticide., female, among the Hindoos, iL 
178; causes of its former provalemv, 179T 
legend in supporlAif tlie pfft^'tice, 179; lirst 
olHcial notice of it by the Hritlsh, 1^: 
singular duuuiucut abjuring the proctico 



728 


INDEX, 


INGLTS 

Infanticide, female.— 
of, ii. 180; exortions of Mr. Duncan to 8np- 
180; imijerfect reiiiodios for, 181; 
diftlctiltiud in dialing witb the crime of. 
181; exertions of Mr. Willoughby to eup- 
l>rcsa, and aatiafactoxy result, 182. 

Inglis, Colonel, apiKdnted 1^ Hir Houry 
Lawrence on his death-bod to the com¬ 
mand of the garriHon of Lucknow, iii. 
630; hlB letter to Havelock from l,<uck- 
now, 649; another letter of, to Havelock, 
desmbing thecomlitionof things at Luck¬ 
now, 650; hia ilespatcb, descriljing the 
fmffcrin^ and henusiu of the garrison bf 
Lucknow, 65(>; his testimony us to the 
fidelity of the native troops in tho resi¬ 
liency of Lucknow, (iSC. 

Inhabitants of India, the, 1. 12; ii. 1, 17. 

Inncs, llrigadicr, his blunder m rehition to 
tlic ao))oy uintini'ers at Ferozci>oor, iii. 573. 

Institutes of Menu, the, i. 16. 

luteitfst, amount of, exigible among tiie 
Hindoos, ii. 97. 

Intoxication of tho Brltisli troops at Delhi 
retards the hualitapture of the city, iii. C23. 

Inverarity. Lieutenant, atrocious munlt^r 
of. near Canduliar, iii. 356. 

Trawadi, tho. iii. 144. 

Islam Khan raisins the standard of revolt 
against Hikumlnr, i. 103. 

Tsle of France, the, Labourdonnnis sent out 
as the governor of, and of the Jsl« of 
Bourbon, i. 409; Labourdonnais' refonns 
in, 410; Britisli exjiedition against, and 
capture of, ii. 846. 

Ismael Beg. deserts ^fndia, II. (>C2. 

Istalif, British cx]MNUtiou against, iii. 456. 

Italian maritime states, r»rogreRs of the, i. 
140. 

Ives’ Voftaife/i'ftm Euffhtn'd to India, quoted 
resitecting young Wpeko, i. 565. 

l:.ai'darH, the, ii. 412. 


j. 


Jacob, Colonel, defeats Shore Mahomed, 
iii. 472; in Kcinde, 403. 

Jailier Khan, his early history, i. 517; his 
CoiKluct-towanls the (bmptvny; dejnitatiou 
sent to T>(4}d t<» complain of. 519. 

Jogannath, ilcwan of uie Bajali of Viziana- 
gram, ii. 470. 

Jaghire, Clive’s, i. 658; objection t<i Clive's. 
659; Clive’s luixiety alsmt, 684 ; ligreement 
US to Clive’s, 686; tenure of Clive’s, cx- 
tetulcd, 706: of Madras, ii. 210. 

Jagmul, shtit l>y Akber, i. 130. 

Jains, the, ii. 80; nature of their worKlnp; 
tlicir practicit as to caste, anil partial re¬ 
spect for the Vedas, 82; moral systen) of. 
83; tomplus of, on Mount Aboo, 148. 

James, <kniimodorc, hU successful exjK^ili- 
tinn against the Angria pirates, i. 511; 
captures their stroJigliold of Sevemdroog, 
Tdz; rdtiiiuoitri's <theriah and another of 
their strongholds, 513. 

James I. grants a license to Kir Etlward 
MichellMinie tr^ trade t(» the >kkst. i. 213; 
renews tho cljarter of tho Fast India 
Conqiutiy, 246. 

Jameson, Captahi, Ins bravery in the Con- 
can, ii. 4CI. 

Janakajoe, iii. 221. 

Japan, Captain Saris’ voyage to, i. 252. 

Jats, the orisu and progress of the, ii. 784. 

Java, the iMimiuest <»f: Sir Thomas Kt^un- 
fonl .HiifHes made governor of, ii. 649. 

Jawud, the storuiiug of, by tlie British, iii. 83. 

JamXiova. a Hindoo ^siet. ii. 137. 

.TeUauder Shalt, his reign, i. 387. 

Ji'iiangir, eldest smi of tho groat Akltcr, i. 
249; receives Captain Hawkins at his 
court, and gives him awife«249; Captain 
Best’s treaty witii, 255; his diaractor, 256; i 
disorders under his government; hisdeath, 
267: wtntest for tho sucoossiou tt», 281. 

Jeiital, Kikjah, liis war with Sebektegin of the 
house of Gliuznee, i. 42; his death, 44. 

Jelal-u-din, his fortunes, i. 64. 

Jolal-u-din Ferozo, founder of the Khilji 
dynasty, on the murder of Keikobad; 
ascends tho tlirone of Delhi, i. 74; his 
competitors, 74; bis humane sentiments 
and mistaken lenity, 74; conspiracies 
against his life, 75; repeh* an invasion of 
the Moguls, 75; inurderwl by his iiephewf, 

4 77; tho misery of the soldier who mumered 

« him, 78. , 

Jel^alMvd, the didloultlM of Brigadier Solo's 
march fn>m Cabool to, iii. 4^; Bale’s ar¬ 
rival at, 431; defenceless state of; its de- 


I Jelalabad,— 

I fences repaired, HI. 432; tlie defeat of tlio 
enemy 433; Bole refuses to obey tho 

order of Generm Elphinstone to deliver it 
up to the Afghans, 433 1 diminution of tho 
garrison of, 434: the defences of, dostruyed 
by an earthquake, but soon retired, 435; 
defeat of the Afghans under Akbar Khan 
at, ^436; relieved by General Pollock, 43G. 

Jenkins, Mr., detained ut the coiuli of Bcin- 
dia as a virtual prisoner, ii. 798; itsl^sed, 
805; is resident at Nagpoor; his opposition 
to the rajah’s'conduct, iii. 68; his treaty 
with Apa BahiU 75; arrests the Kajah of 
Nag]KK)r. 90; liis absolute control at Nag- 
IKxir, 219. 

Jennings, Kcv. Mr., murdensl by the sepoys 

in Delhi, iii. .567 

Jeswunt Ri>w% iii. 76. (Bee Nolkar.) 

Jeswunt liow Biiao, fii. 81. 

Jeswuut Row (woorinura, iii. 472. 

Jeswunt Row Lar. Iii. 108. 

Jeypnor, tho rajah of, iii. 54; British rela¬ 
tions witii. 225. 

Jezait, the, iii. 414, and voU. 

Jerdn, or capitati<»u tax, tho, forbidden by 
Akiicr, i. 142. 

JJialledar, the, i. 393, uofe. 

Jheend, the rajah of, jcjius the British forces 
raised for the recovery of Dellii, iii. <<10. 

Jhunda Bing, leader of tiie Bhangee iHimL 
iii. 270. 

Jivau Sing, of Otleyjioor, Hi. 224. 

John 11. and Alonso V. of Portugal, tiicir 
7-cal for luaritimiMliscovery, i. 151. 

Joiinstone, (’aptdin, attacks and eaptiu-eH 
the Burmese stockailes, iii. 141. 

Jolmstone, Commodore, takes several prizo.s 

ii. 501. 

.Tones, Brigadier, iii. 620. 

Jones. Hlr William, his Anuilio 
iinotcd, i. 16; his approval of Ltird C.'oni- 
wallis’ (xslft of regulations for courts of 
jiidictaturo in India, ii. 636. 

Jota Ram. ill. 225; susiiectcil of murdering 
tlie llajah of .leypoor, 226. 

Joud)M)or, tlie rajali of, procnri'S the murder 
of tho Boondeo minister, iii. 223; BritLsii 
relations with, 224. 

JouriKff o^f ihf Asiatic Sorieti/ of Ben'jal, 
(piot<e«l, 1 . 51, note, 53, note. 

Juan de IVnuva. sent in comuisuid of t1i<i 
tJiird lV>rtugu6se expedition to India, i. 
167; arrives ut (.’ochin, 168. 

Jublier Khan, liis view of Lord Auckland’s 
letter to Dost Mahomed, iii. 312; his pro- 
IMisition to Sir Alexander Burncs, 313. 

Judges, native Indian, the employment of, 

iii. 2.59. 

Judsoti, Mr., tlie Aiiierioan missionary, his 
representation of tlie warlike feelings of 
the Burmese towunls the ICnglisii, iii. 140 ; 
sent by the BuruuMie witli tiie negotiators 
to Sir Archibald Campbell, 174. • 

Jugat Bing, liajah of .leypoor, his contest 
for the iKiautifnl daughter of the liana of 
(kleyiioor, iii. 54. 

Jngdnllnek, the liorrorsof the retreat njion. 
from CalKiol, iii. 427. 

.luggemaiit, the festival of, ii. 51; tlie temple 
of, doscrilMKl, 52; legend rcBixicting, 52; 
Brahmiuical ux))lanation of the worship 
offered to, 53; his annual festival, 53; in- 

» terest of the HraliTnins in the festival of. 

' 55; coinuKstion of tho British govcrtuiieiit 
with, 55; tlie temple of, iilaced imder Bri* 
tish protection, 757. 

Juggut Hiiut. the liankcr, i. 625. 

Jnhoo, Bulbmi's nephew, reliels agidnst 
JohU-u*tUii; is defeateil and iiardoned, i. 74. 

Julol Khan, placcxl by the Afghans on the 
tlirone of Jouupoor, i. 103. 

Julwahoor Bing, iii. 487. 

Jnmutoodrcji, i. 1, 2, and vote. 

.fiuaoo, the hill rajah of. iii. 270. 

Jnnkojoc How Bcindla, Hi. 472. 

Justice, tlie administration of, among the 
Hindoos,’ii. 92. 

Justinian, Indian trade under, i. 144. 

Justin's HistoHir PhiUppicft, Mfori'od to, i. 

Jye Ring, head of tho Gininca misal. Hi. 
270; conquered by Maha Bing, 272. 

Jytak, tlie fort of, General Martindalo re- 
puls^ at, iii. 14. 


K. 


Kabir Pantbis, the, ii. 70. 

Kadlr Khan, and the liajah of Coorg, iuie- 
it^tiug anecdote r^pecting. U. 612. 


KHIZR KHAN 

Kahun, the fort of, Tiravoly defended by 
Captain Brown, iii. 374. 

KaildocK the repulse of the British at, iii. 153. 
Kaiser Bagh, me, at Lucknow, the liattery 
of. captured by the Highlatiders of Have¬ 
lock’s force, ill. 654; broachetl by Captain 
Peel under Sir Colin Campbtdl, 663: cam 
tured, 671. 

Kali, the festival of, ii. 47; liook-swingingat 
the festival of, 47; other liartshritios at the 
festival of, 48; origin of the festival of, 
49; appearance of the festival of, described, 

Kalidasa, a Hindoo i>oet, ii. 131. 

Kalinjor. the fort of, captured from Dariao 
Bing, ii. 828. 

Kalunga, the serious repulse Bustuineil ut. 
by the British, iii. 11; the capture of, by 
tho Britisli, IJ 

Kama, tlie Hindoo god of love, ii. 39. 
KauianKit, thcstock^os of, captureil by the 
British, Hi. 150. 

Kamran, PriiuMs, tlie horrible liarliarities 
infficUsl by, on Futtch Khan. iii. 287, 318; 
sovereign of Herat, 318; luxrused of viola¬ 
ting his cngagcmontH witii I’ersla, 336. 
Kandahar, wn^stisl from Persia bv Aklier. i. 
137; double siege of. by nliah Jehan and 
Auningzebe, 285. (Bee Cmulahar.) 
Kanhojou Angria, the pirate, i. 509; bis 
characteristic nqily to the ronionstrancc <»f 
tiie Kust India Couqiany. 510; uttao^'i-d 
unsucces.sfully by the Portugueso aii<l 
Dutch, 511; his sons, 511. 

Karli, the cave-temjiles of. ii. 144. 

Kasya Hills, the, ilisturlmmxjs in, iii. 206. 
Kavanagh, Mr. T. 11., volunteers to convey 
information front Lucktiiiw to the Brilisn 
camp, lii. 660. 

Kaye’s Administration of the JHast. India 
i'ompautt, <pif)tecl. ii 188; o/ loftl 

Metratf, <}Uo 1 ed, Hi. IWI; hi Afyhan- 
istnn, quoted, 327. 

Kean, Bir John, aiipoinbed coimuaiuler-in- 
ohief as successor to Bir Henry Fane, ili. 
341; lUTive.s off the taiast of Hcindc with 
troiqis for the Afghan expeiUtion, 345. 
Keating, Colonei, liis engagement with the 
Mahruttns at Aross, ii. 402; commands an 
^^leditiou against tJie Isle of Boiu’boii, 

Reeling, (’nptain, si-iit out in cnnimunil of 
tlietliinl exiiL-ditiun oftneLast India ('om- 
luuiy, i. 344. 

Keerut Kiiuiiib, or Tower of Victory, at 
(Uiittoor, i. 300, note. 

Kei Khosrn, aiipointed by Bullnm to succeed 
him, i. 72. 

Koigwin's, Ricliard, nmttny at Romliay. its 
alanning))rogroHs, i. 332; investigation aisl 
Knppn!SHjon of. 333. 

Keikoljail, Koi Khosru lK*ing set aside, he 
ascHiiids the throne of I)cl)ii, i. 72; Ids 
doliauchcry; plots agoinst him, 72; Ids 
meeting with his fatlicr, 73: now plots 
against, 73: liLs miserable death. 74. 

Kcir, Bir William, iii. 78. 

Kelly, Colomd, iii. 23. • 

ICemendiiK!. tlie alTuir of. id *49. 
Kciiiiieiifelt, Admiral, captures a Freneli 
convoy, ii. 501. 

Kunne<ly, Coloru'I Vijns, Ids ilr.svrtj-e/o'.s- info 
the Nature and Affivaii of Anchnt and 
Hindoo Mythtduytf, ii. 24. 

Kerchiiin, or sertan, the lUsease of which 
Ilyder AH died, ii. 507. 

Kerowly, Lonl DaJhousic thwnrtotl hi bis 
proiKiscd aiinexation of, iii. 540 
Kosai-ee Bai, iii. 220. 

Klian Ifahailur Khan, his traitorous con¬ 
duct, Hi. 580; dees before Bir (’liarles 
Najiier, 676, 

Kbiui Bhurcen Khan, a Kuzzilbash cliiif, 
iii. 407. 

Khan Bing, tmale dewan of Mooltan. iii. 

5i17: taken prisoner la hi- em iiiU's. 50K 
KJiarisin. the king of, deb iilw .Bluiiitib. i i.l ; 
drneii out of ItU khig«|om (dieiir'-' 
Khan, 63. 

Khatniaiidoo, the rajah of, iii. 8; Captain 
Kirkiiatriek sent on a uiissiuu to, 9; a'l- 
vunoe of the British on. altamlonedp 19; 
negotiations with the court of, 23. 

Khi'hit, the, ii. 767. 

Kholat, tho khan of, his treaty with Bir 
Alexander Brnmes, and ophiion of tlie 
restoration of Bliah Biiiijali. Hi. 53: exiiu- 
dition against, *364; capture of, 3b5; the 
tonitoricR of, annexed to the doinitiioim , 
of Shah Bhujali, 373; son of Mehmb Khan 
|]^ued by tlie iusurgenta on Ute throne of, 

KhiliioB. tlie. i. 73, noU. . ’ 

Khmut, H. 663. 

Khizr Khan, depu^ of Tamerlane, i. 97. 



INDEX 


729 


KHOJAH 

Khu)aii AlMliUlali, i. 434. 

Khojaii i. 191; Lirt attempt ti'>poiMot) 

4 the gaiTisoti of Din, 191; his to 

take l>iu, 191 : hlA doath, 192. 

Kkooloom. tlaf wulloc of, iji. tiS. 

Khoord Cabuol l*a.ss. the, tii. 425. 
Khoornhaeiv, tho Inirlsirous puNlshnieot 
iuhicted an him :ih a traitor, i. 90. 

K lioarow, muixlorti iiia s(»vcreigu luul aaci‘ruU 
the tljTono. i. 80. 

Kbosrow Mulik, wnt tt) aululm* Ntipaiil, i. 89; 

cliaaator of tho ci^iiodtiou, 

Kluwni. «on of iluhnun, lUva to T<ahoTo. and 
lixosthcMttatof hiMKovormneut thi^ro, i. 50. 
Kho-»ni Mulik, lust of the (Tiuiztiavldos, de¬ 
feated and put to tleatJi by Shaliaim-diu, 
i. 57. 

Kiiowrali Khan, ui. olO. 

KlMirrani. »Sec .SAk/i Jtimv. 

Klnirruk Sing. iii. 480. 

Khyb.^r J*as.s tiio. KrI.xadier Wyld defeat'd 
at, iii. 434 ; foi'<w.*d by CJenerstl l*ollock, 437. 
Kiiyen-bran, iii. 135. 

Killedar (»f Talneer, the. the oxeeution of, I 
iii. 96; Sir TliomaiilJiship's o.vplanation of ' 
the execution id, 97; the nnjnstitiahle j 
eliaraetcr of tJia e\e;ution of, 97- 
Kilpatrick, lUaj ir, at i. 579; his { 

.share of the Xahoh Surajah l>owljjirs , 
treasury, 532. 

Kliieyive, the. Iiattle of, iii. fdl. 

KinI; of l)elhi, delivers up tliii Jhircdw'snislo 
he massacred, iii. 571 : his comlitional 
to open till’gates of J>elliit<i the Jh-itish, 
1d.'>; iiis s ms MSid letU^rs to tlie 'Hritisii 
eaiiip, 015 ; his iHght froiti Jiellii and 
ture, 024; .summary c.tecutiou of his sons 
by l.'a)>tnin Iloil.son. .525. 

K mg-bearing Sev KA//»oe5/vo».. 

J\ inloch, ('ajituin, senttigaiiistthetllioorka^, 
iii. 8. 

Kirktjo, tJU! battle o^ iii. 07. 

Kirkitatriek, (.'aptuii^ sent on a mi.sKioii to 
K hatmaiuloo. iii. 9. 

Klrk)>atrjck. .Major, <h-tiian<ls <»f the Ni/jim 
tf>e tlismisHal of liis Kreiioh i.nr.jps, ii. (>85. 
ICishen, V'lsaje.', a Malirathi leader, heiuls 
ail invasion »if Hii»d<»os*an, ii. 2!N). 
Kis.seiitlass, son of Hojht(lltil),HeJjt with tre-a- i 
sure Oaleiitta. i. .533. | 

K js.s<.t)Bim','e, n suburb of l>elhi, lii. 000 ; the 
relx'Ks attenii>b towered a »»Jittery in, but 
are »lefeated 007. 

K)RtiJ5\, Ohuiid iSahi>)’Ri>roeeedingsat. i. 43.5. 
Jvibtoor, distiii'Uwjce.s a;ji<»ng the Malwattas 
at, i. 177. 

Knox, (’idoncl. in the niglit attack nti .Ser- 
iugapata.'u, ii. <'d4. 

KiKsr Sing, iii. 045, 048. 

Koli-i-n»»or, the. extorted froTU Shah Shujuh 
by Itunjeet Sing, iii. *277. 

K<jhaii Idl Kltan. »<'an lubar chief, Mr. 

Jhimes' letter to, iii. 3i)l. 

Kojuk l*aas, tl«‘, <«em!ral Kngland <lefeat-<!d 
in, iii. 444; Oeneral Ktigiand advmiees 
through. 445. 

1\<»keiii, liriti.sh Sucre*? at. iii. 15,5. 

KoIaiKkor, ili.ilmxtcccluig of tJm rajah of. 
iii. 178. 

Kolos, KhaiicVs, and iloiids, Die, iii. 107; 

iijsnrreetion aunuig. 2'^. 

Kootloogli Khan, iftv.'iues lAslhi, 1. 79; is 
defoatid. 80. 

Korigaon, tins battle of, iii. 86. 

Kotafi, the rajah of, iii. 67; sLugntar form of 
government in, 222; (icneral Jiolicrts de¬ 
feats tile relK*l sop(^ near, 082. 

Kotnv. Itajali MakhtSing reinstated in poa- 
sesaifni of. by the liriiish. ii. 827. 

Ki'liral, iii. 30. 

KriKiiiia, his birth and exploits, ii. 30; his 
wortthip]X!rs, 71. 

Krishna Ivtxunanx*, the beautiful daughter 
(ff tho liana of Oileyisior, iii. 54; hur tra¬ 
gical fate, 50. 

Kuinaoij and (ihurwul, the suhjugittion of. 

iii. *2i). * 

Kumuiiie.r. iii. 83. 

Kiindee Itow, and llyder Ali, intnisteil by 
i4unjeni>j to arrangti Uie. dispute with tho 
Mysore army, ii. 223; intrigue iKdwccn 
iiiiii and Hyder Aii to oust Ninijcraj, 225; 
n»!W intrigue btrtwoeu liiiii aiul the rdd 
<l«>wager-princeBa to oust lly<ler, 227; his 
sudden attack on Hyder, 228; defeats 
Hyder, 231; alarmed hy a sti-abigcui of 
Hyder, ho takes to flight, 232; defejitol 
• by Hyder and given up to him; trcatnicut 
of, l»y Hyder, 232. 

Kuroum Khan, a Pindaree. leadtw, iii. 47; 
treacherous seizure of him by Scindia, 48; 
Ilia iriiprlsonBient, 49; his ndease. and sul>- 
au<iueut dopredatioiLs, 49; his ineiu'sioua 
into tho Nivgpoor terntoiy, 49; bis durra 
diatiersed, ; capture of hia wife, atatc 

VOL/IU, 


Kitreem Khati. - 

elejihauts, &c.. iii. 80; at .Tawud when 
etormed, Kl; Buhmit s ti> Sir John Malcolm 
and entls his di^'s iH^acefully, 83. 

Kurirar. the, iii. 420. and «ofc. 

Kuib Mlnar, i. t».3, imif. 

Kutl>-u-din, <»r Eilsik, (u'hieh see). 
IvittlMi-diii tifilhor,treacherously imirder«‘cl 
by Ihihrain of (ihuwuss i. 50. 
Kuzy.in>ashes. iii. 407 ; tremdicrous convs- 
pondenca* <)f the llritish envoy with. 420. 
KycM'ungyee.allnrnu’st' lejulcr, his defeats 
by the IJrltish, iii. 1,^4, J72. 


L. 


Tiflbourdonnai.s, eaHy eureer <»f, i. 4l>‘9; sent 
out as governor of tJie Isle of Krauet*, 410; 
Iji.s projc<'.t for esla)>lisliing l‘'reiu:h asci'ii 
deucy in the East; his exix'diticm t»t th<i 
Kisb 411 ; emOncRs l»el\vi'eii him .and 
Dupleix, 413 ; prepares* for iM'sieging 
Madras. 414; takes Miwim.s, -1H>: ciuiis 
liidiu. 417. 

Lake, (xomn-al l.onl, a))pointe<l by tin* 
govi'nior-gcneral tr> eoinui.'ind in liindoo- 
Btnn, ii. 749; movesagaiust ^*erl^^n’M FreiieJi 
f •vee, 75S: ra;4ur**' .Mi'lnir. 759; ].eniii‘? 
rerron |o|•|•M•et •. >|,m kii-•» u ii h:i >I-ml a- 

u;. li.- vi-i**fv .i‘ lle;i;i. and n 

p- 'Uh ■>. 7>''l: hi • inb-t \ w wit>hSiiah Alum, 
• 'Ill n-s Oil \:*r.i. 7''3: ent>tun*.s Agra, 
bi-l; hts victory at. Lsiswarce, 7G5:iiiakt*sde- 
fensive treatieswitli tJie nativenijalis. 707; 
lii.s communications with Holkar, 773; his 
distustrous march, 770; takes the held against 
Holkar, 779; his pursuit of Holkar, 781; 
dch-ats liolkiir at Fumickaliud, 782; ad- 
vancc.s on J)eeg, 785; bnsieges and captures 
Deeg. 780; lays siege to Hhurtissir, 780; 
his ineoinjHitmicc for siege oixTittions, 78i»; 
stirprises un<l ih-lVatK Holkar, 795; pio- 
eeisls txuvards the tilumibul, 80<); induces 
Scirnlia tt> release the Hritish re8iil<‘nt, 
805; severely coiideiitiiH J.,ord Eomw'aJIi.s’ 
ix-trognide course: 805; IJolkarsnosto Jiim 
forjK'aw, 8051; makt?s a treaty with Holkar. 
809: interfeix‘H with Hie relrogrinle i>olley 
4if Sirdeorge Harlow, 810. 

Lak^Miti of dutch, iii. 27. 114. 

Laksliinmi l>awsg a captain <«f buinlitti ii: 
IJuiidelcuiKl. ii. 821; Colonel Murtinilale 



Ixdly, Comptile, aiipoinUd governor genera! 
of all the French settlmiieids in India, i. 
59(h prepares to >H*si<'ge Fort Ht. I'hivid, 
,596; his lilunders, 590; captures J'’ort St. 

I )avid, 597; his exultation at bis success, 5159; 
his pecmiiary ditticulties, 599; plan for re¬ 
lieving his pecunit4ry<li!licnilties, 50(1; his e.\- 
pt‘<lition against Tiinjikn!, 0O0;ls*BiegesTi\n- 
joro and fails to take it, 002; resolves to lie- 
siege Madras, lil)3; subordinate op.Tations. 
l‘•^•4.s^p^K•il^sb •r-u, Mji lr.»...iXd c^ouimeiici's 
llse .sieg.'o! M.! Ii.*i>'. o!-.ige<l to raise 
till Mi'ge of M:i.|i:i< ai!il I'lMX'Ht, OiKI; in- 
psdi<-i'm-.iy .ln:.{< . Ic. f«.r<e, 021 ; Cooto 
tirolJls hy his injudiinous e<*ndnct, 022;* 
iiiovt ;uen'.‘*;ni'l count T iiioveTic ut.sof liuri 
and < o.iie, >‘23. --iit pri «> \^ i.'iui, 021: 

1 *. .jt.pi*- (•• r. •■api m-* \V undbva b tP-m fbe 
. iHttlll liiailM lined by t‘oo;e j 
^■2'■.: li.-loree and or<li r of l•a»1le. r:'., ms i 
u.iinl b. iose W .m.uv'ii-b. •’IS: teina:-, j 
>‘2*.*. f.lll.' to reii«'\e Villelii>r<‘. 'Id. i.in Mil I 
popularity ni Fuiuiiclierry. (di; sunviiders i 
I'oiidicherry to Coote, 041 ; his ultinuib* 
fahs trial, eonih-iunatioii, and decapita¬ 
tion, 043. 

Lamliert, t'omuuMlore, sent with asiiuadron 
to llaiJgfMui tt» demand satisfjwtion for 
injurh’K. hi. 530; liis prtux'cdings at Ran¬ 
goon, 531; his lett<*r U> the King of Ava, 
531; the King of Ava’sr«*ply: ignoiiiinioiLs 
treatnuuit of the olH<!crs whom he stmt 
ludiore 531. 

LancastiT, commander of tb«* first JOnglish 
exwditifin tti t.lie Kist, Jirrivc.? at AcJieen, 

i. 239; his jiri'datory excursion, 239; pro¬ 
ceeds to Iluntam, 240; Ids homewaail 
voyage, 240. 

Land. i»ornicious<sonHeiiuenceol' overl<*ttiiig, 

ii. 410 ; <li8St*n»ions alsmt, in the supreme, 
eounollof Bengal, 411: tho plan iinipnactl 
by HoAtiugs, 412; llustiugs’ plan rejected, 
414; plan of Mr. Francis, 415; laud tenure 
In India. 027; Mr. Himting-s’ i»lan of, 027; 
views of Mr. hVanciB, 028; vleiwu of Lortl 
OomwalliH, 629; freed from government 
usKi'Bsment, iii. 190. 


LITOKNOW 

Lang, (kdonepliis operations ivgainst Hyder 
Ali, ii. 276; in u’ant of provisioiiK at 
Vellore, 490; inan.‘hes witli Ti*emtrfrow to 
capture the fort <»l' t'aroor, 521. 

Langles’ MouHtiifh.i (t Moih i-iu'x lif 

CJiindwmUnt, (|Uoteil. j. 71 
Lariacc, hisviewiif tlicahtronomioal tables 
of the Hindoos, ii. 122. 

Laswar«‘c, tieiiorsU Lake’s victory ut, li. 7<'5. 
Landonlalo. Karl of. nunrrcl >s tw<en the 
ministry and ilim'tors of (lie ( Snu^Hmy as 
U* his apiKiintment lui goveri«*r-generul, 
>i. 818. 

J^aw aiiioug thi! Hindoos. il 92. 

Law. M.. a French oMiei-r, references ti», i. 
473. 477, 5S8. 

l«iwrcnce. Captoin, his letter containing 
oveitures from the mnr«lei\ns of the 
British envoy at Ca'mol, iii. 424. 

Ljnvpmee, Miijiir (h'oigi*. Injula'iously 
given uji as a^pt isoner (o Clinttuv Sing, iii. 

Ivawnmct', Sir Ifcnr.v, i|uells for a time (he 
iiin<^!noun wpivit n-n ni;'th<* ‘■•.•]K>ys in (hide, 
ic dt leiM-ihii.e ijiiilineers, 

iffiises his eoiijik'nl to tbedi.xanning of the 
native* troops in Lucknow, .591; fortifies 
and jirovis ouw the n'siileiiey in Taieknow, 
591; jiiarclK's nguiiist Ihe iimtnaxTs in 
(3iiiihut with disastrous U'siiJts, 591; 
abaudoiiH and blows uj* the 5im*lK-e 
Bhowuu, 627; his death. 630. 

Lawrence, Sir John, IiKs Ut /»«'<■/ im thv flf af/a// 
la (bf 7’/«a,/<i5. nuoted, iii. 574; the large 
ennlit lino to him for securing elfeetnal 
aiil in flic siege of Delhi. 699; vigoniiis 
proceedings of, (UI9. • 

l,awivnce, Major-gimeral Slrin:;er. eom- 
iiiander-in-e.hief in India, i. 423; retmna 
to Kngland. 4M; wait with reinforci immtR 
to Trichiiiojsily, 473; atteiiijit lo in1i5n.*ei»t 
Ijtiij, 474; Insactivity, 474; lights the buHle 
of iluhoor, 483; pivparcfj hi n'diieet lie coun¬ 
try nortli of 'rrichinojioly, 485; jMlvauces 
to therelitif of 'rriehinopoly, 486, at Kering- 
liaiM, 487; hrilliant affair with the Ficneh 
at Se.riugliam, 4''7- I’gbt ‘ the 1 .Pik •■•f llie 
Holden Lock. 41": ".•bi ‘1.. Ke l. i i il.e 
Sniyair-Joaf lloek, •l:*l: in 'f';in;i>ri ; ■ii:< mpi 
to intexnipt Insp-imn ip n. 'l':«i.j..ii-. . i*'; 
defeats a stratagem, 591; set aside by th‘* 
Iire.sid(!iiey of Niadras as <•olIlInand<*l* of 
tlie eX)ie<1ition to Betigul, 519 
ljaM'Hnit.a. JlimUH), ii. 203 
J.4iwMe, IJentenuuL at Foil ihimgliiir, iii. 
15. 

I^s-ols, the Ihike of, Ms oppositimi to Ihi* 
n’solulioii of tile lioii.se to innuiii* into 
flic gratuities ^iveii 1 y the ('oiii]»any for 
services done m tlui house, i. ;i60; his 
iiiijH'achnu'nt, and exiilniiatioim. 301. 
Tvcslii*. Colonel, sc-iit in eojumund of an c*.v- 
peditioii to I’oouub, ii. 443; liis incajxu’.ity 
and death, 4-M. 

l.ev.inf Conipany, tlio, established, i. 210. 
L.id-.iv. Ciipuilii. at lihurtis'or, il. 788; 

: I.lx,III s lb ■ iCajah of Cooj'g, ^ ira Itaji'n- 
(Ira, iii. 210. 

Liudwiy, Sir John, sent as'crown pleiiipolen- 
tiury to India, ii. 290 
l^iiiga Baj, iii. 208. 

Lingayots, the, ii. 75. 

lateratun* of tlie IHndoes; Sanscrit, ii. 126; 

|KH‘try, 127; the drains^ 137. 

Little, Captain, captures JMi*war, ii. (Ilk). 
l.,iit.ler, Major-general, at tlie bailie of 
Maharajpoiu*, iii. 48j ; holds Fero:;epior, 
488. • 

T.oilwii^k, Colonel, resident at the c<»uvt ( f 
tlie llajah of Saltarah, hi 267. 

Jjongliekl, Brigiidier, iii. 620. 
l.o)K-y. de Sc*<|Ucmi, l.)iego, his dashivdly 
retreat from Din. i. J87. 

Louis AVI., his jx*ply to Tipj.oo's re<pUKt 
for aid, ii. 59.5. • 

T..iveday, Tjieul*uant, his fab*, iii. 373. 377. 
JvOM’, tlie British resident in Cude, his pro¬ 
ceedings, iii. 2«13, 

Jiucan, IJeuU'iiant. defeat* d by lJoI!.ar, ii. 
777. 

Lucas, Sir tlerv'ase, aiipointod gov* rnor of 
Bonhiay, i. 320. 

laieknow', tho cajituro of. hy the British in 
17»)4, i. 681; Hastings’ visit to, ii. 552; the 
Hon. Henry Wellesle.v sent on a mission 
to, 729; visit of I'iarl Amherst to, iii. 188; 
the HeiKiy mutiny In, 587; the rising of the 
• uiob ill, 5R8; iKirlloUK condition <if, 59(1; tlie 
ipirtillcation and hrovksioning of the rest- 
deucy of,591; blockailo of tho residency of, 
593; state of affain# at, 627; tho Muchei,' 
Bhownn aliatidrined and mown up, 027; 
IKisition of tlie liritiBh ut, 628; de»cription 
of the residency and fortifications of, 620; 
deaUi of tiir ilenry Lawrence at. 030; 

288 




780 


LUOARD 


INDEX. 


MAHOMED 


Lucknow, — « 

llavulock instmctod to sui^rt Hit Henry 
Lawrence at, iii. ^2; Havelock liaviu^ ad¬ 
vanced towards, is ob]is:tNl to fall Mtck 
from. 641; Havelock a^uin advances on, 
641; letter from Colonel liiirlis urtdns 
Havelock to pro^ on to, 6411; Colonel 
Inglls’ account of the siofro of, 65U; 
Havelock's near approach to, 661;cc»usultar 
tion aa to the direction of tiie attack on, 
Havelock starts from tbo Alumbagh 
for, 653 *, Havelock reaches the Becunder 
lliigh; Genertd Ntdll killed, 651; the sevno 
wiudn the residency described hyaiiotiiccr, 
6M; ilavclock ailvanccs Into, and roachen 
the residency, 6.54; Havelr>ck’8de6mtchsetr 
ting foriii tiie ilitliciiltics which hod to bo 
overcome, 655; despatdi of C'oloiiel lugii.s, 
656; force of the )»irrjsoii at tlie 1)cgiii- 
ning and end of the siege state<l by Mr. 
(hibbin, 6.56; the ndioving force under 
Havelock, having forced ihi U'oy m^o tlie 
rc^<lenoy, isblockaiiud tbero l>y the rebels, 
(i57; inutiud operations of l>»siegeil and 
IteMogors, 657; Kir Colin OiunpiKdl plivocs 
himself at tbo heailof a ini»ro powerful 
relieving folx%, 657; Hlr Colin Canipliell 
leaves Caw’niHior for Lucknow, 652 ; Mr. 
J. II. TCavanagh niak<!S his way out to the 
British c<unp, 06(i; Sir Colin (/amplntll 
advanc(;s on the t:ity; tlie Hilkooslia iMirk 
and H(M!undor Bagh captured, 6i:(); tbo 
Shab Nigeof captured; the gtirrison co¬ 
operating, 601: tlie iiioss-bouso ; Motee 
Munzil oarrieit 662 ; the women and 
children removed from tlie residency, 6ii2» 
the garrison ciy|ricabcd, 6G3; tlio city still 
remains in ]M>mRsBion of tiie rebels, 664; 
Sir OtbtnpbeU's hnal imureii on, 670; 

tlie Kaiser Bagii a^tailed, 671; Itabadoor 
JuuK arrives with his (Uioorkas to aid 
the British. 672; tbo city is finally won, 
673; Lonl Oaiiuiiig's i>rodiamati(iu on the 
capture of, <530. 

Lugard. Bir ifklu'anl. at Lucknow, iii. C74. 

Lushiiigton, the Kight Jionounjl»lo K. It., 
appointoil governor of Madnis, iii. 189. 
Lutf AU Beg. ii. 607. 

Lynch, Lieutenant, his procecHliugs in the 
country around Khelat, iii. 333. 


M. 


Macan. Captain, translates tlio petition of 
the Bengal mutineers, ill. 153. 

Macartuoy, Lord, governor of Ma<lrafl, bis 
<|uarrol with Bir Byre C'nnte, ii. 501 ; his 
curious device for provisioning Vellortt, 
504; his minute on military iusitbonlina- 
tion, 509; mldrcsses a letter to Tippoo in¬ 
viting him to terms of peace, 523; moves 
and carries a resolution for the dismimal of 
Gencmi Btuart; makes liiui prisoner and 
ships him to Pkiglaud, 527: misurulor- 
standing between him an<l Mr. Hastings, 
527: open nmture lietwecm him and Mr. 
Hasting 530; as the result of his disputes 
about toe Hahibof Arcot’s debts, he resigns 
the government of Madras, 562; hia visit 
to (^loutta, 563; appolntod by the direc¬ 
tors to bo governor-general, but decliiie.s 
the api>ointmeut. 5t>3. 

Mactmlny, Colonel, his esea]>e from an 
attack on )-ii» life, when resident in Mysore, 

ii. 835. 

Mibcaulay, l,otd. his description of the scene 
presento<l at the comiuoncemout of tlie 
trial of Warren llitstings, ii. 646; ai>- 
iKiintfHl member of the eniipcil of India, 

iii. 246; arrivos at Ootacauiund, 247; his 
answer to the objcctlofli a^inst the now 
law respecting apiieals, resigns un<l 
returns to England. 202. 

Maodowall, General Hny, wa>le commander- 
in-chief, his grievance, ii. 837; places 
CJolonel Monro under arrest- fmr liis 
“Report’' on “tent contracts.” 839; his 
collision with the Modnis government, 
839; i>erishes at sea, 845. 

Maorlowali, Colonel, his operations in 
Caudeisb, 111. killed at Watigaon. 171. 

Maegregor, ai\ officer of Lully’s, compelled 
to surrender Gitigeo, 1. 643. 

Ms^rogor's HUttorf/ o/the tSikhs, fiuotod, iii.. 

Mackaree, the lajah of, iii. 57. * 

Maukrell, Colonel, hisdeathatCaboohlii. 411. 

Macdaren, Oolong, a force ur^er, detached 
to ('abool, but retraces ita i^ps, iii. ^7. 

Madeau, Colonel Lachlan, acts for Hastings, 


MucIockI, General, arrives at Man^Lorc; 
outwitted by Tippoo, ii. 520. 

Macnaghten, Mr., his letter to Lieutenant 
Bumes on the occasion of his mission to 
Caliool, iii. 297; letter from, expressing 
liord Auckland'sdispleosure at Lieutenant 
Bumes’ offer of British protection to tho 
Afghan chiefs, 313; his mission to Laliore; 
instructions given him, 326; his appoint- 
nient as envoy at the court of Bhah Bhujah, 
333; his feeliugs and views as to thecou- 
tt'mplated attack on Hyderabad, 346; hia 
Icttiu' to tho govomor-gencrid exhibiting 
tho views entertained by Bhah Bhujah of 
the Afghans, 353; great game proposed by 
him, to be played in Central Asia, 3t>7; dis¬ 
approves of < General Nott's treatment of 
the oppressing officials of BliaJi Shujah, 
372; pmsses ^r a largo increase of tho 
army of occupation in Afghanistan, 378; 
bis bliMKly in relation to l><Mt 

Maliomed, 380 ; Xx>st Mahomed surrenders 
to him, 330; treats l>oBt Mahomc<i kindly, 
381; ills culpable delay in taking measures 
for tho suppression of the insurrection in 
Cabotd, 394; his pri>pc»al for eifccthig the 
assasBinatiou of the principal retiel Afghan 
chiefs, 40G; offers a reward for the appro- 
heusion of Amour Oolah Khan, 407; new 
intrigues of, 419; troaclierous correspond¬ 
ence with tile Ghiljies and Kn 2 u 6 lb^ieK, 
420; extraonlin^ pro]N>sals of Akbar 
Khan to, 421; his infatuut-e<l course in 
reference to Akliar Kliau, 421; prococrls 
to a couferenou with Aklsar KJiim, and is 
iminlered, 423. 

Miicpherson. Mr., and adviser of JVTa- 

bomed AU; his intrigue with the British 
ministiy on behalf of bis master, ii. 289; 
inailc Governor-general of India, 559'; in¬ 
correct proceilurc of tho directors towanls, 
560; ilnubtful character of his administra¬ 
tion, 561; Lord ConiwaUis' oiiiuiou of him, 
561. 

Macrae, (Jolonel, at Blmrtpoor. ii. 789. 

Mactior, Briguilicr, at the battle of Moodkeo, 
iii. 490. 

Madagascar, arrival of Iloutmaun at, i. 219. 

Maddock, Mr., the Britisli resident in Ouile, 
iii. 214. 

Madhoo Ilow, prepares to oppose Hyder 
All, and defeats iiim, ii. 239; letter of the 
Boml^ay government to, 245; Hyder Ali'a 
successful negotiations W'ith, 248; sends 
an army across tho Nerbuddu, 296. 

Madhoo King. iii. 181, 186. 

Madras, the presidency of, i. 13; W'hcn hrst 
ruiscil to 1)6 a presidency, 277 ; first settle¬ 
ment of tlie East India Comiiony at. 271; 
violent dissensions at, 318; the govcni- 
mout of, UMurjMxi by Bir Edward Winter, 
318; threatimcil the Hutch, 32C; iiro- 
grcBs of tho (kuniiany at, 337 ; formed into 
a regency, 343; tenure of, Iw the Company. 
344; state of tba town of, 414; beneged 
and taken by the French, 415; terms of 
tlic capitulation of, 410; the Nabob of 
Aroot lays claim to, 418; tho NalKib of 
Arcot repidsod from, 419; restored to the 
English, 428; Bufdcr Ali’s connection with, 
4.*13; strange policy of the iiresidency of, 
446; wavering iiolicy of tho pro 8 i<len<y of, 

. 4.54 ; an cxiieditlon sent from, to Tinno- 
veUy, 454; anoxriodikionagainstVulconda, 
456 ; state of affairs in, at the iieriod oi 
the capture of Calcutta by Burafah How- 
lali, 547: resolution come to at. to* 8 oiid 
an expedition to Bengid. 547; Clive up- 
pointod commander of the expedition to 
Bengal by the presidency of, 549; General 
Lally resolves to lay siege to, €03; propara- 
tiona for tho siege of. 605; Lally ap^iears 
liofore, 606; the siege of; mutual blimdcrs 
of the besiegers and besieged, 607; desul¬ 
tory efforts of the besiugers; rumours of 
an assault. 608; a breach maile; arrival of 
the Britiidi fleet; the sk>gc raised, 609; the 
Oomptuiy's Madras jaghiro, ii. 210; vacil¬ 
lating conduct of tho government of, in 
relation to Hyder Aii, 247; negotiations 
of the TOveniment of, with Hyder Aii, 247; 
resolutions of the government of, in reh^ 
tion to Hy<l«ir All, ^ 8 ; absurd conduct of 
the government of, in relation to the 
Nisain, 250: ambitious designs of the 
council of, 263; apiiointment of field do- 
puties to assist Oulonel Smith l^the coun¬ 
cil of, 26(5; letter of the council of. to the 
held de]>utles, 272: Hyder All's advance 
toward, 278; vacillating conduct of the 
council of, 279; Hyder Ali’s letter to tho 

S ivomor of, 280; peace concluded with 
yder AU by the government of, 281; 
J 8 ir John Idndaay arrives in, os crown 
plenipotentiary; the decided ottiiosition 


Mmtras,^ 

of the council of, to him, it 290: letters of 
the council of, to tho cuowm plenipoten¬ 
tiary, 292; proceedings of Jhe council of, 
against the Rajah of Tanjore, 294; dis- 
sensiems between Sir Robert Ftetcber and 
tho council of, 352: dishonoitrablo policy 

■ of tho govemmeut of, 352; ex{>editiou 
sent Ity the cmvernnustit of. to captuie 
Tanjore. 353; Lord Bigot appointed gover¬ 
nor of, 390; inconsistency of the council of, 
in rcferenco to Tanjore, 393; violent dis¬ 
sensions of the council of, with Ix>rd F^ot, 
394; strange proceedings of the council of, 
395 ; the council of, arrest Xiord Pigot, 395; 
the council of, resist tlie demand of Admi¬ 
ral Hughes for the relctme of Lord Pigot, 
396; trims in Kiiglaud of tiie memliers of 
the coimcil of, 398; the Bengal government 
declare thoir amirobation of the acts of 
tho council of, X*8; arraugements of the 
government or, 469; misimderstauding of 
the presidency of, with the Nizam, 47U: 
tho council of, severely cMinsured ly ibu 
government of Bengal, 472; Hyder Aii’s 
CTOunds of coTuplaUit i^oinst the presi¬ 
dency of, 473; the governor of, sends tho 
missionary Bwartzon a mission to Hyder 
All, 474; the iiuxiusistcut jtroceedings of 
the governor and council of, 476; the go¬ 
vernor and two momliei's of the council 
of, dismissed, 478; tlie govenunenP of, 
propost^ negotiations for peace wltli Tipp(H», 
523: pusillaiiimouB conduct of tlio goveni- 
incut of, 524; tho conunissioners of thu 
government of, insultingly trt;atcdly Ti))- 
525; trt^aty of i>t»aco signod In'tween 
TipiKX) and the government of. dis- 
l)Ut4^s between the civil and military au¬ 
thorities at, 527; misunderstanding l>e- 
tween Mr. llastings and the governor of, 
527: Mr. l-iostings’ letter to tiie oomicU of, 
conferring extraordinary isiwers on Kir 
liyre Ooote, 529; eoliision l>etwcen Mr. 
ilastiiigs and the president of the council 
of, ill reganl to the treaty with Timioo, 
531; objwtions of the counuil of, to Lonl 
Moriiii^tou’s plans, 684; dis8ensioiisat,834; 
origin (if tlic (lisKimsums at, 837; retrencli- 
mentsin the army of, and dissHtisfaction 
of tbo (liHeeib, 837; collision between thu 
government of, and 4irhe coimuandcr-ui- 
cliief, 839; mutiny among the otHcors t>f 
the army of, 841; suppression of the niu- 
tiiiy. 643; the Hukeof WellingUm’s views 
on the Kiilijcct of the mutiny at, 845; re¬ 
forms in tho presidency of, ill. 126; tho 
tirosidency of, organizes a column to sufi- 
^iress the mutineer in Ccutrul India, 

Mmlura, Captain Coiie’s attimijit on, 1. 455: 
Hyder makes an iiicmwioii into, ii. 222. 

Marian, or MagaUiaoiis, Ferdinand, his 
circumnavigation of tlie globe, i. 206. 

Maha Nouiyo, a veteran Burmese leader, Iii. 
172. 

Mulia Sing, a Blkh Iwvder, iii. 271; hi» con- 
(iuests, 271; ularui of the oilier Sikh chiefs 
at his successes, 272; his death, 273. 

Mahabharata, the, a Hindoo i>oeut; its bu)>- 
jeet, ii. 132; its n^rit^ 136. 

MaliaxajpcHir, the 1iattl6 of, iii. 481; position 
of the reliel seiioys at, 636; Jluvclouk’s vic¬ 
tory over tlie roliel stipoys at., 635. 

MahidyKior, the battle of. iii. 77. 

MahmcNxl, son of Bulbuii, his ouconnters 
with the Mo^ls, ami death, i. 79, 71. 

Malmiood, Biutaii, his boyhood, i. 42; his 
personal appearance, 43; his war with 
RojaJi Joipal, 44; conquers Beejy Roy, 44; 
encounters Anangjial and defeats him, 44; 
hia triiiuiiihol Itanquet, 46; his cutuiuests 
in ludi:i, 47: takes Komnantli, 48; his pro¬ 
jects, DO; liis iiassage of tlie desert home. 
M; his death, 51; his character, 62; coins 
of, 52, and 7iote ; anecdotes illustrative of 
his sense of Justioe, 52; 4 uh Hucoeasor, 53. 

Mahmood To^Iak.thepsgoaut King of Jhd- 
hi, driven out by Tauiurlaue, 1.95; reseated 
on his throno, 97. 

Mahomed, son of Moobarik, his unworthy 
reign, i. 98. 

Maiioroed, son of Bultan Mahmood, a})- 
poiuted his successor, but ousted W hU 
brother Musaood, L S3. 

Mahomed Alt. his cowrardioe. i. 449; his iK^r- 
ulexities, 453; tho English liavin^ with¬ 
drawn from him, agaiii send him aid. 4544. 
his tortuous policy, 479; supported by tho 
Company, 480: is in danger from his own 
troopa 488; his relations with the British, 
ii. 2U7 : bis ambition, 299; redu<^ Vellore, 
211; his dispute irith tbo Rajah of Tanjore,* 
211; his ambitious stdiemes and intrigues, 
289; his design on Tanjore, 325; epigram 



INDEX. 


731 


MAHOMED 


Haliomcd A]i,— 

cjf a aon of, ii. 627; Lord Oonxwfdlis makes a 
new anaugoment witU, ti25; his death, «73; 
state of his affairs, G73j accused of corros- 
IMindiug with Ti;)pf>o. 717. 

Mahomed Hor>aaein Mirza, excites ilisorders 
in Oujerat; his dofeat, i. 132. 

Mahomed Iraoof, enlisted in the British ser- 
\dce, 1. 496; a base attempt to ruin him, 
497: suspected of aiming at indopendonce; 
tiie British send an oxtieditiou against him, 
it. 212; ^tray^, 213. 

MahomM Khan. Sultan, brother of Dost 
Mi^omed, iii. 519. 

Mahomed Khan, assassinated by Adam 
Khan, i. 126. 

Mahomod Aoza Khan, appointed iiai1> 
dewan for Bengal, Ii. 305 ; falls under hus> 
nicion, 307; intrigue against, in Leadenhall 
Street; its hucccbs. :{08; his arrest ordcrtMl 
by the directors of the C'omi>any, 309: 
efiargcs against him investigated; freed 
from arrest, 317; formally ac<iuitted. 319; 
rcstorcNl to olHce, 330; dis})laced by Ha«it' 
ings, 430; liis restoration peremptorily 
ordered by the directors, 433. 

Mahomed Hhali, placed on tiie Mogul tlirone, 
j. 391: his conspiraf'y to throw off tiic yoke 
of the Heyods, 392; his character, 393; 
threatened byBaiee llao, 396; ilcfeated by 
^adir Hiiah, 399; his death, 402. 

IVAbomed HUureefs fort in (/alxiol. overlooks 
the British cominissariat, iii. 403; resolu¬ 
tion of General Klpliiustonc to attack, but 
alters his mind. 404; taken, 405. 

Mahometan fanaticism, i. 101. 

Maliomotaaiism, its rapkl spread in liidia, i. 
39; ito coiKiuests in Indi^ 39. 

Malmmotans, fonii part of the inhabitivuts 
of India, i. 12; unu.sual combination Ihv 
tween them and the Hindoos, iii. .550. 

Mahrattas, the. the country of, i. 292; wnr 
}>ctweeu the Moguls and, 295; tlieir hrst 
great victory over the Moguls, 293; at w'ar 
again with the Moguls, 303; clevastition 
committed by. 305; dissensious among. 307; 
repulsed in their attack on Hurat, 316; dis¬ 
union among, 385; in tim Fiuijab, ^3; 

I irositect of uu empire of, 404; brought into 
he uaniatic, 432; defeat of, by Moiiacjee, 
494; inva^le tho Mysore, ii. 224; their war 
witli Hyder Air, 239. 248; <langer appre¬ 
hended from, by the directors of the Com¬ 
pany, 263; iitva<le Hiudoi>stan, 296; huI^u- 
gate Hohllci|ud. 296; designs of, against 
I^hita KImn, 297: cession of AUaliabad 
and Ortrah to. 320; extradition against 
Klxam Ali and llydcr Ali, 357; civil war 
among, 369: negotiations of the Bomltay 
government with, 3150; rupture<»f tlie Boni- 
Kay governiueni with, 440; GoddanVs cam- 
Itaigti against, 444; negotiations with, 451; 
defeat of, 462; negotiations renewed witli, 
462; peace made with, 466; Lord (k>ru- 
waliis cancels Maephersou's tretkty witli. 
671 ; league t>f, wlth-flPippcio, 68.5; a caiup- 
l>ax;aar of^ deaerffrad, 604 ; relations be¬ 
tween tira rlizain ami. 667; Lord Moniiiig- 
bm's negotiations with, 087; state of affairs 
>ug, 740; anotlier war of the British 
V’ith, 749; irasiUouipf the army of, 761; 
defeat of. iind^r S^ndia. at Assaye, 762; 
II truce with. 754; war with, roneweil, 769; 
the torniiuation of the war with, 771; iiu • 
porbant results of the war with, 772; 
munlor of tw'o English officers by, iii. 67; 
defeat of, In the Ijattle of the Soetal)al<lec 
HiUs, 72; defeat of, at Korigaon, 86; cai>- 
turo of the strongholds of, 6S; disturltancus 
among, at Kittoor, 177; British relations 
with, during the administration of Lord 
Bentinck, 219; defeated by Gtmgh at Maha- 
rajpoor, 481; defeated at Pumilar. 482; 
rigorous tdrms dietate<l to Gwalior, 482. 
Miihkvn, General Nott’s victory at, iii. 452. 
Midabar, Bo Gama arrives at the coaet of. I. 
155: Hyder Ali sends troops into, ii. 1^2; 
conquest of, by Hytler Ali, 241,246: Hyder 
All's oiraratioiiB in, 264; j»rocoodings of 
(■olouel Humlierstoue in, 666. 

Malacca, Albuquerque's exi)e«lition against, 
and capture of, i. 183. 

Malartic, governor of the Mauritius; his 

{ mbllc rocoptiem of the env(»ys of Tippoo, 

i. 680; his absurd conduct on tlie occasion, 
681. 

Malatm, taken by tlic Englisli, iii. 22. 

by the British. 

Malcolm, Sir John, his share in compelling 
the Kjiam to dislnind his French troops. iC 
686; his narrow escape, 687; sent on a mis- 
Sion to Persia, 733; sent by Lord Minto on 
an embassy to Persia, 833; at the battle of 
Mabi^Ix>or, ill. 77; his pursuit of Obeetoo, 


Malcolm, Sir John,— 
lit. 81; arrives at Tolncer, 94; negotiations 
with the Peishwa,lu2; terms offered to the 
]*eishwa by, 103; appointed governor of 
BomlHiy. 189; variously quoted, i. 563; ii. 
779, 606, 824; iii. 105, 114, 130. 

Midcolm's, Sir John. lA/i' of Lord JtotK'H 
Clive, quoted, i. 514, 663, 6»; Sketch of the 
SifJis— Aciatic Ih’KmrcafM, quotenL 11. 80; 
CfHti’oZ India, quoted, 11.187,659; Po/iftoai 
Historfi of India, (|uoted. ii. 674, 779. 

Main, Alexander wounded among tlio, i. 
31. 

Malligaum, the stronghold of, ill. 98; attempt 
of the British to caitturc, and failuix^ 1*9; 
renewed attack on, und capture of, 100: 
blunder in the terms of capitulation. 100. 

Malojec, fatlier of Shahjei^ i. 21^. 

Malwah, the conquest of, by the M4»guls, 

i. 83; struggle in, btitweeu Aklrar and liaz 
Bahadur, 127. • 

Mama Hahib. regrtit of Gwalior, iii, 372. 

Mail Sing, Itajah of Joud]M}or, Ins oonte.^^t 
for the iraautiful daughter of the Kuna of 
Odeypoor, ill. 54. 

Mangalore, liesieged by Tippoo Sahib, ii. 
619; armistice Iratwceii the English and 
Tipism before, 620; grc.iss vudation of the 
aniiistice, 520; distress and disappolut- 
incnt of the garrison of, 620; surrtiuderod 
tf> Tippoo, 521. 

Manilla, the expiMlition of the British to, 

ii. 206. 

the. analysis of, ii. 141. 

Manser, LienU^naiit, at BlinrtiK)(>r. ii. 787. 

Mansfield, (.•cneral, at the buttle of Cawn- 
|H>or, iii. 668. 

Manufactures, Hindoo, ii. ir>i. 

Map, of Jummooileep, L 1; l^teJemy’s, of In¬ 
dio. 3. 

Maplinre Khan, i. 418. 

Maritime ei>torj»ririt', of the PortAigiusc. i. 
149; of the Kngll^, 195, 224 ; of the Dutch, 
218. 

Marloy, (Jencral, his operations against the 
Ghoorkas, iii. 17: tlie injudicioiiH nature' 
of hiu operations, 18; his retreat and 
sudden disapiraarance, 18. 

Marriage, form of. among the IIuid<»os, ii. 
100; marriage customs, 174; ilisgnsting 
habits of the Nalrs in respect t<>, 177- 

Marshall, Geuiiral, his opcnttlons against 
Byarani of Hatras, iii. 38; at Agra. 62; Jii.s 
operations against the IMndaroes. 798. 

Marshmaii's mentoiv of Mart-lock, quott'il, 
dcserilang tlie scene presented to Have¬ 
lock’s siddicrs on entering OawniMmr, iii. 
637. 

Marhdian, the capture of ilie stockades (»r, 

iii. 533. 

Martaud How, iii. 220. 

Martindalc, ('olonel, seiitagainst LakBhinau 
Duwa, ii. 822; proceeds against Kalinjer, 
829: repulsed at Port Jytak, iii. 14; relin¬ 
quishes the hoira of taking it. 20 . 

Mao% the St., in goW, tlemouiled hy the 
Zainorinof (.'ulicut from Dti (jfaina, i. H>0. 

Master and servaiit, tlic law' of. auioiig Hin¬ 
doos^ ii. 98. 

Masuii)a^tam, i. 614: state of the fort of, 615; 
C-'olouel h\»rdc n«iolvo.s to Irasiege, 615; 
assaultund capture of, 017; mutiny among 
tjie European officers imd men at, ii. 842t 

Mathematics, Hindoo, ii. 123. * 

Matlis, ii. 68. 

Matter, the view htken of, 1)y the Vt'danta 
sdiind of philoiwiphy, ii. 115. 

Matthews, Geuoral, his diuracnt on Kajali- 
iiiuiidroog, ii. 516; rapid conquestH in iied- 
nore, 510; his sistoniramient at bis success, 
617: he and uU his irootis made prisoners, 
518. 

Mau<le. Captain, R.A., commands the guns 
in Havelock's army. Hi. 033, 041; at tJie 
Charliagii liridge, 053. 

Mauritius, the, conteinplutod ex])edition 
against, ii. 7M; Lord MJnto's cxxiedition 
against, 847; capture t>f, 848. 

Maury’s FA//«V«/ Gcoyi’tqtffU of the .SVa, re¬ 
ferred to, i. 9. 

Mawhey, his attack on Kalung.a, iii. 11; 
sujrarseded by General Murtiiidale, 14. 

\luxwell, (.kdonel, various notices of. ii. 592, 
C02. 6U8. 012. 014. 

M'Gaskill, General Sir John, sent in com¬ 
mand of an-cxxiedition against Jstalif, Hi. 
456; assisUi at the installatjoii of Fiittch 
Jung, 457; killed at the liattle of Muodkee, •! 
4^ . ' 

M'Korras, Ckiloncl, shot in the mutiny of 
Vellore, ii. 811. 

M'Morine, Brigadier-general, iii. 146. 

M'KciU, Britiw envoy at Teheran, his letter 
to Yar Mohmootl, iii. 319; proffers nwdia- 
tion tratweeu the Afghans and Persians, 


MIDDLETON 

M'Neill,— • 

iii. 321; failure of his effort to mediate. 322; 
memorandum presented to tiie jihab by, 
326; his view <if the coiulnct of tlic Afghans 
towards tlie l*ersiaus. 336. 

Meance, Eir Clmrlcs Napier's victoiy at, Hi. 
407. 

Mecham and Soppitt., Lieutenants, Uoun 
into the air, iii. 651 
Mt'dhffadesa, ii. 1. 

Medows, (>euem1. appointed governor of 
Madras, li. 587; informs Tippoo of his n]>- 
• {Kiiiitment. 588; his plan of oiraratious 
against Tip])oo, 589; allows I'lxqrao to 
CHi^ira, 592; at Bcringi^patam. 613. 

Mocr Alum, minister of the Nizum. li. 823. 
Mccrtlossiin, his negotiations with Mr. Hoi- 
well to assassinate Meer Jailier, and sc't 
him up in his stemki. ('>69; bis severegovem- 
ment. 072; his designs against Itamnarain, 
072; his <iUttiTel with tlie Oomtiany, 673; 
bis complahjtH, 074; declares inuuuf trade 
free, 675; is deposed and defeated. 076: his 
borriil mas.'^aen.' of Kiiglisimien at Patna, 
677; his junction with ilic Nalsibof Oiule, 
<177. 

Meor HoR».'in. sonof MccrBoosttim, Hi. 471. 
Miht liubbccb, dnwan of GriBsa. i. 625. 
Mocr Jarticr, unuKiiiiant. fortbc iiabn1>sliip 
of Bengal, i. 571 ' his aiiU><Hsleuts, und 
agi'mncnt with tlie OoiiqMvny, 672; the 
Gomxwiy’s (MiunUT-agrccment with, 673; 
the ('orniiany’s private agi'cemont with, 
674; saluted as nalrab by Clive, 581; seatotl 
on tlie musnud by (9ivc, 582; sums paid 
by him on Ins accession, 5i*3; Ids imiiob- 
smi>; his cliaracttir and ditllculiies, 646; is 
jealous of British iniluciiGe, G4C; hisschomo 
H >r diiuinisbiiig Britislx inlluonce. 646; his 
<iuarrel witli Koydulhib, C40; atrocious 
conduct of Ins son, 648; tllvo’s intcrfcronco 
with, on licliolf of Uamnarain, 649; alaxined 
at the Intclligcnei' of the aggresr.ive di'signs 
of the Nalsdxif dude, ^6; his visit to i'al- 
entta, 054; his intrigue w'itJi tlie Diitcii, 
(Xil; scheme to de}K)sc hUh and set up Meer 
GoR.sim. G69; isdcposisl: Im^inlicyandbittiT 
fruits of the transaction, <‘>70; rejihvci'd on 
the musnud, 070; His death, 082; appoint- 
inent of Ids succesHor, 082. 

I M<'('r Miisjcdee, n Knzzinia.^h chief, l.ls 
I doatb. iii. 4o8. 

Me<}r Kfiostuin, iii. 404. 

Mi-cr Hing, IHijah of dondjioor, iii. 51. 
Mt'orun, son <tf fth'er 4JaiHei‘, ins utroeioiiJf 
conduct, i. 04.S; jiretends to Ira in fear of 
JiisHfe, <i52:attempts toimmlcrKoyduilub. 
066; hi.s death. COB. 

Mt'crut, a formidable scjioy mutiny at, iii. 
5*H; proot'cdings t»f the. mutineers in; 
nias.K(xcre pcrpetraUul by tbeiii in, 505; the 
imitiuex'rs of, e.Ht'axrahi J>clliL their recep¬ 
tion und atrocities there. 607T 
M<!i?astheiu«, referred to, i. 33. 

Mehrab Khan, of Khulat, slain, Hi. .904; his 
8011 rostorwl to the throne by Iht' insur¬ 
gents, 373. ^ 

Mt litab Koonwur, wife of Kunjeet King, iii. 
273. 

Molemo Kano, n Gujerat pilot, engaged hy 
Dc Gama, i. isV*. 

Mendicant, a religiouR. announces himself 
as the last avatar of Kali, iii. 177. 

Menu, the Institutt's of, i. 16; ii. 17. 

Mercara, the bbickatle of, liy ilie Itajah of 
Ooiirg, ii. 612. 

M<!rta, the siege of, i. 126. 

Mci-u, i. 2. • 

iMt'KH-liouse, the, at Lucknow, attack of the 
British on. iii. (>>2. 

Metcalfe, Mr., subswiuently liaronet and 
lonl. sent us an envoy to Laliorv, iL 630; 
instructed to fonn an ulHanco with the 
Nabob of Bho]>uul, iii. 42; lUscovcrs the 
fraudulent dealings of William J*uhnGr& 
Ck). and Otaandoo J4i>l, 123; his view of the 
ne(s Hsity of British intericroncc. in Hie 
affairs of India, 181; mode governor of 
Agra, 247. 249; iiuulc provisional govenior- 
goneral. 251; alKilisheB n'strictions on the 
press, 251; his abilities as a KtalCBiuan, 263. 
Metcalfe, Sir Thcophlliis, his house at Delhi 
lihindercd by the rebels and a Iiatteiy 
planted <m his groumls, iii. tK)3; in pursuit 
of the rebels from Delhi, 617. 

Meyrick'a IllutitmtioHs of A ncit'iU A I'ww and 
Armiynr, quoted, i. 472. 

MIjow, the relief of, by General Btuart, iii. 
/ 677. * 

Miclielborne, Bir Edward, recommended tum 
the East India (kimpany by Burleigh, 1 itfb 
refused, i. 229; a license grante<l to him Hi 
trade to the East, 243. 

Middleton, Mr., agent of Hastings in Oude, 
recalled, ii. 36,5. 



7a2 


INDEX. 


MIDDLETON 

Middleton, Captain David, sent in command 
of the Cmisent to tiie Boat; purchases a 
.of cloves, i. 244; sent out a^in in 
cximmand of the Eicimlition^ 246; his pro- 
cecdiiigs, 247; returns to the lied Heo. 250; 
bis pillaging procedure, 251. 

Militanr t^tiuH of the Hindoos, ii. 108. 

Mill's Brithh India, qiioted, i. 5.')0; ii. 313. 

Miiideragce Prahoo, King of Avuviii. 133. 

Minerals of India, I. 7. 

Mines, royal, among the Hindoos, ii. 9t. 

Minto, Lonl, sigiiitieH bo tJiu Bool’d of ('on- 
trol tluit Hir 4r(:;>n(e HurJow is mnwrHedcvl 
from lK!inggov(;m(>r-gen<iral, It. 818; made 
govonior'goiioral; Ids antecedents, 820; bis 
dealings with the disturbrincex in Hnndcl- 
eund, 821; hi.s relations with the l^eishwa, 
824; his rtslations with Ifolkor, 825; hisre- 
lati(ms wilhtlLclliijahof Berar, 825; sends 
a dotiiclitnent against Co]ial Sing, ^7: in¬ 
terferes with Mariana, 82ih his proceedings 
tow’anls the Sikhs, 830; Itiif intcrfeix'uou 
at Delhi, 832; military e^iKHlitioiis under 
his govorument, 846; w'udHan expixlition 
to Mauritius and Bour)>oii, 845; sontLs un 
expedition against tiie Ihitoii sottlomcnts, 
K48: merits of his adininistmtion, 850; his 
encouragement of mitive Utoratui’e. 850; 
Ids restrictioiiHon, and tyraiiilical oondnet 
b)W'ar<ls misHionarIe.s, 851; hiu d(*ati), 8.52; 
his censorship (»f tile pre.ss. iii. 130; niisKioa 
of C.a]>ta1ti (^anning to Rangoon during 
his mlinhiistmtion, 135: Ins cndoiivours bi 
repress the proceedings of Kyen-hraii, 137. 

IMirxa Akhar Sliali, son of Sliah Alum, ii. 
752. 

Miry.a Jam' lV*g, of Scindc, opinMos Akl>er, 
i. 135. 

Mir^a Jehanglr, ii. 832. 

Mir^a Khau.'ii. 135. 

Mirwi Muiidfc, infant sou of Surujah Dow- 
lah'a brother, nnmleredhy Mceruui, i. 5-18: 

Mlnoi Shnrf-u-tliu Hoosseni, oiu! of tlio rt*- 
tainers of, attempts to assuostnate Akber, 

i. 127. 

Misuls, the twelve, of the Hikhs, iii. 209. 

Missiomu'ieH in India, Lord Minto's ineon- 
sistiint and injiu’ious proe(Hi«linss tow'arils, 

ii. 850. 

Mitchell. Colonel, Ins injndiei<nis dooliuss 
with the mutineer sepoys, iii. 550. 

Moas;r.iiii, son of Aunuig/ehe, i. 3S5, 

lVI<»bariz Kluui, govi’mor of I-!yd<’raJKnl, 
defeats] by Nizaui-uJ-M<K)lk. i. ,301. 
%lncba, Cantain Saris sails to, i. 252. 

Moilajee Blionsla. Hih! Apa Sahib. 

ModtJfMl, King of Ghumw, i. 55. 

Mogul djmasty, tlio, in fiidia, i. 105: 
Hawkins’ visitb) the court of theCreat, at 
Delhi. 248; Sir Thoinus Koe’s embassy to 
tlie e(mrt f)f the < li'cat, 255; enipir(\ sonth- 
em limits of, 304; fleet in the Bonilsty 
liarlxmr, 327; the Company’s war with the, 
344; capture of six Mogul slii)>s, 345; un- 
JHitt1e<l state of tlie c*n>piro of, 384: suc- 
ceasion to the Mogul throne diKputx.‘d, ^485; 
T iinjH'iidingdangerof the Mogul empire,401. 

Moguls, tile, their irruptions into India. 1. 
53, 59; invade Mooltau, 70; treacherous 
murder of those in Keikolxul's army, 73; 
invade the kingdom of Delhi (ui<l are rc- 
pulsod, 75; another iiivasUm by, under 
Ameer Dawcnid, 78; another invasion 
under Kootloogh Khan, 79; bliK*ka«le 
Delhi, 82; again cross tiie Indus and un- 
ilefeated, S-i; again invivle India, luid are 
iKingbt off, 88; a new inviwion of, under 
tlie graialsen of Tanierl.ane. 03; 1’ainor- 
luno approaches the Indus, 04; hisgi'and- 
WHi t4ikos Mooltan, 94; l>eltii besiegwl and 
sackiMl. 05; capture of Meerut, amt roUnn 
of l.*ainerlane, 06; Khizr Kluui m:ts as 
deputy for Tamerlane at J>elhi. 97; the 
Mogul ilynasty in India, 105; ivlgii and 
wars of Ihvlicr, 105 (see Habi'r ); Hooma- 
yooii su(x:oeds llabjr; his re^. fortunes, 
and death, 114; reign and actions of Akber, 
121 (see Ahfu i ); reign of Shah Jehan, 281; 
r»*ign of AunuigzolH!, 287 (see A un/UffxJM '); 
wav with the Mahvattas, 295; detoabedhy 
Nadir Hliah, 399. 

Mohanied Toghlak. See. A Inf Khan. 

Molmii Lai, the tiKMniKheeof Sir Alexander 
Bimics; warns Sir Alexander of a hostile 
confeileriicy among the Afghan chiefs, iii. 
,391; escapes w'lien his master is murders], 
407: Sir William Macnaghten’s proiKisals 
to him for elfectlng the iisKassination of 
the leailing Afghan chiers, 407; ho refast4t. 
<-.• the rowanl i/t tlie murderer of one of the 

‘ Afgluui chiefs, ^; (^.niolly and Bunies 
again write to him about tlie assassination 
project, 412; treacherous correspomlence 
of Uic Rritisli envoy with the Crhiljios and 
Kuzzilb£U)hoe carried on through him, 420. 


Moliuu Loll, at the batUe of Plaascy, i. 580. 

Moira, Lonl, mode Covemor-general of 
India, ii. ; iii. 0; tlie plan of operations 
against the GhoorlmB as laid down by, 11; 
notifies a treaty with the Ghoorkas, 23: 
his proposed alliance with Bie NalMdis of 
Bhoiiam and Saugor, 41; liohl polioy 
adoptwl by him against the Fiiidarees, 52; 
his resolution to resume tlie alliance ik>- 
licy, 57. 

Moiz-u-din BeJirum, placed on the throne of 
I>clhi, i. 65. 

MoliiccaK, the, the English attempt to trade 
witli, i. 242, 244: the con<iuc8t of, and of 
Java, by the Miighsh, ii. 848. 

MomliOH, l>e Gama arrives at, i. 154. 

Monaejee, Ids treacliery towanls C’hunda 
Sahib, i. 478; defeats the Mnhrattas, 494; 
defeats the P’rench at Tanjore, 503.‘ 

Monastic institutions among the IXiiidcxis, 
ii. 68. 

Monglilr, the fort of, i. 589. 

Motuchund. governor of Calcutta, refuses 
to forward t-o Siirojali Dowlah letters 
brought for liim by Clive, i. 501; his night 
attack on ('live, 552. 

Monir-iil-Mulk, uiinisterofiheNizaiu.il. 823. 

Mono]K>Ues. of the Veuotians, GciK>esc, and 
Florimtincs, i. 146. 

Monopolies, tlie great ca8<! of, i. 358. 

Moiio)Nily of salt, lietel, luul toliocco, sctcimnl 
to the (.Viuiiiany’s semint*. i. 595; ilisai»- 
provoil by the directors, 597. 

Monotheism of the Hindoo creed, ii. 20; its 
defects, 21. 

Monro, (?olonol, instmetwl by Sir .1. Ci'ad- 
dock to report on iiio practicability lual 
liestmcansof altolishingtent contnvets. ii. 
838; his n^iKirt, 838; pi’occoilings against 
him in conseiiut inw of his report, 839; ap- 
)s*.:ils for ]«roteetioii to the government, 
8:19. 

Monn>. Majnr ib«!tor, stirwcils General 
('aniacas commandcr-in-chicf ; Ids liriu- 
ness in (|iiclling a mutiny, i. 579; his vic;- 
tory at Biixar, 579; csijitures l*oi idicherry, 

ii. 458; his blunder inoj>))OHing llyiler, 481; 
retreats, 484; condnets the siege of N<’ga- 
jiataui, 498; his opinion of the hnport^ince 
of tlie d<*fi*at of Tdioondia, 738; in the 
ntfair of SholajjiMir, iii. 93. 

Monro, Sir Tliouius, his <l<‘ath, iii. 189. 

JVIoiison, ColoiH‘l, HC'iit out as a member of 
the c<nmcU of Bengal, ii. 3(.;0; his private 
inteniew w’itb Nuncomar, 372; opposes 
nasbiiigs on the land (luestiou, 411; his 
siokncHS and deatli, 417. 

Monsou, thii Honourable Colonel, conducts 
the assault on Aligliur, ii. 759; hastens to 
niciit Holkar. 775; his disastrous ndn’at, 
777; encounters Holkar. 778; his disastrous 
ri'ireid e an iniieil, 779 . bin dei.’u'liiiient tii- 
fi*ate<1 :ind il:sper.Msi. 779 '. head.-a stoi'iii 
iiig i>arty a^iinst Bhurtpoor, 791. 

Moiison, Major, takes Alum]>arva and ('iir- 
rical, i. 531; BujierseileH (Colonel Coote, 535; 
woiUiiUsl, 535; n-quests Ckxitc to resume 
the e.omnmiKl, C37. 

Moiisoii, Sir William, Ids account of t'aptaiu 
rjimciistiT's preilatopr proceslurc, i, 240. 

Monsoons in India., L 8; their causes and 
iutluences, 9. 

Montgomery. Mr,, his vigorcuis measures to 

' suppress the spirit of mutiny among the 
Kuiioys ill the Bniijab, iii. 573 ; made eldef 
4»imjidHsioiicr in Glide, in ploto: of Sir 
dames Gubram, 700. 

Montgomery Martin's I/nlnf.oiMiteil, 

ii 153. 

Montn-sor. (.'olonel, Tippoo atteiiiptj4 to de¬ 
stroy a brigjule uiulcr, Uit fails, ii. 694; 
hea<ls the disafftiction at Hydcralxul, 841. 

M<*numental inscriptions, throwing light on 
Imlioii history, i. 33. 

Mooluirik, his wicked reign, i. 85; assassina¬ 
tion of, 86. 

Mooljonk, soil of Khi/.r Khan, succeeds his 
i'atlier, ii. 98. 

IVf<KKluj(H' Bhonsla, ii. 404, 445. 

Mooiliaf-. the IfSitlli' of. iii. 488. 

.Moolla |{i*Aiid, 111.- K‘tti;r to l>ost Mubomcil, 

iii. 

MiHilraj, the dewaii of Mofdtiui, iii. 505; 
resignshisdewanshlp, 505; imuiler of two 
British ofttcers by his soldiers, 507; oiK'iily 
relxils, 608; crosses the t?henab, 509; ifefeat 
of his tnM)i»s eommandetl by bis brother- 
in-IsiW, 511: defeated at HuddfHisaui, 513; 
fortifies Mooltan, 515; Ix’Bicgcd in 
tan, 516; his courage fading, he HurrendorB, 
518. 

MiKiUan. InTO^lcil by the Moguls, i. 70; lie- 
sieged liy Peer Mahomed Jehaugir, 93; 
M**. Agnew and Ijleutenant Anderson 
murdered at, iii. 507; decision of Lord 


MUSIC 


Mooltan,— 

Gough to move on, Iii. 5(%; preparations for 
the siege of, 513; description of, 514; the 
siege and capture of, 616. ^ 

Moona Joun, the l*adwnh Begum strives to 
make him sovereign of Oudo. iii 254. 

Moonir-ul-Moolk, nmuster of tlio Nizam, ill. 

121 . 

Moouyiin Khan, defeats Dawood Khan in 
Bengal, 1.132. 

Moor. Captain, appointed by Hir Henry 
Wheeler t<i arrange terms of capitulation 
wltli Nuna Biddb, Iii. 595. 

Moor, John, a ship cariamter, his skill and 
courage at the siege of Devicotto, i. 438. 

Moor Ihmkec, i. 654, ami votr. 

Mooraug, the province of, taken iKissession 
of by Major Lather, iii. 19. 

MiKirhouse, Colonel, his bnivcry and death 
ut Bangalore, ii. 597. 

Moorish intrigues agaiii.st the I’ortugucsc in 
(^'alicut. i. 165. 

Mofirsliail Cooly Khan, governor of Orissa, 
his revolt against Ali verdy Khan, i. 523; 
his defeat, 523. 

Mooixi, Bagh, the, caiitured at Lucknow, iii. 
674. 

Mcsity Tsilaow*, the lake of. ii. €04, and note, 

M<imba Kumavese, ii. 442. 

Moral system of the illtidoos: its compara¬ 
tive fulness and accuracy, ii. 62; its inetil- 
cation of internal purity and the luisillve 
virtue.^, 63. 

M»*rari Bow, the encounter l-etw'eeii, and 
llyder Ali; singular feat of his elephant, 
ii. 257. 

Morehnhi, ii. CKl. and note. 

ISlorgJin, Captain, ii. 577. 

Momingtoii, tlie 1^1 of. 8ee IVtlhsIoj/ 
{Atartjui't). 

Moniy, M., his despaUdi to Count Wakwski 
on the right-i-if-asyluni (lUcstiou, iii. 615. 

Moro Ikigonath. iii. 2t>3. 

Morrison, Brigadier general, in comniand 
of the Arncon force, iii. 157; proceeds to, 
and cajitures Aj’acan, 163. 

Morrison. liieuU'iiant. and Iiteubenunt Hun¬ 
ter. delivered from prison on the capture 
<»f Wusota, iii. 91 

Mo&tyii, Mr., his death, ii. 448. 

Moiilvio. the. of Eyzaliod. at T.ucknow, lit. 
674. «• 

Moulvie of Lucknow, makes n ilash at ^liah- 
jehaupoor ami plunders it. iii. 577. 

Mountain mnges of India, their gruiiitic for¬ 
mation, i. 6. 

Moffi, a Hindoo agricultural iiiKtrunicut. if. 
153. 

Moziimhiouo. De Gama arrives at. i. 154. 

Miicliee Bhowuu. at lAicknow, abandoiuil 
ami blown u]>. iii. 627. 

Mugs, tiic, iii. 133, 137. 

Muir, Colonel, i. 465. 

Mukhdoom, liis retn^at through the lass of 
Changama. ii. 229. 

Miilliar itow, iii. 75. 

Mullik Kafoor, wilt toClwuniUcj' the Doccaii. 
i. 84; bis ti’casoiiuble pr(>a.’cdingH and 
cruelty, 85; his death. 86. 

Mullik MiMikudur, hisiluriitg exploit, i. 79. 

Miilloo Yekliul Kh{i^n, strives to rcstojo 
Delhi after it has beeii sacked by Tame-t'- 
laim. i. 96. 

Miimoo Khan, p.araniour of the ex-queen of 
Glide, iii. 574. 

Muudisore. captured from the mutineer se¬ 
poys, iii- 679. 

Mung-da. iii. 207. 

Muiigul Bandy, h mutineer sijpoy, his ot- 
on the life of Lie.uieuunt Baugli, iii. 

550. 

Mmigulwor, Havelock twiiv! retires upon, iii. 
641. 


Mimny l-Jegiim, appoinU^d giiArdian «)f the 
NalHib of Bengal, ii. 311: the case of, 359; 
appointed by Hastings to the maiuvgemcnt 
or the houmdiokl of MalioSkied iteza Khan, 
431 : her appeal; carried. 431. 

Mimul, son ofHhali Jeliiui, contests the suc¬ 
cession, i. 287. 

Munlan. the sepoy niutiiieiu’K .at; their defeat 
hy tkilonel Nicholsoli, iii. 576. 

Murray, Coiom*!, varioiiH jtjfcrena’s to, ii. 
765, 775, 795, 797; iii. 95. 

MusaooiL lieeouies successor to Hultan 
MahuKHMl, i. 53:-his iH'rsonal qualities, 
54: transactions of his reign, and his ne^ 
patoce at Ghuznee, 54; uefcateil by the 
Seljuks under Toghrul Beg, 54; deposed 
and murdered, 55. 

Musaood TI., ascemds the throne of Obuznee, 
i. 65. 

Musc.at, the Company pnipo^s the occuiia- 
tion of, i. 310. 

Music, Iliuduo, ii. 139. • 



INDEX, 


733 


MUSJIDIA 

Musjidia, ttie fort of, captureil, iii. 701. 

Mustafa Bag, the sepoy who revealed the 
plot of the Vellore iimtiiieorB, U. 616. 

Mustapha Khan, All Verdy’a goucral, 
rebels ogaiiifA him, i. 527- 

Mutiny, Hhaxton’s, lii BomVtay, i. 329. 

Mutiny, KeiKwin’s, in Boiulwiy. i. 332; Ha 
alarming progrea:*. 332; iuvcstiinktion and 
auppressioii of, 333. 

Mutiny in Vellore, ii. 611; mippresaion of, 
611; punishuioDt of the inutiiioers, 812; 
ori^u of, 813; raid cauaea of. 814; ilhriati- 
unity not chargeable with, 815; took tliu 
governor by aiirpriHc, 815; general alarm 
produced by, 81G. 

Mutiny among the Kuroix^an ofliccra and 
men at MasuUiNttain. ii. 842; at Heringapa- 
tarn; its suppression, 644; at HydcruUyl; iba 
Humtreasion, 644. 

Mutiny among the iltuigal seixiyn. who wore 
to Iki sent to Ava. iii. 157; it.s suppruaHioti, 
160; true causes of, 161. 

Mutiny, the gretit ■Sep<»y, in Iktngjil; nuitiii- 
ouR spirit of the lloitgal so}K»yK, iii. 553; 
causes of the lUUtinouH spirit of the Hougal 
soixiya, 554; the mutiny occurs at a time | 
when there is an accidental delicieucy of 
Kiiro)K'an troo)va in Indio, 555; imprudent 
cotnlncbof goveniiiient, 555; unusual com* 
biuation of Muhometuns and JlindiMW in 
this muUuy,r)56; theKnficld rhic iiitroducvd 
i#QOiig the Ihnigal KetH)yB; obiectiona to 
tl»o ^•eaaecl cartridgea, 557; tno groaaixl 
carlritlgca cmploytMl by the m'poya its a 
j>rotoxt for dimdHidicnce, 557; mutiiioua 
spirit excited ainong tbo aepoya throi^b 
tiieir religious prejudices, 558; unavailing 
attempts to reason them out id their 
fdijectioiiH, 558; overt act of mutiny 
at Berliunipoor. and injudicious nieaus 
UHixl to su]>pres.s it, 55H; a Uuroi»ean 
regiment brought from llangooii to aup- 
pnw the mntiueers, 560; anotlicr imt of 
mutiny at ljarrae];i>oor, 560 ; <lis)>iiud- 
mentof the mutinous lliUi native infantry, 
56[; tot.a1 inoilerpiacy of distMUidmont its a 
punislnncnt for mutiny, 562; mutinous 
.spirit in Oude uuellotl for the pre.Kent by 
.Sir Henry Jj;iwrcncc*, 5t>3; fornndablo mu¬ 
tiny at Meerut; gross carelessness of the 
autliorities, proceedings of tlie Meerut 
mutineers, 565# iiH'iipacity of (Toneral 
llcMitt to <leal with tJie mutiny, 566; 
detaiia of the Meerut mutiny, 560; the 
inufciiieers permittcxl h) esoaix* fr(.>in 
Meerut; tbeif arrival in Dellii, 567; the 
horrible atriMritieaof the Meerut mutineers 
in Delhi. 567; all tlic native trismsin Delhi 
join tliu mutiny, .568; attempt of the mutin¬ 
eers to get jMwwsaiou »>f the Delhi imiga- 
ziiie, 568; heroic defence of the Delhi maga¬ 
zine by nine Hritish Koldiora; tlmircouragi^ 
iliflplayixl in blowing it up, 569; relKillion 
regularly oigani/ed in Dellil by the mutin¬ 
eers, 570; horrilde massaens iK.TiH}trateilin 
Jhdhi by the mutiiieei’S, 571; ineana taken 
to pn*vent a inutlpy iu the I'unjab, 572; 
blunder coffliuiittLsl in dealing M'itli the 
mutiny in Fcio/xMHjor, 573; blunder exmi- 
mitteu at Umljalla in dealing with the 
mutiny, 574; mcasums taken in INishawer 
to prevent a iMit.iny, 575; outbreak at 
Attock and Nowshera; tlic mnthieers dis- 
arniod, 576; tbo inutincei'a defeated Ijy 
NicliolKon, 577; mutiny in the Doab, 577; 
mutiny at IXurmuia; NusseeralKul, Huhil- 
omul, and Hareilly, 578; tixsacUery of the 
sepoys; atrocities at Daroilly aiul Shahje- 
hanpoor, .579; mutiny at Nis.oiiuch, 580; 
mutiny iu Jliansi; borrible massiicrc, 581; 
mutiny at Agra, 582; mutiny at AUahal>u<l, 
583; mutiny in Benares, 584; mutiny in 
tmdo, 585; rising in Dinle, 587; defe^it of 
the Onde mutineers, 588; rising of the 
Lucknow mob, 588; outbreak at Stwtapoor, 
589; atrocities nenietratwlby thoumtineers 
near AurungaWil, 589; proceedings of the 
mutineers atFy/almtl, 590; massnere jktihj- 
trated at Begumgmige. 590; ix.Tilouscf>ndl- 
tionofiiiicknow. .590 (sec /..ifcA'xoip); mutiny 
at (JawniKMir, 593 (see <Juini}>oor)\ govcni- 
mont measures iu reference to the mutiny, 
,597; pitjparations for the recovery of I>eihi 
from the inutitniors, 599 (ms) J>rlhi): siege 
of Delhi; its capturt) from the mutmeon:, 
599; tlie British lK‘siegc>d by the mutineers 
ill Lucknow, 627; Havelock’s victories over 

' the mutineers, (^2; tlie mutiucurii Uwiege 
Anali and 01*0 defeaUxl by Major Vinoeiit 
Eyro, 645; Havelock tights his way tlirough 
the mutineers Into Lucknow, 649; Sir Colm 
C>am]fbell advances against Lucknow, an<l 
delivers the Knglisli families aixl garnson, 
660,6(13; themuivnoersattack Oawupuoratvd 
cndaiigur General Windham, but ore dc- 


Mutiny,—- 

feated by Sir OoUn OampIieU, iii. 664; Luck¬ 
now attackeit and taken from the mutin¬ 
eers, 670; Buliscquetit oiieratious against 
the mutineers; 674; oiwrations against 
the mutineers at Azimghur, iu tin; 
vicinity of Arrah. and in Ttohilcuud, 675; 
auppreasiou of the mutiny in Control 
] ndio,677; tl le go vemor-get leral's pn iclama- 
tiou in relatimito the mutineers, audLonl 
Ellenlxirough's dcH|»ateh relating to tlie 
governor-general's ]>roclanuition, 689; pn>- 
claiiiatiou of her majosiy in ndatioii to the 
mutiiiy; itsetfects, 6y6;Sir<’olin t’amplieirs 
(now Lord Clyde) liiiiU oi>erations against 
the mntineers in (>udc; tinal suppression of 
the mutiny. 698. 

Mnttra, plundered by Sultan Mahmootl, i. 
47. 

MumifTor Jung, opnoseil by Nadir Jung, i. 
44(5; is coM’cd oi^iu surrenders, 448; pro¬ 
claimed Boubabdar by the Fivuch, 452; 
Confers extensive powers on Jhiplelx; is 
slain. 452. 

Mywre, thts. Sevajee’s exi*ediUc>n iub>, 1. 300. 
tr«s)i)s anivo from, in iht; i’antaUc to ui<l 
the French, 633; defeat of a British force 
in, 633; the trisips which anive from, 
ilosert, 635; Ifydcr All’s visit to tlieaipHul 
of, ii. 221; invsuled by the Malirattas, 224 ; 
grunt of, it) the GoiuiMUiy by Nizam All, 
260; entireKubmissiou of, on tJiedefeataiid 
death of TipjKH>; coiniiiiHsioners wnt for 
the regulation, of, 767; the iMvrt.it.iou treaty 
of. 708; resttjratiou of the old dynasty to, 
709; extent of the restore*! kingdom of, 
711; tcuiuvby wliieb it w'us to Ik* Uckl, 711; 

i tropoHisl cesHioii of a ixiHiou of, to the 
^ushwa, 712: distiirlxincc's in. iii. 208; tlie 
rajaii of, converted into a mere ptuistuuer, 
209. 


N. 


Niulir SJiali, the rise' of, and invasion of 
India by, i. 398; defeats the M(»guis an<l 
sai;k8 Dellii, 399: his dtsiturtiure from Delhi, 
400; hisileatli, 401. 

Nagaroote, thetiuuplo of, captured by Sultan 
Mahnnssl, i. 40. 

Nagas, tlie, or fakirs, ii. (58. 

Njj-g|»oor, treaty of the British with the rajah 
of, iii. 44; (Udonel Walker arrives iu, 45; 
murder of t]i<‘ lUiJali of; Apa Sahib miide 
rajah, 68; statu of the British at, 70; 
all'aii's of, 89; attempt of tla^ l*eisliwa to 
reocli, frustrated, 90; aimuxation of, to the 
Britisli dominioiiH, 541. 

NaUfUi', the, of the Boiulxty grenadier bat- 
(Milion, ii. 595, note. 

Nivlm. th<s disgusting liabitsof, ii. 177; single 
order itf suuetwsion among, 178; tnu; cliar- 
aet<5r of, 178; eniol livatineiit of, liyHyder 
All, 242; large ctmtrilmtions levied from, 
by Hydcr, 2(Tl. 

Nana Fumave.se. a Mabratta ininister, 
win’icsofF the widow of Narruiii Bow, ii. 
358; in negotiation witli Geueml (4oddard, 
454; other n^fereiices to, 456, 462, 466, 

713, 740. \ 

Nana Suliib, who he was, iii. 587; diveilistho 
mutineers fmm their puriHisc! of going to 
i>elhi, ami takes them into his own service, 
f*'.(4; liesicges Gawnimor, 594; Sir Henry 
Wheeler capitulattM to, 596: his treachery 
towards the Euroiieans, and atrocities i>cr- 
nctnvted on them by him, 596' cncamiis at 
MahanvjiHior, 635; defeate*! by IXavelock 
at Mahorojisior, (^; attockoilby SirCkdin 
C-amplsdl at Bankee and driven thnaigh a 
jungle, 701 . 

Nan.ak, the blunder of tii<; Sil.h .sect, ii 78; 
his leading tenets. 79. 

Niiphr. General .‘<lr rh.iil -r. James, Isml 
Klli‘nbi>rongli‘s niMi'iK lioii^ to. respocting 
the of rM iti'ii. iii. *952: his report 

to Jsinl Kllenlxirou^i re-p-.i sjiig tin- 
Ameers, 462; hislettt'r foiho .Aiih-cr.s,4i’Kh 
Ids exixidition gainst r.muuini.hiir. 465. 
udvances upon Hyderalioii. 466 ; deetsioii as 
to the (shoiee of niatls to llyderaliad, 4(-'»7; 
his victory ut Meauee, 467; his victory at 
Dubba, 4(>9: hlscaptun^ of Omerkote, 47((: 
struck down by sun-stroke along with, 
forty-three others, 472; his plan of a hill t# 
campaign iu Seimle. 500; his camel eoiiis, 

502 ; his account of tin; inhabitants of 
(hitch Gumluva, 502; his hill campaign, 503; 
appointed coimnaiider-iu-chlef in Imlia, 
528; his misundeTStanding wuth the gjiver- 
nor-generul, 029; resigns his coimAaiul, 


NIZAM 

Naiiier, OeiMwal,- 

lii. 629; Ills welcome from the Duke of 
Wolliiigtou on bis return to Kiiglamb and 
deatli, 629. • 

Napier, Brigmlior. at the siege of liUuknow', 
under 8ir Golin Goinpiieil, iii. 672. 

Narrain Itow, the munler of, i. 256; the 
willow of, carried olf by Nana Furiiavese. 
353. 

Nasir-u-diii, Sultan of ]>olhi. i. 66; his habits, 
67. 

Kasir-ud-Dowlab, made sovereign <if Unde 
by the British residout, and his opponents 
put ilowii, iii. 263. 

Native states of India, i. 12. 

Naval brigade, ihiptuin I’cel's, iii, 657, 068. 

Navigation, the progress of the art of. i. 49. 

Naylor, Mr., his imprisonment by Hir Blijoli 
Imix^y, ii. 436. 

Nazir Jung, at the htxid of a large army, i. 
446; obtainsiHiHsessiouof Muzznffer Jung, 
4-17; wanietl by Major Lawmice, 448; 
aronl^l from his stupor when too lab;; is 
anxious to quit the (.'ariiutie, 449; his deatli. 
451. 

Nuzir-ud-diii, NabOi of Omle, iii. 213. 

Nearehus, Alexnmler’s general, his voyngo 
home from India, i. 32. 

NeciiitK'h, the sepoy iniitiiiy in, hi. 580. 

Negaiiataiii, the siege and e.aptuiv of. by tho 
British, ii. 498; the Miulras government 
it to lie dcHtmyed, 50*1. 

Neill, (kihmel, M'izes Uie ongine-diivor and 
stokci' of (lie. train fmm (JHlcuttalo Jiamo- 
gmige, uiid thus detains the tmiii for his 
i=oldiers, iii. 626; saves Benares and Alia.- 
halKid from the M'puy inutiueers, 627; 
sends troops to the ivlief ot Cttwnpoor, 632; 
killfl lit l.iiiKiiou. 6.54. 

NrpMd. Kh«>'>ii>v Mr.lhk«ics|-at<-l:edagainst', 
i 89, III* geoj;iii]iliii'al po.Hiiiiin, Hi. «i; its 
original eouditiou and inhaliitants, 7; 
(hiiHirUa nKcendency hi, 8; British luter- 
eoiirse with, 8; Ghoorka eiH-roHchmeiits 
on. 9; the seisiy iiiutiiU'erK driven into the 
iiiorshes of, 701. 

N(?raymi Ihiiil, iii 68. 

Ne.sbitt, (-'olouol, his )»ravery at the stomi- 
ing of )8avan<h'oog. ii. 609. 

Ncsselroile, < 'ouut, his diHclaimer of the pn 1 - 
cecilings of Count Himoiiich at the court ■ 
of P«Tsln, iii. 305; his despateli to tho 
Busaian aml>aRsad4ir in London, 308. 

Ni nifu tn, the, ii. 282, Mi»/f. 

N'ewuz Kliaii, iii. 373. 

Newfoundland, discovered by the Culxits, i. 

m. 

Niebolson, Bti, ri-hi r. ira-b- romninnder of 
tlie Ibiiijab siMc I ■•liimii. in 611 : his 
arrival at Jielhi. 6l.‘i; miit in imrsuitnfa 
ri'lH'l force, whicii he <h*f<‘atH, 617; mor¬ 
tally wounded in the assault on Delhi, 620; 
liis death, 625. 

NIeoiis. General JiisiK'r, iii. 184. 

Nieolls, Golone), iii. 20. 

Nixon. Gaiitaiii, a British deiiicbmentmidor. 
oniiiliilated, ii. 276; at Tuiijon*, 498; at Nu^_ 
gore. 498. ^ 

Niyaya school of phiUisiipliy. tho. ii, 116; 

(hitaiua's logic, prisif. syllogism, 116; Ga- 
laulo; his atomic the<iry and physics, 117. 

Nizam, the, liis iiKurKiunsiiiUi the Gamatie, 
ii. 215; tieaty 4if tlie <*oii)]>any with, 216; 

I irofoHsc'd ally of the (kimpany against 
lytler AU: his treochei'caiH conduct, 249: 
op< Illy h < with llyd<-r AJi. 251: rinm- 
1,01 0 } I he i'otiibiiM-d foi'ct'..:, 2.M : hi- iiiipa- 
til i.er pj-eeiphI )NiTilr,i5l: liis'ouur 
• and lligbr. 2.Vi; ]>nbiir leeoueilialioti 
w .1 Ii IHdt r. 2.'i’.. iKirt mg 1 h tueeii him and 
ll><le>. 2.'i9: l.rgotiulioi..- with Coloiiri 
Siiiiih, 26o: lieu tieuly L (%><in him ainl 
Mie ( •Miil'Jil.y. 2''*»; grant of M.\w*r<- toBie 
('ompuny by, 260; misiiiiderstumiiug of 
tlie Madras government with, 470; his 
French trDona.479: deeply <iffended with the 
MudraR colTncIl, 471; his separate treuL 
with TipjMio and Jjord (tomwallis, 580; 
Lord Gomwallis i-evivesan <il(l tr».jaty with, 
giving it the effix't of a now, 581; Icuguo 
of the British with, against Tippoo, 585; 
e.iiaructer of hts troops, 599; lays siege to 
Gonrimieoiida. 610; relations of, with tho 
Mahrattns, 657; obliged to make largo 
conct^Ksions to the Mahrattas, 6S3; Zjuril 
MiimingbIll’s negotiations with, €84; anew 
treaty with, 685: flags of the FVeucli liri- 

S ade in the scrvioAi of, 685; compelled to 
ismisshis Fi^nch troo}is, 686; cession of 
a jK>rtion of Mysore territory to, 709; Bri- 
tish relations wy.h, 739,822; unsatisfactc^fy 
character of bis a^lministration. 823; stato 
of his dominions, iii. 28; British relations 
witli, during the administration of the 
Marquis of HuBtings, 120; influence of 



734 • 


NIZA&f 


INDEX. 

OUDE 


Nisatn, the,— • 

Ch»ttdoo Lsl In bin court, lib 121; Britisli 
relatioDS with, on the &coeBflion of Xa^nui- 
ud-Dowlah. 216; imnsaotions of William 
P^mer & Co. with the govenimeiit of. 216. 

Nizam IChan. Bee Sihundur. 

NizaiD'U-din, his treacherous dosi^Bagaiunt 
his .Hoverehm. i. 72; his 'tna.s.Hacre of the 
Mogul mercenaries in KcikuljatVct army. 
73. 

NizamoUl-Mo^dk, In the Deccan, i. 390, 392; 
made vizier, 393: connives at the Maliratta 
inoursions iiiti> Malwah and (riiienit. 394 : 
endeavours to arrest the progj^s of Bajue 
Kao, 397; arrival In tlie I>eccan, 433; 
arrangements of, in the Can^atic, 434; the 
Bucceasiou to, disputed. 443. 

Nizamut, the, ii. 431. 

Nouehal Bing, iU. 486. 

Non>interfereiice policy, the necessity of 
abandonhig it, on the part of the Bast 
India Company, iU. 34. « ^ 

Nonsuit casea among the Hindoog^i. 93. 

Norford, Captain. kiUed at l>eeg, ii. 783. 

North-east passage,the, attempts U> discover. 

North-west i>^wago. the, attfoiipts of the 
l^>rtuguese to discover, i. 197; Jiritish ex¬ 
pedition to discover, 198; Ridxjrt Tlionm’s 
view as to, 199: Sir Henry Willoughby’s 
expedition to discover, 200; Uopelessiiuss 
of the attempt to discover, 202. 

Norton, Caphitn, his operations against the 
Bimuese, lii. 147. 

Nott, General, his dissatisfaction .at a iuidor 
being placed over him, iii. 3.54; tivkes 
inea.suruH for tlie suppression of the Uhil- 
jios. 369; appointed by Bir Willoughby 
tlottoii to trantiuillizit the Ghiljie country, 
369; his account of the atrocious govern- 
meut of Prince Tiraour, heir-apparent of 
Hhaii Bhujah. 370; his sujipression of the 
opprossioTiB exerciseil by Bhah Bhxijali’s 
omciols, 371; his cemdurt to^rds Hhtvh 
Bhujah’s orticials approvotl l>y Bir Wil- 
loughbv Cotton, 372; his conduct towanls 
Khmi BiiuJah’s oihcials condemned 1^ Bir 
William Maciiaghten and the governor- 
general, 372; doprecat<w th.e witlidrawal of 
any imrt of the garrison of Oandahar, 375; 
(HI the iiijudioious mode of suppn^ising 
outbreaks in Afghanistan, 375; applied to, 
hut u;iable to send aid to <JabcK)i, 399; at 
Cantlaliar, 438; defeats the Afghans at 
Candahar, 438; refuses t<» otiey General 
Elphiiistoue’s order to deliver up Candaliar 
to tlie Afghans, 439; puts Candaliar in a 
state of defence, 440; orders General iiliig- 
laiid to advance through the Kojiik l^ss, 
445; his irritation at the command to re¬ 
tire from Candaliar. 446; the order sent 
him to retire virtually withdrawn, 448; 
the resiKiiisiliiUty of not ri^tiring throwu 
on him. 449; his march from ('andahar t< • 
Ghuzuee, and first emxnniter with the 
onciny, 450; defeats the Afgliaus, 451; re- 
K .captures (thuznee from tlie Afghans, 451; 
’iiis victory at Maidan, 452. 

Nowsbera, a 8e]x>y mutiny at, iii. 576. 

Nuazish Mahomed, hisdissatlsfat'tion at the 
^wor i>OHHessed by Buntjah Dowlah, 1. 

Nueva, I>e, sent in command of the third 
Fortugnose ex)KHlltiou to India, i. 171. 

Nufloosk I’ass, the. Major CliblMirii’s disaster 
at. iii. 374. 

Nu^eot-ud-DowLili, a llohilla chief, ii. 296. 

Nujufghur, dgfeab of the rebel sepoys at, iii. 

Nujuni-ud-Dow'lah. appointed successor to 
Moer .fattier, i. 68*2. 

Nuucomur, governor of Hooghly, i. 5C1; ap- 
IMilntod to the ofHce of dewan, ii. 310; his 
antecedents, 310; his son made dewau, 
311; his duplicity, 318; liecomes accuser 
(»f Hastings. 370; bis pritp^e interview 
with Colonel Monson. and appourauce be¬ 
fore the council, 370; apparent ground¬ 
lessness of his charge^aiust Hastings, 373; 
Is charged with (xmsptracy, 373; the major¬ 
ity of the council take part with him, 375; 
arrested on a charge of forgeiy, 376; ap¬ 
plication in favour of, and Bir Klijah Im- 
IMjy's reply. 377; the process against, suner- 
scued, and renewed, 378; tlie (luestion, 
Was he legMly tried ? 379; his trial, 3^; 
his execution, 384. 

Nnndidroog, captured by the British. Ii. 607. 

Nurdorai. tliu atrocities ir-ti^trati^ by, 
c-'221; hlB etnhaiTaBsmonts. 223; Inti^io at 

• the palace between Hyder Ali and Kundee 
Kow to oust, 225; Hyaer Ali’s to, 231; 
ontrappod by Hyder All, 260. 

Nut Jeman. wife of Jehangir, i. 281; socks 
to raise Bhebriar to the throne, 2%. 


Nnring Phuring. See Prince o/.SfitnwI. 

Nuronjoe, an intriguing woman in the court 
of Gwalior, iii. 475. 

Nusseer Khan, placed by insurgentfl on tlie 
throne of his father Mehrab Khan. ill. 373: 
refuses the terms nlTered him by <YenoraJ 
Nott, 376: defeated at Dadur, 377. 

Nusscer-u-din, of Oude, lii. 544. 

Nusseerabad, the sepoy mutiny in. iii. 578; 
liesieged by the reliels, hut relieved by 
Brigadier Btu^t, 679. 

Nuzur Mahomed, Nabob of Bhointul, iii. 44. 



Oath, the, among the Hindoos, Ii. 95. 
Cfbligatiun, the fonxi of, among tlie Hindoos, 
ii. 97. 

Ochtcrlony, (^iloiiel, sent against Kimjeet 
Bing, ii. 831; his oi^erations (^:ainBt the 
GlKKirkas, iii. 14; his attaitk uii and repulse 
at Fort Bamghur. 14; captures Kamghur, 
16; his HU(xxiMK against the Ghoorkns, 21; 
on tlie renewal of hostilities, again taki's 
tlie field against the <>hoorkas, as Bir 
]>avid Ochterlony. 23; )us Buccessful ad¬ 
vance )yy a different |)ass from the anti(n- 
patod, 24; further succcbsob of, against tlic 
Ghoorkas, 25; his deatli, and public expres¬ 
sion of oHtoem for, 180. 

Odeypoor, the fate of the lioautiful (laughter 
of the nijah of. iii. 54; British relations 
with, 224. 

Gghloo Khan, sen of Glicnghis Klian, chUts 
.• lelal-u-diTi’H service, i, 76. 
t)gul Bing, his reliellion suppressed, i. C48. 
Ohlhain. Colonel, ii. 589. 

Oindut*ul-Giiirali. Nabjih of the Carnatic, 
charged with treacherously (^irresjHmdiug 
witli TIpiMMi, ii, 717. 

f>morkotc, the capture of, by the British, iii. 
470. 

Gmichund, various notices of, i. 556,5.58, .561; 
his strong testimony to the good faith of 
the Knglisli, 562; stiitemeiit of his case in 
relation to Surajah ]>owlah, and the eon- 
H])inK!y to dethrom^ him, deception 
practised on, l>y Clive, 584; fearful elfucts 
of the deception praetiseil on, 584; futile 
attempts to justify the deception practised 
on, 585, 501. 

Onoo, Havelock’s victory over the mutineers 
at. iii 640. 

Oocii, the town of, captunul by 8hahah-u- 
din. i. 57; besieged by l^ccr Mahomed 
.lehaiigir. 93. 

Gojoiu, Holkur's victory over Bcindiaat. ii. 
744. 

Oosinan Khan,Shall Shujah’s minister.urges 
Bir Alexander Buriies to cscaiie from tlie 
conspirators ut CalK>ul, lii. 393. 
Gotacamund, the council held at. iii. 246. 
Gpium, the culture of, In Indio, ii. 1C2; re* 
vouuc derived from, iii. 197; mode of levy¬ 
ing the nwenuc from, 197; objeirtionB to 
the UKxle of levying revenue from, 198; 
final an'augcment respecting the revenue 
yfifroin, 198. 

Orissa, revolt of the governor of, against Ali 
Venly, i. 623; Byed Ahmed made governor 
of, 524; General Wellesley’s oiienitionB in, 
ii. 756. 

Grllch, Von, his Trairfs ta India, quoted, 
u. 139, 166. 

Onne’s Ti'anaactiona, quoted, 1.544, 

553, 559, 563, 641. 

Ormuz, attacked by Alfonso A]liu<jner(|«o, 
1. 179; canturtsl i>y Albuquerfiuc, 186. 

CijT, t’aptam Patrick, quoted as to the mas¬ 
sacre in Auningab^, iii. 589; blown into 
the ttir, hut not hurt. 651. 

Orr, Major, lii. 678. 

Orthodox and heterodox, division of Hindoo 
votaries into, ii. 67. 

Orton, ('aptain, hlKHtrange(Mmdurt;abreach 
of a parole of honour retiiliuted < >n him by 
Hyder Ali, li. 277. 

Ottcfh, the, lii 352, notr. 

Oiidc, relations of the naboii of, with the 
Kobilla^ ii. 321; Mr. Hastings' compaiit 
W'ith the nalK>h of, 322; designs of the 
iinlioh of, against the Kolilllas, 325; pro- 
Itosals of the nabob of, to the Bengal gov¬ 
ernment, 326; tlie state of, and the suc¬ 
cession of Asoff-ul-Dowlah to the ualx>1ir 
ship, 386; liitemal disturlianocs in, 387; 
mutiny in the camp of the nabob of, 388; 
deadly strife among the ministers of the 
nidxib of, 388; interference of the Com- 
]>any’8 troops in the affairs of, 389; shatue* 


Oude,— 

ful treatment of the begums of, ii.541; Has* 
tings accepts a present from the nalnih of, 
546: state of atlairs in, 670: the independ¬ 
ence of, extinguished by tlxo terms of the 
treaty with Sadat Ali, 672: state of afTairs 
iu.duringthe govemsorhip of Doid Morn- 
iiigtou, 723; ])retendod wish of the nabob 
of ,to atxUcate.723; proceedings in relation to 
the wish of the imiiohof, 724; tbonabobof, 
retracts his wish, 725: deteniiiiiationof tlie 
govcmoT'general respecting, 725; remon¬ 
strances of the nabob of, 726; the governor- 

f oneral treats his remonstrance as in- 
onnal insult, 727; two courses sutuuitted 
to the nabob of, by the ^ivemor-gencral, 
728; the answer of the nabob uf, to the g* *- 
venior-generars propemitions, 728: the go¬ 
vernor-general’s pereuij^iry orders resiiec- 
ting his submission, 729; mission of tlio 
govomor-genorars brother to Bucknow, 
tlie (Uipital of, 729: the sulnnission of the 
nabob of; one half of tho torritories of, 
passes over to tlie C'om]>any, 730; a dis¬ 
graceful proposal made by tlie nalKih of, 
to the govcmor-gonoTttl indignantly re¬ 
jected. 731; British relations with, iii. 118; 
the nabob of. complains of being under 
widuo control, 119; the nabob of, asHumes 
the title of king, 120; the inisgovemiiient 
of, 120; alleged grievances of the king of, 
188; relations of the British govemmint 
w'ith, during the administration of Bir 
William Bentinck, 213: the succession dis¬ 
puted in, 263; procecHliiigs of the British 
residtmt in, to secure the succession to 
Nasir-ud-I>owlah, 2C3; vi(»lcut cf»imter- 
procctMlhigs of the Padsliah Begum,264: in¬ 
surrection in tho palace of the king of, su]>- 
pri'ssed, 205: different claimants to tlie 
throne of, 266; amiexatiou of. to British 
toiritorj', 542; early relations w'itli, 543; 
the ualHii) of, assutiies tlie title of king, 543; 
RticcesHion of debauched ]>rince8 in, 644; 
condition of, 544; increasing degeneracy of 
iiativeadministmtion in, 545;thegovcnior- 
genoral makes a tour of ininkectiou through, 
546; determination of the British to annex, 
547; justice of the annexation of, <iues- 
tioned. 547: views of siicressive govemor- 
gencrals as to the annexation of, ; curi¬ 

ous jesuitleal reasoiiiiif-to justify the an¬ 
nexation of, 549; Riiinmary nqiudiation of 
a formal treaty with, 549; LorffDolhouKie’s 
liroclaiiiation re8i>ecting the annexation 
of. animadverted u^khi, b50; mutinous 
spirit in, 5t>2; the mutinous ^irit in,quelled 
for tlie time by Bir Henry Lawrence, St’iS; 
tho mutiny tweaks out again in, 685; vc- 
S])eetive positions of tlie native and ICiiro- 
peau troops in, 586; ixisition of Bir Hugh 
Wheeler in ('.awnpoer, 6H6; rising of the 
sepoys in, 587; defeat of the mutineers of, 
t>y Bir Henry Lawrence, 587; the rising in 
Lucknow, tlie capital of, 588; outbreaic of 
the iK'poys at BoetaiKior, in, 589; atrocioui 
nias.saero ueiu* Aimi««a1>ad, in, 589; pro 
ceiHlings of the mutineers iif Fyzaliad, in. 
590; massacre pcriictratcd at Bogum^ngo 
l>y the miitiuc'crs, 590; perilous condition 
of liUcknow, 590; residency of Luck¬ 
now fortified and ^rcf/isionctl, 691; Sir 
Henry Tjawrence marches iipiinst the mu¬ 
tineers at Ohinhut, with disastrous results, 
591; lilockade of the residency of Lucknow, 
593; mutiny at CawniK>or, 593; Bir Hugh 
Wheeler’sentrenchmcntat (Jawnmior. 594; 
attack of Nona Bahlb on Bir Hugh Wheel¬ 
er’s <;iitrenchmcut atCawnjKKn*: Bir Hugh 
applies to Lucknow for aid, 594; siege of 
C’awniMior Nana BahiU 595; horrors of 
the siege of Gaw'upoor, 595; capituJaiiou 
of Bir Hugh Wheeler; treachery of the 
rebels, 59<i; atrocities of Naifa Sahib; the 
C'awripoor massacre, 697; state of affairs 
in Lucknow, 627; iiosition of the Britisli 
at Lucknow, 628; descriptton of the rcaid- 
denvy and fortifications of Lucknow, 629; 
difiiculticB and dangers cx])oricnccd by 
Havelock In advancing into, 639; Have¬ 
lock’s first encounter with the iimtlneers 
of, 646; Havelock’s campaign in, and ad¬ 
vance on Lucknow, 6^) (see Havelock and 
LwcA'mmc) ; Havelock forces his way into 
Lucknow, 655; Havelock blockaded in 
Lucknow.657: Bir Colin (iampliell advonccH 
on Lucknow and delivers the women, chil¬ 
dren. and garrison, 658; Cawnpooratt^koiT 
hy the rebels, but relieved by Bir Colin 
Campbell, 664; Bir OoUu Campbell ad- 
vancxiB a second time on Lucknpw, and 
captures It, G69; Bir (kilin Ctanphell hav¬ 
ing intrusted Lucknow to the command 
of Sir Hope Grant, proceeds to clear other 
parts of Oude of the rebels. C75; Sif Henry 



INDEX. 


785 


OUTRAM 

Uu*k%— 

Lugard sent to Azinighur against the re¬ 
bels, iii. 675; a columu sent under Genend 
Walixtlc to clear the country towards 
Airah. 676;* Lord Canning's Outle proda- 
niation, 68U: Lord Klleuborough's despatch 
roepeotii^ Lonl Canning's proclunatiou, 
691; the i>aciticatioii of Oude, 6US; the fort 
of the Kiijali of Auiethie disinantleih 698; 
Die fort of Bliuukerpoor attaukeil the 
British and evacuatetl by the enemy, 69U; 
pursuit of Hone Mtulhoo, 700; final defeat 
«>f Nana Sahib mid his brotlier, 701; the 
rebate driven out of Oude into the maralitis 
of Xcpaul, 702. 

Outrain, Oaptiiiu, sent in pursuit of Dost 
Maliomed, ill. 3C2; hesida au oxpetlitiun 
against the Uhiljies, 369. 

Outnuu. Colonel Sir Jmuos, tlie gevenior- 
gener^’s iuHtructioim to, respex^iug Owle, 
iii. MB; oil his arrival in India from Persia, 
he isapiMdutotl to the cotninand of the l>!na- 
])oor and i3awnpoor divisions, and thus 
Rupor8e<les llavelock, (r47; reochea l>ina- 
)Mior, 646; generously waives his right in 
favour of llavelock, 648; enters the Luck¬ 
now residency with llavelock, 655; his <lc- 
scription of the offensive operations of 
besiegers and besieged, 657; left by Sir 
<3oliiL Campbell at the Alumliogh, while 
ho iirocceda to the relief of Genera) Wind¬ 
ham at CawniKX)!', 664; his attack on tbo 
Kaiser Ba^. d 71; his atUick on the Moosa 
Bag)i,674; imluces Lord Canning to modify 
hte prrxslamation on the fall of liucknow, 
694: caUtsl to a seat iu the governor-gene¬ 
ral’s council, 700. 

Overland journey to the East, the, i. 151. 

Owen, OmoucI, rei>cls an attack of llydcr 
All, ii. 496. 


l^acheco, Duarte, his heroism and melan¬ 
choly fate, i. 173. 

l^mlshah Begum <»f Oude, the, her prooectl- 
iugs, iii. 263; sent prisoner to Cawupoor, 
2C>.5. • 

Vaget, Sir ^5dwanl, comniander-iu-chief, 
tietitiou of the Bengal mutineers to, iii. 
1.08; his reply to tbo mutineers, 160; he 
HUpprcsBCH Qie mutiny, 160; his evidence 
res)iecting the mutiny, ICl. 

I'agiMlaa, the seven, 11. 145. 

Fainting and sculpture, among the Hindoos, 
ii. 140. 

l*ahico of Delhi, iii. 605. 
i^alghautchcrry, <3olonul Huinbcratonc’s at- 
U'mpt to capture, ii. 50C. 

PaULxithrmor l^taliputra.the capital of King 
Handracottus. i. 33. 

I'almcr, Colonel, at Ghuznee, Iii. 437. 
l*almer & Co., Wi|liaui, relations of, with 
Chundoo Rai, hi. 121; question of the le¬ 
gality of the loans of, to the Nlztim. 122: 
ileolings of, with Chaudoo Xj»iX saiictioueil 
by the goveruor-geuenU, 122; ilealiuga of, 
disapproved tim directors, 123; the 
l^ukruptcy of. 130; further account of the 
tnmsactions of. 216; legal proceeilir^s of 
creditors of, 217; opiwsing views of tlie 
directors and Uj«nd of Control, 217; pro¬ 
ceedings of the Bot'.nl of Control in regartl 
to, 216; writ of nnividam/M issued against 
the dlrwtors, 210. 

Falmcrstou, Lord, instructs the British am- 
teis^or at 8t. l*etersbmg to demand au 
explauutiou of the doings of Kussian 
agents at the court of Persui, iiL 305; his 
note to b» presented to Count Nesselrade, 
^6: his bill for the better government of 
Indio, 685; his bill frustrated l^thc right- 
o£ asylum question, which led to tlie over¬ 
throw of Jus ministry, 68J. 

Palms of India, 1.10. , ,, , 

i^ulmyra, in the gn^ot lilghway to India, i. 

35; the ruins of, 38. ... 

Faulput, Akber’s victory at, i. 132; the iiattle 
of. between Uie l)<x>ranecs and the Mali- 
rattas, 406. 

Parker, Colonel, tlie eccentric proceedings 
of, hi Oude. ii. 389. 
l^irsuram Thapa, iii. 18. 

• Farvati, the consort of Bivo, H. 33. • 

Patiala, the, feud between the raiah of, and 
his wife; Runjeet Sing calletl in by the 
latter, ii. 830; fidelity of the maharajah of. 
to the British government at tbo time of 
the sepoy mutii^, lit CIO. 
r.'itna, a factory of the Comi*any’s at, seized, 
1. 342. 


Paton, Captain, exposed to danger in an 
Insurrection iu the palace of Oude, iii. 
264. 

Paton, Major, his success against the Ghoor- 
kas, lil. 20. 

Patnmaga, the pmviH'on rcB])ecting, in the 
new charier of the East India Company, 
iii 5. 

l*attiiison, Lleuttmant Thomas, his distin¬ 
guished liravory, iii. 85; descTiption of. 66. 

Peacock, the jewelled, from Tippoo's golden 
tiiroiie, ii. 705. 

l^earce. Major, it 813. 

Pcchell, Mr., magistrate of Chittagong; the 
letter he recoiveil from tlie Rajaii of Itani* 
ree. iii. 137; his wply, 138. 

Poilron, M., the fort of Aiighur taken frt>iu, 
li. 759. 

I*eel, Cat»tain. aiulhfs naval brigaile, iii. (»57: 
his bravery in the attack on tzie Bhah Nu- 
jeef, 661; his attack on tUo mess-house, 662; 
his attack on the Kaiser Bagh, 663; wou- 
doHul skill of his brigade iu moving large 
gims, 6<%; his death at Lucknow, 6?4. 

Poet Bir Robert, moves the a^ipolntment of 
a select comiuitteo !• inquire into t)je af¬ 
fairs of the East India Coiiqiany, iii. L39. 

Peer M^iomtHt lit 271. 

Pwr Mahomed Jehanglr, gnuKteou of Ta¬ 
merlane, invades India and lays siege to 
Ooch. t 93. 

Pegu, the capture of, Ity the British, iii. 53(i; 
as'^ulted by the Burmese and successfully 
defemted, 536; annexation of the provine-* 
of, to the Britisli dominions, 537. 

Pelsliwii. the, i, 396 (seeifivir kou ); Ragon- 
uth Row, ii. 356; Barraiu Row uumlored, 
357; a now claununt of the office. 358; <Uh- 
sunsions caused at Foonah Iw the choice 
of a, 669; lliidit of the. from I'oonah, 745; 
ro-cstablislimeiit of the, by the British, 
747; futile u^otiatious between the min¬ 
ister of tlie Guioijwar and the l^eisdiwa, 111. 
37; his favourite niunlers Gungadiiur 
Sostree. 38: is compelled to ilcliver up the 
murderer, 40. 

Penny, Brigadier, at Gujorat, iii. 526. 

Feuiiycuick, Brigadier, killed at CUiillion- 
waJla, iii. 523. 

Feriapatam, ii. 611. 

i’ermacoil, taken by Hyder Ali aiwl the 
French, ii. 503. 

Perron, a Frenchman, in the serviixj of the 
Nizam, li. 685,687 ;m the service of Bclndia; 
he is defeatdl by General Lake at Oocl, 758; 
he resigns Bcindte’s service, 760. 

Persia, dealings of the EuAt India Company 
with, i. 2^; siugular romonstrance w-itii 
the king of, 337; the polititutl state of, hi 
the middle of the 18th century, 397; Lonl 
Moruington sends a mlHsion to. ii. 733; 
treaty with. iii. 284; ascendency of Russian 
iniluence at the court of, 294; designsof, on 
Hcra^ 295; an ambassador from, arrives at 
Cauilahar, 300; British objections to an 
allimico of, wiUi Afghanistan. 300; sends 
an oxpciUtiou against Herat, 317; siege of 
Herat by, 317 (sec Herat). 

I*ersiiui empire, India once a satrapy of, i. 
23 

Persian Gulf, tlie route by, to Indio, i. 145; 
AJliuiiuerquc’scxpotlition to, 178; tho Com- 
iianys trade in, 33i»; the British cxi»edition 
to. fill. 324. \ 

Perriaus, the, averse U.* nnuitime enterprise, 
i. 37; their erroneous notions respecliug 
tho Caspian ^o, 37; submission of, to the 
Purtuguf^, when tlic latter attiickod 
Crmuz, 179. 

PerUkb Sing, UajiUi of Batturah, iii. 92. 

PosJiawer, the acquisition of, by Rnnject 
Sing, iii. 279,2^; Dost Mahomed’sattemiit 
to recover, 292; Dost MahometVs con¬ 
ference with Mr. Bumeson the subject of, 
299; state of uffaim iu the valley of. at the 
time of tho groat sepoy mutiny. 575. 

PoveKin dc Morlay, French envoy at Manga¬ 
lore, il. 519. 

Philosophers, rewmblonee lK;twccn th<j 
Hindoo and Greek, ii. 121. 

Philosophy, the, of the Hindoos, il. 113; cluef 
sulijectsof, 114; tlie Vedanta school of, 114; 
tho Riyi^a school of, 116; tlie Baukhyu 
school of, 316; tho atheistic and theistic 
schools of, 120 ; Die Yogis. 120. 

Phomioimis, the, i. 24. 

PickoragUl. Lieutenant, iii. 19. ^ ^ , 

Pigot, Mr., sent to relieve Venlachelum. u 
469; as governor of Madras, various notices 
of, 548. 551, 553. 565; 
ixiintod again governor of Mailiti^ ii. 390: 
prepares to restore Uie Rajah of Tanjore, 
391; restores the Rajah of Tanjore, 392; vio¬ 
lent dissensiou between him and the majo¬ 
rity of the council of Madras,394; is arfested 


PORTO NOVO 

Kgot, Mr.,--> 

by commaml of tho majority of the coimcil, 
ii. 395; application for his release restetod, 
396; dies while under arrest, 397. ' 

Piudarees, the. a plundering nation, iii. 45: 
their plundering expeditions, 46; hoirid 
tortures inflicted l>y them on persous sus¬ 
pected of ooncealing proiiertv. 47; leaders 
of, 47: their incursions into British terri- 
tiirles, 50; their devaHtations, 51; encour¬ 
aged by impunity to renew tholr incur¬ 
sions. 51; timhl ooutisels of Dio homo au- 
^tlioritiesrespoothig, 51; holder policy finally 
adopted towanls, by the Iterl of Moira, 52; 
operations of Die BriDah a^ust. 79: their 
successive defeats W the Britisii. 80; pur¬ 
suit and defeat of Clieetoo’s durra, 81: dis¬ 
persion of thoMurras of Kuvoem Khan 
and Wasi) Mahotnoil, 82; fate of the 
leaders of, 84. 

Pirates, Die Aiij^la, i. 509; various exi>e<U- 
tions sent agaiust, fur their suppression, 
5U. * 

I'irates of Gujerat, the, various expeditions 
sent against, iii. 117. 

I'itt, HD., his ItuUuu bill. ii. 565; the leading 
pnivisious of bis Indian BUI, 556; the part 
he took iTi tho pniseoutioii of Ilostings, 
642. 

Pitt, William. Boc AntJterst {Loixl). 

Plants of indi{^ i. 10. 

i’hvssey, the liattle of, 11. 578; tho centenary 
of the battle of, fixed niKin by Die rauti- 
peer sciKiys at DcUii for a groat effort, 
as the fatoil time for the downfaU of tho 
British, iii. 608. 

PloniiKitenUary. a crown, sent to India, li. 
290; tbo huUguaUon of Die directors at the 
appointment, 290; Die luiiiistry claim Dio 
right of sending out one. 291. 

Pliny's Hisiona NattiraliSf cited, i. 38 ; 

account of the voyage to India, 38. 
iqough, the Hindoo, ii. 152. 

I’oco<^ke. A<luiiral,snccecdsAdmiralWatson, 
i. ^7: his tiayal engagement with Die 
French under (^nuit d’Achfi, 597; seeks 
to meet D'AcbO again, which Dio latter 
ileclines; fails to save Fort Bt. David, 598; 
sails to IX'ylnn in search of Dio Ficncli 
fillet; li&i another engagement with Count 
d’Achc, 618; D’Acl»{f8 fear of. 619. 

Poetiy, Hindoo, ii. 127; earllcBt poems of tho 
Vetfos; Die Ramayona, 128; extract fnun 
the Rumaj’ana. 131; the Maliabhomta, 13 ; 
modem, 137; the dnuno, 137, 

Poets, miMlcni Hindoo, U. 137. 

Police and espionage among the Hindoos, ii. 
106. 

I’olior, Captain, i. 408. 

I’ollilore, the teittlo of, li. 495. 

I'olluck, General, at l*eshawer; his advance 
from Poshawertoreliove Jvlalabad,iii. 437; 
441; Ida triumpliant march on Oabool, 542; 
defeat of the Afghans and recapture of 
t'almol. 453; assists at Die instaltetion of 
Futteli Sing, 457. 

l^olygars, tho, 1. 472. ^ 

I'onaiiy, TippiMi’a repulse at, il. 506. 
Poudiilierry, preiKirations of the British 
att^k; state of, 1. 4^; siege of; the siege 
raised, 427; Bufiler All’s coimeution with, 
433; places around, taken Iw Cooto, 631; 
Foote makes prcimratious for lieai^ng, 
6«&; Die surrender of. to the BriDsh, 639; 
cafitured again by the Britisii, ii. 469; 
again besioged and taken, 639. 

Poniapa, a British luterjireter, his treachery; 

lilown from a gun, i. 497. . .. 

J’ooiifd), difflculticB of the ministry of, il. 404; 
iiibtructioDA given to Colonel Upton, as 
]«Ieiiiputcutiary to, 406; French intrigue 
at, 440; revolution at 443; British expetli- 
tioii u>, 447; rcti-eat froni, 4M; threatened 
by (.'olonol Goddard’s advance, 463; curious 
ceremony at, 663; dissensions at, origfnatcxl 
i>y tho'chyoice of a PeiDiwa, 6W; Holkar s 
victory otwBcindia near, 745:thePeishwa'a 
flight from, 745; re-establistmient of the 
Peishwa at, by a British force, 747; ^tile 
negotiations between tho minister of the 
Guicowar ami tlie Petehwa at, ill. 37; site 
of. and Die BritiDi caiitoimienU at, 66; the 
surrender of, t4> the British, 68. 
Poonindhur, conference at. between tlie 
British plenipotentiary and the Mahratta 
ministers, ii. 407; treaty of, 407; treaty of, 
raDfiod by the Bengal govemmout, 409: un¬ 
satisfactory nature of tho Deaty of, 440. 
Popi*, tho, Ids grant to John II. of Portugal, 
i 151. 

Pope, Brigadier, at Ohillionwalla, ill. 524:;^' 
Popham, CaptaiirW., brilliant exploits of. ii. 
4^; captures Gwalior, 459; at Hamnuggur, 
637. 

Porto Novo, the battle of, ii. 491. 



736 


INDEX 


PORTUGAL 

I'onugal, the zeaL of eome of tlw kings of. for 
mariUmo entenrise; Friuoe Heiuy of,i.l5U; 
Alonso V. ana John IL of, 151; tlie king 
of, aspUmcsthe title ofLord of (Juinoa. 151; 
CoiumbuH offers his services to, 152; 
muritiino discovery under Emmiumel of. 

m. 

PortugueHo, the, tboir maritime discoveries 
make India known, i. 3; their diHcovories 
tinder Princo Henry, 150; their discoveries 
under Alonso V. and Jolni IT., 151; the 
King of I*ortuga] souils overland mesaen- 

S ers to the Kas^ 151; Tk^rtolommeo l>ii^ 
oubies the <'anc of (lood HoT>e. 151; their 
dl80overii«4 under Kmnianticl, 153; Vmco 
de Gama commands an ex>>e<Utioii, and 
sights the ('ape of Ootxl Hope, 153; l>o 
Gama’s courao along the coast of Africa, 
154; l>u Gama’s jirocut'diiigH at Mozanx' 
higue, 1G4;I^ Gama’s proceedhigsatMom* 
lias and Meliuilo, 155; l>e Gama onmiges a 
Gujerat pilot, and arrives on the Malab.ar 
coast. 155; first lamliug f>f the Portuguese 
in Iridiit, 157; I>e Gama is invited on shore 
and visits tiie Zainorln of (.'alicut, 177; re¬ 
ception of Do Gama at tiio court of thti 
zamoriu, atj4l inteiwlea', 153; Do Gama’s 
proixised present, l)e Gama's second 
visit to tlio zamoriu, and the King of 
Portugal’s letter. ICO; Do Gama dejiarts, 
hut is forcibly detained onshore, 160; Do 
(iama is reloasMl and trnftlc coinmcnces, 
161; the zaniorhi Tiacomes hostile to tiie 
Portuguese, and sets a guanl over tlie 
l*ortuguose facloi^, 162; Ito Gama retali¬ 
ates, 102: De Gama is attacked by tixe 
vamoriu's fiuet, and sails for Portugal, 103; 
tlio second i’ortugueso exinnlit ion to India, 
conimandoil by Pedro Alvarez ('atirol, KaI; 
tlie ^xiKslition encounters a storm off tho 
Gape of Good Hope, 163; Gabr^ arrives at 
Calicut and has an interview with tlie 
jsamorin. 164; mutual distrust between the 
zoiiioriii and the Portuguese, 1C4; Moorisli 
intrigues against the Portuguese, 1(>5; tlie 
Portuguese factory storme<l by tho Moors, 
1C5; Cabral bombanls Oaliont, 16C; the 
I’ortnguese make iHiaue with the liajali 
of Cochin and reuiovc tinther, 1U<>; 
friendly overtures are mailc to tho 
Portuguese hy other mjahs. 107: Cabral is 

i airsueu tiie /aiiioriirs llrei. 107: thinl 

*ortug*.t 08 e t>x)«i'«hti«>ii, (SimniiiiMled by 
.Tuan do Nuevu, ]67: De Mueva arrives at 
(’ocliinoud defeats the zaiuorin’s ffcot, 108; 
a newoxiKjdition littod ontumlor Vasctwle 
Gama, lint: De Gama's new title; his cigi- 
tiu% of an Egyptian ship, 169; l>o Gama’s 
barbarity, 170; Du Gama’s arrival at Caiia- 
nore, 170 ; his proceedings at Ctdieut, > 
170; treachery of the zainoiin towards 
De Gama, 171; return of De Gama to 
Kuropu, 171; the zaniorin having at- 
iaekiMl Cochin, is defeat-ed by the I'ortu- ' 
gueso miderAlfonsoAllMuiuenjUC, 172; tho { 
Albuquenpies siul for Kiirope, 172; the 
zamorin forms a coalition against the 
t urtuguose, 172 ; the heroism of Duarte 
I’acheco in defence of Cochin; liis fate, 
173; Lope Hoarez supersedes Duaite l*a- 
eboco, and defeats the zamorin, 173; an 
armament is sent out under the command 
* of Don Francisco Almeiilo, 174; native 
combination against tho Purtuguc8o,'175; 
the Hultau of Ji40'pt joins the combination 
against the Portuguese. 175; intrigues 
of the Veiietiaiis against the XVirtuniesc, 
176; an Egjiitian fleet fitted out and sent 
to India t<»*()ppt»He the Portngnese, 176; 
enebuntors lietweon the hostile ilocts, 176; 
heroism and deutii of Almeida's sou 
I.<orenzo. 177; Alfoiisii Albutiiurgiie returns 
to India, iiiiil witges warm the Persian 
Gulf, 178; Ajbiuiueniue attacks Grmuz. the 
Persums subniit, 179; Almeida sets out to 
avenge his sou. 179; Aluiej^i destroys 
Dabul, imd defeats the Sm'kish and 
Gujerat fleets, 180; refuses to n*sign the 
viceroyshlp; his death, 18<J; Albuguonjuo 
attacks Calicut, aiul lias a narrow escape, 
181; Albugueniuu prepares to attack, 
and capturt’S Goti, 182; Goa is taken 
from and retaken 1^ Albu(iuer«|ue, 183: 
Allmgueixiuc’s expedition against and 
capture of Maltutca, 183; AUiuquerque’s 
heroism and humanity, 184; Albuqueniue's 
expedition aminst Atlen, aii<i capture of 
Ormuz, 184; Portuguese; power extended 
iu the East nmler Albuquisniuc, 185; Albu-« 
imeniue's illness and death, 186: Lope 
poarez succeeds Allniquerque; his incaiia- 
city, failure of au attaclr on Aden, 186; we 
Portuguese build a fort at Colombo. 1^; 
retreat of Diego Is>pez, success<^irtoSoaroz, 
fromDiu, 187; native combinations a'^^inst 


I Portuimeso, the,— 

I the Portimucse, 1.187; defeat of the Gujerat 

I fleet off Choul, 188; expedition against Diu, 

and its failure, Iw; alliance of Bahadur, 
King of Qujerat, with the Porti^tese; his 
deatii, 1^; a Turkish oxiiedition gainst 
tho Portuguese iu Gujerat, 189; thei^ortu- 
giiese besieged in Diu, tboir heroic defence. 
liK); tho siege of Diu raised; attempt to 
iKiisfut tlie garrison, 191: tho Portuguese 
again besieged in Dim 191; IMu relieved by 
De Castro, 192; De Castro’s ostentatious 
celebration of the victory; Ills chaxacter 
and death, 193: comblnatioTi of native 
princes aj^nst the X’ortugueso, 193: for¬ 
midable attack on Goa by Ally Adil Bliah; 
its failure, 194: causes of tlie dcclme of 
I*ortuguese iiowcr in India. 194; atteiupts 
of the l*ortngui;se to discover the norw- 
west passage. 197; tho Portuguese iiaviga- 
t4>rs,Gasi)er( kirtcrealaml Miguel Corterelt^ 
197; intrigues of tho Portuguese ngaiuKt 
tiie DiiUli in Baiituiii, 219; a Portu^iese 
ship captured by the ships of tlie ICast India 
(^iinpanv, 236; atteinptsof the IVirtuguese 
iu jir^iulice the King of Achecn against 
the Tkiglish, 239; a I^ori.uguese carrack 
taken Viy the English, 240; their arro^nt 
claims, 248; Captain Best’s spirito<l deal¬ 
ings with tUom, 254; truce liotween theiu 
aiKlthe i^t India CJornpony, 267; captum 
of thdr factory at Hooglily, 284; Mr. 
(kioke’s conventhm witli them <Usavowed 
in Kuglatul, 319; they send au expedition 
against Salsette, li. 360: they 1>Hlge a pro- 
t<?st against tlic attempt of tho English on 
Wiilsette. 362. 

Poms, on Indian prince, opjKises Alexamler, 

i. 26; beaten at the llydasiies, 28; surren¬ 
ders to Alexander. 29. 

Ponis. a Bceoiid linliun prince of the nuino, 
Ills strange conduct toa'ords AlexoiKlur, i. 
3t>. 

I’otiinger, Eldreil, his iirave and successful 
defence of Hemt against the Persians, iii. 
320; his bravery at Oharikur; is wounded, 
uud has a hair-breadth esctiiie, 409. 

Powau^m, the fortress of. ii. 756. 

I’owell, Colonel, his ofieratioiis in Ihmdel- 
cund, ii. 768. 

PratanSing, succeeils J’rithi Narayan in Ne- 
]iaul. iii. 8. 

Predatory system in India, the. iii. 45; pni- 
jiarutions of tiie Britisli to suiqiress it. 62. 

I’rescription, its force among the llindtxis. 

ii. 97. 

Presents, forbiildcn to be taken by the Ckiin- 
fiany's servants, i. 688; attempts to evade 
tlie covenants against taking, 689; receivcsl 
by General (Jaraac, 690. 

Presidencies, the tliree, of India, i. 13; tlie 
extent of tho tliroe, and tlieir relations to 
other iKiwers when Lonl Mornington ar¬ 
rived ill India, ii. C7S. 

Press, the, ceiisorshi]) of, in India, iii. 130; 
regulations of tiio Maniuis of Hastings 
rcsjiocting, 131; restrictions iiniiused upon, 
by Mr. Adam, 132; restrictions on, alH>- 
lishod by Sir Charles Metcalfe, 251. 

I’rinco of Sunset, the, his boastful confidence, 

iii. 173; his new tactics and utter defeat. 
174. 

T’cititing, tho infiuence of the discovery of 

|Xlie art of, i. 149. 

iVithi Narayan, aGhoorkacliiof, makes him¬ 
self master of Nettaul, iii. 7. 

Pritzlcr, General, iu pursuit of the Peisliwa, 
iii. 87; at Siiolaiioor, 9,3. 

Promo, the capture of, by the Britisli, iii. 
534. 

l*ro|M}rby in land, among tiie Hindoos, ii. 
iK). 

l*niphot^, a. reBiK.*cting the downfall of Bri¬ 
tish rule hi India, iii. 668. 

Prother, Colonel, takes several strongholds, 
estiecially llaighur, iii. 94. 

Ptolemy's map of India, i. 1. 

Puncbaycts, Gie, ii. 262. 

Ibuijab. the, Akber subilucs a revolt in, i. 
131; Akber advances upon, 134; the Mali- 
rait^ iu, 403; violent proceedings of a 
Mahometan fanatic in,ui.205; threaten¬ 
ing aspect of affairs In, 486: raxfid succes¬ 
sion of rulers in Lahore. 486; Sir Henry 
Hardinge’s cautious conduct in reference 
to, 487; a Sikh army from, iuvaih^s British 
territory: nroclaniution of the governor- 

, general, w7 ; battle of Moodkee, 488; battle 
of Peroz^ihali, 490; battle of Altwul, 492; 
battle of Hobraon, 495; snbiolsMon of the 
Hikhs; end of the first Sikh war. 498; lower¬ 
ing of a new storm in, 505; resignation of 
MoolraJ, the dewau, 506; new dewau a)>* 
IHiinted; Mr. Vans Aimcwand Lieutenant 
Anuerson sent to receive Mogirai’aresigua- ^ 


BAJPOOTS 

Punjab, the,— 

tion, iii. 506; barbarous murder of Mr. Ag> 
new and Lieutenant Anderson at Mooltau, 
507; Moolraj in open rebellion, 608; deci¬ 
sion to move a military force against Mool- 
tan, 609; military operations of Lieutenant 
Kdwardos, 509; successes of jjieutonaut 

• Ifklwardes, and capture of Dera Ghazec 
Khan, 510; auxiliary force of the Khan 
Bbawul]>oor, 510; battle of Kineyree, 511; 
imbecility of tiio Bhawulpoor general; 
defeat of the reliels; victory of Biuldoosani, 
512; advance of General Whish, 514; de¬ 
scription of Mooltau, 515; proclamation of 
General Whish, 515; siege and capturo of 
Mtxiltau, 516; surrender of Moolr^, 519; 
revolt in Hazareh; Lord Gough takes the 
field. 519: liattle of Ramuuggur, 520; 
strength of the Bikh position; r^ulsed, 
they advauce anew, 521; liattle of Cmilliaii- 
walla, 522; victory of Gujerat, 525; exteu- 
siun of the Sikh dominion and annexation 
of the Punjab, 527; state of affairs in, at 
tho breaking outof tho great sepoy mutiny, 
572; vigorous measures adopted iiy Mr. 
Moutgoinery to keeji down the mutinous 
spirit among tlie sepoys. 573; arrival of the 
guides at Delhi from, 662; iiiiiKirtaut fefiUh 
aid comes to Deliii from, 610. 

Puiijnuit, the. i. 57. 

Puiiniar, tho liattle of, iii. 482. 

Puresliram Biiow, ii. 463, 664, 713. 

I^ursajec or Purswajoc Biiuiisla, Kajah of 
Nagpwr, iii. 44; mtmler of, 68. 

PurscTiuu Ilow', a notorious intriguer, niv* 
poiiitinl liy Apa Hahib his minister, iii. 68. 


Q. 


(piottah. halt of the Afglioii exiicditlou at, 
iii. 354. 


ij. 


Balxui. Lieutenant, killedI6t Oabciol. iii 405. 

liafiios.l8irTboni»s Stamford, iifhilc governor 
of Java, li. 849. 

Kagee. the .careful culture of. in the Mysore, 
u. 167. * 

Kagobah or Ilagonath How. becomes 
Peishwa of the Maliratta empire on tlie 
murder of Narrain How, ii. 356; expedi¬ 
tion of, against Nizam Aliaiul liyder Ali, 
357; a new claimant for bis otfice of 
}>cishwa, 358; <Usallection in liis army, 359; 
Ills alternations <if sucoess and defeat, 359; 
iiegotiatioiiK witli tlie Boiulviiy govern¬ 
ment, 360; treaty of tlio Bomlmy council 
with, 460; furnished witli troojm by tiie 
Bomiioy govemmeiit.-l^^l: comliint'd oiiera- 
tious of, and tho liritish, 465'; results of 
tlie combined operations of, and the Bri¬ 
tish, 463; tlie resolution of the Bengal 
council to support, ^8; resolution of the 
Bombay governmenPto8iipnort>, 441; coni- 
mittud to the custo<ly of Heindia; he 
cscaiiCB, 454. 

liagojee Blionsla, sends Bosker l*uut t<^> in- 
varlo Bengal, i. 524; ills contention W’ith 
Balajee Bao for tiie office of iieishwa, 526; 
sends Bosker l*unt a second time to invade 
Bengal, 526: heads lui invasion of Bengal 
to avenge the inunlerof Bosker Punt, 527; 
unites witli Scindia again, ii. 769; sues for 
peace with the British; treaty of Degaoni, 
771; unites his anus witli Scindia to iiarti- 
tion Bhoiiaul, iii. 42; his death, 44. 

liagojee Bhonsla, llajab of Bcrar, iii. 541. 

Bagonatb. See Jiai/imth. 

Kaighur, the strougiiobl of, taken by Colonel 
Prother, iii. • 

Rain, tlie fall of, in Indio, L 8. 

Rajah IMtonsiugh, a tulookdar, iii. 590. 

liajainali^, i. 586. 

Kajbulluli, through whom the quarrel l>e- 
twean the British residentsn Bengal and 
Suraiah Dowlah originated, i. 532. 

Raiendra Lakshmi, ifi. 8. 

Rajpootona, tho state of. Hi. 53; disturbances 
in, 177. 

Rajpoots, the, i. 58; confederacy of, against * 
Ihihadur Shell, 3^; tlio claim of. to bo 
CshatrlyaB, ii. 12; the rana of, ill. 53: three 
states of, 54; warcauseilby their divisions, 
55; a horrible mode of reconciling Bissen- 
Bions among the chiefs of, 56; subordinate 
priiiciiialities among, 57; state of, and Bii’ 
tifth relations with, * 



INDEX. 


8AXE 


737 


RAJ.POEA 

Raj-por% the Indian namo of the dlseoee of 
wmcb Hyder AU died, il. 507. 

Ila]>raua, the sinniiar fom of goremmeut 
in Catch ao sall^ iii. 222. 

Kaleigh’s, 8ir Walter, History of the Worlds 
(luoted, i. 23. 

Bux, Hi. 700. 

Bam Dow, Rajah of Dowletabad, opposea, 
and is defeate<l by Ala*a-dia, who fa^des 
the Doccan; i. 7d 

Rom Ka^ Slug, ill. 179. 

Itam Row, his proceedings in the Mj^re, 
iU. 209. 

Ram Bi^i of Boondeo, lii. 222. 

li/una efiaudra, Vishnu appears os, to 
stroy the giant Havana, li. 29. 

liamanuja and.BaniannJyitM, the, ii. 69. 

Itamawats, the, 11. 79. 

llamcbunuer Ounneidi, leads the Mahrattas 
at the battle of Dooga^ir, li. 461; ^ain, 462. 

Kaznehundur Waugh, ill. 69. 

ICamxhur, Fort, the repulse of the British 
at, iii. 15; <»> 2 itured, 16. 

llammohun Roy, sent by the King of Delhi 
as his agent to England, iii. 211. 

Itamnaram, Cliye's intoi^ereuco in behalf of, 

i. 649; his visit to Clive, 650;<iuarrelaal)out; 
shamefully Hucrificed byl^. Vausiti»rt,672. 

Hamuuggur, the liattle of. iii. 520. 

Itamoo, the British reindsed at, ill. 148. 

Ranzram Sing, the treatment of the brother 
of, i. 533; timtmontof, by Meer Jafilor, 646. 

Hamree, letters of the rai^i of, to Afr. X*e* 
obeli and the govemor^oneral, iii. 137. 

Haniyantv, the, a Hindoo poem; its subject, 

ii. 128; merits of, 131; extract from, 131. 

Buna, the, of Kajpontana, iii. 53. 

Hana Bahadur, succeeds his father in Nc- 
paul, iii. 8; puts his uncle to death; coiu- 
I)ellea to abdicate, 9. 

Ranee of Burdwaii, her i>ctiiion to the Beu’ 
gaJ council, ii. 3G7. 

Ranee of Jliansi. kader of the rebel sepoys, 
defeated at (Iwalior, fU. 684. 

Rangoon. Captain Canning sent on a ni!r. 
Sion to, ill. 135; embamo laid on the Bri- 
tlah vessels at, 130; a British fleet arrives 
at, 144; capture of, 145; the stockades of, 
145; the Golden |»agoda of, 146: operations 
of the British in the vicinity oL 148; Com* 
modoro Bamb^ sent to, 530; military 
operations against, 533; position of Xew, 
534; capture of its ]>agoda. 534. 

Ranior, Admiral, a crotchet of Ins prevents 
lionl Momlngtou's intended exiieditiou to 
tlie Mauritius, ii. 734. 

Rath Jatra, the ft^tival of, ii. 54. 

Raughurs, the, Hodson sent against; their 
defeiit, iii. 616. 

Havana, tbo monstrous gia^it of Lanka, de¬ 
stroyed by VishTiu, li. 29. 

Rawliiison, Colonel, quoted on the effect of 
imrchasing instead of comtHilling submis* 
siou in Afghanistan, lii. 372: mfuaes to 


obo; 

up 


)y General Elphlnstoue's order to deliver 
_ Oandaliar to thuAfglians, 439; his fetd* 
ings in refumuot) tivtUe governor-general's 
order to retire, 446. 

Hay Huttun Sein, Hajah of Chittoor, i. 83. 
Raymond, M., employed the Xhsam to 
organize native uoois, U. 657. 668, 685. 
Raynor, lAcuteuaiil, Ins gallant conduct in 
defence of the Delhi magazine, ill. 568. 
Rchlm Khan, <^ief of Kholat, iii. ^9. 

RoJd, Genonu, succeotls Genertd Anson as 
commander at Delhi, but throughill health 
is incai)able of acting, iii. tKK). 

Hold, Major, with tbeGhoorkus, attacks the 
reliel sopo^ in the Kj^enguiigo, iii. 607; 
in the assault on DoUii, 621. 

Religion, the provisions rospectix^, in the 
new charter of the East India Comi>any, 
iU. 5. - ^ 

Religion of tue Hindoos, original Bour<»s of, 
ii. 16; erection, 18; tendency of all beings 
to decay, 19; toansmigration, 20; human 
and ilivino penbds, 20; the Supreme Being, 
20: monstrous idolatries, 21: triad of, 22; 
Baktla, or female divlnitlra, 23; Vishnu, 23; 
V iahnu’s heaven, 25: the avaiazs of Vishnu, 
25; Siva. 32; other cleitios, 33; Hindooism 
in practice; Bmhminical observances, 42; 
observances of the vulgar, 44; multipUcity 
of forms, 45: views oa to spiritual perfec¬ 
tion. 46; soif-lnflioted tortures: f^rival of 
Kah, 47; festival of Juggernaut, 51; fes- 
. tival of Hath Jatra, 63: connection of the 
British government with the festival of 
Juggernaut, 55; fundamental principles of 
nmgious belief, 57; dogma of trausmigrar 
tion. 57; Hindoo heaven and hells, 60 
moi^ systdm, 62; Hindoo devotion, 63 
alleged tolerant spirit of Hindooism, 66. 
nrthodo^ and heterodox votaries; leading 
soots, 67; Hindooism variable, 83. 

VOL. Ill, 


Henaud, Major, detached for rehef of 
Cawnpoor, iU. 630; Havelock effects a 
junction with, 6^ 

Rennel's Memoir of a Map of Hindoostan, 
referred to, i. 30. 

Residents, Irtish, tu India, jurisdiction of 
courts over, iii. 259; objections to this iu- 
riadiotion, 259; Macaulay’s reply to the 
oldections, 261. 

Restoration, the, its effects on the East 
India Company, i. 311. 

Revolution, the, its effects oii the I^t India 
Company, i. 348. 

Heyuoll, Goueral Thomas, iii. 184. 

Rhatghur, attacked and captuied by Six 
Hugh Rose, ill 679. 

Rhoouamow, the fort of, Herious blundera 
and imuecessa^ loss of life at, iii. 676. 

Rico, mode of culture of. in India, ii. 156, 

Riobards, Colonel, in Burmoh, iii. 147. 

RintUnbore, or Rpntunbhore, the city of, 
attacked and captured by Ala-u-din, i. 89. 

Ripaud, M., hisintrigiieB withTipiKK),!!. 679. 

K(U)eit.s^ Colonel, ii. 686. 

Roberts, Oenenu. sent 1^ the presidonOT of 
Madras i^ainst the seitoy reltels, lit 677; 
his otwratioiiB against the rebels, GS2. 

lR»ok tomploa of IniUa, i. 17; il iQ, 146. 

Rohilcuud, the subjugation of, by the Mah- 
rattas, 11. 296; alliance of, with the Nabob 
of Gudo agivinst the Malirattas, 298; the 
sepoy mutiny in, iii. 578; Sir Colin Camp¬ 
bell opens' the campaigti in, {qminat tho 
mutineerR, 676; the frontiei^ oL secured 
against tho rebels, 701. 

llohillas, the, relations of tlie Nabob of Oude 
with; their character, ii. 321; the designs 
of the Nabob of Oudo aiadiist, 325; the 
Company committed to war with, 327; 
defeat or, 327; barbarities practise on 
iw Sujoh Dowlali, 328; attempts to justify 
the wa^, 329; Alum claims a diaro 

of their torriiory, 330; pleas in justifleation 
of the war with, exauimed, 331; the ncces> 
eity of the war with, falsely pleaded by tho 
Bengal govenimont, 333; gains of the Com¬ 
pany by the war with, 333. 

Robtuk, Ho^od'b gallant exploit at, iii. 616; 

Roman intercourse witli ludu^ i. 34. 

Bose, Ensign, heads the itorty retreating 
from Cliorikur, and sells ms life dearly, iii. 
409. 

Rose, Sir Hugh, appointed to the command 
of the forces sent to operate against tiie 
mutineers in Central India, iii. 677; 
mardics from Indore to Lahore: he attacks 
and captuves tho fort of Rhamhur, 679; 
marches towards Jhausi through the pass 
of Mudanpoor, 080; attacks Jhansi, defeats 
Tantia Topee, and captures Jhansi, 681; 
moves on Cal]iee and captures it, 682; bs- 
Bumiug tliut the campaign is ended, he 
issues a final order to his troop^ 683; the 
rebels having taken 2 >oi»eBsion of Gwalior, 
he attacks and routs them, 634. 

RoshnyeB, the, Afghim trilw of, i. 135. 

Ross, Obtain, at Bomghur, iii. 16. 

Rotton, Rev. ALr., his Nan'ativcoftheMn-i'Ut 
MiUmu, quoted, iii. 566. 

Routes ro Indio, tho leading, 1. 35; inland, 
35; maritime, 36; the PliwDician, 36: by 
Alexandria, 36; changes in, of Indian 
144. a 

liow Kagonath, iii. 540. v 

Row Ram Ohimd, iii. 540. 

Row Raiilbmi, iii. 27. 

Row Bahib, brother of Nana Sahib, placed 
on tho mtunud of Gwalior by tho rebela 
iU. 684. 

Roweroft, Briga<lier, defeats Bala Row at 
Toolosepoor. ill. 702. 

Roydullub, Meer Jafller quarrels with, i. 646; 
conspiracy against, 655. 

Rukn Khan, attempts tho life of Ids unde 
AlarU-diii; is slain, i. 80. 

Ruku-u-din, successor to Altamsh, i. 64. 

Kuktawar Khan, a reliel sonbohdar, aHsumes 
the rank of general among the rebels, iii. 
579. 

RumboldL Sir William, one of tho partners 
in the firm of William Rsimer & Oo., ar¬ 
rives in India, iii. 217. 

Rumbold, Sir Thouuis, president of Mmlras, 
various refereudls to, ii. 469. 471, 477; a 
bill of pains and i>enalties against, 548. 

Rui^ R{^ brother of Moolrid* carries Mr. 
Agnew, when wouu<led iiy an usaasain at 
Mooltan, into the Eorlgoh, iii. 507; at the 
battle of Kinoyree. 511. 

Ronjeet Sing, a SikKdilof, his proceedings, 
ii. 830; crosses the Sutlej, 831; Mr. Metcalfe 
sent os an envoy to, 831; oomt^eUed to aban¬ 
don his dreams of conquest. 831; suppresses 
tho fanatical followers of Syed Ahmodf lit. 
205; treaty znade by tho Britidi with, 227; 


Runjeet Sizu^— 
bis early training, iii. 273: assumes the go- 
vexumeut, 274; nis aequ^iions, 275; his 
designs on Afghanistan, 277; his treatment 
of Shah Bhundi, 277; extorts the Kc^-i- 
noor from Shall Sbujah, 278: failure of 
his expedition to Oasianere, 278; European 
lUscipIine intooducod into bis army, 279; 
Ids Buooessful policy in caudng Dost Ma- 
iiomed's camp to be deserted, 292; tripar¬ 
tite treaty between Shah Bhujah,- the xtri- 
tish, and, 327; hla interview with the gover- 
*nor^:eueral as related by Havelock, 338; 
ominous incident to, on the day of his in¬ 
terview with the TOvemor-genoral, 339; his 
golden throne, 33^ note ; cotmter-visit of 
the governor-general to, and the festivities 
on the occasion, 349, 

Runjoor Sing, threatens Vmballa, and en- 
oouxiters Sir Horry Smith, iii. 493; defeated 
b^Sir Harrg Smith in the Ixittle of Aliwal, 

Rimn, the, of Cutch, iii. 27. 

Rupa and Ram Jot4 suspected of tlio mur¬ 
der of the Rajah of Jeypoor, iii. i^6. 

Russia, tlio discovery of the intrigi^s of, in 
tlie East, loads Lord Auckland into leok- 
ICKi aggrossive measuros, iii. 268; tiic as¬ 
cendency of, at tlie Forsian court, 294: 
intrigues of, in Ai^iauistan, 301; arrival 
of a special agent from, in Cabool, 302; 
Dost Mahomed doedares to Mr. Bumos the 
oliject of tho agent from, 303; letter of 
D<Mt Mahomed to tlie czar of, 303; leUer 
of tbo ambassador of. to Dost Mahomed, 
304; alarm of the British government at 
the Intrigues of, 305; explanation de¬ 
manded by the Britisli government of tho 
proceedings of the agents of, in Cabool, 
; dischumer of Count Nesselrode of the 
proceedings of Count Simoniohi, 805; 
Lord Palmeraton's note to the Brithih am- 
t>aB8iulor at St. Petersburg, 306; new dis¬ 
claimer <»f the Htuisiau govenimont, 308; 
the explanation of tho Russian govern¬ 
ment cleemcxl satisfactory, 3(^. 

Rut Juttra, tho, iii. 608. 

Kyla, token W tho British, ill. 21. 

Ry(»to the. Afr. Franck’ views of the rights 
uf the, ii. 416. 


w. 


S.acrament8, the five, of tlio Hindoos, ii. 44. 

Sadat All, raised to the throne of Oude, it 
671: tho now treaty with; its tenns, ex- 
tiuguMiing tho Iiidepondanco of Oude,672; 
his pretended wisii to abdicate, 723; jpro- 
positions made to, thereupon, by Lord 
Moruingtoii, 724; be retracts, 725; Lord 
Morulngton^s detenninatiou respectin|r. 
725: his remonstrance. 726; is iutimidaW^ 
727; two courses submitted to; his reply, 
728; LurdMorningtoirsiioronipto^oTaerB 
resiiecting, 72U: mission of the Honour- 
a\>lo Henry Wellesley to, 729; he reluc¬ 
tantly submits, 730; his disgraceful pro- 
))OBal to Lord Momlngton, 731. 

BudatuUo, Nabob of Arcot, f. 431. 

SadcUe-cln^ and the huvima, li. 229, nofr. 

Sodlier, Mr., sent as envoy to Tippoo'scaiup, 
il. 523. . 

SahammKior, an outbreak in, ni. 177. 

Sahib Sing. iii. 272. 

Salio, son of Saml>ajec, acknowledged rajah, 
i. 305. 

Saivas, Uie, ii. 74. 

Saktos, tho, ii. 77; orgies of the worslup of, 
78. 

Saktia or Hindoo female divinities, li. 23. 

Salabut JuMMirocloliiied soubahdar, 1. 463; 
French influence upon, 481; Bussy deserts, 
CIO: his tireaty with the British. 617. 

Bale, M^or, afterwardH General Sir Boliert, 
Bln^o combat with a Bmrman of rank, 
ill. 150; his operations in Burmah, 165; 
sent in pursuit of Barukzye chiefa 356; 
appointed to lead the storming itaity at 
(ihuznee, 358; personal enconntor with a 
hiMie Afghan, 360; defeats a t>ody of In¬ 
surgents in Tootunciturrah, 379: applied to, 

, but unable to send aid to Cabool, 400; 

/ difficulty of hJi» march from Cabool to 
Jelalabad, 430; his difficult position 
Jelalal:«d. 432: rgfuscs to obey tha ord(»* 
of Gonerm Elphinstoru: to deliver up Jelal¬ 
abad to tho Afghana 433; his aocount of 
tiie earthno^e at Jela^alzakd, 434; defeats 
Akbar Khan, 436: mortally wounded'in-. 
tiic battle of Moodkee, 

289 




738 


INDEX, 


»AX,B 

Sule oad purchoHC among Ui6 Uiiidoos, ii. 

98. 

Haleh Mahomod. iloliverfl np tbe liltigHHh Ca- 
bool (ttptlTUB, iii 455. 

Bolkeld, XJoutunaot, bca<lR tlic exi>Io^oii 
{)arty at Delhi, iii. 620; shot through ttio 
arm and 1<^. 622. 

Salsette, coveteil by the C /orrti>r»uy, il. 356; 
tlu) Portuguese exiNsdition agiuiist, 360; 
capture of, by the Uoiii|»auy, 362. 

Salter, Captalu. defeats a Jackranee chief, 
iii. 504. 

Sanuurcau<I, captured and nHsiH^ture*! by 
Baber, i. IOC. 

Sanibatoo, Buccccds Sevajee, i. 301; his vices, 
302; lUs attempt on the islaud of Jlnjoora, 
303; takdh prisoner aiid^uxecutiMl, 305. 

Kariiliaji^, a Uraliiidu, einitloyed by Lord 
Macartney to sound Tippr.to, I. 523. 

Hamiaveraxn, the affair at, bjtwoon Uie Bri* 
tteh aiwi French, i, 477. ,, 

Kandrocottus, King of the l*r»wil, his cliarae- 
tor, and alllaneu with Heleucus Nkator, i. 
33. 

Han^la or Bagala, tlu! city of, ljusleged by 
Alexiuider, i. 30. 

Kankbya Hch<Kd of pliilosophy, the, ii. 118. 

Hanscrit, ii. 12G; now a deiul huigtnige, 127. 

Haris, flaptain, sont out to the lOast by the 
Bast India Coiiipaiiy in ccuumaiul of au 
expe<litJon; his ooursitaiid conduct, i. 251. 

Skittarah, the capture of, by Auningzebo, 1. 
307: anecrloto of the rajah of, and the 
Peishwa, iii. 86: capture of, by the British, 
87; release .of the rajah of, who was pri¬ 
soner In WuHotu,91: re-estahliHliment of 
the rajah of, 02; territory iKistowcNl on the 
rajah of, 02; state of affairs in, 2G7; cliur- 
ac;ter of the rajah of, 2G7: the rajuii of, 
deposed, 2C8: annexation of, 530. 

Sat-ifa i/uffa, the, of Hindoo chronology, ii. 2. 

Hatyavnl.tl^ ii. 25. 

Baugur, t)ropr>sod a11ian<2i’ of the British witli 
the nalK>bof, iii. 41. 

Ha^ohets {. 436, 430. 

Baun^lera, M,r., (governor of Madnis, i. 450. 

Baraiidroog, l)^egc<l and ktkeii by the Bri- 
tial), ii. 60S. 

Savonoor, reduce*! by Hyder All, ii. 23S. 

Hdeneo, Hindoo; astronomy, ii. 121; inathe- 
roatics, 123; arlthnu'tic, 124; algebra, 125; 
other branches of, 125. 

Bclndo, oonnuorod by Maliome<l Oasini, i. 46; 
ino'lo a Mogul province 136; Lord Minto 
sends an embassy tc^s ii. 834; British relit- 
tlons with the Ameers of, iii. 115; changes 
In tbo dynasty of, 281; the Ameers and 
native govemment, 460; commercial treaty 
\vith, 461; Luixl AiicklaiuVs unjust <leal- 
IngB with the Ameers of, 461; Lnrri EUou- 
Ixirongh’s instructious to Sir ('h.arles 
Napier resiK'-cting the Ameers of, 462; Sir 
<%vrlca Napier's rei>oirt rest>eeting the 
Ameers of, 462; oppressive treatment of 
tiie Ainecrs of, 4G2: Sir C'harlcs Napier’s 
letter to the Ameers of, 463; their professed 

*'*VA'ibmi8siou,bnt real hostility to tlw) Britisii. 
464; prcijoratioii of the AiimoTs of, for 
hostilities with the BritLdj, 464; cxix^di- 
tion against i^huaumgluir, 465; proceedings 
at Hyderaba*!, 466; Sir (HiarloB Napier 
arlvancesagainst llyderalia*I, 466; preimr- 
atioiis for battle, 467; >ict<ory ga1no<t by 
Sir (Jiiiirles Napier at Moanco over tlus 
Ameers, 468: Shero Mahonu**! still in avm.4, 
460; victory over the Ameers at Dublfti. 
469; captu]^ of Omerkote, 47(>; annexa¬ 
tion of, 470i Shero Maliomal and other 
chiefs hold out, 471; encounter with Sliah 
Maiiomed, biother of SIumu Mahoine<l, 
471; defeat of Sherc Maliomeil. and all 
hostility in SoUale suppressed, 472; state 
of affairs in, 500; <kitch Guuduva, a dis¬ 
trict of. d<'.scril)Cfl, 501; inhubitiiuts of 
i.^utoh Ouudava, 502; Sir Charles Napier’s 
hill-campaign in Cnteh 503. 

Hi'india, Mahadajee, tbo Mahratta lea4U!r, H. 
2:H>; attacks the British exiieilitiou tu 
Poonab, 449; convention with, 451; pro- 
1 *os(hI nlliancc with, 453; uttompc to nego¬ 
tiate with, 456; his camp sun^Hsod, 457; 
war with, again; his campagain snrinised, 
464; )>eacu with, 466; his nufricndly ftjol- 
ings towards the liritish; his death, 658; 
rise of his family, 658; his dexU^rons pfdicy, 
659; tliohigh ismition to wiiich bo attaluod, 
<>C0; his uffc'ctod mtsleration, 661; his 
financial difliculties. (r62; his visit tQ 
Poouali, 662; his intlneuco with the young 
Felshw'a at Pooiiati. 66j|. 

Heindia. Dowlufe Bow, succeeds Maha<lajee 
Hcindia, ii. 664; his hostility towards tlie 
British, 713; keeps Bajee How virtuivlly a 

1 >risoncT, 741; is conuuerod by Jeswunt 
low Holkitf at Oojtdn. 743: defeated by 


Scindia, Dowlut Bow,— 

Jeawmit Kow Holkar at Poonah, ii. 745; 
desire to form a Mahratta confederacy 
against the British. 748; (leneral Wellesley 
commouces hostilities with. 749; xntrve-^ 
luentB of, 750; position of his army, 761; 
his defeat at Asst^e, 752; he concludes a 
truce, 754; tlrlven out of Qujentt, 755; bis 
forces commanded by M. Perxon defeated, 
758; M. Perron reslmis his service, 760; de- 
feato<l at Agia by ueneral Lake, 763; piur* 
sued by General I^ke. 764; defeated at 
Loswarec, 765: avowed dissolution of the 
confederacy between, and Hagojeo Bhons* 
la not retd: General Welleuley attauks 
his troojis, 769; Gawilgbur captured from, 
776; tenniiiat.ioii of the ^r with, 771; 
ix)Sidon of teiritory made by, to the Bri¬ 
tish, 771; his sympathies witli Holkar, 796; 
shows decidoii leanings to Holkar, 798; 
his detention of theBrjttsli resident, 798; 
his arrogant letter to the govomor-ffoneral, 
and the govemor-geiienu’H reply, 798; his 
hostile intentions frustrated by the peace 
of Bhurtpoor, 799; bis connections with 
Holkar. 8(K); he and Holkar itee liefore 
General Lake, 800; Sir Goox^ Barlow 
ixmcludes a treaty with. -807: pnitests 
against the alUancos of the Nudo!^ of 
Bliopaul and Haugur with the British, iii. 
43; claims HhoiNiul as a dei»endenoy, 43 ; 
his treodierouB seizure of Kureem Klian, 
a l^ndorco leader, 48; his connection with 
the Phidarees, 57; the governor-general's 
])rojocts respecting, 63; a new treaty im- 
|M)S(id on, 64; indirect advantages secured 
to. !>y British interference in Central 
India, 113; tranquillity of Ids territories 
lusler British control; his death, 188; in¬ 
trigues at his C4>urt after hia deatli, 231. 

Heindia, Juukojco How, relations with, iii. 
472; Bhageerut How Hucee<x1s to the throne, 
473; Mama Haliib regent, 473; the gover- 
nor-gonorars iustnuttions to tlie British re¬ 
sident at Gwalior rcsia’cting Mama Sahib, 
473; Mama Sahib <feclines tlie meeting 
jnroltered by tlic governor-general, 474; 
Mama Sahib is displatie*! l>y court intrigues, 
475; auuwathnlnfstration formed, 475; in¬ 
trigues of the Djwla KhasjtHJ Walla, 476; 

] )uda is iua<lo prisoner by bis opiKuicnts; 
his delivery to iiie Britisli frustrated, 476: 
the British demand this delivery of Dada, 
476; movements of British troo)>s towards 
tlie frontiers of Scindia, 478; constematiou 
at Gwalior, 478; ulterior views of the go- 
verijor-genend reganlltig Scindia, 479; ue- 
^'otiatiuns for an interview wiili the malia- 
rajah, 479; march of Britiidi trooist int* 
the territorioK of, 480; hostilities against, 
coutinued, 481; battle of Malianvj)KX)r, 481; 
1>attloof Piiniiiar,482; rigorous terTnH<lic- 
tivted to Gwalior. 482; seixiy mutiny in the 
dominioifs of; his fidelity, 580. 

Sciisliu, Jtumdcc, his niiuu’kaUe hisbirj’, ii. 
658. 

Set»teli I'iisfc India Ctunpany, tht!, i. 366; 
ca[4tal RubscrilHul, 367; siHscial piivileges 
of 367; isquikirity of, 368; aluriii of the 
English parliament at, 368; aw'kward po¬ 
sition of the king in reference to, 369 ; pro- 
c«e<luigs of, at iiainbiirg, 369; sulistxiueut 

,-i»rocccding8 nml ultimate extinction of, 

J 371 . 

Scott, C^olomd, British resident in Oiule, ii. 
7*23; the Nalmb of (m<lc profossos to. 
Ids desire t«> alxliuite. 724; the gtivemor- 
general’s corrtijqxindtmoe with, roHjK'cting 
the nalH>b, 724; tbo nalxd.i transmits a 
meuiori.il tu th(‘ governor-geueral through, 
726; in commaml ut Njqn>oor, ill. 70. 

Scott, Major, agent of Warren Hastings, ii. 
641. 

Hoully, Ooiuluctor, hisliravery in defence of 
the Delin' magazine: Ins dcatli, iii. 569. 

Sculptuni, Iliiuioo, li. 140. 

Seasons, the, in India, i. 9; illustratoil at 
GiUcutta, 10. 

Scixtktcgiu, successor to Aljttcgin, anecdote 
of him, i. 42; war lietween. and the Kiijah 
of Jcipal, 42; his death, 43. 

Secondary and teitiary stmte in India, i. 7. 

Secret service money, employwl by the Kust 
India Company, i. 359. T 

.Sects, Hindoo, modes of distiiignishing, ii. 
67; Nagas, Vaishnava onuHamanuj- 
yi:is, 69; Hamawats, 70: the Kaldr Panthis, 
70: worshippers of Krishna, 71; the Vaish- 
uavas of Bengal, or Ohitanyas, 72; the 
Saivas, 74; the Dondis, 74; the Yogiii. 75; 
tlie Lingayets, 75; tlie Paramohansaa, 76; 
the Agheuns, 76: the Bakta^ 77; Bie Kcr- 
aris, 78: the Sikhs, 78; the Jains, 80. 

Seconder Bagh, the, taken, iii. 660; taken a 
second time, 672. 


SERVICE 

Secundra, AkbePs tomb a^ i. 140. 

Sedateer, ‘Tippoo defeated at, by Colonel 
HtuMt; two native accounte of the b^tle, 
a 694. 

.Sfecr, the. iii. 

Soetabaldoe the battle of, iii. 71. 

Soetapoor, the sepoy outbreak ah iii. 589. 

Seid Laakar Kliam his opptisitiou to tho 
Fren<!h, i. 501. 

Seif-u-din and Ala-u-illn,avengetheinur<ler 
of their brother by Behiazn of Ghuzuee, i. 
56. 

SoleuciiB Nlcator, succotxls Alexander, i. 32; 
his alliance with Hmidraoottus, 33. 

Selim. SOD of Akber, his character, i. 138. 

Helim Bhoikh, hto tomb, i. 130,131, and vto//\ 

SoljukK, the, uuderToghrul Bog, defeat Mus- 
aood, i. 54. 

Hemiramis, her expedition to Indio, i. 21. 

'9cnaj/vtce, iii. 69. 

Seniority, tbe nrinciple of, established liy 
the East India Company as the rule of 
Bucoession to ofilceft i. 330. 

Sepoys, the first, i. 137: drem of t hose lie* 
Killing toTippoo’arogular infantry, il. 698, 
notf; causes of the mutiny among, at Vel¬ 
lore, 813; oomplaiutB of those destined for 
Burmah, ill. 157; ot>en mutiny among tliosc 
destined for Burmah, 156; suppression of 
tho mutiny among tliose destined for Bxu*- 
mah, 160: true causes of this mutiny among, 
161; spirit of iusulioiiUnation among, lu2; 
mutinous spirit among, at Hhikarpoor, 503; 
mutinous spirit of, at the beginning of thc^ 
great mutiny, 653; causes of tlie mutinous 
siilrit among, 554; make tho greased cai- 
tridges a pretext for disobeilience, 556; 
mutiny among, at Berliainitoor. 6^; mu¬ 
tiny uiuong. at Barracki>oor, 561; mutiny 
among, in Oiide, 662; mutiny among, at. 
Meerut, 564; atrocities coniiuitted by, in 
Delhi, 667, 571; kept down in the Punjab. 
.572; mutiny among, in UiulioJlai. 674; mu¬ 
tinous corn!8i»ondciico of, 575; mutiny 
among, at Atteck and Nowsliera, 576; mu¬ 
tiny among, in the Doah. 577: mutiny 
aiuong.iuHurreana, Nusseerabad.und Ho- 
hilcund, 578; outbreak among, at jiareilly; 
treachery and atnKjities of, 579; mutiny 
among, at Ncomuch, 580; mutiny among, 
at .lhaiisi; horrible mtuuubcre perpetrated 
!>y. 581; mutiny among, at Allahabad, 583; 
mutiny among, at Benares, 584; mutiny 
among, in Oude: at Lucknow, 685, 588; 
mutiny MiioTig,at Heetaitoor. 589; atrocious 
massacre i>criK:trated by, near Aurunga- 
l>ud, 589; proceedings of, at Fyzubad, aud 
luas.saci'c iioriietrated by, at Begumgungc. 
.590; ]>eri]ous condition laicknowr is placod 
in l»y, 590; Hir Homy Lawrence proceeilH 
to (^hlnliut against, 591; Lucknow block- 
a«led)>y,593; mutiny anioug, at Cawn]>oor, 
593; Cawrnpoor besieged by, 514; surrendi^ 
*»f Caw'jqxKirto, 694; utr<KitiesperTH:tratcR 
by, at Cawiiijocvr, 596; measures of tho go- 
veruiuuut against, 597; besieged in DeUii; 
Delhi captuixMl ft’omiJ599 (socDe/A/); tho 
British besieged by, in Luck'dow, 627 (see 
Havelock’s r<q>eated<lcfeats of, 
633 (see Itavek>ck )\mutiny among, at Ditia- 
TKior, 644: dcfcateil Atrah, 046; General 
WiiKllmm threateTUHl I'ly, in Cawiipoor, 
664; General Windham dofeated by, 6t;5; 
defeated by Hir (.Niliii i'amplx^Il, 667; Hir 
(%>lin Oainplieirs rqteratious against, 669 
(see Cmnphiil. Sir Colin); Luckiiow' cajj- 
tuTcvl from, 671; final operations against, 
till they are driven out, or utterly amiihi- 
latod, 675. 

H«uu, Hyder Ali inn*lo nalnd) of, ii. 233. 

Serferaz Khan, NalM)b of Bengal, i. 521; a 
(x)iiHpiracy against. 522. 

Serfojeo. adoptc^l son of Tuljajce. Hajah of 
'J'aiijore, claims tho succession, ii. 714; 
Swartz’ailvocacyof, 715; finalljiprccoguized 
)»y the governor-general, 716. 

Sei'ingajialsun, Ijoril Comitallis’ advance 
ujion, ii. 600; outer defences v>f, 613; pre- 
paratioius for the siege of, 618; TIpiioo’s 
palace in, 019, note; luexmratious of (Gene¬ 
ral llarrls for the siege of, 696; tlic Britisli 
l.Kifore, 697; plan of attack on, 698; wiac- 
I'ountable failure of pravikions and oi>por- 
iune supply of to the tnsqis Isifore, 699; 
ItrogroBs of tho siege of, 700; the assault 
on, heaileit by Hir j)avid Baird, 701 ;• cap¬ 
ture, 702; value of tlio capture, 705; alleged 
searcli of the zenana of, for treasures, de-* 
nied, 708; w'poy mutiny in, siippresHcd, 843. 

Seringham, the island of, i. 46^ tbe French 
are strongly reiuforced at, 487. 

Set-inn, the disease of which Hyder Ali died, 
il. 507. 

Service, the fowie*! meaning given te tho 
w'onl by the cormcil of GalcubtEf, 435. 



INDEX. 


SKSOSTRIS 

f^oHOBtris. exp(xUtiou of. to India, i- ' 

Hotuu, Colmtel, bis mun^ from l>olhi tt^- 
watds Oudo, lii. H69. 

Hetoii, Mr.. liritish resident at Delhi, his 
narrow CBcaiie, II. 832 i sent as envoy to 
HyOoralJad. Hi. 281. 

Sovajee, 1. *293; conquers the CoUcun, 293; 
other conquests of. 294; assassuuvtes the 
genera) bf the Rt^jali of DeJaiK>or, 295; 
lioquirea a fleet, 296; proft^tscs submissiou 
to Aurungzebe; visits Dellii, 297; makes 
new acquisitions, 297; game of croft be¬ 
tween, an<l Aururigzebe; IjJh hiiccoss, 298; 

. liift uxf>edition t<» Mysore, 3(K); his ueivtli. 
301; Hiirat pillaged by. 316; Hurut a secoiul 
time pillaged ))y. 325; the Company’s treaty 
with, ^8; attem)»t of, on iSoiul>ay, 331. 

St^venuboog, Kunbojee the pirate makes, )iis 
ca))ital, i. 50*.^; cuipture oF. 512. 

Sewdasheo Cliiimuijce. a lirahiuiii prt'teiuis 
to )k}, ii. 40S. 

Soyed Hahib, 11. 589. 

Sayeds, the, defeat and murder of ruroksliir 
by, 1391; downfaU of. 392. 

Hhafteslmry, Lord, Ills motion to i)riiig the 
conduct of Lortl KUeidMmmgli Ijefore the 
house m relation tc» his IiicUau despateij, 
iii. C93. 

Siiah Alum (see Sfinnada), the barUmnis 
treatment of, b^Golam KadirKhan.ii. 573, 
062; his interview witli General Lake, 7C2. 

81mh Julian, succuetls his father Jehaugir, i. 
282; scuds an army to KtUkU, 284; hlscam* 
Iialghs in the Dcccati, 235; liLs family, ^6; 
«lt'.throned by hU sou Anrungzube. 288; 
character of liis reign, 288; Ids imblic works, 
289. 

Hiiah Mabomc'l, l>r<>tlierofHlj(^ix» MahouKul, 
<lefeato<l l»y Sir Oliiirles Napier, iiL 471. 

Shah Mahomed. Hovcreigii of ('alHioJ, the 
horrid mutilation of Futteh Khan in his 
presence, iii. 287. 

Shall Nnjtscf, the, 4»q>tui'o of the, iii. CCl. 

Shall PiX>r, aucenihi Uie throne of Shah 
Shujah at Caliool, iii. 457. 

Shall Khujah, Bovureiguof<3abool, coiiipellod 
to flee, ii. 833; luvttwl by Itunjoot Sing to 
his (Mmrt.iU. 277; liuujeet Sing extorts the 
Koh-i-noor from, 278; invited by A:<iin 
Khan. 288; bis treaty with Buujeet Sing, 
290; a peusiou«tf wiUiin British terrlt-ory, 
293; atteiui)ts*to raise an army, 328; 
nature («f tiic army he raised, 329; bis 
alleged poimlarity. 337; money i>ayments 
cxtortwl by the Dritii^h from tl*c Ameers 
for. 347; mutual dislike of the Afghans 
and. .853; hisuiitraneointo CalMiol, 3<)2; liis 
Icttortoliuecn Victoria, 363; roniove.Hfrum 
<?abool to Jolalabad, 366; rt^turus t.o 
<Ja»Kiol, 368; atrocious govomiuent <if 
l*rince Tinioiur, the hcir-anparcnt of, 370; 
4>ppressiou oxorcimul by the ofliulals of, 
Kiipprussi>d by General Nott, 671; refuses 
the Bala Hissar for British troops, 389; 
makes the first niovemeut agsdnst tlie 
roItvlH in Cabool, 394; is amaxe-d at tite 
cowunlly c(gidu(;t % the British iuCaltool, 
404; his ultimate melancholy fate, 447. 

ShalmKu-diii, tiie consolidator of Mabomo- 
tau ]M>wer in India; his exploits against 
Tiabore, i. 57; op^stgl and defeated by tbi: 
Kajahs of Delhi and Ajmeor, 58; his thirst 
for vengeance, 59; renews tlie struggle with 
his adversaries, 59; compiers bis adver¬ 
saries, 60; defetvtud by the King of Khar- 
isni, 61; aSBo^sinatoil, 61; the succession 
to the tlirone of, disputed, i>2. 

Khalijeo. curiousmctliodof making him Bon¬ 
in law of Jadu, i. 292. 

Hhahjehanpoor, a RC)H>y mutiny at, ill. 580; 
plundertnl by tlie moulvie of Lucknow, 677. 

Sliaistii Kbau, surprised by Sevajee, i. 296. 

Sliams-udKli^^, Naliob or Perozopoor, is 
Iiaiiged* for the assassination of Mr. 
hVozer, the British coimuissloncrat Delhi, 
lii. 212. 

Bhamsliocr Ihinadur, a Ihmdola chief, war 
witK ii. 7 to. 

Hhapltmd Oolonel, iii. 147. 

Hliapo4»ree. the claims of the Bumicsc on the 
island of, iii. 140. 

Bhaw, Goloucl, %t ScringapataTn, li. (>97. 

Bliaw, Bergoniit, o’ne of the nine heroic de¬ 
fenders of tile l>olhi tn^iazme, iii. 568. 

Shaxton, Caiitain, causes a mutiny in Bom¬ 
bay, i. 329. 

Bhaoada, the, arrives at Benares, i. 655; his 
dosigue on Bengal, C56; his letter to Clive, 
656; Olivo’s reply to, 657; ruapiiears with 
the titte of 8hsm Alum, (^7; dofeateil in 
his aim liy CaUiaud,667; advances on Patna, 
(%8; negotiations wiai, 671; junction of, 
with Meer Oossim. 678; his submissiou. 

• 6B0; tn^ty with, 690: projects of, forre- 
gaiaiagI>oihi, iii.295:flnm partlngbctweeu, 


Bliazada, the, — 

and the Irtish, ii. 297; in tlie liatuls of 
the Mabrattas, 319; claims a shore of tlie 
Knhilla country. 330; desires an interview 
with Isird Ooinwallis, 573: cliaracterof, as 
given by Uastinm, 573; his i>roffored visit 
decliucsl by Lord Coniwallis, 574; subsu- 
(pient interview with Lonl ComwQiliH at 
Bonores, 574. 

8hcs>b^i Khan, the opponent of Baber, i. 
198. 

Sheer Khan Sni\ the opjKnicnt of llooma- 
yoou, besieges Cimmu'and defeats ItiKim.i- 
yoon. i. 114; possesses himself of tU(' throne 
of Delhi, 116. 

Sheils, Lieutenant, siiot by Ihc mutiin'crsut 
Auriingabatl, iii. 5K9. 

Slirkcr-hhiti, the, ii. 580. 

Shelton.Brigadicr, in thoOal>of»l insurrection, 
lii. 394, 397; General Klphinstoue sharis 
his command with, 4)0; liis character, 410. 
his misarraugeinents, 414; detained with 
oLliers as ahostage hy Akbar Khan, 428. 

Hheo Itow Bhao, iii. 540. 

SJiere Dil Khan, iii. 287. 

Where Mahomed, one of tlie Ain'crs of 
Hclnde, resists the Briiisii, iii. 468, -169; 
471; defeat of, 472. 

Shuro Sing, iii. 487: his deft^ction from tlio 
Britisli, 517; rcpiflsed on the laiAs of the 
(/heuab, ^1. 

Sliipman, Sir Abrtduun, sent to tlio Last 
Indies, and latuls at Anjodivali, i. 315; his 
convention with tlie l*ortugucsc, 319; liis 
convention with the Povtuguosi.' diwwowed 
in KnglatKl, 320. 

Shltablloy, arrested, ii. 309; charges ngain.st, 
investigatod; a<Miuittcd. 317. 

Wliolapoor, the afl'air of, iii. 93. 

Kiiolingur, the battlo of. ii. 495. 

Shore, Mr. John (aftc^rwurds Dinl Teign- 
inouth), assists Mr. Francis to draw up his 
l*lan for Bottling 'tlie i\‘Voiiue, ii. 415; 
objects to Ijord Oomwallis* pro))osal of a 
IKirmaueut zoiuindar^'settlement, 6;tl; ap- 
liointodgoveruor-geiieral, w'lthaliaronctcy. 
655; liis }K>lioy in relation to the N izam and 
tlio Malirattus, 664; question of the justice 
and expwlieucy of his policy, 665; imsilani- 
luous cliaracterof hisjiolicy. GG7;tendency 
of liis p<il{cy Ui sUmnlate the Muhmttas 
against tlio Nizam, 666; made Lord Telgn- 
mouth; resigns the govi^nimont, 672 : his 
system of neutrality; its results, 674; his 
relations with tlio Burmese, iii. 133. 

Whujah, son of 81iah,lehaii, seeks the .slice js- 
Hion, i. 287; his incffoctiud struggle, 291. 

Whujah Khan, his intrigues at Delhi, i. 519; 
U^comes Nabob of Bengal, 529; his wise 
government, 521; his death, 521. 

Shuldham, Colonel, semt overland against 
Ava, iii. 157. 

Sliumshecr Kiian, his treacJiei'y, i. 528. 

WhuiiiHoiKlcn. an Afghan chief, defeated )>y 
GKiiorul Mott, iii. 451. 

Shunkui IXiW. son of the ilajah of llowleta- 
liU'-l, comos to aid Ids father against ,)(4al- 
u-din, i. 76. 

Sliwe.-<^-gon, tlie., or the Golden jiag^nla of 
Kangooii. iii. 14<j. 

Wiaiii, to \>e attacked by the Ikmipaiiy, i. 
3i). 


.Siblialil, Brigadier, iuqiosed on l>ythomntlw- 
ous seiioys and munlerud, lii. 57fk \ 

Hiddcc, the, wltli his Mogul fleet in Bom¬ 
bay harlHiur, i. 3;:7; his attempt on Bom¬ 
bay, 3.31. 

Biddy Molkih (a dervis), his nqnitation for 
Runctityoiid treacherous plotting against 
the life of Ids sovcrtdgn, i. 75. 

Biege, of Bmhnmnabail, J. 41; of Koimiatith, 
48; of Rintimlxire, 81; of Delhi, by the 
Moguls, 82; of 'Wuningole, liy Aluf Klian, 
87; of I^llii, byTamonsuie. 95; of Meerut, 
by 1'ameiiaue, 96; of Cbunar, by llooma- 
yoon, 114; of Caudaiiar, liy Hoomayooii, 
118; of Morta, V>y AWier, 126; of t9iit.toor, 
)»y Akber, 130; of Abtii«Hlnuggur, }>y 
Aklier, 138; of Goa, by Albuquerque, 182; 
of Qoo, by Kumal Klian, 183; of Din, l»y 
the Turks and Giijcrateea, 190; of <latida- 
har, by Mhali AbUis, 285;of Gingee, by the 
sou of Aunmg^b(^ 306; of Madras, by the 
French, 415; of Poiidichorry, by the Bntish, 
425; of Trichingpoly, 1^ the Mahrattas, 
^2; of Deviootta, by tbo British, 438; of 
Trichinoiioly. )>y t’hunda Bahfb, 458, 
471, 488, 492; of Arcot, )>y the British, 461; 
of Oliifigleput and Coveloug, 483, 485; of 
Calcutta, tiy Surajah Dowlah, 638: of 
Cliuttdeniagore, bythe Britisli, 6G3; of Foit 
St. David, by the French, 596; ofTanjoi'c, 
to the French. 602; of Madras, by the 
ii^noh, 606; of MasuUiMitam, b^the 
British, 614; of Wandiwosh. by the l^tiBb, 


7ii9 

SITABAM . 

Singe.-- • 

1.022; of Pondlcherrj', by the British, 635; of 
Little BaliiKs^r, liy liyder All. ii, 234; of 
Amboor, by Hyder All, 257; of Tanjore.by 
Mahomed All, 353; of Bassohi. to tlio 
British, 461; of Ponilichcrry, liy theBrltislu 
468; of Aivot, liy Hyder All, 485; of Woudi- 
wash, by Hyder All. 487; of Negapatmu, 
by the British, 498; of TcUicliem*. l»y 
IJydcr Aii, 499; of Mangalore, 

Sahib, 519; of l^ulglioutcheny, by tho 
IMtish, 522; of Bangalore, by the Biitlsh, 

* 597; of Buraiulroog, bv tlie Biitish, 6U8; of. 
Goorumcoudo. by Nhsoin AU. 610; of 
Seriugapatani, by tho British, 696; of 
Agra, by tiie Britlsli; 763: of Delhi, )>y 
llolkar. 7^; l'>oeg, by tlie Britisii, 785; 
of Bliurtpoor, by the British, 7^, 792, 795: 
of Kaluiig:!, by the British, ill. H; ox 
WusutH, by the British, 91; of Chanda, 
by tlie IM^hIl, 93: of Itaighnr and Fort 
'i'alnecr. by tho British, 94; of Muligaiun, 
by tJie British, 98; of ABeergliui', hy tho 
Britikli, 100; of Bhurtpoor, bythe British, 
184; of Herat, by tlio PersianH, 317: of 
Ghuziieo, by the Britisli, 35S; of Jidala- 
IkkI, ))y tlie Afgh.'nis, 431; of C'amlaliar, by 
tho Afghans, 439; of Moolban, liy the 
British, 516; of <.'awupoor, 1>y Nana Sahib, 
,594; of ]>c1)ii, by the British. 601; of Luck¬ 
now, 1^ the rclx'l soiMiys, 626, 649, 656; of 
Arrah, by tlie reliel BciKiys, 645. 

Siklis, the. under Baiidti. i. 2^9; the founder 
of the sect of, ii. 78; rlilTerciit brauAes of, 
80; professvHl subjection of, to theBritish, 
830; Kunjeet Sing, u chief of, 830;^violent 
lirocecdings of a Mahonietun fanatic 
among, iii. 205; origin and territories of, 
269; the twelve mlsms of, 2G9; at wai' witli 
iht'. Afghans, 270: conquests of. under 
Malia Sing, 271; alarm of other chiefs of, 
at the sudtleu aggraudiiu.uueiit of Malia 
Kills, 272; ilunject Sing, 273; acquisitions 
of Ruujeet Hing, 275; relatioiisof, with tho 
Mahrattus and British, 275; tlircateneil 
colUsion of, with tlic British, 276; war 
witJi, prevented by a treaty, 276; ilesi^s 
of Kiinj<iet Sing on Afghanistan, 277; 
llunjeet Sing’s ^'eatnient of Shah 
Shujah; cxbwts rrom Aiie latter tlie 
Koh-i-noor, 278: failmu of an expedition 
of, nguiii'it Caslimero, 278; Kuroi»ean dls- 
inpliiio and anas intnidiUH^dinto tlie army 
of, 279; odiuisition of Peshnw'er by llun> 
jeet Sing. 279; liostilitiek between tho 
Barukzycs and, 288; unfriendly relations 
of tho British witii, 486; ru]»id succession 
• ruiri-n ill l,ali(>n- among, 486; power of 
tin* Jinny 4*'/; invasion of British terri¬ 
tory by an army of, 487; Sir Henry Hoixl- 
Inge’s ]iroclamatjoii res))cctlug, 488: pre- 
Iiaration for a Iwittle with, 4.88; defeated 
in the Ixittlc of Moodkeo, 489; defeated 
ill the l^altlt! of Fcrozt'shuli, 490; tJio 
Britisli- army put in great peril by, 492; 
ilcfcjvtod in tlie battlo of Aliw’al, 4 93_ 
strong positum taken up by, 495; 
ilcFi'ateil ill tlic liattio of Kobraon, 496; 
KuhmiHsion of, to Die British, 498; terms 
imposed on, 498; arraiigemontH with 
Gliolab Sing, 599; new reiielliou among, 
505; military ojicratioTis of Lieutenant 
I'klM'ardtss against, 599; defcaU^l in the 
Iwttloof KiiM'yrvH!, 511; victory gained over, 
nt Huddoosaiii, 5]3;advaneeuna proclama¬ 
tion of (Jeiieml WhiKli, 514; siege and cap¬ 
ture of Mooltaii by the BriUsh, 51^ revolt 
of, ill llazaroli, 519; <.)i»eratron» of General 
(tough against; rcpulsct at Itanniuggur, 
520; Htreugtli of the position of; repulse of, 
521; advance anew to the attack,622; liattle 
of Ohillianwsdla, 522 ; victory over at 
Gujerat, 525, 527;extiiir'tionofSiklHlomln- 
ioii, 528. 

Sikuudur, lus reign, i. 101; curious I'cli- 
gious Tfl:.^ifisiou in the )>rcRciice of, 101; 
celebratisl as a Judge, 102; succcalcd by 
Ibndiini, 103. 

Silk, thumtuiufactun* of, in Judiu, il. 1C5. 

Silk-woniiH. w'hon llrst brought into Kuidiki, 
i. 144. 

Simla manifosto. the. iii. 331; crlticistxl, 33-1. 

.Simoiiich, Count, Jliissiun amljassodor at 
the court <if Teheran; his letter to Dost 
Mahomeil, lii. 304; the siege of Herat 
carried on by tbe I’crsiaiis under his aus¬ 
pices. 321. 

JJuifray, M., lea<is the French in the battle 
• of Plossey. i. 5/8. 

Singphos, the denn^dationB of the, in AV* 
saiu, iii. 

Sjrjee Row (ihatko, minister of Scindia, his 
fate, il. 8U9. . 

Bitaram, brother of the Rajah of Viziano- 
gram, il. 470. ’ 



740 


INDEX. 


SITABAM 


TELLIOHEBRY 


Sitaracn, the ri^ of GungacUiur Sastroo, at 
the court of the Qutoowar, UL 36. 

Siva» the third member of the Hindoo triad, 
il. 32*; the Aupromacy clainiod for. 32; em¬ 
blems of tho worship of. 33. 

Skinner. Oaxitain, Ids succvi^ful etrataeem 
to roli^au his brother when stirroimded 
by tho enemy, ii. 794. 

Skinner. Thomas, his dispute with the Com- 
paiw. i. S^. 

Hlurekini^ the. who?i. 62. 

Sleeman. Coionul, iii. 480. 

Sleeman, Sir W. ll.. his report of the .Htatc 
of O^G. Iii. 546. 

Bleeman’s ItumhUs nml HeMlleciioiif* o/ on 
hulimi Official, quoted, i. 290, 580, 50i>, 
note. 

Smith, Colonel, his estimate of the forces of 
Urder Ali and ^"izam All and his own. ii. i 
261; Uyder Aii’s attack on, and defeat )»y, 
252; his marcli for Trinomalee: In CToat 
need of provisions, 252; his didlculties, 
21^; the allied forces refuse to fight Ills 
troops, 254; a battle precipitated by hli- 
zam All's impatienoe; he aef^ts the Ni- I 
zam and Hyder. 254; pursues Hy<ier ; is I 
joined by Colonel Wood, 258; b^ked of a 
victory through Colonel Wood's a1»urd 
<»ndact, 2G8; his views os to forcing Ily- 
der to an action. 271: his return to Ma¬ 
dras, 273; is indkmantattho pusillauimity 
of the council of Madras, 281; pursues 
A nicer Kiian, and defeats him, ^13; de¬ 
feats the hhdiratUui; Poonah surrenders 
to. iii. 68: in pumult of the Peishwa, S-i, 
87; his re])iil 80 at Koikloo, 153. 

Brulth, Lieutonont-colonel Baird, Iii. 619. 

Bmlth, 8ir Harry, at the Ijattle of Mooilkec. 
iii. 490; at the battle of Fero 2 »B}ta)i, 491; 
rcUovon Lofidioua, 493; gains the victory 
of .^iwal, 494. 

Smith, Mr. Nicholas Uankey, his mission 
to ilyderabad. ii. 834. 

Smith, Major, iii, CO. 

Smith. Sergeant. foniiH one of an cxplosioii 
party at iii. 621. 

Snodgrass, Major, his Nan'otice oj the Ltu - 
mesc JVar, quoted, iii. 169. 

Soarez, Loimi. Hui)em)dcs Poohooo in IVt- 
chln i. 173; defeats the Zamoriu of Callc\it« 
174; Bucooeds Albuquerque. 186. 

Sf)braon, the battle of, Hi. 495. 

Moldiers, the mode of paying, among too 
Hind(M>s, ii. 113. 

Solvra, Xctf Hindous, quotetl, i. 510, auti', 
518, note, 654, note. 

Soma or Chandra, It 3G. 

SomuautJi, tho capture and plunder of, by 
Si:dtan Mahmoc^ i. 48; the tcmidb and 
Idol of, 49; tradition relating to the gates 
of the temple of, 49: Lord l£Uen1x)roitgii’H 
order to General Nott respecting the gaU*^^ 
of the temple of, at Ghuznoo, lu. 460; the 
order of Lord EUeiiborough executed 452; 
Lord KUenborough's proclamation resiMict- 
ing the gates of the tomplo of, 459, 

.ir<«okur Chokea, a Sikh, ill. 270. 

Bofiroj Mai, grandson of Chooranian, ii. 
784. 

Soppltt and MtKsham, Lieutenants, Mown 
into the air, iii. C51. 

Soul, tlie nature of. according to the Vo- 
(huita school of })liilo8ophy, ii. 115. 

Sout)i-west*pas8>^a} to India., the, 1. 206. 

Spaniards, extravagant cloamH of the, ii. 
227. 

•Sitarkcs, Captain, his bravery’ and fate, iii. 
108. 

Speir, Mrs., Li/t- in Aneietd India, quitted, 
ii. 100. 

Speko, the heroism uf young, i. 505; his 
affecting <leatli, 56C; cimtain, 567. 

Sploo lalandR, this East India Comi>any at¬ 
tempt to tnvle with the, i. 242. 

Spiers, Colonel, resident at Gwalior, iii 
472. _ 

Sreenowa‘$now, aii agent of Tlppoo Sultan, 
ii. 523. 

St. Lecor, Colonel, marches against Vaihx* 
Tambi. 11. 836; mispcndud, 8ft. • 

St. Lubin, Chevalier. French aniliasHailor 
to POtn^i, ii. 441. 

Standards of Tippoo Sultan, It. G05-607, and 
note. 

Staunton, Captain, his cucounter with tho 
Peisbwa's army, lil. 85. 

Stamiton, Mr., private secretary to Lonl 
Macartney, U. 623. 

Steam oomumnicabion ti'ich India, first at- 
w^>temptcil, iii. 200. 

Btoi>henson, Captaiir, aiUn in the capture of 
<3awilghnr, ii. 770. 

Stewart, Captain, U. 448. 

Stewart, Seraeaut. one of the nincdofender.R 
of the Delhi magazine, ill. 563. 


8tew&rt*B Historw 0 /Bengal, cited, L 518. 

Btlrliug, Major, iii. 637. 

Stoddart andCouoUy, prisoners in Bokhara, 
iii. 368, 

Strabo, cited, i. 33. 

Stuart, Colonel, his braveiy atCuddaloro, ii. 
513; enooimtozu the south-west monsoon, 
539: captures DiuiUgid, 590; in tlio night 
attack on Berlngapatam, 614. 

Stuart, Major-genGrol, succeeds Sir Eyre 
Ooote, il. 505; his strange conduct when 
urged to take advantage of the couftisibii 
cauRoil by Hyder's deatii, 508; bis wanton 
demolition of forts, 51(>: hisopemtions near 
Cuddalor^ 512; hto attack on the enemy’s 
works, 51z; defeats Tipix>o at Sedaiiocr, 
694; arrives at Seringaiiatam, 698; his 
idan of attack on Seringiipatom, 698. 

Stuart, Brigadier, relieves Mhow, Iii. 677; 
ilefoats tho mutineers at tho village of 
Ooratia; relieves Nccmuch, and captures 
Mundisore, 679. * 

Stuart, Mr., brings aii action against Mr. 
Auriol. U. 434. 

Sturt, Lioutouaut. his bravery in Cabool, ill. 
403. 

.^uhah<la}\ v.hatt i. 141. 

Snbafis, the Rlogul territory dlvidal into, i. 

141. 

Bulwoc Mundcc, a suhurl) of X>olhI, ill. GCC; 
taken ]K)8SCBsion of by the British, 608. 

Succession, the law of, among the Hindoos, 
II. 101, 

Bmla Koonwur, widow of Goer TJuksh, iii. 
274. 

Siiddoosani, the victory of. Hi. 512. 

Budra caste, the, ii. 12; tho condition of, im¬ 
proved in moilem times, 12. 

Sufder Ali, Nabob of Arcot, bis league with 
tho Mahmtta.s. I. 432; Ids connection with 
Madras, 433. 

BuiFrein, Admiral, lauds tror»p.s at I'orto 
Novo, i. 600; defeated by Admiral ilughos, 
500; has atiothor engiwemont w’ith Ad- 
mim Hughes, 502: further engagements 
with Admiral Hughes, 504; joined byM. 
Bupsey. 511; has another en(:ntgcineiit with 
Admirm Hughes off Ouddalorc, 514. 

Sugar, tho extent of ito cultivation in, and 
export from, India, ii. 159. 

Sugar-loaf Bock, the luitUe of tlus i. 401; a 
second battle at, 497. 

Bugwaut Singh, (diief of Karnulur, his Itnld 
exproBsioii of iudigualioti at the cruelty of 
the liana of Odoyiioor towards his beauti¬ 
ful daughter, iii. 56. 

Sujah Dbwlah, Nabob of Oude, junction of. 
M'itii Mocr Cossim, i. 678; offers to treat 
with the British, 680; negotiations witli, 
broken off, 681; comi>olled to negotiate, 
C91; liberal terms grantoil to, 693: retvsons 
for this li1)ei:ality. 694; terms of the treaty 
lietwecn, luidtho Company, 695. 

Bukorani Bapoo, head of tlie Poonah minis¬ 
try, il. 405. 

Sullivan, political agent in Oudo. ii. 502. 

Kumli^oe Angria, a Gwalior cldof, iii 4S1. 

Burojafi Dowuln succeeds All Vemy Khan 
08 Nabob of Bengal, 1. 529 *, his vicious 
character, 530; dissatisfaction of Nuazish 
Mahomed at tho authority nossessod Tiy, 
531: murder of Hosseni Oooiy Khan and 
Hossein Addeen l>}% 531; rival claimuntK 
for the throne of, 632; origin of tho quar- 
Tcl between, and the Bengal presidone^, 
532; his rage at tho receittiou given to 
Kissendass at Calcutta, 533; treatment of 
his messenger by the governor and coun¬ 
cil of Calcutta, 533; attempt ma<h$ to 
imcify him. 634; effect on, of the attempt 
made to iiaoify, 534; attacks and pil¬ 
lages the factory at Cossimbazar, 535; di¬ 
latory preparations of the presiik^ncy 
against, 536; advance of, on Calcutta, and 
first oiieratlons, 538: progress of his opera¬ 
tions, 5fi}; terrifies the governor into flight, 
542; captures the forti 542; immuies tho 
garrison in the Black Uolo, 5^; his heart- 
lessness, 544; his d!sap}>olntinent, and de¬ 
parture from Calcutta, 545; an oigieditton 
against, resolved oii at Bladras, 64opera¬ 
tions against, cnmmenceil, 651; Calcutta 
recovered from, 554; Hooghlyattackedond 
captured from, 655; atl'^mpt to negotiate 
with, 656; furious he inarches south 
against tho British, 657: his behaviour to 
the Company’s deputies, 658; Clive's at¬ 
tack on hts camp. 659; alarmei}, he con¬ 
cludes a peace, 659; treaty with; its do- 
fecto, and Clive’s justification of it, 560; 
Admiral Wateon's letters to, 562; evasive 
reply of, 663; dissimnlation of, 567: pre¬ 
tend to dismiss his French auxilia^s, 
5^; a conspiraqf formed against, 569; 
Clive and tho Company are implicated in 


Surajah Dowlah,-— 

the commiracy against, i. 569; defeated at 
Fl£n»ey, he preiiares for fli^t, 681; flight 
and capture of. 566; bis death, 587. 

Burat, plllafi^ by Sevajee, 1. 316; pillaged 
a second time by Sevajee, 325; prooeedinga 
of tho Bomliay government at, 11. 355; ar¬ 
bitrary Mrangements respeotlng, 716. 

Burgery. Hindoo, ii. 126. 

fiiirfee Anjengaom, ii. 771. 

Surya, it. 35. 

Burya Bidhanta, tiie. ii. 123. 

Buttoe, meaning of the word, and origin of 
the practice, ii. 18.3; HolwoU’s account of 
the cose of a Mahiatta pxiucuss, 18?; 
absiml eulogies of, 188; often oomi>itteory, 
188; Mahometan restrictions on, 189; 
views of brabmiuized Europeans respect¬ 
ing, 189; cautious interference of tho 
(7omi)any with, 189; sucot^ssful aljolition 
of, 190; the abolition of, offcctixl by Blr 
William Bentinck, iii. 199. 

Swartz, tho missionary, requested to tindiw- 
take a mission to Hydor Ali, ii. 474; liis 
riMisous for coiimlying, 475; hte interviews 
with Hyder, 476; his suri^riso at Colonel 
FuUartou's rctii’ing from his conquestB, 

S^ss mercenaries, employed l>y thcKnglisTi 
in India; a comj>any of, captured by im- 
lileix, i. 4^. 

Byaj<>e Guicowar, iii. 116. 

Syajee Kow, iii. 239. 

BytMl Ahmoil, a Mahometan fanatic, ijis 
violent proceedings in tho Funjab, iii. 
205; ills followers BU))])reRfled, 205. 

Kykos, Mr., his letter to Ciivo in favour of 
llastinM, il. 302. 

BynicH, Captain, scut by.SIr John Bhore on 
a miasiou to Ava, iii. 134; his Bmhass// to 
the Kingdom of Ava, infernxl to, 109. 


T. 


Taio Mahiil, tlio, i. 289, and note. 

Taineer, the British 1)eforo tive fort of. lit. 
9-1; it n'sists, contniry^to Holfcar’a onlerw 
to surrender, 95; assaufr, on; massacre of 
British olHcem and soldiers in, 96; tho 
killctlar of, hanged as a rebel, 96; Bir 
Thomap Hislop's explanation of the rea¬ 
son of tho execution of the kithHlar of, 
97; tlie execution of tiie killcdai’ of, un¬ 
justifiable, 97. 

Tamerlane, or Titnour I>eg, his origin, up- 
l)C‘aranco in India, and conquest of Mool- 
tan by his grandson, i. 94; his devastations 
in India, 94; lays siege to. and sacks Del- 
lii, 9-i; captures Meerut, 9U; returns from 
India, 96; apiioints Khizr Khan his de¬ 
puty, 97. 

Tanjoro, tlie Comitauy involvcil in the affairs 
of, 1.435; stati} uf, 438; cxjieditiou to, 430 ; 
failure of tlie expedition to, 437; Cbunda 
Sahib's expedition to, 444: application of 
the raja!) of, to the Jiritlsh for aBsistauce 
against the Frciich 499; Major Lawrenci^ 
in, 500; Tjoliy's exiieiiitiou against, 600 ; 
Lolly's ne^tmtious with the rajah of, and 
resumption of hostUltios, 601; siege of, and 
failuni of the siege, 602; Mahomed All's 
dispute with the rajali of, ii. 211; ^iro- 
cuodings of the Madras oouncil against 
tho rajah of, 294; Mahomed All's designs 
against, 352: expiklition aga inst, 353; siege 
of, 3i^; caph^ of, and dethronemont of 
tho rajah of, 354; tardy condemnation of 
the expedition a^nst, Ity the dlrectr>rs of 
the Company, 355; restoration uf tho rit- 
juh of, ty 1^1 l^gcA 391; Claims of the 
craditors of the rajah of, 892; state of 
affaira in, 497; destruction of a British de¬ 
tachment in, 499; disputed succession in. 
714. ' 

Tauua, the fort of, taken and icWccn, i. 
637. 

Tannah, the Bombay govennnent scud an 
expedition against, 11. 861. 

Tantia Topee, defeated at Calpcc by Bir 
Hugh Bow, iff. 681. 

Tantra Jog, Holkar’s minister, iii. 188. 

Torika, the giants daiu by Qutikoia, Il 38. 

Tarlten, Captain, t^es Ihome, lit. 535. 

Taxilos, Alexander's relations with, i. 27. ‘ « 

Tea. be^ns to form an investment of tho 
East India Company, i. 322. 

Tej Bizm, a Sikh leader, crosses tho Sutlej, 
ill. 4^; his bravery at tho battie.df Feroze- ^ 
shah, 492. ' 

Tclllcherry, successfully defended against 
Hyder. ii. 499. 



INDEX. 


•741 


TEMPEKANCE 


VAI3IINAVA 


Tomporance, Bulbuu's interest iu tUo cause 
of. i. 6S. 

Temples, rock-cut, in Indite i. 17; ii. 143; 
pymmidaL 142 ; i>arts and appciidagen of, 
142; cave^templo of Karli, 144; the seven 
luvgodos, 145; regularly constructod, 147; 
of Oiisfta, 148; Jain, ou Mount Aboo, 148. 
Teniiasscrim province tho subjugation of 
the, Ui. 152; disturbances in, 207. 

Tent contract attennit to alKdisb, and dis- 
turbauces caused tuoruby in Madi'as, ii. 
838. 

Thackeray, Mr., the British collector in 
Kittoor, killed by the miitlneorB, iil. 178. 

’ Thamba Wungyoc, a Bunnosu comuianrlur, 
ill. 150. 

Theft, the law of, among tho Hindoos, ii. 104. 
Thiagur and Klvaniutore, made over by the 
French to the Mysoreans in return for 
troops, 1. 633; taken the Britisli after 
it had reverted to tho French, 843. 
Thomas, George, a military adventurer, 
curious history of. -ii. 820. 

Thomas' Coiujt of tkv Ptftaii SnUmui of Hin- 
doostmt, refop^d to. 1. 80. 

Thom)>son, Captain, his doscriiitiou of the 
api>carance of Ghuznee, iil. 357. 

Thome, Major, liis MnmHrs o/ the 117/r iw 
IiuHa, quoted, ii. 763, 767, 782, 791. 
Tliornc, KolHjrt, his inemori^ to King 
Henry VIIL, i. 198; his views of the nortli- 
• west passage. 199; elTccts of his momoriiU, 
200 . 

Thornhill, Mr. Bcwsley, vohuitocrs to bring 
in the wounded to the residency in Luck¬ 
now, lii. 655. 

Thornton’s of Ixidia, qU 0 tcs»l, i. 133, 

note ; 300, iwte. 

Throne, the golden, of Kunjeet 8Ing, iii. 
339, 

Thuggee. fif*o ThV'jn. 

Thugs, the legend of their origin, ii. lUO; 
their pro(X‘clure, 191; regular trahiiug 
childiam of, to thuggee, 192; lirahmiiiH und 
oflicials intoroKtod iu thuggee, 193; pro- 
iNihlc number of, 194. 

Tigor-hoad footstool of Tippoo’s gohleu 
throne, ii. 705, 706, note. 

Tigcr's-clawe, the, i. 295, 

Timery, Clive captures, i. 4 57. 

Tirnoor Khan, i. 71. 

Timour Beg. *4cc 2Vfmi*rZa«<*. 

Timour, Ibinoc, lieir-api»arcnt of 8hjd> Sim- 
jah; his atrocious guvcmxuent, iii. 371. 
Tiunevelly. expe<litiou to, i. 454^ 

Ulppoo Hultw, taken prisoner when uine 
yc/irs old, iu 228; his ravages in the uotni- 
try round Ma/lras, 256; sent to intercept 
Colonel Balllie’s detachment, 481; Ids at- 
tomi>t to cut oiT a detachment from Ben¬ 
gal frustrated, 493; re)mlsedby tiio Britisli 
at l^onuuy, 5<K>; luisteus to the camp on 
tho news of liis father's doatli, 508; plan 
of future oi>oratiou8, 508; his secret onlor 
to put Sheik Ayaz to deatiu 517: captiu-oa 
Beonore, and niakos General MatthoM's 
suid all his troot.,? lirisoncrs, 518; lays siege 
to Mangalore, 519: armistice witli, tieforo 
Mangalore. 519; hia violation of the armi¬ 
stice, 520; surrender of Mangalore to, 520; 
his choicest provinces invaded, 521; Pol- 
ghautcliorry Ctmtured from him, nego¬ 
tiations with, 523; his insulting treatment of 
the British commissioners, 524; tho British 
comniisalouers meditate on cscanefrom his 
camp, .525; treaty of peace wim the Bri¬ 
tish signed by, 526; his horrible treatment 
of his prisoners, 526; collision between tlie 
govcmor-geucral and the Madras presi- 
deni os to the treaty with, 530; Nizam 
All's treaty with, 580; his forced and bar¬ 
barous conversions In Malabtu*, 582; his 
tiiipicty punished, 583; his intrigues with 
the French, 583; his designs on Travan- 
coro, 584; his attack ou the lines of Tra- 
. vauooro defeated, 584; his rage at 1x:ing 
frustrated. 585; a triple loajpie formed 
VigaiusW^ Lord OuTiiWallis, 585; hlsMng 
u .Aixt of his fvttack mi the lines of Tra- 
vancore, 587; his barbarous proocodiugs 
and fiaciflc professions, 588; military pro- 
Iiarations against, 588; plan of the cam¬ 
paign agaiusti and first operations, 589; 
hia cavalry and infantry, 591, and ftefr; 
hlsoncouiitorwitlithoTBrltish, who retreat 
bofor<r biui, 591: his comp mistaken for 
Colonel Murwell's, 592; unsatisfocto^ re¬ 
sults of the campaign with, 593; Lord 
ComwalliB resolves to command against 
him in person. 595; his march northwanl 
into Coromandel, 595; his embassy to the 
oottrt of-France; its failure, 595; his losses 
in Malabar, 595; Lord Cornwallis opens 
the campaign ^^alnst, 596; attempt of 
three* horsen^en of, on the life of Lord 


Tlppoo Sultan, - 

Comwedlis. ii. 597: Bauanloru ci^tured iu 
presence of his whole army, 699; retreat 
and piusult of. 699; his Isrutal treatment 
of his prisoners, 600; his carioaturas of the 
Engli^, 600; takes up a strong p<Mdtlon 
ou the road to Bangalore, 601; Lord Com- 
tvoUis proi>ares for a general engagement 
witli, 601; is defeated in the battle of Cmi- 
gat, 602; professes a desire to negotiate, 
606; his insincerity, 607; capture of Nmi- 
dUlroog, 607; Goninratulatos nis troops ou 
the resolution of the British to besiege 
t'avaiidroog, whicli Is taken liy storui, (U]8 
i>I>eratlonB against, at Beriugapataiu, 612 
surprised by a suddioi attack, ana disas 
trouB predlcamout, 615: Ids alarm, 616 
his bonjoritieH towards liis prisoners. 617; 
his treacherous i>lot agabist tlie life of liOra 
f'omwuUis, 617: the ultimatum olTorcd 
lilm Tiord Cornwallis, 618; his accept¬ 
ance of Lord ComwaUis' ultimatum, 619; 
his palace, 619, und notf.; his sons deli- 
verca up to the British as hustagos, 619; 
distmto with, us to the adjustment of tho 
deilnito articles of peace. 620; threatcneil 
renewal of hostilities with; ix^ice con¬ 
cluded, 621; conditions of the treaty witli, 
canvassed, 622; views of Lord Cornwallis 
as to tlie treaty with. 623: liis sons restored 
to lilm, 656; his des^s as hi the expul¬ 
sion of tho British ftniu India, 678; his 
intrigues ^vith the French ou bcariiig of 
the success of tho revolutionary war, 679; 
semis a mission to the Mmiritius, 679; tiio 
Iiublic roGOptioD given to bis envoy by the 
governor of tho Mauritius, 689; project of 
a secret treaty udth the French, Cw; ab¬ 
surd conduct of the Frcudi gf >renior of tho 
Mauritius iu reference to, 681; “ Citizen 
Tippoo, ” 681; tlie governor-general resolves 
ou hostilities with. 081; tho govenior-geiic- 
ral’s plana and preparations against, 682; 
difficulties to be ouoouutcrod iu a war with; 
fears of the council of Madras, 683; the 
govemor-goucrars attempt to effect on 
amicable arraugemeut with, 687; the go- 
vemor-geueral’a lettcT to, 688; his reply to 
tile govemor-gencral’s letter, 689; the go- 
vemor-geueral'a rfsjoindcr t<», 690; close of 
tlio correspondence with, 690; letter from 
Bonaparte to, 692; his infatuated course, 
692: comnumcement of a new cumiiaign 
against, 693; attempts to cut olT tho right 
brigade of the Bomljay army, but is re- 
milscil, ; accounts of tiio fiuttle by the 
Ilajali of C(X)rg an<i, 694; hazards a battle 
near Malavilly, and is ilefeatcil, 695; lire- 
parations of the British to liesiege bis 
cajiitul, Scringaputam, 696; his dospou- 
doncy, 696; the British liefore liis capihil, 
697: plan of attack on liis capital, 698; he 
is anxious to negotiata, 699; progress of 
the sie^e of bis capital, 700; his fears und 
superstition, 700; assault ou his capital 
headed by Sir David Baird, 701; capture 
of his capital, 702; surrender of hia sons, 
703: dross worn by him on tho day of his 
deati), 713. and noiv * his dead 1x)dy fomid 
in a gateway, 703; his funeral and umu- 
Holoum, 704, and note ; his liarliarous char¬ 
acter, 704; tho jow'oUcd peacock from his 
golden Uirone, 705, 706, und tioU", tiio col- 
den tiger-head tootstiKil of his throne,m05; 
loss of life incurred in taking his capfflal, 
an<l value of the capture, 705; his family 
removed to Vellore, 707; chari^ against 
tho Naliob of Arcot of oorrospondunco 
with, 717; the connection of his family wntli 
the Vellore mutiny. 812. 

Tirai, aimexeil to the British dominions, 
iil. 18. 

Tlrat 8ing, chief of the Kasyas, iii. 206. 

Tltoo Miya, a fanatical Mahometan, lioginR 
a religious war i^inst Ilindooisni, iii. 205. 

Todd. Major, at Uerat^ iii. 221. 

HiMortf of Raja^am, cited, ii. 784. 

Toghlakabad, i. 93, note. 

Toghnil Beg. defeats MusacxHl, i. 54; his 
gnuid-daughtor married to Moilood, 55. 

Tughrul Khan, reliels against Bulliun, 1. 69; 
surarisod ami slain, 70. 

Tombs. Major, at Delhi, iii. 607. 619, 621. 

Tondeman's \^^pods, disaster sustained at. 
by the Britisib i. 495. 

Toolajee Angria, successor to Kanliojoe, i. 
511; his stnmghokls, 513: pret^arationa of 
the British and Malirattaa to attack hft 
stroi^hold, 513; disputes almut tbeprize-#] 
money to be taken. 514; Oheriali captiutKl 
from, 516. 

Toolofiee Bace, her boauti*, profligacy, and 
doatli, iii. 76. 

Toolosopoor, Bala Bow driven out^f, iii. 
702. 


Toorghay Kbmi, a Mogul chief, invades Hio- 
doostau, i. 82. 

Toormooi^rcon, leads the Moguls in Hiu- 
doostan. i. 

Town^ Uiudeo, il. 173; the inhabitants of, 

174, 

Trodo, Hindoo, ii. 166. 

Trading, privato, forbidden to the sen'ants 
of the Oompuny, i. 687; anrnngcmonts of 
the ComiHiny as to, 695. 

Transnetioru of the Httyaf Asiatic Rodetn, 
quot^ ii. 114. 

Transmigratioii, the dogma of; its jicniiclouB 
effects on society and imlividuais, il. 58; 
the nuturo of, and mode lu which changes 
are regulated, 69; qualities of darkness 
Olid passion. 59; <iuality of goodne^, 60; 
Hliutou heaven, 61; Hindoo iicU, 61. 
Tmiisoxiona, the coniiucat of. lij’tiie Aral^, 

i. 41. 

Travuncora, Tippoe's designs on, il. C84; 
Tipiioo's mttack on tho lines of, 684: dis¬ 
putes of tlie rajah of, with the Comiiony. 
^35; placed undt^r British management, 


Travers, Ctmtain, at Lucknow, iii. CCO. 

Treasury <if the Nalnib of Iktugal, amount 
of. i. ^2. 

Trmty of I’aris In-tween the French ami 
Knglisb, tho clause of, relating to India, 

ii. m 

Trees of India, ii. 10. 

'IVcmalrow, the Brahmin, ii. 521. 

TrvUi the, of Hindoo chninology. ii 2. 

Trevelyan, Mr., iKiIiticnl agi-nt at Kotah, iii. 

Trim!, the Hindoo, ii. 22; Brahtua, 22; 
Vislmu, 23; Siva, 32. 

Tricbiiioiioly. the rana of, solicits the aid 
of the I^alMib of Arcot. i. 431: encamp¬ 
ment of Maiiouied Ali and tlie British ab, 
458; fortifications <if, 458; prciiaratious 
for the defence of, 459: sic^ of, continued, 
471; auxiliary f< iroes are sent from Myson^ 
472; rcinforcemcutH arrive under Lawrence 
tmd (Uive, 473; end of the siege of, 474; 
state of affairs at; Major Lawrence ad¬ 
vances to tho relief of, 486; stratagem an<l 
comiter-stratagem at, 488; plan of tho 
environs of, 489; suxipHed with provisions, 
492; traaclioryof tla* French; oBsaultou, 
and repulse, 492; loss of the enemy, 493; 
devustations commiitiid round, 495; savo/t 
by Calliand, 595; stivto of affairs in, during 
the war with Hyder Ali. il. 497. 

Trlnibiikjoc l^ahiglia. the Peishw'a’s favour¬ 
ite, ills rise and iiiihieuco, iii. 38; his du¬ 
plicity in bis negotations with Guugodlmr 
Siistreo, 37; his 1>arl)arous murder of Gun- 
giulhur Sastree, 39; is accused hy Mr. El- 
phiustone, and his apprehension and Im¬ 
prisonment demanded, 40; the Feishwa is 
obliged to give him iip, 41; he escutios, 58; 
in oonimaud of Bajee How’s troops, 59; 
captured and coutuied iu the fort of Clni- 
mur, 106 . 

Tronjolly, M., commaudirr of a r’renclisi^yj^ 
<lron, defeuWdby Kir Kdward Vinlfin, ii. 
468. 

Truth, Hindoo disregard of, ii. 2o3. 

Tyro, i. 2*1. 

Tyssen’s, Mr., ileimsitions on tlie ebarge of 
briliery against the (!oiii]>any, 1. 363. 

Tj'tler, <^>luncl FruzfT, iii. ChH 


u. 


niu'ur. British inlcrfori'iicr in the iiifairs of, 

iii. 187. 

Uml)alla,*the stqioy mutiny iu, iii. 574. 

United Oomiiiiiiy of MerchantH, tbe, trading 
tisludia. i. 381. 

Uptoii,*t5nHmel, plenipotentiary to Fooiiah, 
instructions to, ii. 490: eonferenco liotw eeii, 
and the Mahratta luinistors at J'ooruud- 
hura407: trcivty made by, with tiie MaU- 
rattoa, 407. 

Usbeks, the, Balier defcate«l by, I. 108; re¬ 
volt of, against Aklicr, 127; canqiaign 
against, 128; Huppr<‘a»i<iii <»f tlio revolt of, 
129. 


A'. 


• * ^ 
VailiKi Tambi, dewun of Travaiioore, his 
intrigiH's. ii. 835; liis defeat, death, and 
cruelty, 836. * 

Vdisliiiava sects, the, ii. 69; of Bengal, 72 





INDEX. 


VaiKya caste, ibo, Ui 12. « 

Valiaut, Goueral, biH lirlgnulc at the battle 
of Mabum^noor, ill. 482. 

Vanslttakt, Jat., Huoceeds Clivo as goveruor 

,, r>f Bengal j. 666; beads a dexiutation of 
‘ the o^imcfl of (Calcutta to Meor Jaflicr to 
induoe him to resign, 670; shainemlly sa< 
diflbes Ramuaraln, 672: opi>uaoBt)le hcJOhIi 
and imuoUtio views of the council of Oil- 
outta, 674. 

'Varanasee, wife of tUo Perisbwa in tlaigbur, 

iii. 94. 

Vaugiiap, Captain.and his broilior.iiiunleredt 
l)y the Malinittiw, iii. 67. 

Vooauta school of philowndiy, the, ii. IH; 
nature of tlio sotU aoconfii 4 ; to, 115; view 
of matter behl by. 115. 

Vedas, tlie, i. 36; ii. 16; oarliost poems of, 
128. 

Vegetable productions of fiiilia i. 10; 
groat variety of, ii. 156. 

Vellore, in want of tirovieioiiH, ir 495; (nitical 
state of, relieved by Coote, 497 : X)rovisioiis 
tlirowii into, 499; a curious device for i)rO' 
visioning. 5U4: the mutiny in, 811; indis¬ 
criminate masBucre of Euroisjans in, 811; 
suimroBsion of the mutiny in, 812; momlxm) 
of TippiKt’s family iniidicatisl in tlie inn- 
tiny, 812; xmuishnicnt of tlio luulhieem, 
812; origin of the mutiny in, 813^, 
causes of thcinntiuy, 814} Oiiristiauity not 
chargeable with tlie mutiny, 815; the mu¬ 
tiny In, tiK>k the gairison liy surpi ise, 61.5; 
general alarm produced by titc mutiny in, 
816. 

Venetian aigosy. lostonthciloodwhi Htiiids, 
i. 211; auaclironism r<>si>octiug, 211. 

Venetians, tlie, their conduct in w^fereiice 
to tlie loaders of the fourth crustvle, i. 146; 
attempt of, to <x))>e with the ilcnoose at 
(loustantlnople, 147; league of, with the 
sultan, 147; why * jey gave up resorting to 
English markets, 211. 

Vcrdacheliitn, relieved by Olive an<l J‘igot. i. 
459. 

Vernon, Sir Psbvard, e.oU'jners Uie Ereiuth 
iu a naval eugagemeut, ii. 468. 

Vicramuditya, » Hcythian lea<lcr in TiuUa, 

i. ,34. 

Victoria, tiuoen. Shah Hlmjah'rt letter to. iu. 
363; her pixiclamation on the suiiprc'ssion 
of the sepoy mutiny. 696; elfect of lier 
prochnnation, r»97. 

VIctfWy, the Tow’er of, at (’Inttoin', i. 3W, 

llOtf. 

Vlgue’s Viaif to refemnl to, i. 111. 

Vikovieli, Oaptahi. a Russian agent, arrives 
in Oalx>ol, lii. 301. 

Village, <lescrii)tiou of an luilian, Ii. 91; an¬ 
tiquity and iHwmaiieney of tlio, sysbeiii, 92; 
ofncersUT)dert1i(‘. system, 170; aristocracy 
of the, 172; coiulitiou of the iuhabitsujts 
»>f, 172. 

Violence, the law relating to, among the 
Hindoos, ii. J04. 

Vira Rajeudra, Rtijah of (iiKirg, hiscnieltios 

. 4 «jbud brutalities, iii. 2(KU bis insolent de¬ 
mand on, and dejx>Hition by the Thitisii, 
210 . 

Visajee Kishen, ii. 29i'. 

Visalce Pundit, engiiged t<j uttai^k Ilyder 
All, it 228; the crafty im)C<;eilinKH of. 23i). 

Vishnu, the famous image of, at Seriiigham, 
1.458; second xtersou iu tlie Hindoo triad, 

ii. 23: supremM^y cluimetl for. 24; legend 

in hupiMwi of the 'jupri'iiau'.v (?Iaiiii<‘d for, 
24 ; tiic lir.ut-n of, 25; t)u‘ uvutar-i of; 
avatar of. 25; avatar of. 2i>:1.1iirtl and 

fourth fivatuis of. L7; tifili and r^xtli a^«(• 
tars of, 28; si v: ntii iixalar oPi 2'.>, eighth 
avatar of, 30; ninth avatar of, 31. 

Viziauagratu, the treatment of tin* rajah 
of, by tlio govermnent of Madras, ii. 470. 

Vizier Ah. mi]»|M)sed son of A?;off*u-l)oMlah, 
raised to the luiLsiiml, but aftei-waids 4le- 
lH>Hod, ii, 670. . ,. 

Vizier I^diomeil. Naliobof iii. 42. 

Volooiida, the Minlriis pix'aidency send an 
ex]wdii1ou against, i. 4.%; deftiat of the ex¬ 
pedition sent stgainst, 457; surrei/iler of, 
to tile Biitish, 477. 

Von tMieh’s TrmrJj in imtia, onoled, ii. 
139, 166. 


T Wahab, Major, killed in reintlse at Kaikloo, 
iii. 153. . 

Wajid AU Bhaht Lord Hardinge'smemoran¬ 
dum addressed to, ill. ,645. 

Walid, paliph of Damt^us, i. 41. 

Walker,' Colonel, cooi;«nttes with lV?r. 
]>uncan to jiut down infanticide, ii. Ibl; 
sent to Nag]ioor, iii. 45. 

Walker, Major, in Burtuab, iii. 155. 

Wallace’s Jf^toHcal and Jh'tn^iHptii'r A ri'onnt 
of British India, nnoteil. ii. 123. 

WiiliKilc, Brigadier, Ids bravery at CawniKior, 
iii. 667: detaeliod to form a jimction witli 
r-oloncl Beton coming from 1>elhi, 669; 
Hcut^ frrmi Ijiicknow in command of a 
(Hiinmn to clear tht* p)\>vhic<.' of the rtdsds, 
67C. 

Wandiwash, Major l^reroton's miKiux'ossful 
attempt o^iust, i. 619; euptured by Coote, 
Ij22; liully resolves t.o reeaxiture, 625; Tjully 
defeated by (ksite l«forc»627; Major Brere- 
ton kilTcil at, 628: stratagem of Litnitenaiit 
Flint to get iM^ssession of, ii. 486: Ix^sioged 
l»y Hyder Ali, 487; tlie siege of, raised on 
the a]>|iearaiiccof (Jixite, 487. 

Wangtuilieiiu, Ckilonel, interesting amu^lote 
of iiumadotle in connection with, ii. 
515. 

War, laws of, among the lliiabsis, ii. 107; 
eliaiigos in the modo of canying on, 111; 
army oii mai'i^i. Ill; camp. 112; coinmis- 
Kuriul, tl2. 

WardV/l/nd.-w., nuote 1. ii. II, 

Wsne, (ti'iieruL ii 75?:. 

Warren, l.imtenunt. iiiraiHM»i. tii. 4>3. 

Wa-<il Mahomed, a Piiidaree hader. iii 79: is 
delivere'l ut> !•> Ihe giwenior g. in ra!. 82 

M'atigaon. Die iitVair of. ul*17l 

Watson, .\ilii:ii-iil. varioii-s noliee-' i 
.“•.'‘KK ;m 4, lei;er-4 of, to the NaUib of 

Ik'ngnl, 5(i2: •iiii,rular maniiei of In-, death 
.'U SaU tte, li 

Watir., Mr., ehiel of Die rojiiisin>'*'faer-o> 
at (joHsiniimzar.sccui'es KisHctiidaKs a. i^K.'cp- 
tioii at Calcutta, i. r>3:i: explanation to 
Bmujaii Dowlah of his conduct os to Kis- 
setidass. 034; suiiimouedby Surajali Dow- 
lali, au<i mode jirisonor, 536; as the (kmi- 
pany's repi'cscntivtive at McHirsliedabtvl, 
562; amdit'd to Yar Luttief Khan for 
the luuKilMibip of Ikuigal, 571; Ills lliglit 
from MiKirsheiluLiad, 574; ascertubis the 
statsi of Die treasury (*f the dei«)se<l Nabfiii 
of Bengal, 582; ills connection with Oini 
chmul, 5^1. 

■We.iib, Mr., ii. 718. ' 

Wellesley, t’oloijcl (afierujuils Duke of 
Wellington), at Sc'iingai>atani, ii. 6‘.M>, 762; 
imule pc'nnanent commandant of Bcrliiga- 
Itatani, 706; tlie details of Die management 
of Mysore intrusted to, 767; upiMiiiited to 
cxminiaud an exiieilltion designed against 
the Mauritius, 734; objections of the 
court of tlireetors to his allowances; the 
nianpiiH's indignation and defeiiec\ 737; 
pUTHueB, defeats, and slays Dliooudia, 738: 
prociKMls to I'ooiiah to n!-estahJish the 
Peishwa. 747; coniniamls in Die De(«an, 
74t>; c»i.)>tui'<‘HAhmcdnuggur, 749; j»rei>aroH 
to give Scindia IxitDe, 751; gains Die vie- 
toi-y of As-Haye, 752; Bciudia coiuJuib!s a 
tnice with, 754; jm^pares for operations in 
other liarts of Didia, 755; liis oiierations 
Fi (lujorat, 755; attacks the IVtahnittas 
%in their violation of the truce, 76i9; defeats 
the Mahmttas at Argaon, 770; caxitures 
<<awilghur, 770; temilnatosthe war, 771 ; 
is iiivesteii w'iih the ortler of the iq,th, 
772; hifl oiiinion (when Duke of Welling¬ 
ton) of the Madrui nnitiiiy, 845; his x>ro- 
phecy in reference to Oaliool, iii. .363. 

■W’^ellesley, the Marijuis (when Ixinl-Morn- 
iiigion), upiMiiiited fJovcrnor-giuieml of 
India, ii. 676; sets sail for India; state of 
affairs on his arrival there, Ii77; rt^solves 


w. 


^ jlo. Colonel, leads a portion of the Afghan 
M^i^tion through tlie Kliyber l^wjs, iiL 

Wagars of Okamandal, the, iii. 117. 
IFof/nuri;, the, or tiger's-c^ws, i. 295, and 
note. 




jection 

plaus.684: his neeoiiations with the*'N'iznnV 
6^1; hi.streaty wlDiDie >izuiii, 6nr>: ))i> ne- 
giiti.itions aiUi tlie Miilirattas. liH?; his at-. 
ieiii|>ttoiirr>ingeumieji1>iyuiili'ri)>i 100.687: 
hi.ili-ftertoTipiMio, 688:Tipxi(N>'sanswerlM 
Ills letter, 68ih ninrejoiiiiWrtoTippoo.O'Ni; 
close of his (^irn-.siNindeiice with TipXKHi. 
690; his manifesto, 691; ap)K>inta a coin- 
niissioD for the setUeinent of the goveni- 
inent of tho Mysore, 707; article in his 
instructions resiiecting the zenana, 708; 
draft of Die partition treaty of Mysore. 
708; <letennlucs the suceessioii to tho 
rajahsliip of Tanjoro, 716; his arbitrary 
arrangement resiiectbig Burat, 710 : 
his lueiwures towonls the Nabob of 
Afeot, 719; his' measures towards the 


’W'ellesley, Marquis — 

Nabob of Arcot approved at homo, if. 
720; appoints Azeem-u-I>owlah Nabo)> 
of the Carnatic. 722; his |irmK>sud treaty 
with the Nabob of Oude, 7ft: his deter¬ 
mination resjiectbig Oude. 725 ; treats 
the Naliob of Onde's* romonstmiK^s us 
an insult, 727; sulimlts to tlio Naliob of 
Oude two courses, 728; his noromxitory 
orders resxiectiug the Nabob of Oude. 729; 
Benda Ids broDicr, Die Honourable llenry 
Wellepley, on a mission to liuekuow, 729; 
intimidates the Naliob of Oude into sub- 
mission, 730: indignantly rejects Die i>ro- 
iMisal of the Naboleof Oude to plunder the* 
liegum, 731; sends Captain Mmcolm on .. 
mission to Persia, 733; «ont<m)>latcs an 
exiiedition against tho Molirattas, 734; 
semis an cxx>odition under Oeneriil Balru 
to Egypt, 734; mismidurstandiiig Ijctween 
tho directors and, 735; main causes of his 
mismiderstandiug with the directors, 736; 
his resignation and the groimds of it, 737; 
cxinscmts to withdraw his resignatioii. 
737; his answerio acongratnlatoiytMldri'SH 
t'roin till.' inhal-iiutitr' of t'aliinia. on tlm 
ttn'tiiinnlion of the Muhratia viu'. 772 ; 
SfiiidiaV amigunt letter to. and hii^ri ply. 
7i>8; tennhiatjoii of lii.s adii.itiis'raiioii. 
8ul; inei'it.'- <>f }i:.< leliiiiiii-traDoii. ^02. 

Wt*ller:)\‘y, the llonotirid'b- Ibiiry, M'lit ly 
his bitither, the goveriior-geueroL on ea 
tnission to Liieknow ii. 729; mmle lieu- 
ti'iiant-govcmor of Onde, 731; Ins relatione 
with the Nttlstbof Ftimickalwul, 732; his 
return to Eumis*, 733. 

Wellsliire, tlenernl. cominaiider f»f tho Tlom- 
luiy division in the Afghan t‘xxM.!ditioij, ijj. 
354; loads an extmditmu against Klielat, 
3t«4; capturt' of Kbelat V»y, 365. 

We’sh, LieuWnant, cai>tures the hill-forts in 
Dauiaum. ii. 457. 

West, Birlfiilwanl, judgeof tUes\i)»rcme court 
of Boinlwy, iii. 292. 

Wheelor, Hir Huglj, his |Htsition at Cawn- 
(Hior. iii. 586: his eiiD'tuu'liinent at t'uwn- 
IKHjr. 594; Is^wiegetl in Cawiqsior by Nana 
Saliib, 595; capitulates to Die ivliAs, 
the atrocious niussacre of the Kiiropedi.'a 
on Die capitulation hy, 596. 

Wheeler, Mr., anpointed to India, ii. 428; 
moves the conhniiation 4F the I'cstoratiou 
of Mahomed Reza Khan, 439. 

M'hish, General, ordere^l by the Britisii le- 
sideut olLLahore i*> advance lui Mo<iltun, 
iii. 513; mlvanecB on Mooftan, 514; his 
proclatnstioii at Mooltuii to the HikU 
itdiels, 515. 

Wliitehill, Mr., governor of Madnu?. ses- 
IKjnded, ii-478; abillof xiaiusandiH-nalties 
against, 548. 

Whitlie, Captain, si'iit against fhiwrl.iite, 
iii. 479. 

Whitlock, General, sent by the Bond'ny jue- 
sideiK^ against ilu> sepoy mutineers, iii. 
677; his operations against the muDmiers. 

682 . A 

Wife, the sale of a, by a tJemmffliaron, inid 
Xiurehase <jf, by anEnglishthoeruoi-gciie* 
rid of India, if. 427. 

Wilkinson, Cnjituin, iii. 386. 

Wilks’, OoloneJ, jtf Slrtrfos of the 
Houlh of Indio, ijuoted, il. 157, 177, 188, 
212, 210, 225, 229, nofr: 232, note; 695. 

William, Fort, the state of, wlien Hnrajuh 
UoM’lahattackiHH.’alcuttn, i. 539; defeelive 
comhtion of the works of, 530; uiiituro of, 
by Bumjali Xfnwluh, 542; the foundation 
tif a college at, 850. 

Willoughby, Lieutenant, his bniveo* in de- 
femling and afterwaiHls blowing u)i the 
Delhi magazine, iii. 5r8: nnuderod. .570 

Willougliby. Mr. J. P.. his zealous and sue- 
ct*ssful efforts to put down iufk ”>±jcide in 
TiHh'a, ii. 182. 

\Villonghby,.Nir Hugh, hisoxpedition to 
norUi-west, and fate, i. 20U<, 

'Wilmcr, Licnitenunt, hisnarroii-^c-oape fr/.m 
iKdng murdered, iii. 356. • 

Wilson, Brigadier, defeats the ridiel se)H>ys 
at Ghozee-u-did. iii. 600: Die coiuniand at 
Dellii devolves on, 612; his deteruiiuatiou 
to hold his iioRitiou lieforedldhi, ril5; his 
address to the tnsiiiB at Delhi, 617; plan of 
ttttack anil assaiht on Delhi devised 1 >w, ^'19' 
new successes daily obtained at JKdli^ de¬ 
scribed liy, 623. ^ 

Wilson, Colonel, IcJifc hy Havelock at Cawn- • 
poor in commaml of the garrison, iii. tU>l. 

vvilBon, Ckimmodoro, defeats the Dutch in 
the £ky of Bengal, i. 662. 

Wilson, i^fesBor, quoted os todhe Xaho1>s 
of the Oaniatic, ii. 720; his History of£ri~ 
tish India, quoted, on the VoUore mi*tiny. 
815. • • 



WINIJHAM 

Windham, Captain, his death while perform¬ 
ing oa act of hvuuanity to a wounded 
soldier, Ui. 386. 

Windham, General, attocketl by the rebels 
in CawiiiK)or, iii. B64; RullieM ont to give 
the reltelK battle, ^65; la lieatcu back by the 
rtibels, 665; relieved by Hir Colin Caxupl}ell, 
6^. 

Wingate, AsaiKtsiiit-aiirgeon. wounded, and 
afterwards brutally murdered at Kori' 
gaon, iii. 85. 

Winter, Sir Edwanl, UBun»s the government 
of i. 318; oljtaliia a tree imuxIou 

• and retires, 31M. 

Wiawas Rao, the Pclaliwa’a son, elaiu at the 
liattie of l^a^jat, i. 40ii. 

Wives, Hiudoo,^o condition of, ii. 176. 

Wood, Colonel, joiiiB C<doiiel Smith, ii. 258; 
his aucccaees. sw: Hydcr All’s attempt to 
entrap; his absurd conduct aud resignation 
of coiumand, 268; narrow esoai)e of his 
dlviHioii. 270; intrusted with the chief com- 
maud, 273; disaster sustaiued tty, at Ran- 
gidore, 274; perilous position of, 274: blmi- 
ders committed tw, 275; is superseiled by 
Colouc] Lang. 275; his oitoratlons :igainst 
the Gliottrkas, iii. 17: wiiKTseiles GeuerJil 
MarkT, 10; abaudetus tlte mlvumv (»ii 
Khatiuaudoo, 10. 

WoiKllnini, Major, finds Omerkette alnui- 
^onod by the enemy, hi. 470. 

^VootUugtot^, fJoIoiiel, tiis oiicratlons in Gu- 
jemt, ii. 756. 

Writers’Buildings, tlic, in i’alcutta, i. 645, 

7bttte. 

Wullec Chandta, a friendly 8c.inde chief, iii. 
504. 

Wiillee of Khodlooni. the, Jbtst Mahomed 
takits refuge with. iii. 368; in coticertwit ii 
T>oKt Mahouu'il. 377; sutnuits t<t the Bri- 
tislt, 370. 


INDEX. 


Wuigaom. the di^Hpraoeful convention of, 
ii. 451; the Bomb^ guvermneiit docdlne to 
mtify and prepare anew for war, 462. 

Wnniugole. the siege of, and repulse of Aluf 
Khan, 1. 87. 

WuBOta, the capture of. by tlic British, iii. 
91. 

■Wyld, Brigadier, the defeat und disasti 
retreat of, With the rdieviiig force of .lelJ 
' labarl, at the Khyber iii. 434; hi 
troops <lemoralizetU 436. 

Wymer, Colonel, defeats the OhiljicM. 111. 
383. 


Y. 


Vania, the lliinldfct god of the infernal re¬ 
gions, ii. 40. 

Yar Luttief Khun, an aspirant for the. na- 
Itoltshin of Bengal, i. 571. 

Yar Maliomod, prime ministor of Prince 
Kamrunof Herat, iii. 318; Mr. M’MiMirs 
letter to, 319; weleomuH and avails hiinmdf 
of the services of Kldred Pottinger, 320; 
rousetl by FCt<lr(>d I'ottuigor to rm>cl the 
iiHsauUs of tlie T*orsianH on Herat, 323; hjs 
rupture with the British rt^siilent, and 
tJir<‘atouod expcilltion against (’titidahar, 
.382. 

Yftgis, the, ii. 75. 

YooiMXif/yes, the Afghan tribes of, eumpaiKU 
tigaiiist, i. 135. 

Yorke. (.tiuitain, In’s limvery in the assault 
on MaHuUi>atatn, i. 616. 

Yu-i^hi, a S<* 3 dihian holder, hiv;MleH India, 
and itecoTTU's th<* fonnd<T of an ludo.Sey- ! 
C.i.i'i -ni. I tx. :. 'll ' 


. 74.3 

ZYN ADDKEN 


Aabita Khan, tlio designs of the Malirattair 
against, il. 297: his alilanco withtho*Nabob 
of Oude against the Mahrattas, 298. ^ 

ZiUiin Bing, a I'indaree leader, ill. 

Zalim King, R^ratia of Kotah, iii. 2^. 

/aiuorin* the, of Coliont, i. 156; lie Gama's 
first interview with, 157; i>e Gama’s pre* 
Rent to,' 159; Ve Gama’s second visit to, 

* 160; dtnnands of Be Gama tlie golden Bt. 
Mar^, 160; Ijecomes hostile to Be Gama, 
163; the ficet of. attaclui I>o Gama, 163; 
interview of Cabral with. 164; Cahiul is 
pursued by the iloet of, 167: defeat of the 
tloet of, 168: trekcheiy of, 171; pro|H>seB to 
attack Cochin, whore the Portuguese haitl 
iKieii roceivoil, 171; forms a -orjalitlon 
agaiuKt tlicLl*ortiigucHi% 173; honourable 
ctmdiict of, 174. 

Zivy-ya-thuyim. Bee Pvhn'p o/ Smuwt. 

Zeln Klian Koka, a Mogul general, i. 136. 

ZmnaunKiiHii.Matiomcd.u Ivnz/UlMish cJiief, 
iii. 407, 424. 

Zmnaun Bhah. H. 833. 

jftemiiidarK, if. 411. 415; summonod to Mndms 
by the MtuUas govcmincnt. 469; rights of, 
6 :t0. 

Zemindary sottleiucnt, n )sTmauent, 
adoiitefl by ],ord CornM'allis, ii. 031. 

Xemiiidawor, on insu^n^ctioll in, iigaiiist 
Hliah Bhujali. iii. 382. 

ZfwUac, the oriental, i. 19, 

Zoology of India, the. i. 11. 

Ziiffur Khan, his hemic conduct against the 

• Mogtd«. i. 79. 

Zulfikar Khan, i. 387. 

Zyn Addcion, fuv<inrite nephew Ali Verdy 
Khan, hi.‘» tra.;'j< :il d'/atii, i. 527. 


oLAiumw; 

w «. Bijo'Riic AKn <'o.. rniKrsn^ 
VIM.AriEI.U.